

CHAPTER SIX

REJECTION THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AESTHETICS

In his epilogue of *The Origin of The Work of Art*,
Heidegger argued that :

Almost from the time when specialized thinking about the artist began, this thought was called aesthetic. Aesthetics takes the work of art as an object, the object of aisthesis, of sensuous apprehension in the wide sense. Today we call this apprehension experience. The way in which man experiences art is supposed to give information about its nature. Experience is the source that is standard not only for art appreciation and enjoyment, but also for artistic creation. Everything is an experience. Yet perhaps experience is the element in which art dies. The dying occurs so slowly that it takes a few centuries. (Heidegger 1971:79)

Then he quotes Hegel's words "Art no longer counts for us as the highest manner in which truth obtains existence for itself." (Ibid. :80) Today many artistic movements, such as Dada, Surrealism, Cubism, Futurism, are already dead. (Surely all these movements came after the death of Hegel) We are acquainted with new modes of art, such as film. Not only these new modes also those which, as you have seen, like Collingwood's theory argues against and we have called the commercial art, the propaganda art and new modes of entertaining which call themselves art. In this context that Heidegger question makes sense to us :

is art still an essential and necessary way in which that truth happens which is decisive for our historical existence, or is art no longer of this character? (Ibid.:80)

but before we go to the next question " Why this is so?", let us

ask ourselves "Has art character as such?" When Althusser asked himself "whether art and ideology are one and the same thing?", his answer is "I do not rank real art among the ideologies, although art does have a quite particular and specific relationship with ideology." (Althusser 1984:173) And art has a certain specific relationship with knowledge too. Knowledge here means scientific knowledge. While scientific knowledge gives us the form of knowing, what art gives us is the form of 'seeing', 'perceiving' and 'feeling'. The peculiarity of art is to 'make us see', 'make us perceive', 'make us feel' something which alludes to reality.

Macherey has shown this very clearly in the case of Tolstoy, by extending Lenin's analyses. Balzac and Solzhenitsyn give us a 'view' of the ideology to which their work alludes and with which it is constantly fed, a view which presupposes a retreat, an internal distantiatiion from the very ideology from which their novels emerged. They make us 'percieve' (but not know) in some sense from the inside, by an internal distance, the very ideology in which they are hold. (Ibid.:174-175)

From this 'internal distance' means from this work of art on its own basis, that we can trace some ideology. From the soil the work emerges but the work has distance from the soil. It has its own 'reality', the reality it creates itself, its own world, from which we can trace from this world, the ideology of that world. Speaking of ideology, this real state of affairs, we know from our experience as humans existing in society, it takes the crucial role in our everyday life. Althusser argues that

ideology slides into all human activity, that it is identical with the 'lived' experience of human existence itself; that is why the form in which we are 'made to see' ideology in great novels has as its content the 'lived' experience of individuals. This 'lived' experience is not a given, given by a pure 'reality', but the spontaneous 'lived experience' of ideology in its peculiar relationship to the real. This is an

important comment, for it enables us to understand that art does not deal with a reality peculiar to itself, with a peculiar domain of reality in which it has a monopoly (as you tend to imply when you write that 'with art, knowledge becomes human', that the object of art is 'the individual'), whereas science deals with a different domain of reality (say, in opposition to 'lived experience' and the 'individual', the abstraction of structures). Ideology is also an object of science, The 'lived experience' is also an object of science, the 'individual' is also an object of science. The real difference between art and science lie in the specific form in which they give us the same object in quite different ways: art in the form of 'seeing' and 'percieving' or 'feeling', science in the form of knowledge (in the strict sense, by concepts). (Ibid.:175)

That is "art make us 'see' the 'conclusion without premises', whereas knowledge makes us penetrate into the mechanism which produces the 'conclusion' out of the 'premises'. (Ibid.:176)

This is true of literary art such as novel which the experience of the author based on some 'cult of personality'. Here I remind you of Collingwood's words when he said of "The narrowness or wideness of the experience which an artist expresses has nothing to do with the merits of his art". (Collingwood nd:121)
Or when he said of a great poet :

Thus Burne-Jones lived in a world whose contents were ungraciously defined by a journalist as 'green light and gawky girls'; Leighton in a world of sham Hellenism; and it was the call of practical life that rescued Yeats from the Sham world of his youthful Celtic twilight, forced him into the clear air of real Celtic life, and made him a great poet. (Ibid.:120)

As you see, in chapter four I distinguish the attributive term 'great' from 'good'. That 'great' means the richness or wideness of the artist's experiences. We can also call some author as 'depth'. This is only in the case of literary arts. When we look to other modes of the existence of art such as music, all these terms,

except 'good', must be redefined. But I'll not touch this problem, what is significant is that the failure in the field 'Aesthetics' to seek the general characteristic of all modes of the existence of art is based on what fault? Some answer can be that there are differing criteria for each mode, or for at least distinguishing to be such a kind as visual, auditory and literary art. What these kinds share only in area of the sensuous one. Or some will refer to uniqueness and disinterestedness as the aesthetic quality of the art work. Some say it is our attitude to take the work as such.

