## CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

In this thesis, I have tried to show that analyticity is a suff-icient condition for determinate radical translation; and that determinate radical translation is a necessary condition for an alyticity. This is why some of the main arguments in support of analyticity made appeal to some such notion as :samew ness of meaning".

In this thesis I have thied to show that a good case against radical determinate translation and its attendent corro. laries which invoke the notion of sameness of meaning will be of great concern to all those supporters of the analytic-synthetic distinction who make appeal to any such intuitive notions of sameness of meaning. I hopelthat Chapter II has shown that if Quine hasn't "disproved" those intuitive accounts of translation, at least he has mande a good case: he has presented an alternative theory for consideration as well as a pragmatic guideline to be used in the theory selection process. or course, themain topic or this thesis Rather, this thesis is largely an exposition of Quine's theory of meaning. I hope that section 6 was an adequate summary of Quine's theory of truth, because it is on the strength of his theory of truth that ouins builds hist case against determinate radical translation and cheres fore analyticity.

There are, moreover, several lines of arguments against the notion of analyticity in its own right, as I tried to whow in Chapter I. Given the whole of Quine's epistemology as a starting point (i,e., both his theory of meaning as well as ris theory of thruth) the notion of analyticity and its implications becomes an obstacle because certain of its intuitive presuppositions commit us to impractical explanations. Of course, the best argument against the distinction is the traditional empirical argument: we have no experience of such a distinction. Rather, the distinction was raised as a way of explaining the process of knowledge. is an explanatory theory, the analytic-synthetic distinction seems to carry some ontolo-. gical commitments which Quine is not willing to admit because of lack of evidence. The ontological committment which lacks evidential support is a committment to meanings as extra-iinguistic and extra-theoretical entities. Neaning is not something that can be had, shared or changed. Rather, meaning is the possibility of certain dispositions to behavior. Moreover, the distinction, independendent of any ontologidal committments, is vague enough to have resisted persistent efforts to explain it convenientiy and coherentryo d98? d9 \& ? 6 E

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