

CHAPTER II

PRC'S DIPLOMACY (1950'S – 1960'S)

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the PRC's foreign policy from 1949 to the early 1950's and 1960's. It first describes China's foreign policy after the founding of New China in 1949, its attitude towards the world, and the development of Chinese diplomatic relations in the 1950's and 1960's. Secondly, it examines the PRC's approach to Korean and Indochinese problems; and thirdly, it summarizes the characteristics of Zhou Enlai's Chinese foreign policy. This chapter points out the historical influence of Bandung Conference and the significance of the Five Principles and Zhou Enlai's attractiveness in Bandung Conference.

2.1 PRC's Foreign Policy (1949)

On the eve of the establishment of New China, Chairman Mao Zedong set forth some policy ideas in order to formulate the foreign policy of New China. The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China which convened in March 1949 and the First Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference which convened in September of the same year made important decisions respectively with regard to the foreign policy of New China which provided orientation for diplomatic work after the founding of New China. The CPPCC gave formal birth to the New People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949.

Between the spring and summer of 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong advanced the three principles of "Starting anew"(另起炉灶), "Sweeping the house clean and preparing invitations to be sent to the guests" (打扫干净屋子再待客) and "Leaning to one side" (一边倒). This was a major decision made in the light of China's historical and realistic situation and in accordance with the existing international environment at that time.

2.1.1 About "Starting Anew"

In order to make a clean break with the foreign policy of the old and semi-colonial China and to uphold the independence and sovereignty of New China, Chairman Mao Zedong advocated that China should "start anew" (另起炉灶) and "sweep the house clean and prepare invitations to be sent to the guests" (打扫干净屋子再待客). That is to say China renounced all the diplomatic relations the KMT Government (国民党政府) had established with foreign countries, treated heads of foreign diplomatic missions accredited to Old China as ordinary foreign nationals instead of diplomatic envoys, reviewed all the treaties and agreements Old China had concluded with foreign countries¹.

2.1.2 About "Sweeping the House Clean and Prepare Invitations to be Sent to the Guests"

Then, gradually the prerogatives and influence the imperialist countries had in China were cleared up and new diplomatic relations with other countries were established on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and equality and mutual benefit.² This was as if a house were being cleaned, from inside to outside, completely cleaning dirty things, getting things straight. After the house was clean, and there was some order, then concern shifted to the people who entered.³

This policy implication lies in firstly it must eliminate the privilege, force and influence of imperialism in China, with the new foundation and the establishment of new relations with various countries.

¹ Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. IV (Beijing: the People Publishing, 2003), p. 1434. (毛泽东 (著), 《毛泽东选集》第四卷, 北京人民出版社, 2003, 第 1434 页。)

² Ibid, p. 1461. (同上, 第 1461 页。)

³ Shi Zhe, *By the Side of Historical Giant—Shi Zhe Memoir* (Beijing: Centre Literature Press, 2001), p. 379. (师哲 (著), 《在历史巨人身边的日子——师哲回忆录》, 中央文献出版社, 2001, 第 379 页。)

2.1.3 About "Leaning to One Side"

The policy of "leaning to one side (一边倒)" is to declare that China would lean to the side of socialism. During the War of Liberation in China, there emerged a sharp confrontation between the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the imperialist camp headed by the United States on the international scene. The United States stood on the opposite side of the Chinese people and supported the KMT in launching the civil war. Moreover, after the birth of New China, the imperialists were not reconciled to their defeat in China, might carry out armed intervention against China while the Soviet Union had long been sympathetic to and supportive of the national democratic revolution of the Chinese people. Thus the above-mentioned situation necessitated China's formation of an alliance with the socialist countries.

In September 1949, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held its first session in Beijing and adopted "the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference" (1949 中华人民共和国政治协商会议共同纲领) which provided

"The principle of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting and international peace friendly cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war."⁴

The "Common Program" (共同纲领) not only defined the basic principles of new Chinese diplomacy, but also regulated some specific policies, including rendering the force of law to the three major policy decisions of "starting anew" (另起炉灶), "sweeping the house clean and prepare invitations to be sent to the guests" (打扫干净屋子再待客) and "leaning to one side" (一边倒) but also provided that

⁴ The Article 54 of "Common Program", see in Appendix X and XI. (《共同纲领》第五十四条, 见附录十、十一, 第 159、166 页。)

“The People's Republic of China shall unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples throughout the world, first of all with the USSR, all People's Democracies and all oppressed nations. It shall take its stand in the camp of international peace and democracy, to oppose imperialist aggression and to defend lasting world peace”;⁵

“The People's Republic of China may restore and develop commercial relations with foreign governments and peoples on the basis of equality and mutual benefit”⁶ and so on. All these basic principles and specific policies facilitated the implementation of New China's diplomatic work.

The proposal of three principles, not accidental the product of international and domestic politics struggles under the big background at that time, which resulted in a historical product. It was the essential decision-making and prudent choice and took the Chinese top leaders' deep consideration, and took history and theory as the basis and the realistic benefit as the foundation. In brief, the foreign principles and policies stipulated in "common program" became the directive and the legal basis of new China's diplomatic work. These fundamental principles and the concrete policies, facilitated the new Chinese diplomacy and helped it to develop smoothly.

