# Expectations and Reality in Meeting Financial Needs of Thai Elderly: A Gender Perspective



A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Economics and Finance Field of Study of International Economics FACULTY OF ECONOMICS Chulalongkorn University Academic Year 2019 Copyright of Chulalongkorn University

# ความคาดหวังและความเป็นจริงในการตอบสนองความต้องการทางการเงินของผู้สูงอายุไทย:ใน มุมมองระหว่างเพศ



วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต สาขาวิชาเศรษฐศาสตร์และการเงินระหว่างประเทศ สาขาวิชาเศรษฐศาสตร์ระหว่างประเทศ คณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย ปีการศึกษา 2562 ลิขสิทธิ์ของจุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

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ภัณฑิรา สุนทรสิทธิพงศ์ : ความคาดหวังและความเป็นจริงในการตอบสนองความต้องการ ทางการเงินของผู้สูงอายุไทย:ในมุมมองระหว่างเพศ. (Expectations and Reality in Meeting Financial Needs of Thai Elderly: A Gender Perspective) อ.ที่ปรึกษาหลัก : ผศ. คร.ยอง ยูน

้จากการสำรวจความคิดเห็นของประชาชนเกี่ยวกับความรู้และทัศนคติที่มีต่อผู้สูงอายุ พ.ศ.2550 (ผู้ตอบแบบ สำรวจอายุ 50 ถึง 59) และ การสำรวจประชากรสูงอายุในประเทศไทย พ.ศ. 2560 (ผู้ตอบแบบสำรวจอายุ 60 ถึง 69) ้จัดโดยสานักงานสถิติแห่งชาติ วิจัยนี้ระบกล่มบุคคลและวัดผลต่างระหว่างสัคส่วนของความคาดหวังและความเป็นจริงของการ ้ตอบสนองความต้องการทางการเงินในวัยสูงวัยของผู้สูงอายุไทยเพศษายและหญิง โดยเน้นที่ผลกระทบจากภูมิภาคและการศึกษา วิจัยนี้ใช้สมการ OLS dummy regression สามแบบเพื่อค้นหางนาด เครื่องหมายและความสำคัญของผลต่างระหว่าง ้ความคาดหวังและความเป็นจริงในการเงิน ผลของวิจัยนี้พบว่าผลต่างของแหล่งรายได้จากเงินออมและบำเหนึ่ง/บำนาณมีความ ้คล้ายคลึงกันอย่างมากระหว่างชายและหญิง ในขณะที่แหล่งรายได้จากการทำงานในวัยชราและบุตรยังคงมีความสำคัญ แต่ใน ้ความเป็นจริงแถ้วสัคส่วนของผู้สูงอายุที่ได้รับรายได้จากทั้งสองแหล่งนั้นน้อยกว่าความกาคหวังค้วยอัตราการเจริญพันธุ์ที่ลคลง เราพบว่าผลต่างระหว่างความกาคหวังและความเป็นจริงในการมีรายได้จากการทำงานในวัยชรานั้นมีขนาคใหญ่ถึงเกือบสามเท่า ในผู้หญิงเมื่อเทียบกับผู้ชาย แหล่งรายได้ของผู้สูงวัยจากบุตรมีความสัมพันธ์กับภูมิภาคและการศึกษาของผู้สูงอายุ ผลต่างของ แหล่งรายได้จากบตรสำหรับผ้สำรวจเพศหญิงที่อาศัยอยู่ในภาคอีสานนั้นน้อยกว่าเกือบครึ่งหนึงของผ้สำรวจที่อาศัยอยู่ในภาคอื่น ซึ่งบ่งบอกถึงความสัมพันธ์ที่ดีระหว่างวัยในภาคอีสาน ผู้สูงอายุที่มีการศึกษาสูงมักไม่ค่อยได้รับการสนับสนุนทางการเงินจาก บุตรโดยมีผลต่างที่ใหญ่กว่าสองเท่าของผลต่างของผู้สำรวจที่มีการศึกษาต่ำกว่า ผลยังพบอีกว่าผู้สูงอายุในชนบทมีแนวโน้มที่จะ ้ทำงานเมื่ออายุมากขึ้น โดยผลต่างสำหรับผู้สำรวจเพศชายที่อาศัยอยู่ในกรุงเทพฯ ใหญ่กว่าสี่เท่าของผลต่างของผู้สำรวจเพศชายที่ ้อาศัยอยู่นอกกรุงเทพฯ นโยบายและเบี้ยเลี้ยงในอานาคตจะมีส่วนสำคัญในการลดผลต่างระหว่างความคาดหวังและความเป็นจริง ของบคกลที่มีความเสี่ยงต่อทางการเงินในสังคมไทย

# จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย Chulalongkorn University

# # 6284054329 : MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE KEYWOR elderly financial security expectation and reality gender Thailand D:

> Phantira Soontornsittipong : Expectations and Reality in Meeting Financial Needs of Thai Elderly: A Gender Perspective. Advisor: Asst. Prof. YONG YOON, Ph.D.

Using the 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues surveying respondents aged 50 to 59 and the 2017 Survey of Older Persons in Thailand surveying respondents aged 60 to 69, this study identified a cohort to examine the gap between reality and expectations of Thai elderly males and females with regards to financial sources in meeting financial needs at old age with emphasis placed on the effect of regions and education. Three models of OLS dummy regression were ran to find the magnitude, sign, and significance of the reality-expectations gap. The results of the study found that the gaps for savings and pension as an elderly financial source is similar for both males and females. While, working at old age and children remain important sources to meeting the financial needs of the Thai elderly, reality continues to disappoint with declining fertility rates. We found that the gap between expectation and reality was almost three times larger for females than for their male counterparts when it came to working at old age. Elderly financial support from their adult children were prominently linked to regional and educational differences in Thailand. The gap of children support for females living in the Northeast was about half of those living elsewhere indicating the strong intergenerational ties in the Northeast. Highly educated elders are less likely to receive support from their children with the gap for respondents with university education to be twice that of lower educated respondents. Rural elders were also more likely to work at old age given the gap for males living in Bangkok being four time larger than for males living outside Bangkok. Future policy and public allowance will inevitably play a crucial role in closing the gap of financially vulnerable individuals in Thai society.

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# 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Thailand's aging population

Thailand has the highest share of elderly people among developing countries in East Asia and Pacific, including China (World Bank, 2016a). With a decline in fertility and a fast pace of aging, the proportion of Thailand's elderly population will continue to increase (World Bank, 2016a; UNFPA, 2011). The proportion of Thai population aged 65 years and older has increased from 5% in 1990 to 8% in 2010 (UNFPA, 2011). By 2030, the proportion of elderly is projected to be over 15% or even exceeding 20% according to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) respectively (UNFPA, 2011; NESDB, 2007). The World Bank predicts that by 2040 more than a quarter of Thailand's population, which is approximately 17 million will be 65 years or older (World Bank, 2016a).

Thailand's speed of aging is increasing at an unprecedented rate, one of the fastest globally and is faster than other ASEAN countries (World Bank, 2016a). The speed of aging in Thailand is primarily driven by a steep decline in fertility which has existed as a continuous trend for many years (UNFPA, 2011; World Bank, 2016a). According to the World Bank, fertility rates decreased from 6.1 in 1965 to 1.5 in 2015 (World Bank, 2016a). Between 1970 and 1990, the total fertility rate decreased from 5.5 to 2.2 (UNFPA, 2011). Remarkably, this 20-year period show the fastest decline out of all the countries in Southeast Asia (UNFPA, 2011). In lesser extent than fertility, increasing life expectancy is also a contributing factor to the speed of aging in Thailand (UNFPA, 2011).

The working age population is expected to shrink by approximately 11% as a share of total population between 2016 and 2040 from 49 million to 40.5 million people (World Bank, 2016a). The decline in the working age population is higher in Thailand than in other developing countries in East Asia and Pacific, including China (World Bank, 2016a). It is predicted that the decline in working age population will begin after or little before 2020 (UNFPA, 2011). Thailand's elderly dependency ratio which is the percentage of elderly population relative to the working age population is increasing continuously. In 1994, the elderly dependency ratio was 10.7% which increased to 14.3% in 2002 (Suwanrada, 2009). The future projection of Thailand's elderly dependency ratio is expected to almost triple from 15% in 2016 to 42% by 2040 (World Bank, 2016a). The potential support ratio, the ratio of individuals in the labour force supporting at least one elderly person has also decreased from 9.3 in 1994 to 6.3 in 2007 (Suwanrada, 2009). By 2023, it is predicted that the potential support ratio will drop to 2.52 (NESDB, 2007). Specifically, a falling potential support ratio reflects the shrinking support of working adults whom elderly can depend on (UNFPA, 2011). The decline in working age population combined with an increasing elderly dependency ratio, and a decreasing potential support ratio, point towards the fact that the aging population in Thailand will evidently face a significant decline in financial support from children and family members.

#### 1.2 Financial status of Thai elderly

Income of older persons has increased over time. In 1986, over half of people age 60 and above reported an annual income of less than 10,000 baht which declined to only 17% by 2007 (income expressed in 2007 values to adjusted for inflation)

(UNFPA, 2011). While, those with income of 100,000 baht or more reported an increase from 4% to 15% in 1986 and 2007 respectively (UNFPA, 2011). Despite continued improvements in social and economic well-being of Thai elderly, poverty and financial hardships still remain among older persons. Among Thai individuals aged 60 years and older, 21% reported having inadequate income, 28% were not satisfied with their financial situation, and 19% reported both income inadequacy and financial dissatisfaction (UNFPA, 2011). When separated between urban and rural, 21% of rural elderly reported both income inadequacy and financial dissatisfaction (UNFPA, 2011). While, this was reported for 13% of urban elderly (UNFPA, 2011).

The majority of Thai elderly are unable to support themselves financially and would need to rely on intergenerational transfers, family support, and government in addition to their personal savings (Yoon et al., 2017; Suwanrada, 2009; Witvorapong, 2015). In Thailand, elderly support and care has been traditionally the role of family and adult children (Knodel et al., 2013a). However, filial obligations to Thai elderly may face a decline over time as older adults with children have increasingly lower expectations for financial assistance (Basten et al., 2014). Additionally, with demographic changes in the near future, it will be unclear on how much family support, the Thai government can provide greater financial security to older persons through programs that guarantee certain income levels for elderly (Suwanrada, 2009). In 1993, an old age allowance system was introduced by the Thai government to provide monetary aid for vulnerable older adults, which was later expanded in 2009 to cover all older adults without a formal pension (Suwanrada, 2009; Knodel et al., 2013a). However, it is claimed that government allowances are not sufficient for subsistence

living above the national poverty line (Witvorapong, 2015). The main purpose of savings for Thai individuals with a minimum income of 20,000 baht is for postretirement spending (Suppakitjarak & Krishnamra, 2015). Empirical evidence on saving behavior of Thai individuals also raise concerns for financial security later in life. An analysis of saving behavior of employed persons in Thailand conducted by NESDB reported that 39% do not save, 26% have balanced earning and expenditure, 9% borrow in order to make ends meet, and 3% is capable of saving but do not (NESDB, 2008) According to the Bank of Thailand, 41% of Thais have not planned or started saving for retirement, 29% of Thais are still in debt at the age of 60, 43% of Thais age 45 and above work in the informal sector (Chittinandana et al., 2017). From a macro level perspective, personal savings was 3.5% to 8% of 2000 to 2007 GDP (gross domestic product) in Thailand (NESDB, 2009). Further evidence also suggests that a number of Thai elders are facing financial instabilities. The Survey of Older Persons in Thailand in 1994 and 2002 reported that 15.7% of Thai elderly living alone have financial difficulties (Suwanrada, 2009). While, 31.3% of Thai elderly do not have savings or financial assets and 34.1% of Thai elderly have an annual income that is less than 20,000 baht (Suwanrada, 2009). Hence, in response to changing demographic patterns, filial norms, savings behavior, and government policies, it is crucial to investigate the financial needs of the Thai population at old age.

## **1.3 Objectives**

This study examines the expectations and reality of Thai elderly financial needs from a gender perspective through the following sources of financial support: personal savings, pension, children, spouse, relatives, government support and by

working at old age. The objective of this study is to (1) determine the gap between reality and expectations in meeting elderly financial needs of males and females in Thailand, and (2) to determine whether region (urbanization) and education (human capital development) are associated in the gap in (1).

#### 1.4 Scope

This thesis presents a descriptive study with a scope focusing on expectation and reality sources of financial support for elderly males and females in Thailand between 2007 to 2017. Expectations and reality of elderly financial support are from cross-sectional data collected from two national surveys: 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues and 2017 Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand. Expectations of elderly income source comes from non-elderly survey respondents age 50 to 59 in the 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues. Actual elderly income source comes from elderly survey respondents age 60 to 69 in the 2017 Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand. These specific age groups were chosen to align with the year surveyed as an advantage to study the same cohort or generation who were non-elderly ten years ago and became elderly ten years later. Given that the two surveys constitute of national representative respondents, further potential endogeneity is mitigated by focusing on same cohort for analysis.

#### **1.5 Contributions of the study**

With Thailand currently emerging into an aging society at an unprecedented rate, it is crucial to investigate whether the financial needs of Thai elderly are being met. Such research will be valuable to study as Thailand is undergoing changes in demographic patterns and financial behavior and therefore it will be important to see how well the aging population is able to prepare for their finances with such changes. In contrast to other literature on Thailand's aging population, the present study focuses on the expectations and reality of financial support at old age. Importantly, the present study also looks at a perspective of gender on elderly financial well-being adding the considerable impacts of regional effects and education across males and females. In particular, lower mortality rates among females and the ever-evolving role of females has resulted in the importance of examining a gender perspective on the theme of aging. Undoubtedly, with an aging population examining among gender allows us to capture the gender inequality aspects of elderly finances. Specifically, is the growing concern of presumed greater social and economic vulnerability among older females compared to males in Thailand.

Furthermore, the findings of this study will be much valuable in providing further implications and policy recommendations for government, individuals, and other relevant financial institutions. With Thailand emerging into an aging society, more government policies that are geared towards supporting the aging population will be much needed. In the context of this study's objectives on financial needs of elderly, it will be important for such policies to help close the gap on expectations and reality of financial sources of elderly in order for Thai individuals to prepare better for their finances when reaching old age. By further examining from a gender perspective in different regions and education levels, the study may potentially contribute to help target financially vulnerable individuals before they reach old age. This will help develop more efficient policies that can better target certain groups of individuals in Thai society in order to ensure that government spending will not go to waste. The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Section two is a review of relevant literatures on the study's topic. The first part of the literature review is organized based on the examined elderly financial sources (children, working, government, pension, personal savings, spouse and relatives). The second part of the literature review is a compilation of relevant studies on the financial well-being among gender and gender roles across region and educational attainment. Section three discusses the conceptual framework of the present study and section four states the hypotheses. Section five explains the research methodology including data source, summary, and econometric models utilized. The results and discussion are stated in section six and seven respectively. The paper concludes with the conclusion and further recommendations in the last section.

## 2. Literature Review

# 2.1 Sources of financial support for Thai elderly

The elderly is supported financially through various sources which is generally divided by public transfers, private transfers, and other sources. The literature review focuses on financial support at old age from the following sources: children, working at old age, government, pension, personal savings, spouse, and relatives.

## 2.1.1 Children and intergenerational transfers

For many decades, the main source of financial support for Thai elderly has primarily been from children. According to the 1994 and 2007 Surveys of Older Persons in Thailand, it was reported that among Thais age 60 and older, their children are the most common source of income and is the most common main income source as well (UNFPA, 2011). Given that the Thai family traditions of reciprocity to parents influences children to take care of financial needs and care of older parents, it may be expected of children to take on this role in society (Suwanrada, 2009; Knodel et al., 2013a). Evidence of traditional norms of support from children have been shown in interviews and discussions with Thai elderly themselves. Rattanamongkolgul et al. (2012) conducted a qualitative study on Thai elderly's perspective on preparing for aging. Using a combination of observations and in-depth interviews, their study reported that Thai elderly believe that, once they raise children, their children should reciprocate by taking care of them in their old age (Rattanamongkolgul et al., 2012). Thai elderly in their study also expressed willingness to try to minimize the burden of care by taking care of themselves, contributing to household duties, earning extra money, and helping with household expenses (Rattanamongkolgul et al., 2012). Knodel et al. (2013a) examines how Thai parents who are approaching old age and their adult children view changes of decline in co-residence with children and how they intend to deal them. Knodel et al. (2013a) uses a combination of analysis of national survey and open-ended interviews and discussion. Many near elderly parents express concerns about becoming a burden to their children and maintaining their independence as long as possible (Knodel et al., 2013a). While, adult children generally proclaim willingness to live with and care for parents, but it remains an open question if these intentions will be carried out (Knodel et al., 2013a).

A number of studies have examined financial support from children and intergenerational transfers towards the elderly. Theerawanviwat (2014) studies the level and patterns of elderly parent and adult child resource transfer and the relationship between family structure and the direction of resource transfer in Thailand. Using 2009 panel survey, they found that 60% of Thai elderly parents receive financial support from their adult children, whereas about 14 % of Thai elderly parents neither give nor receive financial support to or from their adult children (Theerawanviwat, 2014). It was also found that the median amount of money elderly parents received from their adult children was 22,250 baht in 2009, which was slightly above Thailand's poverty line of that year (Theerawanviwat, 2014). Witvorapong (2015) examines the relationship between the wealth of older parents and the receipt of in-kind and monetary transfers from non-resident adult children in Thailand. Using a national survey sample from 2007 and 2011, the study employed a sample-selected bivariate ordered probit model to explore different measures of wealth including home ownership, income, and savings (Witvorapong, 2015). The study found that the relationships between measure of elderly wealth and the receipt of in-kind as well as monetary transfers are positive and statistically significant (Witvorapong, 2015). Specifically, this means that wealthier parents are more likely to receive larger transfers from children (Witvorapong, 2015). Previous national statistics also suggests that filial financial support varies with the family size. According to the 2007 Survey of Older Persons in Thailand, Thai elderly who have greater number of children are more likely to receive financial support than those with fewer children (UNFPA, 2011). However, Thai elderly with fewer children are more likely to report greater satisfaction of their finances and have sufficient income (UNFPA, 2011). A possible explanation may be due to existing evidence suggesting that elderly with fewer children are economically better off than those with more numbers of children. Havanon et al. (1992) examines the impact of family size on wealth accumulation in rural Thailand households. Through an analysis of survey and

focus-group data of couples collected in 1988, the study found that couples in rural Thailand with fewer children were better at accumulating wealth than couples with more numbers of children. This further implies that smaller families could have more potential to accumulate wealth later in life thereby reducing the need to depend on their children for financial support (UNFPA, 2011).

## 2.1.2 Working

For the elderly, the labour market in Thailand has some constraints. For the public sector, most elderly will face a mandatory retirement age at 60 years old in Thailand. There is no legal retirement age in the private sector as it is typically stated in individual employment contracts (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). A large share of persons who are self-employed, such as farmers and informal sector workers, the mandatory retirement age is inapplicable (UNFPA, 2011). This is probably why there are greater numbers of elderly working in rural areas compared to urban areas (UNFPA, 2011). According to a published report by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the labour force participation of Thai elderly have been relatively low and stable as observed from 1991 to 2008 (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). 37.7%, 35.4%, 33.6%, 38.8% and 37.9% of Thais age 60 and above worked in 1991, 1995, 2000, and 2008 respectively (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). In terms of the total elderly population in Thailand, more than half of Thais age 60 to 64 worked of which 71% were men and around 44% were women as of 2007 (UNFPA, 2011). However, labour force participation declines with increasing age for Thai elderly, as shown in elderly aged 75 or older with only about 13% working (UNFPA, 2011). As for employment status, the majority of working elderly people in 2001 and 2005 were

"own-account workers", meaning self-employed or business owners (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). Specifically, self-employment rates of 90% and higher for elderly in East Asia and Pacific countries are common in rural areas of the region (Giles et al., 2015).

Among different regions in Thailand, the South had the most percentage of elderly working at 46.3% (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). In exception of Bangkok, other regions in Thailand saw an increase in labour force participation among people age 60 and older (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). Previous literature suggests that there is no clear evidence on why labour participation of older persons outside of Bangkok are increasing. However, possible reasons may include expanded work opportunities for the elderly or improving health conditions that have allowed elderly to continue working (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). A decline in support from children or family could also be the case as without the traditionally provided care given by family, elderly would have to support themselves (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). However, the World Bank reported that own labour was the primary source of elderly financial support compared to public transfer, private transfer, and other income (Giles et al., 2015). Specifically, in 2011 almost 60% of people over 60 years old reported that their own labor as a main source of financial support in both urban and rural areas (Giles et al., 2015).

#### 2.1.3 Government

With a demographic change towards aging society, the Thai government is under pressure to play its part to support Thai elderly through a public pension scheme. Before the universal pension scheme, the old-age allowance system was established in 1993 to provide financial assistance to the underprivileged elderly, referring to persons age 60 or older with inadequate income to meet expenses or is unable to work (Sakunphanit & Suwanrada, 2011; Suwanrada, 2009). The monthly allowance started with providing 200 baht per person and was increased to 500 baht per person by 2005 (Sakunphanit & Suwanrada, 2011). With the limitations of the old age allowance system, the 500-baht universal pension scheme was introduced in 2009 and is eligible to all elderly regardless of their financial need, but the scheme does not apply to government employees with formal government pension (Sakunphanit & Suwanrada, 2011; UNFPA, 2011). As of the fiscal year 2010, 77.5% of the Thai elderly population were recipients of the 500-baht pension (Sakunphanit & Suwanrada, 2011).

Most Thais believe that the government should play a bigger role in supporting elderly financially in the future (World Bank, 2016a). A recent survey asked Thai adults who ideally should be the primary source of financial support at old age found that around two thirds of Thai adults report government as a primary source of elderly support (World Bank, 2016a). Similarly, it was found that Thai adults believe that the government should be most responsible for providing personal care to retired people when they need help with everyday living or are sick or disabled (Jackson & Peter, 2015). In addition, evidence from 2011 national data shows that public financial transfers are relatively less important than private transfers in reducing poverty in Thai elderly (Giles et al., 2015). This implies that the current public transfers from government are insufficient to support everyday living for the elderly.

#### 2.1.4 Pension

In order to provide adequate old age financial support with an aging population, Thailand will see an increase in the demand for wider coverage of the pension system (World Bank, 2016a). In Thailand, public sector employees including those working in government and state enterprise have long been covered by the government guaranteed retirement benefits (UNFPA, 2011). While, coverage for Thai workers in the private sector was later established in 1999 as the old age pension fund within the national social security system (UNFPA, 2011). There are 7.8 million Thais under the social security programs for retirement and children support, 1.1 million are members of the government pension fund, and 1.5 million are members of the private provident fund (Pootrakool et al., 2005). With significant progress made towards greater coverage of its social pension, Thailand faces financial sustainability challenges with existing schemes as it struggles to expand the formal sector pension schemes (World Bank, 2016a). Compared to other countries around the world, Thailand has a very low contribution rate of only 6% of salary with public sector employees having a separate scheme which is more generous than the private sector (World Bank, 2016a). Evidence shows that Thailand currently has a pension program that is insufficient to support retirement living. Specifically, with over 80% of Thais receiving pension by the age of 61, elderly employment rates especially for those living in rural areas are still relatively high (Giles et al., 2015).

The coverage of Thai pension programs can still be improved upon as there are still many individuals that are uncovered by the existing pension programs. Out of the 13.4 million Thais who are employed in the private sector, only 7.8 million are under social security programs, and 1.1 million have savings through private provident funds (Pootrakool et al., 2005). There are still many more workers making up about 50% of Thailand's workforce of 17.1 million of Thais, who are uncovered due to their working position as own-account worker or unpaid family worker (Pootrakool et al., 2005). More important is the fact that most working Thai elderly are own-account workers (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). However, this may soon change for the future of Thais as evidence shows that there is a substantial increase in the proportion of Thai younger adults that have some form of formal financial coverage for retirement (UNFPA, 2011). Specifically, the number of Thai adults having coverage increase with decreasing age (UNFPA, 2011). This implies that future Thai elderly will inevitably have pension as monthly or lump sum payment when they retire.

## 2.1.5 Personal savings

Personal savings rate may decline with an aging population as older people are likely to used up their savings as their labour income falls (World Bank, 2016a). There is no clear evidence that this may be the case as findings from previous studies have given mixed results. Kim & Lee (2007) analyzes the empirical relationships among demographic changes, saving, and current account balances in East Asia. Using panel VAR model, the study found that an increase in dependency rate lowers saving rates and worsens current account balances (Kim & Lee, 2007). From a discussion paper done by the Bank of Thailand, Pootrakool et al. (2005) examines long-term savings in Thailand and looks into the impacts of aging population on household savings. Holding the saving amount and income of each age group constant, the study finds that aging population will not reduce the level of household saving rate from 1990 to 2020, given that the changing demographic structure will increase the level of income of working age groups (Pootrakool et al., 2005). As the results of this study are investigated at the aggregate level, the authors suggest that enough savings at an aggregate level does not imply that savings will be enough at an individual level, especially with an aging population (Pootrakool et al., 2005). To increase additional savings for retirement, the study points towards government and private pension funds as an aid to provide employees with additional savings (Pootrakool et al., 2005).

Further evidence also show that Thais have relatively low amounts of saving. At the end of 2014, Thai net household savings rate was at 4.88% of GDP decreasing from around 12% of GDP in 1980 (World Bank, 2016a; Pootrakool et al., 2005). Along with low household savings, Thai household debt are also substantially high. In 2015, the household debt to GDP ratio was around 80% of GDP outstanding loans to households and the debt service ratio was 26% (World Bank, 2016a). With the low levels of saving rate and high household debt, the World Bank claims that Thais are currently not saving enough to assure a comfortable old age (World Bank, 2016a). From the Bank of Thailand's 2004 Household Attitude towards Debt and Savings survey, it was found that 54% of interviewed households indicate that they are not saving enough for emergencies and retirement (Pootrakool et al., 2005). Specifically, low income, low financial literacy, low education, high numbers of household members, being a renter or mortgage holder, and being a laborer or firm employee all contribute to households not saving enough (Pootrakool et al., 2005). In addition, statistics on financial preparedness shows that 41% of Thais have not planned or started saving for retirement (Bank of Thailand, 2017). There is existing evidence suggesting that only a small portion of Thai elderly are using savings as a main source of elderly income (Giles et al., 2015). However, surveying Thais age 20 years or older with a minimum level of income at 20,000 baht, Suppakitjarak & Krishnamra (2015) found that the main objective of household savings was for post-retirement spending.

#### 2.1.6 Spouse and relatives

Spouses play an important role in the economic well-being of elderly as they can be primary sources of financial support. A large portion of Thai elderly are married. In 2007, over 60% of Thai elderly remain married and are living together and only 3% of Thai elderly have never married (UNFPA, 2011). While, around 32% of Thai elderly are widowed and about 2% are divorced or separated (UNFPA, 2011). Although spouses are commonly less important sources of financial support when compared to own work and children (UNFPA, 2011). Existing national data in 2007 shows that only about a quarter of Thai elderly cite their married partner as a source of income (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). Among gender, differences between female and male elderly having income from their spouses are very little (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). In terms of financial preparedness for old age, variation among marital status was also observed. Chansarn (2013) studied the economic preparation for retirement of older Thai adults aged 50 to 59 years. The study found that married people had about 1.17 times greater chance of having above than average economic preparation for retirement than for individuals that were single, divorced, widowed, and separated (Chansarn, 2013). Additionally, Thais that were married to the head of

household had the highest chance of having above than average economic preparation for retirement (Chansarn, 2013).

Although not as common, relatives can also be a source of financial support at old age. Relatively low numbers of Thai elderly report their relatives as sources of income. In 2007, only about 11% of Thai elderly have income from their relatives (UNFPA, 2011). While even lesser amounts at about 2% are reported as main source of income at old age (UNFPA, 2011). Among gender, elderly women are more likely to have income from relatives than elderly men (Knodel et al., 2013b).

#### 2.2 Gender roles and financial well-being of Thai elderly

Existing literature has also examined how financial well-being and income sources of the elderly varies with gender in Thailand or elsewhere in the world. Specifically, this section of the literature review focuses finances of Thai elderly in terms of gender differences and gender roles with urbanization and educational attainment.

# จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

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# 2.2.1 Gender

Generally, there has been significant differences of income in terms of gender. For the elderly, it is reported that economic hardship and poverty have been found to be more prevalent among elderly women than elderly men in Southeast Asia as men generally have higher mean income and more income sources (Ofstedal et al., 2004, Masud et al., 2008). Specifically, elderly women are more likely to rely on their adult children for financial support (Masud et al., 2008). A possible explanation is the fact that women tend to live longer and suffer from social and cultural disadvantages leading to lack of economic independence in later life (Masud et al., 2008). In particular, Thailand's elderly population are predominantly females with 55% age 60 and older and 59% age 80 and older as of 2010 (UNFPA, 2011). Labour force participation rate of elderly females are relatively lower compared to elderly males in Thailand. As of 2005, 51% of males age 60 and older work and about 29% of females age 60 and older work (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). In terms of financial support from children, younger traditional filial norms of support are stronger for daughters towards mothers (Silverstein et al., 2006).

Continued improvements of living standards and financial well-being among gender are also observed for Thai elderly. Examining material and quality of household living for Thai elderly found that little percentage difference between men and women who live in better housing with appliances and amenities were found (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). Gender differences among financial status are also improving for Thailand. The percentage of individuals having sufficient income and are satisfied with their financial situation are almost identical for men and women (UNFPA, 2011). However, married women tend to report lower personal income and wealth compared to men (UNFPA, 2011). Among unmarried older persons, females and males are quite equal in terms of wealth (UNFPA, 2011). Continued improvements of gender equality among elderly is evidently beneficial to Thailand's aging population given that the majority of Thai elders are females.

## 2.2.2 Region

More Thai elderly are residing in rural areas compared to urban areas. In 2006, 69% of Thai elderly are from rural areas and 31% of Thai elderly are from urban areas (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). Among different regions in Thailand, aging in the North and Northeast region has been more rapid than other regions (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). It is also commonly known for younger Thai generations to migrate to urban areas from these regions (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). While, the lowest proportion of older persons in the total population was found in Bangkok (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). Comparing fertility rates between urban and rural areas in Thailand, fertility decline faster in urban than in rural areas, but showed little difference since fertility differentials were relatively small (UNFPA, 2011)

Income and source of income may also differ between individuals from different regions in Thailand. In terms of place of residence between urban and rural area, substantial income differences are still evident with wealthier older persons living in urban areas. In 2007, it was reported that elderly in urban areas are more than twice as likely as rural elderly to have 100,000 baht or more as income (UNFPA, 2011). Similarly, urban elderly is only half as likely as rural elderly to report income under 10,000 baht (UNFPA, 2011).

Rural elderlies are more likely to report work as a source of income reflecting **CHULATONGKORN** UNIVERSITY the tendency to remain economically active longer in life (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). In particular, the South region had the most percentage of elderly working at 46.3% (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). This suggests that rural elderly engaging in agriculture consider retirement as a gradual process and not subject to a prescribed retirement age (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). Similar findings are found in the labour force participation rate by location. It was found that Thai rural elderly males have the highest labour force participation accounting for about 90% in 2011 (Giles et al., 2015). While, urban females account for the lowest labour participation rate in Thailand (Giles et al., 2015). In exception of Bangkok, other regions in Thailand saw an increase in labour force participation among people age 60 and older (Fujioka & Thangphet, 2009). Older people in rural areas of Southeast Asia tend to continue working long hours (World Bank, 2016b). In rural areas, elderly males who continue to work as old as 75 years do so for 30 to 40 hours a week compared to elderly females working 20 to 35 hours a week (World Bank, 2016b).

Findings from self-employment data by location also reveal similar results. The share of Thai population who are self-employed was higher for rural than urban residences (Giles et al., 2015). Specifically, self-employed Thais at the age of 60 was highest for rural females accounting for about 80% (Giles et al., 2015). This was followed by rural males, urban females, and urban males at approximately 70%, 60%, and 50% respectively of self-employed Thais at the age 60 (Giles et al., 2015). In urban areas, an increase in the self-employed share around age 60 indicates that selfemployed urban workers, often in commerce and trade tend to remain in the workforce while employees from the formal sector retire (World Bank, 2016b).

Household saving behavior of Thais among different regions reveal mixed results. From Kosiyanon (1974), household saving behavior of Thais were investigated from 1960 to 1972 using a cross-sectional data from the socioeconomic survey. The results of the study indicate that there is a saving differential between urban and rural areas in Thailand (Kosiyanon, 1974). In particular, the urban marginal propensity to save was higher than rural areas and differ significantly among different regions in Thailand (Kosiyanon, 1974). Tengumnuay (1981) examined saving behavior in the central region and greater Bangkok area as part of the Economic Research Department of the Bank of Thailand. Using data from the socioeconomic survey, the findings indicate that urban-rural difference have significant effects on saving behavior in Thailand (Tengumnuay, 1981). Specifically, self-employed and farm households in the rural central area tended to save more (Tengumnuay, 1981). The role of females in Thailand's rural regions have long played an important role in household economies (Singhanetra-Renard & Prabhudhanitisarn, 1992). In rural areas, females are likely to be found working next to their husbands and brothers in the rice fields and often play the important role of "holding the purse strings" and financial planning (Yoddumnern-Attig, 1992).

Compared to Thai elders living in rural areas, urban areas elders are more likely to report pensions as a source of income (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). In 2007, approximately 12% of urban elderly have income sources from pensions as lump sum payments on retirement compared to around 3% for rural elderly (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). Thus, reflecting the greater likelihood for urban elderly to have previously worked in the formal sector, such as government civil service (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). This also supports the fact that many urban older persons, especially females stop working at retirement age (Giles et al., 2015). Withdrawal of urban elderly from work is correlated with access to a formal sector pension (Giles et al., 2015).

In recent years, there has been an increasing trend for adult children to migrate from rural to urban areas for better employment opportunities (Knodel, 2014). As a result, many rural Thai elders are left behind to take care of their grandchildren (Knodel, 2014). A study done by Knodel & Saengtienchai (2007) examines social and economic consequences of the migration of adult children to urban areas for rural parents in Thailand. Using open-ended interviews conducted in 2004, it was found that children migrating to urban areas contributes positively to the material well-being of rural elderly parents (Knodel & Saengtienchai, 2007). In particular, adult children who moved from rural to urban areas, especially to Bangkok are more likely to provide larger remittances to their elderly parents (Knodel, 2014). When intergenerational transfers were examined across urban and rural areas, evidence suggests that there was no significant difference in familial intergenerational transfers between urban and rural areas (Theerawanviwat, 2014). However, urban elderly parents are receiving substantially higher monetary transfers than rural elderly parents. The median amount of money transfer from children to urban parents is 30,000 baht, almost doubling of 17,500 baht for rural parents (Theerawanviwat, 2014). Rural elderly parents are also more likely to receive the largest amount of money from their eldest child only, compared to urban elderly parents where the first two children are greatest financial providers (Theerawanviwat, 2014).

Examining the role of females among migration of domestic workers in Thailand can be complex. In developing countries, female household members may be restricted from migration because of power hierarchies in the family and sociocultural expectations (Chant & Radcliffe 1992). However, this may not be the case in the Thai context since Chant & Radcliffe (1992) reported that the case study of Mae Sa village in the Ping River Valley, Thailand shows the increasing trend toward labor migration among young and single females. Female's participation in rural-urban migrant streams in Thailand is quite prominent, reaching as high as 60 percent of all migrants (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995; Tantiwiramanond, 1995). According to the 1992 National Migration Survey, most migrants to the Bangkok metropolitan area were in their early twenties or teenage years with at least half of these migrants being females (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995). Importantly, females are reported to earn one-third to one-half as much as males in similar occupations (Tantiwiramanond, 1995). Findings from Curran et al. (2005) suggests that in the Thai context, females are considered more reliable remitters than males. However, higher rates of female migrants may also weaken their ties to natal villages in rural Thailand and shift patterns of care provision from daughters to sons (Curran et al., 2005).

## 2.2.3 Education

Education level is an important factor for being financially supported at old age. With basic skills in reading and writing being critical for access to information and employment opportunities, education significantly determines one's economic well-being and financial status later in life (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008; Knodel et al., 2013b). In 2011, only 6% of Thais age 60 to 64 have no formal education and this increases to 27% among Thais age 80 and older (Knodel et al., 2013b). Almost 90% of Thais age 60 and older have only basic primary education (Knodel et al., 2013b). Urban elders are better educated than rural elderly and are more likely to continue schooling beyond the basic primary level to receive secondary education (Knodel et al., 2013b). Gender differences are also apparent among elderly education attainment with elderly men receiving more formal education than elderly women (Knodel et al., 2013b). In particular, gender differences of education attainment are more pronounced with increasing age of older persons in Thailand (Knodel et al., 2013b).

It is more likely for lower educated elderly parents to receive monetary support from their adult children (Theerawanviwat, 2014). This suggests that lower educated individuals are more likely to depend on others for financial support. This also proves to show that education increases one's ability to become financially independent. Data on the employment rate of Thais by educational attainment reveals that better-educated people tend to withdraw from the labour force earlier (Giles et al., 2015). Elderly with least education are more likely to continue working at old age, often out of necessity because of low assets and savings and limited access to old age security programs (World Bank, 2016b). At the age of 60, almost 60% of Thais with an education level of college or higher were still employed compared to about 80% employment rate for Thais with middle school or less education (Giles et al., 2015). Among gender, female elders who had more children, living with children, with less annual family income, who had worked in government jobs, and perceived themselves to be in poor health were all associated with withdrawal from the labor force (Adhikari et al., 2011). While, females with less education, who were heads of households and indebt were quite likely to continue working in old age (Adhikari et al., 2011).

Future trends of education for the elderly in Thailand will inevitably improve in the coming years. Previous data on education of elderly reveal that primary and secondary education of older persons in 1994 were substantially lower than of those in 2011 (Knodel et al., 2013b). According to the 2010 labour force survey, current and projected education of Thai elderly from 2010 to 2050 show that future elderly will be increasingly better educated than current elders in Thailand (UNFPA, 2011). Specifically, a rise in secondary education of older persons of age 60 will increase significantly from 12% in 2010 to 80% in 2050 (UNFPA, 2011). Additionally, gender differences among educated elders will also continue to improve. Although the gender gap in education of elders will continue for the next few decades, it will eventually close and reverse with females projected to have outnumbered males on having secondary or higher education by 2050 (UNFPA, 2011). The improvement of education among older persons will positively contribute to the financial well-being at old age and potentially affect future intergenerational transfers and elderly employment.

# 3. Conceptual Framework

The main objective of this study examines the gap between reality and expectations of elderly financial support for males and females in Thailand. In particular, older Thai males and females evidently have different experiences in terms of financial well-being at old age. On the perspective of elderly financial support among gender, the framework utilized in this study is on the concept of "gender system" as outlined by Mason (2001). In basic social fundamentals, all societies have a set of norms and practices that define the roles, rights and obligations of males and females; this is formally referred to as a "gender system" (Mason 2001). Gender systems can vary and differ across societies and they condition the experiences of males and females throughout the life course. Gender systems, in turn, are both influenced and reinforced by social and economic factors.

In particular, is the importance of gender systems in the household where family is traditionally well-known for being a primary supporter of elderly care and finances. The role of family in Thailand, particularly children is considered the most common source of income for elderly parents across Thai households (UNFPA, 2011). Specifically, the traditions of Thai family on reciprocity to parents influences
children to take care of financial needs and care of older parents (Knodel et al.,

2013a). Thus, the concept of gender systems is most definitely applicable to male and female elders in the Thai context. Gender systems also outlines the differences among patrilineal/patriarchal and the bilateral systems. Given that bilateral systems are more commonly found in Southeast Asia (Ofstedal et al., 2004), the bilateral system can be justified in the Thai context. Where, in patrilineal systems the responsibility of sons (and their wives) are stressed for caring for and supporting parents, whereas under the bilateral systems daughters occupy equally or more important roles in contributing to their parents' well-being (Ofstedal et al., 2004). According to the gender system concept, Mason (2001) theorizes that within bilateral systems, motherhood among elderly females are more likely to receive as much support and care as their elderly fathers do.

The influence of gender systems in the Thai family is most definitely affected by gender differences in economic and financial authority, such as property rights and participation in the workforce. Specifically, Thailand have had a long history of females being actively involved in the labour force, holding basing property and inheritance rights, and having relatively high economic status (Ofstedal et al., 2004). With both economic independence and household roles that Thai females hold, this potentially further differentiates the Thai women from men in terms of receiving public financial support, such government allowance and pension. Thus, the framework of gender systems fully encompasses all of the examined financial sources studied in this research.

Along with the part of gender systems and roles, there will be other variables and factors that may possibly affect or be associated with the financial needs of both older males and females. This includes major socioeconomic factors, like the regional effect (urbanization) and educational attainment (human capital development). Given the rapid economic developments of Thailand, urbanization has increased significantly with the expansion of urban areas and large movements of population. Accounting for nearly 80% of total urban area in Thailand, Thai urban growth is primarily dominate by the Bangkok urban area, which is the fifth largest area in the East Asia region (World Bank, 2015). While, at an individual level, movement of migrants primarily from rural to urban are dominated by younger females (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995). Therefore, to capture the impact of urbanization among gender, the different regions of Thailand (Bangkok, Central, North, Northeast, and South) are examined separately for elderly financial support among males and females. In terms of educational attainment, education is an important factor in determining one's economic well-being and financial status later in life (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). Importantly, gender differences are apparent among elderly education attainment with elderly males receiving more formal education than elderly females (Knodel et al., 2013b). Along with employment opportunities, education also significantly improves the financial planning of many individuals through increasing financial literacy.

Although Thailand over the 10 years, between 2007 and 2017, has been turbulent, regularly punctuated by natural disasters and political instability, the macroeconomy has been somewhat consistent, if not stable. According to World Bank (2020), real GDP growth averaged about 3.2% for the year 2007 to 2017, while CPI inflation and unemployment rate remained low at about 1%. Tourism entering Thailand also grew steadily, and between 60% to 55% of Thais were employed in the informal sector (NSO, 2008; NSO, 2017). More importantly, the data of this study from both surveys are randomized samples of nationally represented survey respondents and fixing the cohort to 10 years allows us to control for possible unobservable factors including fixed-effects, as discussed above.

## 4. Data Source and Summary

The data used in this study are from two national surveys conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO): 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues and 2017 Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand. The 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues is a comprehensive national survey on opinions, attitudes, and expectations towards the elderly of Thailand's working age population ages 18 to 59. The 2017 Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand is a nationally representative household survey on social, health, and economic characteristics. In this study, only questions regarding the source of income at old age were examined in both surveys. Only survey respondents ages 50 to 59 from the 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues were used to represent nonelderly expectations of income source at old age. The Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues is used to capture what Thai non-elderly (aged 50 to 59) expect their income sources would be when they become elderly, age 60 and over While, only survey respondents ages 60 to 69 from the 2017 Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand were used to represent the reality of elderly income source. These specific age groups were chosen to reflect the same cohort or group of individuals who were non-elderlies ten years ago and became elderlies ten years later. And

because both surveys are randomized samples of nationally represented survey respondents, using the same cohort allows us to control for possible unobservable factors including fixed-effects and time-effects, albeit with some limitations. After specifying into defined age groups, the total number of survey respondents was 2,034 for non-elderly respondents from the 2007 Survey and 22,673 for elderly respondents from the 2017 Survey respectively.

Thai respondents in both surveys was categorized according to gender, region, and educational attainment. In the 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues, 47.79% (N= 972) of non-elderly respondents were males, whereas 52.21% (N=1,062) of non-elderly respondents were females (Figure 1). As for the 2017 Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand, 44.67% (N=10,127) of elderly respondents were males and 55.33% (N=12,546) of elderly respondents were females (Figure 1). Respondents in both surveys were categorized into respective regions in Thailand: Bangkok, central, north, northeast, and south. In the 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues, 10.62% (N=216), 24.09% (N=490), 24.09% (N=490), 26.75% (N=544), and 14.45% (N=294) of non-elderly respondents are from Bangkok, central, north, northeast, and south respectively (Figure 2). In the 2017 Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand, 4.66% (N=1,056), 27.82% (N=6,308), 26.33% (N=5,969), 27.83% (N=6,310), 13.36% (N=3,030) of elderly respondents are from Bangkok, central, north, northeast, and south respectively (Figure 2). As for education, respondents were categorized according to their highest education level received. This includes three broad education levels: primary and below, secondary and high school, university and higher. According to the 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues, 81.42% (N=1,656), 12.29% (N=250), 6.29% (N=128) of non-elderly respondents have primary and below, secondary and high school, and university and higher education respectively (Figure 3). The 2017 Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand comprises of 83.42% (N= 18,885), 9.49% (N=2,153), 7.21% (N= 1,635) of elderly respondents have primary and below, secondary and high school, and university and higher education respectively (Figure 3).



Figure 1. The percentage of survey respondents by gender.



Figure 2. The percentage of survey respondents by region in Thailand.



Figure 3. The percentage of survey respondents by education.



Non-elderly and elderly survey respondents were asked of expecting or having income at old age from different sources in both surveys. In this study, the examined sources of elderly financial support include personal savings, pension, children, spouse, relatives, government, and working at old age. The question of interest from 2007 Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues both in Thai (original) and translated to English are stated as follows:

ท่านกาดหวังว่าจะมีแหล่งเงินสำหรับเลี้ยงดูตนเองยามสูงอายุ จากแหล่งต่อไปนี้หรือไม่ (มี/ไม่มี)

ทำงานเลี้ยงตนเอง 2. บุตร 3. รัฐบาล (เบี้ยัยังชีพ) 4. บำเหน็จ/บำนาญ
 เงินออม/ทรัพย์สิน (เช่น บ้าน ที่ดิน เครื่องประดับ เป็นต้น) 6. คู่สมรส 7. ญาติ

Do you expect to have financial support at old age from the following sources (yes/no)

1.Working to support self 2. Children 3. Government (allowance) 4. Pension 5. Savings/assets (eg. house, property, jewelry) 6. Spouse 7. Relatives

The question from 2017 Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand both in Thai

(original) and translated to English are stated as follows:

ในระหว่าง 12 เดือนก่อนวันสัมภาษณ์ท่านมีรายได้หรือทรัพย์สิน (รวมรายได้ที่ไม่ใช่ตัว เงิน) ในการเลี้ยงชีพตนเองจากแหล่งต่อไปนี้หรือไม่ (มี/ไม่มี) 1.การทำงาน 2. บุตร 3. เบี้ยัยังชีพจากทางราชการ 4. บำเหน็จ/บำนาญ 5. ดอกเบี้ยเงิน ออม/เงินออม/ทรัพย์สิน 6. คู่สมรส 7. พี่/น้อง/ญาติ

Within the past 12 months before the surveyed date, did you have income (including income not in monetary form) to financially support yourself from the following sources (have/don't have) 1.working 2. Children 3. Government allowance 4. Pension 5. Savings interest/savings/assets 6. Spouse 7. Siblings/relatives

It is also important to note that working as a source of elderly income refers to

survey respondent's own work and does not take into account income from family



Figure 4. Percentage of survey respondents reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 2,034, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 22,673).

The percentage distribution of expected and actual elderly source of financial support is shown in Figure 4. About 75% of non-elderly expect to be working at old age, but only around 54% of elderly actually work for a living. This shows that individuals are expecting to work at old age, but fewer actually work. In terms of financial support from children, about 87% of non-elderly expect their children to support them financially, but slightly fewer of 73% of elderly actually receive them. From statistics and future projections, this supports the current trend of declining fertility and potential support ratio implying less financial support given through intergenerational transfers. In reality, much more elderlies are receiving government allowance than is expected from non-elderly. Only 47% of non-elderly expect to have financial support from government allowance, but 82% of elderlies actually receive them. This may be due to the Thai government introducing the 500 Baht Universal Pension Scheme in 2009 for every elderly Thai person who is not in elderly public facilities or does not currently receive income permanently (Sakunphanit & Suwanrada, 2011). In the fiscal year 2010, approximately 77.5% of Thailand's elderly population were recipients for the 500-baht pension (Sakunphanit & Suwanrada, 2011). Savings, pension, married partner, and relatives as an income source at old age was much less than expected. In terms of savings, about 76% of non-elderly expect to have savings as an income source, but only 43% of elderly use their savings as income. 16% of non-elderly expected to have pension at old-age, but only 7% of elderly reported having pension in the form of lump-sum and monthly pension. About 62% of non-elderly expected to be financially supported by their spouse at old age. However, only 34% of elderly were supported by their spouse in

reality. Relatives play a less important role of financial support towards elderly with 39% expecting and 10% actually receiving support.

Further comparison can also be made on the ranking of each financial source at old. Given that government was highly unexpected due to the implementation of the 500 Baht Universal Pension Scheme in 2009, the comparison between ranks omitted the financial support from government. For Figure 4, both expectations (2007 Survey) and reality (2017 Survey) ranked financial support from children to be first. Second rank of expectations was for savings, while reality was for working at old age. Third rank of expectations was for working, while reality was for savings. Both expectations and reality ranked spouse, relatives, and pension as fourth, fifth, and sixth respectively.

Breaking down further by socioeconomic factors, expectations and reality of sources of elderly financial support was examined by gender, region, and education. Figure 5 and Figure 6 shows the percentage distribution of expectations and actual sources of elderly financial support by gender. According to male respondents (Figure 5): 78% expected to work at old age, 67% actually work, 86% expected support from children, 69% receive support from children, 46% expected support from the government, 78% receive support from the government, 77% expected support from own savings, 45% receive support from own savings, 19% expected support from pension, 9% receive pension, 64% expected support from their spouse, 33% receive support from their spouse, and 38% expected support from relatives, and 8% receive support from relatives. According to female respondents (Figure 6): 72% expected to work at old age, 43% work at old age, 87% expected support from the government, 84%

receive government support, 74% expected support from own savings, 42% receive support from own savings, 15% expected having pension, 6% have pension, 60% expected support from their spouse, 35% receive support from their spouse, 40% expected support from relatives, and 12% receive support from relatives.



Figure 5. Percentage of male survey respondents reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 972, N = survey respondents age 60-69 = 10,127).



Figure 6. Percentage of female survey respondents reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 1,062, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 12,546).

Figure 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 shows the percentage distribution of expectations and reality of financial sources at old age by region of respondent's residence. According to survey respondents living in Bangkok (Figure 7): 78% expected to work at old age, 31% actually work at old age, 78% expected support from children, 62% receive support from children, 44% expected government support, 68% receive government support, 81% expected support from own savings, 54% receive support from own savings, 29% expected to have pension, 11% have pension, 58% expected to receive support from spouse, 26% receive support from spouse, 44% expected support from relatives, and 10% receive support from relatives. Survey respondents that were surveyed in the central region of Thailand included all provinces in the central region except for Bangkok. According to survey respondents living in the central region (Figure 8): 74% expected to work at old age, 49% actually work at old age, 85% expected support from children, 66% receive support from children, 40% expected government support, 80% receive government support, 72% expected support from own savings, 37% receive support from own savings, 18% expected to have pension, 8% have pension, 55% expected support from spouse, 28% receive support from spouse, 37% expected support from relatives, and 7% receive support from relatives. According to survey respondents living in the north region (Figure 9): 75% expected to work at old age, 57% work at old age, 87% expected support from children, 74% receive support from children, 54% expected government support, 83% receive government support, 82% expected support from own savings, 47% receive support from own savings, 14% expected to have pension, 7% have pension, 65% expected support from spouse, 37% receive support from spouse, 37% expected support from relatives, and 11% receive support from relatives. According to survey

respondents living in the northeast region (Figure 10): 73% expected to work at old age, 58% work at old age, 91% expected support from children, 82% receive support from children, 56% expected government support, 85% receive government support, 68% expected support from own savings, 44% receive support from own savings, 15% expected to have pension, 5% have pension, 65% expected support from spouse, 37% receive support from spouse, 62% expected support from relatives, and 14% receive support from relatives. According to survey respondents living in the south region (Figure 11): 78% expected to work at old age, 56% work at old age, 87% expected support from children, 68% receive support from children, 32% expected government support, 78% receive government support, 80% expected to have savings as support, 47% have savings as support, 12% expected to have pension 8% have pension, 64% expected support from spouse, 37% receive support from spouse, 45% expected support from relatives, and 8% receive support from relatives.



Figure 7. Percentage of survey respondents from Bangkok who reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 216, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 1,056).



Figure 8. Percentage of survey respondents from central region who reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 490, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 6,308).



Figure 9. Percentage of survey respondents from north region who reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 490, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 5,969).



Figure 10. Percentage of survey respondents from northeast region who reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 544, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 6,310).



Figure 11. Percentage of survey respondents from south region who reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 294, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 3,030).

Figure 12, 13, and 14 shows the percentage distribution of expectations and reality of financial sources at old age by educational attainment of respondents. According to survey respondents with primary and below education (Figure 12): 75% expected to work at old age, 57% actually work at old age, 89% expected support from children, 77% receive support from children, 48% expected government support, 89% receive

government support, 74% expected support from own savings, 40% receive support from own savings, 10% expected to have pension, 0.7% have pension, 62% expected to receive support from spouse, 34% receive support from spouse, 40% expected support from relatives, and 10% receive support from relatives. According to survey respondents with secondary and high school education (Figure 13): 73% expected to work at old age, 46% actually work at old age, 80% expected support from children, 58% receive support from children, 40% expected government support, 63% receive government support, 75% expected support from own savings, 55% receive support from own savings, 34% expected to have pension, 22% have pension, 58% expected support from spouse, 32% receive support from spouse, 37% expected support from relatives, and 9% receive support from relatives. According to survey respondents with university and higher education (Figure 14): 70% expected to work at old age, 23% work at old age, 74% expected support from children, 45% receive support from children, 46% expected government support, 22% receive government support, 91% expected support from own savings, 72% receive support from own savings, 78% expected to have pension, 69% have pension, 62% expected support from spouse, 35% receive support from spouse, 44% expected support from relatives, and 8% receive support from relatives.



Figure 12. Percentage of survey respondents with primary and below education who reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 1656, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 18885).



Figure 13. Percentage of survey respondents with secondary and high school education who reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 250, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 2153).



Figure 14. Percentage of survey respondents with secondary and high school education who reported expecting or having financial support at old age from the following sources (N of survey respondents age 50-59 = 128, N of survey respondents age 60-69 = 1635).

## 5. Research Methodology

## **5.1 Econometric Model**

Given the above data summary on the proportions of expectations (2007 Survey) and proportions of reality (2017 Survey) for each examined financial source at old age categorized by gender, region, and education, we get the measure GAP which is the variable of interest in this study. The gap between reality and expectations (GAP) measured for each of the financial sources captured in both surveys is defined as the difference between reality and expectations of financial source at old age, or more formally as follows:

 $GAP_a = \%$  reality — % expectations

where  $GAP_f$  is percentage expecting from 2007 pre-elderly Survey of Knowledge and Attitudes on Elderly Issues subtract the percentage that had access to financial source *a* when elderly from the 2017 Survey of the Older Persons. The financial source in question are denoted  $a = \{$ savings, pension, children, spouse, relatives, government and working $\}$ . The gap can be presented as an overestimation of financial source, where expectations are greater than reality or an underestimation of financial source, where expectations are less than reality.

We further ran 3 models of OLS dummy regression to examine the magnitude and significance of the survey GAP with (1) financial sources at old age, (2) financial sources at old age across gender, education, and region, (3) financial sources at old age within gender (differentiate male and female respondents) across education and region. To prepare the data for the OLS regression models, each variable was binary coded as 0 or 1. In terms of examined seven financial sources at old age, 0 = don'texpect/have and 1 = expect/have. For surveys; 0 = expectations from 2007 Survey, 1 = reality from 2017 survey. For gender; 0 = males, 1 = females. Education and region are a simple 0, 1 binary outcome of specified region or education level (eg. 0 = notfrom Bangkok, 1 = from Bangkok).

Description of each OLS dummy regression model are described as follows. The first model is a *Base Model*, a univariate OLS regression model with the dependent variable as the examined financial sources at old age and the independent variable as the GAP between surveys. The *Base Model* will give us the coefficient to find the survey GAP for each financial source.

$$Source_{ai} = c + \beta_1 Survey_i \qquad (Base Model)$$

Where, *Source<sub>ai</sub>* is the financial source examined denoted  $a = \{$ savings, pension, children, spouse, relatives, government and working $\}$ , c is the constant, and *Survey<sub>i</sub>* is the expectations and reality response from both surveys. In total, seven OLS dummy regression of *Base Model* were ran for each type of financial support.

The second set of models is a multivariate OLS regression model with the gender, education, and region variable included. Namely, the *Regression by Gender Model*, *Regression by Education Model*, and *Regression by Region Model*. It also includes a two-way interaction variable as the product of survey variable multiplied by either gender, education, or region variable. The *Regression by Gender Model* will give us the coefficient interpretations to find the survey GAP among gender and *difference between gender for each financial source*. *Regression by Education Model* will give us the coefficient interpretation to find the survey GAP among education for each financial source.

 $Source_{ai} = c + \beta_1 Survey_i + \beta_2 Fem_i + \beta_3 (Fem_i \times Survey_i)$ 

(Regression by Gender Model)

CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITYSource<sub>ai</sub> = c +  $\beta_1$ Survey<sub>i</sub> +  $\beta_2$ Educ<sub>bi</sub> +  $\beta_3$ (Educ<sub>bi</sub> × Survey<sub>i</sub>)

(Regression by Education Model)

 $Source_{ai} = c + \beta_1 Survey_i + \beta_2 Reg_{ci} + \beta_3 (Reg_{ci} \times Survey_i)$ 

(Regression by Region Model)

Where, Femi, Educai, Regbi are female, education, and region variables

respectively.  $Educ_{bi}$  is the education level examined denoted  $b = \{\text{primary and below}, \}$ 

secondary and high school, and university and higher }. Regci is the region in Thailand

examined denoted  $c = \{Bangkok, Central, North, Northeast, and South\}.$ 

*Fem<sub>i</sub>xSurvey<sub>i</sub>*, *Educ<sub>bi</sub>xSurvey<sub>i</sub>*, and *Reg<sub>ci</sub>xSurvey<sub>i</sub>* are two-way interaction variables with each respective socioeconomic variable. Seven OLS dummy regression of each financial source were ran for *Regression by Gender Model*. Seven OLS dummy regression of each financial source were ran for each three education levels in *Regression by Education Model*. Seven OLS regression of each financial source were ran for each five regions in *Regression by Region Model*.

The third set of models is a multivariate OLS regression model with the gender variable interacting with either education, or region variable. Namely, *Gender-Education Interaction Model* and *Gender-Region Interaction Model*. It also includes both two-way and three-way interaction variables, where three-way interaction variable is the product of survey variable multiplied by gender variable and education variable, or survey variable multiplied by gender variable and region variable. The *Gender-Education Interaction Model* will give us the coefficient interpretations to find survey GAP among gender and difference between gender depending on different education levels for each financial source. The *Gender-Region Interaction Model* will give us the coefficient interpretations to find survey GAP among gender and different regions for each financial source.

 $\begin{aligned} Source_{ai} &= c + \beta_1 Survey_i + \beta_2 Fem_i + \beta_3 (Fem_i \times Survey_i) + \beta_4 Educ_{bi} \\ &+ \beta_5 (Educ_{bi} \times Survey_i) + \beta_6 (Educ_{bi} \times Fem_i) \\ &+ \beta_7 (Educ_{bi} \times Fem_i \times Survey_i) \end{aligned}$ 

(Gender-Education Interaction Model)

$$\begin{aligned} Source_{ai} &= c + \beta_1 Survey_i + \beta_2 Fem_i + \beta_3 (Fem_i \times Survey_i) + \beta_4 Reg_{ci} \\ &+ \beta_5 (Reg_{ci} \times Survey_i) + \beta_6 (Reg_{ci} \times Fem_i) \\ &+ \beta_7 (Reg_{ci} \times Fem_i \times Survey_i) \end{aligned}$$

#### (Gender-Region Interaction Model)

Where, *Educ<sub>bi</sub>xFem<sub>i</sub>xSurvey<sub>i</sub>* and *Reg<sub>ci</sub>xFem<sub>i</sub>xSurvey<sub>i</sub>* are three-way interaction variables with each respective socioeconomic variable. *Educ<sub>bi</sub>xFem<sub>i</sub>* and *Reg<sub>ci</sub>xFem<sub>i</sub>* are two-way interaction variables with each respective socioeconomic variable. Seven OLS dummy regression of each financial source were ran for each three levels of education in *Gender-Education Interaction Model*. Seven OLS dummy regression of each financial source were ran for each five regions in *Gender-Region Interaction Model*.

## 5.2 Interpretation of OLS Dummy Regression Coefficient

To find the survey GAP within gender and differences between gender for each survey, we find coefficients that represents the survey GAP within gender and differences between gender from each three models. Representative coefficients are found by calculating the expectation equation of OLS dummy regression models given 0 and 1 binary outcomes of dummy variables. To find the survey GAP, we subtract expectation equation of Survey 2017 (reality) by expectation equation of Survey 2007 (expectations) from each model. To find the differences between gender (male-female), we subtract expectation equation of males by expectation equation of females from each model. The interpretation of the coefficient to find the survey GAP for examined financial source at old age from the *Base Model* is shown in the example of calculation below with *Source<sub>ai</sub>* specified as working:

Given the OLS dummy regression:

 $working_i = c + \beta_1 Survey_i$ 

The coefficient for survey GAP,

2007 Survey (expectations):

E(working|Survey = 0) = c

2017 Survey (reality):

 $E(working|Survey = 1) = c + \beta_1$ 

Survey GAP with *working* as financial source at old age:

= E(working|Survey = 0) - E(working|Survey = 1)

 $= \beta_1$ 

 $\beta_1$  represents the survey GAP for examined financial source. A negative sign of  $\beta_1$  indicates that the survey GAP has expectations greater than the reality.

The interpretation of the coefficient from OLS dummy regression of the second set of models are same across females (*Regression by Gender Model*), education levels (*Regression by Education Model*), and regions (*Regression by Region Model*). The example of calculation below is from *Regression by Gender Model* with *Source<sub>ai</sub>* specified as working:

$$working_i = c + \beta_1 Survey_i + \beta_2 Fem_i + \beta_3 (Fem_i \times Survey_i)$$

First the coefficient interpretation for survey GAP within gender,

Males and 2007 Survey (expectations):

E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 0) = c

Males and 2017 Survey (reality):

$$E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 1) = c + \beta_1$$

Survey GAP within *males* with *working* as financial source at old age:

$$= E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 0) - E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 1)$$
$$= \beta_1$$

 $\beta_1$  represents the survey GAP within males for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_1$  indicates that the survey GAP has expectations greater than the reality.

Females and 2007 Survey (expectations):

$$E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 0) = c + \beta_2$$

Females and 2017 Survey (reality):

$$E(working | fem = 1, Survey = 1) = c + \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$$

Survey GAP within *females* with working as financial source at old age:

$$= E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 0) - E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 1)$$

 $= \beta_1 + \beta_3$ 

# $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ represents the survey GAP within females/each education level/each

region for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_1 + \beta_3$  indicates that the

survey GAP has expectations greater than the reality.

Secondly the coefficient interpretation for the differences between gender for each survey,

Males and 2007 Survey (expectations):

$$E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 0) = c$$

Females and 2007 Survey (expectations):

$$E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 0) = c + \beta_2$$

Differences between males' and females' *expectations* with *working* as financial source at old age:

$$= E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 0) - E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 0)$$
$$= \beta_2$$

 $\beta_2$  represents the differences between expectations of males and females for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_2$  indicates that males' expectations were greater than females on the examined financial source.

Males and 2017 Survey (reality):

$$E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 1) = c + \beta_1$$

Females and 2017 Survey (reality):

$$E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 1) = c + \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$$

Differences between males' and females' *reality* with *working* as financial source at old age:

$$= E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 1) - E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 1)$$

$$= \beta_2 + \beta_3$$

# $\beta_2 + \beta_3$ represents the differences between reality of males and females for

**examined financial sources.** A negative sign of  $\beta_2 + \beta_3$  indicates that males' reality was greater than females' on the examined financial source.

The interpretation of coefficients from OLS dummy regression of the third set of models on males and females are same across different education levels (*Gender-Education Interaction Model*) and regions (*Gender-Region Interaction Model*). The example of calculation below is from *Gender-Region Interaction Model* with *Reg<sub>bi</sub>* specified as Bangkok and *Source<sub>ai</sub>* specified as working:

Given the OLS dummy regression:

$$\begin{split} working_{i} &= c + \beta_{1}Survey_{i} + \beta_{2}Fem_{i} + \beta_{3}(Fem_{i} \times Survey_{i}) + \beta_{4}Bangkok_{i} \\ &+ \beta_{5}(Bangkok_{i} \times Survey_{i}) + \beta_{6}(Bangkok_{i} \times Fem_{i}) \\ &+ \beta_{7}(Bangkok_{i} \times Fem_{i} \times Survey_{i}) \end{split}$$

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First the coefficient interpretation for survey GAP within gender,

Males, 2007 Survey (expectations), in Bangkok:

 $E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 0, bangkok = 1) = c + \beta_4$ 

Males, 2017 Survey (reality), in Bangkok:

 $E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 1, bangkok = 1) = c + \beta_1 + \beta_4 + \beta_5$ 

Survey GAP within *males in Bangkok* with *working* as financial source at old age:

= E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 0, bangkok = 1) - E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 1, bangkok = 1)

$$= \beta_1 + \beta_5$$

# $\beta_1 + \beta_5$ represents the survey GAP within males with specified education level/living in specified region for examined financial sources. A negative sign of $\beta_1 + \beta_5$ indicates that the survey GAP has expectations greater than the reality.

Females, 2007 Survey (expectations), in Bangkok:

 $E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 0, bangkok = 1) = c + \beta_2 + \beta_4 + \beta_6$ Females, 2017 Survey (reality), in Bangkok:

E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 1, bangkok = 1)

$$= c + \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \beta_4 + \beta_5 + \beta_6 + \beta_7$$

Survey GAP within *females in Bangkok* with *working* as financial source at old age: = E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 0, bangkok = 1) - E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 1, bangkok = 1)=  $\beta_1 + \beta_3 + \beta_5 + \beta_7$  $\beta_1 + \beta_3 + \beta_5 + \beta_7$  represents the survey GAP within females with specified

education level/living in specified region for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_1 + \beta_3 + \beta_5 + \beta_7$  indicates that the survey GAP has expectations greater than the reality.

Males, 2007 Survey (expectations), outside Bangkok:

E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 0, bangkok = 0) = c

Males, 2017 Survey (reality), outside Bangkok:

 $E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 1, bangkok = 0) = c + \beta_1$ 

Survey GAP within *males outside Bangkok* with *working* as financial source at old age:

= E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 0, bangkok = 0) - E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 1, bangkok = 0) $= \beta_{1}$ 

 $\beta_1$  represents the survey GAP within males without specified education level/living outside specified region for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_1$  indicates that the survey GAP has expectations greater than the reality.

Females, 2007 Survey (expectations), outside Bangkok:

$$E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 0, bangkok = 0) = c + \beta_2$$

Females, 2017 Survey (reality), outside Bangkok:

$$E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 1, bangkok = 0) = c + \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$$

Survey GAP within *females outside Bangkok* with *working* as financial source at old age:

$$= E(working | fem = 1, Survey = 0, bangkok = 0) - E(working | fem = 1, Survey = 1, bangkok = 0)$$
$$= \beta_1 + \beta_3$$

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 $\beta_1 + \beta_3$  represents the survey GAP within females without specified education level/living outside specified region for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_1 + \beta_3$  indicates that the survey GAP has expectations greater than the reality.

Secondly the coefficient interpretation for the differences between gender for each survey,

Males, 2007 Survey (expectations), in Bangkok:

$$E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 0, bangkok = 1) = c + \beta_4$$

Females, 2007 Survey (expectations), in Bangkok:

$$E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 0, bangkok = 1) = c + \beta_2 + \beta_4 + \beta_6$$

Differences between males' and females' *expectations* with *working* as financial source at old age *in Bangkok*:

$$= E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 0, bangkok = 1) - E(working | fem = 1, Survey = 0, bangkok = 1)$$
$$= \beta_2 + \beta_6$$

 $\beta_2 + \beta_6$  represents the differences between expectations of males and females with specified education level/living in specified region for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_2 + \beta_6$  indicates that males' expectations were greater than females on the examined financial source.

Males, 2017 Survey (reality), in Bangkok:

$$E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 1, bangkok = 1) = c + \beta_1 + \beta_4 + \beta_5$$

Females, 2017 Survey (reality), in Bangkok:

$$E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 1, bangkok = 1)$$
$$= c + \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \beta_4 + \beta_5 + \beta_6 + \beta_7$$

Differences between males' and females' *reality* with *working* as financial source at old age *in Bangkok*:

$$= E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 1, bangkok = 1) - E(working | fem = 1, Survey = 1, bangkok = 1)$$
$$= \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \beta_6 + \beta_7$$

 $\beta_2 + \beta_3 + \beta_6 + \beta_7$  represents the differences between reality of males and females with specified education level/living in specified region for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_2 + \beta_3 + \beta_6 + \beta_7$  indicates that males' reality were greater than females on the examined financial source. Males, 2007 Survey (expectations), outside Bangkok:

$$E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 0, bangkok = 0) = c$$

Females, 2007 Survey (expectations), outside Bangkok:

$$E(working|fem = 1, Survey = 0, bangkok = 0) = c + \beta_2$$

Differences between males' and females' expectations with working as financial

source at old age outside Bangkok:

$$= E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 0, bangkok = 0) - E(working | fem = 1, Survey = 0, bangkok = 0)$$
$$= \beta_{2}$$

 $\beta_2$  represents the differences between expectations of males and females without specified education level/living outside specified region for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_2$  indicates that males' expectations were greater than females on the examined financial source.

Males, 2017 Survey (reality), outside Bangkok:

 $E(working|fem = 0, Survey = 1, bangkok = 0) = c + \beta_1$ Females, 2017 Survey (reality), outside Bangkok:

 $E(working | fem = 1, Survey = 1, bangkok = 0) = c + \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$ 

Differences between males' and females' *reality* with *working* as financial source at old age *outside Bangkok*:

= E(working | fem = 0, Survey = 1, bangkok = 0) - E(working | fem = 1, Survey = 1, bangkok = 0) $= \beta_2 + \beta_3$ 

 $\beta_2 + \beta_3$  represents the differences between reality of males and females without specified education level/living outside specified region for examined financial sources. A negative sign of  $\beta_2 + \beta_3$  indicates that males' reality was greater than females on the examined financial source.

Table 1. Summary of coefficient interpretation representations from each model.

Model	Coefficient(s)	Representation
Base Model	$\beta_1$	GAP
Regression by Gender Model	$\beta_1$	GAP within males
	$\beta_1 + \beta_3$	Gap within females
	$\beta_2$	Difference between gender
	$\beta_2 + \beta_3$	Difference between gender reality
Regression by Education Model	$\beta_1 + \beta_3$	Gap with specified education level
Regression by Region Model	$\beta_1 + \beta_3$	Gap living in specified region
Gender-Education Interaction	$\beta_1 + \beta_5$	Gap within males with specified education level
2	$\beta_1 + \beta_3 + \beta_5 + \beta_7$	Gap within females with specified education level
	$\beta_1$	Gap within males without specified education level
ظر الا	$\beta_1 + \beta_3$	Gap within females without
	$\beta_2 + \beta_6$	Difference between gender
	00000000	expectations with specified
	$\boldsymbol{\rho}$ + $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ + $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ + $\boldsymbol{\rho}$	education level
	$p_2 + p_3 + p_6 + p_7$	with specified education level
	β <sub>2</sub>	Difference between gender
		expectations without specified
-10	$B \pm B$	education level
	$p_2 + p_3$	without specified education level
Gender-Region Interaction	$\beta_1 + \beta_5$	Gap within males living in specified
Model	I ANGKADN UNIVEDRIT	region
	$\beta_1 + \beta_3 + \beta_5 + \beta_7$	Gap within females living in
	ß	specified region Gap within males living outside
	$\boldsymbol{p}_1$	specified region
	$\beta_1 + \beta_3$	Gap within females living outside
		specified region
	$\beta_2 + \beta_6$	Difference between gender
		region
	$\beta_2 + \beta_3 + \beta_6 + \beta_7$	Difference between gender reality
		living in specified region
	$\beta_2$	Difference between gender
		expectations living outside specified
	$\beta_2 + \beta_2$	Difference between gender reality
	r 2 ' r 3	living outside specified region

(negative coefficient for "within" implies reality is lower than expectations; negative coefficient for "between" gender implies females have lower expectation/reality compared to males)

## **5.3 Hypothesis**

The first set of hypotheses surrounds the idea of differences among financial sources between older males and females. Given that UNFPA (2011) and Fujioka & Thangphet (2009) indicated that there is a higher probability of elderly males receiving their finances from working and further tying to pension, it is predicted that the reality-expectations gap will be smaller for males than for females:

*Hypothesis 1.1*: The reality-expectations gap of working as an elderly financial source will be smaller for males than for females.

*Hypothesis 1.2*: The reality-expectations gap of pension as an elderly financial source will be smaller for males than for females.

Given that Masud et al. (2008) and Knodel et al. (2013b) indicated that there is a higher probability of elderly females receiving their finances from children and family members, it is predicted that the reality-expectations gap will be smaller for females than for males:

Hypothesis 1.3: The reality-expectations gap of children as an elderly financial source will be smaller for females than for males.
Hypothesis 1.4: The reality-expectations gap of spouse as an elderly financial source

will be smaller for females than for males.

*Hypothesis 1.5*: The reality-expectations gap of relatives as an elderly financial source will be smaller for females than for males.

The second set of hypotheses surrounds the idea of male and female financial sources at old age when examined across regions and education. Given that Knodel (2014) indicated that it is common for children migrant workers to provide remittance to their rural elders and with greater probability of filial responsibilities towards mothers as cited by Silverstein et al. (2006), it is predicted that the reality-expectations gap for children as a financial source will be smaller for females living in rural regions than for females living in Bangkok, or for males living elsewhere: *Hypothesis 2.1:* The reality-expectations gap of children as an elderly financial source will be smaller for females living in rural regions than for females rural regions than for females living in rural regions than for females or males living in rural regions than for females rural regions than for females rural rural

Given that Giles et al. (2015). indicated that rural males are more likely to work at old age, it is predicted that the reality-expectations gap for working as a financial source will be smaller for males living outside of Bangkok than for males living in Bangkok, or for females living elsewhere:

*Hypothesis 2.2:* The reality-expectations gap of working as an elderly financial source will be smaller for males living outside Bangkok than for males or females living in other regions.

Given that Knodel & Chayovan (2008) indicated that it is more likely for individuals living in the urban areas to receive pension and with less number of females working at old age, it is predicted that the reality-expectations gap for pension as a financial source will be larger for females living in Bangkok than for females living outside of Bangkok, or for males living elsewhere: *Hypothesis 2.3:* The reality-expectations gap of pension as an elderly financial source will be larger for females living inside Bangkok than for males or females living in other regions.

Given that Theerawanviwat (2014) indicated that highly educated parents are unlikely to receive financial support from their children and with educational attainment higher among older males than females, it is predicted that the realityexpectations gap for children as a financial source will be larger for males with higher education than their male or female counterparts:

**Hypothesis 2.4:** The reality-expectations gap of children as an elderly financial source will be larger for males with higher education than for male or female counterparts.

Given that Giles et al. (2015) indicated that highly educated elders are unlikely to continue to working beyond retirement and with lower number of elderly females in the workforce than elderly males, it is predicted that the reality-expectations for working as a financial source will be larger for females with higher education than their male or female counterparts:

**Hypothesis 2.5:** The reality-expectations gap of working as an elderly financial source will be larger for females with higher education than for male or female counterparts.

## 6. Empirical Results and Discussion

Table 2. shows the survey GAP results of the OLS dummy regression Base Model on examined financial sources at old age for all respondents regardless of gender. The coefficients of the GAP between surveys in Base Model were all statistically significant at the 5% level. In exception of elderly financial support from the government, all other examined financial sources were negatively related with the GAP. This indicates that proportions of reality from elderly respondents in Survey 2017 was less than the proportions of expectations from non-elderly respondents in Survey 2007 for savings, pension, children, spouse, relatives, and working as financial support at old age. For government support, the direction of the GAP was in reverse or in other words reality from elderly respondents in Survey 2017 was greater than what was expected from non-elderly respondents in Survey 2007. This is confirmed by the proportions between expectations and reality of the two surveys in the data summary, as among financial sources at old age, government support had greater proportions of elder respondents receiving financial support in reality than what was expected from non-elders. This we believe was largely due to the Thai government introducing the 500 Thai Baht universal pension scheme for the elderly in 2009 which was two years later of when expectations of non-elderly respondents were surveyed in 2007. Specifically, the 500 Baht universal pension scheme is eligible to all elderly Thais who are not in elderly public facilities or do not currently receive income permanently (Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011).

Overall, the largest survey GAP in Base Model was observed in government support, as indicated in the largest magnitude of the survey GAP coefficient of 0.3454 which was statistically significant at the 5% level. The second largest survey GAP was found in financial support from personal savings and followed by relatives, spouse, working, children, and pension with a magnitude of 0.3198, 0.2903, 0.2773, 0.2109, 0.1395, and 0.0929 respectively which were all statistically significant at the 5% level.

From the results of Base Model, it was found that overall the largest GAP was found in government support of the elderly for all surveyed respondents. Government support was also found to be the only financial source that saw greater proportions of reality compared to expectations. The size and direction of the GAP for government as a financial source at old is largely due to the fact that the introduction of the 500 Thai Baht universal pension scheme for the elderly in 2009, the Thai government sought to directly address the financial security issues of the aging population. In the fiscal year 2010, approximately 77.5% of Thailand's elderly population were recipients for the 500 Baht pension (Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011). And this is the reason, we believe, that reality in 2017 was much higher than expectations formed in 2007 regarding government support as a source of meeting the financial needs of

the elderly.

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											1			
	Savings		Pension		Children		Spouse		Relatives		Government		Working	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Survey GAP	-0.3198***	0.0113	-0.0929***	0.0063	-0.1395***	0.0101	-0.2773***	0.0109	-0.2903***	0.0073	0.3454***	0.0092	-0.2109***	0.0114
Constant	0.7556		0.1686		0.8662		0.617		0.3898		0.47		0.7472	
N	24707		24707		24707		24707		24707		24707		24707	
* p < 0.10,	** p < 0.05	5, *** p	< 0.01											

Table 2. Base Model survey GAP results with standard errors of examined financial sources at old age.

for examined financial sources at old age. Table 3. Regression by Gender, Regression by Education, and Regression by Region model results of survey GAP A A A A A 

	)	8	Non N	STREET, MARKED IN THE REAL PROVIDED INTERNATION PROVIDATION PROVIDED INTERNATION PROVIDED INTERNATION PROVIDED INT	24		
	Savings	Pension	Children	Spouse	Relatives	Government	Working
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
Gender							
Male	-0.3194**	-0.0929**	-0.1633**	-0.3105**	-0.305**	0.3264**	-0.1139**
Female	-0.3187*	+8060'0-	-0.1213**	-0.2483**	-0.2793**	0.3592**	-0.2858**
Region							
Bangkok	-0.2779*	-0.1684**	-0.1583*	-0.322*	-0.3412**	0.2428**	-0.4765**
Central	-0.3558*	-0.092*	-0.1829**	-0.2696*	-0.3011*	0.4023**	-0.2509**
North	-0.3468*	-0.0732**	-0.1338**	-0.2845*	-0.2627**	0.2927**	-0.1783**
Northeast	-0.2456**	-0.1043*	-0.0926**	-0.2783*	-0.2398**	0.2865**	-0.1399**
South	-0.3263*	-0.0322**	-0.1868**	-0.2667*	-0.3713**	0.461**	-0.2241*
Education							
Primary and below	-0.3451**	-0.0892**	-0.1189**	-0.2821*	-0.2870*	0.4064**	-0.1827**
Secondary and high school	-0.2067**	-0.1204**	-0.2189**	-0.2567*	-0.2778*	0.2339**	-0.2649**
University and higher	-0.1960**	-0.0943*	-0.2877**	-0.2642*	-0.359**	-0.2413**	-0.4688**
N	24707	24707	24707	24707	24707	24707	24707

\* partial significance, \*\* full significance
Table 3 shows the survey GAP results of the Regression by Gender, Regression by Education, and Regression by Region Models on examined financial sources at old age across gender, region, and education. In particularly with the interpretation of coefficients in this set of models, the significance of such coefficients can be categorized into partial significance and full significance. Where, partial significance indicates that not all of the coefficients in the interpretation are significant at the 10% level, and full significance indicates that all of the coefficients in the interpretation are significant at the 10% level. From Table 3, it is observed that the survey GAP of male and female respondents when it came to savings as a means of meeting elderly financial needs was strikingly similar. The GAP of savings for male and female had a magnitude of 0.3194 and 0.3187 respectively with the GAP for males having full significance and the GAP for females having partial significance. Among examined regions, the largest savings GAP was found in the central and north regions, with a magnitude of 0.3558 and 0.3468 respectively. The smallest savings GAP was found in the Northeast region at 0.2456. Among education levels, the savings GAP increased in magnitude with decreasing levels of education with the survey GAP for respondents with university and higher education to be 1.8 times<sup>1</sup> larger than the survey GAP for respondents with primary and below education.

Similar to savings, the survey GAP for pension as a financial source at old age was also identical between males and females. The GAP of pension for males and females was 0.0929 and 0.0908 respectively with the GAP for males having full significance and the GAP for females having partial significance. Bangkok

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The larger GAP was divided by the smaller GAP to find how many times a large GAP was larger than a small GAP.

respondents saw the largest GAP among regions indicating pension as a financial source, which was about 5 times larger than the smallest observed gap of Southern respondents.

As for elderly financial support from family, the survey GAP for children as a financial source at old age was about 1.3 times larger for males than for females. Specifically, the GAP of children support for both males and females was fully significant with a magnitude of 0.1633 and 0.1213 respectively. The south region saw the largest GAP from children's support which was about 2 times the smallest GAP found for the northeast region. Among education, the GAP from children's support increased in magnitude with respondent's education. The survey GAP for financial support from spouse and relatives at old age was similar for male respondents with a full significance magnitude of 0.3105 and 0.305 respectively. Compared to the GAP for males, female respondents' survey GAP on support from spouse and relatives were smaller (0.2483 spouse and 0.2793 relatives with full significance). The GAP for spouse as a financial source at old age was relatively similar among examined regions and among education levels. While, the GAP for relatives as a financial support was found to be largest in the South region which was about 1.5 times that of the gap in the Northeast region.

Compared to other examined financial sources, the survey GAP regarding government moved in the opposite direction with a positive coefficient. With the largest GAP among examined financial sources, the survey GAP for government support was slightly larger for female than male respondents. The magnitude for males was 0.3264 compared to 0.3592 for females (both fully significant). With greater numbers of elders receiving government support in reality, the GAP in the South and Central was the largest among examined regions. Specifically, the GAP from Southern respondents was almost twice of the GAP for Bangkok. While, those with primary and below education saw a GAP that was about 1.7 times the GAP for higher educated respondents.

Lastly from Table 3, work as a source of meeting financial needs when elderly saw that the survey GAP for females was about 2.6 times larger than the survey GAP for males. The survey GAP of working for males and females had a magnitude of 0.1139 and 0.2858 with full significance respectively. The largest survey GAP for working found in Bangkok was about 3.4 times that of the smallest GAP found in the Northeast. Among education, the GAP from working at old age increased in magnitude with respondent's education. The survey GAP for those with university and higher education was about 2.6 times larger than the survey GAP for those with primary and below education.

Discussing on the results from Regression by Gender, Regression by Education, and Regression by Region Models, the survey GAP for government support was found to be one of the largest among examined financial sources. When compared between gender, the survey GAP for government support was slightly larger for female than male respondents. This may be because fewer elderly female has access to pension than the elderly male due to former engagement in formal employment (Ofstedal et al., 2004; Masud et al., 2008), resulting for elderly females to report proportionately slightly higher financial support from the government. According to the Survey of Older Persons in Thailand, 17% reported that they were very satisfied and 49% were satisfied with the government's elderly pension compared to 6% who reported that they not satisfied, while 11% never used the elderly pension. Thus, this further give encouraging signs to the future of government allowance in Thailand.

For government support examined across regions, the smallest survey GAP found in Bangkok respondents suggest that lower proportions of Bangkok elders are receiving government support in reality when compared to outside Bangkok. Government support is well received among elders with lower education compared to those highly educated. Thus, reflecting the large GAP found in respondents with primary and below education. This further suggests that elders with higher education are either economically better off and are not in need of government allowance or are receiving sufficient finances from other sources, such as we seen in the results from pension and savings

Furthermore, results from Regression by Gender Model also interestingly found that the gap between expectations and reality when it comes to savings as a means of meeting elderly financial needs is strikingly similar for both males and females. This suggests that the literature on gender differences of expectationformation may not apply in the Thai context. Afterall, Thailand is a bilateral and matrilineal society, and the economic role of Thai woman in the traditional family puts her in a different context from other patriarchal (Western and Asian) societies. Overall, Base Model found the survey GAP for savings to be second largest which was again reflected when examined separately among gender in Regression by Gender. Such significant GAP for savings at old age can be explained through behavioral finance literatures on why people never get to save enough, and our results confirms this in the Thai context. It is commonly well-known fact that education increases one's employment opportunity which may lead to accumulating better savings. This was the case for the results found in this study as elders with higher education are reporting more savings as a financial source. On the contrary, those with lower education find themselves with lower proportions having savings at old age. Thus, reflecting the larger GAP among primary and below respondents compared to highly educated respondents. Such findings prove to show that lower educated respondents are poorly planning their personal savings beyond retirement years which could increase their financial vulnerability later in life.

Moreover, the differences in gaps attributed by Ofstedal et al. (2004) and Masud et al. (2008), due to gender wealth differences and the idea that males are more likely to be formally employed than females may not hold in the Thai context. Although married women tend to report somewhat lower personal income and wealth compared to men, among unmarried elderly persons, females and males are quite equal in terms of wealth (UNFPA, 2011). The Thai adult female has both a relatively favorable (economical) status and a high degree of autonomy and education. And besides, with unemployment rates consistently low (less than 1%) and with the importance of informal employment, any differences in savings between gender should be somewhat mitigated. This again is reflected in the strikingly similar GAP of men and women's gap between expectations and reality regarding pensions as a source of elderly finance. Pensions after all will be tied to formal and informal employment, of which we have little differences across gender. Looking at the overall picture from Base Model, pension also saw the smallest GAP among examined financial sources. As for working, we found that more elderly males worked than females in Thailand which brought the GAP between expectation and reality to about 2.6 times larger for females than for males. This is consistent with Fujioka and

Thangphet (2009) who argue that females traditionally are more inclined to stay at home and take care of household work, even the elderly. The results from malefemale difference also supports this with a huge and significant difference between male and female elders working in reality.

The largest survey GAP for working found in Bangkok was about 3.4 times that of the smallest GAP found in the Northeast. This confirms that elders outside of Bangkok, especially in the Northeast region are more likely to continue working at old age. The findings align with previous evidence which suggests that among other factors including age, pension, and health, living in urban areas contributes to the reduction of the probability of elder's work retention (Sakai and Asaoka, 2007). Income inequality between elders residing in urban and rural areas as indicated by existing Thai statistics (UNFPA, 2011) may also contribute to proportions of those who continue to work beyond retirement. The proportion of elder workers in the northeast region of Thailand generally reflects the nature of agricultural work as majority of workers in this region are employed in this sector. As Knodel & Chayovan (2008) explains; rural elderly engaging in agriculture consider retirement as a gradual process and not subject to a prescribed retirement age. Since the characteristics of agricultural work requires a lot of heavy labor and physical effort, the number of household members is crucial for maintaining such careers. Therefore, it is known for northeastern elders to continue working in their older years if the number of household members is low. Given that there is evidence of migration of working adults to urban areas like Bangkok, this may be the case for many northeastern elders.

Among education, the GAP from working at old age increased in magnitude with respondent's education. This result suggests that much less numbers of highly educated elders are working in reality when compared to lower educated elders. These findings confirm the results of previous literature proving that Thai individuals with less education, who were heads of households and indebt were quite likely to continue working in old age (Adhikari et al., 2011).

Findings for pension as a financial source among region suggests that nonelderly respondents from Bangkok have the highest expectations compared to other regions. This is reflected in the gap between expectations and reality, where Bangkok respondents saw the largest expectations-reality gap among regions which was about 5 times larger than the smallest observed gap of Southern respondents. This supports previous evidence that suggests that urban areas elders are more likely to report pensions as a source of income (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008). This also correlates with the fact that many urban older persons stop working at retirement age. Withdrawal of urban elderly from work is correlated with access to a formal sector pensions (Giles et al., 2015). This shows that there is higher probability for elders residing in Bangkok to have previously worked in the formal sector, such as government civil service.

With most of the non-elderly respondents expecting their financial support from children at old age, the survey GAP for children was smaller in size compared to other financial sources. Although in the Thai family, children remain the most important source of income for the elderly of old age, we found that the financial support for the elderly from children was lower than expected, which reflects the declining fertility and reduced potential base for intergenerational transfers. Moreover, the survey GAP for children support for men was about 1.3 times that of women. This perhaps is because labor participation rates of elderly women are much lower than their male counterparts, so older women may have to rely more on children support. That notwithstanding, from the Thai societal and filial norm perspective, this aligns with previous findings about stronger filial obligations towards mothers (Silverstein et al., 2006) and such filial responsibilities can be beneficial in the Thai aging society with Thailand's elderly being predominantly female (UNFPA, 2011).

Among regions, the smallest GAP for children's support was observed in respondents from the Northeast. This suggests the high proportions of Northeastern elders receiving children support. Possibly the effect of working adults migrating to urban areas and sending remittances to family at home, may have explained for such high proportions in northeast. Knodel & Saengtienchai (2007) noted that elders in the northeast are substantially more likely to have a migrant child, especially one in Bangkok. In particular, the anticipation for northeastern parents was that their migrant children would be able to relieve the current economic hardships of their parents (Knodel & Saengtienchai, 2007). Previous studies indicated that elderly parents with lower education are more likely to receive monetary support from their children (Theerawanviwat, 2014). This is reflected in the trend of GAP from children's support increasing in magnitude with respondent's education.

Table 4 shows the results of difference between male and female for Survey 2007 (expectations) and Survey 2017 (reality) from Regression by Gender Model. As observed from Table 4, in survey 2007 the male-female differences are significant for financial support from pension, spouse, and working. This means that the expectations proportions of males and females are statistically different for pension, spouse, and

working as a mean of financial support at old age. While, examining the reality from Survey 2017 found that males and statistically different than females in terms of receiving elderly financial support from pension, children, spouse, relatives, government, and working. In particular, reality of receiving support from working saw the largest magnitude of male-female difference indicating that there is a huge difference between male and female elders working in reality. Expectations of working at old age was also largely different between male and females, especially among the magnitude for expectations from Survey 2007.



difference for examined financial sources at old age.	Table 4. Regression by Gender Model results of between male-female
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N	Male - Female Differenc e		
24	-0.0266	Survey 2007	Sav
707	-0.0258	Survey 2017	ings
24	-0.0376**	Survey 2007	Pen
707	-0.0355*	Survey 2017	sion
24	0.0177	Survey 2007	Chi
707	0.0597*	Survey 2017	ldren
24	-0.0399**	Survey 2007	sp
707	0.0223**	Survey 2017	ouse
24	0.0137	Survey 2007	Rela
707	0.0394*	Survey 2017	ntives
24	0.0253	<b>Sшvey</b> 2007	Gove
707	0.0581*	Survey 2017	rnment
24	-0.0623**	<mark>Sшvey</mark> 2007	Wo
707	-0.2341**	Survey 2017	rking

\*partial significance, \*\* full significance



	Savi	r Ba	Pen	i sion	CE	dren	Spo	1 Use	Rela	tives	Gover	nment	Wol	
Region														
Bangkok=1	-0.2216**	-0.3194*	-0.1462**	-0.1847*	-0.1506*	-0.1676*	-0.3375*	-0.3112*	-0.3626**	-0.3271*	0.2180**	0.2590*	-0.4154**	
Bangkok=()	-0.3225**	-0.3116*	-0.0845**	-0.0747*	-0.1714**	-0.1232**	-0.3130**	-0.2464**	-0.2993**	-0.2729**	0.3290**	0.3617**	-0.0970**	
Central=1	-0.3441*	-0.3648*	-0.1232**	-0.068*	-0.1796*	-0.1858*	-0.2937*	-0.2512*	-0.3270*	-0.2816*	0.3853**	0.4153*	-0.1873**	
Central=0	-0.3066**	-0.2993*	-0.0864**	-0.0995*	-0.1533**	-0.0952**	-0.3107**	-0.2441**	-0.2956**	-0.2769*	0.3118**	0.3398*	-0.0872**	
North=1	-0.3605*	-0.3277*	-0.0587**	-0.0848*	-0.1553*	-0.1183*	-0.3145*	-0.2531*	-0.2636**	-0.2669*	0.2791**	0.3020*	-0.0817*	
North=0	-0.3044**	-0.3188*	-0.1054**	-0.0924*	-0.1662**	-0.1229**	-0.3090**	-0.2486**	-0.3200**	-0.2828**	0.3437**	0.3744*	-0.1256**	
Northeast=1	-0.2417**	-0.2469*	-0.0996*	-0.1060*	-0.1208**	-0.0708*	-0.3033*	-0.2584*	-0.2506**	-0.2330*	0.2764**	0.2914*	-0.0135**	
Northeast=0	-0.3487**	-0.3441*	-0.0901**	-0.0847*	-0.1803**	-0.1418*	-0.3133**	-0.2459**	-0.3259**	-0.2968**	0.3449**	0.3822**	-0.1523**	
South=1	-0.3514*	-0.3038*	-0.0520**	-0.0144*	-0.2670**	-0.1151*	-0.3393*	-0.2016*	-0.4054**	-0.3409*	0.4450**	0.4754*	-0.1211*	
South=0	-0.3140**	-0.3201*	-0.0997**	-0.1037*	-0.1461**	-0.1230*	-0.3056**	-0.2554**	-0.2882**	-0.2693*	0.3065**	0.3388*	-0.1126**	
Education														
primary and below=1	-0.3592**	-0.3327*	-0.0837*	-0.0933*	-0.1432**	-0.1016*	-0.3107*	-0.2597*	-0.3052*	-0.2741*	0.4000**	0.4101*	-0.0611**	
primary and below=0	-0.1720**	-0.2084*	-0.1013**	-0.0215**	-0.2437**	-0.2682*	-0.3095**	-0.1823**	-0.3050**	-0.3098*	0.0520**	0.0096*	-0.3090**	
secondary and high	-0.1791**	-0.253*	-0.1204*	-0.1214*	-0.1984*	-0.2531*	-0.3024*	-0.1792*	-0.2316**	-0.3554**	0.1849**	0.3180*	-0.2347**	
secondary and might	-0.3426**	-0.3219*	-0.0816**	-0.085*	-0.1613**	-0.1128**	-0.3127**	-0.2549**	-0.3195**	-0.2716**	0.3460**	0.3599*	-0.0952**	
шиvетяку атклиднет – 1	-0.2024**	-0.1895*	-0.1705**	-0.0188*	-0.3271**	-0.2480*	-0.3421*	-0.1862*	-0.4838**	-0.2349*	-0.1771**	-0.3050**	-0.4208**	
0 0	-0.3321**	-0.3288*	-0.0967**	-0.0996*	-0.1480**	-0.1111**	-0.3088**	-0.2522**	-0.2921**	-0.2819*	0.3707**	0.4059**	-0.0862**	
Ν	247	07	240	107	24	707	24	707	243	707	24	707	24	

Table 5. Gender-Education Interaction and Gender-Region Interaction model results of surveyGAP within gender across region and education.

\* partial significance, \*\* full significance

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* partial	Ν	university and higher = 0	and higher = 1	secondary and high school = 0	secondary and high school = 1	and below = 0	n primary and below = 1	South = 0	South = 1	= ()	= 1	North = 0	North = 1	0 0	1 1	=0	Bangkok =1	Region		
significanc	24	-0.0263	-0.0156	-0.0377	0.0524	0.047	-0.0372	-0.0223	-0.0531	-0.0283	-0.0264	-0.0122	-0.0553	-0.0315	-0.0033	-0.0362	0.0452		Survey 2007	Sav
e, ** full sig	707	-0.0231	-0.0026	-0.0171	-0.0218	0.0106	-0.0107	-0.0283	-0.0055	-0.0236	-0.0316	-0.0265	-0.0225	-0.0243	-0.024	-0.0253	-0.0525		Survey 2017	rings
nificance	24	-0.0299**	-0.0937*	-0.0128	-0.1069*	-0.0481**	0.0026**	-0.0312**	-0.0744*	-0.0411**	-0.0288*	-0.0510**	-0.0026**	-0.0193	-0.1002*	-0.0461***	0.0133*		Survey 2007	Pe
	1707	-0.0329*	0.0578*	-0.0166	-0.1079*	0.0315**	-0.0069**	-0.0351*	-0.0368*	-0.0356*	-0.0353*	-0.0379*	-0.0287*	-0.0323	-0.0452*	-0.0363*	-0.0252*		Survey 2017	nsion
	24	0.0255	-0.1093*	0.0013	0.0958	0.016	0.008	0.0321	-0.0677*	0.0197	0.015	0.0186	0.0172	0.0065	0.0591	0.012	0.0813		Survey 2007	Chi
	1707	0.0624*	-0.0302*	0.0498*	0.0411*	-0.0083	0.0495	0.0552	0.0841*	0.0581	0.065	0.0619*	0.0542*	0.0646*	0.0529*	0.0603*	0.0643*		Survey 2017	ldren
	24	-0.031	-0.1718	-0.0381**	-0.0845*	-0.1093***	-0.0278*	-0.02696	-0.1171	-0.0567**	0.0080*	-0.03485	-0.0469	-0.0366	-0.0347	-0.0438**	-0.0004*		Survey 2007	Sp
	707	0.0255*	-0.0159*	0.0196**	0.0385*	0.0178**	0.0231*	0.0231*	0.0204*	0.0106**	0.0529*	0.0255*	0.0143*	0.0299*	0.0076*	0.0227**	0.0259*		Survey 2017	ouse
	24	0.0296**	-0.2187**	-0.0107	0.1845*	0.0493	0.0061	0.0217	-0.0353	0.0084	0.0274	0.0043	0.0369	0.02	-0.001	0.0125	0.0147		Survey 2007	Rela
	707	0.0398*	0.0301*	0.0371*	0.0607*	0.0445	0.0372	0.0406	0.0291	0.0375*	0.0449*	0.0416*	0.0336*	0.0387	0.0443	0.0389*	0.0501*		Survey 2017	ıtives
	24	0.0217	0.078	0.0204	0.0136	0.0431	0.0156	0.0222	0.0469	0.0202	0.0449	0.0355*	0.0132*	0.0261	0.0399	0.026	0.0252		Survey 2007	Gove
	707	0.0569*	-0.0498*	0.0343	0.1468*	0.0007	0.0258	0.0545	0.0773	0.0449*	0.0600*	0.0662	0.0361	0.054	8690'0	0.0587*	0.0662*		Survey 2017	rnment
	24	-0.0647**	-0.031*	-0.0559**	-0.1319*	-0.0977**	-0.0585*	-0.0631**	-0.0581*	-0.0726**	-0.0355*	-0.0595**	-0.0720*	-0.0570**	-0.0779*	-0.0600**	-0.0877*		Survey 2007	Wo
	707	-0.2478**	-0.1259*	-0.246**	-0.2148*	-0.2029**	-0.2654*	-0.2308**	-0.2534*	-0.2231**	-0.2621*	-0.2320**	-0.2389*	-0.2496**	-0.1895*	-0.2348**	-0.1874*		Survey 2017	rking

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Table 5 shows the survey GAP results for males and females from Gender-Education Interaction and Gender-Region Interaction models across region and education. Examining the survey GAP across region saw that a regional effect is present among male respondents expecting and receiving financial support from personal savings. Specifically, the savings GAP for males outside Bangkok was almost 1.5 times more than the savings GAP for males in Bangkok. While for female respondents, the survey GAP among those living inside and outside Bangkok were quite identical. Such similarities in GAP within females are also present in other examined regions, suggesting that proportion of female elders with savings as an elderly financial source may be similar across Thailand. When examined among education levels, the results indicate that both male and female respondents had prominent differences when comparing the survey GAP of different education levels. Specifically, both male and female respondents reported a larger GAP among those with primary and below education which was almost twice the GAP of those with higher education.

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Regarding pensions as a financial source at old age, both male and female saw **CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY** a larger GAP for respondents living in Bangkok as oppose to those living elsewhere. For males, the GAP inside Bangkok was about 1.7 times larger than the GAP for males living outside Bangkok. For females, the GAP inside Bangkok was almost 2.5 times larger than the GAP for females living outside Bangkok. However, in reality much lesser proportions of respondents living in Bangkok reported having pension as financial support at old age. The South and Northeast region also saw the smallest survey GAP when compared to other regions. The survey GAP for females living in the South was about 7 times less than the survey GAP for females living elsewhere. While, the survey GAP for males living in the Northeast was about 1.8 times less than the survey GAP for males living elsewhere.

Elderly financial support from their adult children were prominently linked to regional differences in Thailand, especially in the Northeast. Among female respondents, the survey GAP for those living in the Northeast was about half of the survey GAP for those living elsewhere. This suggests that elderly females in the Northeast are indeed receiving much of what was expected from their children. However, the Central and South region also reported the largest survey GAP indicating that reality of children support fell short for many elders in those regions. The survey GAP for males in the South was about 1.8 times larger than the survey GAP for males living elsewhere. The survey GAP for females in the Central region was almost 2 times larger than the survey GAP for females living elsewhere. When observed across education, the survey GAP was definitely larger for highly educated individuals. With highly educated males and females reporting a survey GAP that was about twice that of those with lower education. Thus, indicating that elderly parents with higher education are less likely to receive financial support from their children.

Regarding financial support from other family members, spouse as a financial source at old age was not much different across region for both male and female respondents. However, when examined across education, female respondents saw a slightly larger survey GAP among those with lower education. Specifically, the survey GAP of spouse's support for females with primary and below education was about 1.4 times larger than for females with higher education. While, financial support from relatives were not much different across region for both male and female respondents. Across different education levels, male respondents saw a larger survey

GAP for those with university and higher education, which was about 1.7 times that of males with lower education.

Gender-Region Interaction Model results for financial support from the government found that the smallest survey GAP for both males and females were reported among respondents living in Bangkok with a GAP of around 1.5 times smaller than for respondents living elsewhere. While, the largest survey GAP for both males and females were found among respondents from the South. Specifically, the survey GAP of government support for those living in the South was around 1.4 times larger than for those living elsewhere. Government support at old age was found to be prominently linked with both male's and female's educational attainment. Specifically, the survey GAP for respondents with primary and below education was about 7 times larger than the GAP for highly educated males and about 42 times larger than the GAP for highly educated females.

Lastly, when examining the results of working from Gender-Region Interaction Model, we find that the survey GAP for respondents in Bangkok are prominently larger than the survey GAP for respondents living elsewhere. Among males, the survey GAP for respondents living in Bangkok was about 4 times larger than for those living elsewhere. Male respondents living in the Central region also reported a survey GAP that was about 2 times larger than for males living elsewhere. Among females, the survey GAP for respondents living in Bangkok was almost 2 times larger than for female respondents from elsewhere. When examined across education levels, the survey GAP for respondents with lower education were smaller than for highly educated respondents with the GAP of lower educated males being much smaller than the GAP of lower educated females. The survey GAP for males with higher education was about 5 times larger than males with primary and below education. The survey GAP for females with higher education was about 1.5 times larger than females with primary and below education. While, the survey GAP for males with secondary and high school was about 2.5 times larger than males with other levels of education. Highly educated males with university and higher education reported their GAP to be of 4.9 times that of lower educated males. While, for highly educated females with university and higher education, their survey GAP was about 1.9 times larger than the GAP for lower educated females.

Discussing on the results of Gender-Education Interaction and Gender-Region Interaction models, the GAP for savings as a financial source within females were quite similar across examined regions. Thus, suggesting that personal savings for females do not vary across different regions in Thailand. This reflects the identical role of women in both urban and rural areas, where urbanization might have played a role in increasing economic independence among Thai females. In particular, with female consisting of a large percentage among worker migrants moving from rural to Bangkok area (Tantiwiramanond, 1995). When examined among education levels, both male and female respondents reported a larger GAP among those with primary and below education which was almost twice the GAP of those with higher education. Such results across education further suggests that having finances at old age met by personal savings is importantly linked to an individual's educational attainment regardless of their gender.

Looking at the largest survey GAP for pension found that the larger survey GAP in Bangkok for females was almost 2.5 times larger than the survey GAP for non-Bangkok females. Thus, suggesting that proportions of individuals expecting to be financially supported by pension are higher in those living in Bangkok, with more females compared to males expecting from pension. This provides future insights on greater proportions of females being part of the formal workforce than males in Bangkok.

Elderly financial support from their adult children were prominently linked to regional differences in Thailand with the survey GAP for females living in the Northeast was about half of the survey GAP for those living elsewhere. This confirms the important role of elderly women in the Northeastern household, especially given that there is evidence of Northeastern migration of working adults to urban areas for remittance purposes. Among educational attainment, the survey GAP was definitely larger for highly educated individuals. Therefore, regardless of gender, elderly parents with higher education are less likely to receive financial support from their children.

Government's support at old age was found to be prominently linked with both male's and female's educational attainment. Specifically, the GAP was larger for lower educated respondents than higher educated respondents. Reflecting on the magnitude of the GAP, the effect of education was proven to be stronger for females than for males. Thus, suggesting that greater proportions of lower educated females are receiving government allowance at old age. While, the GAP for working at old age confirms that Bangkok elders are less likely to continue working beyond retirement regardless of their gender. Interestingly, we found that expectations and reality of working for males in the Central region are also seeing a large GAP, further suggesting that older males in the Central are also less likely to part of the workforce. An individual's educational attainment is prominently linked to their employment at old age, especially more so in males than females. This is reflected in the larger GAP of working among male respondents having higher education. In other words, highly educated males are more likely to be removed from the Thai workforce than their female counterparts. This is interesting to see given historical statistics on higher labour participation rates among elder males than females.

Table 6 shows the results of male-female differences from Gender-Education Interaction and Gender-Region Interaction models across region and education. Among surveyed expectations from non-elderly respondents in 2007 Survey, males and females had statistically different expectations for pension, children, spouse, relatives, government, and working as financial support at old age. In particular, difference between male's and female's expectations from children, spouse, relatives, and government are statistically different for respondents in certain region and education level. Only respondents from the south and those with university and higher education reported statistical difference among gender expectations from children's support. Only respondents from Bangkok, Northeast and those with primary and below, secondary and high school education reported statistical difference among gender expectations from spouse's support. Only respondents with secondary and high school, and university and higher education reported statistical difference among gender expectations from relative's support. Only respondents from the North region reported statistical difference among gender expectations from government's support. While, support from pension and working at old age, was statistically different among male and females from all examined regions and education levels.

The reality of receiving elderly financial support as surveyed in 2017 Survey indicated that male and female elders were statistically different in receiving support from pension, children, spouse, relatives, government, and working. While support from pension, spouse, and working were statistically different for elders from all examined regions and education levels, support from children, relatives, and government saw statistical difference among gender only for those in certain region and education level. Only respondents from Bangkok, Central, North, and South and those with secondary and high school, and university and higher education reported statistical difference among gender in reality from children's support. Only respondents from Bangkok, North, and Northeast and those with secondary and high school, and university and higher education reported statistical difference among gender in reality from relative's support. Only respondents from Bangkok, Northeast, and those with secondary and high school, university and higher education reported statistical difference among gender in reality from government's support.

Among examined financial support at old age in Table 6, the largest malefemale difference was found in the reality of working at old age, especially among respondents from the Northeast and those with primary and below education. While, the smallest male-female difference was found in the expectations of receiving pension at old age, especially among respondents from the North and those with primary and below education.

Given the empirical results of the OLS dummy regression models, we further discuss validity of the stated hypotheses of this study. Beginning with the first set of hypotheses on the idea of differences among financial sources at old age between males and females. For Hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2, it was predicted that the realityexpectations gap of working and pension will be smaller for males than for females. The results from Regression by Gender Model finds that the working survey GAP for males was about 2.6 times smaller than the survey GAP for females. As for pension, the results from Regression by Gender Model finds that the survey GAP for pension as a financial source at old age was identical between males and females. As a result, Hypothesis 1.1 was confirmed by the study's results, but Hypothesis 1.2 was not supported by the study's results. The similarities between survey GAP for pension among gender may indicate that the general idea that males are more likely to be formally employed than females may not hold in the Thai context. For Hypothesis 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5, it was predicted that the reality-expectations gap of children, spouse, and relatives will be smaller for females than for males. The results from Regression by Gender Model finds that the survey GAP for children as a financial source at old age was about 1.3 times larger for males than for females. Thus, confirming the stated Hypothesis 1.3. As for spouse and relatives, the results from Regression by Gender Model finds that the magnitude of the survey GAP for was smaller than the survey GAP for males. This also supports the stated Hypothesis 1.4 and 1.5.

The second set of hypotheses was on the predictions of elderly financial support of males and females when examined across regions and education levels. For Hypothesis 2.1, it was predicted that the reality-expectations gap for children as a financial source will be smaller for females living outside of Bangkok than for females living in Bangkok, or for males living elsewhere. The results from Gender-Region Interaction Model finds that among female respondents, the survey GAP for those living in the Northeast was about half of the survey GAP for those living elsewhere. Therefore, the study result's supports Hypothesis 2.1. For Hypothesis 2.2, it was predicted that the reality-expectations gap of working as an elderly financial source will be smaller for males living outside Bangkok than for males or females living in other regions. This is supported given that the results from Gender-Region Interaction Model found that the survey GAP for males living in Bangkok was about 4 times larger than for males living outside of Bangkok. For Hypothesis 2.3, it was predicted that the reality-expectations gap of pension as an elderly financial source will be larger for females living inside Bangkok than for males or females living in other regions. For females, it was found that the GAP inside Bangkok was almost 2.5 times larger than the GAP for females living outside Bangkok.

For Hypothesis 2.4, it was predicted that the reality-expectations gap of children as an elderly financial source will be larger for males with higher education than for male or female counterparts. Results found that highly educated males and females reporting a survey GAP that was about twice that of those with lower education with the magnitude for highly educated males and females at 0.3271 and 0.2480 respectively. Lastly, Hypothesis 2.5 predicted that the reality-expectations gap of working as an elderly financial source will be larger for females with higher education than for male or female counterparts. It was found that among highly educated females with university and higher education, their survey GAP was about 1.9 times larger than the GAP for lower educated females. Comparing between highly educated males and females, the survey GAP magnitude of university and higher females were indeed greater than their male counterparts (females 0.5155, males 0.4208).

## 7. Conclusion and Recommendations

## 7.1 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

This study examines the expectations and reality of Thai elderly financial needs from a gender perspective through financial support at old age from personal

savings, pension, children, spouse, relatives, government, and working. Using two nationally represented surveys, the study identified a cohort of older persons through surveying non-elderly respondents aged 50 to 59 in 2007 and surveying elderly respondents aged 60 to 69 in 2017. Given that the two surveys constitute randomized respondents, further potential endogeneity is mitigated by fixing the cohort for analysis. The gap between surveys, representing the reality-expectations gap of elderly financial support were determined for both males and females in Thailand. We further investigated the effect of region and educational attainment on the survey gap across male and females. The methodology employed in this study are three models of OLS dummy regression models with two-way and three-way interaction variables.

In exception of government support, we found that expectations to meeting financial needs when elderly from savings, pension, children, married partners, relatives, and by working at old age were typically higher than what was happening in reality for both male and female respondents. This is due to the introduction of the 500 Thai Baht universal pension scheme for the elderly in 2009, where the Thai government sought to directly address the financial security issues of the aging population. Interestingly the regression found that there were similar gaps between males and females for savings and pension as an elderly financial source. This further suggests that gender wealth differences and the idea that males are more likely to be formally employed than females, may not hold in the Thai context. While working and children are commonly well-known sources for financing elders, the reality was less than what was expected for non-elderly respondents. Thus, confirming the decline in fertility rates and intergenerational ties in the Thai household. When retirement causing for the gap for females to be almost three times larger than the gap for males. Undoubtedly, the results indicate that children support and working are linked to regional and educational differences. The role of female in the Northeast stood out with much of them receiving children support, given that the survey gap of children support for females living in the Northeast was about half of those living elsewhere. While, highly educated elders are less likely to receive support from their children with the survey gap for males and females with university education to be twice that of lower educated respondents. When it came to working in rural versus urban areas, the results confirms previous findings of elder workers working in rural industries, especially agriculture. Specifically, the greater proportions of rural males are working in reality making the gap for males living in Bangkok being four time larger than for males living outside Bangkok.

With Thailand emerging into an aging society, more government policies that are geared towards supporting the aging population will be much needed. In the context of this study's objectives on financial needs of elderly, it will be important for such policies to help close the gap on expectations and reality of financial sources of elderly in order to ensure better financial planning in their elder years.

In terms support from children, we see that Thai elders cannot continue relying only on intergenerational transfers from their adult children given the large reality-expectation gaps across most regions. Thus, indicating the transition or switch from traditional filial responsibilities to current ones in Thailand's society, where many Thai elders will be left to finance themselves independently either through working or savings. However, other elders who undergo financial hardships will rely heavily on public and government allowance. As a result of lower support from children and family members, there will be more importance attached to government financial support in the future, especially for elderly men.

A closer examination of gender inequality among elders in the workforce may also be needed given that more older males continue to work when compared to older females. Further investigation on the topic of gender inequality among Thai elders in the workforce will definitely allow policy makers to better understand and develop the right policies to help vulnerable elderly women to be economically independent. In overall, policies ensuring gender equality in the workplace can be improved and expanding career opportunities for financially vulnerable elderly women would prove to be beneficial for the Thai society.

Moreover, with both older males and females falling short of their personal savings in their elder years there is a need for further public education programs to encourage savings, especially for individuals nearing retirement. The subtle changes in the savings and consumption behavior of the Thai population suggest policy measures to encourage savings, for example, through mutual funds from an early age that would help improve the financial security for Thai elderly.

Lastly, since 1982 when Thailand established its first National Elderly Council in response to the United Nations Assembly that recognized elderly rights with respect to care, involvement, autonomy and self-satisfaction (Jitapunkul and Wivatvanit, 2008), various measures have been put in place, such as the 2009 universal 500 Baht old-age pension, but there is still much more space for improvement. Any progress however will have to come with caution, as public-sector transfers are still very low and financing the elderly should not be allowed to threaten fiscal sustainability if the current system is to remain sustainable. Suwanrada and Leetrakul (2014) for example suggest that the old age allowance although beneficial to the elderly and overall economy should seek further sources of revenue in preparation as Thai moves from ageing to "Superaged Society", where the Thai population above 65 years will soon account for more than 25% of population by 2040.

## 7.2 Limitations and Future Study

There are several possible limitations that should be noted in the present study. First, the study's empirical results on interpreted coefficients from all other models except for the base model was limited to providing its significance; indicating only either full significance, partial significance, or no significance. Specifically, to provide the exact p-value in the coefficient's significance we would need to further run numerous models using the bootstrap method to find the standard error of each interpreted coefficient. However, given that most of the presented coefficients were significant, either partial or full, the current results were sufficient enough for drawing relevant conclusions.

Other possible limitations include time varying factors that cannot be controlled for which may be present in the survey respondents. On the contrary, confounding variables from individual heterogeneity that do not vary over time were controlled through fixed effects from taking the difference between survey years of the studied cohort. When examining the external key macroeconomic variables in Thailand, such factors did not have much variation and was consistent over the studied time period. For example, real GDP growth averaged about 3.2% for the year 2007 to 2017 (World Bank, 2020), while CPI inflation and unemployment rate remained low at about 1%. Over the same period, farm incomes and tourism steadily increased. Proportions of employment in the informal sector was consistent, ranging between 60% to 55% of Thais employed in the informal sector (NSO, 2008; NSO, 2017).

Future relevant studies can be further researched in order to improve financial planning of Thai elders in the long term. In the context of the current study, the gap between reality and expectations of elderly financial support gives important implications on the financial preparedness of Thai older persons. Specifically, given that reality of finances was not being met by expectations, it is evidently implied that such individuals were lacking in financial preparation or planning. Therefore, to confirm that such gaps are significantly associated with financial preparedness, future empirical research will be needed to test the association.



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Appendix 1. Original STATA output of the Base Model. working Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] -.2333308 survey -.2109311 .011428 -18.46 0.000 -.1885315 .747296 .0109475 68.26 0.000 .7258382 .7687538 cons children Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] -.1395058 .0101364 -13.76 0.000 -.1593737 -.1196379 survey cons .8662734 .0097102 89.21 0.000 .8472408 .8853059 [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| govt t 37.47 survey .3454094 .0092191 0.000 .3273395 .3634793 \_cons .4700098 .0088314 53.22 0.000 .4526997 .48732 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] pension -.0805093 survey -.0929926 .0063688 -14.60 0.000 -.1054759 .1686332 .006101 27.64 0.000 .1566748 .1805916 cons savings Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] -.3198933 .0113594 -28.16 0.000 -.3421584-.2976282 survey 0.000 .7556539 .0108818 69.44 .734325 .7769828 \_cons Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] spouse Coef. t P>|t| survey -.2773116 .0109868 -25.24 0.000 -.2988464 -.2557769 \_cons 58.62 0.000 .6170108 .0105248 .5963815 .6376401 [95% Conf. Interval] relatives Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 0.000 -.2903265 .0073868 -39.30 -.304805 -.2758479 survey \_cons .3898722 .0070762 55.10 0.000 .3760024 .403742

APPENDIX

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working	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
female	0623213	.0213472	-2.92	0.004	1041632	0204794
survey	1138929	.0161484	-7.05	0.000	1455447	082241
fxs	1718502	.022293	-7.71	0.000	2155457	1281546
	. 7798354	.0154251	50.56	0.000	.7496012	.8100696
children	Coef	Std Err	+	PSITI	[95% Conf	Intervall
		ota. bii.		17101	[558 CONT.	incervarj
female	.0177687	.0193987	0.92	0.360	020254	.0557914
survey	1633057	.0146744	-11.13	0.000	1920685	1345429
fxs	.0420084	.0202581	2.07	0.038	.0023012	.0817155
_cons	.8569959	.0140172	61.14	0.000	.8295214	.8844704
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t.	P>ItI	[95% Conf.	Intervall
				22101	(500 00021	
female	.0253191	.0176374	1.44	0.151	0092512	.0598894
survey	.3264626	.013342	24.47	0.000	.3003114	.3526138
fxs	.0328119	.0184187	1.78	0.075	0032899	.0689138
	.4567901	.0127444	35.84	0.000	.4318102	. 48177
pension	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
female	0376125	.0121891	-3.09	0.002	0615038	0137211
survey	0929818	.0092206	-10.08	0.000	1110547	0749089
fxs	.0021027	.0127291	0.17	0.869	0228471	.0270524
_cons	.1882716	.0088076	21.38	0.000	.1710082	.205535
savings	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
female	0266095	.0217782	-1.22	0.222	0692961	.0160772
survey	3194634	.0164744	-19.39	0.000	3517543	2871725
fxs	.0007245	.022743	0.03	0.975	0438532	.0453022
cons	7695473	0157365	48.90	0.000	7387028	8003919
	.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		10.50	0.000		
spouse	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
female	0399316	.0210643	-1.90	0.058	081219	.0013557
survey	3105173	.0159344	-19.49	0.000	3417497	279285
fxs	.0622621	.0219975	2.83	0.005	.0191457	.1053785
_cons	.6378601	.0152207	41.91	0.000	.6080266	.6676935

Appendix 2. Original STATA output of the Regression by Gender Model.

relatives	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
female	.0137058	.014142	0.97	0.332	0140134	.041425
survey	305003	.0106979	-28.51	0.000	3259716	2840344
fxs	.02575	.0147685	1.74	0.081	0031972	.0546972
_cons	.382716	.0102188	37.45	0.000	.3626867	.4027454

Appendix 3. Original STATA output of the Regression by Region Model.

working	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
bangkok	.0392831	.0353605	1.11	0.267	0300255	.1085917
survey	1954998	.0119979	-16.29	0.000	2190163	1719832
bkkxs	2810364	.0386021	-7.28	0.000	3566989	2053739
_cons	.7431243	.0115231	64.49	0.000	.7205384	.7657103
children	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
bangkok	0938302	.0314744	-2.98	0.003	155522	0321385
survey	1444525	.0106793	-13.53	0.000	1653846	1235203
bkkxs	0139019	.0343598	-0.40	0.686	0812493	.0534454
_cons	.8762376	.0102567	85.43	0.000	.8561338	.8963414
govt	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
bangkok	0389622	.0285889	-1.36	0.173	0949982	.0170738
survey	.3479833	.0097003	35.87	0.000	.3289702	.3669964
bkkxs	1051382	.0312098	-3.37	0.001	1663113	0439651
_cons	.4741474	.0093164	50.89	0.000	.4558867	.4924082
pension	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
bangkok	.1376513	.0197712	6.96	0.000	.0988986	.176404
survey	0806935	.0067084	-12.03	0.000	0938423	0675446
bkkxs	0878671	.0215837	-4.07	0.000	1301725	0455618
_cons	.1540154	.0064429	23.90	0.000	.1413869	.1666439
savings	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
bangkok	.06619	.0352857	1.88	0.061	0029722	.1353521
survey	3178065	.0119725	-26.54	0.000	3412734	2943397
bkkxs	.0399235	.0385206	1.04	0.300	0355791	.1154261
_cons	.7486249	.0114987	65.10	0.000	.7260866	.7711631

spouse	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf	. Interval]
bangkok	0428585	.0341387	-1.26	0.209	1097724	.0240555
survey	2778049	.0115833	-23.98	0.000	300509	2551009
bkkxs	04427	.0372684	-1.19	0.235	1173183	.0287783
_cons	.6215622	.011125	55.87	0.000	. 5997565	. 6433678
relatives	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf	. Interval]
bangkok	.0558764	.0229664	2.43	0.015	.0108608	.100892
survey	2843409	.0077926	-36.49	0.000	2996147	269067
bkkxs	0569891	.0250719	-2.27	0.023	1061315	0078467
_cons	. 3839384	.0074842	51.30	0.000	.3692689	.3986079
working	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf	. Interval]
central	0112245	.0255574	-0.44	0.661	0613185	.0388695
survey	1949129	.0131225	-14.85	0.000	2206338	169192
centralxs	0560693	.0265809	-2.11	0.035	1081694	0039692
_ <sup>cons</sup>	. 75	.0125441	59.79	0.000	.7254128	.7745872
children	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
central	028159	.0226186	-1.24	0.213	0724929	.0161748
survey	1212696	.0116136	-10.44	0.000	144033	0985063
centralxs	0617704	.0235244	-2.63	0.009	1078796	0156611
_cons	. 873057	.0111017	78.64	0.000	.851297	.894817
govt	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
central	092228	.0206405	-4.47	0.000	1326847	0517713
survey	.3281814	.0105979	30.97	0.000	.3074088	.348954
centralxs	.0742916	.0214671	3.46	0.001	.0322148	.1163684
_cons	. 492228	.0101308	48.59	0.000	. 472371	.5120849
pension	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
	.0198134	.0142585	1.39	0.165	0081341	.0477609
central						
central survey	0943826	.0073211	-12.89	0.000	1087323	0800328
central survey centralxs	0943826 .0023388	.0073211 .01 <b>4</b> 8295	-12.89 0.16	0.000 0.875	1087323 0267279	0800328 .0314054
savings	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
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central	0410542	.0253617	-1.62	0.106	0907648	.0086563
survey	3038881	.013022	-23.34	0.000	3294121	2783641
centralxs	0520221	.0263774	-1.97	0.049	1037234	0003209
_cons	. 765544	.0124481	61.50	0.000	.7411451	. 789943
spouse	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
central	086933	.0245408	-3.54	0.000	1350345	0388315
survey	275778	.0126005	-21.89	0.000	3004758	2510802
centralxs	.0061463	.0255236	0.24	0.810	0438814	.056174
_cons	. 6379534	.0120451	52.96	0.000	.6143442	.6615626
relatives	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf	. Interval]
central	0296738	.0165148	-1.80	0.072	0620439	.0026963
survey	2845857	.0084796	-33.56	0.000	3012061	2679652
centralxs	0166548	.0171762	-0.97	0.332	0503211	.0170116
_cons	.3970207	.0081058	48.98	0.000	.3811328	.4129086
working	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
north	0004706	.0255834	-0.02	0.985	0506156	.0496745
survey	222565	.0131244	-16.96	0.000	2482896	1968404
northxs	.0442307	.0266434	1.66	0.097	0079921	.0964534
cons	.7474093	.0125569	59.52	0.000	.7227971	.7720216
children	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
north	.0094798	.0227045	0.42	0.676	0350223	.0539818
survey	1418273	.0116475	-12.18	0.000	164657	1189976
northxs	.0080128	.0236452	0.34	0.735	0383332	.0543587
_cons	.8639896	.0111438	77.53	0.000	.8421471	.8858322
govt	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf	. Interval]
north	. 0932775	.0206372	4.52	0.000	.0528272	.1337277
survey	.3614291	.010587	34.14	0.000	.340678	.3821802
northxs	0687724	.0214923	-3.20	0.001	1108986	0266462

pension	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
north	0312678	.0142657	-2.19	0.028	0592295	0033062
survey	0991184	.0073184	-13.54	0.000	1134628	084774
northxs	.0259242	.0148568	1.74	0.081	0031959	.0550444
_cons	.1761658	.0070019	25.16	0.000	.1624417	.18989
savings	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	. Interval]
north	.0799276	.0254228	3.14	0.002	.0300973	.1297579
survey	3126681	.013042	-23.97	0.000	3382312	287105
northxs	034233	.0264762	-1.29	0.196	086128	.0176619
_cons	. 736399	.012478	59.02	0.000	.7119412	.7608567
spouse	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
north	.0448028	.0245984	1.82	0.069	0034116	.0930172
survey	2760572	.0126191	-21.88	0.000	3007913	251323
northxs	0085702	.0256176	-0.33	0.738	0587822	.0416418
_cons	.6062176	.0120734	50.21	0.000	.582553	. 6298822
relatives	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
north	0296738	.0165463	-1.79	0.073	0621055	.002758
survey	2993196	.0084883	-35.26	0.000	3159572	282682
northxs	.0366803	.0172319	2.13	0.033	.0029048	.0704558
_cons	. 3970207	.0081213	48.89	0.000	.3811026	.4129389
working	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
northeast	0339494	.0246946	-1.37	0.169	0823522	.0144535
survey	2378279	.0133398	-17.83	0.000	2639747	2116811
northeastxs	.0979688	.0257524	3.80	0.000	.0474925	.148445
_cons	.7563758	.012771	59.23	0.000	.7313439	.7814078
children	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. 3	Interval]
northeast	.0595909	.0217686	2.74	0.006	.0169232	.1022586
survey	1584698	.0117592	-13.48	0.000	1815185	135421
ortheastxs	.0658175	.0227011	2.90	0.004	.021322	.1103129
_cons	.8503356	.0112578	75.53	0.000	.8282696	.8724016
govt	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. :	Interval]
northeast	.1287678	.0199081	6.47	0.000	.0897467	.1677888
survey	.3661774	.0107542	34.05	0.000	.3450985	.3872562
northeastxs	079644	.0207609	-3.84	0.000	1203366 ·	0389514
cons	. 4355705	.0102956	42.31	0.000	.4153904	.4557506
-						

pension northeast	Coef. 0194137 0883277	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
northeast	0194137 0883277	.0137625	-1 41			
survey		.0074344	-11.88	0.158 0.000	0463891 1028996	.0075616 0737559
northeastxs _ <sup>cons</sup>	0160048 .1738255	.0143521 .0071174	-1.12 24.42	0.265 0.000	0441357 .159875	.0121261 .187776
savings	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
northeast	100565	.024577	-4.09	0.000	1487374	0523927
survey	3469945	.0132763	-26.14	0.000	3730168	3209722
northeastxs	.1013008	.0256298	3.95	0.000	.0510649	.1515367
_cons	.7825503	.0127102	61.57	0.000	.7576376	.8074631
spouse	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
northeast	.0460373	.023757	1.94	0.053	0005279	.0926025
survey	2776186	.0128334	-21.63	0.000	3027728	2524644
northeastxs	000692	.0247747	-0.03	0.978	0492519	.047868
_ <sup>cons</sup>	. 604698	.0122862	49.22	0.000	.5806164	. 6287796
relatives	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
northeast	0152833	.0159441	-0.96	0.338	0465348	.0159682
survey	309562	.0086129	-35.94	0.000	3264438	2926802
northeastxs	.0697128	.0166271	4.19	0.000	.0371226	.102303
_ <sup>cons</sup>	.3939597	.0082457	47.78	0.000	.3777977	.4101217
working	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
south	.0409336	.0311287	1.31	0.189	0200806	.1019478
survey	208365	.0123478	-16.87	0.000	2325675	1841625
southxs	0158621	.0325858	-0.49	0.626	0797323	.0480081
_ <sup>cons</sup>	.7413793	.0118348	62.64	0.000	.7181825	.7645762
children	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
south	.0052311	.0275963	0.19	0.850	0488594	.0593216
survey	1321262	.0109466	-12.07	0.000	1535823	1106702
southxs	0547937	.0288881	-1.90	0.058	1114161	.0018287
	.8655172	.0104918	82.49	0.000	.8449527	.8860818
govt	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
south	1756744	.0250777	-7.01	0.000	2248283	1265205
survey	.3253481	.0099476	32.71	0.000	.3058503	.3448459
southxs	.1357821	.0262516	5.17	0.000	.0843274	.1872368
_cons	. 4954023	.0095343	51.96	0.000	.4767146	.51409

Coef.	Std. Err.	+	DNI+1	[OE% Comf	
1			E> U	[aps Cour.	Intervalj
0579639 103092 .0708431 .1770115	.017345 .0068802 .0181569 .0065944	-3.34 -14.98 3.90 26.84	0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000	0919612 1165777 .0352544 .1640861	0239666 0896063 .1064318 .1899369
Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
.0510439 3182499 0081325 .7482759	.0309328 .0122701 .0323807 .0117603	1.65 -25.94 -0.25 63.63	0.099 0.000 0.802 0.000	0095863 3423 0716007 .725225	.111674 2941998 .0553356 .7713267
Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
.0222613 278661 .0119135 .6137931	.0299234 .0118697 .0313241 .0113765	0.74 -23.48 0.38 53.95	0.457 0.000 0.704 0.000	0363903 3019263 0494835 .5914945	.0809129 2553957 .0733105 .6360917
Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
.0690945 2769476 0944742 .3798851	.0201128 .0079781 .0210542 .0076466	3.44 -34.71 -4.49 49.68	0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000	.0296723 2925852 1357417 .3648972	.1085167 26131 0532067 .3948729
	0579639 103092 .0708431 .1770115 Coef. .0510439 3182499 0081325 .7482759 Coef. .0222613 278661 .0119135 .6137931 Coef. .0690945 2769476 0944742 .3798851	0579639 .017345 103092 .0068802 .0708431 .0181569 .1770115 .0065944 Coef. Std. Err. .0510439 .0309328 3182499 .0122701 0081325 .0323807 .7482759 .0117603 Coef. Std. Err. .0222613 .0299234 278661 .0118697 .0119135 .0313241 .6137931 .0113765 Coef. Std. Err. .0690945 .0201128 2769476 .0079781 0944742 .0210542 .3798851 .0076466	0579639 .017345 -3.34 103092 .0068802 -14.98 .0708431 .0181569 3.90 .1770115 .0065944 26.84 Coef. Std. Err. t .0510439 .0309328 1.65 3182499 .0122701 -25.94 0081325 .0323807 -0.25 .7482759 .0117603 63.63 Coef. Std. Err. t .0222613 .0299234 0.74 278661 .0118697 -23.48 .0119135 .0313241 0.38 .6137931 .0113765 53.95 Coef. Std. Err. t .0690945 .0201128 3.44 2769476 .0079781 -34.71 0944742 .0210542 -4.49 .3798851 .0076466 49.68	0579639  .017345  -3.34  0.001   103092  .0068802  -14.98  0.000    .0708431  .0181569  3.90  0.000    .1770115  .0065944  26.84  0.000    Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P> t     .0510439  .0309328  1.65  0.099   3182499  .0122701  -25.94  0.000   0081325  .0323807  -0.25  0.802    .7482759  .0117603  63.63  0.000    Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P> t     .0222613  .0299234  0.74  0.457   278661  .0118697  -23.48  0.000    .0119135  .0313241  0.38  0.704    .6137931  .0113765  53.95  0.000    Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P> t     .0690945  .0201128  3.44  0.001    .2769476  .0079781  -34.71  0.000    .3798851  .0076466  49.68  0.000	0579639  .017345  -3.34  0.001 0919612   103092  .0068802  -14.98  0.000 1165777    .0708431  .0181569  3.90  0.000  .0352544    .1770115  .0065944  26.84  0.000  .1640861    Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P> t   [95% Conf.    .0510439  .0309328  1.65  0.099 0095863   3182499  .0122701  -25.94  0.000 3423   0081325  .0323807  -0.25  0.802 0716007    .7482759  .0117603  63.63  0.000  .725225    Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P> t   [95% Conf.    .0222613  .0299234  0.74  0.457 0363903   278661  .0118697  -23.48  0.000 3019263    .0119135  .0313241  0.38  0.704 0494835    .6137931  .0113765  53.95  0.000  .5914945    Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P> t   [95% Conf.    .0690945  .02

## Appendix 4. Original STATA output of Regression by Education Model

working	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
primaryandbelow	.0340465	.0278283	1.22	0.221	0204986	.0885915
survey	3552684	.0263327	-13.49	0.000	406882	3036547
primaryxs	.1725215	.0291539	5.92	0.000	.1153782	.2296649
_cons	.7195767	.0251096	28.66	0.000	.6703603	.7687931
children	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Inter <b>v</b> al]
primaryandbelow	.1054463	.0244694	4.31	0.000	.0574848	.1534078
survey	2540241	.0231543	-10.97	0.000	299408	2086402
primaryxs	.1351125	.025635	5.27	0.000	.0848663	.1853586
_cons	.7804233	.0220789	35.35	0.000	.7371473	.8236993

. Interval]	[95% Conf.	P> t	t	d. Err.	Coef. Sto		govt
.101653	.0196375	0.004	2.90	209217	606453 .02	. 0	primaryandbelow
.0732904	0043174	0.082	1.74	197973	344865 .03	.0	survey
.4148831	.3289608	0.000	16.97	219183	719219 .02	.3	primaryxs
.4576365	.3836333	0.000	22.28	188778	206349 .03	. 4	_cons
Interval]	[95% Conf.	> t	t	d. Err.	Coef. Sto		pension
3652513	4162647	.000	0.03	L30132 -	390758 .01		primaryandbelow
043682	0919538	.000	5.51	L23139	678179 .01	0	survey
.005303	0481404	.116	1.57	136331	214187 .01	0	primaryxs
.5097874	.4637576	.000	1.46	L17419	867725 .01	. 4	_cons
Interval]	[95% Conf.	> t	t i	l. Err.	Coef. Std		savings
008802	1170319	. 023	2.28	76088	062917 .02		primaryandbelow
1358195	2382328	.000	7.16	26125	870261 .0	1	survey
1014074	2147929	.000	5.47	28924	581002 .0	1	primaryxs
.8557066	.75805	.000	2.39	49116	068783 .02	. 8	_cons
. Interval]	[95% Conf.	P> t	t	d. Err.	Coef. St		spouse
.0830271	0230432	0.268	1.11	270579	0299919 .0	. (	primaryandbelow
2063465	3067162	0.000	10.02	256038	2565313 .0	2	survey
.0299372	0811858	0.366	-0.90	283468	0256243 .0	0	primaryxs
. 6404466	. 5447386	0.000	24.27	244146	5925926 .0	.5	_cons
Interval]	[95% Conf.	?> t	t	d. Err.	Coef. Sto		relatives
.03361	0376933	.911	0.11	L81891	020416 .01	0	primaryandbelow
2727935	3402648	000.0	7.81	L72115 -	065291 .01	3	survey
.0568486	0178513	.306	1.02	L90555	194986 .01	.0	primaryxs
.4237032	.3593656	0.000	23.86	L64121	915344 .01	. 3	_cons
f. Interval]	[95% Conf	P> t	t	Std. Err.	Coef.	king	work
.0432862	0872862	0.509	-0.66	.0333083	022	nool	secondaryandhighsch
1820828	2298081	0.000	-16.92	.0121744	2059454	rvey	sur
.0098819	1278415	0.093	-1.68	.0351324	0589798	ryxs	secondar
.7728884	.7271116	0.000	64.23	.0116774	. 75	cons	_c
f. Interval]	[95% Conf.	P> t	t	Std. Err	Coef.	dren	chil
0179088	1332123	0.010	-2.57	.0294132	0755605	hool	secondaryandhighsc
1124318	1545762	0.000	-12.42	.0107508	133504	rvey	su:
0246372	1462554	0.006	-2.75	.0310241	0854463	ryxs	seconda
8957724	.8553487	0.000	84.91	0103119	8755605	cone	

f. Interval]	[95% Conf.	P> t	t	Std. Err.	Coef.	govt
0276363	132005	0.003	-3.00	.0266238	0798206	secondaryandhighschool
. 3737074	.3355598	0.000	36.44	.0097312	. 3546336	survey
0655922	1756768	0.000	-4.30	.0280819	1206345	secondaryxs
. 4981157	.4615255	0.000	51.41	.0093339	. 4798206	_cons
f. Interval]	[95% Conf.	P> t	t	Std. Err.	Coef.	pension
.2267087	.1549326	0.000	10.42	.0183097	.1908206	secondaryandhighschool
0710971	0973318	0.000	-12.58	.0066923	0842145	survey
.0015812	0741258	0.060	-1.88	.0193124	0362723	secondaryxs
.1577612	.1325975	0.000	22.62	.0064191	.1451794	_cons
f. Interval]	[95% Conf.	P> t	t	Std. Err.	Coef.	savings
.0606417	0689735	0.900	-0.13	.0330641	0041659	secondaryandhighschool
3082092	3555846	0.000	-27.46	.0120852	3318969	survey
.1935394	.0568257	0.000	3.59	.0348749	.1251826	secondaryxs
.7788866	.7334453	0.000	65.23	.0115918	.7561659	_cons
nf. Interval]	[95% Conf	P> t	t	Std. Err.	Coef.	spouse
1.0206295	1050241	0.188	-1.32	.0320535	0421973	secondaryandhighschool
82578106	303738	0.000	-23.97	.0117158	2807743	survey
4 .0903117	0422234	0.477	0.71	.033809	.0240442	secondaryxs
1.6442235	.6001711	0.000	55.37	.0112375	. 6221973	_cons
f. Interval]	[95% Conf.	P> t	t	Std. Err.	Coef.	relatives
.0173045	0671789	0.247	-1.16	.0215512	0249372	secondaryandhighschool
2769615	3078408	0.000	-37.12	.0078772	2924012	survey
0590631	0300471	0.523	0.64	.0227315	.014508	secondaryxs
.4077466	.3781279	0.000	52.01	.0075556	. 3929372	_cons
. Interval]	[95% Conf.	P> t	t	Std. Err.	Coef.	working
.0400393	1343139	0.289	-1.06	.0444765	0471373	universityandhigher
16758	2132564	0.000	-16.34	.0116518	1904182	survey
1878988	3690132	0.000	-6.03	.0462013	278456	universityxs
.7721314	.7283933	0.000	67.24	.0111573	.7502623	_cons
f. Interval]	[95% Conf.	P> t	t	Std. Err.	Coef.	children
0551463	2096917	0.001	-3.36	.0394236	132419	universityandhigher
1064306	1469178	0.000	-12.27	.0103281	1266742	survey
	0419499	0 000	-2 02	0409525	- 1610791	universituvs
0808098	2413403	0.000	-3.95	.0405525	.1010/01	universityks

govt	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
universityandhigher	0096816	.0333403	-0.29	0.772	0750306	.0556674
survey	.3911073	.0087344	44.78	0.000	.3739874	.4082272
universityxs	6324729	.0346332	-18.26	0.000	7003561	5645898
_cons	.4706191	.0083637	56.27	0.000	.4542257	.4870125
pension	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
universityandhigher	. 6537579	.0197939	33.03	0.000	.6149606	. 6925552
survey	0993526	.0051855	-19.16	0.000	1095165	0891886
universityxs	.0049527	.0205615	0.24	0.810	0353491	.0452546
_cons	.1274921	.0049655	25.68	0.000	.1177595	.1372248
savings	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
universityandhigher	.1690468	.0442678	3.82	0.000	.0822792	.2558143
survey	3311931	.0115971	-28.56	0.000	3539242	3084621
universityxs	.1351734	.0459845	2.94	0.003	.0450411	.2253058
_cons	.7450157	.011105	67.09	0.000	.7232493	.7667822
spouse	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	. Interval]
universityandhigher	.0001885	.0433416	0.00	0.997	0847636	.0851407
survey	2783261	.0113545	-24.51	0.000	3005815	2560706
universityxs	.0140438	.0450224	0.31	0.755	0742028	.1022903
_cons	. 616999	.0108726	56.75	0.000	.5956879	. 63831
relatives	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
universityandhigher	.0508263	.0291345	1.74	0.081	006279	.1079317
survey	2854758	.0076325	-37.40	0.000	3004361	2705156
universityxs	0737367	.0302643	-2.44	0.015	1330566	0144168
_cons	.3866737	.0073086	52.91	0.000	.3723483	.4009991

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## Appendix 5. Original STATA output of the Gender-Region Interaction Model.

working	Coef.	P>t	working	Coef.	P>t	working	Coef.	P>t
bangkok	0.057349	0.267	central	0.004072	0.913	north	0.001275	0.971
female	-0.0601	0.007	female	-0.05701	0.02	female	-0.05954	0.015
survey	-0.09707	0	survey	-0.08722	0	survey	-0.12564	0
bkkxfem	-0.02768	0.69	centralxfem	-0.02097	0.676	northxfem	-0.01253	0.802
bkkxs	-0.31841	0	centralxs	-0.10014	0.01	northxs	0.043873	0.229
fxs	-0.17471	0	fxs	-0.19267	0	fxs	-0.17248	0
fxsxbkk	0.075061	0.322	fxsxcentral	0.08112	0.12	fxsxnorth	0.005647	0.914
children	Coef.	P>t	children	Coef.	P>t	children	Coef.	P>t
bangkok	-0.13317	0.005	central	-0.05842	0.084	north	0.011452	0.718
female	0.012029	0.557	female	0.006539	0.768	female	0.018664	0.403
survey	-0.1715	0	survey	-0.15331	0	survey	-0.16623	0

bkkxfem	0.069311	0.273	centralxfem	0.052644	0.247	northxfem	-0.00144	0.975
bkkxs	0.020862	0.687	centralxs	-0.0263	0.455	northxs	0.010916	0.742
fxs	0.048283	0.024	fxs	0.058076	0.012	fxs	0.043311	0.063
fxsxbkk	-0.06527	0.345	fxsxcentral	-0.06429	0.174	fxsxnorth	-0.00633	0.894
govt	Coef.	P>t	govt	Coef.	P>t	govt	Coef.	P>t
bangkok	-0.03961	0.355	central	-0.10159	0.001	north	0.106245	0
female	0.026055	0.161	female	0.026155	0.196	female	0.035572	0.079
survey	0.329062	0	survey	0.311848	0	survey	0.343744	0
bkkxfem	-0.00083	0.989	centralxfem	0.013753	0.74	northxfem	-0.02236	0.588
bkkxs	-0.11103	0.018	centralxs	0.073487	0.022	northxs	-0.06464	0.032
fxs	0.032691	0.092	fxs	0.027959	0.186	fxs	0.030708	0.147
fxsxbkk	0.008314	0.895	fxsxcentral	0.002031	0.962	fxsxnorth	-0.00773	0.857
					2			
pension	Coef.	P>t	pension	Coef.	P>t	pension	Coef.	P>t
bangkok	0.106331	0	central	0.066882	0.002	north	-0.0575	0.004
female	-0.0461	0	female	-0.01935	0.166	female	-0.05101	0
survey	-0.0845	0	survey	-0.08649	0	survey	-0.10549	0
bkkxfem	0.059415	0.135	centralxfem	-0.08093	0.005	northxfem	0.048332	0.09
bkkxs	-0.06178	0.057	centralxs	-0.03671	0.098	northxs	0.046753	0.025
fxs	0.009752	0.467	fxs	-0.01302	0.373	fxs	0.013027	0.374
fxsxbkk	-0.04827	0.266	fxsxcentral	0.068078	0.022	fxsxnorth	-0.03915	0.188
			Z Glikee					
			2000 - 2000 - 2000					
savings	Coef.	P>t	savings	Coef.	P>t	savings	Coef.	P>t
savings bangkok	Coef. 0.022085	P>t 0.677	savings central	Coef. -0.05516	P>t 0.146	savings north	Coef. 0.09933	P>t 0.005
savings bangkok female	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625	P>t 0.677 0.115	savings central female	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158	P>t 0.146 0.205	savings north female	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221	P>t 0.005 0.626
savings bangkok female survey	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259	P>t 0.677 0.115 0	savings central female survey	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662	P>t 0.146 0.205 0	savings north female survey	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447	P>t 0.005 0.626 0
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251	savings central female survey centralxfem	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581	savings north female survey northxfem	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342	savings north female survey northxfem northxs	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxs	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxs	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxs	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxs	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxs fxskkk	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef.	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxs fxscentral spouse	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef.	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxs fxs fxssorth	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef.	P>t 0.005 0.626 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxs fxsxbkk	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxsxcentral spouse central	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077	P>t 0.005 0.626 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxs fxsxbkk spouse bangkok female	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529 -0.04382	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202 0.049	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxscentral spouse central female	Coef. -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582 -0.03668	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02 0.128	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north female	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077 -0.03486	P>t 0.005 0.626 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162 0.15
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxsxbkk spouse bangkok female survey	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529 -0.04382 -0.31304	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202 0.049 0	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxsxcentral spouse central female survey	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582 -0.03668 -0.31078	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02 0.128 0	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north female survey	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077 -0.03486 -0.30906	P>t 0.005 0.626 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162 0.15 0
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxsxbkk spouse bangkok female survey bkkxfem	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529 -0.04382 -0.31304 0.043382	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202 0.049 0 0.528	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxscentral spouse central female survey centralxfem	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582 -0.03668 -0.31078 0.001898	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02 0.128 0 0.969	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north female survey northxfem	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077 -0.03486 -0.30906 -0.01213	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162 0.15 0 0.806
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxsxbkk spouse bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529 -0.04382 -0.31304 0.043382 -0.02453	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202 0.049 0 0.528 0.663	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxsxcentral spouse central female survey centralxfem centralxfem	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582 -0.03668 -0.31078 0.001898 0.017071	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02 0.128 0 0.969 0.655	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north female survey northxfem northxfem	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077 -0.03486 -0.30906 -0.01213 -0.00548	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162 0.15 0 0.806 0.879
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxsxbkk spouse bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529 -0.04382 -0.31304 0.043382 -0.02453 0.066578	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202 0.049 0 0.528 0.663 0.004	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxsxcentral spouse central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582 -0.03668 -0.31078 0.001898 0.017071 0.066611	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02 0.128 0 0.969 0.655 0.008	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north female survey northxfem northxs fxs	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077 -0.03486 -0.30906 -0.30906 -0.01213 -0.00548 0.060433	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162 0.162 0.15 0 0.806 0.879 0.017
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxsxbkk spouse bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529 -0.04382 -0.04382 -0.31304 0.043382 -0.02453 0.066578 -0.04021	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202 0.049 0 0.528 0.663 0.004 0.592	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxsxcentral spouse central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582 -0.03668 -0.31078 0.001898 0.017071 0.066611 -0.02419	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02 0.128 0 0.969 0.655 0.008 0.638	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north female survey northxfem northxfem northxs fxs	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077 -0.03486 -0.30906 -0.01213 -0.00548 0.060433 0.000946	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162 0.15 0 0.806 0.879 0.017 0.985
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxsxbkk spouse bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529 -0.04382 -0.31304 0.043382 -0.02453 0.066578 -0.04021	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202 0.049 0 0.528 0.663 0.004 0.592	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxsxcentral spouse central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxs	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582 -0.03668 -0.31078 0.001898 0.017071 0.066611 -0.02419	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02 0.128 0 0.969 0.655 0.008 0.638	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077 -0.03486 -0.30906 -0.01213 -0.00548 0.060433 0.000946	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162 0.162 0.15 0 0.806 0.879 0.017 0.985
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxsxbkk spouse bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxs fxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529 -0.04382 -0.04382 -0.04382 -0.02453 0.066578 -0.04021 Coef.	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202 0.049 0 0.528 0.663 0.004 0.592 P>t	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxsxcentral spouse central female survey centralxfem centralxfem centralxs fxs fxs fxs	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582 -0.03668 -0.31078 0.001898 0.017071 0.066611 -0.02419 Coef.	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02 0.128 0 0.969 0.655 0.008 0.638	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north female survey northxfem northxfem northxs fxs fxs	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077 -0.03486 -0.30906 -0.01213 -0.00548 0.060433 0.000946 Coef.	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162 0.15 0 0.806 0.879 0.017 0.985 P>t
savings bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxsxbkk spouse bangkok female survey bkkxfem bkkxs fxs fxsxbkk fxs	Coef. 0.022085 -0.03625 -0.32259 0.081489 0.100931 0.010907 -0.10866 Coef. -0.06529 -0.04382 -0.04382 -0.31304 0.043382 -0.02453 0.066578 -0.04021 Coef. 0.054156	P>t 0.677 0.115 0 0.251 0.083 0.649 0.162 P>t 0.202 0.049 0 0.528 0.663 0.004 0.592 P>t 0.592	savings central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxsxcentral spouse central female survey centralxfem centralxs fxs fxs centralaxfem centralxs fxs	Coef. -0.05516 -0.03158 -0.30662 0.028185 -0.03753 0.007264 -0.02792 Coef. -0.08582 -0.03668 -0.31078 0.001898 0.017071 0.066611 -0.02419 Coef. -0.02419	P>t 0.146 0.205 0 0.581 0.342 0.78 0.599 P>t 0.02 0.128 0 0.969 0.655 0.008 0.638 P>t 0.444	savings north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth spouse north female survey northxfem northxs fxs fxsxnorth relatives north	Coef. 0.09933 -0.01221 -0.30447 -0.04314 -0.0561 -0.01437 0.047161 Coef. 0.048077 -0.03486 -0.30906 -0.01213 -0.00548 0.060433 0.000946 Coef. -0.04466	P>t 0.005 0.626 0 0.397 0.131 0.583 0.374 P>t 0.162 0.162 0.15 0 0.806 0.879 0.017 0.985 P>t 0.053

survey	-0.29932	0	surve	У	-0.	2956		0	survey	-0.32009	0 0
bkkxfem	0.002115	0.963	centra	alxfem	-0.02	2106	0.52	26	northxfem	0.032581	0.325
bkkxs	-0.0633	0.094	centra	alxs	-0.0	3148	0.22	21	northxs	0.056409	0.02
fxs	0.026372	0.09	fxs		0.01	8683	0.2	27	fxs	0.037227	0.029
fxsxbkk	0.009123	0.857	fxsxc	entral	0.02	6733	0.43	39	fxsxnorth	-0.04049	0.24
working	Coef.	P>t	:	working	3	Coef.		P>t			
northeast	-0.05	402	0.118	south		0.038	64	(	0.38		
female	-0.07	268	0.004	female		-0.063	17	0.	006		
survey	-0.1	524	0	survey		-0.112	63		0		
northeastxf	em 0.037	113	0.441	southxfe	em	0.0050	63	0.	934		
northeastxs	0.138	843	0	southxs		-0.00	85	0.	854		
fxs	-0.15	049	0	fxs		-0.167	71		0		
fxsxnorthea	ast -0.07	607	0.13	fxsxsou	th	-0.027	61	0.	664		
			10	TOTOLOGI	9			2			
children	Coef.	P>t		children	ŋ	Coef.		P>t			
northeast	0.062	312	0.046	south	6	0.0577	35	0.	149		
female	0.019	751	0.38	female		0.0321	87	0.	125		
survey	-0.18	031	0	survey	6	-0.146	12		0		
northeastxf	em -0.00	474	0.913	southxfe	em	-0.099	95	۵ (	0.07		
northeastxs	0.059	484	0.068	southxs		-0.120	94	0.	004		
fxs	0.038	418	0.102	fxs		0.0230	25	0.	293		
fxsxnorthea	ast 0.011	608	0.798	fxsxsou	th	0.1289	05	0.	026		
		đ		-933	~~~	2 PLE	-				
govt	Coef.	P>t		govt		Coef.		P>t			
northeast	0.116	424	0	south		-0.188	83	Î.	0		
female	0.020	224	0.326	female		0.022	27	0.	242		
survey	0.344	913	0	survey		0.306	57		0		
northeastxf	em 0.024	754	0.533	southxfe	em	0.0247	01	0.	622		
northeastxs	-0.06	847	0.022	southxs		0.1385	08		0		
fxs	0.037	349	0.082	fxs		0.0322	55	0.	105		
fxsxnorthea	ast -0.02	232	0.59	fxsxsou	th	-0.001	88	0.	971		
pension	Coef.	P>t		pension		Coef.		P>t			
northeast	-0.02	629	0.183	south		-0.0	35	0.	164		
female	-0.04	113	0.004	female		-0.03	12	0.	018		
survey	-0.09	019	0	survey		-0.099	79		0		
northeastxf	em 0.012	246	0.656	southxfe	em	-0.04	32	0.	213		
northeastxs	-0.00	942	0.648	southxs		0.0477	32	(	0.07		
fxs	0.005	439	0.714	fxs		-0.003	91	0.	776		
fxsxnorthea	ast -0.0	119	0.678	fxsxsou	th	0.0415	16	0.	253		
savings	Coef.	P>t		savings		Coef.		P>t			
northeast	-0.10	196	0.004	south		0.0674	34	0.	133		

female	-0.02832	0.266	female	-0.02231	0.343
survey	-0.34879	0	survey	-0.31407	0
northeastxfem	0.001894	0.969	southxfem	-0.03084	0.619
northeastxs	0.107041	0.004	southxs	-0.03738	0.427
fxs	0.004665	0.861	fxs	-0.00606	0.805
fxsxnortheast	-0.0099	0.847	fxsxsouth	0.053611	0.408
spouse	Coef.	P>t	spouse	Coef.	P>t
northeast	0.012056	0.724	south	0.069991	0.107
female	-0.05675	0.021	female	-0.02697	0.236
survey	-0.31338	0	survey	-0.30563	0
northeastxfem	0.064815	0.173	southxfem	-0.09023	0.132
northeastxs	0.009986	0.78	southxs	-0.03372	0.459
fxs	0.067402	0.009	fxs	0.050143	0.035
fxsxnortheast	-0.02248	0.65	fxsxsouth	0.087549	0.163
			111		
relatives	Coef.	P>t	relatives	Coef.	P>t
northeast	-0.02486	0.277	south	0.099079	0.001
female	0.008441	0.609	female	0.02175	0.155
survey	-0.32591	0	survey	-0.28828	0
northeastxfem	0.018984	0.551	southxfem	-0.05712	0.156
northeastxs	0.075305	0.002	southxs	-0.11715	0
fxs	0.029079	0.091	fxs	0.018929	0.235
fxsxnortheast	-0.01156	0.728	fxsxsouth	0.045551	0.279

## Appendix 6. Original STATA output of the Gender-Education Interaction Model.

working	Coef.	P>t	working	Coef.	P>t	working	Coef.	P>t
primaryandbe~	0.02543	0.48	secondaryand~		0.93			0.28
W	8	2	1	-0.0033	7	universityan~r	-0.06539	5
		0.04			0.01			0.00
female	-0.09776	-8	female	-0.05591	<b>1</b> 5 4	female	-0.0647	3
survey	-0.30907	0	survey	-0.09526	0	survey	-0.08624	0
~~~~	0.03921	0.47	~~~~ · · · j		0.25	universityxfe	0.03345	0.69
primaryxfem	3	3	secondaryxfem	-0.076	5	m	2	9
1 2	0.24791		-		0.00			
primaryxs	8	0	secondaryxs	-0.1395	2	universityxs	-0.33461	0
		0.04						
fxs	-0.1052	2	fxs	-0.19038	0	fxs	-0.18311	0
		0.07			0.12		0.08837	0.32
fxsxprimary	-0.10172	5	fxsxsecondary	0.10743	7	fxsxuniversity	3	5
children	Coef.	P>t	children	Coef.	P>t	children	Coef.	P>t
primaryandbe~	0.10773	0.00	secondaryand~		0.00			0.24
W	6	1	1	-0.11052	4	universityan~r	-0.06436	8
	0.01605			0.00131	0.94			0.19
female	3	0.72	female	4	9	female	0.02554	6
survev	-0.24377	0	survev	-0.16134	0	survev	-0.1481	0
,		0.87	5		0.11	universityxfe		0.08
primaryxfem	-0.00804	1	secondaryxfem	0.09457	8	m	-0.13492	6
			-					

	0.10056	0.00			0.35			0.00
primaryxs	7	3	secondaryxs	-0.03713	3	universityxs	-0.17906	2
fve	-0.02443	0.60	fve	0.04854	0.02	fvs	0.03692	0.07
122	-0.02++3	0.20	172	1	0.10	172	0.04220	0.60
fxsxprimary	0.06598	3	fxsxsecondary	-0.10323	6	fxsxuniversity	5	6
govt	Coef.	P>t	govt	Coef.	P>t	govt	Coef.	P>t
primaryandbe~	0.06998	0.01	secondaryand~	-0.07381	0.03	universituaner	-0.03738	0.42
w	0.04314	5	1	0.02045	0.27	universityan~i	0.02171	0.19
female	5	0.26	female	2	4	female	1	4
SULTYAN	0.05208	0.04	SHRVAN	0.34606	0	CII <b>T</b> VAV	0.37075	0
survey	2	0.51	survey	)	0.90	universityxfe	0.05641	0.39
primaryxfem	-0.02745 0.34793	7	secondaryxfem	-0.00675	2	m	4	6
primaryxs	8	0	secondaryxs	-0.16114	0	universityxs	-0.54788	0
fxs	-0.04239	0.29	fxs	0.01389	0.47	fxs	0.03522	0.04 4
172	-0.0+237	0.23		0.11926	0.03	172	0	0.01
fxsxprimary	0.05256	6	fxsxsecondary	6	9	fxsxuniversity	-0.16318	8
pension	Coef.	P>t	pension	Coef.	P>t	pension	Coef.	P>t
primaryandbe~	0.41005		secondaryand~	0.22364	0		0.68495	0
W	-0.41225	0 04		9	0 31	universityan~r	3	0 00
female	-0.04819	3	female	-0.01283	8	female	-0.02995	3
survey	-0.10134	0	survey	-0.08166	0	survey	-0.0967	0
	0.05088	0.05	1 Marca Down		0.01	universityxfe	0.0400	0.10
primaryxfem	6 0.01760	3	secondaryxfem	-0.09415	2	m	-0.0638	6 0.01
primaryxs	9	6	secondaryxs	-0.0388	9	universityxs	-0.07382	1
c	0.07978	0.00	C	0.00070	0.77	c	0.00000	0.77
IXS	3	0.00	fxs	-0.00379	0.94	IXS	-0.00296 0.15460	5
fxsxprimary	-0.08944	1	fxsxsecondary	1	4	fxsxuniversity	2	0
		จุฬาส		าวทยา				
savings	Coef.	P>t	savings	Coef.	P>t	savings	Coef.	P>t
w	-0.02302	0.53	secondaryand~	-0.0442	03	universitvan~r	0.16306	0.00
	0.04706	0.35		0.0112	0.10	university un		0.23
female	5	2	female	-0.03778	4	female	-0.02635	6
survey	-0.17202	0	survey	-0.34261	0	survey	-0.33211	0
nrimaryxfem	-0.08431	0.13	secondaryxfem	0.09024	0.18	universityxfe	0.01072	0.90 4
prinaryxiciii	-0.00451	2	secondaryxrem	0.16347	5	111	0.12964	0.04
primaryxs	-0.18722	0	secondaryxs	3	0	universityxs	1	7
fys	-0.03645	0.49	fvs	0.02065	0.39	fxs	0.00322	0.88
140	0.06290	0.28	170	J	0.18	170	0.00969	9 0.91
fxsxprimary	8	3	fxsxsecondary	-0.09498	7	fxsxuniversity	7	6
spouse	Coef.	P>t	spouse	Coef.	P>t	spouse	Coef.	P>t
primaryandbe~	0.00010	0.99	secondaryand~	0 02140	0.44	univozit	0.06986	0.25
W	-0.00019	0.02	1	-0.03148	/	universityan~r	5	5 0.15
female	-0.10935	7	female	-0.0382	0.09	female	-0.03106	4
survey	-0.3096	0	survey	-0.31277	0	survey	-0.30883	0

	0.08147	0.13			0.48	universityxfe		0.10
primaryxfem	5	7	secondaryxfem	-0.04639	3	m	-0.14082	4
		0.97		0.01035	0.81			0.60
primaryxs	-0.00117	6	secondaryxs	3	2	universityxs	-0.03335	1
		0.01		0.05783	0.01			0.01
fxs	0.12723	4	fxs	3	4	fxs	0.05663	3
		0.18		0.06530	0.34		0.09934	
fxsxprimary	-0.07624	4	fxsxsecondary	7	9	fxsxuniversity	2	0.27
relatives	Coef.	P>t	relatives	Coef.	P>t	relatives	Coef.	P>t
primaryandbe~	0.01511	0.53	secondaryand~					
W	1	5	1	-0.09941	0	universityan~r	0.17573	0
	0.04934	0.13			0.47		0.02965	0.04
female	1	8	female	-0.01074	8	female	6	2
survev	-0.30508	0	survev	-0.31951	0	survev	-0.29216	0
				0.19525		universityxfe		
primaryxfem	-0.04323	0.24	secondaryxfem	2	0	m	-0.24841	0
1 2		0.99		0.08784	0.00			
primaryxs	-0.00016	5	secondaryxs	1	3	universityxs	-0.19168	0
		~		0.04788	0.00	-	0.01021	0.50
fxs	-0.00481	0.89	fxs	4	2	fxs	4	3
	0.03593	0.35	////				0.23871	
fxsxprimary	8	1	fxsxsecondary	-0.17163	0	fxsxuniversity	6	0



**CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY** 

Financial source at old age		Male			Female		t-stat
	0/2	SE	N	0/6	SE	N	
Expectations	70	5L	1	70	SL	11	
Working	77.98	1.324	972	71.75	1.366	1062	3.27***
Children	85.7	1.129	972	87.48	1.024	1062	-1.16
Government	45.68	1.593	972	48.21	1.537	1062	-1.14
Savings	76.95	1.353	972	74.29	1.34	1062	1.39
Pension	18.83	1.259	972	15.07	1.09	1062	2.25**
Spouse	63.79	1.527	972	59.79	1.479	1062	1.87*
Relatives	38.27	1.553	972	39.64	1.501	1062	-0.63
Reality	/		54	We	7		
Working	66.59	0.464	10127	43.18	0.443	12546	36.43***
Children	69.37	0.455	10127	75.35	0.387	12546	-9.99***
Government	78.33	0.408	10127	84.14	0.329	12546	-11.08***
Savings	45.01	0.487	10127	42.42	0.441	12546	3.93***
Pension	9.53	0.291	10127	5.98	0.213	12546	9.83***
Spouse	32.73	0.462	10127	34.97	0.428	12546	-3.54***
Relatives CHL	7.77	0.266	10127	11.72	0.289	12546	-10.05***

Appendix 7. Welch t-test on differences in proportions of expectations and reality of financial sources at old age across male and females with standard errors from bootstrap resampling.

\* p < 0.10 \*\* p < 0.05 \*\*\* p < 0.01

Financial source at old age		Bangkok			Central			North		I	Northeast			South		chi squared
	%	SE	N	%	SE	N	%	SE	N	%	SE	N	%	SE	N	
Expectations																
Working	78.24	2.761	216	73.877	1.988	490	74.693	1.971	490	72.242	1.912	544	78.231	2.42	294	0.382
Children	78.24	2.817	216	84.489	1.638	490	87.3469	1.518	490	90.992	1.209	544	87.074	1.922	294	1.047
Government	43.518	3.353	216	40	2.207	490	54.081	2.242	490	56.433	2.12	544	31.972	2.7	294	9.068*
Savings	81.481	2.639	216	72.448	2.036	490	81.632	1.768	490	68.198	1.989	544	79.931	2.305	294	1.928
Pension	29.166	3.063	216	18.367	1.735	490	14.489	1.592	490	15.441	1.558	544	11.904	1.902	294	10.113**
Spouse	57.87	3.409	216	55.102	2.244	490	65.102	2.15	490	65.073	2.033	544	63.605	2.791	294	1.371
Relatives	43.981	3.344	216	36.734	2.162	490	36.734	2.182	490	37.867	2.076	544	44.897	2.877	294	1.64
Reality						A	হা/	2000	N.							
Working	30.587	1.409	1056	48.779	0.628	6308	56.86	0.638	5969	58.256	0.621	6310	55.808	0.895	3030	10.533**
Children	62.405	1.476	1056	66.185	0.591	6308	73.965	0.564	5969	81.727	0.487	6310	68.382	0.839	3030	3.213
Government	67.803	1.437	1056	80.247	0.503	6308	83.347	0.481	5969	85.087	0.45	6310	78.085	0.754	3030	2.327
Savings	53.693	1.533	1056	36.857	0.612	6308	46.942	0.646	5969	43.629	0.623	6310	47.293	0.899	3030	3.293
Pension	12.31	1.011	1056	9.162	0.36	6308	7.17	0.333	5969	5.007	0.275	6310	8.679	0.508	3030	3.419
Spouse	25.662	1.342	1056	28.138	0.567	6308	36.639	0.617	5969	37.242	0.598	6310	36.93	0.865	3030	3.77
Relatives	9.848	0.919	1056	6.61	0.31	6308	10.47	0.398	5969	13.882	0.438	6310	7.755	0.483	3030	3.236

Appendix 8. Chi-squared test on differences in proportions of expectations and reality of financial sources at old age across regions with standard errors from bootstrap resampling.

\* *p* < 0.10 \*\* *p* < 0.05 \*\*\* *p* < 0.01

Financial source at old age	No Education			High school or lower			Certificate/diploma			Bache	c squ		
	%	SE	N	%	SE	N	%	SE	N	%	SE	Ν	
Expectations	8												
Working	68.29 2	4.19 6	123	75.34 8	1.034	1724	79.66 1	5.19 4	59	70.31 2	3.99 6	128	1.0
Children	84.55 2	3.25 5	123	88.22 5	0.772	1724	71.18 6	5.93 3	59	74.21 8	3.89 2	128	2.4
Governme nt	43.90 2	4.44 9	123	47.73 7	1.205	1724	33.89 8	6.22 7	59	46.09 3	4.39 4	128	2.6
Savings	66.66 6	4.28 3	123	75.11 6	1.037	1724	72.88 1	5.86 9	59	91.40 6	2.49 6	128	4.3
Pension	4.065	1.76 1	123	12.52 9	0.793	1724	37.28 8	6.29 2	59	78.12 5	3.65 2	128	100. *
Spouse	52.03 2	4.49 2	123	62.64 5	1.161	1724	54.23 7	6.41 2	59	61.71 8	4.27 3	128	1.4
Relatives	43.08 9	4.45 5	123	38.57 3	1.168	1724	32.20 3	6.03 3	59	43.75	4.35 7	128	2.
Reality							//////////////////////////////////////						
Working	45.38 6	1.3	147 4	57.10 6	0.353	1922 9	38.20 8	2.67 2	33 5	23.42 5	1.04 8	163 5	14.5
Children	77.95 1	1.08 6	147 4	74.99 6	0.312	1922 9	49.25 3	2.74 3	33 5	45.44 3	1.22 6	163 5	13.8
Governme nt	86.49 9	0.88 4	147 4	86.82 1	0.244	1922 9	47.46 2	2.74 1	33 5	21.95 7	1.02 7	163 5	49.8
Savings	28.9	1.18 4	147 4	41.98 3	0.353	1922 9	61.79 1	2.65 5	33 5	71.80 4	1.12 2	163 5	21.8
Pension	0.271	0.13 1	147 4	2.402	0.108	1922 9	37.61 1	2.65 5	33 5	68.68 5	1.16 3	163 5	116. *
Spouse	30.12 2	1.20 2	147 4	34.17 7	0.34	1922 9	32.53 7	2.55 2	33 5	35.29	1.16 9	163 5	0.
Relatives	10.65 1	0.80 6	147 4	10.11	0.220 6	1922 9	8.059	1.49 2	33 5	7.828	0.65 5	163 5	0.0

Appendix 9. Chi-squared test on differences in proportions of expectations and reality of financial sources at old age across education level with standard errors from bootstrap resampling.

\* p < 0.10 \*\* p < 0.05 \*\*\* p < 0.01

## VITA

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