

บรรณานุกรม



หนังสือ

- กิริติ บุญเจือ. ปรัชญากรีกระยะก่อตั้งที่อิตาลี. กรุงเทพมหานคร: สำนักพิมพ์ไทยวัฒนาพานิช, ๒๕๑๘.
- _____. ปรัชญากรีกระยะก่อตั้งที่อิตาลี. กรุงเทพมหานคร: สำนักพิมพ์ไทยวัฒนาพานิช, ๒๕๒๐.
- _____. ปรัชญาลัทธิอรรถิภาวนิยม. กรุงเทพมหานคร: สำนักพิมพ์ไทยวัฒนาพานิช, ๒๕๒๒.
- _____. ปรัชญาสำหรับผู้เริ่มเรียน. กรุงเทพมหานคร: สำนักพิมพ์ไทยวัฒนาพานิช, ๒๕๑๘.
- เฟรเดอริค นิทซ์เซ. เทวศาสตร์. แปลโดย เฉลิมเกียรติ ฅินวอล. กรุงเทพฯ: สำนักพิมพ์ดวงกมล, ๒๕๑๘.

เอกสารอื่นๆ

- อานวย ยัสโยธา. "การวิเคราะห์แนวคิดของนิตเชเรื่อง เจตจำนงสู่อำนาจ." วิทยานิพนธ์ปริญญาโทบัณฑิต แผนกวิชาปรัชญา บัณฑิตวิทยาลัย จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย, ๒๕๒๑.

Books

- Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle. Vol. VII: Problemata. Translated by E.S. Forster. Edited by W.D. Ross. London: Clarendon Press, 1927.
- Asimov, Isaac. Please Explain. London: Coronet Books, 1978.
- Copleston, Frederick. Friedrich Nietzsche: Philosopher of Culture. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975.

- Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy. Vol. 7. New York: Image Books, 1963.
- Danto, Arthur. "The Eternal Recurrence." In Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, pp. 316-321. Edited by Robert C. Solomon. New York: Anchor Press, 1973.
- Gould, Josiah B. The Philosophy of Chrysippus. New York: State University Press, 1967.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 1: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans. London: Cambridge University Press, 1967.
- Hollingdale, R.J. Nietzsche. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
- _____. Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.
- Kaufmann, Walter. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. 3d. ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.
- _____. Beyond Good and Evil. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.
- _____. Ecce Homo. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1969.
- _____. The Gay Science. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.
- _____. A Nietzsche Reader. Selected and Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.
- _____. On the Genealogy of Morals. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books, 1969.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Philosophy of Nietzsche. Edited by Geoffrey Clive. New York: New American Library, 1965.

_____. The Portable Nietzsche. Selected and Translated by Walter Kaufmann. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.

_____. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976.

_____. The Will to Power. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

Soll, Ivan. "Reflections on Recurrence." In Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, pp. 322-342. Edited by Robert C. Solomon. New York: Anchor Press, 1973.

Articles

Capek, Milic. "Eternal Return." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3 (1967): 61-63.

Kaufmann, Walter. "Nietzsche, Friedrich." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 5 (1967): 504-514.

Weber, Eugen. "Moral in an Amoral World." Saturday Review 5 (August 1967) 33-36.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย



บทที่ ๒

หน้า ๑๐

"one must not say that the universe dies (II604). For the fire into which the universe changes contains the seeds of another universe; and the things in the new universe generated will not be specifically different from those in the universe which preceded it (II624)."

หน้า ๑๑

"Just as the course of the firmament and of each of the stars is a circle, why should not also the coming into being and the decay of perishable things be of such a kind that the same things again come into being and decay? This agrees with the saying that 'human life is a circle'. To demand that those who are coming into being should always be numerical identical is foolish, but one would more readily accept the theory of the identity of the species. And so we should ourselves be 'prior', and one might suppose the arrangement of the series to be such that it returns back in a circle to the point from which it began and thus secures continuity and identity of composition.

บทที่ ๓

หน้า ๑๔

"...of course, what was once possible can only become possible a second time on the Pythagorean theory, that when the heavenly bodies are in the same position again, the events on earth are reproduced to the smallest detail; so when the stars have a certain relation, a Stoic and an Epicurean will form a conspiracy to murder Caesar..."

พจนานุกรม ๑๕

"it will always bring together things that are incompatible and generalize them into compatibility, will always weaken the differences of motive and occasion."