You can see now the trend as of Collingwood which based on the creative act of the artist escapes such problem. Because the creation takes a crucial role in distinguishing the work from the craft one. And his theory can explain the above search is such a failure. Because the attempt to find general characteristic of the work, only can touch with the sensuous basis of the work. That is those aestheticians are looking in the wrong place. Goodman neglects such trying, and based his theory in the light of the general theory of symbols. Those who apply Wittgenstein's idea of the family resemblance reject such an attempt completely as irrelevant.

Putnam claims that the mode we called literary art is a rival kind of knowledge. (This argues more than the Marxist)

We get closer to the real issue if we realize that according to some - according to the thinkers I wish to criticize - the value of, say, Dostoevsky, is not purely aesthetic in the way in which the value of an abstract painting is, or is sometimes supposed to be, purely aesthetic. The Greek dramatists, Freudian psychology, and the Russian novel are all supposed by these thinkers to embody knowledge - knowledge about man. Thus they both do and do not conflict with science. They conflict with science in the sense of representing a rival kind of knowledge, and thereby contest the claim of science to monopolize reliable



knowledge. But it is a rival kind of knowledge, and hence inaccessible to scientific testing. (Putnam 1978:89)

He rejected this claims to be knowledge about man as on the based that "No matter how profound the psychological insights of a novelist may seem to be, they cannot be called knowledge if they have not been tested." (Ibid.:89) And said that "Yet it is not correct to say that it is not knowledge at all" "It is knowledge of a possibility. It is conceptual knowledge." What such a kind of this knowledge? He argues that :

It may seem strange to describe something as real and 'empirical' as a vision of how humans behave and of what 'make them tick' as conceptual knowledge ; but that is all it is unless it is tested, if not scientifically, at least tested in the actual experience of intelligent and sensitive men and women. Thinking of a hypothesis that one had not considered before is conceptual discovery; it is not empirical discovery, although it may result in empirical discovery, although it may result in empirical discovery if the hypothesis turns out to be correct. Yet the 'knowledge of a possibility' that literature gives us should not be knowledge of a mere possibility. That the possibility Celine holds before us is a 'mere' possibility is, after all, one of the reasons we do not rate Celine higher than we do as novelist. So again the situation is complicated, there are both empirical and conceptual elements in the knowledge we gain from literature. (Ibid.:90)

His using of the term 'test' here, can any scientist accept? I don't know. But all his criterion is based on scientific conception of taking the problem. Many times such who know nothing about nature of scientific inquiry have argued stupidly against science and that is a crude procedure. But this does not mean science cannot be criticized. The truth that theory of Relativity is not an empirical discovery, is it more proper to reject this theory? Or argues that it is a conceptual discovery? The word 'empirical' is somewhat taking bias as if the term knowledge itself, when it means only scientific knowledge. This does not mean that science has no

merit. But means that another knowledge such as human sciences, from its own based can be our choice too. The world we want to live is the world we choose, no matter how hard it is. Such a spiritual element and Vision-Color has its place in our life as what preferable, if we choose it. And then we can change our life-meaning, but not an arbitrarily one. We also change our practice. We make reality. And if we want a rational based one, we can construct reality on that based, without value-free. But value accepted by means of criticizing. Then we know the meaning when Stephen Daedalus (Joyce's hero) said that what he wants is to hellenize the Irish. This is what when we say that work of art gives us much more than its appearance. The vision of the world that artist creates.

Now, some theories tell us more than others. An example is Heidegger's theory of the origin of the work of art. He has offered an account of truth. That says that science is only one aspect, the one which can catch only when truth reveals itself sometimes as truth. There is another aspect of truth as untruth, which does not mean falsity, but means truth does not reveal itself, it's in its concealment.

The work of art takes an important part in his philosophy. It takes a role as a being through which truth reveals itself as openness. The uniqueness of the work is its peculiarity based on itself as what originates from creation. This account is consistent with Collingwood's theory and also distinguishes between art and craft. Both interpreted the meaning of Greek term on the word 'art' and 'craft'. (Collingwood charged Jowett's translation of Plato's Republic as being the source of the error.) Apart from the difficulty

in his use of language many of Heidegger's ideas are like Collingwood's. But Heidegger wanted to do more than Collingwood. He tried to reveal the truth of beings (included human existence), the Being of beings. And using language in its own terms as he interpreted to reveal the essence of truth. The results are exciting: the work of art takes a crucial role and significance in connection with truth. And his account of the thingly character of the work and the workly character of the work can compare with Collingwood's divisible work of art into two parts, its sensuous basis and the special experience.

What Heidegger gives is an answer to a totally scientific point of view. Any argument against his theory from that point of view is charged with as one aspect of the knowledge which root or justification from the truth, this theory propounds. This can block any empirical charge. The significance is on the point. And the significance of Aesthetics is rejected already. Because any attempting on the thingly character of the work, to generalize its qualities, is all only take the work as an equipment, or object, which its essence escaped.

Collingwood, also the same untouchable. Because generalizing the features of the work's sensuous basis is only to seek the system of that symbol, not touch with the work's essence, the 'real' work, the imaginative total experience that the observer must create. The unaccepted of his theory come from epistemic bias, which cannot success in proof his theory as fault on its innermost logic. (Even the private language argument of Wittgenstein which may try to apply to as a case against [See Scruton 1974] the criterion of

identity of the expression [See Wittgenstein 1968:88-90,
Wittgenstein 1967:33-39] , is hard to destroy this theory when it
based on another bases, as of Heidegger.)