2.2 Development of Chinese Diplomatic Relations in 1950's and 1960's

New China's great diplomatic achievements are inseparable from the Premier Zhou Enlai's earnest performance. Zhou Enlai was appointed Premier of the State

⁵ The Article 11 of “Common Program”, see in Appendix X and XI. (《共同纲领》第十一条，见附录十、十一，第 157、162 页。)

⁶ The Article 56 of “Common Program”, “The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China may, on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty, negotiate with foreign governments which have severed relations with the Kuomintang reactionary clique and which adopt a friendly attitude towards the People's Republic of China, and may establish diplomatic relations with them.” See in Appendix X and XI. (《共同纲领》第五十六条，“凡与国民党反动派断绝关系、并对中华人民共和国采取友好态度的外国政府，中华人民共和国中央人民政府可在平等、互利及互相尊重领土主权的基础上，与之谈判，建立外交关系。”见附录十、十一，第 160、166 页。)

Council – the cabinet – and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, and from this moment the world began to know him as Zhou Zongli (周总理) – “Premier Zhou”.

Zhou Enlai’s era of development of relationships with Asian, African and Latin American countries occupies a very prominent position in the history of China's foreign relations. "Equal treatment, mutual support" is the theme of the development of this relationship.

First, the PRC was located in Asia. The vast majority of Asian, African and Latin American countries have been invaded and bullied in the past. After gaining independence, they all faced the common historical mission—that was to build the nation. This made Zhou Enlai sympathize with Asian, African, and Latin American countries and their people on the common interests among these countries with a deep understanding.

Secondly, Zhou Enlai very clearly realized the great importance of China's strategy to develop relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which was the key of breaking through containment policy of the US in 1950s. In the 1960s, these countries were the main targets for China to strive for the establishment of an international united front against the hegemony of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to gain support from the international community.

Exchanges with Europe, Japan and other capitalist countries, was the other side of Zhou Enlai’s expanding diplomatic space for China. After the founding of the PRC, one of the important tasks of diplomacy is the about-face of the status that past-China adhered to the Western capitalist countries to an independent basis and establishment of an equal diplomatic relations with these countries. During the Cold War, in developing relations with these countries, China had to break the limitation and isolation set by the United States, risking sharp ideological confrontation. China's Premier Zhou Enlai in different ways promoted the development of relations with

Britain, Japan, and France which were fairly representative examples. Moreover the three countries were exactly where he had studied and lived in his youth.

Britain was the last Western country to recognize the PRC. She only agreed to half of the diplomatic principles required by New China in establishing diplomatic relations. France recognized the People's Republic of China, but abstained in the issue of China's representation right in the United Nations under pressure from the United States. In order to achieve a breakthrough in Sino-British relations, Zhou Enlai adopted a way of "semi-diplomatic ties" (半建交) during the meeting in Geneva, that is, agreement to exchange charge d'affaires with the British so that the two sides could establish "semi-diplomatic relations" (半外交关系). The "Semi-diplomatic ties" were a pioneering work in the history of New China's establishment of diplomatic relations. It was not only a step forward in Sino-British relations, but in the extremely antagonistic conditions of the two major camps of also allows China to open a diplomatic channel to western countries.

If the Sino-British relationship was officially starting to be released, then the Sino-Japanese relations were starting to promote non-governmental diplomatic means. After the establishment of the PRC, the authorities of Japan followed the United States to set up great obstacles for development of Sino-Japanese relations. Zhou Enlai cooperated with the Japanese personage who called for friendship relations with New China in 1952 opening an approach of Sino-Japanese nongovernmental contact. In the late 1950s, the Sino-Japanese relations were at a low ebb, and taking into account the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in a short period of time would be very difficult. As a result Zhou Enlai came up with a policy of "long-term accumulation" (长期积累). At the beginning of the 1960s, through the efforts of all parties, Sino-Japanese relations was restored, and with a "semi-official" (半官方) in nature.

On January 27, 1964, China formally established diplomatic relations with

France. This was a breakthrough with historical significance in the relations of the PRC with major Western capitalist countries. Once the news that China and France had established diplomatic relations was announced, it then shocked the entire world. It was to show the world that even though with huge differences between the two countries in ideology, political systems and others, they were still able to establish full diplomatic relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

From the 1953 Korean armistice to 1965, under the leadership of Premier Zhou Enlai, China's diplomatic work developed in a comprehensive way. After the initial founding of PRC, 18 countries established diplomatic relations with China, arising to 49 countries and China's international status rose significantly. At the time of Premier Zhou Enlai's death, the countries that had established diplomatic relations with China changed from 49 to 107 countries, and China's United Nations legal status had been restored.

In the early 1970s, the international situation underwent tremendous changes. Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai considered the situation and decided to make to the United States to make a gesture of reconciliation, in order to open up Sino-US relations. Ultimately Nixon's visit to China led to a thaw in Sino-US relations. This major development in Sino-US relations shocked the world again, setting a new upsurge in establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC.

2.3 PRC's Approach to Korean and Indochinese Problems

In the mid 1950s, an important task of China's diplomacy was to improve and develop relations with the newly emerging independent nations, which meant the relations with neighboring independence countries first.

From 1954 to 1956 was one of the most successful periods in China's diplomacy. During this period, in the process of formulation and implementation of

foreign policy, Zhou Enlai played a prominent role, and Chinese diplomacy clearly had his style. After the Korean War ended, China faced the significant and urgent duty in the strategic security aspect that is to prevent the US threatening China from after the northern border area as well as from the southern border area. Through the Geneva Conference held in the spring of 1954, Premier Zhou Enlai used diplomatic means and successfully completed the major task.

At the initiative of the USSR, the Four-power Conference of Foreign Ministers in Berlin reached agreement on 28 February 1954. They decided to convene in April 1954 a Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China. In addition to the USSR, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China were participants throughout the whole conference (**Picture 2.1**); other countries concerned with the two questions were also to be represented respectively at the discussions of their own questions. For the first time, The Geneva Conference was an important conference on international issues in which the PRC participated with the status and in the capacity of the Big Five Powers (PRC, US, USSR, UK and France).⁷




Picture 2.1 Premier Zhou Enlai led the Chinese governmental delegation arrival Geneva to attend the Geneva Conference on 24 Apr, 1954.