พจนานุกรม ๑๖

"...the "superhistorical" man who sees no salvation in evolution, for whom the world is complete and fulfills its aim in every single moment. How could the next ten years teach what the past ten were not able to teach?"

The doctrine of the "eternal recurrence," that is, of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things—the doctrine of Zarathustra might in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus. At least the Stoa has traces of it, and the Stoics inherited almost all of their principal notions from Heraclitus.

พจนานุกรม ๑๗

And she answered with a tender voice: 'Let us be good friends.' -But what I have told you here, dear reader, that is not an event of yesterday or the day before...For time is infinite, but the things in time, the concrete bodies, are finite. They may indeed disperse into the smallest particles; but these particles, the atoms, have their determinate number, and the number of the configurations that, all of themselves, are formed out of them is also determinate. Now, however long a time may pass, according to the eternal laws governing the combinations of this eternal play of repetition, all configurations that have previously existed on this earth must yet meet, attract, repulse, kiss, and corrupt each other again....And thus it will happen one day that a man will be born again, just like me, and a woman will be born,

just like Mary-only that it is to be hoped that the head of this man may contain a little less foolishness-and in a better land they will meet and contemplate each other a long time; and finally the woman will give her hand to the man and say with a tender voice: 'Let us be good friends.'

"I have come across this idea in earlier thinkers: every time it was determined by other ulterior considerations (-mostly theological, in favor of the creator spiritus)."

"...the idea of the eternal recurrence, this highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable, belongs in August 1881: it was penned on a sheet with the notation underneath, "6000 feet beyond man and time." That day I was walking through the woods along the lake of Silvaplana; at a powerful pyramidal rock not far from Surlei I stopped. It was then that this idea came to me.

၁၁
၈၈၇ ၅၂

^၁ The greatest weight.-What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence-even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hour-glass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!"

Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment

when you would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing. "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?

พจนานุกรม

"...Behold this gateway, dwarf!...It has two faces. Two paths meet here; no one has yet followed either to its end. This long lane stretches back for an eternity. And the long lane out there, that is another eternity. They contradict each other, these paths; they offend each other face to face; and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed above: 'Moment'. But whoever would follow one of them, on and on, farther and farther-do you believe, dwarf, that these paths contradict each other eternity?"

...Behold this moment!...From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not whatever can happen have happened, have been done, have passed by before? And if everything has been there before...Must not this gateway too have been there before? And/are not all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all that is to come? ...For whatever can walk-in this long lane out there too, it must walk once more.

And this slow spider, which crawls in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and I and you in the gateway, whispering together, whispering of eternal things-must not all of us have been there before? And return and walk in that other lane, out there, before us, in this

long dreadful lane—must we not eternally return?

Thus I spoke, more and more softly; for I was afraid of my thoughts and the thoughts behind my thoughts. Then suddenly I heard a dog howl nearby. Had I ever heard a dog howl like this? My thoughts raced back. Yes, when I was a child, in the most distant childhood: then I heard a dog howl like this. ...there lay a man. And there—the dog, jumping, bristling, whining—now he saw me coming; then he howled again, he cried. Had I ever heard a dog cry like this for help?

¶¶¶ ¶

¶ Sing and overflow, O Zarathustra; cure your soul with new songs that you may bear your great destiny, which has never yet been any man's destiny. For your animals know well, O Zarathustra, who you are and must become: behold, you are the teacher of the eternal recurrence—that is your destiny! That you as the first must teach this doctrine—how could this great destiny not be your greatest danger and sickness too?

Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally, and we ourselves too; and that we have already existed an eternal number of times, and all things with us. You teach that there is a great year of becoming, a monster of a great year, which must, like an hourglass, turn over again and again so that it may run down and run out again; and all these years are alike in what is greatest as in what is smallest; and we ourselves are alike in every great year, in what is greatest as in what is smallest.

And if you wanted to die now, O Zarathustra, behold, we also know how you would then speak to yourself.... 'Now I died and vanish,' you would say, 'and all at once I am nothing. The soul is as mortal as the body. But the knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs and will

create me again. I come again, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpent—not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I come back eternally to this same, selfsame life, in what is greatest as in what is smallest, to teach again the eternal recurrence of all things...

¶
พพ ๒๒

°You higher man...Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, then you said Yes to all woe. All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, "You please me, happiness! Abide, moment!" then you wanted all back. All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored—oh, then you loved the world. Eternal ones, love it eternally and even more; and to woe too, you say: go, but return! For all joy wants—eternity.

↳ ...he who has really gazed with an Asiatic...into the most world-denying of all possible modes of thought—beyond good and evil and no longer, like Buddha and Schopenhauer, under the spell and illusion of morality—perhaps by that very act, and without really intending to, may have had his eyes opened to the opposite ideal: to the ideal of the most exuberant, most living and most world-affirming man, who has not only learned to get on and treat with all that was and is but who wants to have it again as it was and is to all eternity, insatiably calling out da capo not only to himself but to the whole piece and play...because he needs himself again and again—and makes himself necessary—What? And would this not be—*circulus vitiosus deus*?

¶
พพ ๒๓

°...it is only in the Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the Dionysian state, that the basic fact of the Hellenic instinct finds

expression-its "will to life". What was it that the Hellene guaranteed himself by means of these mysteries? Eternal life, the eternal return of life; the future promised and hallowed in the past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change; true life as the over-all continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality.

^b "I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus- I, the teacher of the eternal recurrence."

หน้า ๒๖

^b The total amount of energy is limited, not "infinite": let us beware of such excesses in concepts! Consequently, the number of states, combinations, changes, and transformations of this energy is tremendously great and practically immeasurable, but in any case finite and not infinite. But the time through which this total energy works is infinite. That means the energy is forever the same and forever active. An infinity has already passed before this present moment. That means that all possible transformations must already have taken place. Consequently, the present transformation is a repetition, and thus also that which gave rise to it, and that which arises from it, and so backward and forward again! Insofar as the totality of states of energy always recurs, everything has happened innumerable times...(Werke: Leipzig, 1901, XII, 51).

หน้า ๒๗

^a "Nothing can prevent me from reckoning backward from this moment and saying 'I shall never reach the end'; just as I can reckon forward from the same moment into the infinite."

หน้า ๒๘

^a "...each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated..."

พจนานุกรม

"If, therefore, there exist anywhere in the world three movements that correspond in their relationships to these three wheels, then the combinations among them can never return to their initial form. Finitude in the number of elements does not at all necessarily insure, even if there is an infinite amount of time for their movements, that the situation of any moment is repeated unchanged.—Naturally, the case could be different. The movements of the world could be so arranged that they run through an ever repeating cycle of combinations. But the bare possibility just sketched suffices to show the putative proof for the eternal return to be an illusion.

พจนานุกรม

พจนานุกรม

"...In fact, the problem of the origin of evil pursued me even as a boy of thirteen: at an age in which you have "half childish trifles, half God in your heart," I devoted to it my first childish literary trifle, my first philosophical effort—and as for the "solution" of the problem I posed at that time, well, I gave the honor to God, as was only fair, and made him the father of evil....Fortunately I learned early to separate theological prejudice from moral prejudice and ceased to look for the origin of evil behind the world. A certain amount of historical and philological schooling, together with an inborn fastidiousness of taste in respect to psychological questions in general, soon transformed my problem into another one: under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is

there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plentitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future?

พท๗ ๓๘

° ...Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question--and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed ...a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even been desired.

๒ " I have never read anything to which I would have said to myself No, proposition by proposition, conclusion by conclusion, to the extent that I did to this book..."

๓ Originally one approved unegoistic actions and called them good from the point of view of those to whom they were done, that is to say, those to whom they were useful; later one forgot how this approval originated and, simply because unegoistic action were always habitually praised as good, one also felt them to be good--as if they were something good in themselves.

พท๗ ๓๙

° Now it is plain to me, first of all, that in this theory the source of the concept "good" has been sought and established in the wrong place: the judgement "good" did not originate with those to whom "goodness" was shown! Rather it was "the good" themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and highminded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian....The pathos of nobility and distance, as aforesaid, the protracted and domineering fundamental total feeling on the part of a higher ruling order in rela-

tion to a lower order, to a "below"-that is the origin of the antithesis "good" and "bad." (The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say "this is this and this," they seal every thing and event with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it.) It follows from this origin that the word "good" was definitely not linked from the first and by necessity to "unegoistic" actions, as the superstition of these genealogists of morality would have it. Rather it was only when aristocratic value judgements declined that the whole antithesis "egoistic" "unegoistic" obtruded itself more on the human conscience-it is, to speak in my own language, the heard instinct that through this antithesis at last gets its word in.... for example, is the case in contemporary Europe: the prejudice that takes "moral," "unegoistic," "desinteresse" as concepts of equivalent value...

