CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

In this thesis, I have tried to show that analyticity is a sufficient condition for determinate radical translation; and that determinate radical translation is a necessary condition for an alyticity. This is why some of the main arguments in support of analyticity made appeal to some such notion as 'same-ness of meaning".

In this thesis I have tried to show that a good case against radical determinate translation and its attendent corrolaries which invoke the notion of sameness of meaning will be of great concern to all those supporters of the analytic-synthetic distinction who make appeal to any such intuitive notions of sameness of meaning. I hope that Chapter II has shown that if Quine hasn't "disproved" those intuitive accounts of translation, at least he has mande a good case: he has presented an alternative theory for consideration as well as a pragmatic guideline to be used in the theory selection process.

The pragmatic guideline-Quine's theory of truth - was not, or course, the main topic or this thesis. Rather, this thesis is largely an exposition of Quine's theory of meaning. I hope that section 6 was an adequate summary of Quine's theory of truth, because it is on the strength of his theory of truth that Quine builds his case against determinate radical translation and therefore analyticity.

There are, moreover, several lines of arguments against the notion of analyticity in its own right, as I tried to show in Chapter I. Given the whole of Quine's epistemology as a starting point (i.e., both his theory of meaning as well as his theory of thruth) the notion of analyticity and its implications becomes an obstacle because certain of its intuitive presuppositions commit us to impractical explanations. Of course, the best argument against the distinction is the traditional empirical argument: we have no experience of such a distinction. Rather, the distinction was raised as a way of explaining the process of knowledge. As an explanatory theory, the analytic-synthetic distinction seems to carry some ontological committments which Quine is not willing to admit because of lack of evidence. The ontological committment which lacks evidential support is a committment to meanings as extra-linguistic and extra-theoretical entities. Meaning is not something that can be had, shared or changed. Rather, meaning is the possibility of certain dispositions to behavior. Moreover, the distinction, independendent of any ontological committments, is vague enough to have resisted persistent efforts to explain it conveniently and coherently.

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Other:

W. V. O. Quine. Professor of Philosophy (retired). Department of Philosophy, Harvard University. Private Conversation, 22 November 1978.

Curriculum Vitae

- Mister Stephen R. Schmidt
- Date and place of birth: 29 September 1945, Washington, D.C.
- Education: B. A., Philosophy and Religion from St. John's

 Seminary College, Brighton, Massachusetts, 1967

 Entered Department of Philosophy, Graduate School,

 Chulalongkorn University, 1974
- Experience: English Teacher: Chiengmai University: 1972-74.

 Philosophy Teacher: Thammasat University: 1976-77.

 Philosophy Teacher: Chiengmai University:

 1977 to present.

ลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย