

สื่อสันติภาพในประเทศไทย: ศึกษากรณีโครงการศูนย์ข่าวอิสระของ

สมาคมนักหนังสือพิมพ์แห่งประเทศไทย



นางสาวสุภาภรณ์ กาญจนวีระโยธิน

สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต

สาขาวิชาการพัฒนาระหว่างประเทศ
คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

ปีการศึกษา 2549

ISBN 974-14-2981-9

ลิขสิทธิ์ของจุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

PEACE JOURNALISM IN THAILAND: A CASE STUDY OF ISSARA NEWS
CENTRE OF THE THAI JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION



Miss Supapohn Kanwerayotin

สถาบันวิทยบริการ
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts Programme in International Development Studies

Faculty of Political Science

Chulalongkorn University

Academic Year 2006

ISBN: 974-14-2981-9

Copyright of Chulalongkorn University

Thesis Title PEACE JOURNALISM IN THAILAND : A CASE
STUDY OF ISSARA NEWS CENTRE OF THE THAI
JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION

By Ms. Supapohn Kanwerayotin

Field of Study International Development Studies

Thesis Advisor Puangthong Pawakapan, Ph.D.

Accepted by the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master's Degree

Charas Suwanmala
.....Dean of Faculty of Political Science
(Professor Charas Suwanmala, Ph.D.)

THESIS COMMITTEE

Vira Somboon
.....Chairperson
(Vira Somboon, Ph.D.)

P. Pawakapan
.....Thesis Advisor
(Puangthong Pawakapan, Ph.D.)

Uajit Virojtrairat
.....Member
(Assistant Professor Uajit Virojtrairat, Ph.D.)

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

นางสาวสุภาภรณ์ กาญจนวีระโยธิน: สื่อสันติภาพในประเทศไทย :ศึกษากรณีของศูนย์
ข่าวอิสราของสมาคมนักหนังสือพิมพ์แห่งประเทศไทย (PEACE JOURNALISM IN
THAILAND: A CASE STUDY OF ISSARA NEWS CENTRE OF THE THAI
JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION) อ. ที่ปรึกษา: ดร.พวงทอง ภัฏชรพันธ์,
82 หน้า. ISBN 974-14-2981-9.

จากเสียงวิพากษ์วิจารณ์ว่าการรายงานของสื่อไทยมีส่วนในการโหมไฟได้ สมาคมนักข่าว
นักหนังสือพิมพ์แห่งประเทศไทยจึงเริ่ม โครงการสื่อสันติภาพสำหรับภาคใต้ในนามศูนย์ข่าวอิสรา
โดยมีเป้าหมายให้นักข่าวจากส่วนกลางทำงานร่วมกับนักข่าวในพื้นที่ชายแดนภาคใต้เพื่อรายงาน
ข่าวในเชิงที่จะช่วยสร้างคลายความขัดแย้งในภาคใต้และเพื่อเปิดพื้นที่สื่อให้สะท้อนเสียงจาก
ชาวบ้านและผู้มีส่วนได้ส่วนเสียนอกจากภาครัฐ สมาคมฯคาดหวังว่าจะช่วยให้ผู้รับสารเข้าใจ
สภาพปัญหาภาคใต้ดีขึ้นซึ่งจะมีส่วนช่วยในการสร้างความสมานฉันท์ในห้วงที่ทัศนคติของคน
ไทยเริ่มโน้มเอียงไปในทางเห็นดีเห็นงามกับการใช้วิธีรุนแรงในการแก้ปัญหาภาคใต้

คำถามของการวิจัยคือ ผลงานของศูนย์ข่าวอิสราเป็นไปตามกรอบสื่อสันติภาพหรือไม่
และสื่อสิ่งพิมพ์กระแสหลักตอบสนองต่อโครงการศูนย์ข่าวอิสราอย่างไร พร้อมกับพิจารณาปัจจัย
ต่างๆที่มีผลกระทบต่อการทำงานของศูนย์ รูปแบบการวิจัยคือการวิเคราะห์วิธีที่หนังสือพิมพ์
ไทยรัฐและมติชนรายงานข่าวกรณีฆ่าตัวตายของโยธินที่บ้านต้นหยงลิ้ม นราธิวาส โดยใช้กรอบ
แนวคิดเรื่องสื่อสันติภาพของโยฮัน กัลตุง นอกจากนี้ยังได้ทำการสัมภาษณ์นักข่าวในพื้นที่และ
ระดับบรรณาธิการในกรุงเทพฯ และใช้เวลากับทีมศูนย์ข่าวอิสราที่ปัตตานี

ข้อสรุปจากการศึกษาคือ ไทยรัฐรายงานข่าวตามกรอบสื่อสงคราม ศูนย์ข่าวอิสรารายงาน
ตามแนวสื่อสันติภาพ ขณะที่มติชนพยายามเดินตามแนวสื่อสันติภาพจากทั้งในวิธีการนำเสนอของ
ตนเองและการนำเสนอของศูนย์ข่าวอิสรา

การเปรียบเทียบผลงานของศูนย์ข่าวอิสราในช่วงเหตุการณ์ที่บ้านต้นหยงลิ้มกับ
เหตุการณ์จับครูหญิงเป็นตัวประกันที่บ้านกูจิงลือปะสะท้อนให้เห็นว่าเรื่องทรัพยากรมนุษย์
ความสามารถ และการให้ความสำคัญต่อสื่อสันติภาพของหนังสือพิมพ์ส่วนกลางเป็นปัจจัยกำหนด
ว่าสื่อสันติภาพในประเทศไทยจะมีประสิทธิผลเพียงใด

สาขาวิชา การพัฒนาระหว่างประเทศ.. ลายมือชื่อนิสิต K. Supaporn

ปีการศึกษา 2549..... ลายมือชื่ออาจารย์ที่ปรึกษา..... พวงทอง ภัฏชรพันธ์

4881325124: MAJOR: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
 KEY WORD: PEACE JOURNALISM/ THAILAND/ CONFLICT/ SOUTH/ THAI
 JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION

SUPAPOHN KANWERAYOTIN: PEACE JOURNALISM IN THAILAND: A
 CASE STUDY OF ISSARA NEWS CENTRE. THESIS ADVISOR:
 PUANGTHONG PAWAKAPAN, PH.D., 82 PP. ISBN 974-14-2981-9

In response to criticisms that the vernacular media made violence in southern Thailand worse through its war-journalism type of reporting, the Thai Journalists Association launched a peace journalism trial called Issara News Centre (INC). The INC aimed at bringing together reporters from Bangkok and the south to produce stories that give context to the complex conflict, get voices of stake holders other than the authority across, including the villagers. The TJA hoped that INC would help bring about empathy required for peaceful transformation of the conflict, at the time when the Thai public opinion was dangerously swaying towards tit-for-tat type of solution.

The research questions are whether the INC coverage conformed with peace journalism framework and how the mainstream media responded to the INC project, as well as factors influencing the strength and weakness of the INC. To arrive at the findings, the student conducted document analysis using Johan Galtung's peace journalism framework of the coverage of a violent incident at Tanyonglimo by the INC in comparison to that by mass circulation *Thai Rath* and *Matichon* newspaper. Interviews and participatory observation also formed substantial parts of the research activities. The findings are that while *Thai Rath* employs war journalism method in its coverage, the INC applied peace journalism approach and *Matichon* showed inclination for peace journalism. Comparing the output of INC during two violent incidents in September 2005, and May 2006 pointed to human resource, capacity and commitment by national newspapers to the peace journalism trial as issues determining the strength and weakness as well as sustainability of the INC which represents peace journalism undertaking in Thailand.

Field of Study International Development Studies
 Academic year 2006

Student's signature

Advisor's signature

K. Supapohn
P. Pawakapan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The thesis process opened up the world in many ways for me, as has the entire MAIDS experience. I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Puangthong Pawakapan for her advice and attentiveness in helping shaped many scattered thoughts together within a realistic framework academically and time-wise. I am grateful Dr Vira Somboon and Dr Uajit Virojtrairat of the Institute for Media Development for the People. Assoc.Prof. Dr Chantana Banpasirichote Wungaeo has been resourceful and has kindly extended to me lots of opportunities to work and learn both in Bangkok and in the South. My gratitude also goes to MAIDS staff particularly Wanphen Wongwian, the Rock of MAIDS, and Prapaporn Tivayanond. Dr Thitinan Pongsudhirak contributed to my learning experience.

My friends in the media circle are the source of strength and moral support, including logistical support in the case of Ketmanee Nuntaranapong and her colleagues at Matichon. Muhammad Ayub Pathan, editor of the Issara News Centre and Pattara Khumphitak, TJA President, helped facilitate my field work. King-oua Laohong was my field-trip partner in the South and she has generously shared notes, insight and contacts with me. In our similar dual capacity of MA student and Chula / reporter, we shared many heart-warming as well as stressful encounters of how ordinary Thais are coping with daily threats to their well-beings in the deep south. Anuraj Manibhandhu, Saritdet Marukatat, Sanitsuda Ekachai and Naovarat Suksamran at the Bangkok Post, and Duangkamol Chotana's friendship and encouragement helped me get by. The same is true for another long list of non-media friends in Bangkok (Nusara, Pipat, Chomanad, Panit, Jetana, Thanyakorn, Onticha, Saowarop, Suzuki, Lan, Hien, Susan) and beyond for their empathy and tolerance of my leave of absence from social life during the past year. My brother Pamorn and Theerada Suphaphong lent helping hand through and through.

I thank my family, especially my parents for their love, understanding and for giving me the free spirit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT (THAI)	iv
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background and Rationale	1
1.2 Literature Review	4
1.3 Research Questions and Scope of Research.....	8
1.4 The Peace Journalism Framework.....	9
1.5 Research Method.....	11
1.5.1 Document Analysis.....	11
1.5.2 Interview.....	12
1.5.3 Participatory Observation.....	13
1.6 Significance of Research.....	13
CHAPTER II CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN THAILAND	14
2.1 The Chronology of 2004-2005.....	14
2.2 Interpretations of Events.....	18
CHAPTER III ISSARA NEWS CENTRE, A QUIET REVOLUTION	25
3.1 The Beginning: INC Loose's Organisation and Structure	25
3.2 Tanyonglimo Coverage: INC in Its Element.....	29
3.2.1 Issara News Centre's coverage of Tanyonglimo	30
3.2.2 Coverage of the Tanyonglimo incident in <i>Thai Rath</i> and <i>Matichon</i> on 22-25 September 2005.....	33
CHAPTER IV ANALYSIS OF THE INC PROJECT	49
4.1 Gujnglupah, INC fading From Major Newspapers.....	49
4.2 Good Intention, Without Clear Strategy.....	55
4.2.1 The Good Intention.....	55
4.2.2 Lack of Clarity and Strategy.....	56
4.2.2.1 Project Duration and Job Description.....	58

4.2.2.2 PDIT and the News Institute: Duplication of Effort?.....	
4.3 Capacity: The Media Industry's Perennial Gap between Bangkok and Periphery Journalists.....	60
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION.....	64
REFERENCES.....	67
APPENDICES.....	72
APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES.....	73
APPENDIX B: NEWSPAPER HEADLINES	74
BIOGRAPHY.....	82



สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

LIST OF TABLES

1. Comparative Reporting Model used for content analysis.....10
2. Choice of headline languages indicating war and peace journalism used by *Thai Rath* and *Matichon*45
3. Comparison of INC Human Resource during Tanyonglimo and Gujinglupah.....54



สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Rationale

The southern border region of Thailand encompassing the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat experienced an upsurge of violence, many of which were insurgency-related, since January 2004. During 2004-2005, the region had undergone over 3,500 attacks, affecting 2,940 people, of whom 1,175 were killed and 1,765 injured, according to research conducted by Assistant Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri of Prince of Songkla University, Pattani. (Issara News Centre, 2006).

The start of a new wave of violence marked by the weapon heist on 4 June 2004 revived attention literature-wise in both Thai and English languages attempting to make sense of what's going on in the south, on top of massive coverage in the mainstream vernacular press. But no one can pin-point for sure who the perpetrators and what their objectives are. The International Crisis Group produced a comprehensive, well-researched and balanced report titled "*Southern Thailand: Insurgency, not Jihad.*" (ICG, 2005) The report traces history of the restive area, attempts at harsh assimilation by Bangkok-based government of the local Muslim population that whose identity, culture and lifestyle differ from the rest of Thailand including Bangkok. Local grievances at Bangkok-led political and cultural assimilation policy and missteps by successive governments provide breeding ground for activities by armed political groups. The report also traces and disentangles the web of insurgent groups' network potentially responsible for the attack. An update of this report entitled "*Thailand's Emergency Decree: No Solution*" was released on 18 November 2005. Two years after the audacious weapon raid in Cho-Irong, Amnesty International on 4 January 2006 released a report documenting human rights violation in the south of Thailand, recommending the Thai government to "work for justice if you want peace." (Amnesty International, 2006). To date though no-one can identify exactly the "enemies" the government is fighting and what these perpetrators are fighting for. A large body of Thai-language works and analysis also

attempted to provide context to the unrest, including *Santipaab nai plew plueng* (Peace Amidst the Fire) by a team of reporters of the Nation newspaper. (Supalak Kanchanakhundee and Don Pathan, eds., 2004).

Since the upsurge of violence marked by a weapon heist at the Fourth Development Battalion headquarters in Narathiwat on 4 January 2004, the mainstream vernacular news media had their field day reporting details of violence and damages. Their coverage is dominated by voices of the authority in juxtaposition of graphic details of deaths, injuries and property damage. Voices of civilians and villagers affected hardly emerged in the mainstream media outlets which influence the perception of Thais outside the region. The media have been blamed for perpetuating the cycle of violence by adopting sensational, crime-story type approach in covering unrest in the southern border region. Such approach concentrates on reporting the “here and now,” sensational details of attacks and casualties, authority-oriented and ignoring explanation of context and complexity of factors, issues and dynamics at play. Through such approach, television and mass circulations – deliberately not-- endorsed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s strong-arm tactics in managing the southern conflict. The institutional set-up of the Thai media also plays a key role in keeping such reporting mode in full force. Bangkok-centric editorial command assigns crime-story type coverage of the Southern conflict to their local reporters. In tandem with pushing its nationalist ideology, the government joined the chorus of criticism leveled at the vernacular media for fuelling violence through sensational reporting.

In employing the approach described above in coverage of the southern unrest, state-controlled broadcast media and mainstream press oversimplify what the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2005, May) characterises as “low-level insurgency” originating from a range of local grievances, while further widening the gap in perception and distrust -- the us and them -- between the rest of Thailand and the Muslim-dominated south and now between local residents of Buddhism and Islamic faith, by seeing their mission as bolstering the government’s policy of loosely-defined nation-state consolidation and national security concerns. One widely held prognosis is that the media can play a constructive role in mitigating conflict by

bridging the gap of misunderstanding and mistrust between the residents and those in the rest of Thailand.

Against such backdrop the Thai Journalists Association (hereafter TJA) launched a pilot project on peace journalism. The TJA-sponsored Issara News Centre (INC) took off in September 2005 as a six-month pilot project, subject to review for possible extension, with partial funding from the National Reconciliation Commission through the National Public Health Foundation. At the time of writing, the TJA was planning to integrate the INC project into a “News Institute” using the INC as a model for training and pool-reporting on broader agenda including political reform in Thailand. The INC newsroom located within Prince of Songkla University’s Pattani campus is led by desk editor Muhamad-Ayub Pathan supervising a team of Bangkok-based reporters from national newspapers and local reporters – traditionally regarded as the second tiered staff of the Bangkok-centric newsroom operation. INC sees its mission as developing literacy of non-violence as reporting model – by attempting to present the “why” which is omitted in the mainstream news media too preoccupied with the daily grind of reporting the “who, what, when, where and how.” (*Krungthep Turakij*,2005). At the same time, it seeks to provide space in the public sphere for “small voices” that usually don’t stand a chance in being newsmakers (like villagers and civilians) to balance the pro-establishment, Bangkok-centric and sports-journalism by the broadcast media and mass circulation.

This project is Thailand’s first of its kind initiated and undertaken by a professional organisation on peace journalism for the Southern Thailand conflict. Output from INC is published on www.tjanews.org., available for public viewing as well as to news organisations for pick-up free of charge. The output has been regularly used by more serious titles including *Krungthep Turakij*, *Matichon*, *Manager* particularly its popular news website www.manager.co.th; *Post Today* and *Thai Post*. Mass circulations with highest readership namely *Thai Rath* and *Daily News* have never used INC output.

1.2 Literature Review

Critique of the Thai mainstream news media's operation and coverage can be found in a number of works. Structurally, the mainstream media are headquartered in Bangkok where editorial decisions, assignment and agenda-setting authorities are concentrated. McCargo (2002) paints the Bangkok-centric nature of Thai newspapers' editorial decision, where editors in Bangkok decide and assign coverage of news stories in the provinces. It still holds today that most papers hire journalists in the provinces as "stringers." These stringers usually get minimal monthly retainer fee if at all and they get paid by volume of stories they file and the newspapers run. The close relationship between "beat reporters" stationed in the Government, the Parliament or the Army, also gravitates reporters towards pro-establishment bias.

The symbiotic relationship between the Thai mainstream media and the government is such that the former at times of various crises tend to pander to the "national interest" line which amounts to elitist, narrowly-defined, pro-establishment interest. Puangthong Rungsawadisab (2005,pp.62-69) provided a case study on how the Thai media in the 1960's rallied behind and helped the Thai government to justify the US secret army bases in Thailand during the Vietnam War. A couple of decades later, the Thai press voiced support for the defense of national security by backing the Thai government's hard line diplomacy of opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Then as Thailand's hard-line policy against Vietnam shifted with the change of leadership to General Chatichai Choonhavan's famous overture to befriend Thailand's neighbours under the policy banner of "turning the Indochina battlefield into a market place," that shifting of ideology was once again endorsed by the Thai press.(Puangthong Rungsawadisab,2005,pp.92-112).

The way the mainstream media traditionally operates, as depicted and documented in these publications remains true till today and it gravitates the coverage of conflict and violence in the south of Thailand since 2004, once again, towards homogenous nationhood and national security concerns.

In a related issue, there was a tendency among the vernacular mainstream press to cast Muslim in unfavourable light. In his master's degree thesis titled *Gaan sathonpaap khong hetgaan ti giew gab chao muslim nai nangsupimthai* (Portrayal of the Muslims in Thai newspapers) Thirayuth Latifi noted in his analysis of "positive and negative" content in relations to presentation of Muslim in the Thai papers that the outcome indicates "negative content is more likely presented than positive content." News value in Thai press concerning the happenings amongst the Muslim often related to "prominence, conflict, mystery, complications and sensationalism," according to his research findings. (cited in Media Monitor, 2005 pp.13-14).

The dominance of the authority's voices is clearly manifested in the output of television newscast during September 2005, as captured in the Media Monitor project in its research findings that representation and balance in TV newscast and the role in reconciliation in the Thai society. (Media Monitor, 2005.) The findings are particularly pertinent to the proposed thesis because it covered with the period of September 2005 when the news agenda was dominated by headlines from the south namely the killing at Tanyonglimo village and the exodus of 131 Muslim Thais from Narathiwat to Malaysia citing security threat from the Thai government in the end of August 2005. The story emerged in the media as they were arrested for illegal entry by the Malaysian authorities in the northern Kelantan State on 1 September 2005. Where coverage of the south is concerned, the findings highlight by quantitative analysis the inequity in allocation of visibility to the various "voices" whereby voices of the authority represented by Prime Minister, ministers, and army commanders received disproportionately large space and prominence. Voices of those directly affected by the conflict, analysts, academics and civil society representatives were conspicuously missing. In an extreme case, output monitored from Army-owned Channel 5 those "small voices" from non-authority sources were absent altogether as its news cast featured exclusively the State point of view in its entirety. In certain cases of violence in the south, representation of the southerners and the Muslims was negatively stereotyped in connection to "terrorism" "insurgency" "brutality-violence," in a practice the Media Monitor said could fuel prejudice against the Muslims.

Pointing out to another flaw of the Thai media in reporting such complex issue as the Southern conflict, investigative journalist Prasong Lertratanawisute observed the majority of Thai journalists operate along the traditional formula of reporting on "who, what, where, when, why and how." (Prasong Lertratanawisute in *Silencing the Media: Rights and Freedom of Expression under Political Corporate Seized*, Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, ed.2005, pp.202-209). "Why" seems the least often used aspect because most media people lack the ability to probe what led to the happenings they are reporting; whether the truth is what the powers-that-be told them at media interviews. In an absence of such line of inquisitive questioning, there is a lack of enthusiasm to investigate the truth for the public which is the media's core mission. Under these circumstances, political leaders seize the opportunity to use "half-truth" in persuading the public to admire government's accomplishments. News and information manufactured for propaganda purpose, or regular use of "half-truth" may initially be designed to impress the public. But as time goes by, the half-truth manufacturers or spin doctors may themselves become convinced that the embellishment is true, while believing that such truth manufactured at their hand would keep them in power and hence the need to constantly spin. A case in point was Prime Minister Thaksin's announcement that the Thai authorities managed to arrest key perpetrators when wrong people were arrested on flimsy basis as shown in several court's decisions to drop charges for lack of evidence to proceed. Still, Mr Thaksin trumpeted during his weekly nationwide radio address the authorities' "success" in quelling violence in the south by having ringleaders arrested.

During 2004-2005 when violence in the south peaked co-incided with the last year in office of Mr Thaksin's first administration and the first year when he was re-elected for a second term with landslide majority. Shunning domestic and international criticism of human rights abuse associated with his anti-drug trafficking campaign that incurred countless extra-judicial killings, he further consolidated his authoritarian rule. (Kasien Techapira in *Silencing the Media: Rights and Freedom of Expression Under Political Corporate Seized*.Ubonrat Siriyuvasak,ed.2005,pp.34-56). The mainstream media, with their focus on here and now and incapability of questioning the authorities' version of truth, inevitably and inadvertently, filled its space –part of the public sphere—with such ideology.

A regular diet of reports along this line has led many Thais to believe that violence in the south is being perpetrated by “the unpatriotic,” in a simple-minded presumption that ignores the deep-rooted complexity and policy missteps involved. A survey research found that more than half of the respondents (1,154 samples of Thais from all walks of life interviewed during 30-31 October 2005) agreed that perpetrators of violence in the south deserve the most severe form of penalty, or even extra-judicial execution. The reason behind this reply is further linked to the fact that 65.42 per cent of respondents viewed “unpatriotism” as motive for the unrest. (Puangthong and Surat, 2005). In this context, it is worth examining the TJA’s trial in peace journalism at this juncture when the Thai society has grown less tolerant of diversity and de-sensitised to violence, with the media playing a role in egging public perception on towards such predicament.

Most studies show the tendency among the Thai media to support, consciously or unconsciously, the official position, thereby promoting the use of “resolute measures,” which usually implicate the use of force against the perceived “enemy” of the nation – or “them.”

In areas with protracted conflicts like the Middle East, Northern Ireland, news media can play role ranging from constructive to destructive in the peace process. Gadi Wolfsfeld offered case studies of the role the media played in the Oslo peace process between Israel and Palestine; the peace process between Israel and Jordan and the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. In these three cases, media coverage nearly unraveled in the Oslo peace process. At the other end of the spectrum, the media played a constructive role in helping to bring about the Good Friday peace agreement for Northern Ireland. The Jordanian media fell somewhere between these two extremes in its coverage of the Israel-Jordan conflict. The author explored with how norms, routines and perceptions of news editors, field reporters shaped the news agenda. (Wolfsfeld, 2005)

In conflict-ridden areas around Asia, newspapers have shown inclination towards war journalism, as elaborated in the findings in *War or Peace Journalism?*

Asian Newspaper Coverage of Conflict. (Lee and Maslog, 2005) The study analyses content of 10 Asian newspapers that covered the conflicts involving India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines.

To date however nothing has been written about the role of the Thai mainstream media in mitigating the conflict in the southern border region.

1.3 Research questions:

- Does the INC coverage conform with peace journalism framework?
- How did the mainstream media respond to the Issara News Centre project?
- What are the factors contributing to the strength and weakness of the INC?

Scope and objectives of the Research:

The scope of the research covers the output and performance of Issara News Centre, with emphasis on its coverage of two major incidents of violence at Tanyonglimo in September 2005 and at Gujingtupah in May 2006. The objectives of the research are:

1. To assess whether the INC conforms with the peace journalism framework by using its coverage of Tanyonglimo violence during 20-25 September 2005 as case study; while at the same time, studying the response of the mainstream press towards the INC output.
2. To examine factors contributing to the strength and weakness of the INC, in other words, factors contributing to the sustainability of peace journalism in Thailand. This is achieved through comparison of the INC coverage of two violent incidents in Tanyonglimo and Gujingtupah, including the mainstream media's response to its coverage of both events.

Hypothesis: Thailand's first attempt at peace journalism for southern conflict coverage succeeded somewhat in raising awareness among certain key stake holders including media professionals and the army. However, war journalism

mind-set is deeply entrenched and cannot be changed overnight with just one short-term trial.

A number of factors contribute to the strength and weakness of peace journalism in Thailand as shown in the case study of the Issara News Centre project by the Thai Journalists Association. These factors include commitment by national newspapers in terms of human resource allocation, willingness to invest in capacity building, editorial decision-making, perception of the southern conflict vis a vis Bangkok-centric politics.

1.4 The Peace Journalism Framework

Johan Galtung is known to be the founding father of peace journalism theory and concept. According to Galtung (2005) war and peace journalism is based on four broad practice and linguistic orientations: peace, conflict, truth, people and solutions. His theory has since the 1970's been developed by the TRANSCEND network; and adopted at practical levels widely in Asia, especially in Indonesia. Peace media trainers Annabel McGoldrick and Jake Lynch of the Conflict and Peace Forum which adapts Galtung's framework list the dos and don'ts for reporters in putting peace journalism in operation.

War journalism is oriented towards the here and now, elite's voices and dichotomy of good and bad. Galtung explained that war journalism portrays conflict as a zero-sum game involving two parties competing to win one goal. In this sense, war journalism treats conflict which in most cases including that in the south of Thailand involves and affects more than just two parties (i.e. the State and its enemy.) Occasionally, the media themselves are confused "talking about conflict when they mean violent."(Galtung,2005).

Peace journalism avoids demonizing language, takes a non-partisan approach and a multi-party orientation. (Lee and Maslog,2005). These are the three most prominent features distinguishing peace journalism approach from war, or sports journalism type of coverage of a conflict.

In Thailand, although the southern unrest is yet to be properly mapped to identify with certainty the players, perpetrators and their affiliation, or what they are fighting for, violence since 2004 has manifested patterns and structure. The conflict in the south may not be fully qualified as “war,” though unprecedented and could be categorised as a murky protracted conflict. In this context and given how the Thai mainstream covered this complex series of events, Galtung’s theory of war journalism and peace journalism is most relevant. The framework below has been developed from existing literature to evaluate INC output along with content over specific periods of *Thai Rath* and *Matichon* newspapers.

Table 1: Comparative Reporting Model used for content analysis

Peace Journalism “The High Road”	War/Violence Journalism “The Low Road”
Explore conflict formation	Spotlight on conflict arena (two parties and one goal; gladiators, sports journalism)
Open space and time “Long article”	Closed space and time “Here and Now”
Transparent	Opaque, Secretive
Voices, empathy and understanding to all parties	Dichotomy : “us and them” journalism
See conflict as problem Focus on creativity Solution-oriented	Victory-oriented
Humanising	De-humanising
Proactive	Reactive
Focus on invisible effect of trauma	Focus on the visible (casualties)
People-oriented	Elite-oriented
Depolarisation	Polarisation, Escalation

Source: Galtung, Lee and Maslog, Mcgoldrick and Lynch

1.5 Research Method

1.5.1 Document Analysis:

A. The researcher proposes to perform content analysis of mass-circulation *Thai Rath* which is pro-establishment, pro-nation-state ideology and fully employs the war journalism mode. *Matichon* is chosen because of its usually conservative, nationalistic view, pre-existence of the Issara News Centre, although it has changed tune to become an active participant in and regular user of INC output.

The period chosen for analysis is:

- 22 -25 September 2005 for coverage of the violence at Tanyonglimo, in which two villagers were shot death in an attack that led to the abduction, torture and killing of two marines. The event shocked the nation – as well as giving rise to the support of strong-arm measures to quell unrest in the south

B. INC output in September 2005. The analysis will be two pronged: to assess the output during the period whether it follows the peace journalism framework. Specifically, INC output during 21-30 September and the coverage of an event on 19 May 2006 when two Buddhist female teachers were kidnapped and beaten up by villagers at Gujinglupah in Narathiwat province.

- Does the INC coverage of the Tanyonglimo event fit in Galtung's peace journalism classification?
- Comparison of the output in September 2005 when the team received full support from Bangkok-based journalists and in May 2006 when such scale of support was no longer available.
- To what extent the mainstream press headquarters in Bangkok respond by using output from Issara News Centre? This will be answered by content analysis of *Thai Rath* and *Matichon* for their coverage of the events outlined above. Information derived from methods describe below will also be input.

1.5.2 Interview

The researcher would like to conduct in-depth interviews with editors in Bangkok headquarters of major newspapers in shaping the news agenda and output. The researcher intends to use her own professional background as a journalist along with the rapport she has established with most of the interviewees below to gather insight into the norms, routines, and attitude of these editors in relation to the research questions. Target interviewees and rationale are:

- Miss Duangkamol Chotana, Editor-in-Chief, *Krungthep Turakij*. The paper was criticised for “doctoring” the picture of one person killed during the Kruse Mosque siege, in what internal inquiry established to be simple technical hiccup in the production chain. However, the paper has played an active role in the INC –sending reporters to the field to work with the INC team and regularly picking up the INC output in the paper. Duangkamol played an instrumental role in supporting the INC operation.
- Mr. Pattara Khumphitak, Political Editor, *Post Today* and President of the Thai Journalists Association. Pattara is one of the founders of INC operation and *Post Today* is a regular user of INC copies. Pattara can also give an overview of other mainstream media.
- Mr. Pradit Ruangdit, Political News Reporter, *Bangkok Post*, another key force behind INC.
- Mr Pramote Fai-upra, Senior Editor, *Thai Rath*. He is in charge of making editorial decision for Thailand’s most influential newspaper that to date would not use INC output nor take part in the reporting operation.
- Mr Pakpoom Pongbhai, News Editor, *Matichon*.

Interviewees in the South:

- Mr. Muhamad-Ayub Pathan, veteran journalist and south-based reporter for the *Bangkok Post* and *Matichon*, and editor leading the INC team in Pattani.
- Mr. Chaiyong Maneepiluek, president of the Southern Reporters’ Club in Haad Yai and stringer for *Daily News* newspaper. He can tell us about the type of stories from the field that sell and that his editors in Bangkok want.

- State officers and villagers.

1.5.3. Participatory Observation in the South:

The researcher intends to spend one week at the INC's office in Pattani to observe editorial meetings in which the Editor and the journalists discuss editorial agenda, ideas and plans for features and coverage. Where possible, the researcher would like to trail these journalists on field assignments to observe how they put the "peace journalism" mindset in action.

1.5.4 Significance of the research:

- Systematic assessment of to what extent the Issara News Centre's attempt at peace journalism helps in conflict mitigation effort.
- Recommendations to the Thai media profession for a model of sustainable peace journalism operation. This will contribute to both the long-term process of conflict mitigation and reconciliation, as well as to the development of media profession in Thailand in terms of responsibility to produce public good.

สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHAPTER II

CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

This chapter aims at depicting the complexity of issues believed to lie at the root causes leading to violence in the southern border region from January 2004 to present. Events in these past two years have challenged historical textbook version of Thailand as a peaceful, homogenously Buddhist nation. From the arm robbery and a series of arson attacks on 4 January 2004, the Thai mainstream media, operating under the constraints of time and space, have devoted news space to incidents themselves typical of the “war journalism” framework, thereby not conducive to educating the public but instead endorsing the State’s favoured approach to overpower the mysterious opponents with physical force. Away from the media in the realm of academia, the resurgence of southern violence from 2004 prompted countless analysts and scholars in Thailand and beyond to probe and debate what causes, who organises what appears to be violence with pattern and structure and for what purpose and no one can answer these questions. This chapter attempts to present some of the main arguments, interpretations and issues surrounding the conflict in the southern border region of Thailand, which is a major theme in the Thai mainstream media over since the first week of January 2004.

2.1 The Chronology of 2004-2005

In its final report, the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC, May 2006) analyses the impact of selective events during 2004-2005 on two strands of relationships: 1) between the State and the people; 2) among diverse groups of people within the State – that form a nexus of peace and internal security of any country. These two sets of relationships also exist beyond the Thai border in the regional and global contexts. Understanding the events listed below as excerpted from its report, the NRC believes, helps to plot the future trend and solution.

4 January 2004: Unknown attackers believed by the Royal Thai Army to number around 50 raided the Fourth Battalion in Cho-Irong District of Narathiwat, took off with 403 firearms and killed four soldiers. The weapon heist took place

simultaneously with 22 arson attacks of schools and checkpoints throughout Narathiwat. These attacks symbolise the State's failure to protect its very own arsenal and armed personnel – the tool of exercising its power. This raises public doubts on the State's competence to fulfill its duty of protecting its citizens when the State itself is vulnerable to such attacks. The event represents a serious tremor in the relationship between the State and the people.

22-24 January 2004: Two men knived a 64-year old Buddhist monk just back from morning alms collection at Bacho District in Narathiwat. Two days later, another band of attackers killed three monks including a 13-year-old novice in Yala province. The symbolic significance of these two attacks rests in the fact that “knives were used to sever the ties” between Buddhist and Muslim residents who once co-existed in mutual trust and peaceful harmony.

12 March 2004: Human rights lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit who had helped to defend many Muslims in national security-related charges for the last two decades disappeared, in a case widely believed to be “enforced disappearance” with some police officers involved. Government figures including Prime Minister Thaksin acknowledged that the lawyer died. Somchai's “enforced disappearance” amounts to destruction of an individual who has faith in the country's justice system” through his track records as defense lawyer. The NRC points out that this directly impacts the relationship between the State and the people, particularly the “minority groups” who feel that even those with faith in the justice system is not safe.

28 April 2004: People numbering in hundreds took to arms such as machetes to attack government installations simultaneously in three southern border provinces. State officials used force in response, resulting in five officials killed on the spot and 106 insurgents killed, including the shooting into the Kruze Mosque killing 32. In terms of casualty figures, the State has won but the issue is how those who live feel about the 106 lives lost. Most of those killed received the funeral rite accorded to martyrs. The choice of machete as weapon and the date which co-incided with the people's uprising against the State at Dusun Nyor in Janae District of Narathiwat B.E.2491 point to alienation between the Muslim Thais in the region. At the same

time, Buddhist residents should be watching with apprehension and mistrust on why men from under 20 to 60 marched to death at their free will on 28 April 2004.

25 October 2004: A crowd of over 3,000 gathered in front of Takbai District Police Office in Narathiwat demanding release of six village defense volunteers who are Muslim Thais. The situation was not the first such challenge in the face of State authorities because on 25 September 2004, villagers laid a siege on a special peace task force operating in Ban I-batu School in Su-ngaipadi District of Narathiwat on the basis of having heard these officers shot and wounded a local woman. On 10 October 2004, villagers said two men in army-like uniform fired three gunshots near Panare beach in Pattani. Negotiation and verification led to a peaceful ending.

Yet negotiation failed in the case of Takbai, with six killed on the spot as State decided to use force to break the demonstration. Some 1,300 were arrested and transported to Ingkayuthaboriharn Camp in Pattani, resulting in 79 deaths from suffocation during the journey. The Takbai incident heightened the level of mistrust significantly because the demonstrators were unarmed and thus the use of force unjustified. The State could not evade the responsibility of those died while being transported. Apart from eroding the relationship between the State and the Malay Muslim Thais, Thailand has been criticised in the regional and international arenas for its handling of Takbai incident seen as oppressing the Muslims and violating human rights by torturing to death some of those arrested.

3 April 2005: Hatyai was hit by a series of bomb attacks in commercial establishments including a department store and the airport, in a move that sowed wide-spread fear among the public on how to go about living normally when the State fails to protect them.

14 July 2005: The provincial centre of Yala has been rocked by blackout, bomb and arson attacks, resulting in two police officers killed and 17 residents both Buddhist and Muslim injured. Two days later, the government imposed an emergency decree. These attacks effectively made Yala residents fear for their safety and inconfident in the State's power to protect them.

30 – 31 August 2005: Imam Stopa Yusoh was shot at Lahan village in Sungaipadi District of Narathiwat and before he died he left an instruction forbidding officers to look at his body for he's confident that he's attacked by State officials. Over 400 residents of Ban Lahan galvanised in a blockade of the village. Shortly after the event, a group of 131 Thais journeyed across the border to seek political asylum in Malaysia. While some believed that both the shooting and the flight of the 131 Thais were insurgency-orchestrated (Bahroon, 2005), the NRC highlighted "cultural dimensions" in the troubled relations between residents and the State. The Ban Lahan blockade was possible because the Muslims take to implement death wish to the heart. The exile meanwhile can be explained by a religious concept called "Hijrah" –Muslims protesting injustice by simply walking away, a practice documented in the history of Thailand and Southeast Asia. Religious implications of these events put neighbouring Malaysia, which happened to chair the Organization of Islamic Conferences on a tough spot.

20-21 September 2005: After the sunset prayers, villagers heard gunshot at the teahouse of Tanyonglimo village in Ra-ngae District of Narathiwat. Six villagers were shot, and two killed. It was rumoured that State officials staged the attack and two marine officers who did not back out of the village in time were taken hostage. Their release was negotiated all night and by afternoon of 21 September, the two were found tortured and killed. Villagers locked themselves up at home in silence and fear since. The NRC interpreted the Tanyonglimo event in multiple layers : relationship between the State and community, collapse of the community as it failed to save lives of the two marines, anger felt by large sections of the Thai public, weakness of the State, or in the eyes of many, and the State's restraint in avoiding the use of force therefore avoiding the "trap" set by insurgency to internationalise the issue. (Bahroon, 2005).

16 October 2005: A group of attackers set fire on Wat Promprasit in Panare District of Pattani province, in which one Buddhist monk was beheaded, and two residents in the temple were also killed. The attack drove the wedge deeper in the already fractured ties between the region's Buddhist and Muslim communities.

7 November 2005: Over 60 attackers raided Bannangsta District Police Office and the District Chief's residence in Yala, in an attack thought to have been staged to confirm the State's vulnerability to violence.

16 November 2005: At least 10 attackers raided three homes using machine guns to kill all nine residents including an eight-month old baby in Ban Gathong of Ra-ngae District, Narathiwat. Most villagers interviewed by the NRC said they believed that the whole family was slaughtered by State officials.

2.2. Interpretations of Events

Like ordinary Thais, I am sick and tired of hearing about yet another attack in the south. I am just waiting for the southern problem to end.

Prasong Lertratanawisute, Senior Editor, *Matichon* and one of Thailand's best known investigative journalists. (Interview June 15, 2006)

The view of Thais in general could perhaps be most accurately summed up in Mr Prasong's words above. Unfortunately, there seems no end in sight. In the first place, the southern conflict has never really gone away from recent Thai history. Something has been going on, unreported in the mainstream media between the end of the Communist Party of Thailand and Communist Party of Malaya's insurgencies until 4 January 2004. Policy missteps conditioned by wrong analysis and miscalculations during Mr Thaksin's two successive administrations only make any possible resolution yet more elusive. Beyond providing column inches and sound bites with authorities being the most frequently used sources, attacks on both State and civilian targets that have taken place in the southern border provinces almost on a daily basis since the start of 2004 have instead exposed a deeply rooted conflict in the region forgotten by the media, stimulated lots of thinking, interpretations and analysis over the last couple of years. These assessments and writings revolve around the themes of identity politics, authoritarianism, national-security orientation,

insurgency, the possibility of inviting linkage to the surge in international Jihadist movements in light of the US war against terrorism.

In the most tangible explanation backed by empirical research data, Srisompob Jitpiromsri with Panyasak Sobhonvasu (2006) found that increasingly people are inclined to attribute the violence to the activities of militants and extremists acting in the name of separatist or similar movements. The escalation of violence in recent years also shows the patterns of target-oriented and well-planned attacks, which seem to be decisively driven by ideological beliefs with social grievances as other conducive factors. “The changing patterns of violence have often been invoked in support of a broad argument: long-standing separatism and sub-regional strife in the deep south are being gradually radicalized, internationalized and perhaps Islamicized. Yet in reality, the explanations for the violence remain contested, and interpretations opaque.” Regardless of the cautious tone, the findings constitute clear proof disputing public statements by Mr Thaksin and some of his lieutenants that violent attacks in the south were perpetrated by petty bandits, or mafia figures fighting turf war or narcotics trade.

From the conventional warfare point of view, the conflict in southern Thailand officially ended with the government’s announcement of the surrender by the last group of Communist Party of Thailand insurgents to the authority at a ceremony on 21 February 1992, dubbed “The Day the Southern Fire Ends.” In that year the Fourth Army Region Commander declared that armed separatism no longer posed a national security threat. (Surachart Bamroongruk, 2004). Amidst deceptive calm, weak inter-agency co-ordination and complacency, what many people believe to have been a mistake serious took place in the form of Cabinet’s decision in 2002 to dissolve a local mechanism called the joint Civilian Police and Military Force (CPT 43) along with the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre on the basis that law enforcement by police force is the normal practice for anywhere in Thailand including the south. (ICG, 2005; Don and Supalak eds., 2004.)

The dissolution of SBPAC and the CPM 43 which were in place since 1980’s left a vacuum in the southern border region. SBPAC until its existence in 2002

fulfilled the critical function of being the sole public sphere, where community and religious leaders as well as administrative officials stationed on the ground could have their say and input at local-level policy in an area too remote geographically and psychologically from Bangkok where policy usually emanates. Further compounding the situation is the fact that the bureaucratic machinery in Bangkok – which remains constant whereas politicians and governments come and go, is marginalised by a confident CEO/prime minister.

There is a consensus that the weapon raid and arson attacks on 4 January 2004 represents a rude awakening to the fact that insurgency in the south is alive and lethal. One fact that will never go away is the identity of the region's indigenous population that they are Muslim of Malay ethnicity with a history of being an independent state until it was incorporated by Siam in 1909. Assimilation policies engineered in Bangkok over the last century to varying degrees of intensity that peaked during the rule of Field Marshall Plaek Pibunsongkhram failed to suppress the fact that people living in the region are different from Bangkok and the rest of Thailand. Instead their identity has never been more pronounced amidst attempt to suppress it. In the strongest take on identity politics being the source of conflict and resentment, Koyrin Anwar and Manso Salae (2004) in *Fai Tai Rue Ja Dab?* [Will the Southern Fire End?] zeroed in on the Siamese colonisation of Patani since the reign of King Rama II and subsequent oppression of Patani nationalism and identity through Siam's nation-state building process. Pointing out that Haji Sulong Tohmima's proposal in 1947 amounts to the call for autonomy—"a minimum to protect the identity" and not separatism, the authors detailed how the arrest of Haji Sulong in 1948 drew criticism of the Malay Nationalist Party in Malaysia.

Refusal to respect diversity lies at the root cause of the conflict, Pichai Ratanapol (2003) who's been working 26 years in the south for the National Security Council told a seminar in March 2003 organised by the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network. One may not need to go back into history as far as the Patani Sultanate to prove this, as Mr Pichai cited an example of unease caused by the passage of the Decentralisation Act in 2003. The State is suspicious and distrustful that compatriots may not be loyal to the Nation-State, when it never really cares

about their well-being. Respect for human rights and diversity is written in the Constitution and in the policy of the Government, or the National Security Council but to translate these concepts into practice would require “extremely profound changes because of the deeply entrenched nature of authoritarian culture,” he told the seminar. (seminar proceedings, 2003)

The entrenched authoritarian culture, combined with the urge to produce quick results for putting an end to the southern fire are among the factors propelling Mr Thaksin towards the choice of using force, rather than the more difficult, time-consuming process of a political solution and reconciliation. In “Fostering Authoritarian Democracy with Violence: The Effect of Violent Solutions to Southern Violence in Thailand,” Dr Chaiwat Satha-anand said opting to use force, as is the case of how the State dealt with the siege of Kruze Mosque and the demonstration at Takbai, has the impact of intensifying the cycle of violence when forceful acts by State officers drew violent retaliation from “opponents in the dark,” resulting in, among other things, the transformation of elected democracy into authoritarian democracy. Dr Chaiwat equates the rejection, thrice, of the peace-building proposal that was formulated with input from the grassroots taking into account socio-economic and ethno-identity background, by then Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng to the Thai State’s reversal to the method characteristic of a State, which is to use force in its attempt to re-instate power where its weak. As a consequence, incidents of daily attack have never ceased since. And in the more frightening implication, the Thai society has come to accept violence as an essential strategy for conflict resolution. (Chaiwat Satha-anand, 2005)

The International Crisis Group’s research report (ICG, 2005) concluded that what’s going on in the south is insurgency driven by local, historical and socio-economic grievances, without any evidence of external involvement in these attacks. Failure to address issues such as justice, trust, better intelligence, better inter-agency coordination on the ground, more representation of the local Malay Muslims in the bureaucracy would only compound the situation.

The religious overtone of the event at Kruze mosque including the discovery of a document entitled “Berjihad di Patani” which appears to have in some ways inspired the violent incidents on 28 April 2004 formed part of the identity politics argument. In “Islam, Radicalism and Violence in Southern Thailand,” (Critical Asian Studies, 2006) academic Wattana Sugunnasil of Prince Songkla University Pattani Campus urged the government to take into serious considerations the religious and ideological aspects of violence in its policy formulation. He observed that Muslim militants are often portrayed by the local media as “mindless terrorists, religious fanatics, and anti-Buddhist militants longing for the past,” while little or no effort has been made to “seriously comprehend the discontents, the thinking and ideological justification that have provided their support.” Yet the success of radical militant groups in the recruitment, posting and ideological retention of members with few defectors demonstrates “the deep ideological nature” of the phenomenon. “To ignore the inspiration, mindsets and motivations of the militants, is to put up an insurmountable barrier to understanding them,” he said, noting that, unfortunately, this kind of denial is rather common among peace-building advocates, subscribers to conspiracy theories, and commentators in today’s Thailand. (Wattana Sugunnasil, 2006).

Writing under the pseudonym “Bahroon” in the Nation Weekly magazine, this former member of a separatist movement cautioned that some “bizarre cult movement” has been manipulating religious faith as these cult members deliberately misled people by invoking Muslim teaching in manipulative manners. For the events in Kruze Mosque, Tanyonglimo and the exile to Malaysia by 131 Thais – among whom are at least two militants wanted by the Thai authorities – he pointed to the pattern and strategy of provoking the State to use force and attempting to “internationalise” their campaigns. In a chapter titled “Shadow of the Malay Pattani Identity,” he challenged the orthodox thinking prevalent within the academic circle including some Thai Muslim scholars about the Malay identity. (Bahroon, 2005, pp.29-34). He is critical of Malay Patani chauvinism echoed by many analysts of southern affairs. “Could the social recognition or preservation of Malay Patani identity alone have enough weight to command a sizeable movement, when the writer himself could not answer what exactly preservation of Malay identity means?

In my previous days of resistance, I did not fight for Malay Patani but I fought because I believed then that if I was fortunate enough to die in a battlefield in the name of Islam, I'd be accorded *shahid* status (martyrdom); unlike these days, when the bizarre cult movement is using spell to lead Muslim youth along sinful path without their knowledge.”

For sure, a new generation of fighters has emerged to perpetrate many of these violent attacks. (Supalak and Don, eds.2004). The questions of who organise and command the structure, their motives and what they are fighting for all form part of a puzzle yet to be resolved convincingly. As facts indicate, the ideology of these militants active apparently since 2004 “is no longer the romantic low-key separatism of the past: the latest waves of attacks have had a much more aggressive and ruthless character.” (Srisompob with Panyasak, 2005).

Security analyst Surachart Bamroongsuk assessed the State's machinery and its bureaucracy is ill equipped to deal with the type of challenge emerging in the deep South since 4 January 2004. Orthodox thinking, or the “Martial Law” mentality where many believe martial law to be the cure still prevails in the bureaucratic circle, residue of the post Community Party of Thailand insurgency era. The weighting towards the use of force has the opposite effect of keeping the insurgency alive, while playing second fiddle to the “Martial Law mentality” is the more effective political approach of community outreach and development works to win the hearts and minds of the people. With the military still focusing the “search and destroy” strategy that failed the US during the Vietnam War, and the Thai police focusing on suppression while the civil administration run by the Interior Ministry is gripped with old boys' network type of power struggle in the bureaucratic ranks, the State mechanism is incompetent to deal with the present type of insurgency. It takes wisdom and new strategy to deal with this security crisis. (Surachart, 2004).

In a research report for National Reconciliation Commission, Chidchanok Rahimmula of Prince Songkla University at Pattani found that military, police and administrative officers in the three southern border provinces do not fully grasp the government's peace and reconciliatory policy directive. (Issara News Centre, April 4,

2006). The research aims to determine how the thrust of the Prime Minister's policy directive number 187/2546 signed by Mr Thaksin on 1 September 2003 instructing all state offices to use peaceful means in managing conflict in the south has filtered down through the chain of command to the ground. Based on information collected from military, police and administrative personnel stationed in Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla, the researcher concluded that: "state officials based in the area do not clearly understand or acknowledge the peace concept and guidelines prescribed in Prime Minister's Directive 187/2546." Factors ranging from structural set-up un conducive to having policy implemented effectively on the ground; culture within organisations, work experience, background of individual officials "directly affect the urge to learn or deny the Directive," resulting in different interpretations of how to apply peaceful means for conflict management. Although the officials surveyed view peace as the right approach, the consensus among them is that peaceful management of conflict in the three southern border provinces is not yet efficient because policy message bearers towards actual implementation do not fully grasp the gist of the Directive; and the use of peaceful means in managing the conflict by various agencies is not well co-ordinated.

Conclusion: There is a common thread in writing and analysis about the Southern conflict to date in that the State is indeed leaping in the dark in its effort to stem violence that threatens human security and development in the south. Weak intelligence gathering, wrong input and hence wrong policy, incompetent state machinery out of tune with the changed reality, old mental model and failure to respect the rule of law have always been identified as factors perpetuating the conflict

CHAPTER III

ISSARA NEWS CENTRE, THE QUIET REVOLUTION

Among the many hands making violence in the south contagious, I want to blame the media for their reporting on 25-26 October. The media published materials spoon-fed by the State in entirety. Has it never crossed your mind at all that you should be speaking to the villagers or other sources to balance the reporting? If not then, what's media for? A Propaganda Department alone would suffice. If anybody is to apologise to the people in the south, as well as to all junior officers who were harmed, the media ought to be among the first, because you're one of those throwing gasoline into the fire, with great gusto.

Historian Dr Nithi Aewsrivongse (2004)

3.1 The Beginning: INC's Loose Organisation and Structure

Amidst criticisms that the media sold sensational headlines through reporting of daily attacks which further fuel the southern fire, Issara News Centre was born. The Thai Journalists Association with co-operation from various newspapers sent a group of reporters to work with their southern counterparts. Truth, knowledge, opinion and feelings have subsequently surfaced in the media, brought forth by team members working across organisational boundaries, as independent and courageous journalists.

Pattara Khumphitak (2006)

President of the Thai Journalists Association

In response to criticisms from many quarters of the Thai society especially public intellectuals like Dr Nithi Aewsrivongse that biased reporting drove the wedge deeper instead of helping with conflict mitigation, a group of journalists initiated a peace journalism project to be implemented by the Thai Journalists Association. In one of the moves leading to the birth of Issara News Centre, a pool reporting desk

based in Pattani, the TJA and the Thai Broadcast Journalists Association (TBJA) organised a study visit for Bangkok-based senior journalists and editors to the southern border region on 18-19 February 2005. (Chavarong Limpattamapanee, Interview June 22, 2006). As a result of the trip, the TJA's board and a group of like-minded journalists explored in earnest how to band together on a collective peace journalism exercise. Among the key proponents of the INC project were Pattara Khumphitak of *Post Today*, Pradit Ruangdit and Ampa Santimetaneedol of the *Bangkok Post*, Nongnart Haanwilai of *Krungthep Turakij*.

At a meeting on 27 July 2005, the TJA agreed to launch "Peace Media: the Southern News Desk Project," also known as Issara News Centre. A website www.tjanews.org was set up within two weeks of that meeting, co-ordinated by Thai Rath's webmaster Chavarong. It was also agreed that from Bangkok, reporters from *Post Today*, *Krungthep Turjakij*, *Matichon*, *Prachachart Turakij*, *Prachathai.com*, *Bangkok Post* and *Naew Na* would join the pioneering editorial team of the INC's pool-reporting desk its office in the premises of Prince of Songkla University Pattani campus. Together with another group of local reporters based in the southern provinces, they would produce stories to be published on its website and which all newspapers could pick up and use free of charge. In a nutshell, the only "in-kind" contribution that newspapers in Bangkok make was to allow their reporters to be absent from their usual routine for a minimum period of 15 working days as input into the INC pool-reporting operation. There's no formal agreement for this human resource arrangement.

From the consensus – not formal agreement – among TJA members, it is evident that INC took shape as a loose structure. Corresponding to its genesis, the INC has a loose organisation based on secondment of Bangkok-based staff volunteered by various newspaper headquarters and local reporters from the southern provinces all with other day jobs that come with routine responsibility that they have to fulfill upon requirement of their respective employers. This arrangement did not pose any serious problem at the time when TJA members remained committed and when the southern conflict manifested by violent incidents that made headline materials such as the violence at Tanyonglimo. Nevertheless, such loose organisation

without solid agreement would have a direct impact on the INC's performance when other immediacy emerged such as political crisis. This problem subsequently emerged eight months later, as shown in the case of violence at Gujinglupah village when two Buddhist female teachers were taken hostage and tortured.

In the south, INC's editor Muhammad Ayub Pathan – based in Yala -- said his full-time editorship is possible with the green light from the *Bangkok Post* and *Matichon* newspaper he strings for. The Southern Newspapers Association of Thailand, as a show of support to the INC project, agreed to nominate eight reporters from the southern provinces to work at INC. (TJA, personal communication, October 27, 2005). These reporters worked for a variety of local publications, as well as “stringing” for Bangkok-based media outlets. TJA convinced its member publications to second reporters to work with INC for successive rounds of two months each in the name of training attachment with their normal jobs intact. (Chaiyong Maneepiluek, interview June 10, 2006).

During the formative stage, key TJA members who themselves are veteran journalists sought meetings with senior editors of several publications to solicit support and participation in the Project – chiefly to convince them to release their reporters for at least 15 days to work at the INC. The arrangement was such that these reporters retained their regular pay and position, while receiving a per diem of 300 baht during the INC attachment. The fluctuation in human resource situation at the INC would take its toll, six months after the INC launch when political crisis broke out in Bangkok from February 2006, resulting from the absence of a formal agreement on INC. In any case, a formal agreement is highly unlikely to be well-received by headcount-conscious editors.

By August 2005, the INC team met with academics and peace advocates including Prof. Dr. Prawase Wasi and attended a workshop on reporting from the south focusing on practical issues such as peace-journalism agenda, breaking-old-habits and operating in the field. It was envisaged then that the “Project” would run for six months with a budget of 2.9 million baht from the Thai Health Promotion Foundation via TJA.

“We aim to develop better understanding among Thai public about the South, at the time when the State does not seem aware that it is a party to the conflict. TJA’s editorial agenda as an alternative source of news and information from the south is meant to add angles other than violence,” said Pattara. (Interview, May 18, 2006). INC Editor Muhammad Ayub (Interview June 2, 2006) lists the following objectives of INC:

1. To offer answers to the society with a view to improving public understanding of the complex situation in the south.
2. To develop INC into a source of knowledge and information from the local perspective through voices of from the grassroots, victims, those affected by ongoing violence, academics, religious and community leaders. For Thais outside the region, a better grasp of the Malay-Muslim dominant south is an essential requirement for long-term peace-building and empathy.
3. To serve as an on-the-job training ground for Thai media people.
4. To establish a network linking Bangkok-based reporters and local reporters working in the southern provinces.
5. To produce output different from the conventional mainstream media agenda.
6. To break the State’s dominance as news source in order to broaden the public sphere for civil society groups, villagers, religious leaders, and other stake holders.

The main objectives of the INC revolve around developing a source of knowledge and information about the multiple facets of the South, upon recognition that Bangkok-based media lacked the knowledge of the local culture, belief, perspectives of the region with different language and culture. It was intended therefore that the TJA through INC cultivated a media network with strong grounding in the region by combining the editorial strength and Bangkok and the local journalists, i.e., a team work of seconded Bangkok and local staff.

The www.tjanews.org portal went live in the last week of August 2005, when output attributed to Issara News Centre, Thai Journalists Association started to appear in several mainstream titles.

3.2 Tanyonglimo coverage: INC in Its Element

On the eve of 19 September 2005, two residents were shot dead as a result of a drive-by shooting by mysterious attackers at the village teahouse at Ban Tanyonglimo in Ra-ngae District, Narathiwat. Two marine officers who happened to pass by were taken hostage as suspected attackers. Amidst chaos and what appeared to be systematic crowd mobilisation by militant groups joined by certain villagers the following morning, the two marines were tortured and killed.

This following section analyses INC's output as well as how two newspapers representing mainstream vernacular *Thai Rath* and *Matichon* covered the murder of two marine officers Second Lieutenant Winai Nakabutr and Sergeant Major Khamthorn Thong-iad at Moo 7 Tanyonglimo village, Tambon Tanyonglimo, Ra-ngae District, Narathiwat. The hostage-taking that went on overnight of 20 September 2005 followed the shooting by anonymous attackers of the village teahouse, killing two villagers and injuring five others.

The first segment examines Issara News Centre's coverage of the violence at Tanyonglimo. The second section examines headline stories of *Thai Rath* and *Matichon* on 22-25 September 2005. The analysis is undertaken within the framework of war and peace journalism pioneered by Johan Galtung.

3.2.1 Issara News Centre's coverage of Tanyonglimo

With the benefit of online distribution, Issara News Centre has been able to break the story since the hostage-taking started in the evening of 20 September 2005. On 21 September, www.tjanews.org published five stories including the chronology, an eyewitness' account from one of its reporters who got exclusive access to the scene because he spoke Malay while other reporters were denied entry by the "villagers," many of whom, it was established later, were not residents of Tanyonglimo. The story headlined "Villagers don't trust the media: unraveling the puzzle of no-Thai-reporter-zone at Tanyonglimo" in relations to villagers' request to have Malaysian reporters at the scene has been picked up by all major titles except *Thai Rath*. "Thai reporters side with the military. Reporters and soldiers are friends and that's why we don't trust them," a woman at the scene was quoted as saying. Former Thai Rak Thai MP Najmuddin Uma was quoted as observing that the mastermind wanted to internationalise the issue by demanding Malaysian reporters to be brought to the scene. INC's coverage of the press conference by State officials from the south offered more depth and sensitivity than when messages from the same event were reported in both *Thai Rath* and *Matichon*. For example, Fourth Army Region Commander said "a group of insurgents" against the generic term "villagers" used by the mainstream press took two marine officers hostage. While Pol.Lt.Gen.Adul Saengsingkaew of the 9th Police Region said evidence-gathering would be conducted in the "fairest manner with maximum justice" for what he called "criminal offence." INC carried an interview with the Reverend Pra Paisal Visalo, an NRC member, who appealed to the government not to use the Tanyonglimo as a pretext to rule out negotiation as a means to end the southern conflict.

On 22 September 2005, INC published the following stories:

1. In a story that was widely picked up by national newspapers, INC interviewed a colleague and villagers on fond memories of the two marines.
2. In an angle totally omitted from the mainstream media, one learnt for the first time from a story headlined "Fear-stricken Tanyonglimo: 'Can't Tell, Don't Know How To Tell'" that one of the villagers shot dead at the tea-shop by

unknown attackers prior to the hostage-taking was a 25-year-old resident called Nima. The atmosphere in Tanyonglimo was grim and stunned villagers were grappling with what transpired in the melee of the two previous days that gave Tanyonglimo a bad name. Villagers remained focused on the tea-shop shooting and when asked about the killing of the two marines, their standard reply was “can’t tell, don’t know how to tell.”

3. In a related story headlined “Who Shot the Tea-shop? The Resounding Question in Tanyonglimo,” INC interviewed the mother of Nima, another person shot dead in the attack preceding the marines hostage-taking.
4. In a story without headline, INC excerpted an address by the Vice President of Malaysia’ opposition party PAS with stronghold in Kelantan State bordering southern Thailand. In his speech published on www.parti-pas.org in the aftermath of 131 Thais seeking asylum in Malaysia, the senior PAS member said the Thaksin’s government is incompetent in giving protection to all Thai citizens.
5. “Echo from Malaysia” gave glimpses into the Tanyonglimo coverage by two Malaysian papers *Berita Hariyan* and *Utusan Malaysia*.

On 23 September 2005, the following stories appeared on www.tjanews.org:

1. “Recollection of the Ninja Bandits Story: When the Media Don’t Reach the Mass: Nightmare in the Villagers’ heart.” A team of three INC reporters interviewed wife of a police officer in Ra-ngae District who said she could not understand why the authorities failed to stop the killing of two marines at Tanyonglimo when lesson could have been learnt from a similar incident two years earlier when two police officers were lynched for mistaken identity in Buenangkuepoh. The rest of the story centred around testimony of Buenangkuepoh village headman who detailed how the incident in his village was different from that at Tanyonglimo – and different from what outsiders read from the media. Ismae Tori pointed to inaccuracies and heresays in media reports about what happened at Buenangkuepoh. He said neither reporters nor State officials ever approached him for information. The story was used by Matichon and several other papers.

2. A piece of commentary by Arifin Binji, affiliation not stated, pointed out that the journey by 131 Thais for political asylum in Malaysia is not the first such incident in Malay Patani's history. He documented how "war and politics" had driven several other leading figures into exile in the past.
3. "Mysterious Hat! Key to the Tanyonglimo Upheaval," featured voices of villagers discussing a mysterious cap typical of Army standard issue found at the scene as evidence suggesting that the tea-shop attackers were not the marines.
4. "What's the truth?" captured the conversation at a tea shop in one of the so-called "red villages," among Buddhists and Muslims exchanging views on how their lives were affected by the unrest. Tea shops represent the "public forum of exchange" characteristic of the south. "Locals are quite used to this sort of things by now, but the indifference we feel is fraught with confusion and insecurity," a gold shop owner said.

The INC's coverage of this event showed synergy at its best between a joint team of enthusiastic and competitive reporters/editors from Bangkok newsrooms and local reporters from the south with knowledge of the area and speak the local language. Stories generated by INC both the routine coverage and peace-journalism type output including voices of villagers that mainstream media normally ignored were picked up and played prominently in many titles read by elitist Bangkokians, establishing its brand of peace journalism. The will to implement the Project, professional solidarity to produce public good, co-operation among senior editors in Bangkok and the Southern Newspapers Association together with blessing from respected figures like Prof. Prawase made it possible to produce exemplary output like the coverage of the Tanyonglimo event. In addition to secondment of their staff reporters, newspapers such as *Matichon*, *Post Today*, *Krungthep Turakij*, helped to establish INC's visibility by running their stories in the papers. All the more for practical reason, Pakpoom Pongbhai, News Editor of *Matichon* said the paper used the INC output extensively during the Tanyonglimo event because it "had the edge, it offered something different, well-rounded, deep and giving importance to voices from the grassroots that were usually unrepresented in the mainstream media." (Interview June 15, 2006).

According to data collected by a group of students from Prince of Songkla University doing professional practicum at the INC, of 350 stories produced by INC between 25 August 2005 and 31 January 2006, *Post Today* is ranked the top user as it played INC stories 133 times, or 33.2 per cent of INC total output from the period. Trailing second is *Matichon* which used INC stories 60 times, or 15 per cent of the output. Thai Post comes third with 41 pick-ups while *Krungthep Turakit* with 38 pick-ups is in the fifth most frequent user of INC stories.

3.2.2 Coverage of the Tanyonglimo incident in *Thai Rath* and *Matichon* on 22-25 September 2005. (See Appendix B for headlines)

***Thai Rath*, 22 September 2005**

The story and pictures occupied one-third of the front page. “Southern Fire Ablaze, Two Marines Killed, “Thaksin Rasping,” read the banner headline, “Marines must not die for free; villagers instigated to kidnap, gruesome mob-lynch and knife.” The story spread from page 1 to four full-length columns on page 16, to share space with the daily astrology column and another story about a man eating live toad and another crime story from Bangkok.

In a custom adopted by Thai newspapers, the news story consists of 29 sub-headings, each with its own headline for a couple of short paragraphs. The story started with factual details in chronological order, from the shooting attack by unknown gunmen at a village tea-shop killing two villagers, wounding five other; and how the two marine officers happened to be at the scene after which they were kidnapped, mistaken as suspect tea-shop attackers. It then went on to detail the negotiation process, how villagers barricaded the only road to the village; women and children used as human shield. The villagers refused to let any outsiders in except for negotiators. Former Thai Rak Thai MP Najmuddin Uma who was appointed to negotiate the release announced that the villagers asked for Malaysian reporters and refused to talk to Thai reporters. Two sub-headings described blood at the scene, as the two marines were apparently tortured and died before the arrival of Malaysian journalists whom the Thai authorities sent a helicopter to fetch. The

Fourth Army Region Commander in his capacity as Director of the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command and his deputy were allocated three sub-headings to announce that the incident was orchestrated. The Commander was reported to tell a press conference that he had evidence that the mastermind of the Tanyonglimo incident were the same people who instigated 131 Thais to flee across the border to Malaysia end of August 2005; and that both incidents were staged to portray the impact of the Emergency Decree on the local people. “The Fourth Army Region Commander instructed soldiers in the three southern border provinces to pay strict attention to the red zone and to use violence in the red zone to end the situation.”

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra whose words occupied three sub-headings condemned the killing as inhumane cruelty inflicted upon the victims. “We will not let these two marines die in vain. Law must be law. I told officials to do the best within the law to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators. We will act most resolutely and fastest to bring perpetrators to justice.” Asked whether this case was related to the flight of 131 Thais to Malaysia, Mr Thaksin said no. Defense Minister Thammarak Issarangkul vouched for the fact that the two marine officers were not the tea-shop shooters. Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai Wannasathit was interviewed on three occasions in a single day and these were reported in four sub-headings. He said the event was a trap set up to lure international media attention; that the majority of the villagers are good people though a few could have been won over to the wrong side. In one of the sub-headings towards the end, Government Spokesman Surapong Suebwonglee said the Deputy Prime Minister of the Sultanate of Oman who was paying an official visit to Thailand praised the Thai Prime Minister’s performance particularly in taking care of Thais of all religious faiths equally and that peace-building efforts by Thailand were at their best.