๑๑๗ mb

In the second place, however: quite apart from the historical untenability of this hypothesis regarding the origin of the value judgment "good," it suffers from an inherent psychological absurdity. The utility of the unegoistic action is supposed to be the source of the approval accorded it, and this source is supposed to have been forgotten-but how is this forgetting possible? Has the utility of such actions come to an end at some time or other? The opposite is the case: this utility has rather been an everyday experience at all times, therefore something that has been underlined again and again: consequently, instead of fading from consciousness, instead of becoming easily forgotten, it must have been impressed on the consciousness more and more clearly. How much more reasonable is that opposing theory (it is not that reason more true-)

which Herbert Spencer, for example, espoused: that the concept "good" is essentially identical with the concept "useful;" "practical," so that in the judgments "good" and "bad" mankind has surmised up and sanctioned precisely its unforgotten and unforgettable experiences regarding what is useful-practical and what is harmful-impractical. According to this theory, that which has always proved itself useful is good: therefore it may claim to be "valuable in the highest degree," "valuable in itself." This road to an explanation is, as aforesaid, also a wrong one, but at least the explanation is in itself reasonable and psychologically tenable.

॥॥१ ३८१

⁹ The signpost to the right road was for me the question: what was the real etymological significance of the designation for "good" coined in the various languages? I found they all led back to the same conceptual transformation-that everywhere "noble," "aristocratic" in the social sense, is the basic concept from which "good" in the sense of "with aristocratic soul," "noble," "with a soul of a high order," "with a privileged soul" necessarily developed: a development which always runs parallel with that other in which "common," "plebeian," "low" are finally transformed into the concept "bad." The most convincing example of the latter is the German word schlecht(bad) itself: which is identical with schlicht(plain,simple)-compare schlechtweg(plainly), schlechterdings (simply)-and originally designated the plain, the common man, as yet with no inculpatory implication and simply in contradistinction to the nobility. About the time of the Thirty Years' War, late enough therefore, this meaning changed into the one now customary.

॥॥१ ६०

⁶ Every morality is, as opposed to *laissez aller*, a bit of tyranny

against "nature"; also against "reason"; but this in itself is no objection, as long as we do not have some other morality which permits us to decree that every kind of tyranny and unreason is impermissible. What is essential in every morality is that it constitutes a long compulsion... What is essential "in heaven and on earth" seems to be...that there should be obedience over a long period of time and in a single direction... "You shall obey-someone and for a long time: else you will perish and lose the last respect for yourself" -this appears to me to be the moral imperative of nature which, to be sure, is neither "categorical" as the old Kant would have it...nor addressed to the individual, but to peoples, races, ages, classes-but above all to the whole human animal, to man.

พจนานุกรม

° To be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practise obedience towards a law or tradition established from of old. Whether one subjects oneself with effort or gladly and willingly makes no difference, it is enough that one does it. He is called 'good' who does what is customary as if by nature, as a result of long inheritance, that is to say easily and gladly, and this is so whatever what is customary may be (exacts revenge, for example, when exacting revenge is part of good custom, as it was with the ancient Greek).... To be evil is 'not to act in accordance with custom', to practise things not sanctioned by custom, to resist tradition, however rational or stupid that tradition may be... 'Egoistic' and 'unegoistic' is not the fundamental antithesis which has led men to make the distinction between 'in accordance with custom' and 'in defiance of custom', between good and evil, but adherence to a tradition, a law, and severance from it.

๒ ...it is above all directed at the preservation of a community a people; every superstitious usage which has arisen on the basis of some chance event mistakenly interpreted enforces a tradition which it is in accordance with custom to follow; for to sever oneself from it is dangerous, and even more injurious to the community than to the individual (because the gods punish the community for misdeeds and for every violation of their privileges and only to that extent punish the individual). Every tradition now continually grows more venerable the farther away its origin is forgotten; the respect paid to it increases from generation to generation, the tradition at last becomes holy and evokes awe and reverence; and thus the morality of peity is in any event a much older morality than that which demands unegoistic actions.

๓๓๗ ๕๐

๑ Such a law as that of Manu originates like every good code of laws: it sums up the experience, prudence, and experimeantal morality of many centuries; it concludes: it creates nothing furthur. The presupposition for a codification of this sort is the insight that the means of ensuring authority for/^atruth...are utterly different from the means needed to prove it. A code of laws never relates the advantage, the reasons, the casuistry, in the prehistory of a law: if it did, it would lose the imperative tone, the "thou shalt," the presupposition for being obeyed....At a certain point in the development of a people, the most circumspect stratum, that is, the one which sees farthest back and ahead, declares the experience according to which one should live—that is, can live—to be concluded. Their aim is to bring home as rich and complete a harvest as possible from the times of experiment and bad experience. Consequently, what must now be prevented above all is further experimentation, a continuation of the fluid state values, testing, choosing, criticizing values in infinitum. Against this

a double wall is put up: one, revelation, the claim that the reason in these laws is not of human origin, not sought and found slowly and after many errors, but of divine origin, and hence whole, perfect, without history, a gift, a miracle, merely communicated. Then, tradition, the claim that the law has existed since time immemorial and that it would be irreverent, a crime against one's forefathers, to raise any doubt against it. The authority of the law is founded on the theses: God gave it, the forefathers lived it.

^b The higher reason in such a procedure lies in the aim, step by step to push consciousness back from what had been recognized as the right life (that is, proved right by a tremendous and rigorously filtered experience), so as to attain the perfect automatism of instinct—that pre-supposition of all mastery, of every kind of perfection in the art of life...to aspire to the highest art of life. To that end, it must be made unconscious: this is the aim of every holy lie.

๑๑๙

^c ...morality is nothing other than obedience to custom, of whatever kind they may be; customs, however, are the traditional way of behaving and evaluating. In things in which no tradition commands there is no morality; and the less life is determined by tradition, the smaller the circle of morality. The free human being is immoral because in all things he is determined to depend upon himself and not upon a tradition: in all the original conditions of mankind, 'evil' signifies the same as 'individual', 'free', 'capricious', 'unusual', 'unforeseen', 'incalculable'. Judged by the standard of these conditions, if an action is performed not because tradition commands it but for other motives (because of its usefulness to the individual, for example), even indeed for precisely

the motives which once founded the tradition, it is called immoral and is felt to be so by him who performed it: for it was not performed in obedience to tradition. What is tradition? A higher authority which one obeys, not because it commands what is useful to us, but because it commands. -What distinguishes this feeling in the presence of tradition from the feeling of fear in general? It is fear in the presence of a higher intellect which here commands, of an incomprehensible, indefinite power, of something more than personal- there is superstition in this fear. .

↳ "Good and bad is for a long time the same thing as noble and base, master and slave."

⁂
พจนานุกรม

๑ Wandering through the many subtler and coarser moralities which have so far been prevalent on earth, or still are prevalent, I found that certain features recurred regularly together and were closely associated- until I finally discovered two basic types and one basic difference. There are master morality and slave morality- I add immediately that in all the higher and more mixed cultures there also appear attempts at mediation between these two moralities, and yet more often the interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times they occur directly alongside each other- even in the same human being, within a single soul. The moral discrimination of values has originated either among a ruling group whose consciousness of its difference from the ruled group was accompanied by delight- or among the ruled, the slaves and dependents of every degree.

⁂
พจนานุกรม

↳ "...their predominance did not lie mainly in physical strength but in strength of the soul- they were more whole human beings..."

หน้า ๔๓

๒ In the first case, when the ruling group determines what is "good" the exalted, proud states of the soul are experienced as conferring distinction and determining the order of rank. The noble human being separates from himself those in whom the opposite of such exalted, proud states finds expression: he despises them. It should be noted immediately that in this first type of morality the opposition of "good" and "bad" means approximately the same as "noble" and "contemptible."

หน้า ๔๔

๓ The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, "what is harmful to me is harmful in itself"; it knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is value-creating. Everything it knows as part of itself it honors: such a morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow: the noble human being, too, helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity, but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power.

๔ "an after-production, a side issue, a contrasting shade"

๕ "...as rounded men replete with energy and therefore necessarily active, that happiness should not be sundered from action-being active was with them necessarily a part of happiness..."

หน้า ๔๕

๖ The noble human being honors himself as one who is powerful, also as one who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in being severe and hard with himself and respects all severity and hardness. "A hard heart Wotan put into my breast," says

an old Scandinavian saga: fitting poetic expression, seeing that it comes from the soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is actually proud of the fact that he is not made for pity...

° To be incapable of taking one's enemies, one's accidents, even one's misdeeds seriously for very long—that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget... Such a man shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into other; here alone genuine "love of one's enemies" is possible...

พจนานุกรม ๕๑

° ...the cowardly, the anxious, the petty, those intent on narrow utility; also for the suspicious with their unfree glances, those who humble themselves, the doglike people who allow themselves to be maltreated, the begging flatters, above all the liars...

พจนานุกรม ๕๒

° A high culture is a pyramid: it can stand only on a broad base; its first presupposition is a strong and soundly consolidated mediocrity. Handicraft, trade, agriculture, science, the greatest part of art, the whole quintessence of professional activity, to sum it up, is compatible only with a mediocre amount of ability and ambition; that sort of thing would be out of place among exceptions; the instinct here require would contradict both aristocratism and anarchism. To be a public utility, a wheel, a function, for that one must be destined by nature: it is not society, it is the only kind of happiness of which the great majority are capable that makes intelligent machines of them. For the mediocre, to be mediocre is their happiness; mastery of one thing, specialization—a natural instinct. It would be completely unworthy of a more profound spirit to

consider mediocrity as such an objection. In fact, it is the very first necessity if there are to be exceptions: a high culture depends on it. When the exceptional human being treats the mediocre more tenderly than himself and his peers, this is not mere politeness of the heart-it is simply his duty.

พจนานุกรม

^{๑๒๑}The slave revolt in morality begins when resentment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is "different," what is "not itself"; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-position eye-this need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself-is of the essence of resentment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all-its action is fundamentally reaction.

พจนานุกรม

^{๑๒๒}"the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone"

^{๑๒๓}...impotence which does not require into 'goodness of heart'; anxious lowliness into 'humility'; subjection to those one hates into 'obedience'(that is, to one of whom they say he commands this subjection-they call him God). The inoffensiveness of the weak man, even the cowardice of which he has so much, his lingering at the door, his being ineluctably compelled to wait, here acquire flattering names, such as 'patience,'

and are even called virtue itself; his inability for revenge is called unwillingness to revenge, perhaps even forgiveness... They also speak of 'loving one's enemies' -and sweat as they do so.

หน้า ๕๕

^๑...the origin of that famous opposition of "good" and "evil": into evil one's feelings project power and dangerousness, a certain terribleness, subtlety, and strength that does not permit contempt to develop. According to slave morality, those who are "evil" thus inspire fear; according to master morality it is precisely those who are "good" that inspire, and wish to inspire, fear, while the "bad" are felt to be contemptible.

^๒"...he is good-natured, easy to deceive, a little stupid perhaps, ...Wherever slave morality becomes preponderant, language tends to bring the words 'good' and 'stupid' closer together."

^๓...here pity, the complaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, patience, industry, humility, and friendliness are honored- for here these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means for enduring the pressure of existence. Slave morality is essentially a morality of utility.

หน้า ๕๖

^๑The highest and strongest drives, when they break out passionately and drive the individual far above the average and the flats of the herd conscience, wreck the self-confidence of the community, its faith in itself, and it is as if its spine snapped. Hence just these drives are branded and slandered most. High and independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, even a powerful reason are experienced as dangers; everything that elevates an individual above the herd and intimidates the neighbor is henceforth called evil; and the fair, modest, submissive, conforming mentality, the

mediocrity of desires attains moral designations and honors.

พจนานุกรม

๑ "the Jews there begins the slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which we no longer see because it has been victorious."

๒ "Jewish hatred—the profoundest and sublimest kind of hatred, capable of creating ideals and reversing values, the like of which has never existed on earth before..."

พจนานุกรม

๑ "What is certain, at least, is that sub hoc signo Israel, with its vengefulness and revaluation of all values, has hitherto triumphed again and again over all other ideals, over all nobler ideals."

พจนานุกรม

๑ A people that still believes in itself retains its own god. In him it reveres the conditions which let it prevail, its virtues: it projects its pleasure in itself, its feeling of power, into a being to whom one may offer thanks. Whoever is rich wants to give of his riches; a proud people needs a god: it wants to sacrifice. Under such conditions, religion is a form of thankfulness. Being thankful for himself, man needs a god. Such a god must be able to help and to harm, to be friend and enemy—he is admired whether good or destructive... To be sure, when a people is perishing, when it feels how its faith in the future and its hope of freedom are waning irrevocably, when submission begins to appear to it as the prime necessity and it becomes aware of the virtues of the subjugated as the conditions of self-preservation, then its god has to change too. Now he becomes a sneak, timid and modest; he counsels "peace of soul," hate no more, forbearance, even "love" of friend and enemy.

