ASEAN'S ROLE IN RELATIONS TO EXTERNAL POWERS ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: CASE STUDIES OF THE ARF AND EAS

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บทบาทอาเซียนในความสัมพันธ์กับมหาอำนาจภายนอกภูมิภาคต่อประเด็นปัญหาด้านการเมืองและความมั่นคงในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้หลังยุคสงครามเย็น: กรณีศึกษาการประชุมส่วนภูมิภาคของอาเซียน และการประชุมสุดยอดของเอเชียตะวันออก

นายเล แทง เลิม

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Thesis Title	ASEAN'S ROLES IN RELATIONS TO EXTERNAL POWERS ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: CASE STUDIES OF THE ARF AND EAS
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เล แทง เลิม: บทบาทอาเซียนในความสัมพันธ์กับมหาอำนาจภายนอกภูมิภาคต่อประเด็นปัญหาด้านการเมืองและความมั่นคงในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้หลังยุคสงครามเย็น: กรณีศึกษาการประชุมส่วนภูมิภาคของอาเซียน และการประชุมสุดยอดของเอเชียตะวันออก (ASEAN'S ROLE IN RELATIONS TO EXTERNAL POWERS ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: CASE STUDIES OF THE ARF AND EAS) อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก : รศ. ดร. วิทยา สุจริตธนารักษ์, 154 หน้า.

การที่อาเซียนมีชื่อเสียงขึ้นมามากเมื่อไม่นานมานี้ ส่วนหนึ่งเป็นผลมาจากความสัมพันธ์ที่มีมากขึ้นกับรัฐภายนอก โดยเฉพาะกับมหาอำนาจ เช่น สหรัฐฯ จีน ญี่ปุ่น อินเดีย สหภาพยุโรป และรัสเซีย อาเซียนเปลี่ยนบทบาทที่เป็นบวกและแข่งขันในการผูกโยงมหาอำนาจเอาไว้ในความสัมพันธ์ ชื่อเสียงของอาเซียนในด้านการเมือง และความมั่นคง แสดงให้เห็นได้ในรูปของสถาบันที่หลากหลายในภูมิภาค อันได้แก่ การประชุมส่วนภูมิภาคของอาเซียน (ARF) และที่ประชุมสุดยอดของเอเชียตะวันออก (EAS) ในเมื่อความสัมพันธ์ที่หลากหลาย และแนวคิดภูมิภาคนิยมเป็นแนวโน้มสำคัญในด้านความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างประเทศในเอเชียแปซิฟิค และเอเชียตะวันออกหลังสงครามเย็น อาเซียนก่อตั้ง ARF ขึ้นในปี 1994 และ EAS ในปี 2005 เพื่อเปิดช่องทางให้อาเซียนและมหาอำนาจภายนอกได้มีส่วนร่วมและถกเถียงปัญหาที่เป็นผลประโยชน์ของภูมิภาค ดังนั้นวิทยานิพนธ์ฉบับนี้จึงเสนอว่าภายในโครงสร้างสถาบันของ ARF และ EAS อาเซียนใช้การส่งเสริมความสัมพันธ์กับรัฐภายนอกภูมิภาคเพื่อให้รัฐเหล่านั้นมีส่วนเกี่ยวข้องกับการเมืองและความมั่นคงของภูมิภาค

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้ให้ความสำคัญกับบทบาทของอาเซียนใน 3 ด้านด้วยกันคือ (1) การสร้างสถาบันทางความมั่นคงที่หลากหลาย (2) สร้างค่านิยมและกฎเกณฑ์ของสถาบัน และ (3) ถ่วงดุลอำนาจ บทบาทหลังสุดแสดงออกให้เห็นในกรณีของ EAS ซึ่งอาเซียนพยายามดึงเอามหาอำนาจสำคัญ เข้ามาเกี่ยวข้องกับสถาบันทั้งๆที่จีนคัดค้าน การที่สหรัฐและรัสเซียเข้ามาเกี่ยวข้อง EAS ในปี 2011 แสดงให้เห็นถึงความสำเร็จของอาเซียนในกรณีของการถ่วงดุลอำนาจ วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เสนอว่าอาเซียนเลือกที่จะไม่เข้าข้างฝ่ายใดๆ อันอาจจะเนื่องมาจากประเด็นของ "ภัยคุกคามจากจีน" อย่างไรก็ตาม ยังเวลาอีกมากที่จะตัดสินได้แน่ชัดและครอบคลุมจริงในการที่อาเซียนนำเอาสหรัฐและรัสเซียเข้ามาเกี่ยวข้อง

วิทยานิพนธ์ใช้กรณีศึกษาของ ARF และ EAS เพราะว่ากรณีทั้ง 2 นี้ได้ดึงดูดความสนใจของมหาอำนาจสำคัญๆ ให้เข้ามามีส่วนเกี่ยวข้อง ดังนั้นจึงเป็นทางที่ดีที่จะตรวจสอบที่ครอบคลุมพอและมากพอเกี่ยวกับบทบาทของอาเซียนในความสัมพันธ์กับอำนาจภายนอกในด้านการเมืองและความมั่นคงของเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ จากการสิ้นสุดของสงครามเย็นจนกระทั่งปัจจุบัน

สาขาวิชา เอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ศึกษา ลายมือชื่อนิสิต……..……..…

ปีการศึกษา 2554 ลายมือชื่อ อ.ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก……..……

5387654520: MAJOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
KEY WORDS: ASEAN/ ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)/ EAST ASIA SUMMIT (EAS)/ BALANCE OF POWER/ MULTILATERAL SECURITY INSTITUTION.

LE THANH LAM: ASEAN'S ROLE IN RELATIONS TO EXTERNAL POWERS ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: CASE STUDIES OF THE ARF AND EAS. ADVISOR: ASSOC. PROF. WITHAYA SUCHARITHANARUGSE, Ph.D., 154 pp.

ASEAN's reputation has been achieved partly thanks to its growing relations with external states, especially with major powers, such as the U.S., China, Japan, India, EU, and Russia. ASEAN has played a positive and active role in tying external powers in its relations. In the political and security aspects, ASEAN's reputation is shown in the regional multilateral institutions, namely the ARF and EAS. As the multilateralism and regionalism were the main trend in the international relations in Asia-Pacific and East Asia after the Cold War, ASEAN formed the ARF in 1994 and EAS in 2005 in order to provide a venue for ASEAN and external powers to share and discuss regional interests. Thus, the thesis argues that within the institutional framework of the ARF and EAS ASEAN has promoted relations to extra-regional states to get them involved in regional politics and security.

The thesis gives particular attention to three sets of ASEAN's role: 1) forming multilateral security institutions; 2) building institutional norms and rules; and 3) balancing powers. The last role is especially reflected in the EAS by ASEAN's attempt to involve all major powers in the institution despite China's objection. The U.S. and Russia's recent participation in the EAS in 2011 marked the success of ASEAN in this role. In balancing powers, the thesis also argues that ASEAN chooses not to take sides in any power though the reason for this role might retrieve from the so-called "China threat". Yet, it needs more time to achieve a comprehensive and exact judgement on ASEAN's effort to involve the U.S. and Russia in the EAS.

The thesis uses the case studies of the ARF and EAS since both of them has attracted participation of all the world major powers and other states. Thus, it helps to examine more comprehensively and fully ASEAN's role in relation to external powers on Southeast Asian political and security aspects from the end of the Cold War till now.

Field of Study : Southeast Asian Studies Student's Signature .....

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACJCC	ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AJCTD	ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
AMMTC	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
ASEAN-PMC	ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CBMs	Confidence-building measures
CECA	Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
COC	Code of Conduct
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DOC	Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
EAEC	East Asian Economic Caucus
EAEG	East Asian Economic Group
EAS	East Asia Summit
FTAs	Free Trade Agreements
IAPS	Institute of Asia Pacific Studies
ISG	Inter-Sessional Support Group
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
PD	Preventive Diplomacy

PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAAF	PLA Air Force
PLAN	PLA Navy
PMC	Post-Ministerial Conferences
PRC	People Republic of China
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asian Weapon-Free Zone
SOM	Senior Officials Meeting
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
U.S.	The United States

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale

The international relations of Southeast Asia have traditionally been posed by external powers. From the sixteenth century and especially after the eighteenth century, European empires began to occupy Southeast Asia. All Southeast Asian countries have experienced colonialism by major powers except Thailand. European influence on Southeast Asian international relations disappeared rapidly after the Japanese occupation of the region from 1942 to 1945 and World War II. Then, during the Cold War till the end of the Second Indochina War in 1975, the pressures of domestic independence movements emerged strongly in the region leading to a chain of political and armed struggles of the Southeast Asia countries as the primary political units in world affairs in order to breakup colonial empires. For instance, the Treaty of General Relations 1946 between the U.S. and the Philippines provided for the recognition of the independence of the Republic of the Philippines; the Geneva Accords of 1954 ended the war between French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam and partitioned Vietnam into two halves; the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to Indonesian government on December 27, 1949; the Federation of Malaya Independence Act was passed by the British Parliament in 1957 to recognize the Malaya's independence**,** which then was expanded to the Federation of Malaysia in 1963; Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965; and Brunei was the last state to become fully independent from Britain in 1984. During the Cold War the Southeast Asian security order was shaped largely by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. It witnessed the belligerence of all the three major powers in the Second Indochina War when the U.S. directly involved in the war from 1960s to 1975[1]. In the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989)[2], Southeast Asia

[1] Since this time journalists, memoirists, historians, and other commentators started writing about the war in the 1960s, the overwhelming majority of books and articles have examined it from the U.S.

continued to face external powers' maintenance of presence, namely the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China in the region. Given the influence of extra-regional powers, especially the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War, Southeast Asian destiny was understandably intertwined with and determined by these and some other external powers (Ganesan, 2000: 259).

Since 1989, Southeast Asia was transferred to a new epoch of relative freedom of external powers' entanglements. Southeast Asian states also fostered relations to the outside of the region to find more opportunities for their development and to maintain peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

ASEAN was formed in 1967 by five founding members, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. At the beginning, ASEAN took shape as a group of anti-Communist bloc. That was due to the Communism's expansion in the world as well as in the regional context where Indochina was turning communist with the help of the Soviet Union and the PRC. Through a policy on exporting revolution to Southeast Asian countries, China was also perceived as supporting local communist movements in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. For another reason, experience of colonialism made some Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines get closer. These countries considered the importance of a regional organization to cooperate Southeast Asian states against external powers' interference. The Second Indochina War, once again, brought major powers into Southeast Asia. It re-raised the fear of interference of external countries in Southeast Asia within ASEAN founding states. This threat led to a definite statement in the ASEAN Declaration that ASEAN states "are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspiration of their peoples." In order to strengthen peace and stability in the region, the ASEAN member states adopted the TAC

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viewpoint. See Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2008).

[2] In September 1989, Vietnam announced totally military withdrawal from Cambodia.

at the Bali Conference of 1976 as the fundamental principles of the Association. The TAC can be considered as a higher effort of ASEAN in regional politics and security in the Cold War era.

The Cold War was ended by the collapse of the Soviet Union leading to the end of its axis of communism; the bipolar system was replaced by the multipolar one; the international dimension of the Cambodian situation ended in 1991 with the Paris Peace Agreement. The relatively clear political divisions and alliances that defined the interstate relationships of Southeast Asia until 1991 no longer apply. The so-called “Soviet threat” and its possible political and security implications for the Southeast Asian region no longer exist. These changes of the post-Cold War era introduced new levels of complexity to the political security of Southeast Asia. Emerging political-security challenges in the post-Cold War era opened a new chapter for ASEAN’s states in stabilizing the region. It also brought new challenges to the Southeast Asian political security, among which was the rise of China as a new major power in Asia. Moreover, as Singh said, “the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and the unexpected withdrawal of the U.S. military from naval and air bases in the Philippines created widespread regional anxiety that these events were the prelude to the creation of a dangerous ‘power vacuum’” (Castro, 2000: 63). Thus, maintaining presence of the U.S. and constraining influence of China on the regional political security are important tasks of ASEAN.

After the Cold War, multilateralism has become the main trend of the world politics and has been supported by most countries. ASEAN’s operation, therefore, is not out of this flow in relations with external powers. Typically, the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and EAS (East Asia Summit) are two multilateral institutions led by ASEAN. The initiative of the ARF derived from the ASEAN-PMC in January 1992 which officially announced plan to initiate a security dialogue by using the framework of the PMC. As a result, the ARF was formed in July 1993 and officially operated in July 1994 with 18 founding members. Up to now, it is broadened with 27 members that are part of Asia and/or border the Pacific Ocean. The forum can be seen as the first multilateral

institution which was established by ASEAN after the Cold War, focusing on political security in Southeast Asia in particular and in Asia-Pacific in general. As mentioned in the ARF's objectives "The ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region." (About the ASEAN Regional Forum: online)[3].

Another multilateral institution in Southeast Asia is the EAS launched in 2005 by ten ASEAN member states, plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and New Zealand. It now includes the two other major powers- the U.S. and Russia as well. The EAS is an open, inclusive, transparent and outward-looking forum, which strives to strengthen global norms and universally recognized values with ASEAN as the "driving force" working in partnership with the other participants. It can also be considered part of ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise, in that security cooperation is one of the key focus areas which aims to promote peace and stability in East Asia. Although establishing after the ARF, the EAS has been becoming a potential institution of political-security issues in the region which draws attention of both the U.S. and Russia, too.

In general, since the ARF's establishment, ASEAN has increasingly reinforced regional political-security cooperation, and has participated more positively in multilateral institutions to bandwagon extra-regional countries into Southeast Asian common political and security issues. Among ASEAN's multilateral institutions, the ARF and EAS are the two most important and largest ones of ASEAN which attract participation of extra-regional countries, particularly major powers, such as the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia in political and security issues in Southeast Asia in particular and in wider regions (Asia-Pacific and East Asia) in general. Within both the ARF and EAS, ASEAN has been on the "driver's seat". Thus, ASEAN has played an important role in relations to external powers on the Southeast Asian politics and security in the post-Cold War era.

[3] http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html

1.2 Literature review

Being considered as one of fascinating and important books in studying the security and political aspects of ASEAN for academics and policymakers, the book *"Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order (2nd ed.)"* (Acharya, 2009) contributes to assessing ASEAN's role in the regional security. In comparison with the first edition, the second one adds Chapter 7, tracing and analyzing the "ASEAN Security Community" initiative. Other chapters update ASEAN's response to both conventional and emerging security challenges since the Asian economic crisis in 1997. Importantly, Chapter 6, dealing with ASEAN's role in Asia-Pacific security, has been updated to cover the latest developments relating to the ARF, the emergence of East Asian regionalism (and the East Asian Community idea), and more generally ASEAN's response to the rise of China and its multilateral engagement of China, Japan and India (Acharya, 2009: xvi). Acharya adopts the constructivist theory through focusing on the role of norms, socialization and identity as central explanatory tools in analyzing ASEAN as a security community. According to Acharya (2009: 7), "the purpose of this exercise is to use the idea of security community as a frame work within which to examine the evolution and nature of ASEAN's political and security role and identify the constraints it faces in developing a viable regional security community". Especially, this book is very useful to understand the origin and development of the "ASEAN Way". Acharya (2009: xv) has taken as his intellectual point of reference the concept of constructivism to assess the merits of "the ASEAN Way" and whether or not the nascent security community is in the ascendant.

With the motivation of introducing a better understanding of the ARF, Severino published a book named "*The ASEAN Regional Forum*" (2009). More importantly, this book is necessary to assess ASEAN's roles in bringing external powers' engagement in Southeast Asian political and security issues. The book studies the ARF's establishment and development process as well as the forces that led to and shaped the forum. In addition, the book contributes to the discussion about ASEAN's role in confidence building, particularly after its expansion. In this forum, ASEAN has been considered as

the “driving force” and has done to strengthen the confidence-building device. However, ASEAN has not been represented its role in the “driver’s seat” as the ARF is a “talk shop”. Hence, the book partly explains ASEAN’s achievements and failure in the ARF through its measures of building peace and stability in Southeast Asia. However, not any particular theory is adopted in this book, as Severino says, “I do not bring theoretical constructs to this book.” Thus, the book was written basing on the experiences and insights that Reverino gained during his career in ASEAN from 1994 to 2002.

“Balance of power” or “balancing power” is a popular concept in Southeast Asian security which refers to ASEAN’s relations with external countries, particularly with major powers such as the US, China, Japan and Russia within inter-state regimes for regional cooperative security. As regards this concept, the book *“Cooperative security and the balance of power in ASEAN and the ARF”* (Emmers, 2003) specially refers to ASEAN and the ARF to define this concept and clarify to what extent may the balance of power, defined in political term, play a part in the relation between ASEAN and the ARF and in the calculations of the participants. In general, the book examines ASEAN and the ARF as institutions that seek to promote the objectives associated with cooperative security for a long period of time through the activities of the Association. However, only Chapter 5 and 6 are related to political and security issues in Southeast Asia after the Cold War. The book is especially important to my study since it leads my idea to ASEAN’s role in balance of power between major powers within the ARF. Nonetheless, the definition of “balance of power” in my study is the “soft balancing” instead of the traditional “hard balancing” as used in this book. Thus, the basis of the balance of power in my study derives from the book, yet the conceptual framework is different.

Although the book *“Order and security in Southeast Asia: Essays in memory of Michael Leifer”* (2006) and the article *“Michael Leifer and the balance of power”* were not written by Leifer, they based on his researching achievements in the field of study of Southeast Asian politics, particularly the balance of power factor in the foreign policies of Southeast Asian states. Leifer is widely regarded as an exponent of realism and an advocate of countervailing balance of power practices. Within the two studies ASEAN

and its regional institutions are conceived as the expression of the underlying regional balance of power structure, among and between extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia. ASEAN states also engaged in balancing acts within the group to forestall possible dominance of a single power or combination of states.

Unlike Leifer who argued that the ARF's role is shaped by the balance of power among the region's great powers, Katsumata's book named *"ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise: Norms and interests in the ASEAN Regional Forum*" (2009) argues that the ARF itself can moderate and influence great power interaction by engaging them multilaterally and embedding them into a sets of norm that will constrain the security dilemma in the Asia Pacific. As mentioned in the title, the book focuses on cooperative security enterprise as an ASEAN's significance, in which it concentrates on the ARF. Besides, the EAS is also discussed in the framework of the cooperative security enterprise. However, the viewpoint of the cooperative security here derives from the six ASEAN's initial member states. It is different from other scholars who criticize the ARF's "talk shop"; Katsumata gives positive assessments of the ARF. Among nine chapters, chapters 3, 4, and 5 are more important for my study. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the establishment of the ARF by the ASEAN states. Chapter 5 focuses on their promotion of the norm of security cooperation within the framework of the ARF. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 go in details of three non-ASEAN participants in relations with the ARF, including China, the U.S., and Australia.

In another research named *"Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a 'talking shop' or a 'norm brewery'?"* (2006) Katsumata explains the ARF basing on constructivism. Specifically, Katsumata (2006: 187). borrows a strand of constructivism which "takes a similar epistemological stance to thoses of the rationalist IR schools" and it seeks to explain events in the real world. Accordingly, his study's approaches include norms focusing on the Concept Paper and the Chairman's statement of the ARF, ideas through interviews, and ideational aspects existing in literature on institutions in Asia Pacific. Thus, this study examines ARF's establishment in the view of constructivism.

Two of Goh's works, including "*Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies*" (2007/08) and "*Institutions and the great power bargain in East Asia: ASEAN's limited 'brokerage' role"* (2011) analyze ASEAN's post-Cold War strategy to involve major powers in Southeast Asian security through its ways of the so-called "omni-enmeshment" and institutionalizing power relations. The "*Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies*" concentrates more on the rise of China and the uncertain commitment of the U.S. after the Cold War which lead to ASEAN's strategic measures in relations with external powers. In the article "*Institutions and the great power bargain in East Asia: ASEAN's limited 'brokerage' role"*, Goh goes in details of ASEAN's achievements of sustaining cooperation on the part of the great powers. Goh (2011: 375) argues that while ASEAN has successfully brought the great powers into sustained dialogue, it has only helped to create a minimalist bargain among the great powers. Constructivism and the English School of International Relations are two main theories which are adopted in this article. In sum, both articles focus mainly on the East Asian region where ASEAN plays an important role in relations with great powers for the regional security. They are really useful to examine ASEAN's role in creating multilateral security institutions for external countries involving in the Southeast Asian political security as well as balance of power as ASEAN's role in relations with major powers. Furthermore, the two articles also find ASEAN's limitations in the great powers bargain therein.

In another paper, "*Great powers and Southeast Asian regional security strategies: Omni-enmeshment, balancing and hierarchical order"* (2005), Goh examines the relationship between ASEAN and great powers basing on the three main concepts, namely omni-enmeshment, balancing power, and hierarchical order. Each concept is explained more clearly in every part of the paper. As such, the idea of "enmeshment", according to Goh, refers to the process of engaging with an actor or entity so as to draw into deep involvement into a system or community enveloping it in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, with the eventual aim of integration. Since 1990s, ASEAN

states have involved big powers in their regional security structure through regional institutions and bilateral arrangements with individual member states. In term of "balance of power" or "balance of influence" as mentioned, ASEAN's strategy is to use the U.S., Japan and other powers within the region to balance against China by both the political and economic ways. On the other, Goh addresses a hierarchical regional order basing on interviews with officials and policy-makers in several Southeast Asian countries, in which the U.S. dominant position is supported and there is power split outcome among major powers by regional blocs. Most importantly, this paper supplies a new viewpoint of ASEAN states on major powers' position in Asia.

Another important research is "*Institutional Balancing and International Theory: Economic independence and balance of power strategies in Southeast Asia"* (He, 2008). He addresses a new concept of ASEAN's role in relations with major powers in the Asia-Pacific called "Institutional balancing" which is a new form of balancing – "soft balancing" behavior. For He (2008: 491), the "institutional balancing" concept is an integration at the interface between neorealism and neoliberalism to explain states' behavior within institutions. He divides "balance of power" into exclusive and inclusive institutional balancing. For instance, the APT is an exclusive institutional balancing which is formed to reject the U.S. unipolar policy, while the ARF is inclusive institutional balancing of ASEAN states to constrain China and ensure U.S. support in the region. This research underlines the important role of multilateral security institutions in balancing powers. It therefore contributes to shaping my perspective in "soft balancing" of ASEAN.

It is important to have a look at relations between external states, particularly between major powers in Asia. The paper *"ASEAN and strategic rivalry among the great powers in Asia"* (2010) by Fenna Egberink and Frans-Paul van der Putten goes into bilateral relations among the great powers in Asia, namely the U.S.-China, China-Japan, and China-India. In this paper, the authors examine briefly ASEAN's role in each mutual relationship among major powers to find out the relevant position of Southeast Asia in Asian geopolitics due to ASEAN's impact on actual security issues. Accordingly, the

authors assume that from the three main geopolitical relationships, it is the one between China and Japan that is most likely to benefit from ASEAN's stabilizing role. The two other ones develop mainly outside the scope of ASEAN-led institutions (Egberink and Putten, 2010: 138). The authors also give the prediction that Southeast Asians need to find ways to deal with China's rise without encouraging new frictions between China and other major powers in order to stabilize regional political security.

1.3 Conceptual framework

1.3.1 Liberal institutionalism

What is an international institution? According to liberal institutionalism, it is an international organization, such as NATO or the European Union; or it is a regime (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003: 117-124). In 1987, Douglass North gave the institution's concept that is rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that structured repeated human interaction (Keohane, 1988: 384). Institution in the view of Robert Keohane (1988) is "a general pattern or categorization of activity or a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized". In 1977, Bull defined international institutions as "a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals" (Narine, 2006: 207). In Bull's study the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great power management of the international system are the key institutions of international society. Similarly, Simmons and Martin (2002: 194) broadly defined institutions as a set of formal or informal rules, stipulating the way in which states should cooperate. From these views, the ARF and EAS are considered as international multilateral institutions.

International organizations are the chief "external" mechanism that liberals believe is needed to constrain the ambitions of sovereign states, Heywood (2011) says. From this idea, liberal institutionalism does see international institutions as being important which can make cooperation between states easier and far more likely.

Liberal institutionalism is rooted in the functional integration theoretical work of the 1950s and 1960s and the complex interdependence and transnational studies literature of the 1970s and 1980s. It is effective to assess the liberal institutionalism through opposite view of neorealist analysis. In the view of liberal institutionalists institutions exist as mediators to facilitate cooperation among states on matters of common interest (Heywood, 2011: 65). By contrast, neorealists view international institutions as creatures of great power self-interest with only a marginal effect in regulating the behavior of states, and none of argument is about institution as significant international actors (Narine, 1998). According to Jackson and Sorensen (2003), liberal institutionalists claim to make a significant difference in Western Europe after the end of the Cold War. They also believe that the high level of institutionalism could reduce the effect of destruction from anarchical multi-polar situation. However, neorealists argue that the end of the Cold War is most likely to bring detrimental effect to the Western Europe and world stability, and this in turn, could result in a major war because of the lack of the balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003:119-120).

In term of international institution's role, liberal institutionalism theorists claim that international institutions help foster cooperation between states. Moreover, according to Jackson and Sorensen (2003), the role of institutions are to provide a flow of information and opportunities to negotiate, enhance the ability of governments to monitor other's compliance and to implement their own commitments-hence their ability to make credible commitments in the first place, and strengthen prevailing expectations about the solidity of international agreements. Liberal institutionalists also argue that institutions can provide a framework for cooperation that can help to reject the dangers of security competition between states (Baylis, Smith, and Owens, 2011: 237). Therefore, liberal institutionalism can be seen as a theory about the role of international institutions in building international cooperation among states, which in turn contributes to the maintenance of peace, security in the region.

1.3.2 Constructivism

In the late 1990s, constructivism emerged as a powerful challenger to the traditional realist-based study ASEAN. It is rooted in the sociology of knowledge and shares assumptions with post-modernism. While all theories of international organization, including neo-liberal institutionalism, recognize the importance of norms, constructivism supplies for a much deeper understanding of norms on shaping international relations. In the viewpoint of Acharya (2001: 22) constructivists offer a more qualitatively deeper view of how institutions may affect and transform state interests and behavior. It means that countries participating in international institutions have to follow the institutional norms and rules in reaction with each other. More generally, as Narine (1998) says, institutions embody the constitutive and regulative norms and rules of international interaction; as such, they shape, constrain, and give meaning to state action and define what it is to be a state. Among ASEAN's attempts, the Association is using institutional structures and its political standing to set the norms and rules that govern interaction in the region (Narine, 1998: 42). This view evidently supports relevance of the constructivist view.

The comparison between (neo)realism and neoliberalism with constructivism will highlight the contrasting view of actors' interests of these theories. Both (neo)realists and neoliberalists define actors' interests largely in material terms and treat them as exogenously given. Similarly, realism uses a rational actor model to explain social phenomena. Meanwhile, constructivists define actors' interests by ideational factors such as norms (Katsumata, 2006: 187) and see states as social actor instead.

In addition, constructivists portray institutions as expressions of the social rules and norms that constrain international society (Narine, 1998: 42). According to Goh (2011), constructivist theorists believe that institutional membership would, over the medium term, create expectations and obligations on the part of the great powers, and over time, socialize them into embracing peaceful norms. Another constructivist theorist, Wendt defines an institution as "a relatively stable set or 'structure' of identities and interests… Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works" (Narine, 1998: 40). For constructivist,

multilateral institutions reflect actors' inter-subjective normative understandings, and these shared understandings in turn influence actors' actions (Katsumata, 2006: 195). Thus, constructivism is used to examine how norms and rules influence state interests and behavior in international institutions. Furthermore, following Goh's above explanation expectations and obligations can contribute to explaining ties between major powers and lesser countries within international institutions.