Opposition leader and Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva urged the government to resolve the problem with sensitivity and for Thais and officials to avoid resorting to emotions. He also said the government needs thorough fact-finding into what’s happened in order to single out perpetrators from among the villagers to for legal action to prevent further escalation of violence.

Except for the Opposition leader, all other interviewees in the story represent the law-enforcement and security branches. There was not a word from other non-authority voice in the entire story. Certain sub-headings convey sensationalism beyond the actual content that follows. “Hunt ordered for trial,” read one of the sub-headings whereas in the paragraph that followed, Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai was saying that the identity of the killers had not yet been established and details were being sought.

By way of backgrounder and in a clear evidence of polarisation, one of the sub-headings “two border patrol police brutalised here before,” told how Ra-ngae District was where “villagers collectively lynched two government officials dead on the spot before.” It recounted what happened at Buenangkuepoh village in Tambon Tanyongmas of Ra-ngae on 26 April 2003 when two border patrol police were killed by crowd in hundreds who heard rumours that the two were “Ninja bandits” terrorising the neighbourhood.

Matichon, 22 September 2005

“Brutal killing of two marines roundly condemned, believed to be done by the third hand, Chidchai said it’s an insurgents’ trap,” read the banner headline, followed by “Fourth Army Commander linked to the 131 ring, villagers instigated, Thaksin ordered hunt – marines won’t die for free.” *Matichon* reported in 25 sub-headings, with factual details related in 10 sub-headings. Interviewees from the authorities included Prime Minister Thaksin, Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai, Defense Minister Thammarak, Fourth Army Region Commander Lt.Gen.Kwanchart Klaharn, Pol.Lt.Gen.Adul Saengsingkeo, Commander of the 9th Police Region; Maj. Gen. Palankul Klaharn, the spokesman of the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command, Special Col. Apithai Swangpob who confirmed that the marines were killed but said that the tragedy resulted from misunderstanding and that he believed this is not what the villagers would have liked to happen yet there were some “third-hand” in the form of a bunch of teenagers from outside Tanyonglimo

tortured the hostages to death. The only non-authority interviewee in the story was Mrs Pranom Nakabutr, wife of Second Lieutenant Winai Nakabutr.

In the “Sidebar” column, the newspaper recalled a somewhat similar event two years earlier when villagers killed two border patrol police whom they mistook to be the “Ninja bandits” that committed multiple crimes in the area. A police officer who went into negotiate the release of these two was critically injured in the process. Ten arrest warrants from which three suspects were arrested and reportedly confessed to joining the lynching because they sincerely believed in the rumours. In a tone different from the same backgrounder featured by *Thai Rath*, the column ended with the note: “From Tanyongmas to Tanyonglimo, two years gone by and still the people and the State are not quite yet connected.”

Matichon used two pieces from INC namely the chronology between 8.30 p.m. of 20 September when the village tea-shop was attacked by unknown gunmen and the two marine officers were arrested shortly after to 3 p.m. of 21 September when their bodies were transported out of the scene. The other is an eyewitness account of one of the INC reporters recounting what he observed, saw, heard, and smelled at Tanyonglimo.

***Thai Rath*, 23 September 2005**

Still in the headline, the story spread through 43 sub-headings spanning three pages. The banner headline said autopsy report showed the two marines were killed 2-3 hours before the rescue. Major sources of the story remain government and State officials chiefly Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai who was interviewed prior to his trip to the south and during his various jaunts there. Friends and family members of the two marines were interviewed. The report said an eerie silence befell Tanyonglimo, as villagers locked themselves up in their homes. The report quoted an anonymous official source as saying that “some villagers dissatisfied with the perpetrators’ action offered useful information to the authority but the majority of them remained intimidated by insurgents still embedded in the area.”

In a distinct feature of Galtung's war journalism, the choice of language in attention-grabbing sub-headings insinuates dichotomy between the State and the perpetrators and to some extent residents of the entire village. Examples of headlines to paint the impression of the strong State include: "Soldiers in Control," "Officers Did Their Best," "Full Honour in Funeral Rite for Brave Soldiers," "Fellow Soldiers Ready to Terminate Southern Fire." Sub-headings featuring interview with Prime Minister Thaksin read "No Liberation Zone in Thailand," "Malaysian Media told not to Poke Nose." Under the sub-heading "Takbai Made Officers Nervous," Mr Thaksin was quoted as saying that the Takbai event "when there was a transport accident made officials nervous, afraid of incrimination and so they refrained from "dispersing the crowd with proper crowd control procedure," resulting in the death of the marines. The bulk of the content in the cluster of sub-headings gave the impression of a ping-pong match at the Government House being played between Mr Thaksin and reporters as the Premier bounced to leading questions from media men reporters at a weekly Premier Meets the Media routine at the time as most questions were also published under "to the question of ..."

Supreme Commander Gen.Chaisith Shinawatra was reported as announcing that he gave the Defense Minister the names of three insurgents whom he "confirmed" were the perpetrators. In the immediate sub-heading that ensued, Defense Minister Gen.Thammarak said what happened "complied with the plot laid out by insurgents manipulating the villagers in a brutal operation that attacked the villagers and assassinated the marines. From now on the three southern border provinces must be under watertight control, now that the people realised what brutal act insurgents are capable of." In addition, he said the police were preparing arrest warrants for three suspected perpetrators whom he alleged "were involved in narcotics" and at large in Narathiwat. "Whatever we do we are at a disadvantage in the sense that we have to be careful about the law. Sometimes even when we did not break the law, people tried to trip us up. In the sub-heading "Threat to Disable Malaysian TV signals," PM's Office Minister Suranand Vejjajiva said he instructed the Public Relations Department to monitor closely Malaysian media coverage of the story and in the event of "continuous attempt to cause misunderstanding, we have the

right to jam or disconnect signals though we don't want to deprive people of options.”

Matichon, 23 September 2005

“Most Brutal Torture Before Slaying Two Marines, Three Ringleaders Identified-Defense Minister Pointed to Drug Link,” read the banner headline, with secondary headlines: “Malaysia reinforced three battalions at border, Sgt.Maj’s wife four-month pregnant.”

In 19 sub-headings, *Matichon* put on top Prime Minister’s statements from his routine meet-the-media appearance, in which he insisted that the event was a purely domestic affair when asked about the request for Malaysian reporters to the scene. The paper reported the latest development in which the Defense Minister said he knew of three suspects whom he alleged are connected to narcotics and insurgency. Senator Maj.Gen.Intarat Yodbangtoey said he knew 15 youngsters aged under 35 took part in the killing, citing “sources from the area.” He alleged that the group was linked to GMIP leader Jehkumae Kuteh and a Toh Imam was also involved. In one of the subsequent sub-headings, Col.Apithai Sawangpob of the Fourth Army Region said no suspect was detained for inquiry. In the only reference to the tea-shop shooting attack preceding the kidnap of the two marines, Ra-ngae District Police Chief Pol.Col.Apirat Sangkhao gave details culled from interviews of witnesses and family members of the villagers killed. He quoted eyewitnesses as confirming that the gunmen used a pick-up truck which was not the vehicle the two marines traveled with.

Two sub-headings dealt with the funeral rite presided over by HRH Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn; and two others dealt with help for the marines’ families.

Other non-authority voices present in the story included:

- A statement from the National Human Rights Commission condemning the violence, urging the government to prosecute perpetrators, and to handle the whole process with transparency.

- Interviews of opposition Democrat members of parliament, among which Narathiwat MP Surachet Wae-asae said when Prime Minister Thaksin said the marines would not die for free, he should bear in mind that the lives of the villagers killed at the tea-shop should not be wasted either and that a committee should also investigate the killing of the villagers.

- An interview with Bangkok Senator and a prominent civil society person Kaewsan Atipothi who commended the decision not to use force in rescuing the marines.

- An interview with Chairman of Pattani Provincial Islamic Committee, saying he believed there were “some hands” manipulating the event and the government must identify these manipulators. He also said it’s a sin according to religious principle to kill the innocent people such as these two marines.

- The Malaysian angle to the story is summarised by a collection of wire-service reports (AP, AFP and Reuters) about Malaysia’s reinforcement of border security along to prevent potential spread of insurgent activities into Malaysia. A story from Malaysia’s official news agency *Bernama* featuring reaction from senior Malaysian government officials and a report in the *New Straits Times* website about the Tanyonglimo event were also featured.

As a sidebar, *Matichon* used a story, with attribution, by Issara News Centre under the headline: “Marines’ friends said both were helpful and friendly to villagers.” The story interviewed colleagues of the two along with an owner of a grocery store frequented by the two describing the pleasant personality of the two.

Thai Rath, 24 September 2005

“Promptly grabbed, Two Ruthless Marine Assassins, Men from Tanyonglimo, Warrants to Hunt Nine other Brutal Gangsters, Two Policemen Killed in Bomb Attack,” the banner headline led into the introductory paragraph which went

on to say: “Defense Minister hands-on, sending task force to grab two teenagers from the village by the neck, with warrants out for all 11 gang members,” who were “detained and sternly interrogated.” The paper described this as latest development with suspects arrested and more are being sought.

Interior Minister Kongsak Wantana appeared in the subsequent six sub-headings to say he had not yet been informed about the arrest; that the Administration Department would train Kamnan, village headmen, district officers on negotiation skill, that he would use “administrative measures” while abolishing the practice of “red zone” characterization.

Army Commander Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan was reported as saying that the army has beefed up its personnel in intensifying efforts to arrest the killers. He also gave assurance that innocent people won't be affected by the Emergency Decree. Prime Minister Thaksin was reported as saying that much progress had been made in finding the perpetrators with more arrest warrants under way.

Col.Payap Singhsawat, a spokesman for the Southern Border Peace-Building Command condemned the killing of the marines. But the report made no reference to the killing of the two Tanyonglimo villagers at the tea-shop.

Under the sub-heading “collective curse for human beings with beastly heart,” the newspaper interviewed a civil servant, a primary school student who signed the condolence book for the two marines. It reported in full messages condemning the killings in scathing language displayed by a group of residents rallying in front of the Royal Thai Navy headquarters.

There is not a single mention in the entire story about the fate of the two villagers killed or others who were injured at the tea-shop shooting attack prior to the marines' killing.

***Matichon* 24 September 2005**

“Ring leaders among marine killers, 1 woman 10 men, two policemen killed in bomb attack,” the banner headline read, followed by the secondary headline “two ustadzes arrested for inciting youth, Thaksin said he’s going to red zone in south.”

The headline story meandered through 36 sub-heads, seven of which dealt with routine attacks in the three provinces; with two devoted to an official press conference announcing that two religious teachers (ustadz) from Pattani were arrested for training and inciting youth and students to join terrorist network and stage terrorist attacks against officials and civilians. One sub-heading reported that a ceremony staged at the central mosque of Songkhla to annul the oath of allegiance (Supoh) to the insurgency movement that a group of 11 “detainees” underwent. At the time, the government has regularly rounded up people suspected of involvement or sympathetic to insurgency for “peace-building orientation” at an army camp.

Similar to *Thai Rath*, *Matichon* kicked off the story with the latest development – of arrests being made and warrants for 11 suspects all reported to be Tanyonglimo residents ; and of Prime Minister Thaksin’s announcement that he’s going to visit the region.

Unlike *Thai Rath* however, *Matichon* did not use sensational language like “killers grabbed by the neck.” *Matichon* gave factual details like names and addresses, quoting a source from the 9th Police Region. It also reported that Thai police sought help from Malaysian marine police to be on the lookout for those suspects with warrants.

Voices of the State and the government were represented by Supreme Commander Chaiyasith Shinawatra who said the police should be given free hand to apply pressure for result and that action should not be picked upon; by the Interior Minister announcing he would do away with the “red zone” classification. A spokesman from the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command urged the people to condemn the killing and co-operate with the authority but he made no

reference to the two villagers killed – a point consistent with the report in *Thai Rath*. Director-General of the Administration Department said administrative officials from district chief to village headman level would be urged to cultivate closer contact with the communities by having stay-over at villages, especially in 245 villages classified as “red” which are violence-prone. The Culture Minister was quoted as saying she heard from a public forum that the southerners don’t like pop stars’ presence at State-sponsored activities and that Thais are urged to be careful about language because villagers find some vocabulary used to describe them “hurtful.”

The only reference to the villagers killed appeared in the statement by Chart Thai Party leader Banharn Silpa-archa who said he has instructed Narathiwat MP from the Party to visit relatives of the villagers killed. Five sub-headings expanded details of the funerals and support for families of the two marines. “A Muslim reporter” was reported to have come to the microphone during a talk by former Prime Minister Anand to say that all problems would have been solved if only Mr Thaksin said sorry. Mr Anand reportedly responded that he advised Mr Thaksin to do just that four months ago and Mr Thaksin nodded along but then the whole situation has been sidelined by the advent of the Emergency Decree.

Matichon picked up a backgrounder by INC about two policemen being lynched by an angry crowd that mistook the duo to be mysterious bandits on the prowl at Buenanguepoh village near Tanyonglimo two years earlier. While *Thai Rath* made reference to the incident in sensational terms in its 22 September 2005 edition reviewed above, the INC story featured the village headman’s version of the story. Ismae Tori said the INC were the first journalists to ever seek him out for his side of the story as he felt the village had been demonised since the event. He also explained the differences between the incident in his village and Tanyonglimo.

On 24 September 2005, INC published a story, picked up by *Matichon*, about the burial of 15-year-old Azuwan, shot dead at the tea shop. The INC interviewed Azuwan’s grief-stricken parents on their final moments together. His father said Tanyonglimo residents regretted deeply what happened because none of them wanted to see State officials murdered in their village.

Thai Rath 25 September 2005

“Condemning bandits killing two marines as beasts, Thaksin volunteered to go south,” the banner headline picked up highlights of Mr Thaksin’s weekly Saturday morning radio monologue broadcast nationwide via the Public Relations extensive network.

Of 25 sub-headings, excerpts from the “Prime Minister Meets the People” monologue filled eight; four carried details from the Police Chief’s press conference announcing two suspects were arrested; six to the Royally-sponsored funeral, post-humous promotion and how large crowd of Thais queued up at the Royal Thai Navy headquarters in Bangkok to sign condolence book for the two marines. Other elements wrapped up under this headline story included the “unusual bustle” of Cambodian Muslims crossing into Thailand via the border town of Aranyaprathet; the Democrat Party sent a fact-finding mission to Tanyonglimo. PM’s Office Minister Suranand Vejjajiva told a seminar that the media should discern information when reporting about the South else they would be “exploited by the other side...one ought to be careful because sometimes, there are more lies than facts.”

Matichon 25 September 2005

“Expletive slipped through airwaves, Ferocious Maew!(the Prime Minister’s nickname) insists ‘I’m in charge’ of the south,” said the banner headline. *Matichon* ran extensive excerpts of transcript from Mr Thaksin’s weekly radio address and the key points similar to *Thai Rath* -- of calling the killers names and that he is in command of the southern situation. Other voices from the State side are similar to those appeared in *Thai Rath*. Alternative voices included the National Reconciliation Commission’s announcement of its meeting to discuss Tanyonglimo; and of Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng’s presentation of compensation money to victims of the Takbai demonstration in October 2004.

Four days after the story hit headlines, the name of one of the villagers killed in the tea-shop attack prior to the marines hostage-taking was reported in the media for the first time in a story by INC titled “Another corner at Tanyonglimo, the Forgotten Boy?” in which it interviews the parents of Azuwan, 15. Matichon picked up the story as a sidebar, underneath the picture of the Deputy Royal Thai Navy Commander at a funeral rite of the marines.



สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

Table 2 Choice of headline languages indicating war and peace journalism used by Thai Rath and Matichon

Element	<i>Thai Rath</i>	<i>Matichon</i>
Headlines/ Subheadings	<p>“ฝีมือโจรซุ่มกลุ่มเดียวกัน” (Work of the same gang of vicious bandits)</p> <p>“แฉมีแผนชั่วโจรสื่อมาเลย์”(Wicked plan to show off to the Malay media)</p> <p>“เหตุตากใบทำจนท.เกร็ง” (Takbai made officers nervous)</p> <p>“รุมสาปแช่งมนุษย์ใจสัตว์”(Collective curse on evil-hearted men)</p> <p>“อำมหิตยิ่งกว่าควาญจัน” (More brutal than beasts)</p>	<p>“วัยรุ่นลอบทำร้าย2ทหารในที่คุมตัว”(Youth attacking two captive soldiers)</p> <p>“ระบุเป็นวัยรุ่นมือที่สามทำร้ายจนตาย”(Death by the hand of brutalizing unknown youth)</p> <p>“ทัพภาค 4 ยังไม่จับผู้ต้องสงสัย” (4th Army yet to arrest any suspect)</p> <p>“กก.อิสลามยันมีคนบงการแน่” (Islamic Committee sure of manipulators)</p> <p>“อานันท์รังสติ‘รุนแรง’แก้ปัญหาไม่ได้”(Anand warns violence can't solve problem)</p> <p>“เผยเคยแนะนำทักษิณขอโทษ” (Thaksin asked to apologise)</p>
Actors/ Language	<p>“ฝีมือชาวบ้านร่วมแกนนำโจรใต้” (work of villagers in pact with southern bandits)</p> <p>“แก๊งชั่ว” (criminal gang)</p> <p>“ผู้ก่อความไม่สงบ” (insurgent)</p> <p>“อำมหิต” “แก๊งทมิฬ”(devil's gang)</p>	<p>“แกนป่วนใต้” (militant)</p> <p>“วัยรุ่น” (youth)</p> <p>“แนวร่วม”(collaborator)</p> <p>“ผู้ต้องสงสัย”(suspect)</p> <p>“คนร้าย”(perpetrator)</p>
Voices : Allocation of space for.	<p>-All figures in authority. No alternative voices on 22/9.</p> <p>-Voices of victims' relatives emerged, but authority's voices remained dominant on 23/9.</p>	<p>-Authority and wife of one of the victims. INC reporters' account from the scene. (22/9)</p> <p>-Substantial presence of non-authority voices and use of INC copies to explain context. (23-25/9)</p>

Conclusion: *Thai Rath* went full force with war journalism in its coverage of the violence at Tanyonglimo by spotlighting on the “here and now.” The choice of dehumanising language for headlines and sub-headings brought about the “them and us” effect of the perpetrators – not all villagers were involved in the hostage-taking versus what seems to be the rest of the Thai newspaper-reading public. Dominant its coverage in terms of news space allocation and prominence were victory-oriented statements from figures in authority (specifying numbers and deadlines for apprehending suspects) especially Prime Minister Thaksin, Defense Minister Thammarak and Supreme Commander Gen. Chaisith Shinawatra. Its coverage during five days examined is elite-oriented and there’s virtually no grass-root voice present. It must be stressed that the hostage taking is not the work of the entire Tanyonglimo village. A disproportionately small space was allocated to voices from other parties in the Thai society outside the authority’s sphere such as academic, peace advocate, civil society representatives.

Unlike most other newspapers during the period, *Thai Rath* did not use any input with branding from the INC. In the only occasion it has ever used the INC output, it incorporated some portion of output from www.tjanews.org without attribution into its headline story spreading through several pages.

“*Thai Rath* did not send any reporter to the INC Project because, contrary to the public perception that it’s the country’s biggest paper, *Thai Rath* is rather understaffed and thus in no position to send anyone to the INC. But it does not oppose the INC project. Secondly, *Thai Rath* did not pick up INC materials, beyond the Tanyonglimo case, because its column inch is very scarce. Every page in *Thai Rath* follows a strict formula, and space is tight because advertisements are booked solid all year round,” a source close to the operation of *Thai Rath* explained (Personal communication, June 22, 2006.)

As for *Daily News*, the country’s second largest newspaper, *Daily News* Chief of Lower Southern Provinces Editorial Centre Chaiyong Maneepiluek, a keen

supporter of the INC project in his capacity as President of the Southern Newspapers Association of Thailand explained why *Daily News* did not use INC output: “The Desk in Bangkok said they already have me as their own correspondent filing and writing for them from the ground.” (Interview June 10, 2006) Like *Thai Rath*, advertisement space in *Daily News* is always preciously booked.

Matichon adopted war journalism insofar as fulfilling routine market imperatives: catchy headlines; placing latest developments at the top; and making sure statements from authority figures were covered. Apart from sensational language in certain headlines and sub-headings, the paper however made visible efforts to balance the dominance of authorities’ voices” through inclusion of what other stake holders in the Thai society had to say. In addition, *Matichon* played INC stories to provide background from alternative perspectives to explore conflict formation beyond the immediacy of here-and-now reporting. Unlike its coverage of two major events in 2004, particularly the siege of Kruze Mosque in April when the paper used dehumanizing language, (calling the insurgents “southern bandits), the paper evident opted for the path of peace journalism in its coverage of Tanyonglimo incident, which took place after the paper has lent tangible support for the INC trial by sending its reporting to join the editorial team and running INC stories in its paper.

Reflecting peace journalism approach, the INC’s coverage made a tangible effort to report the same incident from a variety of different angles (variety of voices including those from the grassroots, the Malaysian angle, sensitive choice of language, selection of content from routine press conferences to get certain points across) with greater depth, and longer-term perspective than the “here and now” focus of the mainstream media represented by *Thai Rath*. Its coverage is people-oriented and shows empathy for villagers, who were cast as the same category of suspects through the generic term “villagers” in the mainstream media.

One notable feature is that the names of the two villagers shot dead in the attack prior to the marines’ death and how their families felt were reported only by the INC. Through INC, villagers’ voices thus emerged to tell their sides of the story

and express their trauma, with some of these voices at times surfaced subsequently in the mainstream press that picked them up – for the first time in recent history of the vernacular press.



สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE INC PROJECT

From Issara News Centre's accomplishment of peace journalism through the Tanyonglimo coverage in September 2005 detailed in the previous chapter, this Chapter explores factors affecting the strength and weakness of Thailand's peace journalism via the case study of INC. These factors mainly emanate from how the Thai Journalists Association managed the Project, co-operation from newspapers' head offices in Bangkok in relations to supply of human resource and the use of INC stories in their respective publications. This chapter will discuss how the very same set of variables resulted in the relative weak performance of the INC coverage of the somewhat similar event on 19 May 2006 when two Buddhist teachers were taken hostage, one severely beaten to brain death, at Gujnglupah. Like Tanyonglimo, Gujnglupah is another village in close proximity to and located in Ra-ngae District. Ra-ngae District is classified by the Thai authorities as "red" area where insurgency is believed to be active and the State weak. What took place in both locations represented variations along the same theme of villagers, instigated by militants and insurgents, resisting the State power.

4.1 Gujnglupah, INC fading From Major Newspapers

On 19 May 2006, two Buddhist teachers Ms Juling Pongkanmoon and Ms Sirinart Tawornsook were taken hostage from the school in Gujnglupah by a group of villagers and people believed to be connected to insurgents. Earlier in the day, law enforcement officers arrested two suspected militants along with two women in the village who allegedly helped to shelter these suspects fleeing arrest from other locations. With security forces withdrawn immediately after the arrest, later in the day two Buddhist teachers were held hostage by those demanding release of those arrested in exchange. Ms Juling was severely beaten and has lain in coma relying on life-support system since. Similar to Tanyonglimo, the event made national headlines.

The INC coverage and follow-up stories involving a variety of stake holders conform with the peace journalism framework. During 19- 23 May 2006, it had

published ten stories relating to the incidents. The first story, factual account of the incident on 19 May 2006, offered plain narrative and chronology of what happened, together with quotes from one fellow teacher and an eyewitness. On 20 May 2006, a team of three INC reporters – all of whom local reporters without any Bangkok-based journalist in the team-- went to the village, to come across a wall of silence as villagers refused to talk. The school janitor provided the only voice of the story. Subsequent stories featured non-authority's perspective; with angles such as how teachers and troops from the northeast feel working in the region, how the communities feel appreciative of teachers' role in education and that it's their duty to protect the teachers, a recollection by a teacher held hostage 17 years ago in Yala for eight days by a group of BRN separatists who eventually set her free without harming her after they got the prisoner they wanted; along with reaction from Muslim religious leaders and civil society groups. These two stories have essentially explored conflict formation in the sense that they show the villagers as not hating the teachers, and that the problem of insurgency movement has never disappeared from the south in the last two decades.

The INC team made the effort to include as many voices of those affected by the violence as possible. Among such stories included how the current crop of teachers working in the South feel threatened about their own safety in light of the Gujnglupah incident but carried on working regardless of the fact that many of their counterparts have since asked to transfer out of the region. It also interviewed two academics from Prince of Songkla University in Pattani to provide analysis focusing on lessons learnt for the State (in that it has to win the hearts of the community) and for the Thai people in general who ought to distinguish between the perpetrators and other villagers who did not take part, or condoned, but who deeply regretted what happened. It also published a brief statement by a group called Network of Women in the South appealing for authorities to urgently provide remedy for traumatised villagers and teachers.

The INC coverage failed to win the attention of Bangkok-based editors who were more preoccupied at the time with the treacherous course that the national political crisis with Mr Thaksin's tenure at stake was unfolding. The INC team that

covered Gujnglupah was without any journalist from Bangkok and was smaller than the one during Tanyonglimo. Besides, the Gujnglupah incident erupted and ended within a matter of hours – unlike the Tanyonglimo when the two marines were held overnight with negotiation for their release protracted well into half of the following day, which allowed lead-time for more thorough editorial assignments and team reinforcement.

But perhaps most importantly from the editorial decision point of view, the Gujnglupah incident also lacked the “drama” of negotiations for hostage release involving demand for Malaysian media at the scene which implicated attempts to internationalise the issue on parts of the State opponents manipulating the scene. With these factors combined, INC lost in the battle to capture the attention of Bangkok-based editors making decision on news space allocation. These editors also decided that the focus of Gujnglupah subsequent from the event itself was the condition of teacher Ms Juling who laid in coma in Songkhla with life-support machine. The alternative voices presented by INC in days after the incident did not take priority in terms of news space and agenda over Ms Juling’s condition as her fate drew national sympathy -- in parallel with the latest twist and turn over the political fate of Mr Thaksin.

Despite best effort under the circumstances, the INC’s coverage of Gujnglupah thus received minimal visibility in terms of news space allocation, in marked contrast with what it received during the Tanyonglimo incident. This is evident in the survey of coverage during 20-25 May 2006 in newspapers that frequently pick up INC copies namely *Krungthep Turakij*, *Matichon*, *Post Today* and *Thai Post*. Of the ten stories produced by INC, *Post Today*, whose political editor Pattara Khumpitak is the TJA President and a founding member of the INC Project, used five stories. *Krungthep Turakit* which sent two reporters both from the paper’s political news desk to join the INC newsroom between August 2005 and early 2006 did not pick up any story at all from the INC as the paper produced its own analysis and background pieces to back up factual accounts from the ground from its own correspondents. *Matichon* used two of INC stories: the chronology on the first day and a piece of commentary written by the religious leader that INC carried but

without attribution to INC as source. *Thai Post*, with restricted readership and circulation, picked up the INC interview with members of the special force from the Northeast posted in the south.

With the policy of *Thai Rath* and *Daily News* of not using INC materials from the start and the frequent users abstained, INC made a faint blip of an impact on the print media for the Gujnglupah hostage incident in May 2006, compared to the big wave it made for its Tanyonglimo coverage in September 2005. The coverage of Tanyonglimo reflects the achievement in virtually every objective that INC set out to be, that is to produce peace-journalism output which would then be distributed to reach the public through newspaper pick-up. This is possible through support and networking among Bangkok headquarters which supply human resources to produce strong copies and subsequently offer news space to accommodate the output.

Matichon's News Editor Pakpoom Pongbhai (Interview, June 15, 2006) who consistently monitors INC output for stories that may strengthen the paper's southern conflict coverage evaluated the Gujnglupah coverage by the INC as "nothing special." Manning the desk during both incidents, he observed that the Gujnglupah coverage from INC lacked to edge of Tanyonglimo's that impressed editors' decision to pick up. "Possibly because the reporting team this time was too inexperienced to handle such a challenge," he said. *Krungthep Turakij's* Editor-in-Chief Duangkamol Chotana gave similar assessment. She said the paper did not pick up INC materials during the Gujnglupah incident because they don't add value to what the Nation Group's staff reporters and analysts could produce. (Interview, May 23, 2006). The verdict from both editors reflects the crisis gripping the INC project nine months after launch. In an absence of partnership in the field with experienced Bangkok-based reporters and writers, the INC team was not yet capable of producing the kind of copies that stand out from the mainstream reporting.

During Tanyonglimo, the INC was up for a fresh start, with seven Bangkok-based reporters from competitive beats in national politics like the Government House, the Parliament, the Police, with strong reporting and writing skills. They teamed up with local reporters with expertise and contacts. The INC team's editorial

operation during Tanyonglimo represents an ideal on-the-job training that the INC Project was aiming at. But that one-off training was not re-enacted for the Gujnglupah coverage.

Bangkok's perception of news agenda and headline trends is a significant factor affecting the strength and weakness of human resource at the INC, as evident in the INC workforce during Tanyonglimo and Gujnglupah periods. Pakorn Puengnetr, from *Krungthep Turakij's* political desk and a specialist in southern affairs, covered Tanyonglimo for the INC during his attachment since the launch in August 2005. The government imposed the Emergency Decree for the south giving law-enforcement officials unprecedented power with the hopes of ending violence. At the time, Mr Thaksin's administration faced no threat of popular dissent, and the South figured more prominently with headline stories such as the attack on the city of Yala in mid July 2005, the exodus of 131 Thais to Malaysia following an assassination attempt of a religious leader in Narathiwat and Thailand subject to international criticisms for its handling of the south. All national newspaper editors were keen on sending reporters from Bangkok to stay for an extended period of time to the south and an attachment with the INC would also be seen as contributing to voluntary work for the TJA. To allow their reporters, especially top ones in charge of important beats, was considered appealing at the time when "there's an influx of stories from the south that were not reported before," according to Pakorn. (Interview, 18 August, 2006).

By the time of Gujnglupah, there is no Bangkok beat journalist present in the INC team. Editors withdrew their reporters seconded to INC since February 2006 to cover the political crisis in Bangkok as anti-Thaksin administration mounted pressure through demonstrations demanding his ouster. The reporters were never sent back to work at the INC as Mr Thaksin fought attempts to oust him resulting in political uncertainties protracting well into mid-2006. The crisis in the capital has taken precedent over what happened in the periphery south, leading to zero contribution of human resource to the INC from newspapers – which were never formally bound by an agreement to do so in the first place.

Table 3 Comparison of INC Human Resource during Tanyonglimo and Gujinglupah

August – September 2005 (INC launched in August 2005; Tanyonglimo 20 September 2005)	May – June 2006 (Political crisis from February 2006; Gujinglupah 19 May 2006)
Co-editors: Muhammad Ayub Pathan <i>(Bangkok Post/Matichon Yala)</i> - Apiwat Suprichawuthipong <i>(Secoded from Post Today)</i>	Co-editors: Muhammad Ayub Pathan. - Somkiat Juntursima (ex- prachathai.com)
Bangkok-based reporters seconded: 1. Pakorn Puengnetr- <i>Krungthep Turakij</i> 2. Thanok Bangpol- <i>Prachachart Turakij</i> 3. WassayosNgamkham- <i>Bangkok Post</i> 4. Pasakorn Chamlongraj - <i>Matichon</i> 5. Sonthaya Pikulthong <i>Naew Na</i> 6. Romdon Panjor - <i>Manager</i>	Bangkok-based reporters: None
Provincial reporters, averagely one-year work experience, full-time hired at INC: 1. Nazuroh Jehhah - <i>Samila Time</i> 2. Somsak Hoonngam - <i>Focus South</i> 3. Ruayrin Petsalabkeo - <i>Daily News</i>	Provincial reporters, full-time INC staff: 1. Nazuroh Jehhah - <i>Samila Time</i> 2. Somsak Hoonngam- <i>Focus South</i> 3. Ruayrin Petsalabkeo - <i>Daily News</i> 4. Natrawuth Muangsuk 5. Sumet Parnpeth - <i>Nation</i> 6. Tuwaedaniya Meringing- <i>BBC Thai</i>
Provincial reporters, part-time hired with other stringing obligations: 1. Nakarin Chinwarakamol - <i>Khom Chad Luek, Yala</i> 2. Sumet Parnpeth- <i>Nation</i> 3. Muhammadparez Lohasan- <i>Daily News, Pattani</i> 4. Waedao Harai - <i>Bangkok Post/ Daily News, Narathiwat</i> 5. Tuwaedaniya Meringing - <i>BBC Thai</i> 6. Muhammad Dueramae(prachathai.com)	Provincial reporters, part-time hired with other stringing obligations: 1. Waedao Harai- <i>Bangkok Post and Daily News, Narathiwat</i> 2. Rosida Pusu - <i>Khao Sod, MCOT</i> 3. Muhammadparez Lohasan <i>Daily News, Pattani</i> 4. Nakarin Chinwarakamol - <i>Khom Chad Luek, Yala</i>

4.2 Good Intention, Without Clear Strategy

4.2.1 The Good Intention

The Thai Journalists Association's initiative on peace journalism as professional contribution to bring about better understanding of the southern conflict is commendable and has won recognition judging from the funding it has received, among other indications. There is a consensus among the media professionals that they have to contribute to this cause. "The primary objective for Issara News Centre is to produce stories so that newspapers can use, and this undertaking represents professional solidarity," said TJA President Pattara Khumpitak (Interview, May 18, 2006). Assistant Editor of the *Bangkok Post* Sanitsuda Ekachai, a well-known peace advocate, welcomed the fact that INC would help to break the State monopoly as dominant provider of news, while offering sustainable training opportunities for the first time since training for Thai journalists has hitherto been donor-driven and ad-hoc in nature. (TJA, minutes of meeting, October 27, 2005). *Krungthep Turakij* reporter King-oua Laohong who spent two months working at the INC newsroom said the secondment has been a great learning experience, since being embedded in the area and listening to villagers offered her far more complete picture of the southern situation than parachuting in for a few days which has seemed the best that Bangkok-based journalists could have usually managed. (Interview, June 10, 2006).

Local reporters working in the INC also appreciate the learning experience working as a team in the INC. Tuwaedaniya Meringing joined INC from its start in August 2005. A Malay Muslim native of Pattani, he has built an extensive and solid network of contacts in the southern border region and though he does not write well in Thai, his knowledge of the areas, culture and ability to speak Malayu plus the contacts played a great part in strengthening the INC output. Tuwaedaniya said he has learnt a lot in terms of working as a team, of balanced reporting and how to develop focus for stories. (Interview, June 5, 2006).

4.2.2 Lack of Clarity and Strategy

At a meeting of key TJA members on 27 October 2005, nearly two months after the INC project was launched publicly, the following major issues that should have been clarified ahead of the launch were still being debated:

4.2.2.1 Project Duration and Job Description

At the meeting referred to above, Pattara sought to convince his peers that the TJA should develop a permanent structure, as a network of reporters and contacts in the South. “What is clear is that we have to set up a base there for local reporters to undergo on-the-job training with counterparts from Bangkok. It will be a challenge for the operation to be sustainable and self-sufficient...so that perhaps one day when we must withdraw, the set-up would still be there enabling us to connect to the ground immediately in the event of a big story.”

As shown in the comparison of its output during the Tanyonglimo and Gujunglupah assignments, having the structure alone matters less than having the right people to man the structure. At the same meeting, the question whether the INC should be ad-hoc or permanent was debated inconclusively. To editors not present at the meeting but having to manage human resource within the editorial department, they need definite answer on the lifespan of the project. Bangkok Post journalist Pradit Ruangdit who actively pushed together with Pattara in making the INC project happen was acutely aware of the challenge “of how to manage it in a sustainable manner” from the outset. INC may need to develop its own reporting staff, instead of relying on short-term secondment from various papers. (Interview, December 8, 2005).

After a stint by its feature writer Passakorn Chamlongraj who applied for it when the Project started, *Matichon* since stopped sending reporter to INC. “We thought it was a short-term trial, not a permanent commitment,” said news editor Pakpoom Pongbhai. (Interview, June 15, 2006). A woman reporter from *Matichon* expressed interests after Passakorn’s secondment but withdrew out of personal safety

concern. In another human resource issue typical of any Bangkok newspaper head office, he pointed out that “some colleagues may raise question of who will assume the routine workload of person seconded to INC with extra pay when the person is still on regular office payroll.”

Asked why she no longer sent her reporters to the INC after having sent two in a succession, *Krungthep Turakij* Editor-in-Chief Dungkamol Chotana said there has been no more request from the TJA to do so; and she’s under the impression that the secondment agreement with TJA has ended. (Interview, July 16, 2006). In fact, the National Group which owns *Krungthep Turakij* has a strong team of reporters in the field, on top of the fact that two of its political reporters Pakorn and King-oua who have served stints at the INC could also write analytical pieces that combine Bangkok and southern perspectives.

From interviews with both editors who are strong proponents of peace journalism via the TJA’s INC Project, it is clear that, by June 2006, they were not thoroughly informed about the status of the Project. This has implications on human resource to ensure INC success and helped to explain why Bangkok newsrooms did not send reporters back to the INC in Pattani after withdrawing their reporters to cover the political crisis since early 2006.

According to INC co-editor Somkiat Juntursima, INC is a “Peace Journalism Training/Workshop Phase1,” spanning for six months from August 2005 under a 2.9 million baht budget and this was later extended to March 2006. The second phase of the Project was supposed to start in April 2006 with three-million baht to develop a database of knowledge about the South and improve the website into an interactive portal featuring exchange of knowledge and opinions. The management power is concentrated at the TJA head office in Bangkok. (Interview, June 10, 2006)

“If we look at INC as a training exercise then it’s fine with me. But I don’t think it’s TJA’s job to set up a news centre. TJA should focus more on capacity-building for people in the media profession,” said Wasant Paileeklee, an adviser to the

Thai Broadcast Journalists Association and a veteran editor in both print and broadcast media.

4.2.2.2 PDIT and the News Institute: Duplication of Effort?

If the TJA wants Issara News Centre to be a training project, what does that leave the Press Development Institute of Thailand, which is a non-profit, joint undertaking of the TJA and the National Press Council? PDIT's job is to organise training courses for journalists.

Amidst ambiguity on where the INC was heading after a six-month trial from August 2005, there were talks about setting up News Institute, which would be a kind of INC with broader scope. TJA President Phusadee Keetaworanart (whose term ended on 5 March 2006) and Prof. Prawase Wasi, President of the Creative Media Foundation jointly signed a Memorandum of Understanding pledging the Foundation's support to the TJA's plan to formalise INC by upgrading it into a permanent structure called the News Institute. The News Institute is aimed at motivating the media profession and journalists to pursue investigative reporting, providing training support and workshops, advocating media's right to seek information and the public's right to know. The Foundation and the TJA would jointly seek funding to implement these activities. (Personal communication, undated).

In his written observation about the News Institute at a TJA meeting, Chavarong Limpattamapanee, Secretary-General of the National Press Council and Executive Director of the PDIT, noted the "duplication of role between the News Institute, intended or not, with that of the Press Development Institute of Thailand which is another organisation under the TJA, particularly concerning promoting investigative reporting and conducting workshops. The News Institute's objectives should therefore be amended for clarity in order to avoid confusion that may arise among allies of the TJA, the PDIT and among journalists themselves." (Personal Communication, undated)

Pattara Khumphitak was elected TJA President for a two-year term on 5 March 2006, co-inciding with the time when the future of INC was being widely debated in the profession. The launch of the News Institute as a new umbrella organisation under whose auspices the INC Project would carry on was announced publicly on March 5, 2006, the annual reporters' day.

An expert in the news industry, speaking on condition of anonymity, said INC's loose structure and vague mandate won't work. He suggested as a possible model for INC the Philippine Centre of Investigative Journalism. "The INC should hire its own staff instead of depending upon short-term secondment. Just as important, it should aim at producing exclusive, in-depth stories, the type that mainstream media don't normally do. Once it has produced what you might call masterpiece of journalistic works, then the stories can sell, credibility boosted. Alternatively, you can set up a network that get together on ad-hoc reporting project without retaining full-time staff," said the source. (Personal communication, June 15, 2006)

Another journalist/activist said while he admires the good intention of the INC project, "more operational details should have been carefully thought through before the launch, or you end up just scraping by for the sake of doing it." (Personal communication, June 22, 2006)

Regardless of whether TJA, PDIT, or News Institute, as of June 2006, none of the reporters working at the INC has attended any training or workshop on peace journalism and related reporting skills. (Interview, June 4, 2006; June 22, 2006.) All that had happened between August 2005 until nearly a year later had been a succession of meetings with academics or peace advocates, but not serious peace journalism training. Muhammad Ayub is also the only person to have attended a workshop on safety and security precaution for human rights workers or journalists working in the southern border region organised by the International Commission for Jurists. Reporters at INC have been working without a reporting/writing manual or guidelines.

4.3 Capacity: The Media Industry's Perennial Gap between Bangkok and Periphery Journalists

INC output during Tanyonglimo in September 2005 when there's a full force of Bangkok-based journalists and during Gujnglupah in May 2006 with depleted staff demonstrates the structural problem in the Thai media profession on the capacity gap between Bangkok reporters and their provincial counterparts.

Reporters based in provinces outside Bangkok have to do multiple jobs to survive. "You'd be starved if you work for just one specific organisation," said INC editor Muhammad Ayub. For instance, his own time is divided into roughly 20 per cent for the *Bangkok Post*, 20 per cent for *Matichon* and 60 per cent for INC. (Interview June 4, 2006.)

Typically a reporter based in one of the southern provinces like Songkhla, Pattani, or Yala would string for one publication, alongside one broadcast outlet either radio with nationwide networks and top-of-the-hour news bulletin such as MCOT, PRD, INN, or for one of the TV stations. Others also work as freelance photographer on top of reporting. Operating under such constraints of having to "sell" stories to the desk in Bangkok, these provincial reporters' professional outlook and news perspective have inevitably been moulded in the war-journalism mind-set of filing spot news and looking for hard facts of here and now, casualties and photo opportunities. They do not have the luxury of time to develop "long" article or "think" piece requisite of peace journalism. They usually supply hard facts and information for the copy-editing desks in Bangkok and it's the job of the desks to rewrite and give headlines to their stories. (Chaiyong Manipiluek, Interview June 10, 2006). Their strength lies in having the local knowledge, understanding and contacts. Some of these reporters are in the INC staff payroll, to much skepticism on why a peace journalism outfit like INC needs to retain four spot-news reporters each already with their own minimum two jobs to take care of. To this controversial item of expenditure in the INC Project, INC co-editor Somkiat Juntursima explained that the INC relies on

these local stringers' networking and expertise for "good will and for being our eyes and ears" to stay on top of things. (Interview June 10, 2006)

In the next rung to the so-called "invisible" network of four reporters that INC retains but hardly have any physical presence in the newsroom, there's another group of four cub reporters who are fresh graduates with average one year of working experience for local publications and they are seconded to the INC via the Southern Newspaper Association of Thailand (Nazuroh Jehha, Ruayrin Petsalabkeo, Somsak Hoon-ngam; while Tuwaedaniya Meringing is an experienced fixer and stringer for a number of media outlets.) These four had been with the INC since the start in August 2005 until the researcher's field trip in June 2006.

It was found during the period of two weeks in June 2006, that there was no daily editorial meeting – a common newsroom practice for editors and reporters to brainstorm and discuss formulation of story ideas and focus, which is especially essential for INC when it's dealing with a peace-journalism, non-mainstream agenda. Instead plenty of energy has been spent monitoring and discussing the police and the Interior Ministry's radio network reporting bits and pieces of incidents and attacks. Reporters have no style manual to rely on, and their copies require quite a good measure of editing before they can go online, according to two editors who have done the assignment and editing jobs. In separate interviews, they both gave assessment that the local reporters are not yet strong enough to produce stories on their own without help from more experienced journalists in Bangkok both in terms of reporting and writing style. On a few occasions of going into the field, it has been clear that these young reporters need to be helped to see the angles and develop potential stories for the INC.

"They are new, the strength is they know the area but they have difficulties grasping with the focus and expressing themselves in writing, and they need training which is lacking, in order to be able to piece together all these jigsaw puzzles of reporting the south," said King-oua Laohong from *Krungthep Turakij* who helped to report and edit copies for INC on the sideline of her own master's degree thesis research at the time of the field trip. She also noted the difference in fast pace and

efficiency that Bangkok reporters brought to the INC newsroom during the early months of the INC. “Perhaps Bangkok journalists have the advantage of having done their time as beat reporters, which trains them to be quick at grasping essence of a story, to be independent and competitive. I do hope these young reporters can stand on their own very soon without relying on help from Bangkok as it’s been clear that lately not too many people volunteered to come down here. I also want them to feel a sense of pride of having worked for the INC.” (Interview June 10, 2006.)

The success of INC from the Tanyonglimo coverage inspired the Thai Broadcast Journalists Association (TBJA) to launch its own trial of peace journalism in broadcast format since the press has limited impact and the broadcast media can reach wider Thai audiences as more Thais watch television and listen to radio than reading newspapers. The brief was to repackage the INC content—produced for newspapers in text only form-- into audio-visual materials available for radios and televisions to use free of charge, similar to the pool reporting done by the INC. A team of five broadcast journalists three southern border provinces led by Choomsak Nararatanawong as editor started working in mid January 2006 and by February they have identified 50 potential topics, each to be turned into a three-minute audio-visual package. But by end of March 2006, the trial was terminated. (Choomsak Nararatanawong, Interview, June 4, 2006).

Reasons that brought an abrupt end to, or what the TBJA officially called “suspension” of this experiment were similar issues centering around human resource capacity that’s faced by INC during the Gujinglupah coverage. All team members of the TBJA trial were provincial stringers with other commitments. Their works need to be checked and played back by TBJA board members who are volunteers with busy full-time jobs in Bangkok and therefore could not revert materials to meet production deadline targets, according to Chumsak. Output from the brief lifespan of this trial had appeared on www.tjanews.org and was broadcast by the regional section of Channel 11 in Yala province, without any national TV coverage.

A source familiar with the TBJA and the Thai broadcast industry said the output from the field under the peace journalism did not measure up to the quality that

professional broadcasters want. (Personal communication). This is the outcome of the fact that, though all TV and radios said they were willing to use TBJA-supplied materials from this trial, they refused to commit sending their own reporters to work in the field. The nature of the broadcast media which have more technical requirements than the press and the policy of broadcast media owners who decline to second capable hands from Bangkok to run the TBJA trial makes it wiser to call off the trial than to persist.



สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The experiment of peace journalism in Thailand brought about by the resurgence of violence in the southern border region since January 2004 has been implemented by the Thai Journalists Association under a project titled “Issara News Centre,” officially launched in August 2005. The coverage of the siege and killing of two marine officers at Tanyonglimo village in Narathiwat in September 2005 which marked the start of INC’s operation was well-received by the mainstream press, establishing visibility to the INC. Most national newspapers except two mass-circulation *Thai Rath* and *Daily News* published INC stories with attribution in a show of collective professional support of the trial. But more importantly, the INC received extensive pick-up for the editorial merit of stories it generated which offered a rich range of perspectives including voices of diverse stake holders and provision of explanation and context to what led to the violence. This was unprecedented in recent Thai media history.

That high level of editorial professionalism that also incorporates peace journalism principles achieved by the INC in its coverage of the Tanyonglimo violence resulted from its organisational strength through the combination of local expertise (provincial reporters with knowledge of the Muslim south and many of whom speak Malay language) and the strong reporting as well as writing skills of Bangkok-based reporters seconded by national newspapers to work at the INC desk in Pattani at the time.

However, the INC started and carried on between its launch until mid-2006 under a loose, informal structure with neither binding agreement for newspapers to commit resources to the pool-reporting desk, nor a specific time frame. Such ad-hoc basis built upon personal networking, rather than a formal contractual basis, made the reporting excellence of Tanyonglimo coverage unsustainable. This weakness has quickly manifested when Bangkok-based editors decided to withdraw their staff

reporters from the INC desk in the south when they needed all hands to cover the national political crisis in Bangkok in early 2006.

The withdrawal of Bangkok-based staff reporters, in most cases without sending replacement back until September 2006 when the political impasse in Bangkok still persisted, reflects the lack of strategy on the part of the INC's management which is the Thai Journalists Association, and the lack of commitment to peace journalism operation on parts of the newspapers. Loose structure that functions upon personal connection and informal agreements incur loose commitment and this is another factor contributing to the weakness of the INC. "Instead of relying on personal connection to secure human resource, perhaps the TJA should secure commitment from newspapers' owners who would then formalize a policy for their respective editorial offices to send staff reporters to work in the INC project continuously," said Pakpoom Pongbhai, News Editor of Matichon. (Interview June 15, 2006).

Since funding for the INC comes from external sources that support the idea of peace journalism by a professional association like the TJA, the mainstream newspapers are not contributors and they therefore feel that this is not an investment they have to take seriously.

The INC started the operation in late 2005 in response to headlines trend when the southern violence became national focus, as well as to criticisms of the media's biased reporting that did not help the advance of national reconciliation from 2004. The success in generating human resource support to produce high-quality stories that conform with peace journalism approach and visibility among the newspaper-reading public through the use of INC stories in most newspapers, as shown in this study signified concrete achievement of this peace journalism trial in Thailand during the initial period between end of August 2005 and early 2006. But in the period thereafter until present, the extent and impact of the trial have tapered off, as national political crisis in Bangkok overtook the news agenda and marginalised the entire operation.

The shift of news agenda from the south towards Bangkok-based political arena in early 2006, combined with the loose structure of the INC, weakened considerably the trial by the Thai Journalists Association. As the study shows, peace journalism focusing on conflict in the deep south enjoyed a brief stint of success. Yet the success proved to be unsustainable in weathering the challenge of the Bangkok-centric nature that reigns supreme in both the Thai press news agenda – giving top priority to national politics -- and how the Thai press operates.



สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

REFERENCES

THAI

Bahroon. (2005). *Jihad si thao kraisaeng krailiang fai tai*. [Grey ijhad, who started and fed the southern fire]. Bangkok: Sarika Publishing House.

Chaiwat Satha-anand (2005). *Prachatipatai amnajniyom: phon khong kaanchai kwamrunraeng nai changwat chaidaenpaktai*. [Authoritarian Democracy: Consequence of Violence Using Violence in the Southern Border Provinces]. In Utai Dulayakasem and Lertchai Sirichai(eds.). *Kwarmru gab kaan kaepanha khadyang koraniwikrit chaidaenpaktai*. [Knowledge and Conflict Resolution for the Southern Conflict (Chapter 4). Thailand: Liberal Arts Academy, Walailuck University, Asia Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

Issara News Centre.(2005).*Botbannathikaan-sue pua santipaab*. [Editorial-Peace Media,August 29] Thai Journalists Association. Retrieved October 24, 2005 from <http://www.tjanews.org>

Issara News Centre.(2006).*Zone sidaeng sentang antarai fanrai khong Khonchaidaentai(1)*. [Red Zone, the Dangerous Route, the Southerners' Nightmare].Thai Journalists Association. Retrieved March 13, 2006 from <http://www.tjanews.org>.

Issara News Centre.(2006). *Wijai kor or sor rabu chad rat maikhaojai santiwithi dub Faitai*. [NRC research said state does not comprehend peaceful approach to south] Thai Journalists Association. Retrieved April 5, 2006 from <http://www.tjanews.org>

Issara News Centre.(2006). *Mor Prawase noon tang sathabankhao saan ngaan soon*

khao issara. [Dr Prawase supported the formation of the “News Institute” to sustain INC] Thai Journalists Association. Retrieved July 20, 2006 from <http://www.tjanews.org>

Janya Palamat, Mattani Juenara and Amornrat Chanakarn. (2005). *Soonkhao Issara gab kwampen tonbaeb ongkorn sue pua santipaab*. [Issara News Centre As Prototype of Peace Media]. Unpublished raw data.

Kasien Techapira. (2005). *Wattanathamkaanmuang amnajniyom patipak patiroop paitai rabob Thaksin* [Reform-averse authoritarian political culture under the Thaksin system]. In Ubonrat Siriyuvasak (ed.). *Pidhoo Pidtaa Pidpaak: sithiseripaab nai mue turakij kaanmuang sue* [Silencing the Media: Rights and Freedom of Expression Under Political Corporate Seized]. Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing Project.

Koyrin Anwar and Manso Salae. (2004). *Faitai rue ja dub?* [Would the southern fire ever end?]. Songkhla: Muslimta'ai Publishing.

Media Monitor. (2005, November). *Paab tuathaen lae kwam somdul nai raikaan khao toratat gab botbat nai kaan saang kwamsamanachan nai sangkhom Thai*. [Representation and balance in TV newscast and the role in reconciliation in the Thai society]. Paper presented at the annual conference of Thailand Development Research Institute, Pattaya.

National Reconciliation Commission. (May 2006). *Ao chana kwamrunraeng duay palang samanachan*. [Conquering Violence with the Force of Reconciliation]. Bangkok: National Reconciliation Commission.

Nithi Aewsrivongs. (2004, November 1). *Kwam runraeng thi maijampen lae antarai nai paaktai*. [The Unnecessary and Dangerous Violence in the South]. *Matichon, excerpted in Fah Diew Kaan* [The Same Sky] (Pre-face) issue October-December 2004.

- Pakorn Puengnetr.(2005,October 1). *Sue Suankrasae* [Alternative media]. Sao Sawadi
Section, *Krungthep Turakij*, pp.2-5.
- Pattara Khumphitak.(Ed.). (2006). *Ruamjai pen nueng* [Unity]. Bangkok: Thai Journalists Association.
- Pichai Ratanapol (2003, March).*Thitthang kaan jadkaan kwamkhadyaeng nai sangkomthai panha paaktai gae dai dauy santiwithi*. Proceedings from Seminar on Conflict Resolution Trend in Thailand: Southern Conflict Can Be Resolved with Peaceful Means by Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (pp.75-85). Khon Kaen:Institute for Dispute Resolution of Khon Kaen University.
- Prasong Lertratanawisute.(2005).*Palang khamtham thi thamlai kwamluang khong khor moon khaosaan*. [Power of questioning that unmasks the deception of information]. In Ubonrat Siriyuvasak (Ed.), *Pidhoo Pidtaa Pidpaak: sithiseripaab nai mue turakij kaanmuang sue* [Silencing the Media: Rights and Freedom of Expression Under Political Corporate Seized]. Bangkok:Kobfai Publishing Project.
- Puangthong Pawakapan and Surat Horachaikul.(2005). *Wikroh tasanakhati khong khonthai tor gaan kaekhai panha kwamkhadyaeng nai sangkom*. [Analysis of the Thai people's attitude towards conflict resolution in the society]. Paper presented at the annual conference of Thailand Development Research Institute, Pattaya.
- Puangthong Rungsawadisab.(2005). *Pitak lokseri kham atibai lae gaan jadgaan kwamjing nai gaan damnoen nayobai tangprathet khongthai nai korani songkram Vietnam*. [Defending the free world: explanation and management of truth in Thailand's foreign policy conduct in the case of Vietnam War] Research Report, Thai Research Fund.

Sukhothaimathirath University Press (2004). *Kaankhao buengton* [Introduction to Journalism]. Nonthaburi: Sukhothaimathirath University Press.

Supalak Ganjanakhundee and Don Pathan (Eds.) (2004). *Santipaab nai plew plueng* [Peace amidst the fire]. Bangkok: Nation Books International.

Surachart Bamroongsuk. (2004). *Wikrit tai su duay yutasaat lae panya* [Southern Crisis: Fight it with Strategy and Wisdom] Bangkok: Animate Group.

Thai Broadcast Journalists Association. (2004). *Annual Report 2003-2004*. Bangkok.

English

Amnesty International. (2006, January). *Thailand "If you want peace, work for justice."* (ASA 39/001/2006). London.

Galtung, J. *Chapter 5 Media: Peace Journalism*. Retrieved September 20, 2005, from <http://www.cnetwork.ca/programs/PeaceJournalism.htm>.

International Commission of Jurists. (2005 August). *More Power, Less Accountability: Thailand's New Emergency Decree*. Geneva.

International Crisis Group. (2005, May). *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, not Jihad* (Asia Report No. 98). Singapore/Brussels.

International Crisis Group. (2005, November). *Thailand's Emergency Decree: No Solution* (Asia Report No. 105). Jakarta and Brussels.

Lee S.T., & Maslog C.C. (June 2005). *War or Peace Journalism?* Asian Newspaper

Coverage of Conflict.[Electronic version] *Journal of Communication, Oxford Journals*,311-329. Retrieved December 12, 2005 from <http://joc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/55/2/311>

Louw, P. Eric. (2005). *The Media and Political Process*. London: SAGE Publications.

McCargo, Duncan.(2002). *Politics and the Press in Thailand: Media Machinations*. Bangkok: Garuda Press.

McGoldrick,A.&Lynch,J.(2001).What is Peace Journalism?. *activate winter 2001*,6-9.

Media Reform Going Backward? (2005). Sopit Wangvivatana (ed.) Bangkok: Thai Broadcast Journalists Association and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Puangthong Rungsawadisab.(2005). Thailand's Response to the Cambodian Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives. *Monograph Series, No.1, Yale Centre for International and Area Studies, Genocide Studies Programme*.

Srisompob Jitpiromsri with Panyasak Sobhonvasu. (2006). Unpacking Thailand's Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations. *Critical Asian Studies*, 38.1(2006), 95-117.

Wattana Sugunnasil.(2006). Islam,Radicalism and Violence in Southern Thailand Berjihad di Patani and the 28 April 2004 Attacks.

Wolfsfeld, Gadi.(2004).*Media and the Path to Peace*. New York: Cambridge University Press. *Critical Asian Studies*,38.1(2006),119-144.



APPENDICES

สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

APPENDIX A

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

- Chaiyong Maneepiluek, President of the Southern Newspapers Association of Thailand, Chief Reporter for *Daily News*' Southern Centre
- Chavarong Limpattamapanee, Head of *Thai Rath* Information Centre, Secretary-General of the National Press Council and Executive Director of the Press Development Institute of Thailand
- Choomsak Nararatwong, ex-Editor of TBJA's peace journalism trial.
- Duangkamol Chotana, Editor-in-Chief, *Krungthep Turakij* newspaper
- King-oua Laohong, Reporter, *Krungthep Turakij*
- Muhammad Ayub Pathan, Editor, Issara News Centre
- Natrawuth Muangsook, Reporter, Issara News Centre
- Nazuroh Jeh-ha, Reporter, Issara News Centre.
- Pakorn Puengnetr, Reporter, *Krungthep Turakij*
- Pakpoom Pongbhai, News Editor, *Matichon*
- Pattara Khumphitak, President, Thai Journalists Association ;
Political Editor, *Post Today* newspaper
- Pradit Ruangdit, Reporter, *Bangkok Post*, advisor to INC.
- Prasong Lertratanawisute, Senior Editor, *Matichon*
- Ruayrin Petsalabkeo, Reporter, Issara News Centre
- Somkiat Juntursima, Co-Editor, Issara News Centre
- Col.Suwat Raungsakul
- Sopit Wangvivatana, Executive Director, Thai Broadcast Journalists Association
- Tuwaedaniya Meringing, Reporter, Issara News Centre

MATICHON INFORMATION CENTER		Subject Heading : 494
Source : มติชน		
Date : 29 เม.ย. 2547	Page : 8,9	No : 47206883

ปฏิบัติการ **ตัดชีพ 107 โจรใต้**

9 ชั่วโมงระทึก

• นอาร์พีจี-รถหุ้มเกราะสยบกลุ่มโจรยึด 'มัสยิดกรือเซะ'



Matichon's war-journalism type of headlines (Operation terminating 107 southern bandits: 9 hours on edge, RPG and tanks overpowering bandits laying siege on Kurze Mosque) in its 29 April 2004 edition. The paper changed tune to adopt peace journalism through INC by late 2005.

สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

MATCHON INFORMATION CENTER		Subject Heading :
Source :	กม ชด ลก	
Date :	26 ก.ย. 2548	Page : 3,15
		No : 48500796

เรื่องเล่าจากร้านน้ำชา
วงสนทนาในพื้นที่สีแดง



...

Another story by INC “Tale from the Tea-shop: Conversation in the Red Zone,” was published by *Khom Chad Luek* newspaper on 26 September 2005.



โคมไฟให้ลูกไซม ฆ่าแม่วิก 'ทักษิณ'กร้าวใส่

**ประกาศท้องแก่กายฟรี
ยุยงชาวบ้านล้อมจับ
รุ่นพี่-แท่งสยดสยอง**

รุมฆ่าโหด 2 ทหารนาวิกโยธิน
ยศ "ร.ต.-จ.อ." ช่วยราชการ
ฝ่ายข่าวกองทัพภาคที่ 4 ฝีมือ
ชาวบ้านร่วมแกนนำโจรได้
เข้าล้อมกรอบขณะเหยื่อไป
ตรวจที่เกิดเหตุ ★ มีต่อเนื่อง 16

สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

Thai Rath, 22 September 2005

MATICHON INFORMATION CENTER		Subject Heading :
Source :	ไทยรัฐ	48/14
Date :	23 ก.ย. 2548	No : 48496181
	Page : 1,16,19	

ผลตรวจพิสูจน์ศพ 2นาฬิกา กายมาแล้ว2-3ชม.

Thai Rath, 23 September 2005

MATICHON INFORMATION CENTER		Subject Heading :
Source :	มติชน	48/0
Date :	23 ก.ย. 2548	No : 48496171
	Page : 1,13	

สุดโหดทรمانก่อนฆ่า2นาฬิกา รู้ตัว3แยกนำมา ลงมือบ้าย2-รณ.ภท.โยงค้ายา

หมายเลข3กองพันตรีชายแดน

พระเทพฯทรงให้ลูกเข้บมึง

เพียบยจำเอกตั้งทอง4เดือน

'ซรมรักษ์'อ้างรู้แล้ว 3 แยกนำก่อเหตุฆ่า 2 นาฬิกาโยชิน โยงแก้ง
ค้ายาเสพติดในพื้นที่นราธิวาส หมอพรทิพย์เปิดผลชันสูตรศพ
พบโคเคนทำร้ายในช่วงบ้ายสองโมง ระบุพฤติกรรมสุดโหด ทรمان
ก่อนสิ้นลม สมเด็จพระเทพฯเสด็จฯพินิจนำหลวงอาบศพและพระ
ราชทานหรีด รับสั่งลูกสาว'เรือดวินัย'ให้เข้มแข็ง ส่วนภรรยา
'จำเอกคำชะ' ตั้งครรภ์ 4 เดือน สธ.ช่วยเต็มที่ **อ่านหน้า 13**

Matichon, 23 September 2005

MATICHON INFORMATION CENTER		Subject Heading :
Source :	ไทยรัฐ	
Date :	24 ก.ย. 2548	Page : 1,13,14
		48497623

ลากคอใต้ห่มคลุม 2 อำนาจติด มือสังหารมูวีกา

เป็นชายลกรรจันมทยงเงิน
หมายจับสำแกงทมิฬอีกคน
สอบกระเบิดกำรวกับศพ
จับแล้วแกงทมิฬพาเหตุโต 2 นวักโยอินเพื่อยตัวประกัน
ในหมู่บ้านตันหยงลิมอ จ.นราธิวาส รพ.กส.ใหม่ * 2500117

Thai Rath, 24 September 2005

MATICHON INFORMATION CENTER		Subject Heading :
Source :	มติชน	
Date :	24 ก.ย. 2548	Page : 1,13,16
		48497356

เผย'แกนนำ'ฆ่านักโยธิน 1หญิง10ชาย 2ตร.สังเวชชีวิตอีกถูกลอบบี้

จับสองคู่สหายบั้นหันฆาต
'ทักษิณ' ถังลงพื้นที่สังเวย

Matichon, 24 September 2005

MATICHON INFORMATION CENTER		Subject Heading :	
Source :	ไทยรัฐ		
Date :	25 ก.ย. 2548	Page :	19,18,17
		No :	48498971

**ประธานใจรฆ่าขมย.
เดรัจฉาน
ทักษิณขอลุยตัวเอง**

ผบ.ตร.กตัญญูแก้การร้าย “โกวิท” ยืนยันมีหลักฐานมัดตัว 2 ผู้ต้องหา
ให้รีบเข้ามาขอพบตัวเสียที แก๊งทมิฬรุมฆ่าโหด 2 นาวิกโยธิน เดือน 11
หัวใจที่ถูกอกหมายจับ ★ มีก่อนนำ 9

Thai Rath, 25 September 2005

MATICHON INFORMATION CENTER		Subject Heading :	
Source :	มติชน	48498621	
Date :	25 ก.ย. 2548	Page :	1,14
		No :	

**หลุด'สัตว์เดรัจฉาน'ผ่านวิทยุ
'แม่'ดุคั่น!
ย่าแก่ได้'ผม'รับผิดชอบเอง'**

**ทำพลาคลักษณ์เลือก-หักล้างเป็นลัทธิ
บาทสมิทธิให้'อาเชียน'ร่วมแก้ปัญหา**

'ทักษิณ'ประกาศสลายแก้ปัญหาไฟใต้ วอนคน กทม.อย่า
วิจารณ์... ฆนุพ่นน้ำตายแล้วมีผลกระทบ ลั่นคนเป็นโจร
ต้องโดนไล่ล่า กำนันดีไม่ใช่ศาลเตี้ย ระดม ผบ.เหล่าทัพ
ประชุมใหญ่ 1 ตุลาคม มีอะไรเกิดขึ้นขอรับผิดชอบเอง
ทำไมตี 3 ปีข้างหน้าไม่ต้องเลือก รมต.มาเลยตั้ง
'อาเชียน'ร่วมคลี่คลายสถานการณ์

Matichon, 25 September 2005

BIOGRAPHY

Since graduating from Thammasat University majoring in English, Supapohn Kanwerayotin has been working as a journalist. She reported for the *Nation* for nearly a year, after which she worked in various reporting capacity at the *Bangkok Post* for almost a decade from features reporter to foreign affairs beat. She served as the *Bangkok Post* Bureau Chief in Hanoi, reporting and traveling extensively in Vietnam during 1992-1995 when the country was emerging from the US embargo and international isolation. In 1996, she went to work as a broadcaster for the Thai Section of the BBC World Service radio in London until late 2000. After a brief stint in Singapore with an internet start-up and a slightly longer stint in Hong Kong as senior writer for the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, she headed home to Thailand. Before joining MAIDS, she worked as press officer for the EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Co-operation Programme from 2003 to September 2005.



สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย