

TREADING WATER: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE PLIGHT AND
CAPABILITIES OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN INDONESIA

Miss Jennifer Kay Moberg



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

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ฟื้นฝ่าไปในสายน้ำ:
การศึกษาเชิงชาติพันธุ์วรรณนาของสถานะและขีดความสามารถของผู้ลี้ภัยชาวอัฟกานิสถาน
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วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต
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จากสถิติของ UNHCR เมื่อปี 2016 มีผู้อพยพมากกว่า 14,000 คน ที่ ตี ต ค ำ ง ่อ ยู่ ใน ป ระ เ ศ ษ อี น โ ด นี เ ซี ย โดยเกือบจะไม่มีใครหวังที่จะได้มีโอกาสจะไปตั้งถิ่นฐานในประเทศที่สามต่อไป ในเมือง Cisarua ในชวาคะวันตักเพียงเมืองเดียว ต้องแบกรับผู้อพยพจากชนกลุ่มน้อย Hazara ของอัฟกานิสถาน ไว้เกือบ 5,000 คน แต่ ใน ส ถ า น ก า ร ณ ์ ที่ ดู เ ห มี อ น จะ ไม่ มี ท ำ ง อ อ ก นี ้ พวกเขาผู้อพยพกลุ่มนี้ได้จัดตั้งศูนย์การเรียนรู้และการสร้างสรรค์เพื่อส่วนรวมขึ้น เพื่อสร้างให้ชีวิตของพวกเขา ระหว่างการรอคอยอย่างไร้จุดหมายให้มีคุณค่าและความหมายของชีวิตมากขึ้น

ค ำ ย อ พ ย พ แ ล ะ อ พ ย พ ก ล ุ ม นี ้ เ ป น ต ัว อ ย ำ ง ที่ น ำ ส น ใจ ที่แสดงให้เห็นถึงความอดทนและความมุ่งมั่นที่จะพัฒนาสังคมของพวกเขาในระหว่างสถานการณ์ของการลี้ภัย ซึ่งก็กำลังเกิดขึ้นในที่ต่างๆทั่วโลกด้วยเช่นเดียวกัน จากกรอบความสามารถและทุนทางสังคม วิทยานิพนธ์บทนี้แสดงให้เห็นถึงความจำเป็นอย่างเร่งด่วนในการจัดตั้งสถาบันเพื่อการศึกษาที่จัดการโดยกลุ่มผู้อพยพเอง ซึ่งจะเป็นการส่งผลดีต่อกลุ่มผู้อพยพที่กำลังไร้จุดหมาย บทวิจัยฉบับนี้นำเสนอความรู้ที่เกี่ยวกับการดำรงอยู่ของชาติพันธุ์และคุณภาพชีวิต เพื่อเล่าเรื่องและประสบการณ์ของกลุ่มคนในสังคมที่ดูเหมือนจะอ่อนแอและแทบจะถูกลืมแต่กลับไม่ยอมแพ้ต่อโชคชะตา

ก ำ ร วิ จ ัย นี ้ ส ร ู ป ใ ห้ เ ห ็ น ว ่า ศูนย์กลางของสังคมผู้อพยพที่มีสถาบันการเรียนรู้ที่จัดการโดยกลุ่มผู้อพยพเองอยู่ด้วย จะสามารถพลิกชีวิตของผู้อพยพให้มีความหมายและมีจุดหมายของชีวิตมากขึ้นในระหว่างการรอคอยอันยาวนาน และจะเป็นการวางเส้นทางให้กับอนาคตที่สดใสแก่กลุ่มผู้อพยพอีกด้วย

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JENNIFER KAY MOBERG: TREADING WATER: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE PLIGHT AND CAPABILITIES OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN INDONESIA. ADVISOR: ASST. PROF. NARUEMON THABCHUMPON, Ph.D., CO-ADVISOR: MICHAEL GEORGE HAYES, Ph.D., pp.

ACCORDING TO THE 2016 UNHCR STATISTICS, THERE ARE OVER 14,000 REFUGEES TRAPPED IN INDEFINITE TRANSIT IN INDONESIA, WITH FAINT HOPE OF EVER BEING RESETTLED TO ANY THIRD COUNTRY. THE WEST JAVA TOWN OF CISARUA ALONE HOSTS NEARLY 5,000 REFUGEES FROM THE ETHNIC HAZARA MINORITY GROUP FROM AFGHANISTAN. IN THEIR INTRACTABLE LIMBO, A GROUP OF THESE HAZARAS HAVE SET UP A NUMBER OF REFUGEE RUN LEARNING CENTRES AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, CREATING FOR THEMSELVES MEANING AND PURPOSE DURING THEIR UNBOUNDED TRANSIT.

THIS TOWN AND POPULATION REPRESENT A UNIQUE CASE STUDY IN REFUGEE RESILIENCE, TRANSFORMATION, AND EMPOWERMENT IN LIGHT OF A DEEPENING GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS. USING A CAPABILITIES FRAMEWORK AND SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY, THIS THESIS EXAMINES THE EMERGENCE OF THESE REFUGEE RUN INSTITUTIONS, AND THE IMPACT THAT INVOLVEMENT WITH THESE INSTITUTIONS HAS ON REFUGEES IN PERPETUAL TRANSIT. THE RESEARCH EMPLOYS ETHNOGRAPHIC, QUALITATIVE METHODS IN ORDER TO SHARE THE STORIES AND EXPERIENCES OF SOME OF THE MOST VULNERABLE AND FORGOTTEN MEMBERS OF SOCIETY IN THEIR JOURNEY TO EMPOWERMENT.

THE ANALYSIS OF THIS STUDY CONCLUDED THAT THE SOCIAL CAPITAL BUILT THROUGH INVOLVEMENT WITH REFUGEE RUN INITIATIVES IS THE CONVERSION FACTOR THAT CHANGES LIVES; COMMUNITY ITSELF IS THE TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENT. THROUGH THIS TRANSFORMATION, REFUGEES HAVE CREATED FOR THEMSELVES MEANING AND PURPOSE DURING THEIR INDEFINITE TRANSIT, AND LAID PATHWAYS FOR A SUCCESSFUL FUTURE.

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
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ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CRLC	Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre
CRSKC	Cisarua Refugee Shotokan Karate Club
CPA	Comprehensive Plan of Action
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CWS	Church World Services
HLC	Hope Learning Centre
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Services
KP	Khyber Pakhtunwa
LeJ	Lashkar-e Jhangvi
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSB	Operation Sovereign Borders
NUG	New Unity Government
RCA	Regional Cooperation Arrangement
RLN	Refugee Learning Nest
SIEV	Suspected Illegal Entry Vehicle
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission on Refugees

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background: Life in Limbo

A group of men are gathered around steaming cups of tea and dishes of nuts and dried fruit. “How are you? How is your health? How is your family? How is your case? Have you heard any news from UNHCR?” Mohammad has been in Cisarua, Indonesia, for three years, six months, two weeks and five days. He does not know long he will be here, nor where he will go next. He is an Afghan Hazara refugee trapped in indefinite transit, with an uncertain future.

By the end of 2016, UNHCR recorded over 67.7 million people of concern, including refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced people (UNHCR 2016, p.19). These millions of people have been compounding in number for decades, as conflicts go unresolved, and populations remain underserved, and situations change from short term emergencies to long term crises.

Afghanistan has been in conflict and sending refugees fleeing for nearly 40 years. However, the millions of Afghans that are in continued protraction in places like Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia are at risk of becoming “forgotten refugees” as the world turns its attention towards migration crises stemming from conflict in Syria, Somalia and central Africa, and the genocide of Rohingya in Myanmar. These situations are indeed urgent; however, refugees languishing in limbo face important long-term challenges of interrupted education, psychological stunting, loss of dignity, and generally halted human development. Nations hosting large populations of long-term refugees tend to also be developing countries, often with limited resources themselves. As governments have the responsibility to support the development of their own citizens, the burden of refugee management and support falls mainly onto

international agencies and smaller NGOs, who are usually underfunded and overstretched.

Indonesia has long been a transit country for refugees en route from other parts of Asia to Australia. Now, due to increasingly restrictive Australian immigration and asylum policies, Indonesia is the unwitting host to over 14,000 refugees, the majority of whom are Hazaras from Afghanistan. The West Java town of Cisarua alone hosts a population of around 5,000 Hazaras, many of whom have been trapped in limbo there for years, unable to return to their home countries, unable to move onwards to anywhere else. Said 19 year old Farkhunda Osman:

I am in the middle of an unknown journey. I am not from Afghanistan, and I am not from any other country now. So that is the problem, which takes your focus away, to think about your life, about your house, about your place in the world... (personal interview 19 April, 2017).

Despite this intractable limbo, a group of Hazaras in Cisarua have set up a number of refugee run learning centres and community initiatives, carving out for themselves a unique place in society, and creating for themselves meaning and purpose during their unbounded transit.

1.2 Objectives of Study and Research Questions

The main purpose of this thesis was to discover why Afghan Hazara refugees in a particular area of Indonesia have been so successful in establishing meaningful lives for themselves. Pursuant to this is to explore the lives of Afghan Hazara refugees facing indefinite transit and limbo in Cisarua, Indonesia, the institutions they have formed themselves in order to cope with the limbo, and how their involvement, or lack thereof, in these institutions is impacting their immediate and long term sense of well-being and human development. Through living with refugee individuals and families in the refugee enclave itself, the researcher first gained an understanding of the main forces driving Hazaras to flee their homes, and how cultural identity shaped

their decisions, route, and ultimately community structure. A deeper look into the community structure, particularly a comparison between those refugees who were directly or indirectly involved with community initiatives and those refugees who were completely uninvolved, was conducted. Ultimately, the picture that emerged revealed the factors crucial to the transformation from merely surviving to actually thriving in a life of limbo.

The research questions explored are as follows:

1. Who are the Hazaras and why are they refugees in Indonesia?
2. Why has the Afghan Hazara refugee community in Cisarua, Indonesia been so successful in establishing meaningful lives in the face of indefinite transit?
 - a. Why have some members of this community been able to thrive, whereas others merely survive, the limbo?
3. To what degree is their involvement with refugee-run community initiatives successful in transforming their lives from vulnerability to capability?
 - a. How can the skills refugees acquire and the transformations they experience through their involvement with refugee-run community initiatives be applied in the case of resettlement or return to their countries of origin?

Therefore, in order to answer these questions, the objectives of the research are as follows:

1. To investigate the community initiatives that have been established by refugees, and how they are run.
2. To discover how involvement with these structures impacts the lives and well-being of refugees in the intermediate and long term.

1.3 Hypothesis


The hypothesis of this research is that the formation and existence of the community initiatives provide space where functionings can be transformed into capabilities, and the indefinite transit gives them the time in which to transform. A strong diasporic

identity of resilience allows them to learn how not just to survive, but to actually thrive. However, the most essential conversion factor in the transformation from vulnerability to capability, is the social capital built through the bridged networks of the community initiatives to other communities.

These networks and networking abilities could be instrumental in the establishment of new, successful, and meaningful lives, in the event that they are resettled to a third country or repatriated to Afghanistan. The example of this community's unique success could therefore advise policies for other protracted refugee situations.

1.4 Conceptual Framework

Central to all the conversion factors affecting the refugees, their capabilities, and functionalities is the social capital with which they arrived, and that they develop during their time in protraction, through involvement with learning centres and community groups. As the primary aim of the research is to answer the question as to WHY this particular group of protracted refugees has been successful, empowered and entrepreneurial, where other groups have not, Social Capital Theory will be used to explain the social networks developed that are central to these positive traits.



Throughout this thesis, particular focus will be given to the various bonding, bridging, and linking forms of social capital, as visualized above.

Bonding capital refers to the network links within a social group, with common ties of culture, religion, and language. This type of capital is common in homogenous societies, particularly when they exist within a larger structure of society of different culture, norms, and values. Bonding capital tends to strengthen trustworthiness and solidarity within communities. Bridging capital refers to links between heterogeneous social groups, who would be otherwise unrelated. This form of capital, although not built on shared culture and norms, allows users to access other networks and resources unavailable to a closed social group. These various forms of social capital can be discovered through observation and survey; further detail can be found in Section 2.5.2.




Figure 2: Levels and Types of Social Capital, from Krishna and Shrader 1999

In order to conceptualize and evaluate the current situation facing Afghan refugees in Indonesia, I will use the Capabilities Approach, as devised by Amartya Sen and developed by Martha Nussbaum and many others. Central to this will be determining the functionings (the things refugees are able to be or do), and capabilities (the actual freedoms they have in order to enjoy functionings), both before and during their involvement with learning centres and community groups in Cisarua, and identifying the factors influencing their ability to realize their capabilities. In order to best analyze their situation, I will use a version of Ingrid Robeyns' conceptual model, to focus on the social conversion factors that preclude empowerment, and the individual conversion factors that enable it:




Figure 3: Representation of Capabilities Set (Robeyns 2005)

1.5 Methodology

According to UNHCR (2017), there are over 65 million forcibly displaced, 22.5 million refugees, and 10 million stateless people in the world today. With figures so immense, it is easy to think of refugees as numbers, and lose sight of the individual human beings themselves. In order to bring human voices out of the statistics, and give a platform for the stories of these individuals to be heard, the researcher conducted a qualitative, phenomenological, ethnographic case study of the Cisarua, Indonesia refugee community. The research was a combination of documentary and field research. The documentary research included a survey of Indonesia's historic role as a thoroughfare and transit post for refugees, legal documents concerning the Australian policy changes that caused the bottleneck of transit refugees in 2014, and the recent media interest surrounding the refugees who found themselves in limbo following those policy changes.

The field research consisted of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with individual refugees, families, and small groups ranging from 2-5 people, as well as refugees from the community who had been resettled to third countries already. Additional interviews were conducted with NGO workers and an Indonesian research institute which focuses on Southeast Asian migrant flows, as well as with leaders in

communities with large populations of resettled refugees. All on-site research was done in Cisarua and Jakarta, Indonesia, as well as Toronto, Canada, with additional interviews conducted via Skype with resettled refugees and community leaders in Canada, the United States, and Australia. Data was triangulated by interviewing different demographics (age, gender, education level, language ability) within the refugee community, as well as by consulting with experts in Indonesia, Australia, and Afghanistan.

The field research took place over the course of 25 days, in three separate site visits, including two in Cisarua, and one in Canada. Initially, the researcher had intended to survey three sites: the Cisarua refugee community, the area in Central Jakarta immediately surrounding the UNHCR offices, and the Tanjung Pinang Immigration Detention Centre on Bintan island. However, upon arrival in Cisarua during the first trip, it became apparent that the community's unique makeup and experience merited a more in-depth study, as well as that physical access to Tanjung Pinang would not be granted. Over the course of the research, one of the primary respondents was resettled to Canada, and the researcher had the opportunity to follow-up with on-site interviews with her there. Because of the strong link between her dramatic story to the research questions and hypothesis, the researcher decided to conduct a mini case study on Tahira Rezai, which can be found in Section 3.8.

1.5.1 Site Selection

The researcher was initially introduced to Afghan refugees in Indonesia through one of her former students from Kabul, whose father had been living in Cisarua, but is now detained in Tanjung Pinang. However, after learning about the legal and political constraints to accessing the detention centre and the individuals detained there, it was decided that the research should focus on self-settled refugees, mainly residing in the Cisarua-Bogor area. Further to this, communications with noted researcher specializing in refugees in Indonesia, Dr. Antje Missbach, enforced the decision to narrow the site scope.




Figure 4: Map of Indonesia (Missbach, 2015)

During the first field visit, the researcher was invited to stay with the manager of the Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, who was residing approximately 500 metres from the school; six other refugee families from Afghanistan and Iraq were also residing in the immediate vicinity of the same building and the one directly across the street from the manager. This led to natural snowball sampling within the immediate community. Nearly every day, the researcher was invited to chai¹ at a different home, and evening meals were shared with between 10 and 20 people each evening.

During the second field visit, the previous manager had since been resettled to Canada, and the new manager, along with a CRLC teacher and one single adult male, had taken over her flat. The researcher stayed one week with them, and one week with a refugee household of five. Over the course of these two weeks, the researcher had chai and meals in many households, both directly affiliated and unaffiliated with

¹ Drinking chai, or saffron-infused tea, is an integral part of Afghan culture. Socializing, business meetings, wedding proposals, etc. take place over chai, and to do so without it would be considered abnormal, and even insulting.

Cisarua community groups, nearly every evening, in Cisarua and Jakarta. This gave the opportunity to see how a wide variety of refugees were living and spending their time, and to understand how their community functioned.

The third site visit was to Toronto, Canada, where the first CRLC manager is now residing. The researcher met with the manager for three days to see her life and circumstances, and also met with a refugee support community group, who were engaged in a variety of support initiatives.

1.5.2 Respondents and Sampling

A total of 25 refugees, current and resettled, were interviewed, employing first selective, and then snowball sampling, which was to be expected within a close-knit, homogenous community. Of the refugees interviewed, 24 were Hazaras, with the remaining being a Pashtun Shia married to a Hazara². Initial subjects were selected based on their involvement with the community organizations; teachers and administrators who had the greatest access to community resources were interviewed first, followed by their friends, family, and neighbors who were interested in the research.

The respondents can be designated into the below four categories:

Sample Groups	Description
Refugees affiliated with community groups	Individuals mainly from Afghanistan and Pakistan, with some from Iraq, Syria, and South Sudan, seeking asylum from respective conflicts who are involved in some way with a learning centre or community initiative in Cisarua

² It is extremely rare for these ethnic groups to intermarry. Such a relationship would surely be frowned upon by both groups, and would surely have been met with scrutiny and persecution in their native Quetta, Pakistan.

Refugees unaffiliated with community groups	With similar backgrounds as the individuals noted above, these are refugees in Cisarua who are not involved in any way with a learning centre or community initiative
Third party supporters	Individuals from NGOs working directly with refugees, think tanks researching refugee policy, and politicians and leaders from communities with large populations of resettled refugees.
Refugees resettled to third countries	Refugees formerly living in Cisarua, who have been resettled to Canada, USA, and Australia. These include both those individuals who were involved as well as those not involved with community initiatives.
Table 1: Categories of Respondents	

All interviews conducted consisted of either oral or written semi-structured interviews based off of the list of questions found in Appendix A, which served as a starting point for more organic conversations that followed. Initial respondents were selected by the researcher based on their roles within the community groups; these then led to a snowball sampling of family members and friends of the first interviewees.

1.5.3 Sampling Size

Of the respondents, 10 were managers, teachers, and admin from the Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre and Cisarua Refugee Shotokan Karate Club, five were refugees otherwise affiliated (students or parents of students) with either CRLC or CRSKC, eight were refugees with no official community affiliation, and two were former refugees who had been resettled to Canada and the United States. Additionally, interviews were conducted with the director of the Habibie Centre, Indonesia's leading research centre, an NGO worker residing in Cisarua, the MP of Gellibrand, Australia, whose population is over 60 percent migrant, including a significant Afghan contingent, a community leader in a predominantly Hazara community in Melbourne, Australia, and a community group in Toronto, Canada, where a former CRLC manager was resettled.

1.5.4 Data Collection, Treatment, and Translation

Data was collected through semi-structured interviews. Official interviews were recorded with on-site notes, and some of the lengthier interviews were recorded electronically. The electronically recorded interviews were later transcribed, and data from all interviews was recorded in Microsoft Excel, in order to organize and sort responses. Interviews were conducted primarily in English. Four interviews with refugees unaffiliated with community initiatives were conducted in Farsi, two of which required a translator (both were group interviews, and the researcher felt more comfortable with a translator present to assist).

1.5.5 Scope and Limitations

The scope of the research is comprised exclusively of individuals physically and socially related to the Hazara refugee community of Cisarua, Indonesia. This included refugees currently living there, refugees who were resettled from there, individuals from organizations dealing with refugees in West Java, and individuals working with Hazara and Afghan refugees overseas. Additionally, there were five respondents (individuals and groups) from civil society organizations and government offices. Cisarua interviews took place in a variety of locations; at the Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre facilities, at the Cisarua Refugee Shotokan Karate Club, in family homes and public spaces, with follow up conversations via Skype, Whatsapp, and Facebook messenger. Interviews with resettled refugees and overseas CSO members were conducted via Skype, Facebook Messenger, and email.

The most significant limitation faced in the research was that of time in the field. The researcher had initially intended to spend over a month doing field research in multiple locations; however, due to unforeseen circumstances, the second research trip was cut short by one week. This prevented her from spending significant time in Jakarta, where the UNHCR offices are located. However, as she was able to live directly with refugee families in Cisarua, she was able to conduct a fully ethnographic study within that community. Additionally, the researcher strongly resembles Hazara

people, and wore hijab throughout the research, so most people – from the refugees themselves, to local Indonesians, to visiting researchers and politicians- automatically mistook her for a member of the community, opening a window of understanding of how they are treated.

As many of the respondents interviewed were able to speak English, it is possible that the sampling itself was somewhat skewed towards refugees who had received education prior to claiming asylum in Indonesia, which could create a self-selection bias. Further, although the researcher does speak basic Farsi, which certainly helped to establish strong rapport with the respondents, when the translator was not present, it was not possible to converse as deeply about nuanced topics as she would have liked. The language limitation also made potential misunderstandings possible; however, the translator was an integral and trusted member of the Afghan community.

An additional limitation was the changing world refugee policy over the course of research. Respondents who were in the final stages of resettlement at the time of the first site visit found themselves thrust back into limbo with the announcement of the United States' 120 day moratorium on refugee resettlements. Due to this policy change, one of the initial respondents even gave up his asylum claim, and returned to Afghanistan. Further limitation on the research was the fact that refugees in Indonesia often receive inaccurate or incomplete information regarding their statuses, and likewise, some respondents themselves may give inaccurate or incomplete information in order to protect themselves and their cases.

Throughout the field research, the researcher hoped to get as many diverse opinions and stories as possible, so as to present the widest scope possible about the lives of refugees in long-term transit. To this end, she sought out individuals from all different walks of life in terms of gender, age, and previous profession. Throughout the research, it became clear that the majority of the refugees' experiences were very similar; the vast majority had all fled from the same two areas, followed the same

smuggling route, and had been waiting with the same uncertain legal status for a similar length of time. The similarities did not detract from the narrative, however, but rather triangulated the research findings and impressed upon the researcher the scale of the persecution they had faced, as well as the strength of the community.

1.6 Ethical Considerations

Any time people share their personal stories, they indeed become vulnerable to the world. Given the extremely sensitive nature of the conflicts and situations from which the respondents were fleeing, and their uncertain legal status, anonymity was offered to all participants. The researcher informed all respondents of the nature, scope, and goals of the project; however, of the 29 respondents, only two requested that their name be withheld from publication. Despite this, all subjects have been assigned pseudonyms for the purpose of publication, with the exception of five respondents who said their real names should be used.

It should be noted that the researcher has a vested interest in this community; over the course of the field study, one of the participants realized that he personally knew the father of the researcher's students from Kabul. In fact, the longer the researcher remained, the more direct personal connections were discovered, bringing the thesis to a very personal place for the researcher.

1.7 Thesis Structure

The next chapter, Literature Review, will give an overview of the ethnic and cultural identity of the refugees, as well as the countries involved- Afghanistan as a sending country, Australia as the destination country, and Indonesia as the country of indefinite transit. The chapter will then explore the concepts of protraction and limbo,

and the conceptual frameworks used, the Capabilities Approach, and Social Capital Theory.

Following the Literature Review will be a chapter on Research Findings and how they relate to the research questions and hypothesis, as well as a case study on one of the respondents and her family. This will be followed by an Analysis chapter, which explains the transformation of the researched community, and answers the central questions of the thesis. The paper concludes with implications of research, recommendations, and presents areas for further research.

1.8 Significance of Research

Although much research has been conducted on refugees and protraction, no solutions have been found concerning long-term development in host countries that are non-signatory to the refugee conventions. This research will therefore contribute to a serious gap in literature concerning moving beyond humanitarian assistance towards long-term human development in refugee limbo situations. This research serves as an important case study highlighting alternatives to traditional development models, which are generally top-down initiatives to refugee assistance. It is clear that, in light of the ever-lengthening refugee crisis, and the increasingly nationalistic direction many countries are taking, that something must change with the status quo of refugee assistance. Therefore, the primary audiences for this thesis are organizations and researchers who are looking for ways to understand, empower, and walk alongside refugee communities in the absence of governmental support.

Finally, as the focus of the research is on Hazara refugees, this seeks to contribute to the very small body of literature (mostly coming from only one author, Dr. William Maley) concerning this marginalized ethnic group. As violence against the Hazara people is now regularly intensifying, and with Afghanistan and Pakistan becoming increasingly more volatile, it can be assumed that further refugee flight will be occurring. This research can add to the base of understanding about the culture and

identity of Hazaras, while displaying their incredible human potential. This is a chance to share their stories, and give a voice to a marginalized and forgotten group of survivors.



CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Over the course of the last several decades, an enormous amount has been written about refugees, the countries and conflicts from which they are escaping, their legal status, the human rights issues surrounding the ongoing crises, and myriad solutions have been proposed. There is no end to the amount of articles, journals, books, and essays on this complex topic. The following section will be a review of some of the key components pertinent to this thesis, starting with Afghanistan as a refugee sending country and its persecuted Hazara ethnic minority group. Following this will be a review of Indonesia's role as a receiving country, and the international politics contributing to the refugee populations it has historically hosted. The next section will discuss the concepts of protraction and limbo, along with themes of refugee entrepreneurship and empowerment. Following this will be a discussion of the capabilities approach and social capital theories, concluding with a brief discussion of the knowledge gaps in the preceding topics.

2.2 Afghan Refugee Flows

Afghanistan, a country plagued with over three decades of continuous conflict, is one of the most significant refugee sending countries in the world. Decades of conflict and ethnic tensions have contributed to multiple waves of refugee flight, resulting in one of the largest diaspora in the world. Afghanistan is currently ranked as one of the world's most corrupt countries, and this distinction has colored its history and multiple failures to provide basic public security and services for its citizens. Much has been written about the conflict in Afghanistan; however, according to Christine Roehrs, with the Afghanistan Analysts Network.

Field studies inside Afghanistan ended almost entirely in 1978-79 with the coming of revolution and war... Little has been done to update our knowledge... The clear majority of publications are studies that criticise the international forces and the development programmes in Afghanistan, as opposed to studies that generate knowledge about Afghan society. Given the current security situation and the difficulties in securing research funds, it is likely that the research of Afghanistan's ethnic groups will only get worse. That means the gaps in the literature will not be filled, at least not in the near future. So analysts are very often working without the benefit of good background material. (Roehrs 2014)

The following sections will thus give a brief overview of Afghan refugee flight, and a study of the Hazara minority ethnic group, around which the thesis research is centered.

2.2.1 Afghanistan as a Sending Country

Over the course of Afghanistan's nearly 40 years of conflict, there have been three significant waves of outward refugee migration: during the Soviet invasion and occupation (1979-1989), during the civil war and Taliban reign (1992-1996 and 1996-2001), and then in recent years following the withdrawal of US forces in 2014. (Hyndman and Giles, 2016). The neighboring countries of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran have hosted the vast majority of the refugees, with a significant diaspora established throughout North America, Western Europe, the UAE, and Australia. With each wave of migration, hosting countries have become increasingly weary, and perceptions towards and accommodation of refugees has steadily declined. Even the Farsi word for refugee in Iran changed from *muhajir*, or involuntary religious migrant, to *panahandegan*, which means 'one who comes from a dangerous place to a safe place,' minus the religious context³ (IOM 2014, Monsutti 2006, Rajae 2000). *Panahandegan*, as it carries no religious connotation, does not command the same requirement of caring for migrants. According to Abbas-Shavazi et al (2005), "Whereas "mohajerin" was considered to be an honorable term, "panahandegan", or

³ The word *muhajir* gets its roots from the first converts to Islam, who were displaced from Medina to Mecca. The Quran dictates that Muslims were not only to welcome, but protect these migrants: "They love those who emigrated to them and find not any desire in their hearts of what the emigrants were given, but rather give them preference over themselves, even though they are in privation. Whoever is protected from the greediness of his own soul, then those will be successful." Surat Al-Hashr 59:9.

refugee, was considered to have a pejorative nuance, even connoting impoverishment” (p.13).

According to exhaustive reports by the IOM (2014), during the years following the 1979 Soviet invasion and brutal occupation, over 2.6 million Afghans fled the country and settled into Iranian cities and towns, where they were permitted to live, attend school, and work. Signatory to the 1951 Refugee Conventions, Iran indeed protected and cared for the muhajirin residing within its borders; according to Rajaei, primary and secondary schools were free, and healthcare was subsidized (2000). As muhajirin, the Afghans enjoyed safety and security that was not available in Afghanistan, and although largely consigned to lower skilled labor, many were able to make a good life for themselves, and their status allowed them to remain in Iran indefinitely.

The second wave of refugees during the Afghan civil war (1992-1996) and Taliban reign (1996-2001) was not as warmly received in Iran, as the government and resources were already spread thin after years of post-revolutionary sanctions, and from hosting millions of refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq. These new arrivals were no longer considered to be muhajirin fleeing a despotic regime where they could no longer practice their religion, but rather deprived people seeking temporary safety (Monsutti, 2006; interview with T. Razai, 2017). As opposed to the previously awarded blue identity cards, which allowed the previous muhajirin to work and attend school, the panahandegan either remained undocumented – some by their own will, many by the will of the government (Rajaei 2000) - or received white panahandegan cards, which restricted their movements. Undocumented Afghan children were no longer permitted to attend schools, and a wide scale repatriation program remained a high priority for the government. To this day, there are still just under a million Afghans still residing in Iran (UNHCR 2016), who report discrimination and increasing persecution from the government, who is keen to repatriate as many as possible.

During the same time periods (Soviet Invasion, Civil War, Taliban times), Pakistan saw a similar influx of over five million Afghan refugees crossing the Durand Line into the border regions of Khyber Pakhtunwa (KP) in the north, and Baluchistan in the south. Unlike their counterparts in Iran, however, these refugees were largely confined to border camps⁴ and impoverished cities, only permitted to attend Afghan refugee schools, and not permitted to work. Owing to strong ethnic ties, Afghan Pashtuns largely settled into Peshawar and its surrounding refugee camps, whereas Hazaras generally went further south to Quetta. In both areas, Afghans have faced severe discrimination from Pakistani authorities, police, the general population, as well as terror organizations there. Unable to access the Pakistani school system, many children have gone uneducated for their entire lives in refugee camps and urban refugee enclaves. Afghans are unable to purchase property or secure non-menial jobs without Pakistani identity cards, and the government frequently threatens to rescind Proof of Registration card, which allowed them some degree of integration, keeping the population in a permanent state of uncertainty and instability.

This discrimination has culminated with the mass deportation of hundreds of thousands of Afghans back to conflict-ridden Afghanistan. According to a 2017 Human Rights Watch report:

In the second half of 2016, a toxic combination of deportation threats and police abuses pushed out nearly 365,000 of the country's 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees, as well as just over 200,000 of the country's estimated 1 million undocumented Afghans. The exodus amounts to the world's largest unlawful mass forced return of refugees in recent times. Pakistani authorities have made clear in public statements they want to see similar numbers return to Afghanistan in 2017 (HRW 2017).

2.2.2 Hazara as an Ethnic Minority and Diasporic Identity

Decades of proxy wars, civil war, Taliban rule, and ethnic conflict have ravaged the country, and with the New Unity Government on the brink of collapse, signs of hope

⁴ In fact, the Persian (Iranian Farsi) word for refugee camp is *mehmanshahr*, which literally means "city for guests." In Pakistan, however, refugee camps are referred to as camp-e mohajir, which simply means refugee camp.

for stability and safety are few and far between. Underlying all of the conflicts are the sharp ethnic divisions that have plagued Afghanistan since its birth. There are four main ethnic groups—Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara; Pashtuns are the majority. Although these ethnic groups each have their own cultures, languages, and strong tribal codes, Islam serves as the unifying force in the country. The Hazara minority is distinctive from the others, as they are Shia Muslims, whereas the rest are Sunni, and have prominently Asian features, which makes them distinguishable from the rest of the population. Further distinguishing them from their *watandar*, or countrymen, Ayres points out, “Hazaras are the only ethnic group in Afghanistan without an outside country to support them, as Pakistan did for the Pashtuns, Tajikistan for the Tajiks, and so on.” (Ayres 2017 p.51).

