

Chapter 2

Theoretical Background

This study is done within the theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics. As Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 278) state, cognitive linguistics has not yet developed into a comprehensive theory. However, a number of approaches within the realm of cognitive linguistics do share a common basis, namely the idea that linguistic structures, essentially semantic structures, are associated with encyclopedic world-knowledge. In cognitive linguistics, language is considered "an integrated part of cognition which reflects the interaction of cultural, psychological, communicative, and functional considerations, and which can only be understood in the context of a realistic view of conceptualization and mental processing" (Aims and Scope of the International Cognitive Linguistics Association; <http://www.unm.edu/~icla/>). Cognitive approaches to language thus take into account our experience of the world and the way we conceptualize it. Cognitive linguists take for granted that meaning is conceptual and cannot be accounted for by describing objective reality, but only by describing the cognitive routines that constitute one's understanding of it (Langacker 1987: 194), and that the cognitive construal of experience in language is ultimately done for the purpose of communication in discourse and cannot be separated from that function (Croft 1998b: 90).

My investigation of Thai emanation expressions relies on the theories of fictive motion and idealized cognitive models (ICM's). These theories offer the best frameworks for examining Thai emanation expressions. Below, I introduce these theories in Section 2.1 and review related studies on motion verbs and emanation events in Section 2.2.

2.1. Theoretical Frameworks

This section is divided into two subsections. Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 respectively account for the theories of fictive motion and ICM's, mainly referring to Talmy (1996) and Lakoff (1987).

2.1.1. Fictive Motion

Fictive motion is fictively conceived motion in space. It is not concrete motion in the physical world, but is abstract motion that is ascribed to one's focus of attention shifting over a conceived scene. The first scholar to give attention to the phenomenon of fictive motion was Talmy (1983), but he used the term virtual motion to refer to the phenomenon. The earliest detailed work on fictive motion is Talmy (1989). The theory of fictive motion was further developed in Talmy (1996) (see below for the details). Langacker (1986, 1987, 1991a) also analyzed the phenomenon of fictive motion, using the terms abstract motion and subjective motion. Langacker (1998b) then used the term virtual motion. Following Fauconnier's (1997) analysis of fictive motion, Langacker (1998b) explained fictive motion from the perspective of conceptual blending. "Conceptual blending" (cf. Fauconnier and Turner 1996) is a general cognitive process that allows several connected but heterogeneous mental spaces to be maintained simultaneously within a single mental construction. "Mental spaces" (cf. Fauconnier 1985) are partial conceptual structures that proliferate when we think and talk, allowing a fine-grained partitioning of our discourse and knowledge structure. They are interconnected and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold. According to Fauconnier (1997) and Langacker (1998b), the conception of fictive motion results from the blending of two mental spaces, namely, space for the actual stationary scene and space for the virtual motion scene (which Fauconnier called "input 1" and "input 2" and Langacker named these the "actual plane" and the "virtual plane").

There are also works on particular subtypes of fictive motion expressions, as follows. Matsumoto (1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997a) conducted contrastive studies on English and Japanese expressions for advent path, coverage path and access path (the first two of which he calls subjective change and subjective motion). I (Takahashi 1998) examined semantic constraints on Thai and Japanese expressions for advent path and coverage path (which I call resultative fictive motion and potential fictive motion). Kunihiro (1985) discussed the cognitive basis for advent path and coverage path expressions in Japanese. Matsumoto (1998b) discussed some Japanese expressions of emanation. I (Takahashi, in press) investigated access path expressions in Thai. In

addition, Matsumoto (1997b) provided linguistic evidence for fictive motion of the coverage path subtype.

Since this study is based on Talmy's (1996) seminal work on fictive motion, I extensively review this below.

Talmy (1996: 212) states that in his study the term fictive is used to refer to the imaginary capacity of cognition. Although he does not explicitly give a definition of fiction motion, from this his statement we know that fictive motion is defined in terms of its relation to the imaginary capacity of cognition. Talmy (1996: 210) regards fictive motion as the product of two overlapping cognitive subsystems: language and visual perception. We observe the more palpable stationariness of an entity and concurrently sense the less palpable motion of the same entity. The two discrepant representations of the same scene, i.e. less palpable motion (fictive motion) vs. more palpable stationariness (actual stationariness), are alternative perspectives. This view substantially corresponds to Fauconnier and Langacker's treatment of fictive motion as the product of conceptual blending as stated above.

In Talmy's (1996: 246-248, 251) view, fictive motion is neither seen at the fully concrete level nor felt at the fully abstract level, but rather is sensed at the semiabstract level of the "palpability-related parameters," as follows. Fictive motion itself is intangible and nonmanifest, as well as vague or indefinite and relatively faint. It has little or no ostension, and no quality of direct visibility. It is of relatively low salience in consciousness or attention, seems less certain, and is difficult to act on. But we do experience it as present in association with other entities that are currently observed at the fully concrete level, and we often understand it as a structural or relational characteristic of the concrete entities seen. Its geometry is regularly topology-like and approximative.

What I think most important in Talmy's account of fictive motion above is the suggestion concerning restrictions on our experiences of fictive motion, that is, the experienced fictive motion is always associated with concrete entities and often understood as a relativistic (non-absolute) characteristic of the entities. Emphasizing the

speaker's or conceptualizer's motivation to imagine fictive motion, I interpret this suggestion as follows: Fictive motion is evoked in the mind when one holistically views concrete entities in the physical world as being situated related to each other in a global structure or network embodied by virtue of fictive motion.

I propose that the function of emanation is to create a conventional setting for the predication of entities around us by spatially connecting them to each other. Emanation expressions are linguistic realizations of such conventional cognitive impositions of emanation. Our motivation to use emanation expressions is the need to spatially and globally relate, by means of the fictive path of emanation, entities that otherwise are disconnected, and further to convey to others our experiences and ideas about relationships the entities hold. In other words, we use emanation expressions to share with others our experiences and ideas about implicit spatial relationships of entities. The imagined emanation is a crucial component of an idealized framework for describing entities which do not physically interact but are related in one's perception and conception.

There are six main categories of fictive motion classified by Talmy (1996): emanation, pattern path, frame-relative motion, advent path, access path, and coverage path. A description of each type is given below.

(5) The cliff wall faces toward the island. (emanation)

Emanation, as illustrated in (5), is one major class of fictive motion. An emanation is characterized as an intangible entity's moving from a source entity in relation to a reference entity. The fictively moving intangible entity may be light (photons), shadow, sound (sonic waves), smell (odorous particles), the conceptual equivalent of the focus of attention, or any other abstract conceptual essence of motion. In (5), the observer's focus of attention moves from the cliff wall toward the island.

(6) As I painted the ceiling, a line of paint spots slowly progressed across the floor

(pattern path).

Pattern path, as in (6), is a fictive motion of some pattern in which physical entities are arranged. In (6), each drop of paint actually moves vertically from the ceiling to the floor, whereas the linear pattern of paint spots already located on the floor fictively moves horizontally along the floor.

(7) I sat in the car and watched the scenery rush past us. (frame-relative motion)

Frame-relative motion, as in (7), involves fictive motion of a person's surroundings relative to that person. In (7), the person sitting in the car is represented as stationary and the scenery outside the car as moving relative to her/him from her/his perspective.

(8) The beam leans away from the wall. (advent path)

Advent path, as in (8), involves an object that fictively arrives or manifests at its site. In (8), the beam is described as having gradually leaned away from the wall although actually it remains stationary.

(9) The vacuum cleaner is down around behind the clothes hamper. (access path)

Access path, as in (9), is a fictive path along which some entity is imagined to follow to the point of encounter with a stationary object whose exact location is at issue. In (9), the location of the vacuum cleaner is characterized in terms of a path that is fictively followed by someone's arm extending.

(10) This fence goes from the plateau to the valley. (coverage path)

Coverage path, as in (10), involves a dimensionally extended object over which something is imagined to traverse, or which is imagined to enlarge its shape. In (10), the fence lying between the plateau to the valley is described as being followed by an observer or a conceptualizer's focus of attention or as advancing its own axis.

Talmy (1996: 216-217) states that these subtypes of fictive motion differ in the following features:

1. Factive motion of some elements {need not / must} be present for the fictive effect.
2. The fictively moving entity is itself {factive / fictive}.
3. The fictive effect is {observer-neutral / observer-based} and, if observer-based, the observer is {factive / fictive} and {moves / scans}.
4. What is conceived as fictively moving is {an entity / the observation of an entity}.

According to Talmy, the feature values for the emanation subtype are as follows:

1. Factive motion of some elements need not be present for the fictive effect.
2. The fictively moving entity is itself fictive.
3. The fictive effect is observer-neutral.
4. What is conceived as fictively moving is an entity.

Value 1 means that a tangible entity's actual motion is not necessarily involved in an emanation event (unlike pattern path and frame-relative motion). Value 2 means that the moving entity in an emanation event is an imagined intangible entity (unlike other subtypes of fictive motion). Value 3 means that the motion of an imagined intangible moving entity in an emanation event does not depend on a localized observer (unlike frame-relative motion). Value 4 means that an entity, but not the observation of it, is imagined to move in an emanation event (unlike frame-relative motion).

Talmy (1996: 216) defines emanation as the fictive motion of something intangible emerging from a source. Talmy (1996: 217-226) further classifies emanation into the following subtypes based on English emanation expressions.

1. *Orientation paths* are formed out of a continuous linear intangible entity that emerges from the front of some object and moves steadily away from it. The line is wholly imperceptible. The subtypes differ with respect to whether the front is a face-type or a point-type, whether the fictive motion of the intangible line is axial or lateral, etc.

1.1. *Prospective paths* are the orientation that an object with a face-type front has in relation to its surroundings. For example: The cliff wall faces {toward/ away from/ into/ past} the valley.

1.2. *Alignment paths* involve a stationary straight linear object with a point-type front, orientation of which is conceptualized in terms of something intangible that moves along the axis of the object, emerges from its front end, and continues straight along a path relative to some distant object. For example: The snake is lying {toward/ away from} the light.

1.3. *Demonstrative paths* involve a linear object with a point-type front from which an intangible line emerges, functioning to direct someone's attention, gaze, or physical motion along its path. For example: I pointed {toward/ away from/ into/ past} the town; The arrow on the signpost pointed {toward/ away from/ into/ past} the town; {pointed/ directed} him {toward/ past/ away from} the lobby.

1.4. *Target paths* are formed by an agent who intentionally sets the orientation of a front-bearing object so that a fictive line emerging from this front follows a desired path relative to the object's surroundings. For example: I {pointed/ aimed} {into/ past/ away from} the living room; I {pointed/ aimed} my {gun/ camera} {into/ past/ away from} the living room.

1.5. *Line of sight* is an intangible line that emerges from the visual apparatus (canonically located on the front of an animate or mechanical entity) and shifts in its orientation. The turning visual apparatus stays in the same location relative to the reference object, while the gaze follows the intangible line and shortens its distance from the referent object. For example: I slowly {turned (my camera)/ looked} toward the door; I slowly {turned (my camera)/ looked} around the room; I slowly {turned (my camera)/ looked} away from the window; I slowly {turned (my camera)/ looked} from the

painting, past the pillar, to the tapestry.

2. *Radiation paths* refer to radiation that emanates continuously from an energy source, moves steadily away from it, and impinges on an irradiated object. One can often detect the presence of the radiation (e.g. light radiation); nevertheless one cannot directly detect motion of that radiation. For example: The sun is shining into the cave; The sun is shining onto the back wall of the cave; The light is shining (from the sun) into the cave; The light is shining (from the sun) onto the back wall of the cave.

3. *Shadow paths* refer to a situation in which the shadow of an object visible on a surface has fictively moved from that object to that surface. For example: The tree threw its shadow down {into/ across} the valley; The pillar {cast/ projected} a shadow {onto/ against} the wall.

4. *Sensory paths* involve the conceptualization of the experiencer (of vision, audition, olfaction, and so on) and the experienced, and of something intangible that moves in a straight path between the two entities in one direction or the other. For example: I looked {into/ toward/ past/ away from} the valley; The enemy can see us from where they're positioned; We can be seen by the enemy from where they're positioned; We can be seen by the enemy from where we're standing; Even a casual passer-by can see the old wallpaper through the paint; The old wallpaper shows through the paint even to a casual passer-by.

Talmy (1996: 226-230) claims that there is a unifying cognitive basis underlying the distinct types of emanation. That is, in all the types of emanation events, the object taken to be active or determinative (in other words, cognitively less dependent) is conceptualized as the source of emanation. Talmy termed this the "active-determinative principle." This principle is based on the model of an individual's experience of "agency" (Talmy 1976: 85), namely the generation of an intention and the realization of that intention. If an agent intends to affect some distant object, she must either move to it with her whole body, reach to it with a body part, or cause some intermediary object to move to it. The determining event (the act of intention) takes place at the initial locus of the agent; the ensuing agentivity progresses through space to the distant object; and

finally, that object is affected (the accomplishment of intention). Talmy termed this pattern the "agent-distal object pattern." The active-determinative principle corresponds to the agent-distal object pattern in that the more active or determinative entity is the source from which fictive motion emanates through space until reaching the less active or determinative entity, the distant object. Thus, the perception of an agent's motion in the physical world is mapped onto the conceptualization of an emanation fictive motion.

2.1.2. Idealized Cognitive Models

Cognitive linguists presuppose the existence of idealized cognitive models (ICM's) in human mind. ICM's are mental structures of our knowledge of the world (Lakoff 1987: 68). They are a gestalt-like complex structure composed of a number of background knowledge structures (or frames) arising from our daily experiences in a certain society and culture. The theory of ICM's, thus, encompasses the social and cultural contexts under which we understand things. In short, ICM's are encyclopedic knowledge structures used for categorizing meanings and organizing the relationship among them. It is supposed that meanings and categories are always characterized with respect to ICM's. Meanings and categories never have values independent of our world knowledge. In cognitive linguistics it is assumed that linguistic structures are associated with ICM's and therefore linguistic structures should be explained making reference to underlying ICM's.

According to Lakoff (1987: 68, 113-114), each ICM may use the following four types of structuring principles:

- a. Propositional structure (cf. Fillmore's (1982) Frame Semantics)
- b. Image-schematic structure (cf. Langacker's (1987) Cognitive Grammar)
- c. Metaphoric structure (cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980))
- d. Metonymic structure (cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980))

Propositional models specify elements, their properties, and their interrelationships within conceptual space. Our knowledge is largely structured in the

form of a propositional model. What Langacker calls the billiard-ball model and the stage model are good illustrations of propositional models. Those models are used for understanding events occurring in the world. In a billiard-ball model, discrete objects move about and interact with others energetically through physical contact. In a stage model, distinct participants interact within an inclusive setting, and a viewer observes the event from a vantage point external to the setting (Langacker 1987: 283-284).

Image-schematic models specify schematic images with entities and the relations existing among them. They can spell out various kinds of conceptions by virtue of their graphic nature. An image schema has a gestalt structure in the sense that the parts make no sense without the whole, and it is topological in the sense that it can be expanded, shrunk, or deformed. Examples of image schemas include: the Container Schema, the Source-Path-Goal Schema, the Part-Whole Schema, the Link Schema, and the Center-Periphery Schema. These image-schemas are common structures that emerge from our constant bodily functioning. The Source-Path-Goal Schema, for example, comes from our bodily experience that every time we move anywhere there is a place we start from, a place we arrive at, a sequence of contiguous locations connecting the source and the goal, and a direction. The basic logic of this schema is that if you go from a source to a goal along a path, then you must pass through each intermediate point on the path; and that the further along the path you are, the more time has passed since starting (Lakoff 1987: 275).

Metaphoric models refer to mapping from a model in one domain to a corresponding structure in another domain. This model is typically used to understand less concrete experiences in terms of more concrete and more highly structured experiences. For example:

- (11) a. You're wasting my time.
b. I will give you that idea.

In (11a), abstract 'time' is taken as a concrete thing, which wastes away. In (11b), abstract 'idea' is taken as a concrete thing, which is sent to someone.

Metonymic models are models containing stands-for relationships, in which one well-understood or easy-to-perceive aspect of something stands for the thing as a whole or for some other aspect or part of it. For example:

- (12) a. The White House isn't saying anything.
b. I hate to read Shakespeare.

In (12a), 'the White House' is standing for the president who usually works inside it. In (12b), 'Shakespeare' is standing for literary works written by him.

In this study I will use all of these models to explain Thai speakers' conceptualizations of emanation events. Propositional models are involved in the categorization of emanation event types. Image-schematic models are involved in the characterization of configuration of emanation. Metaphoric models are involved in the analogy of intangible entities in emanation events to tangible entities in physical motion events. Metonymic models are involved in those emanation expressions like (13). ตา *taa* 'eye' in (13) metonymically represents an unnamed viewer's line of vision.

- (13) ตา ทอด ไป สู่ ท้องฟ้า
taa thót pay sùu thǒng fáa
eye stretch go get to sky

The eyes (gaze) stretched toward the sky.

2.2. Previous Studies on Motion Verbs and Emanation Events

This section is divided into two subsections. In Section 2.2.1 I review studies on Thai motion verbs used to express emanation, i.e., Rungkupan (1992), Teramoto (1992), ไส้ภาววรรณแสงไชย (2537) and ชัยวดี ศรีลัมพ์ (2538). In Section 2.2.2 I review a study on Japanese emanation expressions, i.e., Matsumoto (1998b).

2.2.1. Studies on Motion Verbs in Thai

Rungkupan (1992), Teramoto (1992), โสภาวรรณ แสงไชย (2537) and ชัชวดี ศรลัมพ์ (2538) have analyzed Thai motion verbs to be used for expressing emanation, though in an indirect manner. I will in brief summarize their relevant findings below.

In her study of meanings of the subsidiary verbs ไป *pay* 'away from some reference point (to go)' and มา *maa* 'toward some reference point (to come),' Rungkupan (1992: 48, 60-70) explained that the moving entity of motion represented by these subsidiary verbs is incorporated in the preceding main verb's meaning when the main verb expresses: (a) direct bodily action (e.g. pointing, stepping); (b) communication act (e.g. talking, telephoning); or (c) vision (looking). For example:

- (14) ^๓น้ำค้าง แก บอก มา ^๓เดี๋ยวนี้ นะ
 námkháaj *kee* *bòok* *maa* *dǐaw níi* *ná?*
 Namkhaang PRONOUN tell come right now MODAL
 Namkhaang, tell me right now.

The moving entity in (14) is not the subject argument's referent 'Namkhaang' (the addressee). We construe in this case that what moves toward the reference point (the speaker's position) is the message, which is inherent in the meaning of the main verb บอก *bòok* 'tell' (Rungkupan 1992: 48).

Teramoto (1992: 53) also claimed, in her study of two-verb concatenations in Thai, that the directional verb ไป *pay* 'go' following the verb of vision เหลือบ *lùap* 'glance' in (15) expresses an abstract motion, that is, the direction of viewer's attention.

- (15) ตา ของ ผม เหลือบ ไป เห็น ขาย ทุ่ง ไกล
 taa *khǔwɔŋ* *phǒm* *lùap* *pay* *hěn* *chaay* *thûŋ* *klay*
 eye of PRONOUN glance go see edge field far
 ^๓โน้น
 nóon
 yonder

I cast a glance and saw the edge of paddy fields over there.

โสภารวรรณ แสงไชย (2537) analyzed the meanings of the subsidiary verbs **ขึ้น** *khûn* 'up (to ascend)' and **ลง** *loŋ* 'down (to descend)' and found that these verbs express an invisible upward/downward motion when preceded by a verb of vision, as in (16a), or a verb of communication, as in (16b). The moving entities imagined in (16a) and (16b) are the viewer's gaze and the message transmitted from the speaker to the hearer, respectively (โสภารวรรณ แสงไชย 2537: 32, 64-65, 77).

- (16) a. **ฉัน** **มอง** **ตาม** **ขึ้น** **ไป** **ข้างบน**
chán *mooŋ* *taam* *khûn* *pay* *khâaŋ bon*
 PRONOUN look follow ascend go above
 I looked upward following (something).
- b. **เขา** **ร้อง** **ด่า** **ลง** **มา**
khâw *róoŋ* *dâa* *loŋ* *maa*
 PRONOUN cry abuse descend come
 ว่า...
 wâa...
 COMPLEMENTIZER
 S/he loudly cried abuses at someone downstairs saying ...

ชัชวดี ศรีลัมพ์ (2538) examined conceptual and contextual meanings of the directional verb **เข้า** *khâw* 'enter.' Among this verb's contextual meanings is the invisible motion of sound waves, visual rays, and the smell of air, respectively, into our ears, eyes, and nose, which gives rise to our perception of them (ชัชวดี ศรีลัมพ์ 2538: 53-54, 93, 97-98). Furthermore, she explained that the verb **เข้า** *khâw* 'enter' in (16) implies an imagined enclosed space in front of a desk. What enters the space is not the observer herself. As she turns the face to the desk, her gaze enters the space (ชัชวดี ศรีลัมพ์ 2538: 105).

- (17) **หัน** **เข้า** **หา** **โต๊ะ**
hăn *khâw* *hăa* *tó?*
 turn enter seek desk

(S/he) turned to the desk.

2.2.2. Studies on Emanation Events in Japanese

Some Japanese expressions of emanation were analyzed by Matsumoto (1998b). He explained that the post-positioned motion verbs in V-V lexical compounds in Japanese, such as *-ageru* 'raise' in *mi-ageru* 'look-raise' (meaning 'look up') and *-wataru* 'cross' in *nari-wataru* 'ring-cross' (meaning 'resound'), represent emanation (ibid: 59-66). He commented that the second verb *-wataru* 'cross' describes the aurally sensed pervasion of sounds, but not the pervasion of the acts generating sounds which are directly denoted by the first verb *nari-* 'ring' (ibid: 60-61).

2.3. Summary

In this chapter I presented the theoretical frameworks of this study. I first introduced the theory of fictive motion and then outlined the theory of idealized cognitive models (ICM's). I will employ these for analyzing Thai emanation events in a later chapter. These frameworks will enable me to show how emanation expressions reflect our conventional conceptualizations. I also looked at related studies on motion verbs and emanation events. I will explore Thai emanation expressions expanding on the cognitive accounts given in these previous studies.