1.3.3 Balance of power

The assumptions of the balance of power theory are based on realist suppositions. In a balance of power system, the differential of power among countries causes three security problems to states: (1) the threat of direct attack by another major power; (2) the threat of indirect harm by the military actions of a major power which undermine the security of another, even if unintentionally; and (3) the fear of possibility that one major power will become a global hegemon and thus capable of many harmful actions, such as rewriting the rules of international conduct to its long-term advantage, exploiting world economic resources for relative gain, imposing imperial rule on second-ranked powers, and even conquering any state in the system (Pape, 2005: 10). Thus, a balance of power means that no one state is sufficiently powerful to defeat the others (D'Anieri, 2011).

The term "balance of power" refers to the general concept of one or more states' power being used to balance that of another state or group of states (Goldstein, 2005: 75). Traditional hard balance of power theory suggests that states will fear other states based purely on their capabilities and geographical proximity. Therefore, traditional hard balancing seeks to change the military balance in an actual or potential conflict by contributing military capabilities to the weaker side through measures such as a military buildup, war-fighting alliance, or transfer of military technology to an ally (Pape, 2005: 36). According to Pape's definition, hard balancing includes external balancing (countervailing military alliances) and internal balancing (arms build-ups). While, as pointed out by Michael Sheehan, balance of power as a policy "involves the creation and preservation of equilibrium, the confrontation of power with countervailing power to

prevent a single power laying down the law to all other", balance of power as a system is used "as a point of reference for studying the working of the states system" (Emmers, 2003: 41).

In contrast to the traditional hard balance of power which mainly refers to power balancing in a military sense, institutional balancing or "soft balancing" is a new form of balancing which could be executed through multilateral institutions (He, 2008). Soft-balancing, as Pape (2005: 10) says, uses nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine the superpower's unilateral policies. In addition, soft balancing involves institutional strategies such as the formation of limited diplomacy. In Pape's view, territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signals of resolve to balance are mechanisms of soft balancing.

According to Paul (2004), "soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening" (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005: 73). In the same opinion, Pape (2005: 17) argues that soft balancing can establish a basis of cooperation for more forceful, hard-balancing measures in the future. It can be seen that soft balancing is possible to be used as the initial stage towards the higher aim of hard balance of power with the military cooperation and alliance among states in the balance of power system.

Sharing the viewpoint on the important role of multilateral institutions in the balance of power, He (2008) offsets an integrate model of "institutional balancing" at the interface between neorealism and neoliberalism to explain states' behavior within institutions. As He (2008: 492-494) says, institutional balancing is a new form of balancing – "soft balancing" behavior which focuses on economic interdependence. He claims that "the main hypothesis of the institutional balancing model is that the interplay between the distribution of power in the system and the economic interdependence among states determines state behavior, either hard power balancing or soft institutional

balancing" (2008: 495). It means that there is a definite separation between hard balance of power and soft balancing in He's view. He divides institutional balancing into inclusive and exclusive balancing. Inclusive institutional balancing uses norm/rule-building to restrain behavior among states or control and manipulate agendas to address issues related to states' concerns in multilateral institutions. On the other hand, inside states may rely on exclusive institutional balancing to consolidate their political and economic unity to resist pressures from outside states. However, He's definition of institutional balancing does not mention the capability to convert to hard balancing in the future – a likely trend in Southeast Asia recently.

In sum, the balance of power theory assumes that states exist in anarchy and suffer from the security threat from other countries, particularly major powers. When a state becomes a potential hegemon or a threat to the survival of others, a countervailing initiative is formed to constrain the rising state and assure the preservation and stability of the states system. While the traditional hard balancing relies on military capability, soft balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. As Brooks and Wohlforth (2005: 73) defines, soft balancing "occurs when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power". Hence, in this study, the soft balance of power is used to analyze ASEAN's role in relations with external powers, particularly major powers rather than the traditional hard balance of power.

1.3.4 Conclusion

In general, liberal institutionalism is relied on to analyze ASEAN's role in fostering relations with external powers through the multilateral security institutions where most of all major powers have been involved in regional political and security issues. However, the liberal institutionalism theory cannot explain ASEAN's role as a factor which controls and counterbalances major powers within the ARF and EAS, i.e. why do all countries have to sign the TAC to become official participants of the ARF and EAS? What have made ASEAN "driving force" within these two multilateral security

institutions? Why have all major powers participated in both the ARF and EAS? Therefore, constructivism brings a deeper understanding of institutional norms on shaping international relations and explains obligations of the external powers in relations with ASEAN within the ARF and EAS. In addition, soft balancing contributes to analyzing causes involving external powers in ASEAN-led multilateral institutions and ASEAN's role in balancing major powers. Hence, this study brings together liberal institutionalism, realist soft-balancing, and constructivism to characterize and explain ASEAN's roles in relations to external powers on Southeast Asian politics and security in the post-Cold War era.

1.4 Objectives

The aims of this study are as follows:

- To analyze key factors shaping Southeast Asian politics and security, which in turn, have contributed to ASEAN's role in relations to external powers after the Cold War.
- To explore ASEAN's role vis-à-vis external powers on the political and security aspects in the ARF and EAS framework.
- To evaluate ASEAN's achievements and limitations vis-à-vis external powers from 1991 to 2011.

1.5 Hypotheses

Not until 1999 ASEAN became a truly region-wide grouping with ten Southeast Asian countries. All new ASEAN member states have been still reconstructed since the end of the Cold War, after a long period of the colonial wars. Moreover, ASEAN is a group of small and medium countries which none of them is considered as great power. Thus, ASEAN is judged to be a durable but probably not strong association, especially in the political and security aspects. For instance, ASEAN has shown it weakness in resolving the disputes in the South China Sea between its member states, namely Brunei,

Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam and China or most recently the Thailand-Cambodia conflict over Preah Vihear Temple. ASEAN, therefore, needs the voice of external powers to maintain regional peace and stability, especially in the South China Sea disputes. Given this, I make the assumption that ASEAN has promoted relations to extra-regional powers to get them involved in regional politics and security through the institutional framework of the ARF and EAS. It also means that the relationship between ASEAN and external powers has played an important role in Southeast Asian political security in the post-Cold War era.

Additionally, since the end of the Cold War there have had some major changes in the global and regional context, particularly the U.S.'s uncertain commitment to Southeast Asian political security in the 1990s and the rise of China. The withdrawal of the U.S. from naval and air bases in the Philippines together with the disintegration of the Soviet Union made great advantage for China and Japan to widen their influence on Southeast Asia. On the other side, rapidly improving Sino-Southeast Asian ties since the mid-1990s have garnered attention and some concerns among U.S. policymakers. India also realized ASEAN's importance in terms of politics, economy, and diplomacy through the "Look East" policy initiated in 1991. Hence, in order to avoid a potential competition among major powers for their influence on Southeast Asia, ASEAN has involved external powers, including all major powers in the regional multilateral institutions. My supportive hypothesis is that ASEAN as the center of gravity in the region has played an active and important role in connecting together the external powers' common interests in political and security issues. It is reflected through a range of sustained dialogues held by ASEAN within the regional multilateral institutions' framework. This ASEAN's effort marked a historically important milestone by establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum- the Asia's first multilateral security institution led by ASEAN- in 1994. Then, eleven years later, another ASEAN-led institution- East Asia Summit- was launched towards an East Asian community which would contribute to the maintenance of peace, security, prosperity and progress. In the ARF and EAS process, I also argue that ASEAN has tried to balance powers to maintain regional stability and to avoid being dominated by any major powers. Though China's potential dominance threatens ASEAN states,

ASEAN does not take sides in the U.S.-Sino or Japanese-Sino rivalry in the balance of power.

At the same time, ASEAN was fully aware of its real position as a grouping of lesser states vis-à-vis major powers. It is important for ASEAN states to keep their voice in the dialogues with external powers. To do that ASEAN needs to maintain its role as the center of gravity in the region. In this sense, my hypothesis is that ASEAN has built institutional norms and rules on the one hand to affirm its leading role, and on the other to legitimize participation and to control behavior of non-ASEAN states in ASEAN-led institutions, namely ARF and EAS. Here, I argue that this is a wider-adapted "ASEAN Way" out of Southeast Asia. Noticeably, signing ASEAN's TAC as the primary condition for new membership of the EAS can be considered as a way to bind external powers to ASEAN's norm and rules. By that way, ASEAN's leading role in the ARF and EAR is also more assured.

1.6 Research methodology

The study mainly relies on documentary research, including documents from primary and secondary sources. They are books, articles, journals, official documents and accredited websites. Primary source consists of published and unpublished documents of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat. The primary source such as chairman's statements and reports, summits declaration, and annual meeting reports is chiefly approached from official websites of ASEAN, ARF and the government website of the United States. Secondary source includes published documents of internal experts as well as external scholars who specialize in Southeast Asian Studies and International Relations. Besides, the study uses some other academic websites and online newspaper to collect various viewpoints.

1.7 Scope of the study

It is a huge topic to study ASEAN's role in relations with external powers because it requires researcher to examine in the three main fields, such as political security, economy, and socio-culture. Within the framework and time frame of the Master thesis, the researcher decided to limit the focus of this study to the political-security realm by selecting the ARF and EAS as case studies for three reasons.

Firstly, the definitions of politics and security nowadays become a unique concept in the international relations. Political issues have direct influence on security of a state or region. Furthermore, political security is also one of the three pillars forming the ASEAN Community.

Secondly, the ARF is the ASEAN's initial multilateral security institution after the Cold War which promotes open dialogue on political and security cooperation in Asia-Pacific. Although the EAS was launched later, it is considered as a potential and strategic institution which focuses on political-security issues in East Asia together with economic and other common interests. Within both of the institutions, although most of all major powers, namely the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and India have become official members, ASEAN have occupied the "driver's seat".

Finally, the time frame of the study is limited from 1991 to 2011. The year 1991 is corresponding to the end of the Cold War. Likewise, the year 2011 was a turning point in history of the EAS since in this year both Russia and the U.S. became official members of the EAS. Additionally, in 2011 President Barack Obama is the first U.S. president ever to attend an EAS.

On the other hand, among external states relations between ASEAN and major powers has been emerging in the global and regional context in the post-Cold War era. For this reason, my study is more concerned with ASEAN's role in relations with major powers. Particularly, in the balance of power system where major powers normally are main subjects in the international relations. According to Goldstein (2005: 77), the great powers generally have the world's strongest military forces and the strongest economies

to pay for military forces and for other power capabilities. Hence, the great powers have ability to create an alliance or by itself to balance another power. Middle and smaller powers sometimes “jump on the bandwagon” of the most powerful states to balance one or more other major powers.

ASEAN’s attempts in relations with external powers for the political security are also limited within Southeast Asian context. As mentioned above, although the ARF and EAS are the Asia-Pacific and East Asian multilateral security institutions with most of all major powers’ participation, ASEAN has been considered as “driving force” within both institutions. With its special position, ASEAN on the one hand assures political security within Southeast Asia, on the other ASEAN tries to stabilize politics and security in Asia-Pacific as well as East Asia.

This study does such explorations from the viewpoint of ASEAN, in terms of what this Southeast Asian association has sought from external powers. In this respect, the central focus of this study is on the ASEAN as a factor. Moreover, the term “ASEAN” is used in this study to refer to both the organization and to its member states – which constitute a grouping, in a sense that they are located in the same geographical region and that they are all members of ASEAN.

1.8 Contributions of the study

It is hoped that the study provides knowledge in the fields which are related to political-security cooperation in Southeast Asia for regional stability. To be more specific, it is the political security cooperation at the wider regional level, by taking the ARF and EAS as case studies.

In details, the study supplies deeper understanding of ASEAN’s achievements vis-à-vis external powers in the political and security aspects after the Cold War. Moreover, the study will be a basis for further studies on the ARF and EAS.

1.9 Structure of the study

Chapter I: Introduction

The first chapter includes general information of the thesis: rationale, objectives, major arguments, research methodology, conceptual framework, significance and usefulness of study, scope of study, literature review, and structure of thesis.

Chapter II: External factors contribute to shaping Southeast Asian political-security context in the post-Cold War era

This chapter examines the external factors which shaped Southeast Asian political security in the post-Cold War era. In other words, it concerns engagements of external powers with Southeast Asia and ASEAN mentioned therein mainly in the political-security realm. The first section reviews the end of the Cold War and its impacts on the international and regional context. The second one goes in details of the China's rise in relations with Southeast Asia and in the South China Sea after the Cold War. The third section is about the United States' re-engagement with Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the last one studies other external powers' efforts, namely Japan, India, and Russia to involve Southeast Asia. The chapter ends with the brief conclusion.

Chapter III: ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN's roles in relations with external powers

This chapter analyzes ASEAN's roles which are illustrated in the ARF. The first section supplies an overview of the ARF and external major powers' role in the ARF before going to detail in ASEAN's roles vis-à-vis external powers in the next sections. Accordingly, ASEAN's role includes (1) building institution for security dialogue between ASEAN and external powers, (2) forming institutional norms and rules to control participating countries' behavior, and (3) balancing power among major powers. Finally, a brief summary is concluded from major findings of this chapter.

Chapter IV: East Asia Summit and ASEAN's roles in relations with external powers

In general, the structure of this chapter is not quite different from the Chapter III which is about the ARF. The chapter IV begins with an overview of the EAS establishment and its impacts on the Southeast Asian political security. The second section explains engagement process of external powers, particularly the U.S. and Russia in 2011 in the EAS. Sections 3, 4, and 5 focus on ASEAN's roles in relations with external powers for the Southeast Asian political security. The last section is a brief summary which is drawn from major findings of this chapter.

Chapter V: Conclusion

This chapter provides a conclusion to this study as well as assesses the successes and limitations in relations with external powers.

CHAPTER II

EXTERNAL FACTORS SHAPING SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICAL-SECURITY CONTEXT IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

2.1 The end of the Cold War and its impacts

The Cold War was a period of conflict, tension and competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and their respective allies from the mid-1940s until the early 1990s. During this period, the rivalry between the two superpowers unfolded in multiple arenas, such as military coalitions, ideology, propaganda, espionage, weaponry, industrial advances, and technological developments, which included the space race. The Cold War generated for both of superpowers costly defense spending, a massive conventional and nuclear arms race, and many proxy wars. The year 1991 is considered the marked time for the end of the Cold War by the fall of the Soviet Union.

2.1.1 Impacts of the end of the Cold War on the international context

After the Cold War, the bipolar world of communists and non-communists no longer existed and was replaced by the multipolar world where states, regions, international organizations, and non-state actors would exhibit new forms of power and influence (Dayley and Neher, 2010: 11). The world order right after the Cold War was shaped as “one super power and other major powers” or it could be called “hierarchical multipolarity”, including the U.S., EU, Japan, Russia, and China. The U.S. was left increasingly with a world political leadership role, which was demonstrated impressively during the Gulf war as well as its leadership position in the United Nations. Among other major powers, Japan could be identified as a player with larger roles, and also China would have to define its own course and claim to leadership (Schellhorn, 1992: 58).

These phenomena indicated the reemergence of Asia in the post-Cold War era. This means emergence of Asian role in the post-Cold-War world order, particularly that of Japan, China and recently India's role together with reinforcement of American influence in the world leading to the engagement and competition of influence among major powers in East Asia in general and in Southeast Asia in particular after the Cold War. How this engagement impacted on Southeast Asian politics and security will be make clearer in the next part.

The fall of the Soviet Union led to the end of the communist system in the world. It meant that the ideological confrontation between communists and non-communists was ended. The political confrontation was replaced by increasingly multilateral socio-economic cooperation and development. It was witnessed by the appearance of emergent economic integration mechanisms, such as the NAFTA in 1994, the APEC in 1989 and the AFTA in 1992. The APEC can be considered as an initiation of wider-regional cooperation in Southeast Asia which seeks to promote free trade and economic cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific region. By contrast, the AFTA is an internal trade bloc agreement by the ASEAN member states formed to increase ASEAN's competitive edge as a production base in the world market through the elimination, within ASEAN, of tariffs and non-tariff barriers; and to attract more foreign direct investment to ASEAN. Changes in ideology along with the trend of cooperation and development in the world, therefore, contributed to toning down tension between ASEAN founding members and Indochina. Thanks to this contribution the politics and security in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era became less strained than it had been, although tensions have still existed between several regional countries.

2.1.2 Impacts of the end of the Cold War on the regional context

After the Cold War, the Soviet Union was no longer a major factor in the power equation. There was no qualified rivalry to the U.S.'s dominant position. Parallel to the disappearance of the Soviet Union from Asia, American political and military disengagement took place. The withdrawal from the bases in the Philippines, enforced by

the Philippines Senate was a crucial point in the de-escalation of U.S. containment policy initiated in 1950 at the beginning of the Korean War (Schellhorn, 1992: 60). Naturally, the American military withdrawal from the Philippines caused the regional states to question the United States' commitment to the security of Southeast Asia (Narine, 1998). According to Acharya, the American decision undermined its role as a regional balancing wheel (Acharya, 1993). While the biggest communist country- China "was improving its military capabilities in an environment devoid of the constraints imposed by a Cold War balance of power" (Liow and Emmers, 2006: 49), U.S. presence in Southeast Asia to preserve regional equilibrium vis-à-vis the Chinese dominant regional hegemony was considered necessary (Shambaugh, 2010). In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union- the power balancer of Chinese communism expansion- made ASEAN's countries expect more of U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. Hence, as Singh said, "the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and the unexpected withdrawal of the U.S. military from naval and air bases in the Philippines created widespread regional anxiety that these events were the prelude to the creation of a dangerous 'power vacuum'"[4] (Castro, 2000: 63) which would cause new military conflicts and power struggles in the region despite repeated U.S. statements emphasizing its intention to remain a Pacific military power with significant forward-deployed forces. Due to a "power vacuum", regional major powers could be attracted to a competition for power and influence. As Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore warned that the reduction of the U.S. presence would give rise to a contest for regional leadership among China, India and Japan (Acharya, 2009: 194). In this race, China seemed to get the most benefit without the counterbalance of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to its dominant position in Asia. As a result of the Soviet and American force reductions it absolutely worried ASEAN states about China's rise after the Cold War.

[4] Similar view is shared by Acharya in Acharya, Amitav, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order* (2nd ed.), (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet-Vietnam alliance came to a decline after the Cold War. Together with the fall of the Soviet Union and the communist system in the world, the Soviet aid and support to the Indochinese communists were finished. Thus, the so-called “Soviet threat” which existed in Southeast Asia during the Indochinese wars and its possible political and security implications for the region were removed. On the other hand, the decline of the Soviet – Vietnamese alliance and the departure of most of the Soviet forces from Cam Ranh Bay removed anxieties about a much-discussed threat to sea-lane security in Southeast Asia. However, for at least some ASEAN states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, which worried about China’s threat expansion during the Cold War, the Soviet withdrawal from Vietnam removed a useful counterweight against any design by China for supremacy in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 1993: 12).

In brief, the end of the Cold War introduced new levels of complexity to the political and security environment of Southeast Asia. The regional circumstance was more stable and peaceful than it had been during the Cold War. The relatively clear political divisions and alliances that defined the interstate relationships of Southeast Asia until 1991 no longer apply. However, international and regional alterations after the Cold War significantly affected the political and security environment in Southeast Asia.

2.2 China’s rise and its impacts on Southeast Asian political and security situation

2.2.1 China’s rising in relations with Southeast Asia

Relations between China and Southeast Asia as well as ASEAN in particular have gained considerable improvement over the past two decades since the end of the Cold War. This is the result of a combination of flourishing economic ties, perceptions of China as a more constructive and responsible player in regional politics.

Economically, China has vital strategic interests in Southeast Asia. Economic relations have been the primary driver of the PRC’s relationship with Southeast Asia.

China has tried to ensure friendly relations with countries in the region and to maximize its political influence in those countries through mutual economic relations. Of particular importance to Beijing in this regard are the countries of mainland Southeast Asia, namely Burma, Laos, and Vietnam (which share borders with China), along with Thailand and Cambodia. China has sought to bind these countries of its concerns by financing rail, road, and river transportation links. The countries of maritime Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines have also become strategically important to the PRC. China has become dependent on the free flow of maritime traffic through Southeast Asia to sustain its double-digit economic growth-bringing natural resources into Chinese ports, and getting Chinese-manufactured goods to foreign markets in containers. Even a short-term disruption to maritime traffic could have severe consequences for China's developmental aspirations. In the long-term goal, APT, which was formed after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, is China's preferable mechanism to advance multilateral cooperation in East Asia. The APT is considered as an exclusive institutional balancing against American dominance (He, 2008). This is one of China's aims to tie ASEAN states to an exclusivist East Asian structure of security cooperation.

In the realm of politics and security, there witnessed rapid transformations in bilateral relations between China and Southeast Asian states in the 1990s and the early 2000s. China and Indonesia restored relations and this brought opportunities for China to establish diplomatic ties with Singapore and Brunei. Between February 1999 and December 2000, the PRC negotiated long-term cooperative framework arrangements with all ten ASEAN members which varied by title and content. The cooperative level and field were different in relations between China and each state. The "Plan of Action for the 21st Century" between China and Thailand was considered the most formal, while the others took the form of joint statements or communiqués. The China-Brunei agreement only mentioned "possible cooperation in… defence", while agreements with Indonesia, Laos and the Philippines mentioned of human rights. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea were also issued in the three agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam (Thayer, 2003: 92-95). On the other hand, China also boosted economic cooperation and military assistance with both Laos and Cambodia, which,

according to Thayer (2003), was to drive a wedge between the two countries and Vietnam. Those China's activities illustrate its primary attempts to seek for influence on Southeast Asian states in the post-Cold War era.

In relations with ASEAN as a grouping of Southeast Asian states, China also started promoting multilateral basis with the Association after the Cold War. Specifically, it was officially marked by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's attendance to the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1991 in Kuala Lumpur in the role of a guest of Malaysian government. Then in July 1994, China and ASEAN agreed to open consultations on political and security issues at the senior official level. In the same year, China became one of founding members of the ARF. The following year China was officially accorded dialogue status by ASEAN. In February 1997, ASEAN and China formalized their cooperation by establishment of the ACJCC. In November 2002, China-ASEAN relations were advanced with the signing of two major documents, a joint declaration on cooperation in non-traditional security fields, and the DOC. The following years, China acceded to the ASEAN's TAC and formed a strategic partnership with ASEAN. Next in July 2004, at China's suggestion, ASEAN and China raised their relationship to one of "enhanced strategic relations". This took the form of a five-year Plan of Action (2005-2010) that was adopted at the end of 2004 calling for closer security cooperation in areas as following brief objectives (Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity: online)[5]:

- Promote mutual confidence and trust in defence and military fields with a view to maintaining peace and stability in the region
- Conduct dialogues, consultation and seminars on security and defence issues
- Strengthen cooperation on military personnel training
- Consider observing each other's military exercises and explore the possibility of conducting bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises
- Explore and enhance cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.

[5] http://www.aseansec.org/16805.htm

By the end of 2006, China and ASEAN concluded twenty-eight “cooperation framework mechanisms”, including regular consultations between senior officials on strategic and political security cooperation, which was a yearly conference of foreign ministers, and an annual summit meeting of government leaders (Thayer, 2010). This indicates a good relationship between China and ASEAN in the post-Cold War era in the political and security realms. Prapat (2009) called China’s grand strategy throughout Southeast Asia “China fever”. However, many scholars assume that China would pursue regional hegemony (Thayer, 2003). It seems likely that China’s long-term goal is to displace U.S. and Japanese influence and establish itself as the dominant power. Thus, according to Prapat (2009: 135), many hawkish neo-conservatives prominent in the former Bush administration viewed China as a threat and a rising hegemon – from regional hegemon to global one step by step. However, Chinese government of course used to deny such standpoints. As Hu writes: “Beijing has repeatedly denied that it has any interest in filling [a] power vacuum … its military modernization is naturally perceived as a security threat in the region … This perception problem contributes to the ‘security dilemma’ in Asian-Pacific security” (Collins, 2000: 133). It is said that China has occupied a key role in regional security concerns, such as the South China Sea disputes and SEANWFZ as a regional major power. Thus, as Sebastian (2000: 173) assesses, “the challenge that confronted Southeast Asia-China relations in the early 1990s, particularly from an ASEAN perspective, was how the integration of China into the wider Asia-Pacific community could proceed without subordinating the interests of the regional organization, or those of its constituent members, to those of China.”

Chinese government officials always utilise the concepts of “China’s peaceful rise”, “China’s peaceful development” and “harmonious world” in the international and regional fora in order to reassure the world about China’s upsurge. However, China’s rise along with its military modernization has contributed to strategic uncertainty in the minds of not only other major powers- as competitors of China- but also regional countries, particularly Southeast Asia which shares regional security concerns with China. Among China’s attempts to modernize military, the PLAN, for instance, has greatly increased its

procurement of large surface combatants and submarines. The PLAN is currently acquiring 12 Kilo-class submarines and four Sovremennyy-class destroyers from Russia, as well as a navalized version of the Russian Su-30 fighter-bomber. Since 2000, China has begun construction of several new classes of destroyers, frigates, amphibious landing craft and diesel-electric and nuclear-powered submarines. In addition, the PLAAF is also modernized with several hundred modern Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircrafts from Russia. The PLAAF is also buying additional transport and air-to-air refueling aircraft and strengthening its airborne assault forces. Finally, the PLA is building up- both quantitatively and qualitatively- its arsenal of conventional missile systems, including the 600-kilometre-range CSS-6 and 300-kilometre-range CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles, and particularly, adding a new category of land attack cruise missile (Bitzinger, 2007: 3-8). Most recently, in July 2011, the PLAN has owned a new aircraft carrier. It seems that, while such an expanding military capability will mostly likely be used to attack and defeat Taiwan in case that Taipei declares independence, these capacities can also be used in other areas, particularly Southeast Asia where China has disputes in the South China Sea. Chinese military modernization, therefore, may lead to a potential arm race in Southeast Asia.

Thayer (2003) generalizes the structure of China's relations with Southeast Asia in a frame of a multilateral basis with ASEAN and bilaterally with each of its individual members. Although historical memory of China's security threat has been put back, given geopolitical realities, Southeast Asia must always take its northern major neighbour into account. However, China's interactions with Southeast Asia and its military modernization have made ASEAN states anxious. Hence, Sebastian (2000: 178) launches the question that "as Southeast Asia and China forge their relationship in the post-Cold War era, will the relationship be based primarily on mutual advantage or defined in hierarchical terms?"

2.2.2 South China Sea disputes

South China Sea disputes have been widely viewed as the major flashpoint of conflict in the post-Cold War Southeast Asia. These disputes are around overlapping claims for borders and territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea between four ASEAN members, namely Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, and China with Taiwan as the same side. Among these overlapping claimants, China seems to be the most advantageous party due to its naval power as well as potential military strength. That is the reason why China has insisted on settling South China Sea issue on a bilateral basis despite Southeast Asia's attempts to multilateralize the disputes. As Odgaard says, "since recognized international boundaries have not yet been drawn in the South China Sea, China continues to have overlapping claims with Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam" (Odgaard, 2007: 92).

In fact, South China Sea disputes have remained since during the Cold War. In this conflict China has demonstrated its overwhelming power that threatened Southeast Asian countries about a so-called "sea-lane hegemony" of China in South China Sea. As Acharya states, coming in the wake of the reduction of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and a build-up of Chinese naval power, the Soviet departure from Cam Ranh Bay appeared to enhance Beijing's ability to dominate the regional maritime environment (Acharya, 2009: 194). For instance, China occupied all of the Paracel Islands in 1974. Then, on 14 March 1988 Chinese patrols clashed with Vietnamese vessels at Johnson South Reef, after which seven reefs were occupied by China (Buszynski, 2003: 346). Later in the year, in the autumn of 1988, a major naval exercise code-named "Guangzi-15" was conducted by the Guangzhou Military Region to assess the navy's ability to defend both the coastal territorial waters as well as islands claimed by China in the South China Sea (Guan, 1999: 6-7). More aggressively, in February 1992 China passed "The Law of the People's Republic of China on Its Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas", claiming among other things, all the islets in the South China Sea notwithstanding overlapping claims of some of Southeast Asian states in this area, and reserving the right to use military force to prevent violation of its waters by foreign naval or research vessels (To, 1993; Wah, 1993). This was really a shock to Southeast Asians among efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the dispute. Once again, regional concerns

were raised in 1995, when China occupied Mischief Reef, off the west coast of the Philippines. Generally, those China's military activities reflected the asymmetric power in the South China Sea disputes.

It is clear that China did not want to be bound to any commitments to South China Sea issue as this country denied ASEAN's invitation to sign the Manila Declaration 1992 on the South China Sea calling for the peaceful resolution of jurisdictional issues, the exercise of self-restraint in the area, and cooperation on a range of common maritime problem (Severino, 2008: 21). However, China's ambition in the South China Sea partly reduced since the DOC was signed between ASEAN and China in November 2002, after seven years of negotiations. Although the DOC is a political declaration which intends to prevent further tensions over the disputed geographical features and to reduce the risks of military conflict, it is not a binding code of conduct or a treaty and does not list sanctions one by one in the event of transgressions. More importantly, the DOC was the first step for a binding COC which was assumed to be the future goal. In this situation, the COC is more expected. Accordingly, it can be seen that China's ambitious activities and its naval power warned Southeast Asian countries of the China's hegemony in the South China Sea.

However, endorsement of the COC seems to last longer than the Southeast Asian disputed parties' expectation. The DOC is not a binding code of conduct or a treaty and does not list sanctions one by one in the event of transgressions. This has led to China's continuing assertiveness in the South China Sea recently. China's assertiveness was mostly illustrated through its high-profile naval exercises to reinforce this country's diplomatic stance over maritime disputes (Thayer, 2011: 20). For instance, the PLAN conducted four major military exercises in the South China Sea in 2010, among of which three exercises were considered to bracket the ARF meeting. All together, according to Thayer (2011: 21), these four PLAN exercises were a demonstration that China was rapidly developing the capacity to sustain larger naval developments deep into the South China Sea.

In 2010, China also claimed that the South China Sea now was part of China's "core interest" of sovereignty. This claim of China's "core interest", along with the "U-shaped line" over the South China Sea, was promptly opposed by disputed parties as well as international community. Tensions in the South China Sea between China and Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam were toned up in 2011 as Chinese naval force clashed with both countries. In May 2011, Vietnam said three Chinese marine surveillance vessels intentionally cut a submerged cable of a Vietnamese oil survey ship while it was conducting seismic tests. Then, in June 2011, Vietnam accused a Chinese fishing boat of intentionally ramming its exploration ship- the Viking 2 which was conducting a seismic survey inside Vietnam's 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. In addition, the Philippines also accused China of unloading building materials and putting up military posts on reefs claimed by Manila. It is clear that China has increasingly bullied other countries in the conflicts in the South China Sea.

South China Sea disputes are also among the major challenges for Southeast Asian politics and security in the post-Cold War era. According to Serevino (2006, p. 283), "the overlapping claims of China and at least four ASEAN countries to varying expanses of the South China Sea have made the area a security problem in the region." Together with Chinese military modernization, China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea recently have challenged more than just territorial interests; they have been potential violations of ASEAN's political space (Ba, 1997: 642). That was Southeast Asia's anxiety about a "power vacuum" in the region after the Cold War.

2.3 The United State's re-engagement with Southeast Asia

As mentioned above, U.S. military withdrawal from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines in 1992 did make ASEAN states worry about U.S. commitment with the Southeast Asian political security. Yet, ten years later since the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 event changed the world politics and marked a major milestone in international relations towards terrorism in the globe as well as in Southeast Asia. After the attacks on September 11, the Bush Administration committed to punishing the

attackers. In the first statement after the attacks, U.S. President George Bush said: "I have directed the full resources of our intelligence and law – enforcement communities to find these responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them" (Bush, 2010: 199). Later on December 20th, 2011, the Bush Administration officially announced the war on terrorism in which Al Qaeda was assigned as the first enemy.

The war on terrorism clearly affected Southeast Asian political security as well as American policies on Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia, where several countries such as Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines were discovered to internationally and regionally link terrorist cells, was considered the critical "second front" in U.S. war against terror because of its combination of large Muslim populations; dissident and separatist movements; porous borders and easy transnational communication; under-resourced and occasionally compromised intelligence, police, and military services. It was characterized by Washington observers as a "fertile breeding ground for terrorist operations" (Mauzy and Job, 2007: 635). The U.S. reinvigorated its alliances in the region and reached agreements with other littoral states about having access to pre-positioned supply points and it agreed to a more thorough going use of naval facilities in Singapore. In responding to U.S. efforts in the war on terror in Southeast Asia, the Joint Communiqué of the Third AMMTC was declared on October 11th, 2001 as a significant mechanism of ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation after the 9/11 event. The AMMTC statement strongly condemned all acts of terrorism, particularly the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and expressed the determination of ASEAN in dealing with terrorism[6]. In addition to supplying up to 2,500 troops to help the Philippines to combat Al-Qaeda and assisting Indonesia, the U.S. also encouraged more coordination within Southeast Asia to address relevant issues of non-traditional security. These attempts compressed improving the exchange of intelligence and cooperation between security organizations, establishing better security in ports, including the container security initiative, as well as more determined attempts to counter money laundering, piracy and drug smuggling **(**Yahuda,

[6] See more in ASEAN's official website: http://www.aseansec.org/5621.htm

2006: 30-31). It is assessed that the U.S. was successful in constructing a “hub-and-spokes” arrangement of bilateral, counterterrorist-oriented relationships with Southeast Asia (Mauzy and Job, 2007: 636). The 9/11 event or the war on terrorism definitely affected U.S. re-engagement with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the main purpose of U.S. re-engagement with Southeast Asia after September 11, 2001 was merely to serve the war on terrorism. It, therefore, could not reduce Southeast Asian anxiety of the American uncertain commitment to the regional security.

On the other hand, quickly improving Sino-Southeast Asian ties since the mid-1990s have garnered attention and some concern among U.S. policymakers, observers, and scholars. Moreover, China was rapidly becoming the predominant power in Southeast Asia… leaving in question the U.S. role and commitment to the region, even with traditional allies and friends (Goh, Winter 2007/08: 114). Thus, China’s power rise and its hegemonic ambition pulled the U.S. back to engage Southeast Asia. In addition, as noted above, American withdrawal from the Philippines and the collapse of the Soviet Union after the Cold War could lead to the “power vacuum” in Southeast Asia. Parallel to the “power vacuum”, China’s rise in the post-Cold War era made Southeast Asian countries worry and expect U.S. re-engagement with the regional political and security issues.

The U.S. indeed re-engaged deeplier Southeast Asian security under the Obama Administration from which American policies towards Southeast Asia derived a larger Asia-Pacific policy framework. As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exclaimed at a January 2010 speech to the East-West Center, “the United States is back in Asia”. Both Clinton and former secretary of defence Robert Gates averred that being back in Asia meant a robust reiteration of U.S. strategic interests in the region: specifically, the right of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to untrammelled passage through South China Sea and the Western Pacific more broadly; a multilateral resolution of the region's maritime disputes rather than the bilateral solutions preferred by China; and a repositioning of its military forces to better advance U.S. strategic interests (Dupont, 2011). This clearly aimed to reassure Southeast Asia of U.S. reengagement with the regional political security.

According to *National Security Strategy*, U.S. “alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the cornerstone of security in Asia and a foundation of prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.” Through regional organizations, new dialogues, and high-level diplomacy, the U.S. has promoted security cooperation with individual Southeast Asian states (Thayer, 2010: 42). In October 2003, the George W. Bush Administration designated the Philippines as “a major non-NATO ally”. Besides the traditionally bilateral alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, the U.S. established the strategic partnership with Singapore and the prospective strategic partners with Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam (Thayer, 2010: 16-18). Among the emerging relationships, the Obama Administration paid more attention to the developing security and defence relations between the U.S. and Indonesia and the U.S. and Vietnam (Weatherbee, 2011: 7). Hence, political relationship with Indonesia was improved since U.S. restrictions on cooperation with Indonesia’s special force, Kopassus, were lifted in July 2010. Likewise, the U.S. advanced political relationship with Vietnam in 2008 with the initiation of the first Political, Security, and Defence Dialogue between the two countries. Furthermore, in 2009, Vietnam’s defence minister visited Washington and agreed to open direct military-to-military discussions with the U.S. (Thayer, 2010: 18). These security relationships with Southeast Asian countries are maintained and promoted through American regular military exercises and military assistance programs.

However, those attempts are not enough for the U.S. to deeply interfere in the Southeast Asian political-security issues. Thus, the U.S. has reinforced its presence in Southeast Asia by participating in ASEAN-leading multilateral institutions such as the ARF and EAS. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed the importance of ASEAN in regional affairs and declared a U.S. interest in joining the EAS (Thayer, 2011: 18). It has been illustrated by attending more and more the EAS by the U.S. recently. On July 23, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phuket, Thailand. Her attendance demonstrated the Obama Administration’s seriousness in re-engaging with ASEAN since absence of the Bush Administration in the ARF. In the same year, the U.S. acceded to the ASEAN’S TAC to prepare for the next step of becoming an

official member of the EAS. It also was the signal from Obama Administration that U.S. wanted to upgrade its presence in the region. Most importantly, in 2011 President Barack Obama became the first U.S. president ever to attend an EAS. Also, in this year the U.S. officially joined the ranks of the EAS participants.

In 2009, President Obama became the first U.S. president ever to attend a meeting with all 10 leaders of the nations that comprise the Association of South East Asian Nations. This first ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting was held in November 2009 in Singapore. Especially, the ASEAN-U.S. partnership was raised to a strategic level in the 2nd ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting in New York in September 2010. In this meeting, President Barack Obama mentioned in his speech:

> "We need partnerships with Asian nations to meet the challenges of our growing economy, preventing proliferation and addressing climate change… (T)he U.S. intends to play a leader-ship role in Asia. So we have strengthened old alliances, we have deepened new partnerships, as we are doing with China, and we have reengaged with regional organizations, including ASEAN." (Bower and Hiebert, 2012: 12)

While alliances and bilateral ties are foundation to U.S. interests in Asia-Pacific, the U.S. has also pursued its strategic objectives through deepening its involvement in regional institution.

The most significant attempt which shows us the U.S. strategic re-engagement with Southeast Asia affairs is its involvement in the South China Sea issue. In July 2010, at the ARF held in Vietnam, Hillary Clinton declared that body of water was "pivotal" to regional security and called freedom of navigation a "national interest" of the United States. She also announced U.S. support for "a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion" (Thayer, 2011: 20). U.S. intervention certainly shocked China. In retribution for U.S. engagement, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson declared: "We are concerned about any kind of statement that might be issued by the U.S. and ASEAN over the South China Sea" and

“We firmly oppose any country having nothing to do with the South China Sea issue getting involved in the dispute. This will only complicate rather than help solve the issue” (Thayer, 2011: 21). It is clear that China did not want any involvement of foreign countries in South China Sea disputes, especially of the U.S. because China understood that the Obama Administration was trying to influence the Asia-Pacific region.

Being aware of the importance of the Great Mekong Subregion where China is considered as the leading factor, the Obama Administration has tried to put U.S. appearance in the Mekong region. Specifically, Secretary Clinton launched the “Lower Mekong Initiative”, which China was exclusive, a first-of-its-kind agreement between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States to promote cooperation in the areas of water and forest management, education, and health.

It can be said that the U.S. re-engagement with Southeast Asia rooted from its significant benefits, particularly in the context of China’s rise in the post-Cold War era and the decline of Southeast Asians’ faith in American commitment in the region. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in her statement in February 2009, said “the United States must have strong relationships and a strong and productive presence here in Southeast Asia. This region is vital to the future not only the United States and each of the countries, but to the world’s common interests: a significant and trade-oriented regional economy; a critical strategic location; and a set of countries that will be key to any solutions we pursue on climate change, counterterrorism, global health and so much else” (Chheang, 2010).

2.4 Other external powers’ engagement with Southeast Asia

2.4.1 Japan

The 9/11 event changed the international politics and relations, including adoption of Japan’s legislation which permitted the Self-Defense Forces to undertake highly circumscribed missions overseas. Since then, Japan has increasingly engaged in regional

security affairs (Thayer, 2010: 15). Or as Yahuda (2006: 14) assumed “Japan’s Cold War passivity has ended so that it is now able to provide effective logistic and rear service support to America forces engaged in conflict within the region and beyond.”

After the Cold War, Japan quickly recognized importance of Southeast Asia due to its rich natural resources and expanding economies which could make this region become an important overseas market for Japanese capital and commodities. Even previously, nearly all of Japan’s natural rubber imports, tropical lumber imports, energy sources, copper, bauxite, nickel, vegetable oil and other foodstuffs had been supplied by Southeast Asian countries. That was why nearly half of Japan’s foreign investment in energy and natural resources development was concentrated in Southeast Asia (Wong, 2001: 281). Thus, it is seen that economy has played a primary role in Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia after the Cold War.

However, it did not mean that political security was not so important to Japan when it engaged Southeast Asia. In this term, Japan has made a series of incremental steps to become involved in security issues in Southeast Asia, including regional multilateral institutions, UN missions, anti-piracy operations, bilateral military exercises, and human rights (Smith, 2006: 180). On the other hand, Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia and ASEAN in the post-Cold War era was with the aim of constraining China (Tarling, 2010; Funabashi, 2003). Some Japanese commentators acknowledged Southeast Asia’s role as a natural ally in any future competition with China (Smith, 2006: 180).

The end of great powers’ rivalry in Asia brought Japan advantages to seek for a regional leadership role. ASEAN diplomatic support, of course, would foster Japan’s regional status and international standing among the developed countries; particularly ASEAN was increasingly showing its influence and role in the regional affairs. After the Cold War, Japan’s first attempt to engage Southeast Asia was recorded in its official-level proposal for using the PMC for security discussions was made by the Foreign Minister of Japan Taro Nakayama. Speaking at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in

Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, Nakayama stated that the ASEAN-PMC could be used for "a process of political discussions designed to improve the sense of security among us" (Acharya, 2009: 233). Then, in February 1993, Japan and ASEAN agreed in Tokyo to hold a senior officials meeting to discuss the agenda for a political and security dialogue at the ASEAN-PMC, which was realised in May of the same year. Two months later, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting endorsed establishment of the ARF, which Japan was also one of the founding members of the ARF. For Japan, the ARF provides an insurance policy in addition to that of the U.S.-Japan alliance with which to face the uncertain security environment of the post-Cold War era. It is also a potential platform on which Japan may play a bigger strategic and political role in the region (Er, 2001: 323).

As mentioned, Japan together with Indonesia and Singapore supported expanding and absorbing new members in the EAS to prevent China from dominating the regional community. That Japan's attitude towards China contributed to making the future of the EAS is still unclear because of the institutional struggle and confrontation between Japan, China and some ASEAN states. As Hughes points out that Japan has used regional institutions to counter China's rising influence, by deflecting Beijing's bids for dominance and "deliberately 'over-supplying' regionalism so as to diffuse China's ability to concentrate its power in any one forum" (Goh, 2011: 391).

Following India and China, Japan acceded to ASEAN's TAC in July 2004 in Jakarta. This has further strengthened the Treaty's importance as a code of conduct governing relations among countries in the region and as a diplomatic instrument for the promotion of peace and stability in the region (ASEAN-Japan Dialogue Relations, 2012: online)[7].

One of Japan's concerns in Southeast Asian security is the stability of the region. Specifically, Japan played a major role in the settlement of the Cambodian conflict which was well received from ASEAN at that time. Japan made a substantial contribution to the

[7] http://www.aseansec.org/5740.htm

resolution of the problem by the Tokyo Conference on Cambodia held in June 1990 before the eventual signing of the Paris Accords. This engagement with Cambodia was assessed to pave the way for a series of incremental activities (Smith, 2006: 185). Furthermore, Japan also participated in the peacekeeping operations in East Timor in 2000.

Besides, Japan has shown its interests in transnational political problems affecting Southeast Asia. In 1994, the government of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto began regular bilateral security dialogues with ASEAN members. Regular military-to-military activities and exchanges between Japan and some ASEAN member states, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam have been promoted since 2007 (Smith, 2006: 185). In the same year, relations with ASEAN, as a group, were upgraded when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sought to build a more explicit strategic relationship with ASEAN (Er, 2001: 323).

In another effort to engage Southeast Asia, Japan's most important contribution to security cooperation in Southeast Asia has been its promotion of anti-piracy measures in Southeast Asian shipping lanes- through which most of Japan's trade passes. Japan successfully initiated the ReCAAP. This was the first government-to-government agreement to promote maritime security in the region (Thayer, 2010: 15). Recently, Japan has increased engagement with Southeast Asian maritime security through exercises with India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnamese navy.

Japan's role in counterterrorism is also evident, particularly through the provisions of aid for regional counterterrorism programs throughout Southeast Asia (Smith, 2006: 187-188). This cooperation was enhanced since ASEAN and Japan adopted a Joint Declaration for Cooperation on the Fight against International Terrorism at the 8th ASEAN-Japan Summit in November 2004 in Vientiane. This was a concerted response between Japan and ASEAN to the emerging threats posed by transnational crimes, terrorism and piracy not only to the region but the entire world. Following this declaration, the AJCTD was launched for a period of five years, spanning from March

2006 to March 2011, marking the first phase. The proposal for the second phase is currently being developed (ASEAN-Japan Dialogue Relations, 2012: online).

In sum, Japan's regional strategy has been basically towards Asia-Pacific and East Asia, in which Southeast Asia is a crucial part in the foreign policy. In the role of a regional major power, Japan has acknowledged itself the role in keeping peace and stability in the region. Thus, Japan's engagement with Southeast Asia is on the one hand to look for economic opportunities and on the other to assure regional stability. As Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi mentioned in his speech in the 20th Singapore Lecture in January 2002, "In cooperation with the countries of ASEAN, we tend to make an even more active contribution to ensure regional stability here in Southeast Asia." Japan's political-security engagement with Southeast Asia has been normally through economic aids and assistances in order to maintain regional stability.

2.4.2 India

During the Cold War, India followed the strategy of non-alliance and supported the Third World's movements which reduced India's role in the international and regional arena as well. By that time, India looked at ASEAN as a front for anti-Communist Southeast Asia. It, therefore, preferred bilateral relations with individual countries in Southeast Asia rather than with ASEAN as an organization. Although India's government made endeavours to improve India's relations with ASEAN, it was not quite successful because of serious disagreements between India and the ASEAN on the Cambodian problem and on the India's fight with Pakistan (Kaul, 2001: 54-60). Thus, Kaul (2001: 62) concludes "the India-ASEAN relations in the Cold War period is a story of missed opportunities, mistrust, misperceptions and bungling diplomacy."

After the Cold War, India started worrying about the rise of China and its role in Southeast Asia. India realized ASEAN's important role in politics, economy, and diplomacy. From this view, India increased its attention and engagement with both ASEAN and each member states. Mattoo (2001: 104) said, ASEAN was emerging as

central pivot in the Indian view of Asia and its future, and essential to the construction of a security order that would be in India's interests. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union- the major trading partner of India during the Cold War- affected India's economy, particularly the source of cheap imported oil. Above reasons contributed to stimulating India's "Look East" policy toward Southeast Asia (Weatherbee, 2009; Hong, 2007). This policy was initiated during the early 1990s as a part of India's attempts to cope with post-Cold War shifts in world and Asian politics, has picked up the threads, lost during the 1950s and 1960s, of seeking intensive engagement with the ASEAN region.

The official relationship between India and ASEAN was established in 1993 in the form of Sectoral Dialogue Partnership (Nien, 2004: 133). Since then India has increasingly broadened its relations and cooperation with ASEAN in all fields. In 1996, India became an official ASEAN dialogue partner with an annual ASEAN+1 Summit. India also realized the ARF's important role in political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. As Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh mentioned in his speech in Singapore in June 2000 that: "Our participation in the ARF reflects India's increasing engagement, both in politico-security and economic spheres contributing to the building of greater trust, confidence and stability in the region. Our discussions in the ARF highlight the need to evolve a conceptual security paradigm that reinforces dialogue and cooperation, based on consensus" (Mattoo, 2001: 106). Hence, two years after the ARF's establishment, India became a member of this multiple security institution and took part in the Post Ministerial Conference, where ASEAN members meet their dialogue counterparts to address and to discuss political, economic, security and social issues. India's participation marked an important turning point in India's Look East policy. From a dialogue partner position, India rapidly became a full-scaled cooperation partner of ASEAN.

At the 3rd ASEAN-India Summit held in November 2004 in Vientiane, India and ASEAN signed the "ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity" document, setting out a road map for long-term ASEAN-India engagement (Hong, 2007: 124). In April 2005, India became an official member of the EAS. With the

support of Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand plus Japan, India was one of founding members of the EAS in April 2005. According to Hong (2007: 124), this was a significant step in India's drive for stronger linkages with East Asia.

In term of bilateral political relations with Southeast Asians, India signed on to cooperation agreements with Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia to broaden security concerns in the region. Weatherbee (2009: 225) finds that India's goal in relations with Southeast Asia is to have the same standing in ASEAN as China and to position itself as a fourth major power actor in Southeast Asia. In parallel to involving in the ARF, India also increase defence cooperation with individual ASEAN states, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, particularly the cooperation between the coast guards and the navies. Not only political relations, but India also boosted economic relations with individual Southeast Asian states and with ASEAN as a group. For instance, India signed a bilateral FTA with Thailand in July 2003, the CECA with Singapore in June 2005, and the CECA with Malaysia in February 2011 which boosted investment and trade. India and ASEAN signed a framework agreement in 2003 for a regional free trade agreement.

Being aware of importance of the Great Mekong Subregion and China's influence on the region as well, India advanced to another phase of India's Look East policy by sponsoring the "Mekong-Ganges River Cooperation Project" between India and five ASEAN member states, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam in 2000 to foster cooperation in tourism, culture, and education in this sub-region. In another effort, India forged links with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam and marshaled support for India to hold a summit level meeting with ASEAN (Hong, 2007: 124). As Nguyen Dy Nien (2004: 136), former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam assesses, the successful cooperation of the Mekong-Ganges region was a very good mechanism that supplemented the already existing cooperation arrangements between India and ASEAN as a whole and helped to narrow development gap in ASEAN.

On the other hand, ASEAN did acknowledge that India's important geographical and political position and its stability greatly contributed to peace, stability and development in South Asia as well as the Asia-Pacific region (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam Nguyen Dy Nien, 2004: 134). ASEAN also saw that participation and the rise of India could help reduce ASEAN's dependence on Japan, the Western countries, and China in trade and economic relations (Hong, 2007: 123). ASEAN-India Senior Officials have met and exchanged views on political and security issues of mutual concern between ASEAN and India at SOM level and in the framework of PMC and ARF all of which helped both sides to deepen mutual understanding, strengthen friendship and cooperation, thus enhancing peace and security of the whole region (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam Nguyen Dy Nien, 2004: 134). Also, in recognizing India's active role as an important regional player ASEAN welcomed India's support for ASEAN's effort in the establishment of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

However, South China Sea issue, China's rise in Southeast Asia, and the increasing engagement of external powers with Southeast Asia after the Cold War, all together, added complication to the Southeast Asian region's politics and security. Naturally, India's engagement and policies on Southeast Asian was affected by China's rising influence (Weatherbee, 2009; Mattoo, 2001; Hong, 2007). India on the one hand fostered its presence in Southeast Asia and on the other indicated to Beijing that New Delhi had the ability to impinge on China's traditional strategic area by conducting high-profile joint naval exercises in the South China Sea. That is why as ASEAN-India ties have strengthened, there has been much talk about an emerging Sino-Indian rivalry in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2009: 228).

It can be said that the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for both ASEAN and India to focus on promoting a strategic environment in Asia that is free of those thorny issues that have complicated relations between the two sides (Albar, 2004: 108). Both sides also made advances in mutual relations in politics, economy, security, and socio-culture.

2.4.3 Russia

During the Cold War, Soviet Union's interests in Southeast Asia were driven by communist ideology and the notion of fighting an international struggle against capitalism in general, and the US in particular. After the end of the Cold War, a unipolar world was potentially formed with the leading role of the U.S. due to the Soviet Union's disintegration. Russia was one of states strongly opposed a unipolarity. Russia declared multipolarity to be one of the basic principles of its foreign policy and underscored its understanding that a unipolar world could not adequately reflect the diversity of national interests and concerns of various countries. Hence, promotion of relations with ASEAN has played a notable role in the Russian foreign policy of multipolarity (Chufrin, 2006: 9-10).

After the fall of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the overall Russian influence in Southeast Asia declined rapidly. Military cooperation and developmental assistance, which used to be the bedrock of Moscow's ties with countries in the region such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were no longer there. Russia was not a threat to Southeast Asian countries and has been one of ASEAN's dialogue partners.

For more than a decade, with the post-Cold War economic collapse at home, Russia lacked the economic capacity or strategic ambition to assert itself in the region. At the beginning of the post-Cold War era, there was a struggle within Russian politics about the "Look West" policy. People who supported the policy assumed that "the West was the best positioned economically and technologically to bail Russia out of its economic predicament". Whereas, the anti-"Look West" feared that closer ties with the West could lead to Russia being co-opted into the West's security sphere (Singh, 1999: 100). However, it was quickly ended in late 1992. By 1993, Russia recognized the increasing importance of Asia Pacific and reorientated the foreign policy to seek for its role in this region after political, economic, social, and military difficulties in the country.

One of the focuses of Russia's policy after the Cold War was Asia Pacific where ASEAN was important for Russia's development of regionalism therein because of its "driver's seat" of Asia-Pacific regionalism (Paradorn, 2009: 789). Furthermore, Russia's policy of multipolarity was to constrain U.S. strength. Thus, as Paradorn (2009: 792) suggests, ASEAN was seen as one of center of power with which Russia should forge good relations to create a potential counterweight to U.S. influence.

Russia considered the ASEAN PMCs and ARF as important fora contributing to building up peace and stability not only in East Asia but also in a wider Asia Pacific region. Since the middle of the 1990s Russia became a regular participant in the PMCs as a fully-fledged ASEAN dialogue partner and an active member of the ARF. Russia's participation in the ARF has been to engage more deeply Southeast Asia political security in particular and the Asia-Pacific region in general. Russia's attendance was also a way to promote its policy of multipolar world against U.S. unipolarity (Paradorn, 2009: 790).

An emerging East Asia regionalism was also an essential cause that moved Russia to forge closer ties with ASEAN. In there, the EAS, in which ASEAN is viewed as the "driving force", has emerged as a crucial institution in East Asia since 2005. For this reason, Russia tried to take part in the EAS. Nevertheless, Russia's approval to the EAS seemed to be more difficult than to the ARF. Its application for the membership of the EAS was rejected at the first summit in Malaysia in December 2005. Some members such as Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, and Japan opposed Russian membership because of the lack of substantive relations and fears of diluted ASEAN significance. Thus, Russia was granted observer status only (Paradorn, 2009: 791). Until 2011 Russia along with the U.S. officially became the EAS's members. This marked a turning point in Russia's policy towards East Asia, where China's rise has occupied the region.

According to Singh (1999: 102), regionally and internationally, Russia has pushed for taking part in the region's different fora where it can balance vis-à-vis China, Japan, or the United States. In the Asia-Pacific region Russia also saw the ARF, in which Russia was a founding member, in balance-of-power terms. In Southeast Asia, Russian interest

would mainly focus on economic cooperation with ASEAN as a strategy to influence the regional balance of power in favor of Moscow's long-term political and security interest concerning China, Japan, the U.S., and India (Nathan, 1999: 120-121). Generally, Russian diplomacy on key regional security issues was viewed positively in the overall context of the Southeast Asian and the Asia Pacific balance of power (Nathan, 1999; Paradorn, 2009).

However, Buszynski (2006) assesses that Russia's interest in Southeast Asia was indeed rekindled only after Putin's election as president in April 2000. Since then, Putin's government was keen to re-establish Russia as an international power, armed with a much improved economy boosted by oil and gas revenues, and Moscow has clearly turned its attentions to its old stomping grounds in Southeast Asia. Under the Putin Administration (2000-2007), Moscow was able to raise to a new level its relations with both ASEAN and its individual members (Kanaev, 2010: 109). In the Tenth ASEAN Summit, in Vientiane in November 2004, President Vladimir Putin said:

> Russia considers ASEAN to be an important and highly influential organization actively contributing to the integration of the Asia-Pacific region. We hold in high esteem the constructive and creative role which ASEAN plays in promoting stability in South East Asia, its economic and social development. Multilateral and multidimensional cooperation with the ASEAN member-states present an important direction of Russia's foreign policy. And we have firm intention to continue building up and strengthening partnership with ASEAN in the interests of peace, stability and progress of our common Asia-Pacific region. (Chufrin, 2006: 14).

Following fruits of the Putin administration, Medvedev's government has continued to consolidate Russia's achievements. If Putin became Russia's major arms salesman and sought to expand arms sales with ASEAN states, namely Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand (Buszynski, 2006: 276), Medvedev also has attempted to increase arms deals with Southeast Asia (Kanaev, 2010: 110). In 2007, Indonesia and Malaysia placed large orders for Russian fighters while Thailand expressed interest in

Russian weaponry. Vietnam also ordered more Su-30MKKs to reequip its armed forces (Paradorn, 2009: 91). Moreover, Moscow has strengthened its profile in relations with the individual countries of Southeast Asia through other major spheres, including energy sector, innovative technologies and people-to-people contacts (Kanaev, 2010: 110).

It can be seen that the political-security relationship between Russia and ASEAN has made progress since after the Cold War. ASEAN as well as Southeast Asian countries play a crucial role in Russia's policy towards Asia Pacific and East Asia to repose its posture in these regions. Russia's accession to the TAC on 29 November 2004 reflected its strong commitment to regional peace, stability and a significant contribution to the TAC as an important code of conduct governing inter-states relations (ASEAN-RUSSIA Dialogue Relations, 2011: online)[8].

2.5 Concluding remarks

The collapse of the Cold War structure and the resultant fluidity in international relations are bound to affect the security landscape of Southeast Asia in particular and the wider Asia-Pacific region in general. With the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse, China has gradually and more rapidly in recent years, gained regional influence at Moscow's expense. In Southeast Asia, China's diplomatic and commercial influence is arguably far greater now than it ever was in Cold War times, rivaling the U.S. and its strategic partner Japan. Apart from growing bilateral business ties, ASEAN is increasingly reorienting to accommodate China's growing clout through its APT forum- entailing ten Southeast Asian nations plus China, Japan and South Korea.

In the political and security aspects, China's diplomatic offensive in Southeast Asia has raised questions in the U.S. and throughout Asia concerning the nature of China's rise and its implications. Maintaining disputes in the South China Sea between four ASEAN states and China and Taiwan have been particularly escalated recently.

[8] http://www.aseansec.org/5922.htm

China also has increased its assertiveness over disputed territories in the South China Sea. Furthermore, China's military modernization has recently become a flashpoint in international relations. These China's illustration have raised deep anxiety of ASEAN that if China could claim to be a Southeast Asian nation, it would also be able to "strengthen…[its] claims to a role in the affairs of Southeast Asian chambers of international power and diplomacy" (Ba, 1997: 642). Meanwhile, U.S. policy on unilateralism and the global war on terrorism under the Bush Administration (2001-2009) led to a precipitous decline in America's reputation among many publics throughout the world, including those in Southeast Asia. This American strategic policy caused Southeast Asian unease about the U.S.'s uncertain commitment to regional security during a long time in the post-Cold War era. The contrast between the perceived "rise of China" and "decline of the United States" in Southeast Asia for a period after the Cold War makes it easy to reach the conclusion that China has begun to stake its claim as the region's hegemon.

Concern about China's potential hegemon has drawn attention of other major powers like the U.S. back to Southeast Asia. Not until 2010 when Obama was president the U.S. has indeed moved its focus of foreign policy to Asia Pacific where Southeast Asia is a necessary part. Both Hillary Clinton and Robert Gate declared that the U.S. was "back in Asia" in order to indicate a robust reiteration of U.S. strategic interests in the region and to assure Southeast Asia of its certain commitment in the region. Japan, which shares border and has territorial dispute with China in the Senkaku Island (called by Japan) or Diaoyu Islands (following China's calling), is also anxious about China's rise and its military modernization. Similarly, India shares interests with Southeast Asia, the U.S., and Japan in the South China Sea where China has increased its claim over almost of all territory. More importantly, China's rise and its increasing influence on Southeast Asia definitely affect the India's "Look East" policy, of which Southeast Asia is an important factor. Russia has been more concerned in Asia-Pacific and East Asian regionalism in order to seek for its presence in these regions. In order to gain its goal Russia was able to become a counterbalancing actor in the ASEAN's balance of power in the region. Moreover, multipolarity was one of the basic principles of Russia's foreign

policy to object U.S. unipolar policy in the post-Cold War era. As Primakov declared at a 1996 ARF meeting that ASEAN was one of the most important poles of Russia's multipolar world (Paradorn, 2009: 792).

On one side, China's rise and its ambitious dominance involve other powers; uncertainty in Southeast Asia is largely attributable to the ambiguous relationships of the great powers toward the region on the other (Narine, 1998). The engagement of the external powers with Southeast Asia has clearly had major contributions to shaping the political security environment in the region after the Cold War. Though Southeast Asia is a strategic part in the external powers' policy towards wider Asia-Pacific and East Asian region, this sub-region plays a major role in success of the external powers' strategies. Evidently, the ARF and EAS, where ASEAN has occupied the "driver's seat", have attracted participation of external powers such as China, Japan, India, the U.S., Russia, European and other countries. Through the two institutions, political-security issues of Southeast Asia in particular, of Asia Pacific and East Asia in general are addressed and discussed.

In summary, the engagement of major powers with Southeast Asia has brought advantages for ASEAN member states, particularly in the economic realm regarding big markets of China, America and India. Politically, it also has created difficulty and challenge for ASEAN from confrontations between the major powers or between major powers and Southeast Asia. Difficulty is reshaping regional order in the post-Cold War order. Challenge is that overlapping and competing interests of the major powers in Southeast Asia have potentially produced regional instability. Thus, ASEAN needs to underscore its role in relations with external powers for the regional political security in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER III

ARF AND ASEAN'S ROLES IN RELATIONS TO EXTERNAL POWERS

3.1 An overview of the ARF

3.1.1 Establishment of the ARF

The ARF was established in July 1994 as a result of changing security context in Asia after the end of the Cold War. Particularly, the collapse of the Soviet Union might cause the unipolarity of America as the world's lone superpower; the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines bases and its uncertain commitment to the regional security along with the China's rising influence on Southeast Asia, caused concern among ASEAN states as well as to Japan and Australia about the strategic consequences of those dramatic events. Moreover, as Emmers recalled, ASEAN members did not want to be excluded from a new strategic architecture that was chiefly dependent on a Sino-Japanese-U.S. triangle (Severino, 2009, p. 13). In this situation, ideas for the ARF- a multilaterally institutional approach to Asia-Pacific security- was formed (Tan, 2002, p.7).

Turning back to the ARF's predecessor, the APEC- an institutional form of multilateral economic structure- was formed in November 1989 to promote trade in the Asia-Pacific region and to build a sense of self-confidence among Asia-Pacific states. This can be seen as source of encouraging the ARF's formation as Leifer (1996) explained that "the economic underpinnings of security and the need for continued dialogue and firm links with global and regional partners were also stressed" (Thanasak, 2004, p. 23). The senior officials of ASEAN and its PMC dialogue partners intended to create a regional security structure similar to the APEC.

Prior to the ARF's establishment, a meeting at the ministerial level of states across Asia-Pacific was organized for the first time by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and his Japanese counterpart, Taro Nakayama in September 1990. Participants were from Australia, Canada, China, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, the Soviet Union, Thailand, the U.S., and Vietnam. Specific security issues, such as the Gulf war, the Korean Peninsula, Cambodia, and even the international strategic situation were discussed in this meeting (Severino, 2009, p. 8).

An existing ASEAN mechanism was the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference which had been initiated gradually since the mid-1970s. This was a series of annual meetings between ASEAN Foreign Ministers and their counterparts from external region that had the status of "dialogue partner". These meeting mainly focused on economic and political issues (Acharya, 2009, p. 197).

At the ASEAN-PMC in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, Nakayama forwarded a proposal for a political dialogue to ASEAN-ISIS, according to his say:

> I believe utilizing ASEAN-PMC as such a political dialogue forum for mutual reassurance is timely and meaningful. In order to make such as political dialogue more effective, I think it is also meaningful, for instance, to establish, under the auspices of this conference, a Senior Officials Meeting to provide the conference with feedback on the result of the discussion at the meeting (Severino, 2009, p. 9).

This proposal associated with ASEAN leaders at that time that resulted in Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's decision intensifying "its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN-PMC" (as cited in Singapore Declaration of 1992)[9] toward enhancing regional security. This idea was also officially issued in the Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's statement in the conference that the PMC could "well serve the purposes of addressing the many security issues… confronting ASEAN, East Asia and Asia Pacific" (Katsumata, 2009, p.

[9] http://www.aseansec.org/5120.htm

124). It promptly got support from almost of all Dialogue Partners such as Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia and Canada. As a result the PMC machinery was capitalized as the basis of the wide-regional security platform. Those ideas and supports of a security forum reflected a growing regional desire for the expansion of cooperative security.

The ASEAN-PMC, held since 1978, followed the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, hosted by each member in rotation was in itself a forum for security consultations among the ASEAN members (Acharya, 1993, p. 60). The ASEAN-PMC has been the centerpiece of the dialogue system between ASEAN and dialogue partners which initially was aimed to raise economic issues related to access of ASEAN's exports to developed-country markets, investments from developed countries in ASEAN, and development assistance to ASEAN countries from the dialogue partners (Severino, 2009, p. 4). However, since 1991 when ideas of the ARF were born, most of the participants had shared the view that they should start a multilateral security dialogue by using the framework of the PMC.

The PMC engages its dialogue partners, together and individually, in discussions of international and regional security issues, mainly focusing on nuclear proliferation and disarmament and the situation in the Middle East, and initiatives for regional cooperation (Severino, 2008, p. 91). With its effort in founding and transforming the PMC's function, ASEAN has always insisted on being in the "driver's seat" of the PMC process. This functional transformation put the PMC as one of ASEAN's attempts to promote political and security cooperation with external countries.

According to Acharya (2009, p. 197), the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 1992 and the ASEAN-PMC meetings in Manila were a crucial turning point in ASEAN's decision to play a direct and important role in Asia Pacific security multilateralism under an expanded PMC framework. ASEAN's officials and dialogue partners did acknowledge that regional peace and security could not be usefully discussed without participation of China, Russia, and Vietnam (Severino, 2009, p. 21). Thus, it was

quickly agreed to endorse participation of China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea in the ARF. ASEAN's dialogue partners within the framework of the ARF, of course, could not be absent. In the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and PMC, which were held in Singapore on 23-25 July 1993, participants agreed to establish the ARF (official website of the ARF)[10]. In the end, in July 1994, the first ARF ministerial meeting took place in Bangkok with participation of six ASEAN members at that time, two other Southeast Asian states that were not yet ASEAN's members (Vietnam and Laos), ASEAN's seven dialogue partners (the U.S., Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the EU), Papua New Guinea as an ASEAN observer, China and Russia- the 'consultative partners' of ASEAN. As of the end of 2011 the ARF's membership number has increased to twenty-seven states that are part of Asia and/or border the Pacific Ocean[11].

Following the First ARF Chairman's Statement in 1994 at Bangkok, the two main objectives of the ARF were as follows:

1) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and
2) to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region (as cited in official website of the ARF)[12].

In this first working session at the level of foreign ministers of the ARF, participants decided to continue to meet on an annual basis.

3.1.2 Participation and role of external powers in the ARF

[10] http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html

[11] These countries are the ten ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), the ASEAN Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States), and other invited partners Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka.

[12] http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html

Acharya (1996, p. 35) points out that the end of the Cold War has contributed to uncertainty of the future relationship among the region's great powers in Asia-Pacific, the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and India. The effects from major powers in the region contributed to the creation of security cooperation.

3.1.2.1 Japan

As mentioned, the removal of the United States' bases from the Philippines was one of reasons which could cause the "power vacuum" in Southeast Asia. This fear was not only come up for Southeast Asia but also for Japan. According to Soeya (1994), Japan feared that the U.S. military withdrawal from East Asia might create a competition for regional hegemony as Tokyo would not be able to distance itself (Thanasak, 2004, p. 24). Thus, Leifer (1996) explained that Japan's initiative to establish the ARF was considered as an attempt to encourage a new structure of regional relations which would keep involving U.S. military (Thanasak, 2004, p. 24). Another assumption, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan continued to be heavily dependent on the U.S. military umbrella. That alliance relationship on the one hand assisted Japan's own security ability; and on the other intended to restrain Japan's resurgence. In that situation, according to Cunha (1996, pp. 241-242), only within a multilateral institution, involving a regional network of interdependence and mutual restraint, would Japan boost its security role in the rest of the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, Japan viewed the ARF as a tool to improve relations with South Korea and China (Emmers, 2003, p. 116). As Katzenstein and Okawara (2004, p. 108) explained, that was Japan's pragmatism which viewed multilateralism as a complement to rather than as a substitute for bilateralism. In short, Japan's effort to establish the ARF was to guarantee its security concern through the U.S. military presence as well as to seek for its posture in the Asia-Pacific security.

It cannot deny the active role of Japan in building the ARF. As mentioned, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama proposed a political dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region in 1991. Previously, Sato Yukio- a MOFA official- articulated a new

concept of regional security multilateralism which was a multifaceted approach to Asia-Pacific security and stability. Sato's idea was stimulated by the Soviet CSCE proposal and reflected his own perspective on the post-Cold War regional security order (Takeshi, 2007, p. 42). Sato is also person who suggested employing ASEAN-PMC as a forum for political dialogue among the Asia-Pacific states (Takeshi, 2007, p. 27)[13]. According to Takeshi (2007, pp. 41-42), Japan's pursuit of regional security multilateralism was to promote mutual trust among regional countries as well as between Japan and Asian states, who worried about Japan's future regional role due to its militarist history. Furthermore, Japan would foster its larger political and security role in the region.

Besides supporting for a multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, Japan played an important role in "impressing upon Washington the importance of multilateral security dialogue for the Asia-Pacific region, when Washington was skeptical about a multilateral approach", Yukio Satoh explained (Emmers, 2003, p. 116).

3.1.2.2 The United States

When the ideas and proposals of a multilateral security institution were issued at the ASEAN-PMC, they did not attract the U.S. attention. America emphasized the value of bilateralism instead of multilateralism in cooperative security. It was for the reason that the first dynamic of forming multilateralism in Asia-Pacific was reactions to the bilateral alliances centred on the U.S. that had formed the basic framework of the regional order since the 1950s (Wesley, 2009, p. 49). Thus, the U.S. was concerned that the multilateral platforms would potentially undermine, and, in the long run, challenge the relevance and credibility of the bilateral security arrangements of America with individual actors again (Narine, 2002, p. 104; Katsumata, 2009, p. 124). However, this U.S. viewpoint changed under the Bill Clinton Administration. The U.S. had more

[13] See more Japan's contribution to the ARF's establishment in Takeshi Yuzawa. (2007). *Japan's security policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The research for multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific.* London and New York: Routledge from page 16 to 42.

positive view on the ARF as a diplomatic instrument to contribute to promoting U.S. bilateral security with its allies (Emmers, 2003, p. 116).

On the other hand, the U.S. presence in the ARF was initially highly considered by Japan and ASEAN member states because the ASEAN states were lack of sufficient military force to protect the region by themselves, and particularly, there was no power in Asia strong enough to offset the China's rise. Not only Southeast Asian issues but also the key regional crises on the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Straits need the managing role of the United States. As Goh (2011, p. 387) assesses, the U.S. keeps playing crucial role in guaranteeing the vital freedom of navigation and maritime security in the region by its powerful naval force. Thus, ASEAN states considered the U.S. presence in the region as well as in the regional security institution- ARF- as a "benign external guarantor" (Goh, 2011, p. 387).

3.1.2.3 China

From China's perspective, it was not totally interested in a multilateral security forum from the outset of the ARF. China was concerned that multilateralism could be a tool of other powers, especially the U.S. dominance to contain China and interfere in its domestic affairs such as the Taiwan issue. China was also worried that the ARF could become a mechanism in order that the U.S. would interfere in the South China Sea dispute, or the ASEAN states would take this forum to involve America in the dispute. Meanwhile, other Chinese analysts saw the regionalism could help to raise the U.S. role in East Asia (Hung, 2006, p. 44). Despite its skepticism about multilateralism, China certainly did not want to be left out of the ARF that contained all major powers' participation. Thus, in order to avoid American or other major power's dominance in the ARF, China supported ASEAN's leading role as a middle power in the ARF (Emmers, 2003, pp. 116-117).

A report by the IAPS, a department of the influential Chinese think tank, pointed out that China could not stop the U.S. leading role in the ARF; therefore, China should

take part in the forum and shape its development from within to keep its interests not be undermined. The report also found that by participation in the ARF China could maintain its close ties with Southeast Asian neighbors (Hung, 2006, pp. 44-45). Furthermore, Hung (2006) argued that joining the ARF would bring China opportunity to enhance its good relations with ASEAN and foster international multipolarity against the U.S. unipolarity. As a result, growing relations with ASEAN states together with China's appearance in the ARF China could contribute to "the weakening of U.S. ties with its Asian allies", Foot (1998) figured out (as cited in Goh, 2011, 389). Dramatically, China's perspective on multilateralism was changed to positive view after joining the ARF's multilateral security dialogues. As the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Chen Jian stated that China would support ARF "as a new approach to regional security, an approach different from Cold War mentality, an approach which seeks to strengthen peace through dialogue and cooperation" (Acharya, 2001, p. 183). This China's support was necessary to enhance establishment of the ARF at the beginning of the multilateralism.

3.1.2.4 Russia

At the beginning of the post-Cold War era, Boris Yeltsin government paid more attention to Northeast Asia, where Russia had unresolved territorial disputes with China and Japan, and instability on the Korean Peninsula rather than Southeast Asia (Mihoko, 2007, p. 126). However, the multilateral security institution ARF was led by ASEAN. Russia, therefore, had to foster its approach to ASEAN in order to take part in the regional multilateral system. In other words, as Mihoko (2007, p. 150) said ASEAN was perceived as another door for Russia to integrate in Asia-Pacific politics and economy.

In the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific, Russia highlighted the formation of a more balanced and stable relationship with the U.S., China, and Japan (Mihoko, 2007, p. 130). This viewpoint was clearly concerned with ASEAN's strategy of balancing the external major powers comprising the U.S., China, and Japan in the ARF. Being fully aware of Russia's role in the regional multilateral institution, from the outset of the ARF's

establishment, ASEAN actively invited Russia along with China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea to participate in the ARF. Hence, Russia became one of founding members of the ARF.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's reputation and influence were lesser in the world politics due to its focus on domestic changes. Until the late 1990s, Russia had been excluded from APEC. The ARF was the only forum where Russia could participate in confidence-building measures and make contact at the ministerial level in Asia-Pacific (Mihoko, 2007, p. 126). Joining the ARF, therefore, was a great opportunity for Russia to enhance its political stature in the international arena in general and in the Asia-Pacific in particular.

3.1.2.5 India

In the Cold War, the different perspective between India and ASEAN states on the Cambodian conflict made a major obstacle between India and ASEAN. As a Moscow's alliance, New Delhi supported Vietnam during the Indochina wars (Grare, 2001, p. 125). Meanwhile, almost ASEAN states, especially Thailand and Singapore took sides in China to back Khmer Rouge against Vietnam. Since the end of the Cold War, growing cooperation among Southeast Asian states contributed to improving relations between India and ASEAN. India was aware that a peaceful, stable and prosperous Southeast Asia would best serve its interest (Grare, 2001, p. 136). Thus, India indicated its positive behavior towards Southeast Asia through a policy of confidence building measures by participating in particular joint naval exercises with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Naidu (2000) found out that the 1994 Singapore speech of the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao indicated that "India would like to be part of the evolving security framework in the region to assuage doubts about arising from its potential military mights as well as to contribute to the security edifice that was being crafted by the Asia-Pacific powers" (as cited in Grare, 2001, p. 126). Those were India's efforts of its "Look East" policy.

While all major powers such as the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia were the ARF's members, India- an emerging major regional military power from the Cold War (Grare, 2001, p. 124)- naturally could not accept to be left out of the regional institution. Especially, this is the first time India participated in a multilateral institution; thus, it lobbied actively to join the ARF (Grare, 2001, p. 129). In contrast, India's participation as a major regional military power would lie in ASEAN's strategic balance of power within the ARF process. Additionally, participation in the ARF was also a good opportunity for India to promote cooperation with ASEAN states and other external powers as well. As a result, India became the ARF's member in 1996 after becoming a full ASEAN's dialogue partner in 1995.

However, the ARF member status does not mean that there was no disagreement between India and ASEAN. For instance, India was strictly criticized by ASEAN states and other ARF members for its nuclear tests in 1998. At that time, India had to seek for a diplomatic solution from the ASEAN states to avoid a condemnation of its nuclear tests as well as a lessening of its relations with ASEAN (Grare, 2001, p. 130). India's effort was acceptable partly because some ASEAN states saw India's nuclear tests as a "showing their flag" that would not hurt them (Sridharan, 2001, p. 78). That can be seen a diplomatic success for New Delhi.

In sum, external powers' participation in the ARF derived from various perspectives and aims. Notably, the U.S. and China's participations, which were the two most powerful countries in the world by that time, draw the most attention of scholars because of their potential influence on the institution as well as regional security.

3.2 ASEAN's roles in relations to external powers in the ARF

With the first working session of the ARF convened in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 with 18 founding members, the ARF became the first truly multilateral security institution in the Asia-Pacific region. It has been an extension of a model of regional security pioneered by ASEAN which has created open meetings for discussion of

regional political and security issues in the strategic environment attendant at the end of the Cold War. It has also been the only regional security framework in the world today which involves all the major powers in world politics (including the U.S., Russia, Japan, China, India, and EU). This can be seen as ASEAN's achievement, but a challenge as well. ASEAN is grouping of middle and small powers in aspect of both economy and politics in Southeast Asia and had not covered all countries in the region yet till 1999 with the entrance of the last member, namely Cambodia. How could ASEAN show its role in relations with external powers in such challenging conditions? It is analyzed in this chapter by examining the formation and working of the institution.

3.2.1 Forming multilateral security institution for sustained dialogues

3.2.1.1 Founding forum and promoting dialogue with external powers

Being fully aware of major powers' interference in Southeast Asia during the Cold War did not mean that ASEAN would "close the diplomatic door". ASEAN states acknowledged that it was impossible to keep the major powers out of Southeast Asian security and policies. ASEAN was also aware that security dialogue with external powers would increase Southeast Asian security and self-confidence on the part of the association (Singh, 1997, pp. 133-134). Additionally, the changes of the post-Cold War era, particularly the U.S. uncertain commitment following its military withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992 and the rise of China- a neighboring major power which shares border and has had territorial disputes with four Southeast Asian states in the strategic South China Sea- did not allow ASEAN to ignore major powers' role in its strategic policies on regional security. As one ASEAN official said, "it is better to… engage China now when it wants to be in than to let it go off on some unilateral track" (Ba, 2009, p. 178). ASEAN, thus, called for security dialogues with outside powers as response to the post-Cold War uncertainties and challenges. The Singapore Declaration at the 4th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in 1992 endorsed ASEAN members' engagement in security dialogue with external powers:

> "ASEAN could use established fora to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in the region… taking full cognizance of the declaration of ASEAN Concord. To enhance this effort ASEAN shall identify its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC)."

However, the question of ASEAN by that time was how to connect the engagement of external powers with regional political and security issues. At that very moment, ASEAN still lacked coherence within the group. There were different perceptions of the next regional hegemony between ASEAN states. In contrast to Indonesia and Malaysia's fear of China, Singapore was more concerned about Japan's ability of remilitarization (Acharya, 2009, p. 194). Moreover, ASEAN needed to bring together all ten Southeast Asian heads of government to become a coherent and strong regional association. In this situation, the initial engagement of external powers if was not put in a systematic structure, could bring back interference of extra-regional states in Southeast Asian affairs as they did in the Cold War. Hence, multilateral security institution could be seen as a safe and advantageous venue for the lesser ASEAN member states to enter into dialogue with the Asia-Pacific states about regional politics and security.

Before the ARF's establishment, the idea of an Asia-Pacific multilateral security institution derived from the Australian proposal for founding of an Asian version of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which played a crucial role in easing the Cold War in Europe (Wesley, 2009, p. 57). As Gareth Evans, the then Australian foreign minister, envisaged "a future Asian security architecture involving a wholly new institutional process that might be capable of evolving, in Asia just as in Europe, as a framework for addressing and resolving security problems" (Acharya, 2009, p. 196). Another ARF's founding member, Canada, also stressed the need of creating a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (PCCSD) which encouraged a process of confidence-building and dialogue (Tan, 2007, p. 19). Not only the Australians, the Canadians, but also the Japanese and the Singaporeans saw importance of the discussions of political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War context

(Severino, 2009. p. 7). Though those proposals of the security model were found unfeasible in Asia and might lead ASEAN to “lose its identity”, Lee Kuan Yew argued (as cited in Acharya, 2009, p. 196), they were partly received with agreement by ASEAN members about forming a security institution to engage other countries in Asia Pacific. By ASEAN’s July 1991 Ministerial Meeting, the ministers agreed to expand the PMC agenda to include security; they also agreed to engagement of other countries in East Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific with regular constructive consultations (Ba, 2009, p. 174). Then, at the summit held in Singapore in January 1992, ASEAN states authorized the grouping to deal with security issues and organize regional security dialogues both within Southeast Asia and in wider-regional Asia-Pacific. In short, the ideas and demands for a security institution initially drew attention of many countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the ARF’s formation was ASEAN’s effort in order to realize ASEAN states’ and external powers’ desire for an Asia-Pacific institution where members discuss and share regional political and security issues.

In combination with ASEAN’s acknowledgement of the extra-regional powers’ predictable engagement with Southeast Asian security and the need for establishing a multilateral security institution for sustained dialogues in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War, the ARF’s formation was a natural result which reflected ASEAN’s primary effort in relations to external powers to involve them into guaranteeing of Southeast Asian security. In fact, these ideas of talking about regional security within ASEAN and with states outside ASEAN were not entirely new. These ideas derived from ASEAN’s own experiences with an informal, inclusive regionalism. ASEAN’s invitation to the Soviet Union and China to attend their first AMM as observers in 1991indicated a starting point for ASEAN’s new expanded security dialogue with external powers (Ba, 2009, p. 179).

At the 27th AMM in 1994, the foreign ministers agreed “the ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the

Asia-Pacific" (Joint Commuique of the Twenty-seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 22-23 July 1994)[14]. The chairman's statement of the second ARF officially defined the character of the ARF as "a forum for open dialogue and consultation on regional political and security issues, to discuss and reconcile the differing views between ARF participants in order to reduce the risk to security". Again, at the 8th ARF in Hanoi in 2001, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam Nguyen Di Nien reaffirmed the ministers' commitment to advance the ARF as an effective forum for dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues in Asia-Pacific. Generally, ASEAN has obtained its purpose of bringing ASEAN states and external countries to a common dialogue to discuss political and security issues. Promoting dialogue among the ARF's members was often reflected in the ARF chairman's statements by ASEAN's leaders.

In short, the ARF has brought together several ASEAN's dialogue partners in to the regional multilateral institution to discuss political and security issues in general. Its work is augmented by "track II" arrangements such as ASEAN-ISIS[15] and a wider Asian-Pacific network known as CSCAP[16] meetings and workshops where government officials, other organizational representatives, think tank, and specialists discuss various security-related issues (Rüland, Oktober 2002, pp. 85-86). Functionally, CSCAP formed four working groups which undertake studies in the areas of Maritime Cooperation, Security Cooperation in the North Pacific/Northeast Asia, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security as well as Confidence and Security-building Measures (See the official website of CSCAP)[17].

3.2.1.2 Consolidating the institution's procedure

[14] http://www.aseansec.org/3665.htm

[15] ASEAN-ISIS was officially launched in 1988. Its main objective, which is registered with the ASEAN Secretariat as an NGO, was to strengthen cooperation in the field of research on strategic and international problems.

[16] CSCAP was organized "for the purpose of providing a structured process for regional confidence building and security cooperation among countries and territories in the Asia Pacific region (See CSCAP, Article II: The Purpose and Functions of CSCAP, Kuala Lumpur 1993:9).

[17] http://www.cscap.org/

At the second meeting of the ARF ministers held in Brunei on 1 August 1995, the ARF Concept Paper was adopted as the institutional roadmap charting the body's future. The paper recommended three stages for the evolution of the ARF, including confidence-building measures (CBMs), the development of mechanism for "preventive diplomacy" (PD), and modalities for conflict resolutions (official website of the ARF)[18].

Among a number of the specific types of CBMs were approved in Stage One of the ARF agenda, including exchanging annual defence postures on a voluntary basis, increasing dialogues on security issues on a bilateral, subregional and regional basis, greater transparency through the publication of defence documentation such as Defence White Papers, maintaining senior-level contacts and exchanges among military institutions, encouraging participation of the ARF members in the United Nations Conventional Arms Register, and creating an annual seminar for defence officials and military officers (Acharya, 2009, pp. 201-202). At the meetings of the ARF's CBM ISG in November 1998 and March 1999, three additional confidence-building measures were addressed. The ISG recommended that ARF members should be encouraged to exchange visits of their naval vessels as a useful means of promoting transparency and confidence; they should exchange visits to military establishments; and they should compile national lists of publications and experts on confidence-building measures and circulate them to other ARF members.

Another institutional feature of the ARF is the Senior Officials Meeting (ARF-SOM) which takes place prior to the ministerial meetings to prepare the ground for the decisions at latter annual meetings (Singh, 1997, p. 138). To encourage defence representatives' greater participation in intersessional activities the ARF-SOM would be organized before annual session. The SOMs are the focal points of coordination and preparation for the ARF ministerial meeting, where participants explore and exchange ideas on political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region (Severino, 2009, p. 38).

[18] http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-publication/459.html

The chairman's statement of the eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2001 emphasized "confidence-building is of essential importance to and remains the foundation and main thrust of the whole ARF process" (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, p. 185). It was reaffirmed in the 2003 chairman's statement the importance on "continuing work on confidence-building measures as the foundation of the ARF process (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, p. 260). The question here is that why ARF needed to promote confidence building. In the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific context there were existing suspicions and uncertainties among participants, such as between the U.S. and China about containing ability of each other, the perception of rivalry between China and Japan for influence in East Asia and China's suspicions of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the South China Sea disputes. These tensions, particularly between the major powers could break up the ARF's coherence and participants' cooperation which is the core factor of the neoliberal institutionalism. For those reasons, ARF needed to build the confidence to reduce the mutual suspicions among states in the region (Severino, 2009, p. 33) and to foster cooperation among ARF's members. As mentioned clearly in the ARF Concept and Principles of PD, "cooperation among ARF members can preempt disputes as well as prevent disputes from developing into conflicts by enhancing trust and understanding" (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, p. 215).

In contrast to confidence-building, which is a pre-requisite to PD, PD is meant to focus on specific security issues and to adopt measures to reduce the risks of open conflict. It was later officially adopted to be part of the second stage of the three-stage process of the ARF. In the Bangkok CSCAP (*Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific* which was formed in June 1993 in Kuala Lumpur) meeting of 1999, eight principles of PD were briefly outlined:

- Diplomacy: It relies on diplomatic and peaceful methods such as diplomacy, negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation.
- Non-coercive: Military action and the use of force is not part of PD

- Timeliness: Action is preventive rather than curative; PD methods are most effectively deployed at an early stage of a dispute or crisis.
- Requires Trust and Confidence: PD can only be exercised successfully when there is a strong foundation of trust and confidence.
- Consultation and Consensus: Any PD effort can only be carried out through consensus after careful and extensive consultation among ARF members, with due consideration for the need for timeliness.
- Voluntary: PD practices are to be employed only at the request of all the parties directly involved in the dispute and with their clear consent.
- PD applies to conflicts between and among states
- It is conducted in accordance with universally recognized basic principles of international law and inter-state relations embodied (Acharya, 2009, p. 204).

The 8th ARF held in Hanoi in July 2001 noted the progress made in strengthening measures to address the overlap between confidence building and preventive diplomacy, boost the effectiveness of the ARF process. Also, in this meeting a number of PD initiatives that could be undertaken by the forum were adopted, including confidence building efforts, norms building, enhancing channels of communication and role of the ARF chair (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, p. 215). In this meeting, the ministers agreed to adopt the “ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy” which clarified the point, defining PD following three steps:

- To help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between States that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability;
- To help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and
- To help minimize the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region (Severino, 2009, pp. 53-54).

The “ARF Concept and Principle of PD” was emphasized in the Ninth Meeting as a major achievement in the evolution of the ARF. However, what has happened in fact is different from positive statements in the ARF meetings. It is said that ASEAN has been stuck in the CBMs, particularly after the ARF’s expansion (Severino, 2009). According to Emmers and Tan (December 2009, p. 14), the large membership restricts its capacity to maintain internal coherence and move ahead. Moreover, participation, implementations and compliance of the CBMs are voluntary, and there is not any obligation for participants to implement the measures (Kawasaki, 206, p. 223). In the second stage, Severino (2009) argued that the PD is stuck in defining what kind of conflicts and situation which it can prevent. And there has been contrast perspective between ARF’s members in the PD development. While Australia, Canada, Japan and the U.S seem to promote implementation of PD, China and the ASEAN states support dialogue and consultation. China, for instance, rejects any possibility relating to PD that the ARF would intervene in the Taiwan situation, which has been considered as China’s internal affair (Severino, 2008, p. 29). Yet, ASEAN states and China have been willing to apply PD for the South China Sea issue which is shown in the DOC signed by China and ASEAN in November 2002 (Emmers&Tan, December 2009, pp. 16-17). Thus, it has failed so far to move toward PD. Although the ARF is stuck in the both first stages, it does seem better to create an institution for ASEAN states and external powers to discuss the Asia-Pacific political and security issues than not to have any one at all.

3.2.1.3 Resolving the South China Sea issue with China within the ARF institutional framework

China has insisted on bilateral negotiation with ASEAN-related disputing states to resolve the South China Sea disputes, whereas, ASEAN states have preferred multilateral approach to forge a more binding code of conduct in the issue. In the effort to table the South China Sea dispute in a multilateral dialogue ASEAN succeeded in negotiating the DOC in the South China Sea with China, showing their commitment to maintaining peace and security in South China Sea by restraining themselves from complicating the situation and settling all disputes through peaceful means.

ASEAN's post-Cold War involvement in the South China Sea disputes has been defined by the absence of a common threat perception and therefore of a common stand on security issues (Emmers, 2003, pp. 128-152). On the other hand, ASEAN and the ARF worked to bring political and security cooperation to a higher level, especially through a positive process of engagement with China, which in turn ceased to be a revisionist international actor and became a more responsible power (Emmers, 2010, pp. 101-105). Thus, it was necessary to raise the South China Sea disputes in the multilateral fora to achieve a comprehensive solution for all parties.

Since the ARF's outset, ARF's ministers acknowledged that the South China Sea issue was one of the flashpoints of potential conflict in the region. However, territorial dispute was used to be considered as a sensitive issue and under China's stress on bilateral rather than multilateral discussion on the subject; the ARF took up the South China Sea over dinner rather than in plenary, although the plenary meeting was held behind closed doors (Severino, 2010, p. 43). At the 2nd ARF, with the rise of tensions in the Mischief Reef, the ARF ministers also commended bilateral and multilateral, governmental and on-governmental consultations and seminars in the Asia-Pacific region including the Indonesian Workshop (co-sponsored by Canada) series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea as a useful means of enhancing dialogue and cooperation (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, p. 10). In another attempt, at the 7th ARF held in Bangkok in 2000, participants welcomed a dialogue on the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Consultations and the Informal Workgroup on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea and welcomed the ASEAN resolve to work closely with China in this matter (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, p. 163). The most temporary important achievement of ASEAN in the South China Sea issue has been the DOC which was signed in Phnom Penh on 4 November 2002 as an instrument to prevent further tensions over the disputed area and to reduce the risks of military conflict.

In the 43rd AMM in 2010, ASEAN Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the DOC of 2002 as a milestone document between ASEAN states and China to build mutual trust and confidence, thereby, to help maintain peace and stability in the region. ASEAN Ministers also encouraged efforts to fully implement the Declaration and the eventual conclusion of a more advanced Code of Conduct. Moreover, ministers agreed that international law, including the UNCLOS 1982 was greatly encouraged to resolve peacefully disputes. This was reaffirmed at the Chairman's statement, the 7th ARF in Bangkok in July 2000 and added the aim of ensuring the freedom of navigation in this area (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, p. 162). By this way, ASEAN highly estimated the CBMs and the exercise of self-restrain to avoid potential conflicts in the area.

Most recently, in a series of ASEAN-related meetings opened in Hanoi in the first half of 2010, Vietnam failed to get the South China Sea disputes on the agenda (Thayer, 2010, p. 25). However, at the 17th ARF annual ministerial meeting held in Hanoi in July 2010, foreign ministers or representatives of 27 ARF members discussed political and security issues as well as cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Once again the South China Sea issue was officially addressed on the ARF's agenda. Twelve of the ASEAN's twenty-seven members raised maritime security issues, including the South China Sea (Thayer, 2010, p. 35). Especially, at this time the disputes were raised in a multilateral security forum which 'shocked' China.

Because of these series of incidents, on the occasion of the ARF summit held in Bali in July 2011 the South China Sea was one of the hottest issues. In this summit, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono underlined the slow pace of the talks and challenged the foreign ministers to "send a strong signal to the world that the future of the South China Sea is a predictable, manageable and optimistic one" ("South China Sea," 2011).

In the South China Sea disputes, the most successful effort of ASEAN until now has been signing the DOC with China. The declaration was perceived as a sign that China

respected ASEAN principles and really wanted to solve peacefully the disputes (Emmers & Tan, December 2009, p. 17). Within the ARF framework the ARF process, therefore, should be considered the core of ASEAN's engagement policies towards Beijing which started in the early 1990s (Katsumata, 2009, p. 27). However, what China has done recently are beyond the ASEAN states' expectation. Hence, Southeast Asia expects that the COC between ASEAN and China will be signed soon.

3.2.1.4 ASEAN's contributions to other external powers' issues

Through the ARF, ASEAN has organized several dialogues on disputes between non-ASEAN states working as members of the ARF. In March 1996, China held military exercises to threaten Taiwan and influence its coming presidential election. This Beijing's action led to a U.S. deployment of two carrier squadrons to the area. Though American ships did not enter the strait and no invasion took place, China angrily criticized the U.S. "for grossly interfering in China's internal affairs and for the brazen show of force" ("China, U.S. set," 1996). At the 9th meeting in Brunei, the ARF provided the setting for dialogue between the U.S. and China on the Taiwan Straits issue in 1996. This dialogue was truly a bilateral meeting between the two major powers' representatives, but it was generally approached under the ASEAN's multilateral non-confrontational principle (Dickens, 1998).

The ARF has also served as a vehicle to promote dialogue with North Korea. For instance, the ARF meeting in July 2002 offered an opportunity to the U.S. and North Korea to resume a dialogue after the George W. Bush Administration characterized North Korea as an "Axis of Evil" along with Iran and Iraq (Emmers, 2003, p. 35). In 2003, at the 10th ARF meeting, the ministers supported the denuclearization of North Korea and urged this country to resume its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to reverse its decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All ministers at the meeting agreed to support the further efforts of ASEAN as the role of the ARF Chair to help ease tensions in Korean Peninsula.

Besides those two flashpoints between external powers in the Asia Pacific, there are other serious crises in the Sino-U.S. relations in the mid 1990s, or Sino-Japanese in the early and mid-2000s. In this sense, the present arrangements have benefited the great powers, helping to keep them engaged and thus boosting ASEAN's capacity to keep the process going. By involving the external powers into the ARF process ASEAN has mediated their relations so that they can come together to discuss the political and security issues of common concern and perhaps to tone down the tensions among them (Jones, 2010).

Not only traditional security issues, but also non-traditional security has been regarded as common threats by all ARF participants. Thus, ARF also discussed other security issues such as natural or man-made disaster, transboundary environmental pollution, energy security, issues arising from the civilian use of nuclear power, international terrorism, drug-trafficking and other transnational crime, and communicable diseases are preferred to discuss in ARF rather than sensitive one. It is due to the fact that these issues would be susceptible to treatment and cooperation in a broad multilateral setting (Severino, 2008, p. 29).

According to Severino (2008, p. 30), under present circumstances and for the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the ARF, the only Asia-Pacific-wide forum dealing with regional security at a high political level. It, therefore, can be argued that the ARF has contributed to promoting dialogue between external participants and de-escalate the crisis.

In general, the ARF was born basing on the ASEAN model of addressing security through political dialogue purposedly to serve as a supplementary vehicle which might influence emerging security issues in the post-Cold War era. In this purpose, ASEAN has been successful in building a multilateral security institution for sustained dialogues and cooperation. The ARF can be seen as ASEAN's success in providing a venue for ASEAN states and external powers to work on the political and security issues peacefully. It has been a place for member states to open discussing regional political-security issues, to

explore their information about regional circumstances and to boost political cooperation for further regional stability. In the view of neoliberalism, the ARF is an arena for strategic cooperation between its member states in dealing with various regional security issues. Parallel to common security of the region each state pursues its own interests (Katsumata, 2006, p. 182). As Singh (1997, p. 137) said, the ARF gave Japan an entry into regional security dialogue which it has long sought, it gave Russia a similar entry and say in Asia-Pacific security discussions which the Soviet Union had tried in vain to obtain, it allowed the U.S. to be part of a new multilateral security institution without compromising its bilateral military arrangements in the region, and it brought China a new forum to interact with its neighbors and other Asia-Pacific powers.

3.2.2 Building institutional norms and rules

In a security framework for dialogue as the ARF, in which few military measures are pursued, ASEAN- a grouping of countries with low military capabilities- has been able to play a leadership role (Katsumata, 2009, p. 29). This section examines how ASEAN has presented its leading role in relations to external powers in the ARF.

3.2.2.1 ASEAN's "driver's seat"

ASEAN's central role in the ARF was shown through some certain ways. It was reflected not only in the name "ASEAN" Regional Forum, which is to ensure the centrality of ASEAN's role in it, but also in its rights and obligations which are illustrated in the Concept Paper adopted in the Second ARF. Accordingly, the Concept Paper asserts that "ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be the primary driving force" of the ARF. The ARF annual sessions are held in ASEAN countries after the annual AMM and chaired by the foreign ministers of the host ASEAN governments. The Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee will provide the bureaucratic framework to support and coordinate ARF activities. The forum's procedures have to be based on prevailing ASEAN norms and practices. ASEAN has a significant say in the agenda and on admission of new members to the ARF. Decisions should be made by consensus and after careful and

extensive consultations. No voting will take place (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, pp. 8-16). Thus, there is not any alternative to ASEAN leadership of the ARF forum and process as Leifer pointed out in 1994 that both the foreign ministers of Thailand and Singapore said “ASEAN will always have the driver’s seat” and will “steer the ARF” (Coombe, 2003, p. 50).

However, ASEAN’s leading role in the ARF is not merely due to its subjective claims. Acharya (2009, p. 6) explains that ASEAN’s credibility in resolving the Cambodian conflict made external powers accept ASEAN’s nominal leadership in the ARF. It was important because all three super powers, including the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China participated in this conflict. Yet, ASEAN’s peaceful solution of the Cambodia conflict created itself the reputation in the post-Cold War era. Rizal Sukma (as cited in Coombe, 2003, p. 50) also argues that ASEAN’s leadership role in the ARF is a result not only of an act of skilful diplomacy but essentially by default. It is due to the fact that the ARF was founded on the ASEAN-PMC. That has given ASEAN great influence over ARF activities. Moreover, it cannot deny ASEAN’s crucial role in founding the ARF. As Mahathir (1995) said, “ASEAN created the Asean Regional Forum. ASEAN must stay the course to ensure that the ARF process is not steered into a direction which ASEAN does not wish to pursue” (Ba, 2009, p.182). On the other hand, Katsumata (2009, pp. 28-30) used the norm of cooperative security to explain ASEAN’s leading role. He assumed that ASEAN constructed an environment which defined ASEAN as the centre of the Asia-Pacific regionalism in the background of major power rivalries. That background did make it difficult for the U.S., China, or Japan to occupy the “driver’s seat”. Hence, ASEAN has been in a unique position. ASEAN’s “driver’s seat” in the ARF has been accepted by its pre-attempts during the post-Cold War era and by the way it created the ARF.

If ASEAN’s success in resolving the Cambodian conflict contributed to ASEAN’s leading role in the ARF, its latter position as “driving force” in the ARF “presents a significant advance in ASEAN’s international status”, as Leifer judges (as cited in Coombe, p. 50).

ARF meetings would be synchronized with the year-cycle of ASEAN member states. This is the way ASEAN manages the roles and interests of the great powers in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as well as affirm its leading role in the institution. On the other hand, according to Acharya (2009), ASEAN can control the agenda of discussions through two important norms: the need for an indigenous approach and the "ASEAN Way" of dialogue. By these ways, ASEAN can play an important role in the development of any future regional security institution.

For the norm of indigenous approach, Katsumata (2006, p. 193) argues that while the Southeast Asian countries' interests and policies were influenced by external ideas, the influence of such ideational factors was affected by the local norms in Southeast Asia. Adapting the norm of indigenous approach ASEAN brought the TAC into ARF framework "to encourage the ARF participants to associate themselves with the TAC" (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, pp. 13-14).

ARF's leaders' adoption of the TAC as "a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence building, preventive diplomacy and political and security cooperation" in the chairman's statement at the first ARF meeting was seen as ASEAN' success to affirm its central role in the ARF. The TAC is the regional norms for interstate relations in the region which were codified by the ASEAN leaders at the first ASEAN Summit Meeting in Bali in February 1976. Those principles of the TAC code of conduct include:

- Respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;
- Freedom from external interference, subversion or coercion;
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
- The peaceful settlement of disputes;
- Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
- Effective cooperation among themselves.

Actually, as Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas assessed at the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1991 that in the early 1990s, policy makers in the governments were also committed to the Southeast Asian diplomatic norms, as they frequently emphasized the importance of the TAC and relevant norms in their discussions of regional security issues on various occasions (Katsumata, 2006, p. 192). While the TAC has been observed as an ASEAN countries' key to the promotion of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, the commitment of external states to the TAC marked the next important step of ASEAN to bind participants to Southeast Asian security interests. In sum, according to Coombe (2003, p. 50), ASEAN's leadership role in the ARF was made possible by a regional organization with some experience in building institutional identity and in managing regional order, making it an acceptable interlocutor to all parties.

ASEAN's leading role was practised on its right to grant ARF's membership. The U.S. put pressure on China and Russia's participation as well as Myanmar's membership. Nonetheless, ASEAN leaders believed that "it was well within their rights as an indigenous regional process" instead of other non-ASEAN states' business. In 1996, as Thai Foreign Minister Kasem S. Kasemsri definitely claimed in response to U.S. objections to Myanmar's participation in the ARF: "Who participates in ARF is a matter for ASEAN to decide" (Ba, 2009, p. 182). By this statement ASEAN reaffirmed its leading role in the ARF process. ASEAN was aware that replacement of the ARF's leadership by any another power in the context of existing rivalries between major powers could lead to a competition among these states and regional instability.

3.2.2.2 The ARF's "ASEAN Way"

The "ASEAN Way" is a term of diplomacy or code of conduct that has evolved in intra-ASEAN relations and presents the conscious rejection by Asian leaders and policy-makers of what they perceive is to be imported Western notions of diplomacy and multilateralism (Capie & Evans, 2002, p. 14). Acharya (2009) asserted that the "ASEAN Way" is crucial bedrock of building a Southeast Asian community which norms, values

and identity are expected to be shared among and internalized by ASEAN member states and their populations. The “ASEAN Way” was later extended to the ARF as the first attempt ASEAN sought to brand its security modality and management to a security institution covering the entire Asia-Pacific region. Narine (1998) pointed out that ASEAN through the Concept Paper explicitly promoted the “ASEAN Way” as a method of building intra-ARF relations. The “ASEAN Way” in the ARF includes not only ASEAN’s own norms such as decision-making through consensus, non-use of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other members but also the relatively new norms of inclusivity.

The ‘ASEAN Way’ is referred to the informal consensual approach of the ARF. As it is mentioned in the chairman’s statement at the 2nd ARF: “decisions of the ARF shall be made through consensus after careful and extensive consultations among all participants” (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, p. 8). Consensus is often regarded as one of the few core practices of ASEAN which is aimed at enhancing the “comfort level” of the ASEAN members and is regarded as an important precondition for success in ASEAN diplomacy (Katsumata, 2009, p. 53). It ensures that the group’s decisions are made and implemented on a voluntary and non-binding basis. It allows dissident views to air, but it emphasizes formation of a common ground among all parties such that discussion could move forward and a collective decision be reached (Acharya, 2009, pp. 82-83). Since the 2nd ARF Meeting, it has almost become consensus that the group will develop in an evolutionary manner. Process would be made moving the ARF forward at paces comfortable to all participants– not “too fast for those who want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast” (The ASEAN Regional Forum Documents Series 1994-2006, p. 16). Within the ARF framework, the consensus approach to decision-making gives the key role to the chair who determines when consensus has or has not been reached (Capie & Evans, 2002, p. 20).

Aside from the consensus building arrangement, the “ASEAN Way” is also featured by the norm of inclusiveness, which is central to the idea of cooperative security: bringing both like-minded and non-like-minded countries into dialogue (Capie & Evans,

2002, p. 18). As mentioned above, since the early 1990s AMM ASEAN's officials and dialogue partners acknowledged that regional peace and security could not be usefully discussed without participation of China, Russia, and Vietnam. As a result they invited not only the participants of the ASEAN-PMC to this new forum but also the non-like-minded countries. Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi (1994) contended that the concept of an ARF "requires the development of friendship rather than the identification of enemies. The nature of security problems in the Asia-Pacific is such that they do not lend themselves amenable for management through the old method of deterrence by countervailing force" (Acharya, 2009, p. 199).

The norm of non-use of force, or peaceful settlement of disputes, is associated with ASEAN's informal approach to conflicts. It encourages member states to seek the improvement of the situation in the long term by gradually promoting a sense of mutual trust in the aim of facilitating communication between disputed parties (Katsumata, 2009, p. 52).

Basing on the TAC, the "ASEAN Way" also includes the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states stating that members would not interfere with internal affairs such as human rights, democratization of domestic politics and ethnic conflict. As people know, some ASEAN states such as Myanmar and Vietnam have faced a barrage of the U.S. criticism for human rights and democracy. Thus, non-interference can be seen an effective method to avoid likely intervening of major powers in ASEAN member states' internal affairs. Although those issues have an impact on regional security, Yoneiji Kuroyanagi assumes that the ARF cannot deal with such issues (Thanasak, 2004, p. 86).

In other words, the impact of the "ASEAN Way" on the ARF process was also reflected in the Concept Paper which envisaged three categories of security cooperation: CBMs, PD, and conflict resolution (later changed to "elaboration of approaches to conflicts") (Acharya, 2009, pp. 199-201). In the 2nd ARF Meeting in 1995, participants endorsed the proposals from the Concept Paper in order to keep the ARF as a forum for

regional security dialogue and to continue discussing how best to implement CBMs. The ARF also saw the development of CBMs as the first stage of its three-stage evolution plan. The two other stages are going to be developed respectively in the future.

Although the concept of the “ASEAN Way” is mentioned widely in the ARF process, there is no common definition of the “ASEAN Way”. According to Kawasaki (2006, p. 221), constructivists view “the ‘ASEAN Way’ as an expression of identity formation among the member states when it is in fact a form of institutional solution for the Assurance Game.” Severino (2009, p. 40) emphasizes the “ASEAN Way” with its informal, non-binding, and non-coercive character, which has been thought to be essential, at least at the initial stages, for the building of trust among the ARF members. On the other hand, three stages for the evolution of the ARF also determined the “ASEAN Way” in the ARF. Severino (2009, pp. 43-45) affirms that ASEAN’s leadership of the ARF is now accepted by all, and the “ASEAN Way” is also considered as the ARF’s way of diplomacy. No substitute for ASEAN leadership or the “ASEAN Way” has been plausibly put forward for building mutual confidence in the ARF system. After all, the “ASEAN Way” of diplomacy was meant to facilitate cooperation between countries on an equal footing through non-military means (Katsumata, 2009, p. 270).

Today, external powers are in the process of learning the value of ASEAN’s dialogue-based approach, thereby committing themselves to cooperative security in the context of the “ASEAN Way” (Katsumata, 2009, p. 20). Though some countries in the ARF might not accept the “ASEAN Way”, ASEAN has successfully institutionalized the “ASEAN Way” value as the code of behavior among ARF member states. Of course, adapting the “ASEAN Way” to the ARF has benefited ASEAN. The “ASEAN Way” defining the ARF helped ASEAN to cope with the uncertain sentiments about its relevance in the future. It ensures the group’s centrality and reputation would remain largely unchallenged despite the relative increase of strategic uncertainties in the region. Flexible decisions which are made on a voluntary basis without voting, and consensuses can help ASEAN to feel safe in such an institutional setting where non-ASEAN members could not easily impose their wills on the group. In particular, the “ASEAN Way” has

helped to maintain the ASEAN's centrality within the ARF, insulating and hedging against scenarios that might upstage ASEAN and unseat its control by external powers (Vic, 2007).

In general, the ARF has provided a venue for the participant countries to practice, strengthen and spread cooperative norms over a larger geographical area – from Southeast Asia to the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF, hence, should be seen as a framework for the development and practice of a set of norms associated with security cooperation (Katsumata, 2006, p. 195). In this process, constructivist viewed that the ASEAN countries' interests and policies which led them to initiate the ARF were defined by a set of norms concerning security cooperation. In order to achieve political and security interests, particularly in the context of increasing engagement of external powers with the ARF, ASEAN has built norms and principles to control participant countries. The "ASEAN Way" in the ARF and ASEAN's "driver's seat" in the ARF either by default or by its construction have reflected ASEAN's attempts to constitute institutional norms and rules in order to control reactions among participant countries. It does not mean that ASEAN aims to overwhelm extra-regional countries' role or to become a regional hegemon, but ASEAN would like to promote cooperative security among Asia-Pacific states. As Mahathir stated, "ASEAN created the Asean Regional Forum. ASEAN must stay the course to ensure that the ARF process is not steered into a direction which ASEAN does not wish to pursue" (Ba, 2009, p.182).

However, the ARF has been criticized for being no more than a "talk shop" that is unable to respond to security development in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, in the constructivism view, the cooperative security forum is significant in terms of norms, although it may appear to be a mere "talking shop" with no tactical significance. The ARF has still witnessed its crucial role in the Asia-Pacific regional politics and security. Evidently, more and more countries have been willing to participate in the ARF process because an involvement in ASEAN's normative exercise would enhance the legitimacy of their interests in Asia-Pacific affairs (Katsumata, 2009. p. 30). As a result, the ARF's attraction contributes to advance the legitimacy of ASEAN's "driver's seat" in the ARF.