Historically, the Hazara have suffered intense discrimination and persecution, and have narrowly survived two bouts of ethnic cleansing. During the early 20th-century reign of King Abdur Rahman Khan, approximately 60% were murdered or displaced. During the draconian reign of the Taliban, the Shia Hazara were persecuted as *qaafir*, or infidels, leading to devastating massacres and the expulsion of over 12,000 to Australia alone (Saikal, A. 2012). Millions fled to the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan. Due to the prolonged instability and conflict in their homeland, many were resigned to remain there, where, despite being unwelcome and unintegrated, they set up lives for themselves. According to Prof. William Maley, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported that in 2015 there was:

a sharp increase in the abduction and killing of civilians of Hazara ethnicity by anti-government Elements. Between 1 January and 31 December Anti-Government Elements abducted at least 146 member of the Hazaras community in 20 separate incidents.... Many attacks on Hazaras go unreported in Western media, and escape the attention of foreign missions understandably preoccupied with protecting their own personnel in Kabul. (Maley, 2016-2).

Hazara in Afghanistan largely live in three main areas: a Hazara enclave in the capital city of Kabul; the Hazarajat, a barren, mountainous region in the Central Highlands region of the country, accessible only by air or Taliban-controlled road; and the

district of Jaghori, in Ghazni province. Within Kabul, Hazaras are relegated mostly to the poorest sections of town, without access to government services like electricity and water (Shuster 2016). The Central Highlands, despite being home to the famous Bamiyan Buddhas, which were destroyed by the Taliban in 2001, still lack any state provided electricity, which Chiovenda proposes is evidence of systemic discrimination (2014). The Junbish-e Roshani (Enlightenment Movement, also referred to as “Enlightening”) was formed in response to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s decision for the controversial Central Asian TUTAP electricity link to run through a different province, which already has power access. Although initial protests by Junbish-e Roshani were peaceful, a horrific double suicide bombing at a July 2016 protest killed over 90 people.⁵ Jaghori is surrounded by Pashtun territory, leaving the Hazara constrained in movement and vulnerable to attack. As a result of this isolation and persecution, thousands of families have fled to the Pakistani border city of Quetta. In recent years, there has been a significant uptick in violence against Hazaras in Kabul, Jaghori, and Quetta, spurring thousands to flee again and seek secondary and tertiary asylum (Hucal, S. 2016, Shuja, A. 2016, HRW 2014).⁶

Quetta, Pakistan hosts a significant population of Hazaras settled after fleeing persecution in Afghanistan. There, the Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) is a militant Sunni supremacist terror organization, whose 2011 letter to the Hazara community opened with: All Shias are *wajib-ul-qatl* [worthy of killing]. We will rid Pakistan of this unclean people... our mission [in Pakistan] is the abolition of this impure sect and people, the Shias and the Shia-Hazaras, from every city, every village, every nook and corner of Pakistan (Hazara News Pakistan 2012).

⁵ The researcher was still residing in Kabul at the time of the first protest, for which the government provided security, and which was lauded for its peaceful nature. The researcher departed the country weeks before the double suicide attack, which took place at Deh Mazang square, just at the end of the street where the author had been living for the previous two years. Deh Mazang a busy intersection, which largely divides the Hazara side of town from the rest of the capital. All 97 victims of the attack were Hazara.

⁶ It will later be touched upon that the vast majority of research respondents were originally from Jaghori. During one interview, the researcher lamented “Ech adam jawan bar Jaghori nadara, hale koleh inja bar Cisarua astan.” (There are no young men left in Jaghori; they are all here in Cisarua now.)

LeJ have been responsible for hundreds of Hazara deaths, including near weekly target killings, and the two enormous bombings in 2013 in Hazaratown, Quetta, which claimed over 200 lives, and spurred thousands of Hazaras to flee that same year. Despite being labeled as a terror organization by the Pakistani government, LeJ and its related group, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), continue their campaign of extermination nearly unimpeded. Rarely are the actual perpetrators brought to justice, but rather, police and media condemn the bombings and target killings, while taking little further action.

As a result of this pattern of public condemnation followed by inaction, the targeted groups, particularly the Shia of the Punjabi and Hazara communities, seem to have concluded that the state is unwilling or unable to protect them from militants. (Dedalus 2009, p. 43).

As evidenced by the literature, over the course of several generations, the Hazara have fled from their original homelands, to the Hazarajat, to Kabul and Jaghori, and then to Iran and Pakistan; now, they are fleeing once again. They face not just ethnic onslaught from the Taliban, but also religious targeting from terror organizations such as the Islamic State and LeJ (Rathore and Mahmood 2016). However:

Few Hazaras seem interested in armed revenge... For a community that originally came to Quetta to escape Abdul Rahman's depredations over a hundred years ago, it is an ironic fate. An estimated 30,000 of them have risked life-threatening journeys to seek asylum in Australia or Europe rather than wait for the next massacre (Olszewska, 2013).

Despite a century of discrimination, persecution, and what Husain describes as a "simmering genocide" (2015), the Hazara people have learned to:

Remain very vigilant of changing situations and take advantage of every opportunity that comes their way in order to maintain and strengthen their viability as one people. They have learned that it is important for them to be

adaptable to different situations and environments, and to network nationally and internationally in order to promote their objectives (Saikal 2012, p. 83)

Likewise, renowned researcher Liza Schuster explains of the Hazara mindset:

More than any other ethnic group in Afghanistan, the Hazara have embraced educational opportunities at every level, and, though there continues to be a significant gender gap, Hazara girls are also more likely to attend primary, secondary and higher education than girls of any other ethnic group. Government institutions provide very poor quality education, are overcrowded, and teaching is done in three shifts per day, teachers are underpaid and unable to survive from teaching alone. In Hazara areas, government provision is particularly bad, but the Hazara community has built its own schools, and currently the school with the best results in the country is Maktab Marafat in Dashti Barchi... it has the highest rate of success in the Kankor, the University entrance exam (Schuster 2016, p. 5).

Owing to generations of persecution and exile, Hazaras as a people have developed a unique identity of resilience and survival. This has allowed them to succeed in the face of hardship, where other groups have not been able. Hazaras seem to have developed a diasporic identity based on overcoming hatred and discrimination, strengthened by international networks and the emergence of an active civil society in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This international unity has likely contributed to the success of initiatives within the refugee diaspora, which will be discussed in Chapter III: Research Findings.

2.3 Refugees in Indonesia

Given its geographical position, and its huge, porous, and difficult to patrol maritime border, Indonesia has long been not a destination, but a way station on the migration route to Australia, whose historically welcoming policies, security, and freedom have represented strong pull factors for asylum seekers from all over the world. Most refugees “do not have Indonesia in mind as the ultimate country of final settlement. Rather, they view Indonesia as an intended way station and the final stepping stone on the journey to Australia” (Missbach 2015-2, p.7). This section will discuss how

Indonesia has dealt with significant refugee flows in the past, how it is impacted by Australia's migration policies, and the current situation for asylum seekers today.

2.3.1 Indonesia's Refugee History and Policies

Indonesia is a non-signatory to the 1951 Refugee Conventions and the accompanying 1967 protocol; therefore, "refugees and asylum seekers entering Indonesia are mostly considered as illegal immigrants." (Ansori et al. 2017, p. 94). Despite this classification of incoming refugees as criminals, the country does protect against refoulement, providing a very minimum standard of protection.

One of the primary reasons Indonesia has never signed the Geneva Conventions is its position in ASEAN; as the largest and most influential country, Indonesia subscribes to the concept of "the ASEAN way." This includes commitments of non-confrontation, non-interference with the affairs of other ASEAN states, and the sacrosanctity of state sovereignty. One country signing the conventions and accepting refugees would be seen as an indictment of other ASEAN members, who may be refugee-sending countries. According to Kneebone, ASEAN approaches refugee issues without any regional solidarity, and instead places maximum importance on maintaining state sovereignty and practices of non-interference (2016). Although the vast majority of asylum seekers in Indonesia do not come from other ASEAN countries, the government generally adheres to a policy of deterrence:

To date (2015), Indonesia has no functioning asylum system... [It] prefers to discourage potential newcomers and restrict their entry rather than to improve the protection of the asylum seekers, thus undermining the international asylum and protection system (Missbach 2015-2, p. 154).

The rationale may be that if refugees are not welcomed, they will not come. As a result, the over 14,000 refugees waiting within Indonesia are subject to marginalization, neglect, abuse, and worse, despite Indonesia's adherence to the UN conventions on Torture and Civil and Political Rights.

Although non-signatory to the Refugee Conventions, Indonesia has long seen itself as a transit country, and has often played host to large refugee populations flowing through Asia, the first instance being during the Indochinese crisis of the 1970's and 80's, when widespread conflict forced over 1.5 million Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians from their home countries. During this time, regional processing centres and holding camps were set up on various islands in Southeast Asia; Indonesia's Galang was one such island. "The Indonesian government made it very clear that it would not receive refugees permanently, but that it was forced on humanitarian grounds to host transiting migrants temporarily..." (Missbach 2015-2, p. 32-33). To manage the massive refugee flows and alleviate the hosting burden on countries like Indonesia, in 1989 the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) was instated. This consisted of a series of screening mechanisms for refugee status determination, and a framework for either resettlement outside of the region for those awarded refugee status, or repatriation for those whose claims were denied.

While the CPA essentially served as a regional document, the fact that it provided for extra-regional resettlement gave it an international dimension — with a corresponding international responsibility — that the countries of ASEAN wished to emphasize (Casella 2016, p.5).

So even as Indonesia opened its doors to refugees, it did not open them indefinitely, and made clear that they were merely temporary guests, not permanent residents.

Starting from the mid-1990s, asylum seekers from the Middle East, Central Asia, and Sri Lanka started transiting through Indonesia on their way to their intended destination of Australia. These new refugees were fleeing spreading conflicts, as well as countries of primary asylum like Iran and Pakistan, whose policies were becoming increasingly inhospitable (a phenomenon discussed in Section 2.2.1). Despite the success of the CPA, Indonesia still lacked any actual legal framework to process these newly arriving refugees. Not only was there a lack of laws to regulate the processing, but immigration officials also had "no understanding of international refugee

procedures or the work of the UNHCR” (Missbach 2013, p. 297). Rather than deal with the refugees, the Indonesian government instead deferred to UNHCR for refugee processing, correctly assuming they mostly wanted to simply pass through without declaring asylum there (Missbach 2013). Subsequently, just as the CPA processing centres had recently been closed, new centres opened to accommodate the Middle Eastern refugees who were caught en route to Australia.

According to Missbach’s 2015 exposé on people smuggling, refugees generally came through Bangkok or Kuala Lumpur by flight, proceeding to Indonesia by boat. Indonesia itself was never the intended destination, but rather a transit point from which to stage the final maritime journey to Australia. Nardone and Correa-Velez described the Indonesia portion of the refugee voyage thusly: “Their arrival to Indonesia, the final transit country before reaching Australia, was neither their physical nor their mental end of the journey, but rather the beginning of the ultimate boat voyage...” (Nardone and Correa-Velez 2015, p. 301).

During the period from the mid 1990’s until 2001’s Pacific Solution (which will be discussed in section 2.3.2), and then between 2008-2013, tens of thousands made the dangerous journey through the Indian Ocean or over the Timor Sea to Australian territories such as Christmas Island or Ashmore and Cartier Islands (Maley 2016). In order to facilitate these journeys, which included recruitment, money handling, airport, hotel, and boat arrangement, a network of people smugglers was necessary. These clandestine arrangements and voyages were extremely precarious, resulting in the maritime deaths of thousands of asylum seekers, and international outcry over the deplorable circumstances in Indonesian and Australian immigration centres used to detain asylum seekers. The below section will outline the events and Australian policies which have had the most significant impacts on the asylum seekers attempting these journeys, and those who find themselves now trapped in Indonesia.

2.3.2 Australian Policies Impacting Indonesia

Australia and Indonesia are inextricably linked in the roles they play in the fates of tens of thousands of individuals fleeing conflict, persecution, instability, and genocide. As the intended destination for asylum seekers transiting through Indonesia, Australia has implemented a series of policies to manage the flows and arrivals of refugees. The following section will very briefly outline the major incidents and policies that have shaped the lives of asylum seekers thus far, and that are having a lasting impact on the decisions they make, and the changing landscape of Indonesian asylum.

Following the boat arrival of over 12,000 asylum seekers between 1999-2001 and the widely publicized tragic sinking of a refugee boat off the coast of Christmas Island (Maley 2016), the Australian government implemented what was known as the Pacific Solution, staying in place between 2001-2008. The Pacific Solution excised territories such as Christmas Island from Australia's migration zone, meaning refugees who landed in these offshore territories were no longer eligible to submit visa applications or claim asylum, and those arriving unauthorized were sent to detention centres in Nauru and Manus Islands. Additionally, under the Pacific Solution, refugee-bearing boats were also forced back into non-Australian waters, returning refugees back to Indonesia for detention there. Simultaneously, the Australia-funded Regional Cooperation Arrangement put the onus on the Indonesian government to prevent maritime refugees from being able to enter Australian waters in the first place, and then designating IOM and UNHCR to handle the asylum seekers within Indonesia (Taylor and Rafferty-Brown 2010). Although the Pacific Solution and RCA indeed saw a massive decrease in irregular maritime arrivals (as well as deaths), an outrage over the deplorable treatment of detainees in Manus and Nauru, as well as the high cost of the program, brought about an end to the policy at the end of 2007.

As conflicts in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan sent new waves of refugees towards Australia, the incidences of boats sinking steadily increased, and thousands of asylum seekers languished in detention, Australia made the decision in 2012 to reopen the

immigration detention centres in Manus and Nauru, as well as on Christmas island. These centres, according to Briskman and Fiske:

...are sites of imprisonment and follow carceral regimes including multiple daily head counts, use of ‘management units’ (separate compounds, rooms or cells in which people can be held in group or solitary confinement) to control behaviour, limitations on movement within the facilities and restrictions on communication with the world beyond detention and, at times, excessive and arbitrary use of force by guards who seemingly act with impunity (Briskman and Fiske 2016, p. 228).

Soon thereafter, Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) was enacted, whereby all refugee boats headed for Australia were turned back, and “processing and settlement in Australia will never be an option for anyone who travels illegally by boat” (Government of Australia 2017). OSB was accompanied by widespread, Australian-funded print, television, radio, and online campaigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia, aimed at deterring refugees from attempting to reach Australia.⁷ The implementation of these policies indeed resulted in a slowing of the boats departing Indonesia; however, according to Briskman and Fiske, the influx of refugees from Afghanistan, in particular, only increased.

The community was growing as the arrivals continued, but departures had all but stopped... Many refugees who could not find support from anywhere, turned themselves in to Indonesian authorities, asking to be put in detention to get food and shelter. Within a year, detention and community centres were filled beyond capacity and hundreds of refugees camped outside immigration centres waiting to be accepted (Ali et al 2016, p.30).

⁷ In Afghanistan, Teahouse Consulting Agency launched a YouTube ad campaign, wherein every video began with a statement in Farsi, Pashto, and English warning that “you will not make Australia your home” (personal communication with Amanullah Nuristani, CEO of Teahouse Consulting, 2017).

Australia had effectively outsourced its refugee crisis to Indonesia, which lacked the capacity to humanely address it.

In 2014, another significant blow was dealt to refugees: “Asylum seekers who are registered with the UNHCR in Indonesia on or after 1 July 2014 will no longer be eligible for resettlement in Australia” (Ansori et al. p. 92). This created an immediate blockage of thousands of refugees, who had never intended to stay in Indonesia. Then, in December of 2014, the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation was instated, which provided the minister of immigration with “the power to detain people at sea (including outside Australia’s jurisdiction) and send them to other countries or vessels, even without the permission or knowledge of those countries” (Refuge Council of Australia 2016). Notably missing from the legislation were references to the 1951 Refugee Conventions. “As a staging post for asylum seekers en route to Australia, the consequences for Indonesia and those seeking asylum within that country is a steady increase of people in protracted situations” (Ali et al 2016, p. 28).

As Australia’s policies of deterrence aimed to prevent further maritime arrivals and attempts, the conditions at its offshore detention facilities gained international notoriety for their human rights shortcomings, including arbitrary beatings, substandard food, slow and inadequate health care, lack of stimulation, and removal of identity (Bull et al 2011, Farmer 2013, Missbach 2013, Briskman and Fisk 2016, Maley 2016). After a series of damning exposés, the Australian Border Force Act of 2015 was initiated, including a clause making it illegal for an “entrusted person,” anyone working with or for any agency related to Australian immigration and border protection (including agents of foreign governments and international organizations), to disclose “any information that was obtained by a person in the person’s capacity as an entrusted person” (Government of Australia 2015, paragraphs 4, 41)⁸. The penalty for violating the Border Force Act is two years of imprisonment; basically, Australia

⁸ The simplified outline of part 6 of the Australian Border Force Act 2015 states: “An entrusted person must not make a record of or disclose protected information unless the making of the record or disclosure is authorised by a provision of this Part, is in the course of the person’s employment or service as an entrusted person or is required or authorised by law or by an order or direction of a court or tribunal.”

has instituted a gag rule, making it impossible for anyone to share accurate information of the actual conditions of the detention islands, further isolating refugees from the rest of the world. This is significant for several reasons. The gag rule prevents would-be refugees from accessing adequate and accurate information, which could affect their migration decisions. Further, communities and individuals within Australia who do not have the full picture of the conditions in which asylum seekers are detained, cannot possibly understand the scale of human rights violations wrought against them, let alone sympathize with their plight. ASEAN countries and their policies are heavily influenced by Australia and its policies for refugee management. Policy change is unlikely without support, and support is unlikely without knowledge.

2.3.3 Refugees in Indonesia Today: A Snapshot

According to UNHCR, as of December 2016, there are 14,405 people of concern in Indonesia, with only 636 resettled in 2015-2016. (UNHCR 2016-3,4). As Indonesia is a non-signatory to the 1951 Geneva Conventions, but signatory to CAT and ICCPR, refugees are generally safe from *refoulement*, but unfortunately cannot hope for local integration. There is extremely limited support from organizations such as UNHCR, IOM, the Jesuit Refugee Services, and Catholic World service; it is grossly insufficient, most often leaving refugees dependent on remittances from the homes they fled in the first place (APPRN 2017). Refugees are not allowed to work, and “the majority of regional governments do not allow foreigners to send their children to Indonesian schools” (Nethery et al 2011, p. 93). Because of this inability to do basically anything, refugees find themselves trapped in circumstances of intractable uncertainty, boredom, and stasis, with nothing to do other than await their refugee status determinations, and subsequent word of resettlement. According to UNHCR officials, due to the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis and the shifting priorities and agency funds, refugees can expect their waiting times to increase for many years (Gunawan 2016).⁹ This, coupled with the United States’ February 2017 “Refugee

⁹ In fact, during the time of writing, the researcher received the following message from the founders of the Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre: “Recently UNHCR representatives from Indonesia and Thailand

Ban,” has caused further delays and desperation, as refugees slated for US resettlement saw their status shifted from “processing” to “indefinite hold” (Brown 2017; personal communication from S. Adiba).

A December 2016 Presidential Decree does lay some groundwork for “a more comprehensive and coordinated approach in Indonesia’s response to asylum seekers and refugees” (APPRN 2017, p. 45), particularly in that refugees are no longer recognized as illegal migrants, but rather under the definition of refugees as outlined by the 1951 Conventions. Further, according to the International Detention Coalition, the decree includes provisions outlining which government agencies will be responsible for retrieving refugees stranded at sea, managing detention centres, and caring for the most extremely vulnerable refugees (IDC 2017). This is a step in a positive direction, but the reality is that refugees are still facing more than a decade of limbo in Indonesia.

2.4 Protraction and Limbo

2.4.1 Protraction

Much has been written about protracted refugee situations in the world. According to the UNHCR, a protracted refugee situation is defined as when:

Refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance (UNHCR 2004).

visited the school and told the community that they must be ready for a 10 or 15 years wait, and that many would not get resettled from Indonesia” (Email from J. Hoff, founder of CRLC, October 2017).

Protraction roughly refers to “populations of 25,000 or more who have been in exile for five or more years in developing countries.” As of 2017, the U.S. State Department reports over 30 protracted situations, with over 6.7 million refugees therein (HIU 2016).

Some of the most significant and longest lasting examples of protraction include over 5 million Palestinians living in Jordan, Lebanon, and other Levant countries, hundreds of thousands of Somalis living in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, over a million Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, hundreds of thousands of Burmese in camps along the Thai-Myanmar border, and many more. Unfortunately, over the last few years, significant international crises in the Middle East and Central Africa have created massive new refugee flows, and the rapidly escalating genocide in Myanmar has thrown hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into a humanitarian crisis on the Bangladeshi border. It is clear that, despite the ongoing efforts of the international aid community, protracted refugee situations are only going to increase.

In their series on protracted refugee situations in the 2005 Adelphi Papers, Loescher and Milner demonstrate that the presence of protracted refugee groups creates further instability in the countries hosting them, mostly developing nations themselves. This instability manifests with the weakening of local governances, as well as increased distrust from local societies of the “outsiders” waiting within their borders. Protraction is described as involving refugees who are “largely confined to refugee camps or settlements, have little or no livelihood, and are highly dependent on international assistance” (Loescher and Milner 2005, p.36).

In their 2016 book, “Refugees in Extended Exile, Living on the Edge,” Hyndeman and Giles write extensively about the concept of “long-term exile,” wherein

People who are displaced from their home countries and live in long-term exile [and] become largely invisible to the outside world. Once refugees are “saved” from violence, hunger and imminent death, an assumption is often

made that the humanitarian crisis is over and human suffering ends. For most refugees, this is not the case (Hyndman and Giles 2016, p.1).

This speaks to the need to view situations of protraction in terms of mid to long-term development, rather than a humanitarian response, which can only address the short term urgent needs of food and shelter, and not the important needs of human development and protection. This is echoed by Lui (2007), who points out how refugee populations usually fade into the background of humanitarian and development assistance, in light of more urgent and emerging refugee crises. Indeed the world's major protracted situations have not been ameliorated, despite existing for decades. The Palestinians, Somalis, Afghans, and millions more, who have been born into protraction, run the risk of being forgotten as the conflicts which sent them fleeing remain unresolved.

2.4.2 Limbo

Experts Sampson, Gifford, and Taylor compile a list of terms used by a variety of authors, almost helplessly, to describe the concept of limbo:

‘in-between-ness’ (Balduck 2008; Hightower 2015; Stock 2012)... ‘on hold’ (Brekke and Brochmann 2014), ‘stuckedness’ (Missbach 2014)... ‘involuntary immobility’ (Carling 2002)... ‘constant interim arrangement’ (Hess 2012) (Sampson et al 2016, p. 1137-1138).

Within academic literature, there seems to be no agreed-upon definition of limbo, as it is, in and of itself, such a diffuse concept, trying to place value on uncertainty. For the purpose of this thesis, I will define limbo as being “long-term transit,” drawing from Dowd’s conceptualization of the “stranded migrant,” (2008), the synthesis of Sampson et al. of “indefinite transit,” (2016), and Missbach’s 2015 “state of permanent temporariness.”

One of the most startling hallmarks of long-term transit is that of the transformation of the intention of the refugee who is stuck. For example, refugees who are stranded in a transit country like Indonesia likely never had the intention of settling there, but rather planned only for a brief stop en route to Australia or another third country. However, when the option onwards migration is no longer possible, refugees lose their agency, and find themselves trapped in a holding pattern of continuous uncertainty. Therefore, “Living in transit is not a brief sojourn on the way to somewhere else, but rather an indefinite and potentially permanent state of precariousness” (Sampson et al 2016 p. 1135).

During a period of long-term transit, refugees’ lives are reduced to the torturous anticipation of “hurry up and wait;” all the things they had done and all the things they had been before are stripped away. Not only do they suffer a loss of homeland, but they also suffer a grave loss of identity. In the absence of the ability to work or go to school, such titles as ‘student,’ ‘mechanic,’ ‘lawyer,’ or ‘farmer’ no longer mean anything. As Missbach says:

If neither onwards migration nor integration into a transit country are viable options, transit migrants become second- or third-class inhabitants, deprived of basic rights because of restrictive policies of that transit country which seek to prevent their long-term integration into its society (Missbach 2015-2, p 17).

It is in this state of limbo and desperation that Bull et al. (2011) write that individuals stuck in indefinite detention or uncertainty can develop mental and psychological issues. These can be due not just to the loss of identity, the loss of agency, and the loss of one’s future, but also the crippling boredom and immovability that accompanies the inability to work or go to school. Taylor and Rafferty-Brown describe these losses as “dying by stages” (2010).

Although the terms are often used interchangeably, protraction and limbo represent different ideas. There is something somewhat more permanent about protraction; it is not better, by any means, but it is perhaps more stable, in that there is little

assumption that anything is going to change. In a state of limbo, there is a constant awareness and expectation that something COULD change, that something SHOULD change, but that the person in limbo has no control over any of the factors that would make this change possible. Limbo is intransigence, stasis, stalemate. This is the temporal, physical, and psychological state which the research community occupies, and therefore the questions, hypothesis, and observations are all conducted within this frame.

2.5 Conceptual Frameworks

This thesis draws from two sets of conceptual frameworks; the Capabilities Approach, and Social Capital Theory. The frameworks were chosen because they are the most apt at understanding the subject matter at hand, as depicted in detail in the first half of the literature review. The capabilities approach helps to describe the personal transformation that takes place during situations of limbo, catalyzed by conversion factors (e.g. social capital). Social capital theory hence takes the framework provided by the capabilities approach and further refines it, helping to both explain the diasporic identity of the Hazara ethnic minority as well as describe the social networks that brought them to Indonesia. It will be argued that it is ultimately this conversion factor that helped them to survive (and in some cases even thrive) there. In the following section, I will give a brief overview of these ideas, and conclude with the reasons for employing them in this thesis.

2.5.1 Capabilities Approach

The capabilities approach is a broad paradigm for evaluating individual advantage and social structures, and for identifying the social constraints that restrict or influence

welfare. The approach gives a framework with which to analyze well-being, based on what individuals are actually able to achieve, dependent on their circumstances, and allows for targeted policies to be designed to improve individual well-being. Amartya Sen, based the Capabilities Approach on the understanding of “living as a combination of various ‘doings and beings’, with quality of life to be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings” (Sen 1993, p. 31).

Capabilities refers to the freedom and opportunity to enjoy or pursue a particular set of functionings. *Functionings* refer to states of being and doing; for example, the state of being safe and secure, being educated, being part of a social network; working, walking outdoors, reading a book, and *Achieved Functionings* refer to those functionings an individual chooses to pursue. These concepts are all closely related and can easily be confused, and Sen explains thusly: “A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to achieve” (Sen 1987, referenced by Robeyns 2003, p. 11). In other words, functionings are living conditions, whereas capabilities are the opportunities to realize those conditions.

Whereas Sen formulated this approach to be used as a broad paradigm, Nussbaum further develops the notion of functionings down to a more specific concept of ‘central functional capabilities’ as “fundamental entitlements inherent to the very idea of minimum social justice, or a life worthy of human dignity” (Nussbaum 2011, p. 24-25). These would include the very basic general capabilities of being sheltered, safe, and healthy, and access to education, social interaction, emotional well-being etc. It is from this idea of fundamental entitlements that she constructed her understanding of social justice, and the idea that governments have a responsibility to guarantee within their constitutions the central functional capabilities, in order to achieve minimum standards of well-being for its citizens (Nussbaum, 2003). In this same school of thought, Wilson-Strydom argues that not only governments, but also social organizations and the very structures of society should be designed to expand peoples’ capabilities and freedoms to achieve the functionings they value (Wilson-Strydom 2011).

Particular attention should be paid to conversion factors, or characteristics or circumstances that influence a person's ability to convert resources, commodities, and the means to achieve, into actual capabilities. Robeyns writes about the three categories of conversion factors: personal, social, and environmental (2005). Personal conversion factors would include things like a person's physical condition and intellect; social conversion factors include things like public policies, gender roles, and social norms; environmental conversion factors include climate and geographical location (Robeyns 2005). All of these factors play significant roles on how effectively individuals are able to actualize capabilities, and will be a significant focus of this thesis.

2.5.2 Social Capital Theory

Social Capital Theory is sometimes described as a new term for an old concept. In 1840, De Tocqueville described the changing conditions in America, noting the emergence of new social patterns of labour and independence, social participation, and their impact on the burgeoning democracy. From then on, many scholars touched about the ideas surrounding social capital, but the theory saw somewhat of a renaissance in the late 20th century, when sociologists and scholars like Bourdieu, Putnam, and Coleman began studying social capital in earnest. The central idea within Social Capital Theory is that networks of relationships, along with their various forms of connections and levels of depth, are invaluable for the human development of individuals and groups in society (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1988, Putnam 1995 and 2001, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, Woolcock 1998, etc). As a core concept, this theory has been applied to a multitude of fields such as sociology, economics, corporate psychology, political science, and many more. With the proliferation of social media networks like Facebook and Twitter, interest in the concepts of social capital has moved into the mainstream, and the theory is being used to inform a variety of debates surrounding civic engagement around the world.

The central themes of Social Capital Theory are social capital itself, bonding, bridging, and linking networks, and ideas of trustworthiness, obligation, and

reciprocity. These will all be discussed below, but it should first be noted that these concepts are certainly not exclusive to Social Capital Theory; indeed, there is great intersectionality between this conceptual framework and many other theories of gender, inequality, migration, entrepreneurship, and more.

Social capital can be generally defined as “networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995 p.66). Individuals or groups of people build social capital through changes in relations in their various networks. This is a bit general, so in order to better understand the theory, it is necessary to unpack some terms for the different types of network relationships. Bonding networks refer to strong links with people with a shared identity like family and close friends, as well as shared ethnic group, culture, or religion. Bridging networks go a step beyond bonds, referring to more distant links such as colleagues, associates, friends of friends etc. Linking networks refer to relationships of a more official or institutional nature, for example with government officials, political or economic institutions, or people higher up or lower down the social ladder. Over the years many judgements have been made about the benefits or detriments of bonding networks vs. bridging networks (Keeley 2007, Patulny et al 2007); however, this thesis does not purport to make such distinctions, but rather, like Woolcock (2001), seeks to understand the different combinations of bonding, bridging, and linking networks that contribute to the current situation of the subjects of the study. Parallel with bonding and bridging are the important concept of exclusion. This should be understood in a completely neutral sense, as all forms of social capital can be both beneficial and detrimental (Keeley 2007). For example, strong bonding networks can simultaneously build up a safety net for its members, and also hinder their development within a wider society.

These networks and social structures hinge upon a high degree of trustworthiness, wherein different actors can rely on the reciprocity of their social compacts. This goes beyond simply ‘I scratch your back, you scratch mine;’ rather, there must be “durable obligations arising from feelings of gratitude, respect, and friendship or from the institutionally guaranteed rights derived from membership in a family, a class, or a

school” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, p. 243). This is demonstrated in the myriad of case studies about immigrant entrepreneurship and self-employment, whose success often rely heavily on family enterprise mindsets, and multiplex relationships of both bonded and bridged networks. Though there have been many studies concerning this very topic, the academic focus has been entirely on resettled refugees, or asylum seekers in communities where they have the right to work (Lamba and Krahn 2003, Fong et al 2008, Bizri 2017). For the purposes of this thesis, I have chosen to focus the social capital lenses on protracted refugee situations where the discussion is not around the success of a business, the integration of a community, the status of civic engagement, or any of the other more traditionally studied areas, but rather on the very ability of refugees within the protracted community to survive. This refers not just to food and shelter, but also the ability to access goods and services, interact with people outside their immediate households, and significantly, be able to maintain psychological well-being in indefinite transit.

Finally, for the purposes of this study, it is important to understand the different dimensions of social capital: the structural, relational, and cognitive aspects help to describe and clarify the patterns of connections, the nature of relationships between different actors, and the cultural understandings that facilitate connections (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). The structural dimension of social capital refers to the pattern or map of connections between different actors- to whom do people connect, and how. This structural map is important in order to understand how multiplex relationships connect to each other, how individuals connect into the networks of other individuals and so on. The relational dimension of social capital is more personal, describing the nature of interpersonal relationships, and the social assets that develop therefrom. It is through the relational dimension that resources like trust, norms and expectations, and obligations and expectations are built up (Coleman 1988, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, Putnam 1995). The third dimension of social capital, the cognitive dimension, deals with the aspect of shared culture, language, norms, and codes. This dimension is crucial for the understanding of all other aspects of social capital theory, as it both provides the glue that binds together the structures of social networks, and also lays the foundation of understanding for relational capital.

The success or demise of a community can be best understood through a social capital framework. As Putnam (1995) wrote:

For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital... dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants' sense of self, developing the "I" into "we..." (pp. 66-67).

2.6 Knowledge Gaps

Dr. Antje Missbach's seminal work, *Troubled Transit: Asylum Seekers Stuck in Indonesia* (2015), completed research during the summer of 2014, at the tail-end of a great rift in Indonesian-Australian diplomatic relations. In November 2014, just a few months after research completed, Australia's Minister for Immigration and Border Protection announced that "asylum seekers who have registered with UNHCR after 1 July 2014 will no longer be eligible for one of the 11,000 humanitarian program places set aside for asylum seekers living overseas" (Farrell 2014). Further to this, in October 2017, UNHCR officials approached members of the Cisarua refugee community to tell them they should expect waiting time to increase to 10-15 years.

What is the transition between protraction and limbo and back to protraction? How should this be addressed? "When does temporary stop and permanent start?" (Missbach 2015-2, p. 16). For communities who find themselves caught in the shifting tides between temporary displacement and protraction, within countries who are non-signatory to the 1951 Refugee Conventions, how can aid organizations and NGOs address their needs, or should this work instead be shifted to development initiatives? In the absence of outside assistance, refugees in the Cisarua community have taken aid and development into their own hands. But the most important and central question is: why have Hazara refugees in Cisarua succeeded where others have not?

The main theoretical themes addressed here- diasporic identity, limbo, capabilities, and social capital- may seem unrelated; however, these all, in fact, complement each other in explaining the complex set of circumstances of the thesis. For example, Coleman (1988) discusses various dimensions of social capital, including traditional structures of tribal networks. In relation to the current thesis, it is interesting to note that the subjects of the case study come from such tribal social structures; however, over the course of their exile and protraction, they have been able to break out of these traditional social capital arrangements, in part due to their transforming identity. Additionally, the conversion factors needed and employed in the capabilities development of the subjects result directly from newly formed bridging and linking networks that were only made available by protraction in Indonesia in the first place. These themes will be applied in detail in Chapter IV Analysis: From Vulnerability to Capability.

CHAPTER III: RESEARCH FINDINGS

The researcher conducted two ethnographic research trips to Cisarua, Indonesia, one research trip to Toronto, Canada, as well as online interviews via Skype and Facebook messenger. During all three trips, the researcher lived with refugees, shadowed them during their daily activities, i.e. attending staff meetings at the learning centre, working in classrooms, organizing activities for the students, helping families prepare meals, shopping in the local bazaars, socializing with other refugee individuals and families, and drinking *chai*.

3.1 Introduction to Cisarua, Indonesia

Formerly a brief transit point on the way to Australia, the town of Cisarua, Indonesia, was meant to be a temporary stopover for refugees from the Middle East, South and Central Asia, en route to Australia. However, in 2013, Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) was implemented, effectively halting all boat arrivals to Australia and creating a bottleneck of refugees stranded in Indonesia. There are currently about 7,000 Afghan refugees and asylum seekers residing in Indonesia, most of whom have been there for several years. Cisarua is located approximately three hours from Jakarta, somewhat accessible to the UNHCR and IOM offices in the capital, but without the overcrowding and high rental prices. Cisarua has become an unusual pull for Afghan refugees; of the town's population of about 113,000, nearly 5,000 are Afghan asylum seekers of the Hazara ethnic minority, awaiting refugee-status determination and resettlement. Although Indonesia is a Sunni-majority country, Shia Muslims like the Hazara do not face the same persecution they do in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and women enjoy the same freedoms, to a certain extent, as those of men. Social networks have been built up over the years, as more and more refugees arrive and are unable to move onwards. According to refugees in Cisarua, asylum seekers are now traveling to Indonesia not with the intention of reaching Australia, but to stay in Cisarua and seek resettlement from there.

Despite the improvement in their security conditions, the Afghan refugees face many challenges. Due to the Syrian conflict, UNHCR warns that resettlement waiting times may be extended by several years. Many of the refugees have already been in Indonesia for up to five years, and are being advised that wait times could increase 10 to 15 more¹⁰. Coming to terms with this prolonged and uncertain transit, and in the absence of support from the Indonesian government, the Afghan refugee community has had to fend for themselves. As such, some of the refugees have set up and staffed learning centres, which provide schooling for children and English and computer classes for adults. Other refugees have set up community groups such as a women's handicraft group¹¹, a karate club, and a football league. These schools and community groups have significantly strengthened the community and given their participants a renewed sense of hope and purpose in their lives of limbo.

The physical community of Cisarua is built around a 20 kilometer ascending stretch of Jalan Raya Puncak, a narrow two-lane road lined with bazaars, small shops, restaurants, and hotels. Secondary roads branch off to form small neighborhoods; however, Jalan Raya is the only paved road connecting the main West Java cities of Bogor and Bandung. Because of this, during rush hours and weekends, the government institutes a one-way system, stopping all traffic from one direction to accommodate the cars and huge passenger buses heading to and from Bandung. The primary forms of transportation are *angkot*, public shared minivan taxi; *ojek*, public motorcycle taxi; or simply walking¹² along either the road, or the gutter beside the road. At the base of the Jalan Raya is Cisarua's main bazaar, with shops selling both Indonesian and Afghan goods. Further up the road lies the Bazaar Arab, with more

¹⁰ Hearbreakingly, between the time of thesis defense (February 2018) to final submission (March 2018), UNHCR visited the community once again, and informed them that their waiting time would now approach 25 years.

¹¹ The women's handicraft group is no longer meeting, as the leader was resettled to the United States in 2016. Unfortunately, nobody was able or willing to take up the leadership mantle.

¹² During one site visit, the researcher was walking up Jalan Raya Puncak with a refugee family, when one of the children suffered a serious wound from slipping on the rock and garbage-strewn road shoulder. The child's foot was grievously cut; however, the mother said they had no access to a reliable medical facility, so they poured water on the wound, wrapped it in a torn shirt to stop the bleeding, and continued walking up the road.

expensive shops with international goods, as well as many stalls of sheep and goats for Arab restaurants.

Demographically, Cisarua is a mix of Indonesians, Afghan asylum seekers, and a constant flow of tourists from Saudi Arabia seeking cooler climates and a more liberal lifestyle. Owing to the large percentage of foreigners who are unable to work, but still spend money, the town of Cisarua has changed from a rural hamlet into a developing village with a growing economy. Several refugees reported that before the influx of Arab tourists, they would go to pray and worship alongside their Indonesian neighbors; however, due to the strong Arab presence, they no longer felt welcome or safe in the Sunni mosques. In fact, of the 25 refugees interviewed, only four reported that religion played a significant role in their life in transit, and five reported that, since coming to Indonesia, that they had given up religion altogether.

One even said “The prophet cannot help me. What has the prophet ever done for me? Look where I am” (Bakhtiyari, A., personal interview, 19 April 2017). The situation is further exasperated by the complete lack of Shia mosques in Cisarua.



Figure 5: Map of Cisarua (Google Maps)

3.2 Origins of Migration

The Hazara ethnic minority hail historically from the Central Highlands of Afghanistan; however, waves of persecution and genocide drove them into three main areas: Jaghori, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan; Dasht-e Barchi, Kabul Province, Afghanistan; and Hazaratown, Quetta, Pakistan. It is from these three locales that the vast majority of asylum seekers in Cisarua hail. The Afghan Central Highlands still remain the homeland of Hazaras; however, due to the remoteness and inaccessibility of the region, there is virtually no Taliban presence, and the region is the most stable and secure in Afghanistan. Despite the extreme poverty, there is not a significant population of asylum seekers fleeing the Central Highlands region, and the researcher only encountered one family (not official respondents to the research) from this area.




has the highest *kankur*, the national university entrance exam, pass rate in Afghanistan¹³. Despite this, many respondents from Jaghori reported that they had not received education beyond a primary level. Two respondents had been almost completely illiterate prior to coming to Indonesia, and through the efforts of CRLC were learning both Farsi and English for the first time. One learned for the first time how to use not just a mobile phone, but a smartphone with Facebook, Viber, and Whatsapp, in order to communicate with family members remaining in Jaghori.

Security was the number one concern for asylum seekers from Jaghori. 11 out of 13 respondents from Jaghori specifically cited Taliban attacks on Hazaras in the region as a primary reason for fleeing. One lost one of his sons to a curable disease because the road to the nearest treatment facility was blocked to Hazaras by the Taliban. Two respondents, in separate unrelated incidents, were kidnapped by the Taliban on roads leading to Jaghori. One was released after negotiating himself, the other was released after his family members paid a ransom; however, his travel companion was killed. One woman, who had lost a son to the Taliban, stated, “Everyone here has a family member who has been kidnapped or killed by the Taliban” (personal interview, 29 April, 2017). Despite the inability to work or attend official school in Indonesia, the freedom from fear of the Taliban represented an infinitely better life.

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CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

¹³ It should be noted that, according to the World Bank, Afghanistan has the second lowest literacy rate in the world, only 31%. Ghazni province has a literacy rate of 49.6 percent, second only to Kabul, at 56.7 percent.




3.2.2 Dasht-e Barchi, Afghanistan

Two respondents, approximately 8 percent of the official interview subjects came from Dashte-Barchi, Kabul Province, Afghanistan. Both of these respondents were female, and traveling with very large families; one in a family of nine, one in a family of 10. Both had been waiting for three and a half years at the time of interview; neither of them have been resettled at the time of writing. One respondent's family had previously been approved for resettlement by the United States, had completed their interviews and medical checks, and had been waiting for their visas to be finalized, when her case was changed to "indefinite hold," with the 27th January 2017 suspension of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). As of January 2018, the United States has reportedly resumed their resettlement program; however, according to CRLC manager Khalil Payeez, "They have cancelled all the interviews that happened a year and a half ago, and are now re-interviewing everyone, and told them the process is slower than before" (personal interview, 28 January, 2018).

Bonding social capital network ties within the diasporic Hazara community began forming long before displacement. Jaghori and Dasht-e Barchi are linked through strong family and cultural ties, despite the physical distance. Several of the research

subjects from Jaghori temporarily resided in Dasht-e Barchi while awaiting their passports and documents from Kabul for their onward journeys.

Dasht-e Barchi, meaning wasteland of spears, is a Hazara enclave in the west of Kabul¹⁴. Much like Jaghori, Dasht-e Barchi boasts the highest education rates and female literacy in the country, with many Hazaras viewing education as the primary means of surviving in a country rife with discrimination and persecution against their ethnicity. All respondents from Kabul were from Dasht-e Barchi, and cited the deteriorating political and security situation as their reasons for fleeing. Indeed over the last several years, there have been an increasing number of attacks on Dasht-e Barchi, and the Darulaman Road, the main road leading into the enclave. Both the Taliban and Daesh (the Farsi name for the Islamic State) have claimed responsibility for complex suicide attacks on mosques, schools, and the bazaar in Dasht-e Barchi. Notably, Daesh carried out a massive attack on a peaceful demonstration at Deh Mazang square on Darulaman Road, which claimed the lives of over a hundred protesters, the majority of whom were Hazara. Momo-e jan, the eldest of the respondents, learned of the death of one of his sons at Deh Mazang when he had already been in Indonesia for two years; his housemates were afraid to tell him the news, due to his advanced age and poor health. He was unable to go back to Afghanistan to bury his son, and fears for the lives of his other children.



¹⁴ When the researcher was living in Afghanistan, she was frequently warned to stay away from Dasht-e Barchi, as it was considered to be dirty and dangerous. However, visits to the area revealed that, for Hazaras, there was no danger; in fact, given that the researcher has strong Hazara features, it was actually safer for her to move around in Dasht-e Barchi than many other parts of Kabul.

Figure: Map of Dasht-e Barchi area of Kabul (Calogero, P. 2006.)

3.2.3 Quetta, Pakistan

Nine respondents, or 36 percent of the official interview subjects came from Quetta, Pakistan. Many of them were originally from Ghazni province, but at one point had fled south to Pakistan. Only two respondents actually had held Pakistani passports prior to asylum in Indonesia; the rest were second round refugees from Afghanistan. Of the nine respondents, three were female, and nine male. Five were traveling unaccompanied; four were traveling with families. Their limbo duration ranged from six months to four years at the time of interviews; one respondent had already been resettled to the United States and was interviewed via Skype, one refugee was resettled with her family to Canada directly after the first interview in January 2017; however, none of the other respondents have been resettled at the time of writing.

Every one of them cited security concerns, specifically the target killings of Hazaras, as their main reason for fleeing. The situation in Quetta is documented in section 2.2.2 of the literature review: “Hazara as an Ethnic Minority and Diasporic Identity.” All of the issues outlined there regarding the genocide, target killings, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, and Pakistani Taliban, were reinforced by the accounts of every single refugee from Quetta. Three of the respondents had been present during the 2013 Hazaratown bombing, which was the catalyst for thousands of Hazaras to flee.

Prior to fleeing to Indonesia, CRLC Manager Khalil Payeez worked at an English language school in Quetta. He was both a teacher and one of the managers, responsible for running the afternoon session. Between 2012 and 2013, complex attacks and target killings against Hazaras were a near constant, but it was decided amongst the managers that they should only cancel school if a certain number of people had been killed. “More than five, it is closed, and everybody knows. Less than five, everybody has to come, because it was a daily routine. Every day at least one or two people were killed...” If they closed for every attack and target killing, there

would be no more school. Describing the bomb blast which killed over 100 people, which was the final straw for many Hazaras, he stated: “On the roof you could find dead bodies. You could find heads, you could find fingers, just body parts everywhere... you could not even identify anyone from the remains.” Khalil was a teacher at this school; Khadim Dai and N. Barakzai were students there at the time; both survived the attack, and fled immediately thereafter (Payeez, K. personal interview 30 April, 2017).



Figure 10: CRLC founder, Khadim Dai, and classmates; classroom after 2013 blast in Hazaratown, Quetta. (Sydney Morning Herald 2014)




Figure 11: Attacks on Hazaras in Quetta, Pakistan (Hazara Organization for Peace and Equality)

3.3 Push and Pull factors

Of the 25 refugees interviewed, every one of them cited security as the main reason for fleeing their countries of origin. Not a single person cited financial difficulties as playing a role in their decision to leave. Most respondents cited multiple reasons for fleeing their countries, including security, the Taliban, political problems, gender inequality, discrimination against specific professions or social groups like musicians, and most significantly, the widespread discrimination, violence towards, and target killings of Hazaras. Every respondent reported at least one family member had been killed or kidnapped, and every respondent reported having encountered discrimination because of their ethnicity.

Across the board, respondents chose to flee east, as opposed to west towards Europe, for common reasons, the most significant being existing family members already residing in Australia. Many assumed Australia was still more welcoming to refugees than Europe, despite news of Operation Sovereign Borders, and the campaigns of refugee deterrence. Other pull factors include:

- Existing Hazara community in Australia
- “Australia was a little bit cheaper... and less risky because you were crossing fewer countries” (Dai, K. personal interview, 22 May, 2017).
- “The European route was closed... Europe takes months... and you need to go through difficulties and very bad countries to go there” (Barakzai, N. personal interview, 30 April, 2017).
- “We came here legally... with passports and visas, because there was a lot [of rumors] about being resettled from Indonesia” (Adiba, S. personal interview 24 April, 2017).

Many refugees reported that they did not even know where they were headed, they just needed to get out as quickly as possible, and relied entirely on their smugglers to bring them to a safe destination. “I didn’t know where I was going, I didn’t even pack,

I just had to leave at once” (group interview, 29 April, 2017). Even after Australia announced in July 2014 that those seeking asylum by boat would no longer be eligible for settlement, refugees still chose to come to Indonesia, knowing that even if they had to wait for a long time, it was still safer than from whence they were coming, and their chances of resettlement to any third country were better with UNHCR Indonesia.

We had some problems in Iran, and we couldn’t move to Afghanistan because of the [in]security, so we decided to come here. We had two options, moving to Europe or Indonesia. We researched about it and found this way to be safer (Atahi, S. personal interview, 24 April 2017).

3.4 Life in Indonesia

Of the 25 respondents from Cisarua, 10 were female, and 15 were male. 12 were traveling unaccompanied (1 female, 12 male), and 13 were traveling with family, both immediate and extended. Ages of respondents ranged from 17 to mid-70’s; however, it should be noted that, due to poor or absent records-keeping, many Afghans do not know their actual age.

3.4.1 Methods of Flight

Social capital networks played a role in every step of the asylum journey. Each of the respondents employed a smuggling network to get to Indonesia. Smuggling networks consisted of local Afghans or Pakistani coordinators in the countries of origin, linked to the refugees through families or friends, local officials in Thai, Malaysian, and Indonesia airports, Afghans and Pakistani operatives within the transit countries, Malaysian and Indonesian drivers, hoteliers, and fishing boat operators. These

networks were vast and varied, connecting people of many different nationalities, languages, professions, spanning multiple countries over borders of land and sea.

The refugees' experiences with the smuggling networks varied greatly; one reported that the smugglers tried to take advantage of him, steal his money, feed him false information about his security; whereas another reported that his "smugglers were great! They were more like travel agents than smugglers! I felt like I was a prince, being escorted to immigration and to the planes" (Noori, A. personal interview 19 April, 2017). Most respondents took similar routes:

- Flights from Quetta-Islamabad-Oman/Jordan/Dubai-Kuala Lumpur, overland to coastal area, boat over the Straits of Malacca, overland to Pekanbaru, flight to Jakarta.
- Flights from Kabul-India-Malaysia, overland to coast, boat to Indonesia, flight to Jakarta.
- Flights from Quetta/Kabul-Islamabad-Bangkok, overland to Malaysia coastal area, boat to Indonesia, flight to Jakarta.
- Flights from Kabul-India-Singapore-Surabaya, overland to Jakarta.

All respondents described the smuggling networks to be extensive and well organized, involving up to 30 members, placed throughout each airport, immigration checkpoint, hotel, and maritime point. Those with preexisting English skills had easier times in the airports, as they were able to read and communicate without suspicion; however, those without such skills were fearful every step of the way, at the mercy of the smugglers. Respondents paid the smuggling networks anywhere between USD4,000 and USD8,000 per person for fake visas, flights, overland and maritime transports, and hotels. Several respondents came "illegally legally," with either real visas procured by illegal means, or with real visas, which they overstayed.

“Everyone was afraid of transiting in Malaysia. Inside the airport if you are caught, there are no more questions, just you are sent back... but outside the airport if you are caught, six months initial jail. Done...” Khalil was instructed by his smugglers where to inconspicuously ‘stay busy’ in the Kuala Lumpur airport, and to purchase a sim card from one of the cleaners in the immigration hall. He went to immigration counter 45, as previously instructed. The officer looked at him and said, “From Pakistan?” and stamped his passport. When Khalil later checked, he saw that the immigration officer himself was part of the smuggling network; he had put a fake stamp into his passport.

Khalil was traveling with two other men from the same smugglers. As they were only able to speak very little English, the smuggler ordered Khalil to wait for them and guide them around. “I booked a taxi for the hotel where I was supposed to go, but when I came out of the airport, a lady jumped in front of me. I was shocked. I thought, “This is it, I am caught,” and I just lost myself.” However, she was just the concierge, trying to help him. When he was about to put his bags into the boot, the smuggler called him and told him to wait for the others, who had gotten lost in the airport. However, when he went back inside to search for them, he learned they had been caught by the police. He never heard from him again (Payeez, K. personal interview 30 April, 2017).

Kentucky Fried Chicken

It was 3rd October 2013, early morning at 6am, when we landed in Thailand. It was raining and the weather was so hot. As I was walking through the airport, holding my baby son with one hand, and our suitcase with the other. Tabassum was walking beside me. We had no idea where to go and what to do. Then all of a sudden a man [one of the smugglers] appeared in front of us, and told us not to look at him, but to keep walking behind him. He instructed us to hide behind a big pillar and

wait for his sign. Then he told us to go to the counter to stamp our passports. When we came out of the airport, a different man was standing beside a taxi and made us to sit inside.

They took us in a hotel and told us not to go outside, as we would be arrested by the police. But I was wondering if we have legal visa and passport how come police can arrest us. After that we slept for the whole day and woke up in the middle of the night, because we were hungry, but what to eat? I had no idea. I walked down at the lobby, but the receptionist said the only restaurant open late was Kentucky Fried Chicken, and she called for a taxi to take us there. I took the kids to KFC, where enjoyed our first meal in Thailand. KFC. I did not know that for the 29 days to come, we have to come here and eat only KFC, as I had no idea where to find halal and healthy food. On top of that, our agent forbade us to go outside much, as we would surely be caught and detained, or sent back by the police.

Upon arrival in Jakarta, whether by air or overland from other parts of Indonesia, a common thread amongst the respondents was a sojourn at the Sabanoz Hotel¹⁵, formerly located in the Jalan Jaksa area of Jakarta. From this point, they were either advised to wait for further instruction from the smugglers regarding departing by boat for Christmas Island, or encouraged by other refugees to apply for refugee status with the UNHCR. Following the July 2014 announcement that “Asylum seekers who are registered with the UNHCR in Indonesia on or after 1 July 2014 will no longer be eligible for resettlement in Australia,” (Ansori et al. p. 92), most respondents who had been in Indonesia for fewer than two years at the time of interview had no intention of sailing to Australia, whereas those who had arrived prior to the announcement had planned to make that maritime journey.

¹⁵ A Google search for “Sabanoz Hotel” only turns up one article, which mentions that a group of Afghan asylum seekers had departed from the Sabanoz Hotel in Jakarta, to the coast in Sukabumi, from where they had launched boats intended for Christmas Island (Alford, P., and Nathalia, T. 2014).




Figure 12: Map of Migration Routes (Human Rights Watch)

3.4.2 Asylum Arrangements

The 25 refugee respondents represented a variety of household sizes, ranging from single, unaccompanied, to traveling with up to 10 family members. At the time of research, waiting times ranged from only one month up to four and a half years. Only one household has been resettled since the time of initial research interviews in January 2017. Respondents resided in a variety of living conditions, ranging from a USD15 per month windowless room (“Why should I spend a lot of money? I accept my low condition, and the good outweighs the bad” (Bakhtiyari, A. personal interview 19 April, 2017)), to cohabitating with 10 family members inside a squalid two-room flat, to shanty houses, to newly constructed houses overlooking a river, to being hosted in a luxury villa by local sponsors¹⁶. The common thread between all of

¹⁶ One young family paid a very low rent for a rare air-conditioned flat; however during the interview, the loudspeaker from the mosque across the narrow street blasted the sound of the *azzan*, or call to prayer, directly into the small apartment, so loud the windows shook.

these living arrangements was that all of the refugees were completely dependent on their own savings retained from selling all of their personal property and items prior to fleeing, or on financial support from overseas family and contacts. None of the respondents were engaged in any income-earning activities, though CRLC teachers receive a nominal travel stipend to get to and from work. In fact, only two of the 25 respondents had received any kind of financial assistance from NGOs or government agencies; one being for the birth of a child. Momo-e Jan, an elderly man in poor health, is eligible for financial assistance from Church World Service to receive treatments; however, he must pay the transportation to a Jakarta hospital in order to receive it.





Table 2: Family Status vs. Waiting Time

Coming from conflict areas full of destruction, many respondents expressed surprise at the peace and beauty they initially found in Indonesia:

I didn't know it would be so beautiful... I saw a lot of the Indonesian students who were just leaving home. And I was just thinking, oh wow, these people are so kind. And for the first time in my life, I saw women sitting with men in the same car! Instantly I felt very comfortable... One day I was observing the green view here and I thought, 'I could never get upset here, this is so beautiful' (Barakzai, N. personal interview 30 April 2017).

However, after many years of waiting in limbo, with dwindling hope for resettlement, opinions soured: “Bar Cisarua budan, misli ki dar jahannam¹⁷ sabz budan ast” (“Being in Cisarua is like living in a green hell”) (Atmar, A. personal interview 23 April, 2017).

3.5 Stakeholders

The primary stakeholders, the refugees, can be divided into two distinct groups; those affiliated in some way with community organizations, and those with no affiliations. Refugees affiliated with community organizations could be further designated into those directly involved with the community organizations – students, teachers, administrators, – and those indirectly involved – parents and family members of students, teachers, administrators, who do not attend classes or participate with the organizations themselves. Secondary stakeholders would be organizations working with or for refugees. Tertiary stakeholders are those individuals, organizations, and

¹⁷ It should be noted that Afghans take the concept of hell very seriously, and would not use the term “jahannam” lightly or in jest. Others present during this interview were shocked to hear a woman say this word.

institutions that have developed relationships with the refugees, as a result of the social capital expansion of the community.

3.5.1 Refugees and Refugee-Run Initiatives

There are a number of agencies (listed in 3.5.2) who play a role in the life of the refugees; however, due to the physical inaccessibility of Cisarua, lack of government support, and extreme financial limitations, these agencies play an increasingly diminishing role. Instead, more significant stakeholders are the organizations set up by the refugees themselves:

- Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre (CRLC)
- Cisarua Refugee Shotokan Karate Club
- Beyond the Fabric (now defunct women's handicraft group)
- Refugee Learning Nest (RLN)
- Refugee Learning Centre (RLC)
- Hope Learning Centre (HLC)
- Cisarua Refugee Football League

The learning centres all grew out of the same initial organization, and due to overwhelming need and interest, had to expand several times in order to accommodate the number of students in need of education. CRLC, RLC, and RLN all serve over 150 students each, and even HLC, the newest addition to the learning centre community at only a few months old at the time of writing, already has over 70 students. CRLC is the only independent learning centre, operating solely on individual support, and unlinked to a supporting agency or NGO.

Of the 25 refugees interviewed, 15 were directly involved in community institutions, two indirectly involved, and eight not involved at all. Every CRLC staff member interviewed (11 in total) was involved in multiple initiatives, including the Cisarua Refugee Shotokan Karate Club, as well as the Cisarua Refugee Football League. For

many of the girls and women participating with the CRFL, it was their first time being allowed to run around freely, their first time to play a sport, and their first time to experience coed activities. Three female adult students, who attended English classes at CRLC, reported that going to the refugee school gave them the first opportunity in years to leave their homes to do something meaningful; in Jaghori, they were constrained by culture and security concerns from taking part in community life like this. Said one respondent of his involvement, “Limbo is my university. I have learned the meaning of life here! Limbo has given me an opportunity, the gift of time and space” (Bakhtiyari, A. personal interview 19 April, 2017).

3.5.2 NGOs and Refugee Agencies

There are a number of NGOs and refugee assistance agencies operating, or formerly operating, in Indonesia, including:

- Jesuit Refugee Service
- Church World Service
- SUAKA (Indonesian Civil Society Network for Refugee Rights Protection)
- IOM
- UNHCR
- Save the Children

Every respondent interviewed was registered with UNHCR, but their interactions with the organization were limited to their refugee status determination interviews, and the constant calling to inquire about their cases. Few of the refugees had had any interaction with any other organization other than Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), who run English classes in Cisarua-Bogor area. JRS used to have a much larger presence, providing legal advice and counseling; however, due to financial and political constraints, they have greatly downscaled their operations. Sister Taka Gani, formerly of JRS, remarked that they had become overwhelmed financially by the great need of refugees in Cisarua, only able to provide a small amount of money to a small number of people. Currently, Taka has taken on an independent role, living in

the refugee community, providing legal advice, assistance with bureaucratic paperwork, applications, rejection appeals, and much needed counseling, spiritual guidance, and moral support.

Church World Service (CWS) operates primarily in Jakarta, and whereas they do provide some financial assistance to the extremely vulnerable residing in Cisarua, they are otherwise not stakeholders there. One respondent, who moved from Cisarua to Jakarta, in order to access health services for his newborn child, receives a small stipend for teaching and providing translation services at a CWS office; however, he mentioned that they were far too overstretched serving the asylum seeking community in Jakarta to be involved with Cisarua. Similarly, SUAKA maintains a presence in Jakarta, and has never ventured into Cisarua, despite its sizable refugee population. IOM deals mainly with refugees in Immigration Detention Centres; one respondent reported that he used to receive a small stipend from IOM, but after several years in IDC, this funding had run out, and he was left without any support whatsoever (Farhan, personal interview 11 November 2016).

Save the Children recently became aware of the existence of the refugee-run learning centres and community organizations. The researcher's second site visit coincided with Save the Children's first ever visit. One SCI delegate commented that they had never even realized that there were so many refugees or refugee children in this area, and that they were excited to learn more about the education initiatives that were being spearheaded, and to join in the support efforts. However, according to the current CRLC manager, "Now it is only JRS here, Save the Children disappeared" (Payeez, K. personal interview 28 January, 2018).

3.5.3 International Support Network

Significantly, through social media campaigns, the work of international researchers and journalists, and a recent documentary film about Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, an unlikely but powerful network of international supporters and stakeholders has solidified. Coinciding with the establishment of CRLC, active social media

campaigns led to an influx of journalists and researchers from primarily Australian universities and media outlets. This led to the establishment of partnerships with the Refugee Council of Australia, the University of Technology of Sydney, and the University of Sydney, who provide online classes for adult students, as well as curriculum planning and material support. CRLC coordinates visits from UTS professors with the other learning centres, in order to share the training and knowledge within the Cisarua refugee community. Dr. Lucy Fiske, UTS professor, now sits on the CRLC board of directors, and recently authored the book “Human Rights, Refugee Protest, and Immigration Detention,” which draws on some of the experiences of Hazara refugees in Indonesia. Researchers from ASEAN universities have led to broader awareness of the refugees in Cisarua, resulting in partnerships with the University of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Community.


Following a collaborative concert in 2017, local institutions such as the Community Music Centre and the Suzuki Music Association of Indonesia (SMAI) have connected Hazara refugees from Cisarua with members of the local community interested in providing support. As such, several young members of a large household are now residing in the homes of these local supporters, providing them with a calmer and more stable living environment. Additionally, members of SMAI have been linking professors from the Universitas Pelita Harapan Teacher’s College, in Lippo Karawaci, with CRLC in order to provide official teacher training to the volunteer staff.


Further expanding the stakeholder footprint is the recent documentary, “The Staging Post,” produced by Australian filmmaker Jolyon Hoff, and CRLC founders and former refugees Muzafer Ali and Khadim Dai. This film explores the lives of several Hazara refugees in Cisarua, and the establishment of CRLC. Hoff and Ali premiered the film in 2017, and embarked on an Australia-wide tour of universities and community groups, spreading awareness and garnering support for the protracted refugees in Indonesia. In December 2017, The Staging Post had its first international showing in Toronto, Canada, where former CRLC manager, Tahira Rezai, had been resettled. The film premiered to a group of residents dedicated to supporting refugee rights, and following the documentary, formed a G5, or Group of Five refugee

sponsorship group. G5s are officially government recognized community groups, who arrange to sponsor recognized refugees to come to Canada. Rezai is now advocating to bring vulnerable members of the CRLC community to Toronto. A case study of Rezai's journey can be found in Section 3.8.

3.6 Perceptions of Satisfaction, Capabilities, and Barriers to Empowerment

Although all respondents had the same legal status, they came from different educational and technical backgrounds, with different levels of participation in society in Cisarua, and therefore had many different perceptions of their own capabilities, as well as bridges and barriers to empowerment. All respondents were surveyed on these perceptions of their existing capabilities and barriers, and are represented below. Capabilities are grouped into three categories: skills, which included pre-existing education, vocational training, language abilities, and previous careers; talents, which included artistic abilities, athleticism, ability to understand and communicate with others, and sensitivity; and motivation, which included strength of character, ambition, the willingness to learn, and the will to succeed at all costs.





3.7 Social Capital Strength

A clear determinate of perceived life satisfaction was strength of social capital networks. As aforementioned, the respondents could be divided into two distinct categories: those affiliated, and those unaffiliated with community initiatives. This can be further disseminated into NGO-run initiatives and refugee run initiatives. Respondents affiliated with only NGO-run initiatives reported similar levels of despair and helplessness, whereas respondents affiliated in any way with refugee-run organizations reported a much more hopeful outlook on their circumstances. Wahid, who at four and a half years at the time of interview in April 2017 was the respondent with the longest waiting time, was not affiliated with any refugee-run community groups. He attended English classes at JRS three days a week, but had no other involvement. He stated, “Baad az zyāt wācht, man gij shudum (After such a long waiting time, now my mind has become confounded)” (group interview 28 April 2017). Other unaffiliated respondents reported an “inability to do anything,” and that they were “floundering” (group interview 28 April 2017). Momo-e Jan reported “Ech namekunum. Dars namesha, faqat yak ketab da sei sola... (I do not do anything. I cannot follow classes, and only could read one book in three years.)” He said that he was, at that point, too old and too depressed to learn English (personal interview 22 April, 2017).

Respondents affiliated with refugee run initiatives reported that the international connections and friendships they made with visitors to the learning centres or karate club increased their awareness of the outside world, and reminded them that they had not been forgotten. One CRLC staff member stated that the learning centre “brings everyone in the community together. It allows me to meet many people, and gives exposure to foreign cultures. While we teach, we learn” (Barakzai, N. personal interview 30 April, 2017). Another teacher said that her “involvement has given meaning to life here. Everything else is uncertain, like my refugee status and what will happen, but Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre is a reason to keep going!” (Osman, F. personal interview 19 April, 2017). Sahar Adiba, although extremely frustrated with her limbo and uncertainty, stated “Seqa du rui dara” (every penny has two sides). She reports that her time in Cisarua has opened up her experience of the world, and given her connections with foreigners, and she has now developed a great network of international friends (personal interview 24 April 2017). One respondent even went so far as to say that his life is infinitely better, having become a refugee in Cisarua, that being in limbo had given him a great opportunity. “I lost a lot of money, I lost a lot of time, but instead I found myself.” His involvement with CRLC has taught him how to communicate with foreigners and his own community, and he has now developed the dream to create his own organization, whether in Indonesia, or Afghanistan, or upon resettlement in a third country, to help refugees (Bakhtiyari, A. personal interview 19 April 2017).

Overall, all respondents affiliated with refugee-run organizations reported a sense of purpose and meaning in their limbo, despite the common frustration; no unaffiliated respondents reported any satisfaction or sense of purpose whatsoever. Those affiliated with organizations such as CRLC gained access initially to other initiatives within the physical Cisarua community, subsequently to foreign entities affiliated with these initiatives, and ultimately to individuals, initiatives, and organizations bridged to CRLC. Refugees without that first link to a community initiative gained no such access, and remain almost entirely excluded.

In order to more thoroughly explain the differences between those affiliated and unaffiliated with community initiatives, the researcher conducted a social capital network mapping of their respective links. Figure 15 shows the extensive access that bridging links provide through affiliation with CRLC- as far reaching as alternative housing opportunities in Indonesia itself, to potential employment opportunities in third countries. The map was based on interviews, survey, and observation. In sharp contrast to that wide network, refugees unaffiliated with any community initiative, across the board, reported no communication with foreigners,¹⁸ no access to or knowledge of many community initiatives, no external support, and very little interaction with anyone other than their immediate community of family and neighbors.

As demonstrated in Figure 16, the physical representation of social access for refugees affiliated with community initiatives is dramatically more populated, with interactions at multiple levels, whereas the social capital access of those unaffiliated remains sparsely populated. Access for those unaffiliated with community initiatives is limited to immediate vicinity (family and neighbors), and the government and authorities, who have a limited reach and impact, at best. The below maps were constructed based on interviews with respondents, a survey of the community, and information from the Habibie Centre in Jakarta, which conducts extensive refugee research in Indonesia.

¹⁸ As the researcher speaks Farsi, she was able to access individuals in this excluded sector of the community that other foreigners would not be able to.




Figure 15: Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre Network Map

The below network maps show the difference between refugees unaffiliated with community initiatives versus those affiliated with community initiatives. Those unaffiliated are not without networks; however, they are sparsely populated, displaying very low network strength. The lack of bridging capital shows the difficulty these refugees have in crossing any sort of power gradients to officials, media, and the international community. Alternatively, refugees who affiliate themselves with community initiatives in any way access a densely populated social capital network, opening up to them multiple ties of bridging capital, which link them with a much greater power gradient of international support.




Figure 16: Social Capital Network Map of Refugees Unaffiliated with Community Initiatives




Figure 17: Social Capital Network Map of Refugees Affiliated with Community Initiatives

3.8 Case Study of Tahira Rezai

Tahira Rezai, former manager of Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, experienced one of the most difficult journeys recorded. Her husband, brother, and cousin, had departed Quetta, Pakistan, in 2012, following increasing attacks and target killings of Hazaras. After transiting through Indonesia, they boarded a fishing boat for the Australian territory of Christmas Island, but were never heard from again. After months of trying to track him down remotely, Tahira decided to go to Indonesia and try to find him herself. She obtained an “illegal legal” visa,¹⁹ and made her way to Indonesia in November 2013, by way of a smuggling network. Upon arrival in Indonesia (via Thailand and Malaysia), she spent six months in Jakarta, starting out at the notorious Sabanoz Hotel, and then moving to stay with relatives, who were also seeking asylum. Her attempts to locate her husband were fruitless, and she was encouraged by family back in Quetta to register with UNHCR and seek asylum, as the security situation was worsening.

In Summer 2014, Tahira heard that a refugee school was being established, and relocated herself and her two children, Tabassum and Zulfi, to Cisarua, in order to teach, give her children the opportunity to go to school, and join a community. Prior to relocating to Cisarua, the family had spent their months in misery, “It was killing me – being in Jakarta – with nothing to do all day, no ability to go anywhere, just keeping the kids inside all the time” (personal interview 30 May, 2017). Fearful of being caught and put into immigration detention, or deported back to Pakistan or Afghanistan, Tahira and the children spent their time in hiding – sleeping during the day, and trying to stay busy during the night. Once they moved, Tahira began teaching at the Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, and was eventually appointed as school manager. There she trained the young staff, and hosted many of the journalists and researchers who were interested in finding out more about the Afghan refugees stuck in Indonesia.

¹⁹ “Illegal legal” visas are quite common; legitimate visas obtained through smugglers and bribed government officials.

A single mother ranks high on the refugee vulnerability index, and Tahira and her two children were settled to Saskatoon, Canada, in February 2017, the dead of winter. When they arrived, it became clear to her that their situation was far from ideal – the agency who was handling their case did not provide them with anything, neither soap nor toothpaste, internet, bedsheets, winter jackets, nor even the starter USD50 per person given to newly arrived refugees. Saskatoon is a small city in remote central Canada, offering little opportunity to a single refugee mother of two. Within a few days, Tahira realized she would need to relocate to a bigger city. She reached out to her network – researchers who had been through Cisarua, former colleagues from international organizations with whom she had worked in Afghanistan, supporters who had been following the work of Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre on social media sites like Facebook and Instagram. She connected with Jane Motz-Hayes, a contact of Lucy Fiske, one of the initial researchers, who had assisted with the establishment and now sits on the board of CRLC. Ms. Motz-Hayes is part of the Withrow Welcome Group, an officially recognized community sponsored refugee support group in Toronto, and connected Tahira to Harriet and Matthew Eastman, who provided the family with free housing for two months. She also connected her to group members Orbee and Sanjit Shah, who run an import-export company, who were able to employ Tahira. The researcher of this thesis connected Tahira with other Hazara refugees who had settled in Toronto, who provided her with arrival assistance and community.

Through the various bonding and bridging connections, Tahira is now employed and living independently with her children, who are enrolled in the Toronto public school system. She is an activist for refugee resettlement, and is now connected with a Community Sponsor group, who sponsor and support refugees coming to Canada. Tahira is advocating for other members of the CRLC community, namely the single unaccompanied men, who unfortunately are at the lowest priority level of resettlement, to be sponsored and brought to Canada. Tahira's social capital network construction began before she arrived in Cisarua, and continues to grow even after she has been resettled.



Figure 18: Tahira presenting to the Toronto community group (Zulfi, age 6, beside her)

3.9 Summary of Findings

To summarize, through the three ethnographic research trips, in-depth in person interviews, and remote interviews, the following can be ascertained: Cisarua, Indonesia is home to a significant refugee community of Afghan Hazaras, who have successfully formed self-run community organizations, which have had clearly positive and transformative effects on the refugees. The Hazara community is largely homogenous, with strong bonding ties of ethnicity, religion, language, culture, and place of origin. However, the refugee run initiatives have produced strong and effective bridging ties to a much broader network of social capital. Satisfaction and sense of well-being, as well as predicted integration success in resettlement are closely tied to the strength of these bridging networks; the stronger the affiliation with the refugee led initiatives, the higher the sense of hope and satisfaction. Refugees who remain unaffiliated with bridging networks beyond their own immediate community reported despair and hopelessness across the board.

Within the Hazara refugee community, success breeds success; the strongest community initiatives were those run entirely by refugees, with little to no official outside controls. Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre manages its own finances by writing its own grants and annual reports, running its own fundraising campaigns. Other groups, who are beholden to their corporate or NGO sponsors and donors, do not enjoy the same freedoms to organize and communicate as they see fit. Other factors that contribute to the strength of social capital within community organizations include engaging social media activity, well maintained websites and presence, active communication skills, and a general willingness to work for free, with the understanding that dignity comes from working and helping others, not just salaries and recognition.

All of these factors combined paint a picture of a rare community, who has been able to bring meaning, hope, and positivity into an impossible existence. As the Afghan proverb goes, “Bad az haar tariki, roshan ast,” “After every darkness, there is light.”

CHAPTER IV ANALYSIS: FROM VULNERABILITY TO CAPABILITY

4.1 Describing the Baseline – Vulnerability and Resilience

To be a refugee is to move from one state of vulnerability to the next. Owing to a well-founded fear of persecution in their home countries, they put their lives in extreme peril as they flee across borders and seas, putting their fate in the hands of people smugglers, in order to reach an uncertain destination.

All of the refugees interviewed spoke of the crushing instability of their limbo – not knowing their status, not knowing their future, not knowing anything except their own helplessness. They had all fled intense persecution; most had lost family members or friends already. Some had been pursued by the government, some had been pursued by the Taliban or Laskhar e Jhangvi; all had fled the terrible encroaching persecution of the Hazara people in Afghanistan and Pakistan, under constant threat of suicide bombs and target killings. Though the children largely did not remember their former lives, most of the adults spoke of symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder – nightmares and flashbacks, difficulty sleeping or excessive sleeping, anxiety, depression, and a feeling of “paralysis” that many mentioned.

Once the refugees arrived in Indonesia, they faced a jarring full stop in their quest for a safe and new life. Non-signatory to the Geneva Conventions, Indonesia does not grant rights to work, study, or travel to asylum seekers, while at the same time, refugee status determinations and third-country resettlement processing times are notoriously convoluted and lengthy. This leaves them in a continuous state of uncertainty, constantly fearing detention and deportation, constantly and anxiously awaiting any news from UNHCR about their status.

Because refugees are not able to access schooling while in Indonesia, any studies they were previously undertaking are also put on hold. For many, education was the only thing of value they had in their previous lives. Nearly all respondents lamented that, despite their efforts to continue their studies, it was impossible for them to earn official certification for anything, due to their status. Although the long term benefits of improving English skills are indisputable (the only four countries accepting refugee resettlement from Indonesia are the English speaking United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), without certification, all education attempts would need to be restarted upon resettlement, a seeming exercise in futility.

The dependence on others for livelihood, status, financial support, is cripplingly demoralizing. Unable to work, refugees are not permitted to take any income, and therefore must rely on remittances from overseas family and friends. The long and uncertain waiting process means that many have been borrowing or asking for money for several years.

The first article in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (UNGA 1948); however, all of those things that give life dignity – the ability to provide for one’s self and family, the ability to learn and grow, the ability to be free – are either lacking or just out of reach for protracted refugees. One respondent lamented that, although he was a finance manager in Afghanistan, in Indonesia his life had become so undignified that, rather than pay US\$150 to have a tooth problem fixed, he had had to get it removed altogether.

Nevertheless, over generations of persecution, displacement, and survival, the Hazara people have built up an intense resilience. Unable to participate in other areas of public life in Afghanistan, they have turned to education, entrepreneurship, and civil society activism. Now, in their continued protraction and marginalization in Indonesia, this attitude of resilience has proven invaluable in the absence of government assistance. One woman bakes *naan-e khushk*, Afghan bread, to trade with other refugees and informally sell to the Arabic restaurants in the area. One man,

relegated to immigration detention in Tanjun Pinang after running out of money and people to fund him, has learned English by practicing conversations via Facebook messenger with foreigners he met while in Cisarua. One man taught himself to play a musical instrument, with the help of YouTube clips, in order to stave off the crippling boredom and painful monotony of limbo. Several young women, due to their English abilities and tenacity of character, have become the heads of their households, navigating UNHCR and Indonesian bureaucracy on behalf of their families. These people all withstood years of fear and persecution, months of perilous flight, and have brought the same resilient spirit to their time in limbo in Indonesia.



Figure 19: Woman makes naan-e khushk every morning to sell to local restaurants

4.2 The Significance of CRLC –Transformation to Capability

Despite this current state of limbo, Hazara refugees in Cisarua, Indonesia, have managed to transform this time and space to find purpose, meaning, and empowerment in the face of a stalled life. And it is not just because of the resilience they have already developed over generations. Despite a culture of ‘survive at all costs’ and a the benefits of a largely homogenous community, not everyone is able to

transform their vulnerabilities into capabilities. For this, an external conversion factor is required.

The difference between surviving and thriving in this wider Hazara community is the community and network developed through institutions like Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, and the skills and resources available through said networks.

Life in limbo is difficult, but for some, infinitely better than what came before. In this current stage of transit, they are no longer being persecuted, and their lives are not in danger of violence. No matter the negative aspects of limbo, and as aforementioned, there are many, it does provide the time and space, giving the chance to grow in human capability, *but only if they are able to seize that opportunity*. Institutions like the Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre provide structure to an otherwise ungrounded and aimless existence of constant waiting. Many respondents affiliated with CRLC noted the discomfort and frustration of limbo, but expressed extreme gratitude for the centre and its role in their lives.

All CRLC affiliated respondents asserted that the best thing about the centre was the transformation of their community by giving purpose to their lives. One said “Before I came here [to teach] it was like I was in jail. [CRLC] provides community” (Noori, A.²⁰ personal interview 19 April, 2017). Another said, to the agreement of those around her, “Involvement has given meaning to life here. Everything else is uncertain, like the refugee status and what will happen, but CRLC is a reason to keep going” (Osman, F. personal interview 19 April, 2017). The opportunity and ability to communicate with others in their same situation has strengthened the bonds within the community itself, and the connections made with the myriad of foreign journalists, researchers, volunteer teachers, and trainers have provided a bridge to an outside world and network previously unattainable. By contrast, respondents unaffiliated

²⁰ He also shared that, prior to coming to Indonesia, his mother had been completely illiterate even in Farsi. Now she was learning to speak, read, and write English, so he felt it was already worth the journey.

with any community groups all felt trapped in their isolation, voiceless and forgotten by the world.

The transformative bonds are those that open the individual and community's minds to a much wider world view; the ability to learn from other media, make connections to other forms of support, knowledge, and resources. Those who keep themselves isolated from the community initiatives, that allow for these things, simply miss out. Indeed the community, local and international, formed by the learning centres and community initiatives themselves is the transformative element that has allowed this time of limbo to become a time of empowerment and growth for so many. The networking that allows capabilities to be built and vulnerabilities to be overcome has been just as important as the state of mind and sense of identity, the resilience, that the Hazara refugees carried with them to Indonesia.

4.3 Community Initiative vs. External Support

Becoming a manager at the school has given people like Sheeba Atahi authority to make decisions, and has built confidence in their own abilities to solve problems and guide others. As Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre is run entirely by the refugees themselves, this power is entrusted to its teachers and administrators by fellow refugees, as opposed to being assigned by an NGO, who may or may not even be based in the same area, let alone country. This has instilled in them a sense of pride and responsibility in their work, which they do willingly and for free; "Being a manager here allows me to help others. It allows me to take this limbo time and turn it into something positive for myself and others" (Payeez, K. personal interview 30 April, 2017).

Reports of difficulties and discord in other learning centres run by foreign NGOs were a constant at CRLC and CRSKC, reinforcing the firmly held belief that they were better off running their own school by themselves, drawing from the expertise and

experience of their own community, as opposed to the funding and oversight of organizations who might not understand their unique struggles as well as abilities.

The great success of Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre has been that it capitalized on existing needs (children's education and adult employment) and the available capabilities (former teachers and managers), and brought these together to form a meaningful group initiative to empower the entire community. Those adults who were not qualified to teach were invited to be involved in other ways. They helped to prepare the school building, procure supplies like carpets, furniture, and stationary; one father even volunteered to be the *chowkidor*, or caretaker, of the school facilities after hours.

Any NGOs interested in supporting CRLC are invited to work alongside the refugees, but not from the top down. In fact, with the assistance of founding member Muzafar Ali (who had since been resettled to Australia, where he is now a citizen), Cisarua Learning Inc. has been registered as an independent non-profit organization in Australia. Because of this, CRLC is able to take donations through their foundation, without relying on outside NGOs to support, and by extension, control, them. The success of CRLC comes from within the school, from within the community, from the refugees themselves. This success breeds further success, with refugees gaining the strength and voice to take as much control over their own time and lives as possible.



Figure 20: International volunteer working side by side with CRLC staff (photo by J. Salehi, from CRLC Facebook page)

4.4 Sustainability of the Transformation

The best thing for refugees protracted in countries where they are not afforded the rights to build physical or financial capital, is to build as much social capital as possible, and to bring as many actors into the social networks as possible. The advantages of this may not always be immediately clear in the short-term, but success stories like Tahira Rezai securing housing and employment in Canada through the CRLC worldwide network, or Farkhunda securing a stable homestay for herself and her family through the collaboration between CRLC and the Suzuki Music Association of Indonesia, demonstrate the tangible long-term benefits of these kinds of community initiatives. If these bridged networks can also be linked to each other, life will not be perfect in the interim, but it will be better and more meaningful, and the future becomes less uncertain.

4.5 Summary of Analysis

In summary, the community that has grown out of the refugee run initiatives in Cisarua, Indonesia, is a remarkable example of transforming vulnerability into capability and empowerment. For those who get involved with the community groups, the social capital built from these ever strengthening networks radically transforms individuals from those simply surviving limbo to people thriving in a time and space that has allowed them to actualize their capabilities.

This is illustrated most vividly by those who were not initially involved with CRLC, but quickly came to experience the benefits once they began to participate. Mohammad Mostafa recently joined the CRLC staff, after nearly three years of being uninvolved. He was convinced to join by friends of his, after he realized that with no activities other than near constant sleeping and exercising (his English was already quite advanced, JRS only offers beginning classes, which did not apply to him), he was becoming disoriented in a constant haze of confusion.

Soon after joining, other staff and administration noticed his emerging leadership abilities, and quickly began giving him more roles and responsibilities.²¹ He said that not only does he have a sense of purpose during his limbo time, he is learning to deal with a variety of people, and has learned flexibility and patience. Before joining the community and building social capital, he had “no goals, no aim, I was angry all the time,” but now he has realized, through expanding his network and understanding other people, that the goal of his life both in limbo and in future resettlement is “to be a positive person in society, and to help other people” (Mohammad, M. personal interview 19 April, 2017).

Mohammad’s example raises an important point: those refugees who are excluded, either by lack of knowledge or network, or by self-imposed isolation, do not benefit

²¹ When the researcher first met him, she was surprised to learn he had only been with the school a few months; she had assumed he was one of the managers, due to the leadership position he was already occupying, and handling marvelously.

from the connections and network that have helped ameliorate the wellbeing and livelihoods of those involved in the community initiatives. Though sometimes criticized by some within the community groups, these unaffiliated refugees are not necessarily lazy or apathetic, but rather, simply did not fit into the refugee-run projects already initiated.

As a central outcome of this thesis, therefore, the researcher stresses that it is essential to recognize further community needs and identify the capabilities of those as of yet unaffiliated in order to form new networks of mutual benefit and growth, so that they are no longer out in the cold. Supporters must ask first what the refugees themselves actually want and need – facilitate the process by probing with questions, as opposed to arriving with answers and solutions from outside. Perhaps a future project for CRLC would be to do a community survey, aiming to create a database of community members, including existing capabilities, as well as what people are willing to do, learn, and teach.

The growing and strengthening community in Cisarua, Indonesia truly exemplifies the famous Afghan proverb: There is a way from heart to heart; we can succeed if we work together: *Del ba del, raah daarad*.

CHAPTER V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Implications of Research

This thesis has been focused on people in perpetual transit, and therefore focused on interim strategies for thriving. However, anyone who is a refugee will hopefully ultimately end up being resettled at some point. If and when that happens, those who are already able to already engage with outside heterogeneous social groups and communities, who are able to build and utilize social capital, who already know how to network and capitalize on their networks, will have a much easier time integrating. They will already be able to do the basic things necessary for joining a new and foreign society, as opposed to those who has spent the last many years dazed and regressed because of isolation from larger communities. Those who did not engage with bridging groups will have to start from zero.

Yasin Ali, originally from Quetta, and now a Hazara community organizer in Australia, reinforces this notion that social capital transforms lives, and empowers the vulnerable for a successful future:

Our Australia-based communities hold social gatherings, events, and information sessions for the new arrivals, with the participation of other Australians to help to them socialise, learn their roles, rights and responsibilities as a member of the community, learn and respect the differences of their new multicultural fellow country men and women. We encourage them to get engaged in community activities and make more contacts with the wider Australian communities which will help them integrate quicker and guide them to use the opportunities wisely for a better future. (Ali, Y. personal interview 28 May, 2017)

As demonstrated by this thesis, a refugee who has already learned how to engage with the community in which they live will surely have a significant advantage in this process.

5.2 Recommendations

Ultimately, the best possible scenario is that the push factors in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan would be resolved, all of the refugees would be resettled from Indonesia, and there would be no more need for refugee learning centres, karate clubs, and other such community initiatives. These scenarios are noble; however, they are unrealistic dreams at this point. In light of this reality, the researcher recommends an immediate and drastic policy change in Indonesia, allowing refugees to work and go to school. The 2017 decree from President Joko Widodo took some promising initial steps towards a more humane treatment of refugees, including officially recognizing them as refugees, as opposed to illegal migrants. This shift in the right direction needs to become the law of the land, and grant refugees the right to pursue a dignified life.

With the understanding that this sort of policy shift takes time and the cooperation of many different ministries and stakeholders to implement, a second significant policy shift is recommended; granting official accreditation for the education received in the refugee run learning centres. Accreditation will allow refugees to access other options; for example, with a proper high school diploma, graduates of Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre could apply for university, scholarships, education visas, and ultimately access a completely different path for their lives. In the meantime, many universities around the world are coming to understand the necessity to offer accredited classes to people without documentation, as the global refugee crisis intensifies. Online portals like Kiron University and Coursera connect refugees with institutions offering credit and certification, and the United States based University of the People is the first non-profit, free, and accredited institution offering online

degrees. These are wonderful starts, but in order to address the needs of the millions of refugees worldwide who have had to put their lives and educations on hold, it is necessary for more institutions to offer accredited, free, mobile tuition to the vulnerable and displaced.

In terms of immediate, achievable actions, the researcher recommends continued building of strong connections with refugee sponsorship groups like Tahira's Toronto network. These groups have the legal and financial ability to bring refugees out of their limbo and into their new lives; they just need to be connected. Instrumental in these connections is putting a human face to the refugee crisis through effective social media and communications campaigns. As such, the researcher recommends that NGOs and individuals seeking to assist groups like CRLC should put resources towards media communications training. Several CRLC students and teachers already indicated interest in photography or writing; these interests should be nurtured and turned into concrete skills.

5.3 Further Research

Ethnographic study frequently uncovers many additional areas of research that are necessary. Such was the case with this study, and after the research and data collection had been completed, several additional areas remained.

Some of these areas of research may include:

- Further examination into the lives of Hazara refugees who are not affiliated with any community groups.
- An in-depth study of other refugee communities in Indonesia, i.e. Somali, Burmese, Sudanese, non-Hazara Afghans etc.
- An in-depth comparison of non-independent learning centres and initiatives, which would include the following categories:
 - o Groups that are overseen by an outside NGO, but staffed by refugees.
 - o Groups that are overseen and staffed by an outside NGO.

- Further case studies of refugees who have been resettled to third countries, both those who were affiliated and those who were not affiliated with refugee run community initiatives.
- In-depth studies into the lives of asylum seekers who are living in immigration detention centres, how they are surviving and if they are able to thrive.
- A collection of short stories, sharing the accounts of as many refugees as possible. There were so many stories from so many that the researcher could not include, but they are all important and deserve to be heard.

Ultimately, the most important area of research is that of how Indonesian policies can be amended, so that asylum seekers can lead truly dignified lives, and contribute not just to their own community, but to the Indonesian community that hosts them.

5.4 The Future of Afghans in Indonesia

The UNHCR has laid out three durable solutions for refugees: voluntary repatriation, third country resettlement, and local integration. The Cisarua refugees have no option to return to Afghanistan, as the persecution against Hazaras intensifies daily. Recently, representatives of UNHCR Indonesia delivered the wrenching news that, due to the worsening Rohingya refugee crisis, the downsizing of the United States' refugee resettlement program, and the closing of Australia's borders, that they should prepare to spend their long-term future in Indonesia. A statement released by CRLC confirmed the sobering news:

Representatives from Indonesia and Thailand visited the school and told the community that they must be ready for a 10 or 15 years wait, and that many would not get resettled from Indonesia... There have only been 50 refugees resettled to Australia from Indonesia this year and another 50 went to the

United States. So the maths is not good for the 15 thousand refugees currently in Indonesia (CRLC 2017)²².

Therefore, the only remaining possibility of the three durable solutions is local integration, where their status remains unchanged, where their rights remain limited. So what does the future hold for Afghans in Indonesia? Surely this new development, or non-development, as the case may be, should spur an awakening of more “sleeping leaders.” Former JRS delegate and current fierce advocate, Sister Taka, frankly laid out this reality a long time ago: “They have to wait for a long time, that is just the reality. But now, what are you going to do?” (Gani, T. personal interview 26 April, 2017). What can anyone do, but accept their fate, and make the best from it? The Hazaras in Cisarua have already proven that the capability and security they have developed through their building of social capital strength is the very ability to locally integrate; they already have and will continue to rise far beyond any expectations of anyone in limbo.



²² After the time of thesis defense (February 2018), UNHCR visited once more, and informed the Cisarua community that they would now face up to 25 years in Indonesia.

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APPENDIX

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

APPENDIX A

SAMPLE OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW (REFUGEE)

Basic Information:

Name / Age / Gender / Marital Status / Household Size / Occupation prior to coming to Indonesia / Current occupation in Indonesia

Leaving the Homeland:

Where did you live prior to coming to Indonesia?

When did you leave?

What were your reasons for leaving?

How did you get to Indonesia?

Why did you pick this route?

Life in Limbo:

What services or support do you receive from INGO/CSOs?

- Are you registered with UNHCR?
- Do you receive any financial assistance?
- Do you receive any medical support?

In what kind of accommodation do you live? / Where?

How do you spend your time?

What activities are most meaningful to you here?

Are you satisfied with your life in Indonesia?

What are your goals for your time in transit?

What factors impede these goals?

What factors enable these goals?

Involvement with Refugee Run Community Initiatives:

Please describe your involvement with the community initiative.

How / why did you become involved with the community initiative?

How has your involvement impacted your life?

What skills, if any, have you gained from your involvement?

What would you be doing if you were not involved / what were you doing prior to getting involved?

Learning Centre / Community Initiative Teachers / Coaches:

What training did you have prior to your involvement with this initiative?

What training do you receive now?

What certification / recognition / official documents have you earned?

How do you ensure transportability of education without diplomas?

What do you need to improve your teaching / leadership abilities now?

Do you intend to continue teaching after resettlement?

Learning Centre / Community Initiative Managers and Administrators:

How was the learning centre / community initiative established?

What prior business or management knowledge did you have before managing the centre?

What skills were necessary to acquire in order to manage the centre?

What are the management or organizational tools you use to run the centre?

What kind of outside financial or training support do you receive?

How has your involvement in managing the centre impacted your life?

Capabilities:

What do you perceive to be your capabilities?

What do you perceive to be your needs?

What is standing in the way of fulfilling your potential?

Future:

What are your expectations for your life in resettlement?

What are your goals and dreams for your life in resettlement?

How do you feel that your involvement with the learning centre can contribute to these goals?

APPENDIX B

Semi-structured Interview Participants Included in Data Analysis
Interviewed from 11 November, 2016 – 28 January, 2018

DATE	NAME	AGE	SEX	STATUS
11 Nov. 2016	Farhan* ²³	40s	M	Unaccompanied
19 Apr. 2017	Noori, Ali Haidar*	19	M	Accompanied
19 Apr. 2017	Osman, Farkhunda*	17	F	Accompanied
19 Apr. 2017	Mostafa, Mohammad*	24	M	Unaccompanied
19 Apr. 2017	Bakhtiyari, Ali* ^{^24}	31	M	Unaccompanied
22 Apr. 2017	Momo-e Jan	70s	M	Unaccompanied
23 Apr. 2017	Atmar, Aziza*	20s	F	Accompanied
24 Apr. 2017	Adiba, Sahar* [^]	22	F	Accompanied
24 Apr. 2017	Atahi, Sheeba*	27	F	Accompanied
25 Apr. 2017	Abbasi, Khalil*	32	M	Accompanied
26 Apr. 2017	Soltani, Hamida	26	F	Accompanied
26 Apr. 2017	Mohammad*	30s	M	Accompanied
27 Apr. 2017	Danish, Mariam*	24	F	Accompanied
28 Apr. 2017	Ehsan, Aman*	32	M	Unaccompanied
28 Apr. 2017	Wali, Edrak*	35	M	Unaccompanied
28 Apr. 2017	Amiri, Wahid*	32	M	Unaccompanied
28 Apr. 2017	Mohammad Karim*	43	M	Accompanied
29 Apr. 2017	Khala Bibi*	60s	F	Accompanied
29 Apr. 2017	Name withheld 1	40s	F	Accompanied
29 Apr. 2017	Name withheld 2	20s	F	Unaccompanied
30 Apr. 2017	Payeez, Khalil [^]	27	M	Unaccompanied
30 Apr. 2017	Barakzai, Nijat* [^]	22	M	Unaccompanied

* Name has been changed

[^]Multiple interviews were conducted on multiple dates

22 May 2017	Dai, Khadim	21	M	Unaccompanied
30 May 2017	Rezai, Tahira	30s	F	Accompanied



VITA

Jennifer has an extensive background in music education and school administration. She is the founder and managing director of KinderU Suzuki Music Academy in Hong Kong, and has taught in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. In 2014, she took a sabbatical to join the Afghanistan National Institute of Music as events coordinator and head of the string department. There, she worked with the most underserved members of society- orphans, street working children, and girls, providing opportunities including performances for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and First Lady Rula Ghani, a wide range of international embassies, and international tours.

Her time in Afghanistan sensitized her to the complicated issues surrounding refugee-sending countries, leading her to pursue a career change from music, and enroll in Chulalongkorn University's International Development program. Jennifer is the Refugee Programme Education Officer at Hong Kong- based NGO, Branches of Hope/ROAD (Refugee Opportunities and Development). She also serves as a mentor for Sisters 4 Sisters, an Afghan NGO, which pairs women in business from foreign countries with ambitious, but vulnerable Afghan girls, to provide counsel, support, and encouragement.

She holds a Bachelor of Arts in Music Performance from Houghton College, and certification in Violin Pedagogy through the Suzuki Association of the Americas.



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