

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER AGREEMENT OF 1994
IN CONSERVATION OF TROPICAL FORESTS

- ITTO's YEAR 2000 OBJECTIVE AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH ECONOMIC THEORIES -



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
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


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แบบพิมพ์บทคัดย่อฯ ภาษาไทย

พิมพ์ต้นฉบับบทคัดย่อวิทยานิพนธ์ภายในกรอบสี่เหลี่ยมนี้เพียงแผ่นเดียว

ธาตุกะคะ ฟูคาโฮริ : บทบาทของ INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER AGREEMENT 1994 (ITTA) ในการอนุรักษ์ป่าเขตร้อน, ITTO ปี 2000 และความสอดคล้องกับทฤษฎีทางเศรษฐศาสตร์
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ITTA ปี 2000 เป็นข้อตกลงที่มีจุดมุ่งหมายเชิงอนุรักษ์มากกว่าข้อตกลงในปี 1983 เพื่อให้สอดคล้องกับความห่วงใยในการที่ป่าไม้เขตร้อนจะหมดไปตามที่กล่าวไว้อย่างชัดเจนใน Rio Accords 1992

The Bali Partnership Fund ก่อตั้งขึ้นภายใต้มาตรา 21 เพื่อจัดหาทุนเพื่อที่จะบรรลุเป้าหมายการจัดการการค้าไม้ในเขตร้อนภายในปี 2000 อย่างไรก็ตามรายละเอียดของการสนับสนุนโครงการรวมทั้งจำนวนเงินบริจาคและระดับความพอใจในการจัดการยังไม่เป็นที่ตกลงกันระหว่างสมาชิกประเทศต่างๆของ ITTO

หัวข้อเกี่ยวกับสิ่งแวดล้อมระหว่างประเทศเป็นปัญหาที่จะต้องแก้ร่วมกัน ทฤษฎีการหาผลประโยชน์ทำให้ข้อตกลงระหว่างชาติในการเสียดสเพื่ออนุรักษ์สิ่งแวดล้อมนั้นล้มเหลวอย่างไม่สามารถหลีกเลี่ยงได้ การไม่มีกฎหมายที่บังคับอย่างจริงจังก็เป็นสาเหตุใหญ่ ข้อตกลงระหว่างประเทศสามารถทำให้เกิดข้อสรุปที่จะแก้ปัญหาความร่วมมือในการอนุรักษ์สิ่งแวดล้อม โดยที่ประเทศสมาชิกของ ITTO จะได้รับผลประโยชน์ในจำนวนที่เท่ากับภายใต้ข้อตกลง ITTO 1994 ถ้าประเทศสมาชิกประสบความสำเร็จในการเจรจาเพื่อวางแผนงานการแก้ปัญหาที่เป็นรูปธรรมสำหรับ the Bali Partnership Fund ปัจจัยสำคัญอีกอันหนึ่งที่จะนำไปสู่ความสำเร็จคือการนำเสนอบทของไทยในโครงการ the Bali Partnership Fund ทฤษฎีการหาผลประโยชน์กับบทของไทยในวิทยานิพนธ์นี้จะนำไปสู่การแก้ปัญหาที่เป็นผลสำเร็จได้

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The ITTA of 1994 was adopted as a more conservation oriented agreement than the previous ITTA of 1983, responding to the growing global concern on the tropical forest depletion as clearly expressed in the 1992 Rio Accords. The Bali Partnership Fund was established under its article 21 to provide funds to achieve sustainable management of tropical timber trade by the year 2000. However, detailed implementation schemes, including the amount of contribution needed to the Fund and the level at which the sustainable management of tropical timber trade is satisfied, have not been agreed among the member countries of ITTO.

International environmental issues are often analyzed in light of the collective action problems. Traditional game theory would predict that negotiations on contribution allocation for environmental conservation would fail because of the free-rider problem. The absence of an effective enforcement institution is the main reason behind this prediction. International agreements could provide a solution to overcome the collective action problem in the field of environmental conservation. A number of games are played on the models representing the Bali Partnership Fund in this thesis. Those games indicated that effective equilibrium amounts of contribution between producing and consuming member countries of ITTO could be obtained, particularly when both sides recognize the same values in the tropical forest conservation. This value sharing could be achieved under the ITTA of 1994 if the member countries succeed in negotiations to set up concrete action plans for the Bali Partnership Fund. Another crucial factor for the games to succeed is the introduction of penalty clauses in the implementation scheme of the Bali Partnership Fund. The games with a penalty factor in this thesis all turned out to produce successful solutions.

ภาควิชา.....

สาขาวิชา.....

ปีการศึกษา.....

ลายมือชื่อนิติ..... 

ลายมือชื่ออาจารย์ที่ปรึกษา..... 

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