3.2.3 Balancing powers

Ali Alatas (1991) conceded that Southeast Asia "can't keep the four powers [the USA, Japan, China and the Soviet Union] out of the region" (Acharya, 2009, p. 198). ASEAN did acknowledge clearly the importance of external powers' engagement in Southeast Asia and needed to recognize their legitimacy in the regional political and security issues. Yet, the most important problem for ASEAN was how to counterbalance those major powers within the ARF's framework.

3.2.3.1 Regional hegemon and balance of power – a factor in the ARF's formation

As mentioned in the Chapter II, the Southeast Asian political environment in the early years of the post-Cold War era was impacted by a range of problems. The U.S. announced withdrawal of its military from the Philippines in November 1991 that made ASEAN anxious about the U.S. uncertain commitment to Southeast Asian security; the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991meant that bipolarity during the Cold War came to an end; Beijing passed the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas that had reiterated China's claims in the overlapping claims in South China Sea and stipulated the right to use force to protect islands, including the Spratly, and their surrounding water on 25 February 1992. All those events worried ASEAN states about an imbalance of power in the region. More importantly, ASEAN's July 1992 AMM/PMC marked a shift in ASEAN states' attention toward China after its new law on South China Sea and a contract of this country with an American oil exploration company (Ba, 2009, p. 170).

The U.S. withdrawal along with the end of the bipolar world system also created a possible emergence of a "power vacuum". In that situation the question of Asia' future was a power competition probably between China and Japan. In a comparison between China and Japan, Roy (1994) found the China's development gap in the economic and

political aspects vis-à-vis Japan in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, though Japan had the world's second largest economy, China had more long-term advantages than Japan to develop its economy in the near future. Roy argues that in spite of Japan's temporary economic development, China was able to become hegemon in the region in the future. China's economic development and potential as a result could help the country to develop its military power. Meanwhile, Roy (1994, p. 151) also pointed out that Japan's military weakness after the Cold War challenged its hegemony. Therefore, owning to both the economic and military advantages China would potentially become a hegemon in Asia.

Looking back at China's struggles with Vietnamese vessels in South China Sea in 1974 and 1988 leading to China's occupation over several disputing reefs and islands, it reflected China's willingness to use force to settle disputes with other states, even when its own territory was not attacked (Roy, 1994, p. 156). Especially, in 1992 China passed a new law authorizing the use of force in defence of China's South China Sea claims, again with the promise to use force to protect its claims. Therefore, Roy assumed that China was more likely prone to using force to pursue its goals in the region than Japan. It was due to that, Roy analyzes, (1) while the Japanese government was democratic and stable, the Chinese government was authoritarian and unstable; (2) China was a dissatisfied power, while Japan was s status-quo power; (3) the great advantage of population made China easier to mobilize its army personnel for war than Japan. By contrast, it is mentioned in the Chapter II Japan has acknowledged itself the role in keeping peace and stability in the region. Thus, along with the disputes in South China Sea, China's prone trend towards using force in disputes clearly challenged Southeast Asian territorial and security interests in the strategic sea.

However, perceptions of the next regional hegemon differed within ASEAN. In contrast to Malaysia and Indonesia's fear of China, Singapore was more anxious about Japanese remilitarrisation (Emmers, 2003, p. 168). ASEAN states were aware of Japan's ambition of becoming a hegemon in Asia in the World War II. Since Southeast Asia experienced Japanese occupation of the region from 1942 to 1945. With its economy

success, if Japan successfully remilitarized, it could be the dominant military power in Asia.

A powerful China probably becoming a regional hegemony in Asia after the Cold War appeared in mind of ASEAN members of an unstable Southeast Asia. Not until that time, prior to the end of the Cold War, Indonesia and Malaysia had perceived China as a primary source of external threat to the region (Emmers, 2003, p. 88). On the other hand, ASEAN was an incoherent grouping with only six member states in the early 1900s. Hence, the formation of a security institution was necessary to help regional states to deal with not only the "China problem" but also Japan.

However, "ASEAN is confident in its role as a driving force in regional security dialogue, but it recognizes that security cooperation arrangements such as those under ARF are possible only when the regional environment is stable and is maintained by positive relations among the major powers" (Tarling, 2006, p. 206). Thus, presence of other major powers, particularly the U.S. involvement in the regional institution indeed played an important role vis-à-vis China's rise. As Ali Alatas put it, regional security would be best ensured not through excluding the great powers, but through "equilibrium among them and between them and Southeast Asia" (Acharya, 2009, p. 199). The chairman of the ASEAN-PMC 1993 also affirmed: "The continuing presence of the United States, as well as stable relationship among the United States, Japan and China, and other states of the region, would contribute to regional stability" (Emmers, 2001, p. 279). It indicated how important the balance of power could be to rely on forming the regional institution, the ARF.

The Tokyo-based Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), in the annual report on Asian security in 1994, argued that ASEAN's aims in the establishment of the ARF were as follows: to maintain the U.S. military presence as an essential factor in the balance of power in the region; to involve China, which was regarded as a potential threat, in the regional multilateral forum; and to maintain regional stability by checking China with the assistance of other regional powers (Katsumata, 2009, p. 39).

3.2.3.2 ASEAN's strategies for balancing powers

It is clear that in order to create a balance of power in the region ASEAN needs to form a regional institution. But how would this institution operate? And what has ASEAN done within the institutional framework to balance powers?

3.2.3.2.1 Promoting multilateralism in Asia Pacific

Dibb (1995) assumes that a forum is an effective way for the middle powers to maintain non-threatening power balance in the region. The function of such an informal institution is to encourage dialogue and consultation in the region's important security issues. However, how to draw attention and keep long-term interests of external powers in the institution? To resolve the issue, according to Acharya (2001), ASEAN sought to use multilateralism to "moderate and maintain" the external powers' presence in the regional institution. A multilateral institution is also to prevent dependence on external security guarantees by military balancing (Acharya, 2001, p. 182). Thus, I argue that multilateral security institution, which involves external powers in security dialogues and cooperation, is ASEAN's vehicles to balance powers in Asia-Pacific.

Prior to the ARF's establishment, ASEAN began promoting multilateralism by expanding its PMC external dialogues to include new dialogue partners, including China. Its discussions covered international and regional security issues, mainly focusing on global and regional issues, for instance the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the threat of climate change and initiatives for regional cooperation (Severino, 2008, 91). At the ASEAN-PMC SOM in Singapore in 1993, for the first time, seven ASEAN's dialogue partners attended an ASEAN conference. Emmers (2003) assesses this ASEAN-PMC as the ASEAN's primary indication of considering balance of power in the forthcoming formation of the ARF. Singapore, which was keen to establish a multilateral structure of security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific and was the chair of ASEAN's Standing Committee during 1992-1993, was successful in collaborating with Japan and Australia (Emmers,

2003, p. 114). This expansion of ASEAN states formed the basis for the Asia Pacific's first multilateral security forum, the ARF.

Other significant multilateral frameworks that emerged during this phase were the South China Sea Workshops, the APT and its meetings (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea), and the EAS. It is noticeable that in the South China Sea issue China has always preferred resolving the territorial disputes by the bilateral approach. ASEAN's efforts to multilateralize the issue can be seen as ASEAN's first step to engage the U.S interference. The succession of those multilateral frameworks that ASEAN has founded over the years has provided political platforms for ASEAN to relate to developed countries, major powers and related states on the regional stage.

One of remarkable successes of ASEAN in the attempt to promote multilateralism was to encourage the U.S. to take part in the ARF. As mentioned that the Bush government doubted that multilateralism would undermine its existing bilateral ties with alliances in the region. However, this concern was shifted under the Clinton Administration. The U.S. supported and identified multilateralism as one of the ten major goals of the new American policy in Asia. The U.S. view on multilateralism was reflected in a concentric circle of security institutions within a multilayered approach of (1) maintaining existing bilateral alliances, (2) developing the newly security consultations within framework of the ASEAN-PMC and the ARF, and (3) participating in multilaterally institutional action with the most concerned and relevant actors to resolve specific security problems such as in the Korean Peninsula (Acharya, 2001, p. 182). Likewise, ASEAN was successful in moving China from skeptical perspective to supportive role for multilateral approach in the Asia-Pacific region. Explaining this China's shift, Acharya (2001) gives two assumptions. First, China was aware that regional countries were doubtful and anxious about the China's rise. Thus, multilateral dialogues were venue where China could harmoniously "discuss and share its security concerns and approach with Asia Pacific countries". Second, if China had not followed the multilateral tendency which had been accepted by all the other ARF's members, it would have been isolated from the region.

With the formation of the multilateral security institution ARF in 1993, in the following years, multilateralism was officially in the ARF document. The working scope of the ARF was noted at the 4th Meeting that the ARF had developed into a forum a multilateral security dialogue and cooperation for discussion and making decisions by consensus. The role of the institution, as Dibb (1995) points out, is to share information and views on the policies and intentions of powers in the region, as well as their military capabilities and activities. And as Acharya (2001) explains, by acting collectively within the framework of a multilateral institution, ASEAN may shape the development of a set of ideas, norms and principles that might convince the region's major powers to view diplomacy and "rules of acceptable conduct", rather than military approaches.

In sum, multilateralism has paved the way for ASEAN to engage the U.S and other major powers in the regional political and security issues in constructive ways and to develop their relations with each other and with ASEAN states, and the rest of the region. The multilateralism is also ASEAN's vehicle to call for the U.S. certain commitments towards Asia-Pacific politics and security after its withdrawal from the Philippines.

3.2.3.2.2 Involving major powers into regional politics and security

It is said that the ARF was founded on the one hand to engage China and to contain it in the region and institutional norms and principles, on the other to ensure the U.S. maintenance of security interests and commitments to the region. Moreover, ASEAN encouraged the other major powers to deepen their stake in the economy and stability of the region (Acharya, 2009; Goh, 2005, 2011). Thus, one of the key purposes of the ARF was to involve the U.S., Japan and China in a structure of multilateral security dialogue in order to promote distribution of major powers to stability in the Asia-Pacific region (Emmers, 2003, p. 116).

At the outset of the ARF, ASEAN tried to engage the major powers, including the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia in the multilateral security institution. All of those countries were the founding members of the ARF. Later, Singapore viewed India as an essential factor in the ASEAN's long-term strategy of a multipolar balance of powers (Sridharan, 2001, p. 76). Hence, India was also granted the ARF membership to be included in the regional security structure in 1996. Because of the different viewpoint of the regional hegemon as well as the key purposes and objectives of enmeshment, the ARF was kept open for all major powers to hold stakes in Asia Pacific (Goh, Winter 2007/2008). By involving actively all major powers in not only good political relationships among them but also deep and preferential economic exchanges, and opening defence dialogue and exchange, the ARF created "overlapping sphere of influence in the region that are competitive but positive-sum" (Goh, Winter 2007/2008, p. 129). In this case, instead of a potential "power vacuum" which could cause a competition in the region, enmeshment could lead major powers to "keep an eye on each other" in order to constrain other one's aggression.

At the regional level, ASEAN has shown its role as the main channel of engagement with external powers, developing on the traditional practice of having "dialogue partners" (Goh, Winter 2007/2008, p. 124). By granting the "Dialogue Partner" status for the major powers and other external powers as well which is stipulated at the chairman's statement of the 2nd ARF and applied for other participation, ASEAN identified and legitimized the role of these players in the regional political and security issues. Constructively, it advances these powers' more engagement with regional issues and acting responsibly basing on mutual benefit.

Another way, ARF attracted the U.S. as a global power and other major powers, was its broad institutional setting and security agenda (Goh, 2011). By this way, ASEAN raised political and security issues not only within Southeast Asia but also almost all the flashpoints in the world politics, i.e. the South China Sea disputes and the nuclear crisis in Korean Peninsula. Especially, the Taiwan issue has always been seen the China's internal affair; thus China used to oppose to include the issue in the ARF's agenda.

However, the ARF provided an avenue for Washington and Beijing to initiate a new process of diplomatic rapprochement on a regular basis. Likewise, the South China Sea issue relates to four ASEAN states, China and Taiwan, but China has demanded for bilateral negotiations with each ASEAN states and without external participation to resolve the disputes. In the past the U.S. refused to accept Manila's claim that the scope of their mutual defence treaty covers its position in the Spartly Island. U.S. refusal clearly made ASEAN anxious about the U.S. commitment to the South China Sea disputes in the confrontation of ASEAN with China (Acharya, 2001, p. 180). Nevertheless, in the 17th ARF in July 2010 in Hanoi, ASEAN involved the U.S. in the South China Sea issue by the statement of the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton:

> The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. We share these interests not only with ASEAN members or ASEAN Regional Forum participants, but with other maritime nations and the broader international community.
>
> The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant. While the United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.
>
> The U.S. supports the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct. The U.S. is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures consistent with the declaration. Because it is in the interest of all claimants and the broader international community for unimpeded commerce to proceed under lawful conditions. Respect for the interests of the international community and responsible

> efforts to address these unresolved claims and help create the conditions for resolution of the disputes and a lowering of regional tensions (Clinton, 2010).

After the above statement other major powers such as Japan, India, and Australia also started to support the freedom of navigation in South China Sea and a multilateral resolution for the disputes (Snyder, 2001). By addressing the South China Sea disputes to the multilateral security institution and encouraging the U.S. to make a statement on the issue, ASEAN had a big progress in an unequal game with China in South China Sea. Particularly, a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes over South China Sea became the "national interest" of the America. In addition, the U.S. supported the DOC signed in 2002 between ASEAN and China and encouraged the parties to reach agreement on the full COC. This is ASEAN's approach in the South China Sea issue, according to Egberink and Putten (2010, p. 133),

Goh (Winter 2007/2008) takes the ARF as the key example of ASEAN's strategy of external powers' engagement with regional political and security dialogues. On the whole the basic approach of ASEAN to dealing with China's rise has remained the same as it has been since the end of the Cold War: to strengthen ties with China to mediate its rise while at the same time to encourage other major powers to become or to remain engaged Southeast Asian political and security issues, which is hoped to counterbalance Chinese influence (Egberink & Putten, 2010, p. 133).

In sum, the fear after the U.S. military withdrawal from the Philippines and of the rise of China drove Southeast Asian countries in the power politics and strategic interest calculations. Accordingly, the purpose of the ARF should be considered in term of power (Katsumata, 2009, p. 37). What the ASEAN has sought is a security arrangement which may serve as a vehicle to deal with problems of power politics, by reengaging Washington's commitment to regional security in order to constrain China's growing influence on Southeast Asia. To be specific, the most important function of the ARF is to serve as an arena for the maintenance of a balance of power.

3.3 Concluding remarks

The ARF has been a major rationale for ASEAN-led multilateralism in Asia-Pacific after the Cold War. It is a forum in which participants can exchange information and discuss regional political and security issues. It has also provided a venue for some discussion of sensitive issues, such as when Secretary Clinton asserted at the 2010 ARF that the U.S. has a vital interest in the South China Sea disputes. ARF's formation was a result of ASEAN's expanding multilateralism in the context of declined U.S. commitment and heightened China's influence. Thus, the ARF was established to maintain the U.S. presence in the region and constrain China's increasing influence on the region.

The ARF is also the sole institution in the world which includes all the world major powers, such as the U.S., China, Japan, EU, India, and Russia. This has built ASEAN's reputation; however, it challenges ASEAN's capability in relations to external powers as well. First of all, ASEAN was aware that it needed to create a forum for countries to attend and maintain sustained dialogues. Since that purpose, the ARF was formed as a multilateral security institution. Despite initial doubt of some countries like the U.S. and China about effect of the multilateralism on the U.S. bilateral relations to its regional alliance and the role of China in the region, the ARF was still established by ASEAN and Japan's support. From the liberal institutionalism perspective, the ARF has promoted cooperation among the Asia-Pacific states in order to keep peace and stability in the region.

ARF has been integral in promoting ASEAN leading role in regional institutional building. ASEAN leading role has been accepted by all the ARF members. Some major powers like China preferred ASEAN, a grouping of small and middle powers, to lead the ARF process rather than being under control of any other great power. According to Acharya (2009), the way ARF has embraced ASEAN's norms, the TAC and the "ASEAN Way" of institution building reflects ASEAN's leading role. The TAC has been observed as an ASEAN's key to foster peace and stability in Southeast Asia and to bind

external powers to regional security interests. The “ASEAN Way” was fully reflected in the Concept Paper which envisaged three categories of security cooperation: CBMs, PD, and conflict resolution (later changed to “elaboration of approaches to conflicts”). Though the ARF has enjoyed some success in confidence building and in integrating regional major powers into a security dialogue, it has been stuck in the PD stage. From a constructivist perspective, ASEAN’s norms and principles, especially the “ASEAN Way” within the ARF framework has shown ASEAN’s role in managing regional order as the “driving force” and the effect of those norms on the development of collective interests and identities (Acharya, 2009).

Not only does the ARF help to foster the prospects for a more predictable and constructive relationship among the major powers, but also enables ASEAN to dilute great powers’ dominance in Southeast Asia. A key element of this ASEAN strategy is the balance of power. By forming the ARF as a multilateral security institution ASEAN has enmeshed all major powers in the institution. Sitting on the “driver’s seat”, it is legitimate for ASEAN to invite other powers in the institution. The “ASEAN Way” along with the ASEAN’s TAC has created a so-called “ASEAN’s value” in the ARF process to decline not only China’s rise but also other major powers’ potential dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. The balance of power has helped ASEAN maintain the external powers’ contribution to Southeast Asian politics and security; and, in parallel, has made constraint on each other among major powers to assure ASEAN’s major role in the ARF.

CHAPTER IV

EAS AND ASEAN'S ROLES IN RELATIONS TO EXTERNAL POWERS

4.1 An overview of the EAS

4.1.1 Establishment of the EAS

The financial and banking crisis in 1997-1998 initially swept through Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea and then spread to most other East Asian countries. It caused serious social upheavals and change of ruling regimes in a number of regional states, including Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines, and the most painful consequences for Indonesia. However, the crisis marked the beginning of the next stage in regional development. The idea of a regional economic bloc in East Asia was growing (Chufrin, 2006, p. 6). It was partly due to East Asian countries, especially the Southeast Asian disappointment in the arrogant U.S. policies and the reluctant role of the U.S. during the financial crisis. As a result, the ASEAN Plus Three was created in 1997 to promote economic cooperation between Southeast Asia and East Asia and to deal with U.S. pressure after the 1997-1998 East Asian economic crisis (He, 2008). The Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000 was another step of the East Asian countries to create a network of the so-called "swap arrangements" in order to protect stability of the regional finance as well as of exchange rates of national currencies and, as an experience of the 1997-1998 economic crisis, to prevent such any large-scale crises in the future (Chufrin, 2006, p. 10).

The idea of an EAS was initially raised at the 2000 APT Summit in Singapore. This idea mainly aimed to transform the APT into a more coherent and developed regional framework which would open the right of hosting summit to all the thirteen APT members (Dent, 2008, p. 169). This idea was raised again by China at the 2004 APT

Summit. The EAS was initially proposed to work as a forum for regional economic and security issues. China's idea gained political support from Malaysia which was fascinated by the idea of establishing a non-Western Asian bloc in the early 1990s (He, 2008, p. 509). Meanwhile, Indonesia and Singapore were concerned that it might irritate the United States like East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) proposed by the Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad in December 1990[19]. Finally, the Chairman's Statement at the 2004 APT meeting agreed that the first EAS would convene in Malaysia in 2005.

Basing on the APT framework of economic cooperation, China and Malaysia wanted to expand the APT to include political and security cooperation among Asian countries without admitting new members. However, China and Malaysia's original EAS proposal was challenged by Indonesia and Singapore with support from Japan (Goh, 2011, p. 385). The U.S. lobbied Japan, according to Munakata (2006), not to support China's proposal which aimed to enhance the influence of China and to exclude the U.S. role in East Asia (as cited in Pomfret, 2011, p. 95)[20]. Hence, Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore argued that the EAS should expand and absorb new members, such as Australia, New Zealand, and India in order to increase the 'effectiveness' of regional cooperation. Though it was not publicly mentioned, we can find out that Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore's proposal for more members was to prevent China's dominance.

The First EAS Meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur on 14 December 2005 achieving consensus of participants. Accordingly, the EAS contained 13 APT members plus India, Australia, and New Zealand. Thus, the EAS configuration was sometimes referred to as ASEAN+6. Later, the EAS leaders agreed to convene the summit regularly.

[19] The EAEG was proposed to include the six ASEAN members, three Indochina countries, plus Japan, China, South Korea, and possibly Taiwan and to work as a trade bloc in Asia to counter economic pressure from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EC. However, the proposal was sharply criticized from the U.S. for being a plainly anti-American basis. Thus, the proposal was not carried out.

[20] Sharing the viewpoint Goh (2011) also argues that the EAS is the ASEAN's exclusive institutional balancing against the U.S.

The ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in April 2010 issued a statement encouraging the U.S. and Russia to consider membership. The 6th EAS Meeting, held in Bali on 19 November 2011, has marked a historical milestone by the official participation of both Russia and the U.S. for the first time. In this summit, the U.S. and Russia's membership was also approved. That increases EAS member amount by 18 countries. It includes now the entire major powers of the Asia-Pacific region, including U.S., China, Japan, India, and Russia.

In sum, EAS is a forum for dialogues on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia. By the EAS establishment the dream of building an East Asian Community got started and proceeded.

4.1.2 Participation of major powers in the EAS

4.1.2.1 China

Kai He (2008) argued that the APT, which was established after the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997, was an exclusive institutional balancing of ASEAN states against the United States. Standing on another standpoint people see China's success in leading the East Asian states, particularly Southeast Asian states to get over the crisis in 1997 without dependence on America. As the only forum without the presence of the U.S. and other extra-regional states, the APT brings together East Asian countries only and provides China with a larger voice in determining regional affairs (Hung, 2006, p. 86). China has used the APT as a point of influence to promote East Asian regionalism with the U.S. absence from East Asia (Thayer, 2010, p. 22). That promotion, therefore, led to China's proposal to upgrade the APT process into the larger EAS.

ZANG Xiuling, an associate professor at Shandong University's Institute of Contemporary Socialism, points out China's primary calculations in forming the EAS:

> The current APT structure is not conductive to the equal participation of all countries. Hence we should change the APT process to the EAS. Though EAS participants will be the same as those in the APT, the status of these thirteen participants will be more equal. Hosting of the Summit will not be limited to only ASEAN members; all thirteen members can take turns to host it. In this way, all participants will have the opportunity to convene the summit, and enjoy equal participation in the regional cooperation process (Hung, 2006, p. 87).

By that viewpoint, China from the outset of the EAS did not support expanding the EAS membership to include non-APT states. Nonetheless, because of the determination of Indonesia and Singapore backed by Japan to invite other countries such as India, Australia, and New Zealand to the Summit, China had to accept participation of the three new members to the EAS. Most recently, China was decidedly lukewarm when a divided ASEAN finally reached consensus in inviting both the U.S. and Russia Federation to take part in the EAS (Thayer, 2010, p. 53). Previously, China strongly opposed U.S. presence in the EAS by its claim that "The U.S. definitely cannot be invited to the EAS. Multilateralism cannot have unlimited openness; there must be some limits to participation" (as cited in Hung, 2006, p. 88). China's stance on U.S. participation indeed changed when ASEAN gave the main condition for participating in the Summit was for the state to sign ASEAN's TAC. That signing made China believe that the U.S. will be bound to the TAC's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs (Hung, 2006, p. 88-89).

In short, China has tried to push its influence on the EAS process to protect its role in the Summit from other major powers, particularly the United States. In fact, China did not try to evict the U.S. from the region, but it put pressure on ASEAN states which have been sitting on the "driver's seat" of the EAS as well.

4.1.2.2 Japan

As mentioned above, Japan's strategic interest in expanding the membership of the EAS was to add greater counterweight to an ascendant China. In the long-term strategy, it is also a way to limit China's influence in any emerging East Asian regional institutions or organizations (Dent, 2008, p. 171). However, in the economic realm, Japan did not see China as its serious economic competitor for the future. Japan also paid more attention to closer cooperation in an APT FTA (Singh, 2007).

Japan supported ASEAN's way of informal confidence-building through intensive dialogue. On the other hand, Japan preferred building more intrusive and binding regional arrangements that could touch upon internal matters such as democracy, human rights, transparency, and harmonization of internal regulatory systems. However, the Japan's pursuit in East Asia was opposite to China's way that mostly dealing with the "external" dimensions of state-to-state relations and leaving internal matters out of the agenda of regional cooperation. Especially, in cooperation with ASEAN, China avoided facing sensitive issues such as human rights, military transparency, and political liberalization, but focused on integration issues touching upon domestic institutional adjustments. That made Japan worried about China's influence on the EAS. As another reason, Japan pushed India, Australia, and New Zealand to join the EAS processes (Kikuchi, 2006).

4.1.2.3 India

Excluding from the two regional economic institutions, including the APEC and APT the EAS brought an opportunity for India to broaden its economic market over the wider region East Asia. Besides, participation in the EAS was also necessary for India in relationships with China (Grant, December 2011). And yet, it might be in India's long term interests not to either ally itself with the U.S. or join in building any anti-Chinese coalition in the region. It would be in India's own long term interests to ensure that no single country dominated the region, but the coldwarish coalitions would in general be counterproductive. India's efforts should be geared towards keeping such coalitions off the region, and not participate in them if they are forged. Thus, the EAS would provide a

great opportunity for India to engage itself with the dynamics of new Asia that is coherent not only economically and culturally but also strategically.

As one Indian commentator says: “The major strategic concern in the EAS region arises from the rise of China and its consequences. India has a complex framework of engagement with China where there are areas of competition, cooperation and conflict operating simultaneously with varying paces and thrusts” (Muni, 2011). In addition, India’s participation in the EAS has contributed to strengthen its Look East policy. In this context India looked at the EAS as a move in the direction of realizing its long cherished dream of building an Asian community (Rajan & Suryaprakash, 2007).

4.1.2.4 The United States

In the view of Pomfret (2011, p. 95) the U.S. generally showed less concern about East Asian regionalism in the early 2000s than it had in the 1990s. George W. Bush started his president period by a big challenge of the 9/11 event. What gathered mostly the U.S. attention during the first years of the Bush Administration was the global war on terror. The U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia was due to its war on terrorists instead of regional security in East Asia.

However, the U.S. has proved its positive involvement in East Asia since the later 2000s, especially under the Obama Administration. Remarkably, the U.S. decision in 2010 to accept ASEAN’s invitation to join the EAS marked a considerable change in U.S. foreign policy towards the East Asia region. Not only did it mean that the U.S. judged that it could not afford any longer to be excluded from a growing regional organization. It also meant that the U.S. accepted that it had to complement its bilateral relationships with Asian countries like China and India, but also ASEAN, with a serious attempt to engage in a regional nexus (Grant, December 2011). Relating the U.S. involvement in the EAS, ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan stated: “The successive and proactive re-engagement of ASEAN by the US has brought about a transformation of seismic proportions to ASEAN-US relations” (Chheang, 2010).

President Obama's participation in the EAS in Bali in 2011 underscored the Administration's commitment to deepening engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and playing a leadership role in its emerging institutions. In his first attendance, President Obama called for a broadening of the leaders' discussions to address strategic and security challenges. Obama underscored the shared interest of EAS member states in reaffirming international rules and norms in these areas; enhancing partner capacity to address existing and emerging challenges; and promoting regional cooperation. He focused on three main fields which are tightly related to U.S. foreign policy, including maritime security, non-proliferation, and disaster response and humanitarian assistance (The White House, 2011).

4.1.2.5 Russia

Russia attended the First EAS as an observer at the invitation of the host Malaysia. In this summit, Russia's request for the EAS membership was supported by China and India, but some other countries rejected (Pomfret, 2011, p. 95). Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia opposed Russia's membership due to its lack of substantive relations and fears of diluted ASEAN significance (Paradorn, 2009, p. 111). Thus, ASEAN did not consider its relations with Russia substantive enough to merit Moscow's inclusion in the EAS until 2011. Together with the U.S. Russia has been accepted to take part in the EAS since the 6th summit in Bali.

For Russia, being participant of the EAS will bring the country benefits to economy and security. Geographically, Russia partly bordered by three East Asian countries such as North Korea, Japan and China. This plays a geopolitical importance to Russia, especially with regard to its energy security. Moreover, the EAS membership is an important tool so that Russia can play its role in the regional security issues like the situation on the Korean Peninsula. It is also a tool for Russia to maintain economic security that would provide favourable external conditions for a balanced development of

Siberia and the Russian Far East and for a efficient use of its natural resources (Chufrin, 2006, p. 101).

Economically, Dmitry Mosyakov, the expert at the Institute of Oriental Studies, says that Russia has every reason to believe that the Southeast Asian countries will invest money in the country's economy (Natalya & Olga, 2011). Thus, as a factor of the EAS will promote economic cooperation between Russia and Southeast Asia in particular and other regional major powers in East Asia in general. Russia's major interest in East Asia is currently economic. It is the largest energy supplier in the world, and its ability to supply energy-poor countries like China, Korea and Japan have considerable significance. Another area, weaponry sales is also Russia's strength. According to SIPRI, from 1996 to 2000 Russian arms exports amounted to nearly US$ 16 billion, most of which was accounted for by Asian countries. In East Asia, China was Russia's major client. SIPRI estimates that China alone occupied for nearly 42 per cent of the total value of Russian arms sales in ten years from 1997 to 2007 (Paradorn, 2009, p. 90). Thus, getting closer East Asia would open a major economic market for Russia with traditional client like China, India, and Japan as well as emerging ones in Southeast Asia.

In addition, according to a Russian Foreign Ministry official, Moscow wants to establish cooperation in five sectors of the EAS, including finance, energy, rapid reaction, healthcare and education. Welcoming participation of both Russian and the U.S., Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Marty Natalegawa judged that the involvement of the US and Russia in the 6th EAS would fill the forum`s emptiness because now all countries potential to play a role and influential in East Asian had joined the same forum (Maruli, 2011).

4.2 ASEAN's roles in relations to external powers

4.2.1 Forming multilateral security institution for sustained dialogues

4.2.1.1 Primary regional cooperation and ASEAN's attempts to build institution in East Asia

We know that ASEAN states had participated in a number of wider regional fora and institutions before the introduction of the EAS framework. Examples include the APEC, ARF, and APT. The previous chapter examined how the multilateral security institution was formed to promote dialogue and cooperation among the Asia-Pacific states in a wider trans-regional process through the ARF. Likewise, prior to the EAS establishment ASEAN states had sought to form a regional economic bloc within the East Asian region. And then, the Association along with regional major powers, including China, Japan, and South Korea has tried to expand dialogue framework of the grouping or institution over political and security issues step by step.

That was not the first time that such a grouping had been officially proposed by ASEAN states. In the early 1990s, Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed setting up EAEG as a trade bloc in Asia to run parallel to the NAFTA and EC. Mahathir argued that this would bring geopolitical and integrational balance to an emerging post-Cold War world in which Europe was implementing its single market and the U.S. and its closest regional partners the NAFTA. He also suggested the EAEG would be a vehicle for championing East Asia interests generally on the global stage. The original EAEG blueprint was launched in December 1990, containing plans to form a preferential trading arrangement between East Asian states (Siau, 2011).

The proposal met with sharp criticism from the U.S. because of its view on this grouping as a plainly anti-American basis (Chufrin, 2006, p. 6). The U.S. even applied heavy diplomatic pressure on its closest East Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea to reject it. Moreover, Japan feared that EAEG would damage its tie with the United States. Similarly, Thailand and Indonesia argued against the proposal. Response to Thailand's request for a cooperative and coordinative group of ASEAN countries in order to attract foreign investment to the region, Mahathir explained that EAEC is a consultative forum for East Asian states and served as a way to open trade in the region. Meanwhile,

Indonesia supported the idea of open regionalism, such as APEC which included the U.S. and other Pacific economic powers. Another ASEAN state, Singapore, did not want to damage its relationship in relation to its international trade benefits with its counterparties, but indicated building a free-trade area (Siau, 2011). At the end, after argument about opposing standpoint of Malaysia with Thailand and Indonesia on the EAEG and Malaysia's acceptance of modification to a more informal East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), ASEAN members came out with three common options to facilitate EAEC as following:

- EAEC to be included in the meeting between foreign ministers of ASEAN and its major trading partners;
- EAEC to function under the umbrella of APEC;
- To tie EAEC to the annual ASEAN economic ministers meeting as a forum on trade and economic policies affecting East Asia (Siau, 2011, p. 74).

Those given options effectively mean that ASEAN at last reached a consensus on the EAEC. In contrast to the U.S. and Japan, China initially supported the EAEC and welcomed the region's economic cooperation. Yet, the participation of Taiwan in the EAEC caused its objection later (Siau, 2011, p. 75). However, it seemed not able to change the U.S. and Japan's original determination of the proposal. Thus, the EAEG/EAEC was not carried out despite Malaysia's latter attempts to issue its proposal at the 1991, 1992 ASEAN summit and at the 1993 APEC Ministerial Meeting. According to He's (2008, p. 506) explanation, the EAEG/EAEC failure was due to (1) the U.S. allied relationship with several East Asian states which were key factors of the EAEG/EAEC, and (2) the deep economic dependence of ASEAN on the America.

However, ASEAN's dependence on the U.S. economy was indeed changed as the APT was born. As mentioned above, the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis presented the APT group with a clear set of imperative challenges from the very start. In order to improve the regional financial system, to attract investors and to prevent such future financial crises, regional leaders agreed to establish a surveillance mechanism in East

Asia, including ten ASEAN (nine initially) members, China, Japan, and South Korea. This institutional establishment in East Asia, according to Kai He (2008, p. 510), was an exclusive institutional balancing of ASEAN states against the United States. The financial crisis affected ASEAN states to think about how to strengthen their economic security and specially reduce economic dependency towards the external powers, particularly the United States (Kai He, 2008, p. 507).

The first meeting which was known as the APT held in December 1997 when ASEAN sponsored the first informal EAS. At the 1998 APT in Hanoi, the APT was further institutionalized by the ASEAN states by deciding to hold the summit regularly. The APT involves meeting of the heads of government, ministerial-level meetings of economic and financial ministers, meetings of senior officials from ministries and agencies. Specifically, that high-level summitry is now further supported by separate meetings of APT Finance, Economic, and Foreign Ministers; Senior Officials Meetings, and Senior Economic Officials Meetings.

The first achievement of the APT was the Chiang Mai Initiative reached at the 2000 APT summit in Chiang Mai, Thailand. Purpose of the initiative was to establish a system of bilateral currency swap agreements (BCSAs) among the APT member states to protect themselves better against future currency speculators' attacks. It also called for cooperation in the areas of capital flow monitoring, self-help and support mechanisms and international financial reforms (Dent, 2008, pp. 156-161). Furthermore, according to Hamilton-Hart (2003), the thirteen states of the APT process have worked together regularly on a growing number of other issues, including health, labor, tourism, the environment, in addition to developing technical skills and functional capacities (as cited in Ba, 2010, p. 124).

4.2.1.2 The EAS - ASEAN's security cooperative enterprise

Launched in 2005 and involving the ASEAN members, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and New Zealand, the EAS can be considered part of ASEAN's

cooperative security enterprise, in that security cooperation is one of the key focus areas, along with economic and cultural issues (Katsumata, 2009, pp. 12-13). Originally, the EAS proposal was supposed to develop incrementally as the logical extension of the APT process (Ba, 2009, p. 240). Being bigger than the APT but smaller than the ARF and covering not only economic but also security issue, the EAS also can be seen as the fruit of earlier efforts of ASEAN to promote security cooperation in the ARF.

While the APT had not addressed traditional security issues like the ARF, the EAS broadened the APT agenda covering regional political and security issues as well. Furthermore, in the future issues related to maritime security, nonproliferation, food and energy security and connectivity would also be tabled in the EAS agenda (Kavi, 2011). Relating to politics and security, it was mentioned in the EAS's declaration that the EAS will focus on "fostering strategic dialogue and promoting cooperation in political and security issues to ensure that our countries can live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment" (Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the EAS Summit)[21]. The EAS has provided the useful forum for all major Asian powers to discuss the nuances of involving Asian strategic relations. In the first EAS meeting, the leaders of sixteen countries recognized that East Asian "shared interests in achieving peace, security and prosperity" (Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the EAS Summit). The EAS, therefore, has provided a venue for regional states to exchange and discuss their common issues relating to regional politics and security. The de-nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, for instance, was mentioned in the Chairman's statement of the First EAS Summit as a great contribution to the regional peace and stability.

Although Northeast Asia contains all of East Asian major powers, namely China, Japan, and South Korea, there has not had any regional institution or group to connect these major powers, particularly in term of politics and security. It was mainly due to a combination of unresolved historic problems and the potential for regional hegemonic

[21] http://www.asean.org/aadcp/repsf/abouteastasiasummit.html

rivalry between a pair of two countries (Dent, 2008, p. 172). Thus, it is not easy for one of the two states to accept the leading role of the other one in Northeast Asia. In this sense, ASEAN's capability brought those great powers together in Asia correlated with the incapacity of great powers to successfully mediate their relationships fully on their own. In addition to the APT, the EAS served a natural functional response to intensified interdependencies between Southeast Asia and regional major powers of Northeast Asia. Basing on East Asian regionalism the EAS offered the opportunity to improve Southeast Asia's relationships with external powers and relationships among non-ASEAN participants through dialogue and functional cooperation (Dent, 2008). Since then, in the political-security sphere, ASEAN can share Southeast Asia's common problems with its partners as the role of stakeholders of the EAS.

ASEAN has capacity to host and chair EAS summits, and thereby involves external powers to Southeast Asian political and security issues. Furthermore, a set of "ASEAN Plus One" frameworks, in which ASEAN meets each of its external powers, will be held every year. Those processes can also be regarded as a component of ASEAN's cooperative enterprise (Katsumata, 2009, p. 13). It contributes to improved relationships between ASEAN and external countries in East Asia.

In sum, the EAS may itself be considered as regional frameworks of institutionalized cooperation between East Asian countries and extra-regional states. Within the EAS framework, the governments of each have all agreed to the benefit of the region as a whole. Basing on the EAS framework, ASEAN has reinforced relationship among participant countries. ASEAN, as the hub of the EAS process, has played an important role in connecting external powers.

4.2.2 Building institutional norms and rules

4.2.2.1 The ASEAN's TAC

In 2005, ASEAN set three conditions for participation in the EAS, including: (1) the status of full ASEAN Dialogue Partner, (2) substantive relations with ASEAN, (3) accession to the TAC (Severino, 2008, p. 99). By this way, ASEAN has tied its relationships with external powers. In other words, holding out the fundamental conditions for new participants, particularly accession to the TAC, naturally enhanced ASEAN legitimate role in leading the EAS in the vision of extra-regional powers. As same as the ARF, not only can ASEAN help legitimate and make more acceptable the EAS, but it can also do the same for external partners through its institutional conditions. China, Japan, and India, for example, at very least all looked to ASEAN because they understood that they themselves lack the legitimacy and authority to lead East Asian processes (Ba, 2009, p. 244).

ASEAN's TAC was designed to promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia and to provide a procedure for peaceful dispute settlement. However, this EAS's condition had not been imposed for membership of the regional's primary multilateral security institution, the ARF. As a compulsory condition of participation in the EAS, the TAC's success reflects ASEAN's increasing role in wider-regional multilateral security institutions. As Ba (2007) explains, the TAC is not only a condition of membership in the EAS, but also stands out as an indigenous, regional tool that has now been widely acceded to by every state in East Asia except North Korea, the major powers of South Asia and the South Pacific, as well as Russia. Both Australia and New Zealand accepted to sign the TAC in order to be granted EAS's membership in 2005. Alone among the significant extra-regional players in Southeast Asia, the U.S. previously continued to avoid signing the TAC because of the anxiety that the principles of non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs of Southeast Asia will potentially conflict with its doctrinal commitment to pre-emptive military operations against terrorism which was the U.S. primary foreign policy at that time ("The East Asia," 2005). Yet the U.S. has recently signed the TAC on 22 July 2009 significantly contributes to reinforcing the TAC value. It proves that all major powers have accepted the ASEAN's norms and principles as a so-called "generalized value" beyond Southeast Asia.

Ba (2007) argues that the extension of the TAC beyond Southeast Asia is an especially remarkable advance for ASEAN, the group of lesser powers, on relationships with external powers. Not only is it merely a condition of membership in the EAS, East Asia's newest regional framework, but it also stands out as an indigenous, regional instrument that has now been acceded to by every state in East Asia except North Korea and other extra-regional countries as well. Moreover, the decision to make TAC a fundamental condition of membership in the EAS clearly reflects an ASEAN's effort to maintain its centrality in expanded regional process (Ba, 2009, p. 241).

4.2.2.2 ASEAN centrality

"ASEAN centrality", ASEAN "driving force" or the "driver's seat" are the notions standing for ASEAN's leading role in a wider-regional institutions or architecture, in which the Southeast Asia's relations with the external powers are conducted with the interests of the ASEAN community in mind. The term "ASEAN centrality" has recently been preferred for use in the EAS where agenda and membership are determined solely by ASEAN members (Ho, 2012).

ASEAN centrality is shown first of all at the Chairman's statement of the first EAS Summit in December 2005. It is claimed that ASEAN is the driving force working in partnership with the other participants of the East Asia Summit (Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the EAS Summit). ASEAN centrality was accepted broadly by the EAS's members because of the ASEAN's capability of legitimizing external powers' participation. Especially, ASEAN centrality received the China's supportive attitude at the outset of EAS (Ba, 2007). On the other hand, basing on East Asian regionalism, ASEAN was seen as a crucial grouping which was necessary for regional development in the ongoing reconstruction of East Asia (Ba, 2009, p. 216). In other words, ASEAN's success and reputation at the "driver's seat" of the ARF and APT might be a reason for continuing support from EAS's participants.

As mentioned above, the EAS's proposal initially proposed to open the right of hosting summit to all the thirteen APT members. However, the decision of the first EAS meeting has maintained ASEAN's chairmanship by hosting the annual EAS summits. This decision has put ASEAN firmly at the "driver's seat" of the EAS. ASEAN took advantage of the EAS's centrality to hold EAS summits in association with ASEAN annual meetings. By that ASEAN can share Southeast Asian political and security issues with extra-regional states in the EAS's framework. Besides, ASEAN's role as the host of annual EAS summits allows the EAS agenda to be determined by the ASEAN members only. This ASEAN's sole capability has out grown the major powers' demand to be treated as equal partnership. However, as Kavi (2011) says, the ASEAN leaders fear that they would lose control of the EAS if others are allowed to set forth agenda and host the summit.

All the three conditions to become an EAS member are referred to ASEAN's relationship with new participant countries. It means that the admission of new members is determined by the ASEAN members only. It contributes to affirmation of ASEAN centrality as a nature in the EAS process. Among the three conditions the TAC is the most important instrument that helps to expand the 'ASEAN Way' beyond Southeast Asia. ASEAN has created itself as a hub of the East Asian architecture which all the EAS's members have to fully accept Southeast Asian indigenous norms and principles before officially participating in the EAS. Furthermore, since the EAS is an expansion of the APT including more the political aspect, according to Ba (2007), ASEAN has become a kind of a hub for political-economy and free-trade initiatives in East Asia.

The new global context shows that more and more major powers indicated to be willing to take part in the EAS, which most recently the U.S. and Russia were granted the EAS membership in 2011. Can ASEAN maintain its central position at the EAS? Response to this question Singapore's Foreign Affairs Minister K Shanmugam affirmed that ASEAN's centrality in the EAS would not be affected, even with the entry of the U.S. and Russia. He explained that the role ASEAN has played is recognized and accepted by everyone (Ismail, 2011).

4.2.3 Balancing powers

4.2.3.1 East Asian regionalism and dominant power in East Asia

Dent (2008, p. 272) defines regionalism generally as the structures, process and arrangements that are working towards greater coherence within a specific international region in term of economic, political, security, socio-cultural and other kinds of linkages. Also referring to coherence of factors in regionalism, Hettne (2005) offers various forms, including social (ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history, consciousness of a common heritage), economic (trade, investment, finance linkages), political (regime type, shared ideology) and organizational (regional institutions, etc.) (Dent, 2008, p. 5). This theoretical basis helps to examine East Asian regionalism since the 1990s and ASEAN's role in forming the EAS.

As proved above the interest in East Asian regionalism arose from the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. In fact, the idea of East Asia regional grouping was proposed by Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in December 1990 named EAEG, but was changed EAEC later. This initial ideal was not carried out until the 1997 crisis led Southeast Asia decide to cultivate independent capability from the U.S. influence by forming the APT. However, this Malaysia's proposal might be considered as the bedrock of expansion of the regionalism in East Asia in the post-Cold War era.

If the positive aspect of the APT was to reduce Southeast Asia's dependence on the U.S., its negativity was broadening China's influence on ASEAN states. Since the APT was an ASEAN's exclusive institutional balancing in that the U.S. was deliberately excluded (He, 2008). In the East Asian regionalism tendency both Japan and China, the region's two great powers, probably played a crucial role. In the APT framework, China evolved as a dominant country to compete with Japan as regional leader in East Asia. This tug of war over China-Japan relations caused a sustained deterioration in the political and security fields, particularly from 2001 to 2006 (Tuosheng, 2009). Tuosheng

(2009, p. 113) called China-Japan relationship during this time “cold politics and warm economy”.

In addition, Sino-Japanese relations have remained problems of unresolved long standing historic issues, especially concerning Japan’s past military actions in Asia, and the potential for regional hegemonic rivalry between the two states (Dent, 2008, p. 172). Zhai Kun (2009) proffers four assumptions about the East Asian dominant power surrounding China-Japan relations. The first possibility is that China and Japan will dominate together. The second possibility is that China and Japan will struggle to be the dominant power. The third one is that China and Japan will infiltrate the region to dominate it. The last one is that all East Asian countries publicly (together) push ASEAN to be the dominant power. In his view, Zhai Kun (2009, p. 26) supported ASEAN’s role of designer, pusher and organizer as implementations of the strategy of balancing major powers.

In fact, the world has witnessed the rapid rise of China’s economy in the XXI Century. Especially, China’s economy has overtaken Japan as the world’s second-biggest economy in 2011. Figures from Tokyo showed that Japan’s economy was worth $5.474 trillion at the end of 2010 while China’s economy was closer to $5.8 trillion in the same period (“China overtakes Japan,” 2011). As Prapat (2009, p. 131) claimed that: “after a few centuries of relative decline, a resurgent China is reclaiming its previous place and status in the global economy.” In the military realm, China’s big investment in its military budget for 2007, according to Tkacik (2007), would be considerably higher at US$450 billion though China just announced around US$45 billion (as cited in Prapat, 2009, p. 130). This would lead to a transformation of the Asian power structure by the China’s rise (Prapat, 2009).

The worsening of China-Japan relations in the 2000s caused much concern in the international community. According to Tuosheng (2009, p. 114), poor China-Japan relations not only weakened their cooperation in establishing regional multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as the APT and the EAS, but also led to a serious

imbalance in the China-US-Japan triangle. However, China showed its overwhelming role in the competition in East Asia. Though Beijing backed down on playing host, the EAS was a China's initiative. Meanwhile, Japan sought counterweights to China's influence (Pomfret, 2011). At very least Japan was successful in including India, Australia, and New Zealand as the EAS members.

How about the U.S. posture in the East Asian regionalism? It is believed that Japan and China were racing against each other before the U.S. could respond and join the discussion (Siau, 2011, p. 70). The U.S. was left in this competition because of its reluctant role during the East Asian financial crisis and its less concern about East Asian regionalism in the early 2000s.

4.2.3.2 ASEAN's balance of power

As a grouping of lesser countries, ASEAN states did not expect a dominant revival between the two great powers China and Japan which could bring instability to the Southeast Asian political and security environment. It was clear that no East Asian country wished to be forced to make a choice between China and Japan (Tuosheng, 2009, p. 114). To constrain dominance of China as well as of any power in the EAS ASEAN has tried to make a balance of power by engaging all major powers in the EAS process. Sharing the viewpoint, Prapat (2009) agrees that ASEAN has tried to strengthen its relations with and bring in Japan, India, Australia, and the U.S. to counter balance China's influence.

At the outset of the EAS, Japan's insistence on including India, Australia and New Zealand as founding members was a geopolitical balancing manoeuvre to counteract China's ascendant power within the East Asian region (Zhai Kun, 2009: 27). Both Indonesia and Singapore supported the Japan's viewpoint. Facing the rise of China and the possible loss of ASEAN influence, EAS expanding membership was clearly aimed at diluting Chinese influence (Ba, 2009, pp. 240-241). According to Severino's (2008, pp. 98-99) assessment, a larger EAS would certainly provide values beyond the APT. It

would involve Australia, India and New Zealand into cooperative endeavours to which they could usefully contribute. It would also signal ASEAN's open-ended desire to engage the international community beyond East Asia.

The Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo emphasized the importance of including India.

> "In every area, we have to think and act strategically so that South-east Asia becomes a major intermediary between China and India. This is our historical position and this should also be our future." China's growth was bringing prosperity. So would India's. 'What we must watch carefully is the improvement of relations between China and India'" (Tarling, 2006, p. 214).

This statement pointed out the strategic role of India in the EAS. India was courted as a counterweight to China as Mr Goh Chok Tong said in his speech that India and China are huge countries with wise and old civilizations that know how to calculate their national interests, and that neither would allow itself to be used (Kesavapany, 2007, p. 14). According to Beeson (2009, pp. 87-88), the U.S. temporary absence along with rising Asian economy made both India and China potential to redefine the balance of influence and power within any grouping of which they were a part and the very definition of the region any new institution claims to present. Not only did India counterbalance China, it was also able to contribute to the stability of the region in economic, political and security terms as the role of leading EAS member (Kesavapany, 2007, p. 15). Furthermore, in the situation of worsening relations between China and Japan, India could help both sides to warm up political relations. ASEAN, therefore, could not ignore the crucial role of India in the EAS. In the containment of China strategy, not only ASEAN states but also the U.S. begun referring to India as one of the five world great powers which could rile China (Sridharan, 2007). In their turn, India has also indicated its desire to join the grouping of East Asia. In fact, India does not want China to dominate the APT and East Asia Community. Thus, India indeed expected to become an EAS member to pursue its aim of balancing and hedging against Chinese

influence (Prapat, 2009, pp. 143-144). The ARF membership status is an advantage of India to participate in the EAS.

Not only India, some of Southeast Asian countries like Singapore, were also keen to bring Australia to balance Chinese influence. In the view of China and other East Asian states, Australia had close relationship with America (Beeson, 2009, p. 88). Australia saw participation in the EAS as potentially important for advancing its interests in both economic and security spheres. According to Corbett and Fitriani (2008), in 2006, Australia showed its willingness to contribute to the Chiang Mai Initiative (Pomfret, 2011, p. 100).

Recently, the most significant signal of ASEAN in the effort of engaging all major powers in the EAS was inclusion of the U.S. and, less important, Russia's membership. At the 2010 EAS Summit in Hanoi, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said that ASEAN had decided to deepen engagement with Washington and Moscow by expanding the 16-nation EAS. Diplomats said their inclusion would also help to "counterbalance" the dominance of regional superpower China[22]. As Ambassador-at-large Professor Tommy Koh also explained the ASEAN strategy as "[bringing] the major powers (particularly the U.S. and China) together and [embedding] them in a cooperative framework … thereby [reducing] the deficit of trust" (Ho, 2012). In other words, the inclusion of the U.S. and Russia in the 2011 meeting suggests that greater attention is now being accorded to the ASEAN-led institutions. By the U.S. and Russia's participation, the 2011 EAS Summit equally saw the members committing to positive multilateralism in the region, and the U.S. can help ensure the sustainability of this multilateralism by preventing the balance of power from tilting to any one side (Prakash, 2012).

As far back as the ARF, ASEAN has recognized that the deeper engagement of the U.S. with Southeast Asia would be the challenge to China's influence in the region.

[22] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h3xcrO8YSIm9-PeBMNAC-i5PMfcw

Recent moves of the U.S. to claim the South China Sea dispute as its “national interest in freedom of navigation”, and Washington’s opting for membership of the EAS could in turn be interpreted as a response aimed at preventing Chinese hegemony in the region (Egberink & Putten, 2010, p. 134). The 19th ASEAN Summit continued seeing ASEAN’s rising request for the EAS’s focus on strategic and maritime cooperation in the region. According to Prakash (2012), this appeal was aimed at the U.S. attendance. The 6th EAS Chair’s statement also showed that the U.S. participation led members to agree on the “supremacy of principles and norms of international law” (Prakash, 2012). That clearly indicated the South China Sea issues where ASEAN states have asked China to respect the 1982 UNCLOS in resolving the disputes. Thus, the U.S. participation in the EAS will bring with itself the equilibrium in the region. On China’ side, this country fully acknowledged the U.S. presence in the EAS could provoke ASEAN states to blow up the South China Sea issue. Hence, in early 2011 China proposed the Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles of Mutually Beneficial Relations to govern the future EAS discussion. Notably, just only the last principle has been diplomatically phrased as “promotion of the ocean as a unifying factor and as public good for enhancing common prosperity of mankind” (Kavi, 2011).

On the other hand, ASEAN tried to constrain all participants by stipulating the three conditions for membership of the EAS. The TAC principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of one another and non-use of force made some external powers like the U.S. concern over the possible constraint imposed by the TAC (“The East Asia Summit”, 2005). By signing the TAC signatories had to restrains themselves from their powers in relations with each other, especially from the use of armed force as an overwhelming advantage of major powers. By this way, ASEAN also can realise the external powers’ interests in the Southeast Asian region, making them legally committed to not using armed force in the region. This is an ASEAN’s advance in comparison with the ARF process. It proves that ASEAN has consolidated its posture in relations to external powers within the framework of the multilateral security institutions.

In addition, to strengthen its bilateral relationship with external powers, ASEAN has formed several of ASEAN Plus One. The beginning of ASEAN+1 came from Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's proposal in 1997 as an attempt to improve Japan's relationship with ASEAN states. He announced to hold a summit meeting with ASEAN on a regular basis (Siau, 2011, p. 76). ASEAN has built ASEAN Plus One cooperative mechanisms with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, Russia, and the United States. A set of ASEAN Plus One frameworks, in which ASEAN meets each of its non-Southeast Asian partners, can be regarded as another component of ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise. On the other hand, fostering economic cooperation is also an ASEAN's effective way to profound interdependent relationships with external powers. Basing on this view, ASEAN has built FTAs with the EAS member states, including Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand (Prapat, 2009, p. 140). Also, ASEAN started discussing economic integration within East Asia to consolidate bilateral FTAs with existing partners into a wider agreement (Dent, 2008, pp. 196-200).

4.3 Concluding remarks

The EAS's establishment and development has proved the increasing posture of ASEAN in the international arena. The EAS can be seen as the fruit of the EAEG/EAEC idea of regional grouping, an initiative by Malaysia towards the East Asian regionalism in the 1990s. Larger than the APT framework, the EAS expands it work field over economic and security issues. In addition to the ARF, in which ASEAN plays pivotal and leading roles, the extension of the TAC beyond Southeast Asia is an especially remarkable development for ASEAN's group of lesser powers.

It is said: "East Asia is probably the most diverse region in the world in terms of economic development asymmetry, mix of regimes and socio-religious traditions and characteristics" (as cited in Dent, 2008, p. 3). Additionally, participation of India, Australia, and New Zealand in the EAS made this regional institution more complex. It raised the question of Mahathir Mohamed of limited socio-cultural linkages between the

two Oceanic countries and East Asia. Nevertheless, from a social constructivist perspective, the APT's efforts to promote a stronger East Asian regional identity among its member states will be the basis for advanced process made at the EAS level (Dent, 2008, p. 179).

It is too early to fully examine the U.S. and Russia's role as the balancing factors in the EAS. Nonetheless, the most recent participation of the U.S. in the EAS has shown that ASEAN could not deny the existence of this world great power in the ASEAN's strategy of balance of power. The absence of U.S. from the outset of the EAS was implemented by India, Australia, and New Zealand's presence in spite of China's objection. Since ASEAN was fully aware of the threat of regional dominance by the powers like China and Japan at that time, especially of China's reactions to the South China Sea issues and its military modernization in recent years. Continuing the role in balance of power, which had been played in the ARF, ASEAN has kept involving all major powers in the EAS. In parallel, ASEAN has made it the hub of the region through a wide range of bilateral relationships with the external powers in the framework of ASEAN+1. By this way, ASEAN on the one hand has enmeshed all major powers in the Southeast Asian political and security issues, on the other has tried to keep its centrality in the EAS to prevent the balance of power from tilting to any one side. Now, ASEAN hopes to maintain equal, peaceful and co-existent relations with major powers in the region.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1 ASEAN's successes

The most significant success of ASEAN in relations to major powers lies in ASEAN's ability to bring together different states into regional multilateral institutions. It has been illustrated through ASEAN's initiatives in forming regional institutions, such as the ARF, APT and EAS. Thanks to those initiatives ASEAN has attracted external powers to sustained dialogues on regional political and security issues. Basically, ASEAN enhanced cooperation with non-ASEAN states and between the external powers. Regionally, Southeast Asian security and cooperation deeply depend on the stable and regular level of relations between ASEAN states and each of the major powers (Ba, 2010, p. 117). Thus, ASEAN's role in binding external powers to regional politics and security has contributed to maintain peace and stability in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, promoting cooperation between the external powers was especially important to Northeast Asian region where the institutional linkage has been thin. The EAS is an example of ASEAN's contribution to relations in Northeast Asia in particular and in East Asia in general. Though ASEAN's contribution to relations between external powers is less clear, its efforts have also helped to maintain peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

As regard ASEAN's success in bringing together extra-regional states, ASEAN has affirmed its leading role within both the ARF and EAS process. ASEAN's "driver's seat" was implemented by a chain of its mechanisms, including the TAC, the "ASEAN Way" principles of confidence building and mutual trust. Especially, extension of ASEAN's TAC beyond Southeast Asia has contributed to raising ASEAN's reputation and posture in the international arena as a grouping of lesser countries in relations to major powers. Signing the TAC as the integral condition of new members in the EAS can be seen as one of ASEAN's clearer contribution to regional security through the TAC's

fundamental principles. Other ASEAN's norms and principles, which were specifically mentioned in ASEAN's declarations of the institutions' establishment, also help ASEAN control the external powers' behavior within framework of the region's multilateral institutions like the ARF and EAS. In the other words, the balance of power strategy has helped ASEAN maintain its leading role in both the regional multilateral institutions like the ARF and EAS. ASEAN, of course, is fully aware that China does not want both the ARF and EAS to be controlled by any other major power, especially by the America. By contrast, the U.S. and Japan are also concerned about China's hegemony which can dominate the region through its influence on the regional institutions. ASEAN, therefore, has tried to engage all major powers in the ARF and EAS but does not take sides in any power in its balancing process to keep the leading status.

Through such regional multilateral institutions and a strategy of balancing powers within the institutional frameworks ASEAN has shaped a new regional security structure. ASEAN has built a new regional structure, in which ASEAN plays the role as a hub of the bilateral relationships with each of the external powers through the ASEAN+1 framework. The ASEAN+1 groupings were formed with the aim of strengthening mutual trust and friendships between ASEAN and external powers (Zhai Kun, 2009). Moreover, ASEAN creates its centre of gravity to draw attention of external powers in regional political and security issues. This can be seen as ASEAN's success in integrating Southeast Asia into the wider-regional structures of the Asia-Pacific and East Asia.

In relations to China in particular, ASEAN successfully reinforced China's willingness to participate in ASEAN-led institutions. This contribution was extremely important in the situation of the China's rise after the Cold War. From a constructivist perspective, it contributes to socialize China with ASEAN's norms and principles (Acharya, 2009). From another approach, liberal institutionalists see China's participation in the regional multilateral institutions as a way to constrain China's influence on the region by promoting cooperation and dialogue among state members. Likewise, ASEAN was successful in pulling the U.S. commitment back to regional security. In regard to this success it was ASEAN's notable contribution to development of multilateralism in the

Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era. By the use of the multilateralism ASEAN has assured the maintenance of both the U.S. and China in the regional multilateral institutions. Basing on the multilateral tendency ASEAN has also brought external powers into sustained dialogues on regional issues. The most important success of ASEAN in this front has been the South China Sea issue. ASEAN has successfully enmeshed the U.S. and other extra-regional states, such as Japan, India, and Australia in the disputes between China and some ASEAN states, namely Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in South China Sea instead of China's insistence on non-internationalizing disputes. In general, the U.S. and China are the two world greatest powers. Thus, external powers' presence in Southeast Asia has played a crucial role in balancing each other.

According to Ba (2010), the Southeast Asian region has seen important growth in stability and cooperative exchanges associated with the development of ASEAN. Therefore, ASEAN's success in the two regional multilateral institutions, the ARF and EAS has played an important role in assuring peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

5.2 ASEAN's limitations

Incoherence has indeed been one of ASEAN's remarkable limitations. This ASEAN's weakness was seen by several scholars. For instance, two Chinese scholars to whom Severino (2009, p. 43) spoke, believed that ASEAN lacked the cohesion required to exert effective leadership of the ARF. Ba (2007) also had the same assessment that ASEAN's incoherence hurt its image and detracted from ASEAN's ability to play a stronger role in larger arrangements. It can also decrease ASEAN's ability of individual bargain with external powers. Jones (2010) explained that ASEAN's incoherence is rooted deeply in the domestic constitutions of the ASEAN members along with their differing strategic priorities. The issue has clearly become so urgent that Carolina Hernandez, a long time track-2 participant from the Philippines had to argue, "ASEAN needs to reinvent itself not just in terms of its norms and codes but even in the way members deal with one another" (Ba, 2009, pp. 216-217). Severino (2006), former

ASEAN Secretary-General, also argued that ASEAN's effectiveness and influences is greatest when its member states stand together and are united (Ba, 2010, p. 123).

In order to solve the problem ASEAN needs to develop intra-ASEAN integration efforts alongside their East Asian and Asia-Pacific activities. ASEAN has to demonstrate to other powers that it is a strong group and an effective body that is strong enough to lead others in the building of consensus and to stay on its "driver's seat" of the regional multilateral institutions.

Furthermore, ASEAN lacks the determination to resolve regional conflicts. Though it was issued in the ARF Concept Paper as the third stage- modalities for conflict resolutions- it seems to be so far from what ASEAN has obtained from the first and second stage. According to Ba (2010), this is ASEAN historical challenge and its institutional culture, whose all members have tended to protect their national autonomy and prerogatives and, in parallel, to accept others' desire to do the same. It is also fully reflected in the ASEAN's TAC principle of non-interference and the "ASEAN Way" of consensus-driven decision-making process. The non-interference principle retrieved from the historical experience of ASEAN states of the colonial interference. Thus, ASEAN member states feared of external interference in their domestic affairs. Meanwhile, the consensus process aimed to prevent the ability of major powers (individually or in concert) to impose their will on the rest (Ba, 2010). This makes ASEAN a mere "talk shop" in the eyes of several scholars and observers. This view for a long time can erode the ASEAN centrality. Thus, ASEAN needs to act to improve its reputational challenges. Otherwise, ASEAN's political and security interest in Southeast Asia will always be around the corner (Ba, 2010, p. 129).

A weak ASEAN that either lacks the will or ability to be more assertive in promoting interests of common concern or so divided within itself that it loses the normative legitimacy that has attracted players to its table and justified its centrality (Ba, 2007, p. 6). As Singapore's Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar said at Opening Statement to

28th AMM on 29 July 1995 in Brunei, “if we in ASEAN do not move fast and stay ahead of developments, we will be sidelined” (Ba, 2007, p. 6).

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: A CONCEPT PAPER

Introduction

1. The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. For the first time in a century or more, the guns are virtually silent. There is a growing trend among, the states in the region to enhance dialogue on political and security cooperation. The Asia-Pacific is also the most dynamic region of the world in terms of economic growth. The centre of the world's economic gravity is shifting into the region. The main challenge of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is to sustain and enhance this peace and prosperity.

2. This is not an easy challenge. The region has experienced some of the most disastrous wars of the twentieth century. It is also a remarkably diverse region where big and small countries co-exist. They differ significantly in levels of development. There are cultural, ethnic, religious and historical differences to overcome. Habits of cooperation are not deep-seated in some parts of the region.

3. ASEAN has a pivotal role to play in the ARF. It has a demonstrable record of enhancing regional cooperation in the most diverse sub-region of the Asia-Pacific. It has also fostered habits of cooperation and provided the catalyst for encouraging regional cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings have contributed significantly to the positive regional environment today. There would be great hope for the Asia-Pacific if the whole region could emulate ASEAN's record of enhancing the peace and prosperity of its participants.

4. Although ASEAN has undertaken the obligation to be the primary driving force of the ARF, a successful ARF requires the active participation and cooperation of all

participants. ASEAN must always be sensitive to and take into account the interests and concerns of all ARF participants.

The Challenges

5. To successfully preserve and enhance the peace and prosperity of the region, the ARF must dispassionately analyse the key challenges facing the region. Firstly, it should acknowledge that periods of rapid economic growth are often accompanied by significant shifts in power relations. This can lead to conflict. The ARF will have to carefully manage these transitions to preserve the peace. Secondly, the region is remarkably diverse. The ARF should recognise and accept the different approaches to peace and security and try to forge a consensual approach to security issues. Thirdly, the region has a residue unresolved territorial and other differences. Any one of these could spark conflagration that could undermine the peace and prosperity of the region. Over time, the ARF will have to gradually defuse these potential problems.

6. It would be unwise for a young and fragile process like the ARF to tackle all these challenges simultaneously. A gradual evolutionary approach is required. This evolution can take place in three stages:

Stage I: Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures

Stage II: Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms

Stage III: Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms.

7. The participants of the first ARF Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in July 1994 agreed on "the need to develop a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia-Pacific region". In its initial phase, the ARF should therefore concentrate on enhancing, the trust and confidence amongst participants and thereby foster a regional environment conducive to maintaining the peace and prosperity of the region.

Stage I: Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures

8. In promoting confidence-building measures, the ARF may adopt two complementary approaches. The first approach derives from ASEAN's experience, which provides a valuable and proven guide for the ARF. ASEAN has succeeded in reducing, tensions among, its member states, promoting region cooperation and creating a regional climate conducive to peace and prosperity without the implementation of explicit confidence-building measures, achieving conditions approximating those envisaged in the Declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The concepts of ZOPFAN and its essential component, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANFWZ), are significantly contributing to regional peace and stability. ASEAN's well established practices of consultation and consensus (musyawarah and mufakat) have been significantly enhanced by the regular exchanges of high-level visits among ASEAN countries. This pattern of regular visits has effectively developed into a preventive diplomacy channel. In the Asian context, there is some merit to the ASEAN approach. It emphasises the need to develop trust and confidence among neighbouring states.

9. The principles of good neighbourliness, which are elaborated in the concept of ZOPFAN, are enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). One simple concrete way of expanding the ASEAN experience is to encourage the ARF participants to associate themselves with the TAC. It is significant that the first ARF meeting in Bangkok agreed to "endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation."

10. The second approach is the implementation of concrete confidence-building measures. The first ARF meeting, in Bangkok entrusted the next Chairman of the ARF, Brunei Darussalam, to study all the ideas presented by ARF participants and to also study other relevant internationally recognised norms, principles and practices. After extensive

consultations, the ASEAN countries have prepared two lists of confidence-building measures. The first list (Annex A) spells out measures which can be explored and implemented by ARF participants in the immediate future. The second list (Annex B) is an indicative list of other proposals which can be explored over the medium and long-term by ARF participants and also considered in the immediate future by the Track Two process. These lists include possible preventive diplomacy and other measures.

11. Given the delicate nature of many of the subjects being considered by the ARF, there is merit in moving, the ARF process along two tracks. Track One activities will be carried out by governments. Track Two activities will be carried out by strategic institutes and non-government organisations in the region, such as ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP. To be meaningful and relevant, the Track Two activities may focus, as much as possible, on the current concerns of the ARF. The synergy between the two tracks would contribute greatly to confidence-building measures in the region. Over time, these Track Two activities should result in the creation of a sense of community among participants of those activities.

Moving Beyond Stage 1

12. There remains a residue of unresolved territorial and other disputes that could be sources of tension or conflict. If the ARF is to become, over time, a meaningful vehicle to enhance the peace and prosperity of the region, it will have to demonstrate that it is a relevant instrument to be used in the event that a crisis or problem emerges. The ARF meeting in Bangkok demonstrated this by taking a stand on the Korean issue at the very first meeting. This was a signal that the ARF is ready to address any challenge to the peace and security of the region.

13. Over time, the ARF must develop its own mechanisms to carry preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution. In doing so, the ARF will unique challenges. There are no established roads or procedures for it to follow. Without a high degree of confidence among ARF participants, it is unlikely that they will agree to the establishment of mechanisms which are perceived to be intrusive and/or autonomous. This is a political

reality the ARF should recognise. However, it would be useful in the initial phase for the Track Two process to consider and investigate a variety of preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution mechanisms. A good start was made with the three workshops organised by International Studies Centre (Thailand) and Institute of Policy Studies (Singapore) on ASEAN-UN Cooperation for Peace and Preventive Diplomacy, and the Indonesia-sponsored series off workshops on the South China Sea.

Stage II: Development of Preventive Diplomacy

14. Preventive diplomacy would be a natural follow-up to confidence building measures. Some suggestions for preventive diplomacy measures are spelled out in Annexes A and B.

Stage III: Conflict Resolution

15. It is not envisaged that the ARF would establish mechanisms conflict resolution in the immediate future. The establishment of such mechanisms is an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue as they proceed to develop the ARF as a vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability.

Organisation of ARF activities

16. There shall be an annual ARF Ministerial Meeting, in an ASEAN capital just after the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. The host country will chair the meeting. The incoming Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee will chair all inter-sessional Track One activities of the ARF.

17. The ARF shall be apprised of all Track Two activities through the current Chairman of the Track One activities, who will be the main link between Track One and Track Two activities.

18. In the initial phase of the ARF no institutionalisation is expected. Nor should a Secretariat be established in the near future. ASEAN shall be the repository of all ARF documents and information and provide the necessary support to sustain ARF activities.

19. The participants of the ARF comprise the ASEAN member states, the observers, and consultative and dialogue partners of ASEAN. Applications to participate in the ARF shall be submitted to the Chairman of the ARF who will then consult the other ARF participants.

20. The rules of procedure of ARF meetings shall be based on prevailing, ASEAN norms and practices. Decisions should be made by consensus after careful and extensive consultations. No voting will take place. In accordance with prevailing ASEAN practices, the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee shall provide the secretarial support and coordinate ARF activities.

21. The ARF should also progress at a pace comfortable to all participants. The ARF should not move "too fast for those who want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast".

Conclusion

22. ARF participants should not assume that the success of the ARF can be taken for granted. ASEAN's experience shows that success is a result of hard work and careful adherence to the rule of consensus. ARF participants will have to work equally hard and be equally sensitive to ensure that the ARF process stays on track.

23. The ARF must be accepted as a "sui generis" Organisation. It has no established precedents to follow. A great deal of innovation and ingenuity will be required to keep the ARF moving forward while at the same time ensure that it enjoys the support of its diverse participants. This is a major challenge both for the ASEAN countries and other ARF participants. The UN Secretary-General's" Agenda for Peace" has recognised that

"just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labour must adjust to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity".

APPENDIX B

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
THE SECOND MEETING OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM

Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 1 August 1995

1. The Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held on 1 August 1995 in Bandar Seri Begawan. The Meeting was chaired by His Royal Highness Prince Mohamed Bolkiah, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam.

2. The Forum was attended by all ARF participants. The Secretary-General of ASEAN was also present.

3. The Ministers welcomed Cambodia to the ARF.

4. The Ministers expressed their satisfaction at the level of stability in the Asia Pacific Region. They noted the ways in which cooperative relationships were developing constructively. In this regard, the Ministers noted the many positive steps taken since the first ARF in Bangkok in July 1994, particularly those which built confidence and created greater transparency. In this respect, they noted the participants' willingness to address substantive security issues in a spirit of mutual respect, equality and cooperation.

5. The Ministers expressed their appreciation for the consultations conducted by the Chairman of ARF, Brunei Darussalam, with ARF participants to obtain their views in preparation for the ARF. Based on the inputs and proposals, ASEAN has produced "The ASEAN Regional Forum - A Concept Paper", as annexed .

6. The Ministers considered and endorsed the Report of the Chairman of the ARF-SOM. In particular, they adopted the following proposals in the context of the Concept Paper:

A. GOALS AND EXPECTATIONS

- The ARF participants shall continue to work closely to ensure and preserve the current environment of peace, prosperity and stability in the Asia Pacific;

- The ARF shall continue to be a forum for open dialogue and consultation on regional political and security issues, to discuss and reconcile the differing views between ARF participants in order to reduce the risk to security; and
- The ARF recognises that the concept of comprehensive security includes not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and other issues.

B. METHOD AND APPROACH

- A successful-ARF requires the active, full and equal participation and cooperation of all participants. However, ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be the primary driving force;
- The ARF process shall move at a pace comfortable to all participants;
- The approach shall be evolutionary, taking place in three broad stages, namely the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts. The ARF process is now at Stage I, and shall continue to discuss means of implementing confidence building. Stage II, particularly where the subject matter overlap, can proceed in tandem with Stage I. Discussions will continue regarding the incorporation of elaboration of approaches to conflicts, as an eventual goal, into the ARF process.
- Decisions of the ARF shall be made through consensus after careful and extensive consultations among all participants.

C. PARTICIPATION

- The participants of the ARF comprise ASEAN Member States, Observers, Consultative and Dialogue Partners of ASEAN. Any new application should be submitted to the Chairman of the ARF who will then consult the other ARF participants; and
- To request the next Chairman, to study the question of future participation and develop the criteria for the consideration of the Third ARF through the ARF-SOM.

D. ORGANISATION OF THE ARF

- There shall be an annual ARF in the context of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conferences to be preceded by ARF-SOM;
- The ARF process would move along two tracks. Track one activities will be carried out by ARF governments. Track Two activities shall be carried out by strategic institutes and relevant non-governmental organisations to which all ARF participants should be eligible. To be meaningful and relevant, the ARF Chairman shall ensure that Track Two activities as indicated in ANNEX B result from full consultations with all ARF participants; and
- The ARF shall be apprised of all Track One and Track Two activities through the current Chairman of the ARF, who will be the main link between Track One and Track Two.

E. IMPLEMENTATION OF IDEAS AND PROPOSALS

- In order to assist the Chairman of the ARF-SOM to consider and make recommendations to the ARF on the implementation of the proposals agreed by the ARF participants as indicated in ANNEX A of the Concept Paper, the following shall be convened at the inter-governmental level:

1.Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building, in particular, dialogue on security perceptions and defence policy papers; and

2.Inter-sessional Meetings (ISMs) on Cooperative Activities including inter-alia, Peacekeeping.

- ISG and ISMs shall be governed the following by guidelines:

1. ISG and ISMs shall be co-chaired by ASEAN and non-ASEAN participants;
2. ISG and ISMs shall be held in between ARF-SOMS; and
3. Findings of the ISG and ISMs shall be presented to the ARF-SOM in Indonesia in 1996. The possible continuation of the mandate of the ISG and ISMs shall be reviewed at that time.

7. In this regard the Ministers agreed that Indonesia would co-chair the ISGs on CBMs with Japan; Malaysia would co-chair the ISMs on Peacekeeping Operations with Canada;

and Singapore would co-chair the ISMs Seminar on Search and Rescue Coordination and Cooperation with the United States.

8. The Ministers also agreed on the following:

- to encourage all ARF countries to enhance their dialogues and consultations on political and security cooperation including exchanges on security perceptions on a bilateral, sub-regional and regional basis;
- for the ARF countries to submit to the ARF or ARF-SOM, on a voluntary basis, an annual statement of their defence policy;
- on the benefits of increased high level contacts and exchanges between military academies, staff colleges and training; and
- to take note of the increased participation in the UN conventional Arms Register since the first ARF and encourage those not yet participating to soon do so.

9. The Ministers expressed the view that their endorsement of such specific ideas and proposals provided sufficient direction for the ARF process at this stage. They also reaffirmed their belief that the Asia Pacific Region-currently had an historically unprecedented opportunity to establish and consolidate long term conditions for peace and stability.

10. The Ministers also received the reports of the following seminars on Building of Confidence and Trust in the Asia Pacific, held in November 1994 in Canberra, Australia; Seminar on Peacekeeping: Challenges and opportunities for the ASEAN Regional Forum, held in March 1995 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam ; Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy, held in May 1995, Seoul, Republic of Korea. They commended the hosts and sponsors of those seminars for their efforts and agreed that the arrangements under the Track Two process should continue. They also noted the Russian offer to host a Track Two seminar in Spring of 1996 on the proposed Principles of Security an Stability in the Asia-Pacific : Region. They also commended bilateral and multilateral, governmental and on-governmental consultations and seminars in the Asia Pacific region including the Indonesian Workshop (co-sponsored by Canada) series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea as a useful means of enhancing dialogue and cooperation.

11. Noting the overall stable environment and many areas of ongoing regional cooperation, the Ministers exchanged views on regional security issues, and highlighted the following:

- expressed concern on overlapping sovereignty claims in the region. They encouraged all claimants to reaf firm their commitment to the principles contained in relevant international laws and convention, and the ASEAN's 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea;
- recognized that the Korean Peninsula issue has a direct bearing on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. They welcomed the recent US-DPRK talks held in Kuala Lumpur and expressed the hope that this would lead to the full implementation of the Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994. The Ministers urged the resumption of dialogue between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and believed that it would assist in the successful implementation of the Agreed Framework and the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The ministers also recognised the importance which international support for the Korean Peninsula. The Ministers also recognised the importance which international support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Organisation (KEDO) has for the implementation of the Agreed Framework;
- expressed their support for the efforts of the Royal Government of Cambodia to achieve security, promote national stability and economic recovery; and
- emphasised the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in promoting regional peace and stability. They welcomed the commitment by all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996. Those countries who plan to conduct further nuclear tests were called upon by all other ARF member states to bring immediate end to such testing. They also endorsed the nuclear-weapon free zones, such as the SouthPacific Nuclear Free Zone, in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and expressed the hope that all nuclear weapon states would in the very near future adhere to the relevant Protocols. They noted with satisfaction the progress made towards the establishment of the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and encouraged

further consultations on this issue with those states that would be significantly affected by the establishment of the zone.

APPENDIX C

KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION ON THE EAST ASIA SUMMIT

Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 2005

WE, the Heads of State/Government of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, People's Republic of China, Republic of India, Japan, Republic of Korea and New Zealand, on the occasion of the historic First East Asia Summit on 14 December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia;

RECALLING the decision of the 10th ASEAN Summit and supported by the 8th ASEAN Plus Three Summit held on 29 November 2004 in Vientiane, Lao PDR, to convene the First East Asia Summit in Malaysia in 2005;

REITERATING our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and other recognised principles of international law;

ACKNOWLEDGING that in a rapidly changing international environment, our economies and societies have become increasingly interlinked and interdependent;

REALISING the increasing range of challenges facing the world and the need for concerted regional and global efforts to respond to these challenges;

RECOGNISING our shared interests in achieving peace, security and prosperity in East Asia and the world at large;

DESIROUS of creating a peaceful environment by further enhancing cooperation and strengthening the existing bonds of friendship among our countries in keeping with the principles of equality, partnership, consultation and consensus thereby contributing to peace, security and economic prosperity in the region and the world at large;

CONVINCED of the importance of strengthening bilateral and multilateral interactions and cooperation among the participating countries of the East Asia Summit and the world at large on issues of common interest and concern in order to enhance peace and economic prosperity;

REITERATING the conviction that the effective functioning of multilateral systems will continue to be indispensable for advancing economic development;

RECOGNISING that this region is today a source of dynamism for the world economy;

SHARING the view that the East Asia Summit could play a significant role in community building in this region;

FURTHER RECOGNISING the need to support efforts to build a strong ASEAN Community which will serve as a solid foundation for our common peace and prosperity;

DO HEREBY DECLARE:

FIRST, that we have established the East Asia Summit as a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.

SECOND, that the efforts of the East Asia Summit to promote community building in this region will be consistent with and reinforce the realisation of the ASEAN Community, and will form an integral part of the evolving regional architecture.

THIRD, that the East Asia Summit will be an open, inclusive, transparent and outward-looking forum in which we strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognised values with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership with the other participants of the East Asia Summit.

FOURTH, we will focus, among others, on the following:

- Fostering strategic dialogue and promoting cooperation in political and security issues to ensure that our countries can live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment;
- Promoting development, financial stability, energy security, economic integration and growth, eradicating poverty and narrowing the development gap in East Asia, through technology transfer and infrastructure development, capacity building, good governance and humanitarian assistance and promoting financial links, trade and investment expansion and liberalisation; and
- Promoting deeper cultural understanding, people-to-people contact and enhanced cooperation in uplifting the lives and well-being of our peoples in order to foster mutual trust and solidarity as well as promoting fields such as environmental protection, prevention of infectious diseases and natural disaster mitigation.

FIFTH, that:

- Participation in the East Asia Summit will be based on the criteria for participation established by ASEAN;
- The East Asia Summit will be convened regularly;
- The East Asia Summit will be hosted and chaired by an ASEAN Member Country that assumes the ASEAN Chairmanship and held back-to-back with the annual ASEAN Summit; and
- The modalities of the East Asia Summit will be reviewed by ASEAN and all other participating countries of the East Asia Summit.

SIGNED at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on the Fourteenth Day of December in the Year Two Thousand and Five.

For Brunei Darussalam:

HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH
Sultan of Brunei Darussalam

For the Kingdom of Cambodia:

SAMDECH HUN SEN
Prime Minister

For the Republic of Indonesia:

DR. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO
President

For the Lao People's Democratic Republic:

BOUNNHANG VORACHITH
Prime Minister

For Malaysia:

DATO' SERI ABDULLAH AHMAD BADAWI
Prime Minister

For the Union of Myanmar:

GENERAL SOE WIN
Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines:

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President

For the Republic of Singapore:

LEE HSIEN LOONG
Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand:

DR. THAKSIN SHINAWATRA
Prime Minister

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam:

PHAN VAN KHAI
Prime Minister

For Australia:

JOHN HOWARD
Prime Minister

For the People's Republic of China:

WEN JIABAO
Premier

For the Republic of India:

DR. MANMOHAN SINGH
Prime Minister

For Japan:

JUNICHIRO KOIZUMI
Prime Minister

For the Republic of Korea:

ROH MOO-HYUN
President

For New Zealand:

HELEN CLARK
Prime Minister

BIOGRAPHY

Le Thanh Lam was born and raised in Hai Duong Province, northern part of Vietnam on March 30, 1985. He acquired Bachelor's degree in International Studies majoring in American Studies from Faculty of International Studies, College of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University (VNU) in Hanoi in June 2007. After his graduation from VNU, Lam has worked as a lecturer of the Faculty of International Relations, College of Social Sciences and Humanities, VNU in Ho Chi Minh City since October 2007. He has been a teaching assistant of Global Issues, and developing other courses on Southeast Asian Studies and ASEAN, which are also his research interests. In October 2008, he started his Master of International Relations by an associated program between the Faculty of International Studies and the Faculty of International Relations. Later, obtaining a grant from the "Weaving the Mekong into Southeast Asia" (WMSEA) Fellowship 2010 with the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation, Lam has currently enrolled in the International Master's Degree Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Chulalongkorn University (Thailand).