⁷ "The Geneva Conference", **Events and Issues**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC [online], 2000. Available from: <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18033.htm>

Before the conference, because the attending parties had the principled divergency on how peacefully solve the North Korean issue, Zhou Enlai estimated it would be very difficult for the conference to make progress in the North Korean issue, but that the conference would be successful if some progress was made in the Indochina issue. If Indochina cease fire was to be realised and peace restored, then the US would not have been able to an excuse to manufacture war in Asia any longer. Under Zhou Enlai's management, the policy that the Chinese delegation drew up before the conference was, with utmost effort, to be sure to achieve certain agreement which may obtain the consensus and solution, even if it was temporary or the actual individual agreement, and he did his best not to cause the Geneva Conference to disperse without any positive achievements being made.

After the Geneva Conference start, as Zhou Enlai expected, US deliberately obstructed so that all parties could not be able to reach any agreement on the North Korean issue. But Zhou Enlai's sincere endeavor won many national representatives' commendations and the high praise (**Picture 2.2**).



Picture 2.2 In 1954, the assembly room of the Geneva Conference

In the succeeding discussion about the Indochinese issue, Zhou Enlai played an important role. He seized the opportunity of the French political situation change to appropriately adjust the strategy to mediate among the parties of Vietnam, France,

Cambodia and Laos to break the deadlock. Eventually, all the parties except for the United States reached an agreement on the restoration of peace in Indochina with three Armistice Agreements, and released a final declaration. The US delegate refused to accede to the conference “Final Declaration (最后宣言)”, and it was isolated.

The success of the Geneva Conference enabled the Indo-China war to stop, and saw the termination of the long years of colonial rule carried out by France in this region and affirmed the national rights of the three Indo-Chinese states. This resulted in a postponement of the plan that the US direct armed intervention in Indo-China, relaxing the international situation further, while the security of south China’s border area was consolidated. This was an important milestone in the process of the struggles for independence by the people of the three Indo-Chinese states. At the Geneva Conference, relations of China with Cambodia and Laos, two close neighbors, had a good start. The Sino-British relations had developed to some extent, while France and US also have contacted in varying degrees with China.

Attending the Geneva meeting was also an important step that Zhou Enlai on behalf of New China to seek peaceful coexistence in a broader sense. According to the experience of this conference, Premier Zhou Enlai proposed “a policy of establishment of a peaceful unification front” (建立和平统一战线的政策).⁸ This was an important development of his thought of international united front. Different from the way Zhou Enlai put in the early years of China founding of “peace democratic camp (和平民主阵营)” of “taking Soviet Union as the head(以苏联为首)”, “the peaceful unification front (和平统一战线)” basically took the national security of PRC as the center to conceive. The scope went far beyond the peace democratic camp. Zhou Enlai explained that, this peaceful unification front took into account the issue of war and peace, and it not only

⁸ Zhou Enlai, *The Collectanea of Zhou Enlai’s Diplomacy* (Beijing: The Central Literature Publishing, 1990), pp. 120—133. (周恩来(著),《周恩来外交文选》,中央文献出版社,1990,第120-133页。)

included the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, "but also for peace-loving countries."

2.4 Characteristics of Zhou Enlai's Chinese Foreign Policy

Zhou Enlai was one of the founders of the People's Republic of China. The PRC also provided him a chance to display his talent in the diplomatic arena. From the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the mid-1970s, among the exchanges of China with other countries in the world, among the courses of China stepping into international political arena, Zhou Enlai had been a figure at the center. His diplomatic practices represented the right direction of China's diplomacy.

2.4.1 The Formulation of the PRC's Diplomatic Policy

As a founder of new Chinese diplomacy, Zhou Enlai explicitly pointed out before the founding of the PRC, "we have a basic stand on diplomatic issues, that is, the stand of independent Chinese nation, the position of independence and self-reliance (我们对外交问题有一个基本的立场, 即中华民族独立的立场, 独立自主、自力更生的立场。)" His in-depth analysis, and believed the key to achieving independence was "not place ourselves in the influence of a country (不要置身于一个国家的影响之下)", and that "no country should interfere in China's internal affairs (任何国家都不能干涉中国的内政)".⁹ Zhou Enlai not only proposed the view of "independence", but also explored ways and means of carrying out this idea. He believed that the Chinese must do away with the old diplomatic tradition and create a new type of diplomacy.

Earlier in the latter period of the Sino-Japanese War, he suggested that in order to establish "China's new models" (中国的新典型) in front of foreigners, communist diplomacy must oppose "anti-foreign" (排外) and "fear foreign, fawning foreigners" (惧

⁹ Pei Jianzhang (ed.), "Zhou Enlai's Speech at the Ministry's Conference" in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, Vol. I (The People Publishing, 1980), pp. 321-322. (裴坚章(主编),《周恩来在外交部干部会上的讲话—周恩来选集》(第一卷),人民出版社,1980,第321-322页。)

外媚外) the two misconceptions in China's diplomatic history over the past century. On the one hand, China needed to strengthen self-confidence, while on the other hand to be good at learning the strong points of foreigners, and be good at working together with them.¹⁰

During the Chinese War of Liberation, he engaged in diplomatic work further, as he believed that "diplomacy must break the traditional ideology of bourgeois, and overthrow the diplomatic copy of reactionary rule to establish a neo-democratic, namely the ideal of foreign policy under the lead of the proletarian ideology (从事外交工作必须打破资产阶级外交的传统思想, 推翻反动统治的外交因袭, 而建立新民主主义也就是无产阶级思想领导的外交政策思想。)"¹¹ All these considerations of Zhou Enlai were important in the ideological preparation for creating neo-Chinese diplomacy.

In the latter period of the Chinese Liberation War, the task to found the People's Republic of China was on the agenda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In the formulation of foreign policy, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai would solve two fundamental questions: firstly, how to ensure the birth and consolidation of Neo-China in the international environment of US-USSR Cold War; secondly, how to sever the humiliating diplomatic ties with old-China to remove the stigma of a semi-colonial political status, establishing new foreign relations on the basis of equality. In the process of formulating foreign policy, first Zhou Enlai made attempts and breakthroughs in some important respects, later Mao Zedong made the decision of

¹⁰ The Party History Laboratory of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China (ed.), **Selected Papers of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China**, Vol. 14 (Beijing: the Central Party School of CPC Publishing, 1991), p. 317. (中共中央党史研究室(编),《中共中央文件选集》(第十四卷),中央党校出版社,1991,第317页。)

¹¹ The Diplomatic History Laboratory of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), "Zhou Enlai's Instruction of Central Foreign Affairs Group in Rectification Learning Program in 1947" (Beijing: The Central Literature Publishing, 1987), pp. 225-228. (外交部外交史研究室(编),《周恩来在中央外事小组整风学习计划上的批示(1947)》,中央文献出版社,1987,第225-228页。)

commanding the overall situation and built the framework of overall policy. Finally, it was to be substantiated and implemented by Zhou Enlai.¹²

In winter 1948, the People's Liberation Army occupied Shenyang City and other big cities, and how to deal with foreign consulates became the most sensitive diplomatic issue. On 10th November, the telegraph drafted by Zhou Enlai from the Central to northeast was proposed and it stated that the consulates of Great Britain, US, France and other countries should "not be recognized, only recognize them as ordinary foreigners (应采取不承认而只承认为普通侨民的方针)"¹³. The essence of this guideline did not recognize that the Kuomintang government (KMT) had established diplomatic relations with these countries.

The Politburo meeting was held in January 1949 to discuss diplomatic issues and after the meeting the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued "*Instructions about Diplomatic Work* (《关于外交工作的指示》)". This document that Zhou Enlai drafted, Mao Zedong amended and fixed the principle of "no recognition (不承认)", and pointed out such aims as the PRC gaining the diplomatic initiative to be free from the shackles of the past humiliating diplomatic tradition contributed to canceling imperialist privileges in China, thereby preventing imperialist interference in China's internal affairs in order to achieve Chinese national independence and liberation.¹⁴

¹² Li Tianming, "Chou En-lai and Mao's Foreign Policy", *Pacific Community*, 2, No. 4, (July 1971). (李天明, 《和平社会—周恩来和毛泽东的外交政策》, 第四期, 1971年7月。)

¹³ Sino-USSR Literature Laboratory (ed.), "*Chronicle of Zhou Enlai: 1898—1949*, Vol. I (Beijing Press, 1989), p. 356. (中苏文献研究室(编), 《周恩来年谱(1949—1976)》上卷, 北京出版社, 1989, 第356页。)

¹⁴ The Party History Laboratory of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China (ed.), *Selected Papers of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China*, Vol. 18 (Beijing: the Central Party School of CPC Publishing, 1991), p. 44. (中共中央党史研究室(编), 《中共中央文件选集》(第十八卷), 中央党校出版社, 1991, 第317页。)

Later, Mao Zedong summarized above the policy ideal in vivid language such as “starting anew (另起炉灶)” and “sweeping the house clean and prepare invitations to be sent to the guests (打扫干净屋子再待客)”. The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC in March 1949, Mao Zedong pointed out more clearly that China did not need to hurry to resolve the issue whether the imperialism recognized new China, “we should stand in one front with the Soviet Union allies. (我们和苏联应该站在一条战线上, 是盟友。)”¹⁵ By the end of June, he had published an article “On People's Democratic Dictatorship (《论人民民主专政》)”, openly confessing that new China would practise socialism in “leaning to one side” (一边倒). Meanwhile, Zhou Enlai completed the “the Common Programme of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference” (CPPCC) in the drafting, and legally elaborated the principles of the PRC's foreign policy. Thus, a task that formulated foreign policy for neo-China was basically completed.

After the founding of the PRC, Premier Zhou Enlai more comprehensively summarized new China's peaceful diplomatic policy as “starting anew (另起炉灶)”, “leaning to one side (一边倒)”, and “sweeping the house clean and preparing invitations to be sent to the guests (打扫干净屋子再待客)”, and preached that “courtesy demands reciprocity (礼尚往来)”, and to “help supply each other's needs (互通有无)”, and to “unite the people all of the world (团结世界人民)”—six key principles in all.¹⁶ He explained these policies like this, the policies of “start anew” changed China's semi-colonial status to establish independent diplomatic relations. after founding, the other two principles: “sweeping the house clean and prepare invitations to be sent to the guests” showed in the strategic initiative, and publicly “leaning to one side”, “China is

¹⁵ Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. V (Beijing: the People Publishing, 2003), p. 262. (毛泽东 (著), 《毛泽东文集》第5卷, 人民出版社, 2003, 第262页。)

¹⁶ Zhou Enlai, *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai* (Beijing: the Central Literature Publishing, 1990), pp.49-51. (周恩来 (著), 《周恩来选集》, 中央文献出版社, 1990, 第49-51页。)

clearly at the side of peaceful democratic front in whole world, a clear-cut break of imperialist fantasy".¹⁷

In the mid-1950's, an important task of China's diplomacy is to improve and develop relations with the newly emerging independent nations, which are the relations with neighboring national independence countries at first, therefore, need to draw a principle for exchange with these countries. Zhou Enlai clearly pointed out, "today the principal contradiction is issues of peace and war of the international, new war could be postponed, it may be stopped too. (今天国际上的主要矛盾是和平与战争问题, 新战争能够被推迟, 也就可能被制止。)." And that "the basic point of our policy is to have the courage to implement the peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition in countries of the different system (我们政策的基本点是敢于在制度不同的国家间实行和平共处与和平竞赛。)." Accordingly, he creatively put forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to deal with the peace issue, and to also deal with the issues of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, seeking common ground amongst for existing differences, flexible response, to successively carrying out multilateral diplomacy at both the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, and made tremendous efforts in order to relax the international trend, and to strive for a peaceful international environment conducive to China's socialist construction.

It can be said that the PRC is beginning to raise the banner of five principles of peaceful coexistence and to play a significant role in the international political arena, and Zhou Enlai has become a world-famous outstanding statesman and diplomat.

2.4.2 A Unique Style of Diplomacy

Zhou Enlai, as one of the outstanding leaders of Chinese Communist Party of the People's Republic of China, played a hugely influential role in the world. Zhou Enlai also is an acknowledged all over the world as the outstanding foreign diplomat,

¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 65-66. (同上, 第 65-66 页。)

and the brilliant achievements of the People's Republic of China's diplomatic work, it can not be separated with the name of Zhou Enlai.

Firstly, Zhou Enlai along with Mao Zedong and other proletarian revolutionists of the older generation formulated China's diplomatic routes, guide lines, and policies, creatively practised the Chinese Communist Party's theoretical knowledge and Chinese traditions on the diplomatic activities, establishing the unique diplomacy style of the PRC. Secondly, international communities praised his noble character, while noting that the world knew China primarily through the image of Premier Zhou Enlai. At the initial period of the founding of new China, Zhou Enlai instructed Chinese foreign staff to constantly sum up their diplomatic efforts and experiences, which was to become common knowledge. He called on foreign workers studying the concerned foreign works, while stressing that Chinese diplomat should make diplomacy Chinese-style.¹⁸

In fact, Premier Zhou Enlai's creative diplomacy practice was a brilliant masterpiece of the New China's diplomatism. Zhou Enlai's diplomatic style has been the diplomatic style of socialistic China.

(1) An Independent Self-Reliance Principle

The PRC's diplomacy, from the outset, has fully put up a spirit of independence, which formed a distinctive feature of neo-Chinese diplomatic style.

The independent in new Chinese diplomacy meant dismantling all control of imperialism be it politics, economics, and culture in China, non-recognition the KMT government had established with foreign countries, non-recognition of all treaties that old-China had concluded with foreign countries. Only in this way China could fundamentally change the semi-colonial status of old-China, and effectively protected

¹⁸ Xu Huairong (eds.), *The Collection of Zhou Enlai's 100th Anniversary Commemoration* (Beijing University Press, 2002), pp. 120-133. (许怀熔 (编), 《周恩来百周年纪念论文集》, 北京大学出版社, 2002, 第 120-133 页。)

the nation's independence and sovereignty. The PRC would like to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, in relations to the countries that were hostile to Chinese people, China adopted a policy of not showing haste in establishing diplomatic relations with them.

The Taiwan issue was an important principled issue related to China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Zhou Enlai stressed, "Taiwan is the main obstacle to the normalization of relations between China and the United States on key issues. We respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the United States of America. We do not interfere in the internal affairs of the United States. We demand the United States not to interfere in China's internal affairs, too. (台湾问题是阻碍中美两国关系正常化的关键问题。我们尊重美国的主权、独立和领土完整。我们不干涉美国的内政，我们要求美国也不要干涉中国的内政。)"¹⁹ The Chinese government adhered to the United States to severing "diplomatic relations" with the Taiwanese authorities, repealing the "United States and Chiang Kai-shek Treaty" (美蒋条约), and to withdraw of the armed forces and military installations of the United States from Taiwan, as necessary conditions for the normalization of the Sino-US relationship. After the United States government had accepted these fair and reasonable proposals of the Chinese government, the Sino-US governments then established diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.

(2) A Policy of Seeking Common Ground while Reserving Differences

How to correctly handle the differences among countries in the course of establishing and developing normal relations with all countries, is a problem New Chinese diplomacy faced. The "seeking common ground while reserving differences"

¹⁹ Pei jianzhang (ed.), "Diplomatic Thought and Practice" in **Research on Zhou Enlai** (Beijing: the People Publishing, 1991), p. 5, p. 241, and p. 250. (裴坚章(编),《研究周恩来:外交思想与实践》,人民出版社,1991,第5、241、250页。)

(求同存异), a proposal put forward by Zhou Enlai opens up a correct way to solve this problem, thereby forming another feature of neo-Chinese diplomacy.

The explanation of "seeking common ground while reserving differences" (求同存异) can be divided into the following three points: first, the countries with different social systems may have the common ground; they should seek the common ground, and should find out the common ground, such as peace and business. Second, differences of social system, ideology, and way of life should be respected by each other, put these differences aside and not discuss them for the time being. Third, with all countries seeking the common ground, there could be peaceful coexistence while provocative sayings as well as those against the policy of seeking common ground be set aside.²⁰

Respect of national sovereignty and independence is a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence caused a widespread positive response at the international level as principles applicable to general international relations. They become recognized norms of international relations. This is a major contribution of New Chinese diplomacy for contemporary international politics and provides a principled basis for countries in the world "seeking common ground while reserving differences".

(3) Equal Treatment

Zhou Enlai was willing to take advice from friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and often asking these friends what advice they had about the work of the Chinese side, and whether they felt a great-nation chauvinism (大国沙文主义). He also worked tirelessly to explain that China would never seek hegemony.

²⁰ Cao Yingwang, "Seeking Common Ground While Reserving Differences" in **Zhou Enlai—The Diplomat First of China** (Shanghai: the People Publishing, 2006), P. 242. (曹应旺(著),《中国外交第一人周恩来: 求同存异》, 上海人民出版社, 2006。)

Premier Zhou Enlai's equal treatment in international exchanges has been praised generally by the international community. His respect and understanding of small countries, in particular reflect the Chinese distinctive style to treat people equally.

(4) A Moral of Doing What Is Said

The motto of "promises must be kept and action must be resolute" (言必信, 行必果) with six Chinese characters has always been adhered in his own diplomatic practice. Zhou Enlai kept his word in diplomatic activities, which left a profound impression on many countries. This solemn style safeguards national dignity, raises international prestige, and forms a notable characteristic of New China's diplomacy.

Former Secretary of State of the United States of America, Henry Kissinger, in his memoirs said, "At least the contacts between US Chinese diplomats are proved reliable totally, they keep to the significance and spirit in agreement. As Zhou Enlai likes to say *we mean what we say* (至少在和我们的接触当中, 中国外交家证明是完全可靠的, 他们信守协议的意义和精神。正如周恩来喜欢说的‘我们说话是算数的’。)"²¹

(5) A Practical and Realistic Style of Work

Zhou Enlai was the model of seeking truth from facts in diplomacy. When Zhou Enlai discovered matters which violated China's foreign policy, he immediately took measures to rectify or remedy them by any means. Where necessary he apologized to other side personally, or open-eyed criticized staff of the Chinese side, striving to restore the external adverse impact to maintain the solemnity of Chinese foreign policy. The work style of practical and realistic was used in international exchanges by Premier Zhou Enlai, and then formed a proletariat diplomatic style that China has built on continuously.

²¹ Novak Rewland Evans & Robert D. Kaller, "The Frustration Power" in **Nixon in the White House** (New York: Random House Press, 1971).

(6) An Attitude of Making Friends Extensively

Zhou Enlai was good at breaking down all kinds of distant barriers to make friends widely. At the beginning of the founding of PRC, Zhou Enlai had pointed out, "Chinese people need peace, China need friends. We are pinning our hopes on the people of the world."²² He always stressed inter-countries increasing contacts to develop mutually friendly relations. The countries having same ideology needed the friendly exchanges of certain ways to promote friendship; otherwise an estrangement would be the result. The countries with different ideology, not quite same ideology, or misunderstanding the PRC temporarily, also needed some certain exchanges to further communicate ideas to each other, enhancing mutual understanding. Even if the countries had not established diplomatic relations with the PRC, China also paid attention to developing friendly contacts with the people there, contributing to promote the establishment of officially friendly relations.

2.5 The Beginning of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Era: the Bandung Conference

In April 1954, the Indonesian Government proposed the convocation of an Asian-African conference. In December of the same year, the five Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia and Pakistan held a conference in Bogor, Indonesia and reached an agreement on convening an Asian-African conference and decided that the conference would be jointly proposed by the five countries. The conference was attended by 29 Asian and African countries besides the five countries mentioned above, namely, Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Vietnam Democratic

²² Zhou Enlai, "Friendly Relations" in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, Vol. III (Beijing: the Central Literature Publishing, 1981), p. 98. (周恩来(著),《周恩来选集》(第三卷),中央文献出版社,1981,第98页。)

Republic, South Vietnam (later reunified with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and Yemen (Republic of Yemen).

The Asian-African Conference, also known as the Bandung Conference, from 18 to 24 April, 1955, the Bandung Asian-African Conference of the world attention was solemnly opened in the Independence Palace of Bandung, Indonesia. More than 340 delegates who represented 29 countries in Asia and Africa participated in this conference (**Picture 2.3**).



Picture 2.3 *The assembly room of Asian-African Conference at the Independence Palace Bandung, Indonesia in April, 1955.*

2.5.1 The Origin of Bandung Conference

In the second half of 1954, increasingly in 1955, until late in 1956, international tensions seemed to be slackening. The 1954 Geneva Conference reflected the desire of both sides of the Cold War for some degree of *détente*. In this world of reduced tension and greater flexibility, the “non-aligned” (不结盟) played a greater role in providing alternatives to the two blocs. The Bandung Conference asserted that the search for peaceful co-existence led along more promising paths than the effort to establish positions of strength.²³

²³ Evelyn Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics 1941-1956*, Ithaca (Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 311

At the Bogor Conference, 28-29 December 1954, the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan agreed to hold an Asian-African Conference under their joint sponsorship in April 1955, the purposes of which were to promote goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa; to consider economic, social, and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented; to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples such as racialism and colonialism; and to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world of today and the contribution they could make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.²⁴ Because of the differing political persuasions of the countries invited, ranging from Communist states like the PRC and North Vietnam to “neutralist” states like India, Indonesia and Burma to states more or less friendly towards the West such as Liberia, Ethiopia, Lebanon to allies of the Western powers like Turkey in NATO, and Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines in SEATO, the conference sponsors pointed out the “acceptance of the invitation by any one country would in no way involve or even imply any change in its view of the status of any other country”.²⁵

2.5.2 The International Atmosphere at the Bandung Conference

The Asian-African Conference was held at a time when the post-war movement for national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America was vigorously surging forward and when the forces of imperialism and colonialism were met with heavy blows. It was the first international conference held by Asian and African countries themselves without the participation of any Western colonial power.

The Conference was chaired by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and Indonesian President Sukarno made the opening address entitled “Let a New Asia

²⁴ TMFA, L&A, File (Miscellaneous) Pol. 3/2497-98/2 Joint Communiqué of the Bogor Conference (December 29, 1954): Statements by Prime Minister of Burma Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan.

²⁵ Ibid. See also TMFA, L&A, File 3.2.2/1 Letter of Invitation (No.28/VIII) from the Prime Minister of Burma Ceylon, India, Indonesia (15 January, 1955).

and a New Africa Be Born(《让新亚洲和新非洲诞生吧!》)!” Subsequently, representatives of different countries used the universality address to expound their respective views and principle stances on Asia-Africa and world peace. After two days of plenary sessions, the conference was divided into three committees, namely political, economic and cultural. They deliberated behind closed door for five days during which they discussed such issues as national sovereignty, racism, nationalism and struggles against colonialism, world peace and economic and cultural cooperation among the participating countries. Most representatives expressed their good wishes for the Asia-Africa Conference success, and hoped that the conference would clear-up of colonialism, thereby promoting world peace.

However, during the conference differences among countries came into play. The major differences were how to deal with the newly emerging Asian and African national countries. Some of these countries' representatives were in favor of neutrality and non-alignment policies, and advocated the ideal that Asian and African countries should adopt peaceful coexistence with socialist countries; while the other countries' representatives took communism as a major threat and proposed to participate in the US-led treaty system in confrontation with the socialist states. A few countries' representatives, due to historical reasons and a lack of understanding of the PRC, in their speech also expressed doubt concerning new China

The Chinese Government had all along adopted a positive attitude of supporting the Asian-African Conference. The Chinese delegation was attending the conference with a strong desire for peace and friendship and expressed the conviction that the conference would certainly surmount all sorts of sabotage and obstacles and be completely successful. Despite a genuine and not entirely unfounded fear of China as a threat to national independence which existed among certain Asian countries, there was no reason to think this conciliation was in any way superficial; it was in fact necessarily

linked with China's search for common ground upon which Asian solidarity and "zones of peace" could be build, in accordance with the Five Principles.²⁶

The imperialists, especially the United States, tried their utmost to create disputes by using some countries. Supported by the United States, the Chiang Kai Shek clique plotted a political scheme of attempting to assassinate Premier Zhou Enlai and as a result sabotaging the conference. It created the mid-air explosion of the passenger plane "Kashmir Princess (克什米尔公主号)" which shocked China and the world. As a result, three staff members of the Chinese delegation, five Chinese journalists and three foreign journalists died in this event. The US also sent a big contingent of so-called press "delegation" to Bandung in an attempt to manipulate the conference from outside and to split the conference. Jamali, the representative of Iraq in his speech targeting China, declared communism "neo-colonialism (新殖民主义)" and accused China as "threat (威胁)" and "infiltration (渗透)" to neighboring countries. He urged other countries to take "defensive measures" against "ideology of communism (共产主义思想)". In the following speeches, a small number of other countries also issued discordant voices with the spirit of the meeting. *The New York Times* took the opportunity to state that representatives should not to focus on the fighting against colonialism and racism, but against communism, not to conquer "the dead horses of colonialism", but to fight "the living tigers of communism."²⁷

2.5.3 The Success of Zhou Enlai's Speech at the Bandung Conference

The Bandung Conference was, followed the Geneva meeting, the first AsianAfrican countries' meeting at Indonesia that Premier Zhou Enlai led the Chinese delegation to participate in the April 1955. Again world attention focused on Zhou Enlai appearing in public of the international meetings. In Zhou Enlai's diplomatic

²⁶ David A. Wilson, "China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part II)" in *China Quarterly*, No.31 (July-September 1967), p. 96.

²⁷ "The Asian-African Conference in Bandung" in *New York Times* (April 20, 1955).

career, this was the most brilliant scene (**Picture 2.4**). The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence he advocated also displayed an extraordinary vitality. This meeting was a starting point to the PRC opening the door to Asian and African countries.



Picture 2.4 Zhou Enlai's diplomatic attractiveness at the Bandung Conference.

The Chinese delegation to the conference was led by Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai and members of the delegation were composed of Vice-Premier Chen Yi, the Minister of Foreign Trade Ye Jizhuang, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu and Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia Huang Zhen (**Picture 2.5 – 2.7**). The advisors to the delegation were Liao Chengzhi, Qiao Guanhua, Chen Jiakang, Huang Hua and others. During the first two days of sessions at which the delegates made general statements, delegates from some countries attacked communism as “dictatorial” and “neo-colonialism” in the presence of the Chinese Delegation and even suspected China of subversive activities against its neighboring countries. Facing these provoked attacks, this time the delegates and journalists participating in the conference imagined what the Chinese delegation would say. Some reporters even predicted information in advance: Zhou Enlai would strongly tit-for-tat refuted Jamali and others.

Before attending the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, Zhou Enlai, on the basis of the analysis of the then prevailing situation and in view of the complexity of


the participating states, has formulated a general strategic policy for the Chinese delegation, aimed to expand the united front for peace, to promote the national independence movement, to create conditions for the establishment and enhancement of relations between China and some other Asian and African countries and to make the conference a success.



Picture 2.5 Zhou En Lai at Bandung Conference



Picture 2.6 Chinese delegation's adorning badge



Picture 2.7 Zhou En Lai's business card

Zhou Enlai understood clearly that the Chinese delegation actions were likely related to the success or failure of the Asia-Africa Conference. Due to different

political systems, ideologies, and lack of understanding of one another, plus the imperialist secret provocation, these discordant voices were not surprising. It was realized that the fight with representatives from other countries by mouth would lead the meeting go astray. Zhou Enlai and members analyzed the situation and decided to firmly insist on the principle of seeking common ground despite differences.

Faced with the danger of the Conference being sidetracked, Premier Zhou Enlai changed his mind. Instead of delivering the prepared speech himself, he had it distributed as a written statement and made a supplementary speech off the cuff. He clearly stated, "The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarrel, to seek common ground and not to create divergences. There exists common ground among the Asian and African countries the basis of which is that the overwhelming Asian and African countries and their peoples have suffered and are still suffering from the calamities of colonialism. All the Asian and African countries gained their independence from colonialist rule whether these countries are led by the communist or nationalists. We should seek to understand each other and respect each other, sympathize with and support one another and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence may completely serve as a basis for us to establish relations of friendship and cooperation and good neighborliness (中国代表团是来求团结而不是来吵架的, 是来求同而不是来立异的。亚非国家存在求同的基础, 这就是绝大多数国家和人民自近代以来都经受过、并且现在仍在受着殖民主义所造成的灾难和痛苦。无论是共产党领导的还是民族主义者领导的亚非国家都是从殖民主义的统治下独立起来的, 可以相互了解和尊重、互相同情和支持, 和平共处五项原则完全可以成为我们中间建立友好合作和亲善睦邻关系的基础。)"²⁸ (Picture 2.8)

²⁸ Zhou Enlai, "Supplementary Speech" in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, Vol. II (Beijing: the Central Literature Publishing, 2001), p. 153. ("周恩来在万隆会议上的补充发言", 《周恩来选集》(第二卷), 中央文献出版社, 2001, 第153页。)



Picture 2.8 Zhou En Lai addressed the Bandung Asian-African Conference

Premier Zhou Enlai's speech won widespread acclaim among the delegates of the participating countries, and laid the foundation for the success of the Asian-African of "seeking common ground while reserving differences (求同存异, 协商一致)" which not only won the support of an overwhelming number of delegates but also laid the groundwork for the success of the conference. At the same time, in the post-conference the Chinese Delegation entered into extensive contact with delegates of many countries, conducting frequent consultations and enjoying close cooperation with them and contributed positively to the smooth progress and success of the Conference (**Picture 2.9**).



Picture 2.9 Post-conference Zhou En Lai signed for the representatives and staffs of countries participating Bandung conference.

The spirit of unity of the Asian and African people opposing imperialism and colonialism, struggling for the defense of national independence and world peace and the promotion of friendship among the peoples as demonstrated at the Conference was known as the “Bandung Spirit (万隆精神)”. The Conference enhanced the unity and cooperation among the Asian and African countries and inspired the people in the colonies to struggle for national liberation and played a significant role in promoting the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle of the Asian and African people and in consolidating their unity.

2.5.4 The Attractiveness of Zhou Enlai and Five Principles

The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence was put forward for the first time by Premier Zhou Enlai at the meeting with members of the Indian Government Delegation on 31 December 1953, when China negotiated with the Indian delegation on Sino-Indian relations in the Tibet Region in Beijing from 31 December 1953 to 29 April 1954 (**Picture 2.10**). The contents were: **(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty** (changed to mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity at the Asian-African Conference), **(2) mutual**



Picture 2.10 On 31st December, 1953, when Zhou Enlai met with the Indian Governmental delegation, he put forward The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence for the first time. Here was their group photo: Indian President Rajendra Prasad (right first), Vice President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (right third), and the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit (added to in the Sino-Indian joint Statement and Sino-Burmese Joint Statement), **(5) peaceful co-existence.**

Under the efforts of the Chinese delegation and participating delegations, the conference reached consensus on the mutual interests and some issues of major concern to the Asian African countries and a "Final Communiqué" was adopted. The contents of this included economic cooperation, cultural cooperation, human rights and self-determination, the issue of people in dependent countries. Other issues were promotion of world peace and cooperation as well as the adoption of the Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation, and the Ten Principles in handling international relations. The Ten Principles for conducting international relations was a continuation and development of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence.

That the Five Principles was put forward had great strategic significance. From the overall view of the PRC's foreign relations, it was an effective means of China breaking the limitations and isolation to develop relations with foreign countries. In the long-term view, it constituted a footstone of China's foreign policy, being the most viable policy in the Chinese diplomatic history. Practical experiences more than 50 years hereafter have proved, that it was possible to establish and develop relationships with all countries of the world only on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence in order to provide the most favorable peaceful international environment for China's socialistic construction, and any violation of the Five Principles would have been a hindrance to the cause and to the Chinese people.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence have become the basic norms in developing state to state relations transcending social systems and ideologies. These principles have been accepted by the overwhelming majority of countries in the world.

Conclusion

This chapter examines Chinese foreign policy after founding of New China in 1949, its attitude towards the world, and the development of Chinese diplomatic relations in 1950's and 1960's. It includes discussion of the approach to solving Korean, Indochina's problems – the Geneva Conference, Zhou Enlai's success at the Bandung Conference, and the attractiveness of the Five Principles make the role of PRC known to the world. Finally, it points out the historical influence of the Bandung Conference and the significance of the Five Principles and Zhou Enlai's attractiveness in Bandung Conference.

The Bandung Conference is the best example of Zhou Enlai himself playing a big part in foreign activities, and through a sustained effort he and members of the Chinese delegation succeeded in breaking all sorts of sabotages and obstacles among parties attending the conference to build Asian solidarity and “zones of peace”, in accordance with the his famous Five Principles, and made friendly contacts with the diplomatic corps of the Asian nations. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence completely served as a basis for all the Asian and African countries to establish relations of friendship and cooperation and good- neighborliness. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence have become the basic norms in developing states transcending social systems and ideologies. These principles have been accepted by the overwhelming majority of countries in the world.

Also, the trend of friendly contact between PRC and Thailand originated in a way from this Bandung conference. Sino-Thai relations will affect and improve stability in Asia and their countries. The following chapter examines Thailand's foreign policy and Sino-Thai exchange of relations from 1949 to 1975 caused by the changing of mind and behavior of different rulers of Thai regimes – Phibun, Sarit until M.R. Kukrit governments.