Formerly, he represented a people, the strength of a people, everything aggressive and power-thirsty in the soul of a people; now he is merely the good god. Indeed, there is no other alternative for gods: either they are the will to power, and they remain a people's gods, or the incapacity for power, and then they necessarily become good.

၅၅၇ ဝ

The madman.—Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek God!" —As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lose? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated? —Thus they yelled and laughed. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. "Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to

death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever is born after us- for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history hitherto.'

Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. "I have come too early," he said then; "my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder requires times; deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars-and yet they have done it themselves."

It has been related further that on the same day the madman forced his way into several churches and there struck up his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and called to account, he is said always to have replied nothing but: "What after all are these churches now if they are the tombs and sepulchers of God?"

พจนานุกรม

"The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd-but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, or the "beasts of prey," etc."

"I have declared war on the anemic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not with the aim of destroying it but only of putting an end to its tyranny and clearing the way for new

ideals, for more robust ideals--"

หน้า ๒๒

Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for an act of supreme self-examination of the part of humanity, because flesh and genius in me. It is my fate that I have to be the first decent human being; that I know myself to stand in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia.--I was the first to discover the truth by being the first to experience lies as lies--smelling them out.--My genius is in my nostrils.

After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come for the No-saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great war--conjuring up a day of decision. This included the slow search for those related to me, those who, prompted by strength, would offer me their hands for destroying.

หน้า ๒๓

What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome. Not contentedness but more power; not peace but war; not virtue but fitness...

หน้า ๒๔

The order of castes, the order of rank, merely formulates the highest law of life; the separation of the three types is necessary for the preservation of society, to make possible the higher and the highest types. The inequality of rights is the first condition for the existence of any rights at all. A right is a privilege. A man's state of being is his privilege. Let us not underestimate the privileges of the mediocre. As one climbs higher, life becomes ever harder; the coldness increases, responsibility increases.

^aThe word "overman," as the designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed to "modern" men, to "good" men, to Christians and other nihilists—a word that in the mouth of a Zarathustra, the annihilator of morality, becomes a very pensive word—has been understood almost everywhere with the utmost innocence in the sense of those very values whose opposite Zarathustra was meant to represent—that is, as an "idealistic" type of a higher kind of man, half "saint", half "genius."

หน้า ๗๐

^bFrom a possible future.— Is a state of affairs unthinkable in which the malefactor calls himself to account and publicly dictates his own punishment, in the proud feeling that he is thus honoring the law which he himself has made, that punishing himself he is exercising his power, the power of the law-giver? Such would be the criminal of a possible future, who, to be sure, also presupposes a future lawgiving—one founded on the idea 'I submit only to the law which I myself have given, in great things and in small.'

หน้า ๗๑ ^c"Terrible it is to be alone with the judge and avenger of one's own law. Thus is a star thrown out into the void and into the icy breath of solitude."

หน้า ๗๒

^dGoethe—not a German event, but a European one: a magnificent attempt to overcome the eighteenth century by a return to nature, by an ascent to the naturalness of the Renaissance—a kind of self-overcoming on the part of that century. He bore its strongest instincts within himself: the sensibility, the idolatry of nature, the anti-historic, the idealistic, the unreal and revolutionary (the latter being merely a form of the unreal. He sought help from history, natural science, antiquity, and also Spinoza, but, above all from practical activity; he surrounded himself with limited

horizons; he did not retire from life but put himself into the midst of it; he was not fainthearted but took as much as possible upon himself, over himself, into himself. What he wanted was totality; he fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will (preached with the most abhorrent scholasticism by Kant, the antipode of Goethe); he disciplined himself to wholeness, he created himself.

In the middle of an age with an unreal outlook, Goethe was a convinced realist: he said Yes to everything that was related to him in this respect—and he had no greater experience than that ens realissimum called Napoleon. Goethe conceived a human being who would be strong, highly educated, skillful in all bodily matters, self-controlled, reverent toward himself, and who might dare to afford the whole range and wealth of being natural, being strong enough for such freedom; the man of tolerance, not from weakness but from strength, because he knows how to use to his advantage, even that from which the average nature would perish; the man for whom there is no longer anything that is forbidden—unless it be weakness, whether called vice or virtue.

Such a spirit who has become free stands amid the cosmos with joyous and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole—he does not negate any more. Such a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faith: I have baptized it with the name of Dionysus.

บทที่ ๕

บทที่ ๗

“The consciousness of appearance. ...I have discovered for myself that the human and animal past, indeed the whole primal age and past of all sentient being continues in me to invent, to love, to hate, and to infer. I suddenly woke up in the midst of this dream, but only to the

consciousness that I am dreaming and that I must go on dreaming lest I perish—as a somnambulist must go on dreaming lest he fall. What is "appearance" for me now? Certainly not the opposite of some essence: what could I say about any essence except to name the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a dead mask that one could place on an unknown x or remove from it! Appearance is for me that which lives and is effective...

III 7 1b

First proposition. The reasons for which "this" world has been characterized as "apparent" are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable.

Second proposition. The criteria which have been bestowed on the "true being" of things are the criteria of not-being, of naught; the "true world" has been constructed out of contradiction to the actual world: indeed an apparent world, insofar as it is merely a moral-optical illusion.

Third proposition. To invent fables about a world "other" than this one has no meaning at all, unless an instinct of slander, detraction, and suspicion against life has gained the upper hand in us: in that case, we avenge ourselves against life with a phantasmagoria of "another," a "better" life.

Fourth proposition. Any distinction between a "true" and an "apparent" world—whether in the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant (in the end, an underhanded Christian)—is only a suggestion of decadence, a symptom of the decline of life. That the artist esteems appearance higher than reality is no objection to this proposition. For "appearance" in this case means reality once more, only by way of selection, reinforcement, and correction. The tragic artist is no pessimist: he is precisely the one who says Yes to everything questionable, even to the terrible—he is Dionysian.

၇၇၇ ခု

° ...so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no "being" behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to the deed-the deed is everything.

၇၇၈ ခု

° ...no wonder if the submerged, darkly glowering emotions of vengefulness and hatred exploit this belief for their own ends and in fact maintain no belief more ardently than the belief that the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb-for thus they gain the right to make the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.

၇၇၉ ခု

° "The concept of "God" was until now the greatest objection to existence. We deny God, we deny the responsibility in God: only thereby do we redeem the world."

° ...there are altogether no moral facts. Moral judgments agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities. Morality is merely an interpretation of certain phenomena-more precisely, a misinterpretation. Moral judgement, like religious ones, belong to a stage of ignorance at which the very concept of the real and the distinction between what is real and imaginary, are still lacking; thus "truth", at this stage, designates all sorts of things which we today call "imaginings."...Morality is mere sign language...

၇၈၀ ခု

° Granted that nothing is 'given' as real except our world of desires and passions, that we can rise or sink to no other 'reality' than the reality of our drives-for thinking is only the relationship

of these drives to one another...-Granted finally that one succeeded in explaining our entire instinctual life as the development and ramification of one basic form of will - as will to power, as is my theory-; granted that one could trace all organic functions back to this will to power and could also find in it the solution to the problem of procreation and nourishment -they are one problem - one would have acquired the right to define all efficient force unequivocally as:will to power. The world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its 'intelligible character'-it would be 'will to power' and nothing else.-

พจนานุกรม

° Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: "the eternal recurrence." This is the most extreme form of nihilism: the nothing (the "meaningless"), eternally!

พจนานุกรม

°...it also brings to light the weaker and less secure among them and thus promotes an order of rank according to strength, from the point of view of health: those who command are recognized as those who command, those who obey as those who obey.

พจนานุกรม

° I too speak of a "return to nature," although it is really not a going back but an ascent-up into the high, free, even terrible nature and naturalness where great tasks are something one plays with...

° The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal conformation and seal?

หน้า ๘๗

^๑ To "give style" to one's character - a great and rare art! It is practice by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed-both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and exploited for distant views... It will be a strong and domineering nature that enjoy their finest gaiety in such constraint and perfection under a law of their own...

หน้า ๘๘

^๒ Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, then you said Yes too to all woe. All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, "You please me, happiness! Abide, moment!" then you wanted all back. ...You higher man, do learn this, joy wants eternity. Joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, wants deep eternity.

^๓ My formula for greatness in human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. No merely bear what is necessary...but love it.

ประวัติผู้เขียน

นางสาววนิดา คุตตวัส สำเร็จการศึกษาได้รับปริญญาครุศาสตรบัณฑิต
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย เกียรตินิยมอันดับสอง วิชาเอก ศิลปศึกษา วิชาโท ชีววิทยา
ในปีการศึกษา ๒๕๑๗ และได้เข้าศึกษาต่อในบัณฑิตวิทยาลัย จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
ภาควิชาปรัชญา ในปีการศึกษา ๒๕๑๘.



ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย