

THE EX-KMT REFUGEES IN NORTHERN THAILAND IN THE AGE OF
INTERNATIONAL-POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF POST COLD WAR
ASIA

Ms Lei Tong

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บทคัดย่อและแฟ้มข้อมูลฉบับเต็มของวิทยานิพนธ์ตั้งแต่ปีการศึกษา 2554 ที่ให้บริการในคลังปัญญาจุฬาฯ (CUIR)
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ผู้วิจัยก็กมิตั้งในภาคเหนือประเทศไทยในยุคการเปลี่ยนผ่านของการเมืองระหว่างประเทศ

ของเอเชียในยุคหลังสงครามเย็น

นางสาวลี ทอง

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต

สาขาวิชาการพัฒนาระหว่างประเทศ

คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

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By Ms. Lei Tong
Field of Study International Development Studies
Thesis Advisor Associate Professor Withaya Sucharithawarugse, Ph.D.
Thesis Co-advisor Wasana Wongsurawat, Ph.D.

Accepted by the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master's Degree.

..... Dean of the Faculty of Political Science
(Professor Supachai Yavaprabhas, Ph.D.)

THESIS COMMITTEE

..... Chairman
(Naruemon Thabchumpon, Ph.D.)

..... Thesis Advisor
(Associate Professor Withaya Sucharithawarugse, Ph.D.)

..... Thesis Co-advisor
(Wasana Wongsurawat, Ph.D.)

..... External Examiner
(Norbert Ropers, Ph.D.)

ลือทอง : ผู้ลี้ภัยก๊กมินตั๋งในภาคเหนือประเทศไทยในยุคการเปลี่ยนผ่านของการเมืองระหว่างประเทศของเอเชียในยุคหลังสงครามเย็น. (The EX-KMT REFUGEES IN NORTHERN THAILAND IN THE AGE OF INTERNATIONAL-POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF POST COLD WAR ASIA) อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก : รศ.ดร. วิทยา สุจริตธนารักษ์,อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์ร่วม : ดร.วาสนา วงศ์สุรวัฒน์, 118 หน้า.

ผู้ลี้ภัยก๊กมินตั๋ง (KMT) ในภาคเหนือของประเทศไทย มีต้นกำเนิดมาจากกองทัพ KMT ที่ถอยร่นจากประเทศจีนเข้าไปในประเทศพม่าในปี 1949 บางคนได้รับการยอมรับจากรัฐบาลไทยในฐานะผู้ลี้ภัยพลเรือนที่หนีจากสงครามต่อต้านคอมมิวนิสต์ในช่วงทศวรรษ 1980 และได้รับสถานะภาพเป็นสัญชาติไทยบางส่วน เพื่อเป็นการตอบแทนที่ช่วยกำจัดคอมมิวนิสต์ในประเทศไทย แต่บางคนก็ยังคงไร้สัญชาติ

ในแง่ของการเมืองระหว่างประเทศ สงครามเย็นในทวีปเอเชียจบลงเร็วกว่าในยุโรป การผงาดขึ้นมาของประเทศไทยในภูมิภาคนี้ และแผนยุทธศาสตร์ ของอเมริกาในเอเชีย ได้เปลี่ยนโครงสร้างการเมืองระหว่างประเทศในทวีปเอเชีย ตั้งแต่ทศวรรษที่ 70 เป็นต้นมา สิ่งเหล่านี้ได้แปรเปลี่ยนสิ่งแวดล้อมในการอยู่รอดของ KMT ส่วนที่เหลือ อยู่ในภาคเหนือของไทย ผู้ลี้ภัยที่เป็นนักรบของ KMT ได้ค่อยๆ สูญเสียความสำคัญไปใน “หมากรุกกระดานใหญ่” แห่งพลังอำนาจต่างๆ

อย่างไรก็ดี ผู้ลี้ภัย KMT หาใช่เป็นเพียง “เหยื่อ” ของความแปรเปลี่ยน พวกเขาได้ดิ้นรนที่จะตั้งหลักแหล่งในประเทศไทยหรือกลับได้หวั่น พวกเขาเพียงพยายามแก้ไขสถานะความมั่นคงมนุษย์โดยผ่านกลุ่มผลประโยชน์และระบอบปกครองชุมชน จากนั้น ยุทธศาสตร์ต่างๆ ได้นำไปสู่ผลกระทบอันหลากหลายด้านสถานความมั่นคงมนุษย์ของกลุ่มเป้าหมาย แต่ในอีกทาง ยุทธศาสตร์ต่อเนื่องและไร้ระบบก็ไม่พอเพียงที่จะเป็นเกราะป้องกันกลุ่มเป้าหมายจากภาวะคุกคามทางความมั่นคงมนุษย์

วิทยานิพนธ์ฉบับนี้ส่วนใหญ่อาศัยการวิจัยเชิงเอกสาร แต่การวิจัยภาคสนามในหมู่บ้านสองแห่งคือหมู่บ้านแม่สลองและหมู่บ้านสันติสุข ก็ได้ช่วยในเรื่องความเข้าใจสถานะความมั่นคงแห่งมนุษย์ของกลุ่มเป้าหมายในมิติของความมั่นคงแห่งชุมชน ความมั่นคงทางเศรษฐกิจ การศึกษาและสัญชาติ

สาขาวิชา การพัฒนาระหว่างประเทศ
ปีการศึกษา 2554

ลายมือชื่อนิสิต.....
ลายมือชื่อ อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก.....
ลายมือชื่อ อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์ร่วม.....

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CHS:	Commission on Human Security
CCP:	Chinese Communists Party
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
FCRA:	Free China Relief Association
FETO:	Far East Trade Office
IMOB:	Intelligence Mainland Operation Bureau
KMT:	Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalists Party)
NGO:	Non-governmental organization
OCAC:	Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission
PRC:	The People's Republic of China
ROC:	Republic of China
UN:	United Nations
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Sixty years ago, a group of KMT military forces retreated from Yunnan Province of China to northern Burma and Thailand when defeated by Mao's People Liberation Army. They did not go to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek for two main reasons: they were largely derived from Yunnan, and they had an historic responsibility in the fight against communism. For a fairly long period from 1949 to early 1970s, the KMT remnants in northern Thailand received financial and military assistance, both from Taiwan and the US Central Intelligence Agency, for launching harassment attacks on the new People's Republic of China.

Defeated by the Sino-Burmese allied forces in 1961, the Third and Fifth Armies of the ex-KMT retreated from Burma to Thailand. The Thai government permitted the KMT armies' entry and granted them with refugee status after petitioning by the leaders of the armies, Gen. Li Wen-huan and Gen. Duan Xi-wen. Since the Thai military government wanted to take advantage of the KMT armies to defend the northern border from the communist incursion, the armies were allowed to keep their arms and equipment. Some of the KMT militias and their families received Thai citizenship as a reward for eradicating Thai and Miao communists¹ during the 1960's and 1970's under the arrangement of Supreme Command Headquarters of Royal Thai Armed Forces dealing with the KMT issue. In 1984, the Supreme Command Headquarters moved to the Thanization issue of the ex-KMTs to the Ministry of

¹Miao, also known as Meo, is a linguistically related minority residing in South China and SE Asia, including the Hmong that is the sub-group of Miao residing in Thailand, Vietnam and other Indochina countries. Miao Communists revolt in Thailand started in 1967 in Chiang Rai. The ex-KMT armed remnants in northern Thailand were taken advantage by the Thai government to capture the Miao Communists from 1967 to 1975, then again from 1978 to 1982 when they completely surrendered to Thai government.

Interior. The successive civil government tabled granting the target groups Thai citizenship until 2005 when the new Nationality Act was implemented. Hampered by diverse causes, thousands of the ex-KMTs or their descendents still have no Thai citizenship to this day.

Between 1950s and early 1980s, Taiwan offered evacuation a number of times to the ex-KMT refugees, but the bulk of them chose to stay in Thailand for fear of political prosecution in Taiwan. Since 1960s, Taiwan began to recruit high school and university students from the KMT refugee villages scattered in northern Thailand and whole SE Asia to buttress its orthodox image of China. Before 1994, the admitted students could be granted Taiwan citizenship a couple weeks after their arrival in Taiwan. For those who came to Taiwan with forged passports, they were also given the citizenship of Taiwan, with it the ability to both live and work in the island, or even transfer to Japan by Taiwanese travelling certificate². This was the case until a year before Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2000. Then, the most important Taiwanese quasi official organization Free China Relief Association that lent diverse aids to the ex-KMT refugee communities in northern Thailand claimed its demise in 2002 for shortage of financial aid from the DPP government.

Since Ma Ying-jeou³ began an advocacy campaign on behalf of the KMT's rights in 2008 (8 years after his party stepped down), the KMT refugees from northern Thailand and Myanmar have launched several demonstrations. They asked the Taiwanese government to grant them citizenship. On the one hand, the barriers those inhibit the stateless ex-KMTs from being granted citizenship primarily derive from Thai administrative complexity. On the other hand, Taiwan did not manage a project for the 'return' of the KMT refugees until 2009. At the same time, a temporary approach was adopted in response to the situation that many offspring of the ex-KMT in Thailand and Myanmar were stranded in Taiwan for statelessness.

²To many Taiwanese, Japan is the an ideal destination for travelling, study, and migration for the developed economy, clean environment and short distance from Taiwan (Chang 2001).

³ Ma is the current President of KMT Party and ROC based in Taiwan

The PRC (the People's Republic of China), that was once harassed by the KMT remnants until 1970s, used to pay great attention to the presence of KMT in the Golden Triangle area for the sake of national security. The Cold War in Asia took a different form from its counterpart in Europe, and ideological disputes between the PRC and the U.S gave way to Sino-U.S alliance of anti-Soviet expansionism and international hegemony since the beginning of 1970's. After a series of political tradeoffs, the PRC took the place of Taiwan in the Asian strategy of the United States, which led to the eventual decline in the strategic position of the KMT refugees in northern Thailand, converting them from warriors to stateless refugees completely.

Accompanied by the improved relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan from 1990's onward, the PRC adopted a new policy to the ex-KMT in northern Thailand. The Consulate General to Chiang Mai has sent financial, agricultural, and educational supports to the KMT refugee villages since 2006. The third generation of the KMT armies in northern Thailand obtained opportunities to study for free at university in the mainland of China and hold PRC citizenship. By all cursory appearances, the PRC is generous in providing help in many forms to change the situation of the KMT refugees as long as the refugees are willing to accept the conditions of the aid.

1.2 Statement of problem

Under the tit-for-tat system of the Sino-U.S relationship, the KMT armies received aid from the U.S and Taiwan easily either for their combat role in 'retaking' Mainland China or for their living cost in northern Thailand. But ever since 1971, situation has deteriorated irreversibly as the international system changed and the power structure began to transform in Asia: Henry Kissinger visited Beijing secretly in July of 1972 to discuss the anti-Soviet alliance with the PRC; the Sino-Thailand diplomatic relationship was built in 1975; and Sino-U.S diplomacy on the ambassadorial level was formed in 1979. These are because the military threat and

expansionism of the USSR had outweighed any ideological issues between the PRC and the U.S.

Along with recognition of the PRC, the position of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in international affairs dropped. Rejecting the last evacuation provided by Taiwan in the early 1980s, the KMT armies were completely converted to stateless refugees. Simultaneously, all external aid was cut off, as the armies had lost strategic importance on the ‘grand chessboard’⁴ of the major roles in the international system of Asia. Limited by statelessness, the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand were vulnerable to a series of human right violations such as the right to move within the border of Thailand, right to education, right to work and employment, etc. In response to this, some stateless KMT went to Taiwan asking for Taiwanese citizenship, with the possibility of being stranded on the island.

While nationality is important in survival and development of the KMT refugees, it is not the singular channel to survival and development. Since the Asian-political transformation, NGOs began to emerge in a new role in lending support to the survival and development of refugees. After a number of large-scale demonstrations by the KMT refugees who were stranded in Taiwan during the ruling of Democratic Progressive Party (2000-2008), Ma Ying-jeou’s government began to consider and enact relevant rules regarding the survival and development quandaries of the KMT refugees, particularly the third generation.

In the meantime, after some ten years fighting against the communists for the Thai government, many KMT refugees had already received Thai citizenship, while others remain stateless. There are a few reasons accounting for this. The Nationality Act adopted in 2005 has been beneficial for the refugees in applying Thai citizenship. The KMT refugees mostly have access to Thai nationality and some even obtain dual citizenships of both Taiwan and Thailand. The PRC also no longer treated the KMT

⁴The Polish-American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski published his work *The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperative* in 1997. Afterwards, the academia of international politics cites the word of “Grand Chessboard to describe the complexity of international relations.

refugees in northern Thailand as opponents, but as political refugees that need aid by all means, such as endowing Chinese nationality, free education and employment opportunities. But, some KMT refugees are still holding strong ideological resistance to the assistance from the PRC, which hampers the survival and development of some of the refugees.

In summary, the international-political transformation of Asia and the coping strategies of the KMT refugees have composed a series of drivers and factors that either support or undermine the survival and development of the KMT refugees as a group. This thesis will present how the international-political transformation of Asia and the responsive techniques of the refugees affect their survival and development.

1.3 Research objectives

- 1) To analyze the international-political transformation of Asia as the external environment of the ex-KMT refugees' survival and development since post Cold War.
- 2) To investigate the coping strategies of the ex-KMT refugees regarding the transformation.
- 3) To study the effects of the international-political transformation of Asia and coping strategies on the human security of the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand.

1.4 Research questions


- 1) How did the post Cold War transformation of Asia shape the human security status of the ex-KMT refugee communities in northern Thailand?

- 2) To what extent do the coping strategies of the target groups affect their human securities?

1.5 Conceptual framework

As the independent variable in this thesis, the international-political transformation of Asia is basically represented by the rise of the PRC in the region, including the related changes of Sino-U.S and Mainland-Taiwan relationships in the age of post Cold War. Meanwhile, the rising of Khun Sa⁵ in the Golden Triangle region also impacted the survival and development of the ex-KMT refugees. The coping strategies of the refugees, including governance of the communities and advocacy for and against diverse forces, act as the intervening variables. Governance mainly engages in the structural and cultural adjustments, and advocacy is in response to the changes of the relevant parties: Taiwan (government and NGOs), Thailand, PRC and Khun Sa. Through the coping strategies of the leaders, the international-political transformation of Asia changes the survival and development status of the refugees; the refugees are the dependent variable of this thesis. The changes of the dependent variable will be measured by nationality, life status, education and employment.

⁵ Khun Sa (1934-2007) is a Burmese Shan warlord fighting for founding an independent Shan Republic from Burma. He is also a drug lord. His family was one of sawbwars in Shan State of Burma. His mother is a Chinese Dhai (Shan), so Khun Sa has a Chinese name Zhang Qi-fu (Chang Shee-fu)



1.6 Hypothesis

In the age of post Cold War, the human security fate of the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand is a function of the international-political transformation of Asia, facilitated by variant interactions of the relevant parties, such as the changing interactions between China and U.S and Mainland of China and Taiwan. The transformation creates both opportunities and obstacles for the survival and development for the refugees. The strength and direction of this causal relationship is affected (for better or worse) by the coping strategies of the target groups.

1.7 Research methodologies

This research uses qualitative method to investigate the interactions between international-political system of Asia and the activities of the KMT people to defend

their human security in response to the impact of the system. The qualitative research is conducted in two parts: documentary research and field research.

For the documentary research, information from newspapers, journals, textbooks, articles, research findings and reports related to the ex-KMT refugees and international-political system and structures are collected. And the classical works of neo-realism and neo-liberalism in the realm of international-politics are supportive for building the theoretical framework. Overall, documentary research based on primary and secondary data is the main research method of the thesis.

Aside from the books in the references of this thesis, I also got some primitive documents compiled by PKU's Institution of International Studies, including: *The Shanghai Communiqué* (1972); *Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America* (Jan 1 1979); *The law of relationship between the U.S and Taiwan* (April 10th, 1979); *Introduction to the cross-Strait relationship* by the Committee of Mainland Affairs attached to the Administrative Council of Taiwan (July 6th, 1994); President Jiang Ze-min's *Eight points about the re-unification* (Jan 30th, 1995) and Lee Teng-hui's response; and Lee's statement in Cornell University (June 9th, 1995).

Field research techniques included semi-structured in-depth interviews, participant observation and discussions with selected key informants, such as previous diplomats and scholars in relevant fields. The network of informants was established through the snowball technique. Data collection was carried out since December 2010. Interviews were conducted in Chinese and translated into English. In-depth interviews with the key informants and individuals with semi-constructed questions updated the information about the coping strategies of the KMT refugees in northern Thailand, since there is limited literature to which can be referred. The key informants and experts' interviews are listed into 2 groups:

1) Non-PRC experts who are familiar with the KMT issue

Bertil Lintner: a Chiang-Mai based Swedish correspondent, author of ‘*The merchant of madness*’ and ‘*Burma in revolt*’. He is fairly knowledgeable about the drug issue in the Golden Triangle and the history of the KMT remnants.

Dr. Chang Wen-chin: a professor of Academia Sinica of Taiwan. Dr. Chang is famous for her research about the migration history of the target communities. She gave me all her research papers and PhD dissertation about the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand. She spent years visiting the KMT refugee communities in northern Thailand since 1990s.

Mr. Zhang Xue-hai: Chairman of Taiwan Legislative Progressive Association. He is contributing to the settlement of the KMT refugee issues. Mr. Zhang visited the Asian Institute of Chulalongkorn University last year, discussing the issue with some teachers from the institute.

2) PRC experts

I was introduced to a retired Chinese diplomat (Diplomat A) who briefed me on the political stance of the central government of PRC in regarding the KMT issue in Thailand. Diplomat A advised me that I should avoid using unverified reports/documents as there is a risk of spreading rumors or inadvertently divulging confidences, but I could still use them to help consider my research hypothesis. He also clarified some inappropriate or biased understanding or argument about the facts I collected from my literature review in Bangkok.

I accessed a previous official who used to work on the ‘United Front’⁶. Same

⁶ ‘United Front’ was the domestic policy of China Communist Party during the anti-Japan War (1937-1945), implying joining with all kind of anti-Japan forces to defend the security of China. After WWII, Mainland China has the Department of United Front to prevent any domestic conflicts and separation, maintaining the territorial and sovereign integrity of the country. Peaceful re-unification of Taiwan is a key working goal of the Department.

as Diplomat A, the official does not want the names mentioned under any occasion (actually, he is forbidden to give out some information), although he is also retired. The official told me several activities in which he took part in Thom Ngob village which was the foothold of the Third Army of General Li, and what kind of attitude the headmen and leaders of the village and villagers bear about the PRC in term of ideology, and how they feel about their loyalty to Taiwan. I was not able to access the Third Army during my fieldtrip in Thailand, as they are still doing intelligence collection for the Taiwanese and Thai government (Bertil Lintner, personal interview, 4th July, 2011). The information from this official explained what the Third Army was. There are three major KMT communities in northern Thailand: Army 3, Army 5, and the intelligence army. I visited Mae Salong of the Fifth Army and Santisuk for intelligence army; only Tham Ngob was not accessible even though I built good network with Mae Salong and Santisuk.

Access to the ex-KMT communities was conducted through the help of the chairman of Taiwan Legislative Progressive Association, Mr. Zhang Xue-hai, and Principle Yang Guo-qin of Santisuk Chinese School. My two case studies are Doi Mae Salong in Mae Fah Luang and Santisuk in Mae Chan of Chiang Rai Province. The interviewees were chosen by the headmen of the two villages due to the research objectives about the human security status of the target groups. Selection also relied on the availability and voluntary consent of the interviewees. The personal backgrounds of the interviewees are included in the Appendices B and C.

1.8 Selection of the research sites

Dr. Chang Wen-chin, a Taiwanese researcher, who interviewed 27 ex-KMT refugee communities in 4 years, claims it is difficult to exercise an in-depth interview on the KMT refugees, with the exception of Mae Salong. This is because most of the KMT refugees still do not want to talk to an outsider about their issues. (Her last

journey to the KMT refugee region was 2005.) Mae Salong is located in the mountainous area 75 km northwest from Chiang Rai city, Mae Fah Luang, used to be the headquarters of the Fifth Army of ex-KMT guided by General Duan Xi-wen. Mae Salong is the most open community among all of the KMT villages, and has been opened to tourism industry since 1990's.

Another fieldtrip site is at Santisuk, Mae Chan. This is a village much smaller and younger than Mae Salong, but was picked for its less developed situation and lesser known resettlement history. Santisuk was the foothold of ex-KMT intelligence force before disbandment in 1975, and composed of 60% of Wa ethnic KMT people and 40% Yunnanese Han KMT people. One of the reasons that Santisuk was chosen for the research is that this might be the only community in which original charismatic leaders are still alive, and through which the role of leaders in response to the international-political transformation can be tested. Most importantly, Santisuk might be the only remote KMT village accessible to me. I am from the Mainland of China and had limited time to establish this network.

1.9 Ethical issues

The objectives of the research and the fact that information collected would be used for academic purposes only were explained to all interviewees. Besides, the interviewees were informed of the research topic and given an explanation about it, so that they would fully understand that this is not a survey on any government's behalf. For these, consent and cooperation were obtained from interviewees.

1.10 Significance of the research

While there are many papers about the stateless KMT refugees from northern Thailand, they are mostly migration or drug issue researches from the perspective of micro-economy. There are several books from Alfred McCoy, Bertil Lintner, Ko-lin Chin and Ron Renard arguing the opium and heroin economy of the KMT and the political causes behind the drug trafficking, yet none of them give further analysis

about the KMT people beyond the economy and military. The concentration of the books is about the politics of drugs. Dr. Chang Wen-chin's migration papers observe and analyze the issue from the micro perspective to a whole. This thesis will study both micro and macro factors and their integral impact on the human development of the KMT refugees.

1.11 Limitation of the research

To a large extent, this research depends on documentary data that might not be updated constantly. Besides, the participation observation and in-depth interview at Mae Salong and Sandisuk two villages do not represent the situation of all 100 of the KMT refugee villages in northern Thailand. In addition, this research recognizes that complicated factors are responsible for the human security and human development of the ex-KMT refugees in the northern Thailand, and cases vary village by village. However, this thesis focuses on international-political drivers and the feedback of the ex-KMT.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW



Note: Map of Thailand and neighboring countries

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to provide a literature review about ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand. It is divided into five sections. The first section is a theoretical and conceptual overview regarding the international-political transformation in post Cold War Asia. The second section reviews concepts and implication about „security“ in the age of the post Cold War-- both „national security“ and “human security.” International-political transformation induced by relevant forces is examined in the third section. The fourth section provides brief migration history of the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand, and the demarcation between them and the refugees in UNHCR version. The process of obtaining Thai citizenship in the fifth part offers a framework for exploring why there are still thousands of ex-KMT people remaining stateless.

2.2 Theoretical and conceptual overview

This section examines the concepts that are related to the international-political transformation in post Cold War Asia, namely international-political transformation, national security, and post Cold War.

2.2.1 International-political transformation: international-political system, structure and transformation

To argue the impact of international-political transformation, it is necessary to clarify what the transformation is and what the indicators of the transformation are. According to the general acknowledgement of the academia of international politics,

international-political transformation refers to the changes of international-political system.

2.2.1.1 ‘System’

For William Coplin (1980), „the term *political system* is used to depict a set of interrelated units whose patterns of interaction, taken together, roughly represent some kind of loose organization“. Kenneth Waltz’s definition that a system is composed of a structure and of „interacting units“ is similar to Raymond Hopkin and Richard Mansbach’s definition that “a system is an abstract concept comprising a set of units complexly interrelated through interaction.”

Waltz argues that states are the units whose interactions form the structure of international-political systems. Hopkin, Mansbach and Waltz also claim that nation-states are the major „players“ of international-political systems. In general, realism and its derivative schools of international politics agree that the state is the major component of the international-political system. On the other hand, Hopkin and Mansbach also include non-government factors into the system in their work, *Structure and Process in International Politics* (1973). This thesis focuses on the impact of the relevant states on the ex-KMT refugees, but will present the role of the NGOs for their growing importance in the system.

2.2.1.2 ‘Structure’

According to Kenneth Waltz, “a system is composed of a structure and interacting units.” The concept of structure is based on the fact that units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently, and during interaction they produce

different outcomes (Waltz 1979). Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Political structure is defined first, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second, by the specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across units.

“Structure emerges from the coexistence of states and formed by the coactions of the units, maintained on a principle of self-help that applies to the units (Waltz 1979).”

2.2.1.3 ‘International-political transformation’

In his classical neo-realism work *Theory of international politics* (1979), Kenneth Waltz points out that international-political system is formed by the coactions of self-regarding units. International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era. While Waltz assumes that ordering, function, and capability of units define international-political structures that maintain systems, he also claims that “the units of anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated.” Therefore, Waltz, to a large extent, denies the transformation of international system through ordering change of units in the system. By “anarchy,” Waltz means the status which demonstrates a lack of international government, setting all units under control.

In 1977, the publication of Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane’s *Power and Interdependence* initially proposed the idea of ‘interdependence of states’. Joseph Nye proposed in 1988 that structure and interdependence of states, international regime and the characters of states are the three factors impacting the process and transformation of the international system. That is to say, neo-liberalists attribute the transformation of international-political system not only to altered structure (ordering, function and capability of units), but also changed regime and characters of states.

While both neo-realism and neo-liberalism acknowledge that interstate conflicts and cooperation are the dynamics of system transformation, the latter assumes that interactions between states can be positive-sum games. Besides, neo-liberalism gives attention to international mechanism and integrates process into understanding the intentional-political transformation.

In this thesis, the analysis of the international-political transformation relies on Kenneth Waltz's structure theory, complemented by neo-liberal structure theory.

2.2.1.4 'Post Cold War Asia'

While the ideological confrontation between the U.S and U.S.S. R gave birth to worldwide Cold War, the Cold War in Asia took the form of the tit-for-tat in the Sino-U.S relationship. Besides, the Cold War of Asia was more complicated than its European counterpart in terms of the co-existence of the ideological dispute and military conflict represented by Korean War. However, military security took the place of ideological dispute in Sino-U.S strategic concern, when both countries acquired the more practical threat from the Soviet hegemonic expansionism. In 1972, signified by the visits of Kissinger and Nixon to Beijing, Asia entered the era of post Cold War, but Cold War discourse retains its lasting influence to this day in either the Sino-U.S relationship or the link across the Taiwan Strait: the early 1970's saw Asia enter the beginning of the post Cold War era.

2.2.2 'Security', "national security' and 'human security'

As realists argue, inter-government cooperation and conflicts involving national security are the dynamic of international-political transformation, since they alter the ordering and capability of relevant forces. These, in turn change the international-political structure and process. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the concepts of security, national security, and human security.

2.2.2.1 ‘Security’

Alfred Wolfers’ *Discord and Collaboration* (ed Collins 2006) states: “Security, in an objective sense, measures, the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.” The state has been the thing secured and is known as the referent object, and it has sought security through military might.

2.2.2.2 ‘National/ state security’

In *Security in International Politics: Traditional approaches* (ed by Alan Collins 2007), Patrick Morgan argues that components of state security include physical safety, autonomy, development and rule. He also argues development and rule are less important than security and autonomy in the perspective of realists generally. Realists view international politics as an anarchic system, in which states are said to be structurally insecure-their existence suffused with risk. Morgan claims that the essence of international politics is competition for power to maintain state security, with power consisting ultimately of coercive capability. “Realists expect cooperation, especially on security, to occur only among limited groups of states, as in alliances, or on relatively uncontroversial matters, and even then it will be hard to sustain” (Morgan 2007). Considering all relevant parties in the thesis hold realistic

view about state security, Patrick Morgan's argument promotes the understanding of the logic of every country's policy-making, which is the dynamic of the international-political transformation in post Cold War Asia.

U.S. National Security: A Framework of Analysis (eds Kaufman, Mckitrick & Leney 1985) points out that national security is directly related to values which makes it difficult to measure security in objective fashion and not a static condition. "It is determined in the context of both the international and domestic environments changing constantly". In *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (1989), Sam. C Sarkesian lists the priorities of national interests in top-down sequence: vital interests that effect the survival of the U.S (e.g. military security); critical interests that impact the propensity of the state in the long run without affecting the survival of the state (e.g. democracy and ideology); serious interests that affect first and second order interests.

In *Thinking About National Security* (1983), Harold Brown states the gravest international threat is military intimidation or conventional attack on U.S. allies and friends. If either occurred, the world military and political balance would tilt dangerously against the U.S. Brown argues in the book that the relationship with PRC was still being formed, and a major clash over policies toward Taiwan could abort the development of close ties. In the late 1960's, the relationship with East Asia shifted sharply. It was the goal for the U.S. to be politically friendly with as many countries in that region as possible and retain mutual economic benefit. The PRC was taken as an ideological, political and military threat to the USSR, facing military deterrence from the latter. Shared threat of the USSR to the national security, Sino-U.S alliance composed the dynamic of the international-political transformation of Asia, providing opportunity to the transform the confrontation between the Mainland of China and Taiwan.

2.2.2.3 ‘Human security’

Contemporary Security Studies (ed. by Alan Collins 2007) lends support to the understanding of human security, and its dialectic relationship with national security. “Human security had its origins in the 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Report, in which „Human security“ is described as a condition where people are given relief from the traumas that besiege human development (Kerr, 2007, p 92). Kerr notes that realistic discourse of national security and humanitarian perspective of human security are both the necessary but insufficient for the inclusive security. This thesis uses UNDP approach that emphasizes the interrelated as diverse types of security and the importance important as a security strategy.

Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy point out in *Human Security Concepts and Implications* (2007) that human security is about the survival, well-being and dignity of humans. Thus, the community, the nation, and the other groups are referents of security as long as the security „trickles don“t to people.” Tadjbakhsh argues. Human security threats include both objective and tangible elements. In sum, threats are interlinked and interconnected, and should not be prioritized. Securing people is not just an ethical imperative but the best strategy to secure the state and the international system. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy’s work lends important support to the argument of this thesis through comparing human security approach with security approaches of structural-realism (neo-realism), liberalism, and constructivism.

According to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, human security discourse addresses the states as the “fundamental purveyor” (CHS 2003) for the protection of its citizens in order to develop their resilience to difficult conditions (CHS 2003), but it overlooks the fact that the provider not only can be the state, but also the people. In other words, the nexus between conflict and development for human security depends on the endeavor of both the state *and* people. The human security of the ex-KMT sheds light

on this viewpoint." The thesis basically employs the proposition of the broad school, as the difficulties the target groups are facing now are more related to „freedom from want“ rather than „freedom from fear.“

2.2.3 International-political transformation in post Cold War Asia

In this section, introduction is given to both the internal and external changes of the relevant forces including the PRC, Taiwan, the U.S and Thailand, because they are the drivers of the international-political transformation of Asia in the age of post Cold War. By this, the thesis follows the discourse of the neo-liberalism that relies upon the international-political transformation on both international-political structure and process. Khun Sa's ambition of chasing an independent Republic of Shan imposes over ten years of war on the majority of the ex-KMT communities in northern Thailand. This should not be ignored as another factor that impacts the survival and development of the refugees, although the rising of Khun Sa did not result from the cease of the Cold War in Asia directly.

2.2.3.1 Normalization of Sino-U.S relationship

Referring to Fang Lianqing and Liu Jinzhi's *Post War History of International Relations* (1999), Brezhnev proposed, in 1968, a series of hegemonic foreign policies including "limited sovereignty, socialist family, relevant benefits and special responsibility of big country" to justify its invasion of Czechoslovakia, which is known as the principals of "Brezhnev Doctrine." To the end of the 1960's, the ideological dispute between the Soviet Union and the PRC escalated to be sovereign conflicts that were represented by the "Treasure Island Incident"¹. However, Brezhnev technically came up with "alleviation policy" to shield the Soviet ambition of

expanding worldwide in 1971. Nixon's administration was mired in the Vietnam War that drove the U.S to recognize the equal position of the U.S.S.R in international affairs, but also was aware of the hegemonic expansion revealed in supporting India, Pakistan, Egypt, Angola, Ethiopia (in its dispute with Somalia), and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia (Fang & Liu 1999).

Confronting the same Soviet menace, the U.S and PRC played down the importance of ideology in strategic consideration, converting national security concern to military safety. Through international aid from several channels, secret interviews between the leaders of the two nations occurred in 1972 (Kissinger 1994). Due to Nixon's inappropriate strategy of magnifying Vietnam War to Cambodia and Laos, and the dispute on the issue of Taiwan, the diplomatic Sino-U.S relationship was not established until 1979. In reality though, the Cold War was ending in Asia since the 1970s (Fang & Liu 1999).

2.2.3.2 Mainland-Taiwan relationship & Sino-Thai relationship

Although the Cold War may have effectively ceased in Asia, this reduction in tension was not the case across the Taiwan Strait; rather, Chiang Kai-shek's ambition of retaking the mainland of China by taking advantage of the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in Mainland China (Fang & Liu 1999) was renewed.

According to Qin Yi-hui's *The Tragic History of the KMT Troops in the Golden Triangle, 1950-1981* (2009), Taiwan attempted to gain more material and

¹ On the morning of March 2, 1969, an armed clash between the U.S.S.R and PRC occurred along the Sino-Soviet border on the Treasure Island, which was a disputed but usually uninhabited island in the Ussuri River. Both sides claimed casualties.

strategic aid from the U.S for launching a war of harassment against Mainland China during 1968-1969, but was rejected by the States; the States was already preoccupied with the Vietnam War and the Soviet threat. In 1971, Mainland China supplanted Taiwan in the United Nations. The KMT military remnants stationed in Thailand and Laos were conscripted by the U.S armies for bombing strategic projects of the northern regime of Vietnam during the first couple of years of 1970's (Lintner 2010).

Along with Asia entering a post Cold War phase and improved Sino-U.S relationship as well as the escalating tension between PRC and Vietnam, a new Sino-Thai diplomatic relationship was built in 1975, which replaced the previous ROC (Republic of China)-Thailand official relationship. The same year, Chiang Kai-shek died in Taipei, and his son Chiang Ching-Kuo became president.

"On January 1, 1979, the PRC announced the end to every-other-day shelling of Jinmen and a decidedly less bellicose approach to Taiwan...From 1979 to 1993, the PRC's stance toward and rhetoric about Taiwan was noticeably less confrontational than it had been." (Wachman 2007). During this period, Chiang Ching-Kuo relaxed restrictions on cross-strait trade and travel in October 1987. In 1991, Lee Teng-hui terminated the "Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion" which symbolized Taiwan formally accepting the reality of CCP's control over the Mainland. "Between December 1990 and August 1992, emissaries of the PRC and ROC presidents met secretly to talk nine times in Hong Kong, Beijing and Taipei (Wachman 2007). "

According to Wachman's *Why Taiwan* (2007), Lee Teng-hui aimed to reform the political system by which Taiwan was governed and rationalize its external relations. This entailed breaking the throttlehold that Mainland-born KMT loyalists held in the name of democracy, enfranchising the Taiwanese majority who was not then inclined to see the island as part of China. Then, the Democratic Progressive

Party declared that Taiwan is not the ROC, but an independent and sovereign state. When Ma Ying-jeou came to power in Taiwan on the KMT's behalf again in 2008, he proposed peaceful reunification again (Wachman 2007).

2.2.3.3 The rise and fall of Khun Sa

In accordance with the record of Alfred McCoy's *Politics of Heroin*, General Duan Xinwen told a British journalist that "We have to continue to fight the evil of Communism, and fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium". The dominance of the KMT remnants in drug dealing encountered challenges from the Shan forces of Khun Sa that was also expanding drug trafficking and establishing refineries in the 1960's. This led to the Ban Khwan opium war between the KMT remnants and Khun Sa in 1967. Although Khun Sa was decisively defeated, he controlled certain portion of the drug traffic in the Golden Triangle.

In one's online journal *Death of a drug lord* (Asia Times Online 2007), Bertil Lintner briefly delineates Khun Sa's attempt of building a Shan State that is independent from the ruling of the Burmese Junta, but which sent him to the jail in Mandalay from 1969 to 1974. Khun Sa and his militants were driven out of Ban Hin Taek by Thai government, but soon launched war against the Third Army of Li Wen-huan and Ai Xiao-shi's previous KMT intelligence force based in Santisuk in 1982 (Chang 1999). This war did not end until 1996 when Khun Sa surrendered to Yangon.

2.3 'The ex-KMT refugees'

The thesis addresses the ex-KMT people in northern Thailand as KMT refugees, because they were given refugee IDs by the Thai government. However, they are not authentic international refugees in UN sense of it. The appropriate way to address them should be “stateless people”, but this title is also changing as the real stateless population of the ex-KMT communities in northern Thailand are shrinking because of the death of the first generation of the KMT migrants, continuous granting of Thai citizenship, and the emigration to Taiwan. The thesis still uses ex-KMT refugees to address these people, in that there are still many of them remaining stateless for diverse causes.

2.3.1 ‘Refugees’

“The 1951 Refugee Convention establishing UNHCR spells out that a refugee is someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." (UNHCR)

2.3.2 ‘Stateless people’

“Nationality is a legal bond between a state and an individual, and statelessness refers to the condition of an individual who is not considered as a national by any state. Although stateless people may sometimes also be refugees, the two categories are distinct and both groups are of concern to UNHCR (UNHCR).”

Statelessness occurs for a variety of reasons including discrimination against minority groups in nationality legislation, failure to include all residents in the body of citizens when a state becomes independent (state secession) and conflicts of laws between states. Statelessness has a terrible impact on the lives of individuals. Possession of nationality is considered essential for full participation in society and a prerequisite for the enjoyment of the full range of human rights.

While basic human rights are to be enjoyed by everyone, selected rights such as the right to vote may be limited to nationals. Of even greater concern is that many more rights of stateless people are violated in practice - they are often unable to obtain identity documents; they may be detained because they are stateless; and they could be denied access to education and health services or blocked from obtaining employment (UNHCR).

2.3.3 'Ex-KMT refugees'

Yunnan province is embedded at the southwestern border of China, being taken over by China Communist Party (CCP) in Jan of 1950. Accompanying the triumph of CCP, the last group of KMT (Kuomintang lead by Chiang Kai-shek) soldiers retreated from China, entering northeastern Burma. 70% of the armies comprise Han Yunnanese, who stemmed from Yunnan Province (Chang 2007) and the rest were made up of the minorities from Yunnan and Burma.

In 1953, the newly independent Burmese government complained to the General Assembly that the KMT Yunnanese military illegally occupied the territory of Burma. Under the pressures from international society and the interweaving international political benefits and conflicts, Chiang Kai-shek officially announced to

evacuate the military groups to Taiwan, but only around 6,750 weaker and older people went to Taiwan during the evacuation, and almost 10,000 KMT guerrillas were left in Burma (Chang 1999). For the majority left, Burmese government made it their final decision to expel them under the military advice from PRC (Chang 2001). After the defeat in 1961, the bulk of KMT military remnants withdrew to northern Thailand, scattering over Chiang Rai (Fifth Army led by General Duan Xi-wen), Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son (Third Army led by General Li Wen-huan). There were also other KMT military forces that retreated to Thailand with the Third and Fifth Army that are lesser known than the two.

The Thai government allowed their entrance as a tactical maneuver, in that this group was regarded as a defensive power in anti-communist plan. The Thai government addressed the target groups as “civilian refugees” and claimed that their organized military units had been broken up in order to justify their right to remain in the territory of Thailand (McCoy 1972). Since 1971, when Taiwan claimed no more responsibilities and control on them officially (Chang 1999), they have been regarded as stateless persons in this thesis. For resettlement, the ex-KMT militias fought against the communists for Thailand as foreign mercenaries, but their dependent villages are addressed as ex-KMT refugee communities until today due to how the Thai government labeled them during the Cold War. Many of them have been granted Thai or Taiwanese citizenships, although the first generations are still stateless persons. For their protracted demilitarization and Thainization from 1960’s to the end of 1980’s, they were also defined as refugee warriors in migration academia. But briefly, they were also stateless persons in the version of UNHCR for decades, and many of them still bear such stateless identity under the consideration of international law.

Generations of the target groups are categorized by the birth place mainly in this thesis: the first generation of the ex-KMTs refers to the Chinese Yunnanese born and raised until the age of 15 years² in Mainland of China or Burma; the second

generation refers to those born in Thailand, and their children are defined as the third generation of the ex-KMTs. Nearly all ex-KMT veterans of the first generation are stateless people should they still be alive. Literally, the second generation should be Thai should they have been born in the territory of the state. But technically, most of them were still stateless until just 2-3 years ago for the bureaucratic complexity of obtaining Thai citizenship. The bulk of the third generation has Thai citizenship, but the demonstrations of the third generation asking for Taiwanese citizenship in late couple of years also prove that there are hundreds or thousands of them remain stateless.

No one can deny the presence of the KMT refugees in northern Thailand, although the exact figure is not available. Dr. Chang Wen-chin's nine research papers make the information about the KMT refugees' life status and historical context attainable. The papers which provide most relevant information to this thesis include: *From war refugees to immigrants; the Complexities of the migration and ethnic identification of the KMT Yunnanese Chinese in northern Thailand; Identification of leadership among the KMT Yunnanese Chinese in northern Thailand; Venturing into 'Barbarous' regions; Home away from home; The interstitial subjectivities of the Yunnanese Chinese in Thailand and KMT; and Chang's PhD dissertation: Beyond the military: The complex migration and resettlement of the KMT Yunnanese Chinese in northern Thailand* (1999).

News online sheds light on the returning life of the KMT refugees in Taiwan and resettlement in Thailand, but academic research is seldom seen. Chang's papers all focus on the single topic about migration without analysis to the macro-political context. Here lies the knowledge gap which this thesis will fill. In addition, Alfred

² Chang Wen-chin argues that even though there are differences concerning the age when one is more or less socialized to be a member of a society, 15 is a rough demarcation.

McCoy's *Politics of Heroin* (1972) and Kolin Chin's *The Golden Triangle* are the two works give political context of the Cold War for the migration of the KMT refugees.

In light of the Nationality Act of Thailand (2005) and the Temporary Rule of Managing the Stranded ex-KMT Refugees in Taiwan (2009), one encounters some external efforts in improving the survival condition of the KMT refugees in northern Thailand, yet in discussions about the implementations of the law and rules seem to shove many practical difficulties hampering the KMT refugees in obtaining the legal identity of either Thailand or Taiwan. News reports, TV programs and NGOs' working reports update the information about the survival and development of the refugees.

2.4 Thai nationality obtaining processes

The processes for obtaining Thai nationality are described in MAIDS student Anticha Wongwian's thesis entitled, „*Stateless people's needs and problems in obtaining Thai nationality: A case study of hill tribe people in Chiang Rai*”. She states that Thai nationality involves mainly three sectors-- stateless people, assistance agencies, and state's agencies; and it involves the following seven-step process:

- 1) searching for information
- 2) gathering and preparing evidence
- 3) document and request submission
- 4) investigation
- 5) case follow-up
- 6) appealing
- 7) ID card-making

CHAPTER III

INTERNATIONAL-POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN POST COLD WAR ASIA

3.1 Introduction

According to this thesis, changes in the international system have demonstratively shaped the human security fate of the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand, including those in the sample groups. This chapter analyzes the international-political transformation in post-Cold War Asia by examining the characters and activities of the major role-players, namely, Taiwan, Thailand, PRC and the U.S. The changed ordering, functioning and capability of the interested parties and the altering interactions between them are observed within a neo-realistic framework to demonstrate how international-political transformation, particularly on the dimension of international structures, impacts the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand.

3.2 Dynamics of Transformation

“Distinctive characteristics of the international relations approach to the analysis of interactions among nation-states include the attention given to their motivation and the power they use to influence each other (Hector Correa, 2001).” Strange (1991) emphasizes that security and economics are the two main issues considered in the theory and practice of international relations. One of the basic assumptions of realism about international relation is that nation-states are motivated only by their interests. Realists also assume that power is defined as access to national security and that

maintaining this security is the most crucial interest of the state. Therefore, the following analysis of the interactions between the relevant states is established on the realist assumption that international relations is about interests and security of nation-states.

Before discussing the nature of the international-political transformation and its impacts on the ex-KMT, it is useful to recognize that according to a review of the literature about national security, the priorities of individual states can be seen to change according to the historical context. For example, the considerations that have influenced the U.S in its pursuit of its national interest have undergone enormous change over time. During the Cold War, for example, critical interests such as ideology ranked at the top of the list of vital interests. However, the ideological conflict between the communist PRC and capitalist U.S gave way to a preoccupation with military and internal security in the post-Cold War era. The dynamic of this change resulted, first, from the military expansion of the Soviet Union and its threat to the critical security of the PRC and U.S, and, then, from the power vacuum left by the fall of communism and the break-up of the Soviet empire.

Shifting priorities of the concerned states can likewise be seen to have affected the international-political transformations that have influenced the sample groups for this study. According to this thesis, the status of ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand largely depends on the changed function and capability of the PRC in the region. The rise of the PRC in the regional affairs, while not the only driver, will be shown to be the most significant. However, other drivers such as the increased interdependence of the PRC and the U.S, growing internationalization of government and varying characters of relevant states also impact the process and structure of the international system (ed. Keohane, 1986).

3.3 The Sino-U.S Game

For the purpose of this paper, the key object of the study of international relations is the analysis of interactions among nation-states. These interactions necessarily involve interdependent goal-directed activities. Interdependency means that the achievement of the goals of any nation-state does not depend only upon its own actions, but also upon those of the other nation-states. Thus, while states pursue their self-interested aims to ensure their survival, they will always be influenced by the actions of other states. Here, the disciplines of international relations and game theory coincide, specifically around the idea of interdependence and competition.

Game theory, specifically, the „prisoner“s dilemma“ model has been employed to study the interactions between the relevant state-actors in this case-study. Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation and the formal study of decision-making where several players must make choices that potentially affect the interests of the other players.¹ As there is no binding relationship between the relevant units of this case study, the interactions between the PRC and the other States, will be analyzed using the non-cooperative game model. Through an analysis of the ways that international relations affect the KMT refugee issue using the lens of a non-cooperative game model, this thesis will take issue with Waltz“s static viewpoint of the international-political structures and system.

Using these concepts, this thesis will construct a game theoretical framework for the analysis of the interactions of the interested states and the impacts on the ex-KMT refugees. To construct a game theoretical framework for the analysis of the interaction between PRC and the US, the initial step is to identify the relevant actors. First, there is no doubt that the People“s Republic of China and the United States of America are the two major players, with the other states playing more or less supportive roles. Second, allies of the U.S and PRC were much more than spectators. Even allied countries that were apparently far from central to either of the big powers

¹ Citation of the concepts relevant to the game theory is from James Doughty“s fifth edition of *Contending Theories of International Relations*.

interests facilitated interactions between them on occasion. For example, observation of the various channels that helped bring about the visits of Kissinger and Nixon in 1972 reveals that U.S allies, such as Pakistan and Germany, and ideological partners of China, including Poland and Romania, provided assistance to ensure the first Sino-U.S communication since 1969.

Next, the strategies of the actors should be specified. A strategy is one of the given possible actions of a player. In terms of game theory, we can view Sino-U.S relations since the beginning of the 1970s as a non-zero sum game², specifically, a positive-sum game, thus assuming a degree of complexity. However, this thesis simplifies the strategies of the U.S and the PRC to be confrontation and cooperation over Taiwan.

It is assumed that the most desirable payoff³ to both sides was cooperation and the most undesirable was the bilateral choice of continuous confrontation. However, it would be premature to conclude that the Sino-U.S game is a positive-sum game before the output is observable, because the settlement of the Taiwan issue could reverse the whole game, thereby invalidating the cooperation of the states, and transforming the situation into a negative-sum game. The issue of Taiwan induced a dilemma for both states in the Sino-U.S game. Since the emergence of the issue, the Sino-U.S game has involved a “prisoner’s dilemma” in which neither the U.S nor mainland China has any idea that how much effort the other side would make to maintain or change the position of Taiwan. This is largely the case, even today.

Fortunately, both sides have mutually noted the desirable outcomes of the

² A game is said to be zero-sum if, for any outcome, the sum of the payoff to all players is zero. In a two-player zero-sum game, one player’s gain is the other player’s loss, so their interests are diametrically opposing. In contrast, non-zero-sum describes a situation in which the interacting parties’ aggregate gains and losses is either less than or more than zero. In a non-zero-sum game, there is the possibility of a win-win resolution.

other side through negotiations and meetings at all official ranks. As a result, the strategy of the U.S has been to recognize the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China with which the U.S government would establish a diplomatic relationship, and the PRC's strategy has been a decidedly less bellicose approach to Taiwan with the recognition and strategic support of the U.S. The payoff for the U.S was to obtain China's support in containing Soviet expansion in Asia, and for China, diplomatic recognition and strategic aid from the U.S when confronting the U.S.S.R. In terms of game theory, it can be said that the normalization of the bilateral relationship and the ensuing concessions on the Taiwan issue compose the Nash Equilibrium⁴ of the Sino-U.S game.

On the issue of normalization of the bilateral relationship, the „prisoner's dilemma“ model of game theory facilitates useful analysis of the interaction between the PRC and the U.S. First, it discredits the comments of realists about inter-state cooperation. Waltz denies the possibility of long-term cooperation between international-political units, because he denies the tolerance of actors after deception. In light of the repeated games between China and the U.S after the diplomatic relationship was constructed, it is clear that both sides have continued to engage despite clear breaches of trust. While the initial impetus behind the normalization of the relationship was for military security, the rewards of economic cooperation arose as its successor the Soviet threat diminished in the early 1980s. That is to say, cooperation is not always temporary, even if the catalysts of cooperation are shifting.

Second, game theory reveals the process of how the function and capability of the U.S. and the PRC in Asian politics have also shifted and changed, though there are questions about the accuracy of the explanation afforded by the theory. Nevertheless, it is clear that the U.S's leading function in the containment of communism was

³A Nash equilibrium, also called strategic equilibrium, is a list of strategies, one for each player, which has the property that no player can unilaterally change his strategy and get a better payoff.

replaced by a new role as the leader of anti-Soviet hegemony in the early 1970s. Also, its capability was undermined by the protracted and escalating Vietnam War and several U.S.-Soviet pacts acknowledging the equal position of the U.S.S.R. with the U.S. in international affairs. The functioning of the PRC in the regional affairs completely changed with normalization of Sino-U.S. relationship: from a communist member of the Soviet bloc to a member of the anti-Soviet hegemony, from ideological foe to strategic ally of the USA, the PRC is one of the most important drivers of the international-political transformation of Asia. In terms of the capability of Mainland China, first, the communist regime was further legitimated through its recognition of more democratic states, and, second, the ending of the Cultural Revolution announced the end of the ideological turmoil and the beginning of economic development.

However, the model does not offer a complete analysis. First, the primary assumption of game theory, that the rationality⁵ of all players is common knowledge, is untenable in this case. Officially, the rationality of the PRC and U.S. on the issue of Taiwan was not apparent and indeed, both sides maintained that there should be no negotiation and debate between the two governments. Ostensibly, the presence of the U.S. navy in the Strait and China's ever-other-day shelling of the Jinmen and Mazu islands⁶, suggested that the Taiwan issue could deadlock the Sino-U.S. relationship. However, it was the unofficial and secret communication between the two governments that indicated the possibility of the bilateral concessions on the Taiwan issue.

A second assumption of game theory is that the desirable outcomes of each

⁴ A player is said to be rational if he seeks to play in a manner which maximizes his own payoff. It is often assumed that the rationality of all players is common knowledge.

⁵ Jinmen and Mazu are offshore islands of Taiwan. From 1958, People's Liberation Army units in Fujiang Province began shelling the KMT-controlled Jinmen and Mazu islands every other day, demonstrating the decision of the PRC to reunify Taiwan and to expelling the presence of U.S. armies in the Strait (Fang & Liu 1999).

actor are static, which oversimplifies the interactions between the U.S. and PRC. Initially, the ideal payoff for the USA was building a military alliance with the PRC, but this was amended to non-military cooperation. For China, the desirable outcome was the official recognition of the PRC and the removal of U.S. influence on the Taiwan issue, but this later transformed into a more tolerant Sino-U.S diplomatic relationship with tacit acceptance of the ongoing presence of the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait.

Third, the game theory fails to analyze the Sino-U.S interactions in a developing context, in that game theory tends to work for spot analysis rather than course analysis. It is this inborn limitation that prevents game theory from explaining how the relationship between the two states transformed after the dissolution of the U.S.S. R. China has been taken as a future or even current rival in the regional affairs by the U.S ever since the mid-1990s because of its robust economic growth.

Through the analysis above, it is not difficult to recognize that the game between the PRC and the U.S. was brought about through temporary expediency when the military security of both states was endangered by the U.S.S.R. That both states ranked the Taiwan issue less urgent or important than the threat of the Soviet hegemony was the premise behind the series of concessions made regarding the position of Taiwan and its separation from China. Because of the limitations of game theory in buttressing course analysis, long-term desirable payoffs of the two forces in respect of Taiwan are not given sufficient consideration. In reality though, without counting how the issue of Taiwan may eventually be solved, a separated China (Mainland & Taiwan) is beneficial to the U.S, but undermines the national interest of China.

To the U.S, the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand were not much different from any highlanders in Southeast Asia that were hired by CIA as anti-Communists during

the Cold War. When the U.S found its way to co-exist and cooperate with the biggest communist country in Asia, the strategic position of the previous anti-Communists was simultaneously played down. In addition, the rising functions and capabilities of Mainland China in the regional affairs of Asia had revealed that the KMT aim of re-taking mainland China by military means was entirely hopeless by the end of the 1970s. Understanding of this fact drove the U.S. to transform its ideological strategy from supporting the military operations of the anti-Communist groups to peaceful transformation.

The impact of these transformations on the target groups has been huge. Following the end of the Vietnam War and the failure of the CIA in Laos in 1975, the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand stopped receiving aid from the U.S, and therefore lost their critical anti-Communist function on the grand chessboard of the Sino-U.S relationship. What is more, increasing recognition of the PRC regime by the international community induced the end of the Republic of China (ROC) as the sovereign representative of China. In terms of international law, this shift brought about many difficulties for the ex-KMTs left behind in northern Thailand on their way back to their spiritual fatherland—the ROC. However, the separation of China and the presence of the U.S navy in Taiwan Strait left space for another round of Sino-U.S games about the future of Taiwan, which might again change the external environment of the target groups of this thesis. Briefly, in post-Cold War Asia, the shifty dynamic of the Sino-U.S relationship altered the external environment of the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand by marginalizing their political ideology and changing Taiwan’s international-political identity, from which they garnered much of their supports.

3.4 Altered Cross-Strait Weather

Interactions between Mainland China and Taiwan fall into three chronological periods: 1971-1988, 1988-2000, and from 2000 to the present. To analyze the

Mainland-Taiwan relationship during the first stage, David Lake and Stephen Krasner's definition of sovereignty and Alan Collins' theory of intelligence are applied. To understand the cross-Strait relationship in the second and third stages, this thesis employs a theory of nationalism to help explain the dynamics.

3.4.1 Stage 1 (1971-1979):

In spite of the absence of a commonly agreed definition of „sovereignty“, the duality of sovereignty across internal and external dimensions is broadly acknowledged. The internal dimension is based on the notion of the state and its relationship with its citizens. The external dimension considers relationships amongst states (Lake, 2003). Interactions between Mainland China and Taiwan during the 1970s manifest the ambiguity of national sovereignty. Taiwan claimed the sovereignty of the whole of China until the U.S. recognized the Mainland as the only legitimate representative of the state. David Lake's provides three characteristics of authority to provide a theoretical-analytical framework for the internal dimension of the sovereignty for this case. Sovereignty is highly connected with authority (Lian 1985), and „recognition of international community“ to the analysis of external aspects of sovereignty. Alan Collin's theories relating to the function of intelligence services are used to underscore features of mainland-Taiwan relationship in this period.

From 1971 to 1979, the Mainland-Taiwan relationship was characterized by competition for international recognition. According to Krasner (1999), the external criterion to guarantee national sovereignty relies on recognition by the international community. Under the political system in place since the end of World War II, international recognition can be gained from other states, assuming an equality of position with the UN as the only supranational authority. Mainland China, with typical foresight, began to establish friendships with its counterparts in the Third World from the 1950s onwards, which paved the way for the PRC to access the UN in

1971. Taiwan suffered a loss of support when the strategic modification of U.S. diplomacy towards the Mainland persuaded increasing numbers of U.S. allies in Asia and Latin America to terminate official recognition of Taiwan and establish diplomacy with the PRC. Most relevant to this thesis is the establishment of the Sino-Thailand relationship in 1975. In this first stage, Taiwan lost most countries' recognition and found its sovereignty vanishing, if not almost entirely disappeared.

Alan Collins points out (2007) that intelligence services for nation-states usually began as military intelligence units supplying information to commanders during times of conflict and were usually cut back or eliminated when the hostilities ended. This pattern is born out in the case of Taiwan. The ending of the Cold War in Asia together with the mitigation of the risk of cross-strait military confrontation, led to the dwindling of intelligence battles⁷ between the Mainland and Taiwan.

In sum, the nine years from 1971 to 1979 witnessed the struggle between Taiwan and the Mainland of China for legitimacy in international affairs and for recognition as the representative of China. During the international-political transformation of Asia in the post-Cold War era, the influence of the PRC clearly outweighs that of Taiwan in every aspect of regional affairs.

3.4.2 Stage 2 (1980-2000)

⁶For Taiwan, intelligence about mainland was collected through three channels. First, Chiang Kai-shek left spies in mainland of China before retreated to Taiwan that were mainly uncovered by PRC during the first 2 to 3 decades of the construction of the state. Second, military bases of the Nationalists government in Southeast Asia mainly collected intelligence by aircrafts. Third, CIA used to help Taiwan in accessing intelligence about mainland of China. Ever since the establishment of Sino-U.S and Sino-SE Asian relationships and PRC's announcement of severing supports to the communication of SE Asia in 1979, the latter two accesses were largely shut down. For Beijing, it is said that many CCP intelligent agents based in Taiwan were also uncovered during the Cultural Revolution when confidential was divulged (Wachman 2007).

Taiwanese nationalism was cultivated and proliferated strikingly in Taiwan during Lee Teng-hui's twelve years in power, starting in 1988. "The percentage of people in Taiwan who considered themselves as solely Chinese dropped from 48.5 percent in January 1993 to 13.1 percent in mid-1999. Those who considered themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese increased from 16.7 percent to 44.8 percent for the same period. Those who said that they were both Taiwanese and Chinese increased from 32.7 percent to 39.9 percent" (Sheng 2002).

Nationalism is defined as "primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent" (Gellner 1983). From 1980 onwards, the cross-strait relationship began to alleviate. Taiwan recognized the legitimacy of CCP on the Mainland during the regime of Chiang Ching-Kuo. "Taipei was entertaining thoughts of how to adjust its posture toward the PRC to accord with pressure from within Taiwan and enticements by Beijing to undertake measures that would encourage trade across the Strait, build confidence, and advance the aim of unification" (Wachman, 2007). In 1987, Chiang relaxed the cross-Strait trade and travel. In return, Beijing also reiterated „Peaceful re-unification“ and „One country, two systems“ principals.

Lee Teng-hui succeeded the presidency in 1988. Lee claimed his agreement with Beijing's „One China“ policy, but submitted „Two-state“ theory concomitantly in 1993. What is more, Lee claimed that Taiwan bore the right to develop its own diplomatic space. Since the 1990s, Taipei has tactically made great efforts in developing quasi-diplomatic connections with a number of South East Asian countries, excluding countries close to the PRC, such as Cambodia, Burma and Laos. Beijing was badly irritated by the Lee's „Two-state theory“ that acknowledges Taiwan to be part of China but that China is another state. Interestingly, trade and travel between Mainland and Taiwan developed enormously regardless of the arguments and military crisis about sovereignty and re-unification across the Strait.

3.4.3 Stage 3 (2000-Present)

Although less provocative than Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian makes use of and continues to foster Lee's separatism and indigenous Taiwanese nationalism. Since his election in 2000, Chen Shui-bian has completely discarded the "One China" principle. Chen claimed that the sovereignty of Taiwan is not negotiable. A Taiwanese scholar, Lin Chia-Lung, argues that there are several causes of the rising indigenous Taiwanese nationalism including: political democratization and common glory, enduring rivalries and common suffering, development of Taiwanese consciousness, and effects of the PRC's military threats. Even though these perspectives are prone to be over-dramatic and ethnocentric (after all, the DPPs are not indigenous as they are merely Fujianese who migrated to Taiwan from mainland of China one or two hundred years earlier than the KMT) the character of these claims points to reasons why the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand do not hold similar opinions about Taiwan's independence as the Taiwanese do.

In response to Chen's new Mainland policy, the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the PRC State Council issued a White paper entitled "The one China principle and Taiwan issue". Beijing rejects official ties with DPP, in view of its advocacy of the independence of Taiwan, although civil communication is ongoing. Meanwhile, Beijing employs a series of strategies to respond Chen Shui-bian's independence agenda: political pressure, economic engagement, and military deterrence. This thesis limits its examination to political pressure because of its relevance to the human security of the ex-KMT refugees, particularly in the exercise of maintaining a „United Front“.

KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou's election in 2008 has mitigated the cross-Strait tension to a given extent, but the DPP still holds its market among the earlier Fujianese migrants which might send the party back to power again in 2012.

Complicated and ever-shifting Taiwanese politics renders an uncertain future for the Mainland-Taiwan relationship, making developments for the ex-KMT in northern Thailand uncertain.

Taiwan's capability in international affairs can no longer be comparable with that of a sovereign state, and the Mainland-Taiwan relationship is fluctuating with the classical Chinese political rationale that the world will separate after long time united and will do the opposite after long time splitting. Since the end of the civil war in 1949, the cross-Strait relationship has transformed from military confrontation to mitigation, and more recently the mechanism of political dialogue has been consolidated by economic communication. However, thirty years since Asia entered the post-Cold War age, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian's Mainland policies have dragged the Mainland-Taiwan relationship into impasse or even regression. But Ma Ying-jeou's election once again inculcates new hopes and expectations for the mitigated cross-Strait tie.

The vicissitudes of the unification and separation of China are more significant for the fate of the cross-Strait relationship than the ideological disputes of the Cold War since the 1980s. Indeed, to a large extent, without the intervention of the USA, the cross-Strait relationship would not have been given so much of a Cold War hue, insofar as the crucial reason of the presence of the ex-KMT remnants on the territory of Thailand was due to Chiang Kai-shek's scheme of retaking the mainland China rather than it being an ideological battle. Hence, the target groups have been endowed with dual identities: in the dimension of domestic politics, they are the combatants from the erstwhile ruling party of China and, on the international level, curious legacy from the Cold War. In the post Cold War Asia, the establishment of Sino-U.S diplomatic links, primarily ended the function of the target groups as Cold War legacy, even though the Cold War has maintained an ideological influence on the sample groups.

In addition, the transformed CCP-KMT relationship since 1987 offers the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand a novel space for survival and development. The recognition by the KMT Nationalist government of the CCP's legitimate rule in Mainland China downgrades the military and intelligence importance of the ex-KMTs, impelling the resettlement and demilitarization of the target groups in northern Thailand, notwithstanding the fact that the final demilitarization of the target groups was fulfilled under the pressure from the Thai government.

Another factor profoundly impacting the target groups is the worldwide momentum of self-determination of „indigenous people“ that emerged following the end of the Cold War. Lee Teng-hui and the DPP's election both shed light on this point, which has not only re-defined the cross-Strait relationship, but also directly endangered the survival and development of the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand. By denying succession with the KMT Nationalist government, Chen Shui-bian attempted to deny the responsibility of Taiwan in supporting the target groups. In contrast, the KMT administration of Ma Ying-jeou has made efforts in granting the stateless descendents of the ex-KMTs Taiwanese citizenship and delivering updated educational resources to northern Thailand. In brief, considering that Taiwanese aid is important to the ex-KMT communities, political trends in Taiwan, particularly the KMT-DPP rivalry, will be a long-term factor affecting the human security of the target groups.

3.5 Sino-Thailand vs. Taiwan-Thailand Interactions in Post-Cold War Asia

Thailand is famous for its flexible diplomatic tactics which always set it free from any colonial or hegemonic impacts in the modern history. Yet, to attribute the normalization and development of Sino-Thai relationship entirely to the ending of the Cold War in Asia is not an inclusive opinion, granted that the Thai-U.S alliance

during the Cold War was a significant contributor to the aloof stance of Thailand to China.

There were intricate reasons which impeded the bilateral willingness of China and Thailand to build friendly official relations during the Cold War, including ideological hostility, the issue of double-nationality of the Chinese that resided on the territory of Thailand, and the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Still, bilateral efforts for propelling Sino-Thai friendship seldom stopped even until 1957's military coup in Thailand (Xie, 1980).

As an economic, political and ideological ally of the U.S, as well as being a monarchy, Thailand was naturally fearful of „Communist China,“ and alarmed for the presence of Thai, Miao, Lao communists supported by the PRC on its territory. These were the main reasons why the Thailand tactically permitted the arrival of the KMT militaries and facilitated resettlement. Undeniably, the rationalization of China at the end of the Cultural Revolution and the crack in the “Iron curtain” of Asia infused vigor into the deadlocked Sino-Thai relationship in the early 1970s. Mutually hostile comments were discarded a couple of weeks after Nixon's visit to Beijing. More importantly, China stopped all aids to the communist insurgencies in Thailand and terminated the Chinese nationality of those Chinese who inhabited Thailand with Thai citizenship. These activities contributed to the growing mutual confidence and friendship, and helped in achieving the diplomatic relationship established in 1975.

The diplomatic relationship of Mainland China and Thailand all but severed the delivery of Taiwanese assistance to the ex-KMT refugee communities from 1975 to 1982. But according to Bertil Lintner, Mainland China started delivering aid to the target groups from mid-1985 onward under the permission and help of the Thai government. Nevertheless, Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang, Ajarn^s Zhou and Ms. Yang from Mae Salong and Ajarn Ma and Ajarn Han from Santisuk claimed that the PRC also

impeded the Chinese education of the ex-KMT communities by asking the Thai government to ban Chinese schools from 1985 to 1992.

In the main, the Sino-Thai relationship developed in the stability of post-Cold War Asia. From the early 1990s, Taiwan started to pin its goal of independence to a novel Taiwan-Southeast Asia relationship, mainly through cooperation on the economy and trade and fostering Taiwan-South Asian quasi-diplomatic relationships. For example, the Taiwan Far East Affairs Office, located in Bangkok, is one such quasi-official institution (Wu, 2001). One of its major functions is to promote Taiwan-Thailand negotiations about the ex-KMTs' human rights and human security status.

3.6 Conclusion

Interaction of the relevant units and the transformed international-political structure based on this interaction facilitated a radical shift in perceptions of the target groups in post-Cold War Asia. To the U.S, they are no longer the anti-communists in Asia; to Taiwan, they are longer the warriors that are responsible for retaking the mainland from the atrocity of the CCP; to Thailand, they are no more the „watchdog at the gate of Siam“; and to mainland of China, they are no more Chiang Kai-shek's bandits. The transformed Sino-U.S, mainland-Taiwan and Sino-Thai relationships during 1970s and 1980s downgraded the strategic position of the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand from the international level of the Cold War to the national security of Thailand. The emergence and boom of the indigenous complex in Taiwan gives the target groups further difficulties in achieving development. Specific impacts of the transformation on the target groups are discussed in the next chapter through the concepts of „national security“ and „national interests“.

⁸ Ajarn is Thai expression of „teacher“.

Khun Sa's impact on the KMT refugee communities, as a by-product of international-political transformation in post-Cold War Asia, is analyzed in the next chapter. Most data were collected through in-depth interviews with the headmen of the target groups.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPACT OF THE TRANSFORMATION

4.1 Introduction

The influence of international-political transformation on the ex-KMTs can be examined by observation of the relevant states' changing strategies. For example, the influence of these states' national interests on the sample group is obvious, particularly in the area of state security. Kenneth Waltz establishes the argument that "changes in polarity also affect how states provide for their security (Waltz 2008)". The impact of the transformation on the KMT population is analyzed over two different periods around 1979, when improving Sino-U.S. relationships hastened the decline of Taiwanese influence in Asian politics and also indicated the beginning of massive international political transformation (which continues to this day).

Both the support of the U.S. government and the interference of CIA used to buttress the survival and development of the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand as well as accelerate the amelioration of the Sino-U.S. relationships during 1970s had little direct impact on the target groups. Rather, the notable effects were demonstrated mainly through the changing functions and capabilities of Taiwan in confrontation with those of the Mainland. At the beginning of the 1980s, the transformed cross-Strait relationship changed the external environment for the survival and development of the ex-KMT refugee communities. Taiwan, Thailand and Mainland China implemented their new policies on the ex-KMT refugee communities.

4.2 The Vanishing U.S Impact

To a large extent, the survival of the KMT refugees in northern Thailand relied on drug and jade trafficking from Shan State to Thailand (from where the drug is trafficked to the U.S.). Much like with South American syndicates, Middle Eastern and Italian drug dealers/mafias, the CIA bolstered the KMTs in opium cultivation and drug trafficking by lending technical and personnel supports until the early 1960's (McCoy 1972). However, in the conclusion of the protracted Vietnam War, Washington discovered many former U.S. service personnel were addicted to opium and derivative products. Because of rampant drug-related diseases and social problems threatening national interests and social stability, the U.S Congress asked Thailand to "contain" drug trafficking and dealing in its territory in 1973. Praphrat Charusathien told General Li Wen-Huan that his army had to stop dealings drugs (Qin 2009).

"The U.S. government just took us as the anti-Communist tool. How can we expect they have emotion and mercy about the tool after the Cold War. To our Fifth Army, the CIA only once air dropped 200 carbines in 1960s and the Americans never gave us anything for our presence in northern Thailand, although it was the U.S government that aggressively convinced the Nationalist government to station us here and promised lending us military and financial crutches in retaking the mainland of China. The only thing they did for our benefit was that the U.S. government purchased over one ton of opium storage at the Miao village Pa Dua in 1979 through UN, and burned the opium in front of us. But this was more beneficial to the Americans more than anybody else" (Zhang Guo-Qiang, personal interview, 19th June, 2011).

4.3 Taiwan

For Taiwan, the interest in retaking Mainland China has faded since Taiwan was supplanted by the PRC at the United Nations in 1971. Under the direction of Mr. Zhang Guo-Qiang, the key informant of Mae Salong, Taiwan ended its financial and military aid to the Third and Fifth Army, which it had been supplying since 1969. Meanwhile, in 1970, in response to the demand of the National Security Council of Thailand, Taiwan sent officials to Thailand to discuss the disbandment of the KMT military in northern Thailand, particularly General Li's Third Army and General Duan's Fifth Army (Chang 1999). However, rather than dismissing all ex-KMT militaries, Taiwan reorganized and recruited intelligence troops (the Intelligence Mainland Operation Bureau) several times from 1965 to 1973 and also offered new commanders, training and financial assistance. This aid was designed to bolster the army's intelligence collection and to help launch attacks on the southern border of the PRC (Qin 2009). The intelligence army was dismissed in 1975. For reasons unknown, the weapons of the intelligence army were given to Khun Sa, and many soldiers were recruited to Khun Sa's troops at Hin Taek.

Aside from its diminishing control over the armies, the weakening position of Taiwan in international affairs provoked a „first tide of nationalism“¹ in retrenching the image of an “orthodox” China, by such means as the policy of enrolling overseas Chinese students to study and reside in Taiwan. From 1979 to 1991, full scholarships were available for most students from northern Thailand (Chang 1999). Before the Thai government implemented the “Thainization” policy in 1994, the KMT government in Taiwan granted ex-KMTs Taiwanese citizenship easily as long as the persons managed to arrive in Taiwan. From 1994 to 2009, particularly during Chen Shui-Bian's post (2000-2008), the ex-KMT refugees could not come to Taiwan and apply for Taiwanese citizenship unless their direct relatives resided in Taiwan.

¹ In this thesis, the rise of KMT's nationalism since Lee Teng-hui's election is defined as the first tide of nationalism in Taiwan, because Chen Shui-bian's election is regarded as another rise of Taiwanese nationalism by some academic scholars. Nevertheless, this thesis assumes that Chen Shui-bian's election and the prevalence of his theory of indigenous Taiwanese are more attributable to the ethnic separationism in the worldwide, even though Fujianese is not an ethnicity, but a geo-demographic concept.

As mentioned before in the literature review, this is because Chen did not want to take on the burden of the ex-KMTs that might oppose his separationist stance. In 2009, Ma Ying-jeou's administration ratified a temporary rule that granted the ex-KMT refugees, who were stranded in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian's post, legitimate rights to stay in Taiwan for education.

Taiwanese author Boyang's novel *A Strange Land* drew Taiwanese society's attention in early 1980s with surprising tales of the ex-KMT military remnants' anti-Communist battles and their struggles in a vicious environment for survival. In addition, several Taiwanese and Hong Kong musicians composed songs about the KMTs in northern Thailand, invoking broader social concerns about the lives and difficulties of the refugees. Under such circumstances, Taipei began to concern itself with the livelihood of the KMT refugees. Although assistance at the government level was not possible in northern Thailand as Taiwan's ambiguous international position and condemnation from the DPP regarding budgetary concerns restrained any possibilities of government assistance, NGOs such as Free China Relief Association (FCRA) Service Group in Chiang Mai and Taipei, and its successor Ciji Buddhist Relief Foundation in Taiwan (with the FCRA dismissed in 1994 for funding shortages) played an escalating role in boosting the development of the refugee communities.

4.4 Thailand

The Sino-Thai diplomatic relationship established in 1975 marked the end of a period in which KMT refugees could access assistance from Taiwan through land and air transportation across the territory of Thailand.

After General Li and General Duan's „opium war“ with Khun Sa in 1967, the Thai government attempted to force the two armies to disarm. But the “Red Miao”

revolt in May 1967 changed the Thai government's mind. In 1969, General Duan and General Li were invited by the Thai government to capture Miao Communists. Because of the sophisticated skills in mountain warfare and in pitting the tribe against tribe, Li and Duan's armies gained a number of important victories, received the approval of Thai government as well as the promise of being granted Thai citizenship after the anti-Communists' war (McCoy 1972).

Thailand banned drugs in 1957, but to take advantage of the KMT armies fighting the communists, the government made no efforts to urge the KMTs to quit drug trafficking until 1973, even when the U.S. warned Thailand not to tolerate KMT drug dealers any more. To acquire continuous monetary aids from the U.S., Supreme Command Headquarters of the Royal Thai Army claimed in 1975 that it would do a land survey in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai for the purpose of relocating the ex-KMT refugees. From 1976 to 1978, the Supreme Command Headquarters of Thai army gradually moved the responsibility for the resettlement of the KMTs to the Ministry of Interior (Qin 2009).

In return for capturing communists, the 1,881 previous KMT militarists who survived, as well as their families, were ratified to obtain Thai citizenship in 1978 by the Ministry of Interior; following this precedent, 1,676 families received Thai citizenship in 1980, 1,622 in 1982 and 8,549 in 1983 (Qin 2009). The rest that failed to prove their identity or did not register for whatever reason remained stateless. The moving scope of the stateless ex-KMTs is generally limited to the mountainous region or the administrative town where they are allowed to permanently reside (Wongwian 2008). Principal Yang of Santisuk Chinese School told me that students from ex-KMT communities are not entitled to study in senior high schools and universities in Thailand without Thai citizenship. In turn, the stateless KMTs and their descendants rarely obtain opportunities for well-paid employment with this low level of education. For those ex-KMT refugees who were ratified to obtain Thai citizenship, all might not get citizenship due to bureaucratic complexity (to be discussed in Chapter 6).

Aside from granting citizenship, the Thai government also made efforts to offer guidance and favored policies to help the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand achieve economic development. Due to the data collected from my fieldtrip to Mae Salong and Santisuk, the Thai government not only contributes to promote the “touristy” reputation of Doi Mae Salong through official advertisements, but also enacts and exercises a favored tax policy for normal business activities.

“Some western journalists were with the KMT armies when we retreated from mainland of China to Burma, then to Thailand. A Canadian journalist published his literature, *The Transport Corps of the Century* in early 1960s. The Thai government took advantage of the impact of work in the West from mid 1970s and westerners’ curiosity about the Cold War legacy in the East to help Mae Salong coin a brand of historic tourism. The Thai government as well recommended us to develop mountainous resorts for the Thai tourists since 1980s. You know, this is a country that is famous of the beach. Without the advertisement of the Thai government, Mae Salong would not have so many tourists today” (Miss Lei, personal interview, 20th June, 2011).

Nearly every KMT refugee community had a Chinese school when they resettled in Thailand, and the Thai government seldom interfered with this except twice: once in 1975 and again from 1985 to 1992. The Chinese schools at Mae Salong and Tham Ngob were changed to Thai schools in 1975 (Qin 2009), and Chinese education was banned from 1985 to 1992 (Zhang 1999). But no clear explanation is given to explain why Chinese education was banned. I was told during the fieldtrip research that Thai government did this to improve its relationship with Mainland China who assumed that the ex-KMT refugees should be Thai-ized. Some villagers and headmen of the two villages claimed that they were not allowed to study Chinese from 1985 to early 1990s, because the Chinese President visited Thailand in 1984,

implicating that the PRC felt its national security was threatened by the continuous presence of the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand.

Thai diplomatic policy since the 1990s, regarding Taiwan and Mainland China appears to be two-pronged when it comes to the issue of the ex-KMT refugees. On the one hand, Thailand strives to get along with the Mainland by implementing a Thainization policy for the KMTs; on the other hand, Thailand helps Taiwan deliver the stateless KMT descendants to study in Taiwan. The two-pronged diplomacy is attributable to the unusual cross-strait relationship as well as Thailand's willingness to benefit from both sides. An "official" connection with Mainland China is indispensable in the post-Cold War Asia, while enormous Taiwanese government investment and quasi-official cooperation with Taiwan are also appealing. Bertil Lintner claims that the predominant donor of Thailand's Royal Project for Opium Eradication since the 1970s is Taiwan, but Taiwan hid its interests under the title of the Royal Family.

"You know the Royal Project of Opium Eradication since 1970's and Dr. Ronald Renard has a work *"Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000"* about it. But you may not know that the most supportive donor of this project was the KMT Nationalist Government of Taiwan. The Nationalist government acquired that the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand caused the drug issue of the host country in 1970, inducing the discontent of Thailand about Taiwan. With the financial and technical supports to the opium reduction, Taiwan not only erects an accountable image in front of the host country of the ex-KMT refugee communities, but also wins the confidence of the Royal Family" (Bertil Lintner, personal interview, 4th July, 2011).

4.5 Mainland China

Mainland China officially stopped support to the communists in Thailand in 1979 (Qin 2009). From the 1980s onward, the PRC no longer regarded the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand as political opponents due to mitigated tension across the Taiwan Strait and the diminished armed harassments from the target groups on the southern border. However, Mainland China remained alert to the presence of the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand in the given period because of the previous armed attacks and intelligence collections of the target groups. Dr. Chang Wen-chin argues in her doctoral dissertation (1999) that the pressure from Beijing was one of drivers urging the Thai government to finally disarm the ex-KMT military remnants in late 1980s. In addition, it is said that asking the Thai government to ban the Chinese education of the ex-KMT villages was another approach of the PRC to diminish the potential threat to its national security from the target groups.

“The President of the Mainland visited Thailand in 1984, and was not happy when was told about the presence of the „Chinese refugees“ in northern Thailand (the ex-KMTs). Then he denied China had refugees in any other countries including Thailand, and claimed that the ethnic Chinese in northern Thailand should be Thais. After that, the Thai government banned the Chinese education over the ex-KMT villages from 1985 to 1992” (Ajarn Zhou from Xinghua Chinese School, personal interview, 19th June, 2011).

“But we never quit studying Chinese. We went to Thai schools during daytime by hiding the Chinese textbooks in our bags. Then, we went to our Chinese teacher’s home for 2-3 hours” study of Chinese language, cultures and norms after the Thai classes

around 4 pm” (Ms. Yang of Guoqin Tea House, personal interview, 22th June, 2011)

Bertil Lintner also points out that the Chinese government had already started material assistance to the refugee communities in 1985, although the official record of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says the first donation was taken to the KMT village Arunotai and Yang by the Consular General to Chiang Mai in 2006 (Chen 2010). In the following three years, the Consulate General in Chiang Mai delivered textbooks, computers, and direct monetary donations to several ex-KMT villages in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. According to the thesis of Chen Wen-zheng, a Master’s graduate of National Taiwan University, the Consulate General to Chiang Mai began sending stateless students in northern Thailand to study in the Overseas Chinese University in Kunming and Quanzhou since 2006. The admitted students are “efficiently” given an overseas Chinese passport on their arrival to Mainland of China, studying for free at the university (Chen 2010).

In fact, the strained cross-strait relationship from the 1990s to 2008 mainly accounts for the increased diplomatic access of the PRC to the KMT villages. As mentioned in the literature review, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian both attempted to lessen the influence of Mainland-born KMT loyalists, including the ex-KMTs in Thailand, on the target groups. This is one of the reasons why Taiwan amended its education policy and returnee policy for these target groups. In addition, Taiwan made integration compulsory for the ex-KMT refugees during that period since the education, employment and lives of the refugees unavoidably posed an economic burden on the declining economy. On the side of the PRC central government, maintaining a “United Front” has always been the preferred technique for contending with Taiwanese separatists. A „United Front“ entails unifying diverse forces that oppose the independence of Taiwan from Mainland China, and vice versa as much as possible, and the primary objective remains that the ex-KMT refugees should be united.

4.6 Conclusion

The emergence and persistence of the target groups resulted from deliberate consideration by the relevant states about their national security interests in the context of the Cold War and civil war of China. However, that context has been now removed, which has yielded a loss in strategic importance of the target groups. The human security status of the target groups fell under the consideration of related parties and civil society following the demilitarization of the ex-KMT military remnants in the 1980s. As Kenneth Waltz argues, the transformation of the international-political system has had several impacts on the states, and policy adjustments and transformed interactions between the relevant states has shaped the human security fate of the ex-KMT refugee communities in northern Thailand.

CHAPTER V

ADVOCACY OF EX-KMT LEADERS FOR THE RELEVANT PARTIES

5.1 Introduction

In reality, the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand are stateless people rather than refugees, as discussed in the literature review. They were also “refugee warriors” before demilitarization in late 1980s, although the term “refugee warrior” is a brand new phrase coined by Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo in 1989. Unlike regular refugees, the ex-KMT refugees are more than passive victims of international-political transformation - although their vulnerability is undeniable. The military leaders used to play significant roles in the survival and development of the communities before 1990. With the vanishing of the charismatic General Duan and General Li, the previous coherent communities have been reduced to fragments.

This section analyzes the coping strategies of the ex-KMT refugee communities at the community level to the interest parties. The KMT villages are divided into three different communities according to the military forces that contributed to the resettlement and establishment of the villages, namely the Third Army, the Fifth Army and the intelligence troop. With leaderships of different styles, the three communities employed different strategies in response to the transformed external environment, affecting the human security of each community differently, though similarities are also observable. The leadership of each community is studied by its advocacy of the diverse external forces in this chapter.

5.2 Three Army-Based KMT Refugee Communities and their Leaders

According to Alfred McCoy's *Politics of Heroin* (1972), the KMT broke into three separate commands on arrival in northern Thailand in 1961: General Duan Xi-wen's Fifth Army, General Li Wen-huan's Third Army and General Ma Jun-Guo's First Independent Unit of Intelligence operatives. Ma's unit was under the direct supervision of Chiang Ching-kuo, and received financial support for intelligence operations in China and Burma.

General Li was responsible for border control when Li Mi's troops retreated out of China from Yunan in 1950, and he joined the Anti-Communist Salvation Army on Li's way to Burma. The Third Army initially arrived at Tham Ngob in 1953, but the formulation of the village did not come until 1962 (Chang 1999). In 1962, the Third Army and Fifth Army were granted status as "civilian refugees" by Phao's government of Thailand out of sympathy with former Chinese Nationalists and also to employ them as border security (McCoy 1972).

General Duan Xi-wen is a KMT major general, and his leadership is regarded as being milder and less hierarchical than that of Li's. The headquarters of the Fifth Army was founded in Doi Mae Salong in 1963 (Chang 1999), and many clandestine radio stations were positioned there to collect intelligence about communists in the region and in Mainland China. In contrast to General Li, Duan always maintained a close relationship with Taiwan. McCoy argues in the *Politics of Heroin* that Li and Duan's armies had established their domain of drug dealing in the Golden Triangle region since the early 1960s, and the position was consolidated after their "Opium War" with Khun Sa in Laos.

The Third Army used to have well-trained caravans composed of sophisticated KMT soldiers, and Duan's army was primarily responsible for providing information to the caravans of the Third Army on their way to traffic drugs between Burma and Thailand. The survival of Li and Duan's armies and their communities depended on

drug trafficking until 1973 when Li was warned to by the Thai government (Qin 2009). Villages established by the Third Army are under the control of Li and his children in a patriarchic system, although the familial control has dwindled. Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang from Mae Salong claimed that both Duan and his father (General Zhang Peng-gao, who was the commanding officer of Duan) held that when the KMT militias retreated from China „retaking the Mainland“ was impractical unless pushed by exogenous forces such as those involved in the Korean War.

Ma's troop did not rely on opium for funds like the Third and Fifth Armies. In order to perpetuate the myth of Chiang Kai-shek's imminent „return to the Mainland“ by launching repeated sabotage raids into southern China and executing cross-border espionage missions, Ma's army was financially supported by Taiwan until its dismissal in 1975 (McCoy 1972). Compared to Li and Duan's armies, General Ma's army is less well-known to outsiders. First, the intelligence troop was not even familiar to their counterparts in Li and Duan's armies, because this troop was still launching military and intelligence raids in southern China until 1973. China's Vice Premier, Geng biao, gave considerable attention to the presence of Ma's army on the border and eastern Burma in 1971, when Li and Duan's armies had stopped military harassment of China for years (Qin 2009). Second, the leadership of the intelligence army was not as clear as those of the Third Army and the Fifth Army. Since the resettlement of 1977, the leadership of Muban Santisuk is in the hands of an ethnic Wa leader Ai Xiao-shi and his wife Li Yu-xian, as the lady was the founder of Santisuk village. Because of the illiteracy of the couple, educated Han veterans such as Principal Yang have been appointed joint headmen.

5.3 Advocacy of the Ex-KMT Leaders for the Relevant Parties

“Refugee warriors are not merely a passive group of dependent refugees but represent highly conscious refugee communities with a political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for a political objective, be it to recapture the homeland, change the regime, or secure a separate state. To exist, they require sanctuary in a neighboring country permitting military operations from its territory. Without a friendly base, the community in exile can only be refugees. But with a sanctuary for the warriors and relief assistance for the refugees, refugee-warrior communities can develop” (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989).

Zolberg mentions the defeated KMT armies as one classic type of refugee warrior in the *Escape from Violence*. In Cold War Asia, the ex-KMT refugees indeed survived and developed according to the theory of refugee warriors: they bore the hope of recapturing Mainland China until 1971 when the PRC supplanted Taiwan at the UN and Nixon visited Beijing; they profoundly loved the KMT regime and looked unremittingly for chances to change the regime of the CCP in China; Thailand offered them sanctuary for military and intelligence operations; and they used to have patrons from Taiwan and U.S, guaranteeing their survival in the Golden Triangle.

The situation, nevertheless, changed in post-Cold War era. The feedback of the ex-KMT leaders on the nature of the international transformation and its effect on their communities imply some special characters that are different from those their Southern American and African counterparts as discussed by Zolberg in *Escape from Violence* (1989). Instead, their resettlement in Thailand and relationship with Taiwan and Mainland China witness a self-empowerment migration history.

5.3.1 Relationship with Taiwan

In 1970, Taiwan showed willingness to cooperate with the Thai government for intelligence about the activities of communists and on the issue of replacing Li and Duan with other leaders dispatched from Taiwan. Li and Duan rejected leaving the armies, expressing their willingness to combat the communists for the Thai government to General Thawee. Then, Taipei informed the Thai government that the Nationalist government would bear no more responsibility for the KMT remnants in Thailand (Chang, 1999).

Given that the theory of refugee warriors is viable in expounding the activities of the KMT remnants during the Cold War, it touches little upon how the relationship between the refugee warriors and the regime they support transforms in the post-war age. There are several factors which undermined the loyalty of the refugee warriors to the regime they used to champion. In this case, first, the ex-KMT leaders irritated Taiwan by frequent claiming that they were so eager to retake the “Big Yunnan” (the majority of the refugees are Han Yunnanese) rather than the whole Mainland. Chiang Kai-shek always suspected that Li and Duan wanted to build their own Yunnanese power-base independent of the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Since Taiwan removed its aids, the KMT communities had intensively championed the leadership of Li and Duan over that of Taipei because of their contribution to the resettlement of the communities in Thailand.

“From 1969 onward, the Nationalist government and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the lyrics of previous patriotic songs were completely replaced by the name of General Duan Xiwen. We did this because Taiwan ended financial supports for us, but General Duan rejected abandoning us to go to Taiwan. Under his guidance, Mae Salong developed so fast. However, the changed lyrics induced the suspicion of Taiwan. The Chiangs assumed that

we were not loyal to the Nationalist government anymore.” (Mrs. Yang, personal interview, 22th June, 2011).

Second, General Duan and General Li disliked the intelligence army which emerged later, in what they assumed was an indication that Taipei had no confidence in them and had resolved to give them no freedom owing to the negative intelligence reports about them. During my conversations with the informants from Santisuk and Mae Salong, it is clear that this mistrust remains as it was indicated to me that the headmen of the two villages have some issues with each other.

For the disobedience of General Duan and General Li, Taipei ridded itself of the burden of supporting the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand with the closure of the embassy of the Republic of China in August 1975. With Chiang Kai-shek’s death, these KMT communities were forgotten as a mere legacy of the Cold War until 1980, when Boyang’s novel was circulated broadly, drawing the attention of the Taiwanese to the merits of the ex-KMT remnants who had captured Miao and Thai communists years before.

Of the two generals, Li’s loyalty and personal connections with Taiwan are weaker. Li’s children are even more offensive to Taiwan than their father. Since the 1980s, Li’s son and daughter do not disguise their discontent with how Taiwan deserted their father, complaining about the KMT party on public occasions (Chang 1999). The emergence of Free China Relief Association (FCRA) in Chiang Mai, meanwhile, was treated as the interference in the dominance of the Li family over the community, according to an anonymous Chinese diplomat.

After the death of General Duan and General Li, the relationship between the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand and Taiwan has tended to be closer although ambivalence also remains. Since the 1980s, Taiwan has dispatched experts and agriculture, infrastructure construction, and tourism personnel to ex-KMT communities in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. Villages established by the Third and Fifth Armies have received financial, technical and educational assistance from Taiwan consistently in the past three decades. This explains why the ex-KMT communities maintain ideological loyalty to Taiwan, even though complaints about the KMT party are never in absence.

In contrast to most KMT refugee villages, the demographic composition of Santisuk is not Han Yunnanese Chinese; rather, 60% of the former intelligence soldiers and officers are ethnic Wa from Ximeng Wa Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan province of China. Ai Xiao-shi, the ethnic leader, told me that he led around 400 Wa men from his villages to join General Ma's army during Ma's attacks on the southern border of China in the 1950s (Ai, interview, 2011). Mr. Ai said they did not even know the difference between the CCP and the KMT, and their association with KMT army resulted from hope to get more food.

The relationship between Santisuk and Taiwan was close; albeit Santisuk receives less attention from Taiwan nowadays, as mentioned previously, villagers of Santisuk are mostly former intelligence officers and their dependents. Rather later than the two armies of Duan and Li, the intelligence army was officially dismissed by Taiwan in 1975, but in reality, intelligence activities continued until twenty years ago. Principal Yang and other in-depth interviewees from Santisuk told me that they appreciated my courage in visiting the community alone as a young woman. They even implied that they might have killed me as a CCP spy had I come 15 years ago. Mr. Ai and his Wa soldiers and dependents are all illiterate, which made it easy for the KMT to employ them as anti-communist knights by giving them food.

The leadership of Santisuk remained fairly loyal to the Nationalist government in Taiwan until 20 years ago. One of the reasons is that they were mostly KMT soldiers or dependents who experienced the brutal fighting with Japan in Burma during World War II. Before the 1990s, Mr. Ai Xiao-shi and Principal Yang Guo-qin, headmen of Santisuk, used to firmly believe that China was occupied by the evil CCP in 1949, and they felt so honored to undertake the responsibility of re-taking the Mainland from evil on behalf of the Nationalist government. Undertaking the task of collecting intelligence about both PRC and the Third and Fifth Armies, the intelligence army used to have an intimate relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo directly.

Principal Yang assumes that the undercover nature of their intelligence collection is another key reason why Santisuk has not entered into any donors' sights. Civil societies in Taiwan are familiar with the Fifth Army through popular songs such as *Mae Salong* and *Asian Orphans* and news reports in the mass media. In addition, illiteracy is another factor for the Santisuk's poorly known position to donors. "Only six people from this village have studied in Taiwan to this day, while other villages have sent thousands of their second and third generations to Taiwan for study and employment. Most Wa people here are illiterate", Ajarn Ma said to me during my participant observation at the Chinese school of Santisuk. Burdened by secrecy surrounding the original mission in Thailand and the continuing problem of illiteracy, Santisuk possesses limited capability to respond to the transformed external environment.

While the coping strategies of the three communities vary according to the capabilities of their leaders, there are several commonly shared ideological strategies in dealing with Taiwan: loyalty to the Nationalist government, anti-separatism and applications for Taiwanese citizenship. Chen Shui-bian irritates all the communities, not only through cutting aids, but also denying their identity as the citizens of the

ROC and ignoring their anti-communist merits. Several demonstrations by the stateless KMT descendents have occurred in Taipei since Ma Ying-jeou was elected on KMT's behalf in 2008, asking Taiwanese citizenship for education and employment in Taiwan.

It is worthy to point out that these demonstrations and activities of citizenship application are mostly guided by NGOs based in Taiwan. That is to say, in the time since charismatic figures such as General Li and General Duan passed away, the ongoing coping strategies of the ex-KMT refugees are bolstered by non-government forces.

5.3.2 'Watchdog at the Gate of Siam'

General Duan always proudly addressed himself the „watchdog at the gate of Siam“ (McCoy 1972), because his Army 5 played a significant role in anti-communist battles from 1967 to 1982. As previously mentioned, Miao communists emerged in 1967 in Chiang Rai. In the following three years, Thai armies proved incapable in containing the expansion of the Communists. Having graduated from the renowned military school in Kunming, General Duan was more far-sighted than his counterparts General Li and General Ma. Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang claimed that General Duan and General Zhang Peng-gao (Zhang Guo-qiang's father), commanding officer of General Duan, firmly believed at the very beginning of retreatment from Yunnan to Burma in the 1950s that the conflict between CCP and KMT was just a temporary skirmish between siblings which would end sooner or later. “Duan had begun to ponder the future of his army in 1967, coming to a conclusion that the army would be abandoned by Taiwan should the cross-Strait relationship change”, said Zhang Guo-qiang.

According to Alfred McCoy (1972), while the Army 3 and Army 5 were compelled to join the anti-communist war, the two armies were not supposed to take part in the actual fighting, but instead to carry food, water and corpses. General Duan, however, did not want to lose the opportunity to be employed by the Thai government, because he had made the decision to resettle the army and its dependents in Thailand. The Thai government proposed that the two armies be granted the permanent right to stay in Thailand should they make a valuable contribution in the anti-communist battles (Chang 1999).

From 1970 to 1974, the Third and Fifth Armies gained many successes in the anti-communist war for Thailand, winning the promised reward for the armies and their dependents to resettle in Thailand legally, although it took another ten years for them to be granted Thai citizenship or other identity certificates. To a large extent, General Duan's well-prepared strategy and close personal connection with Thai government and military were responsible for the successful resettlement. Mr. Wang, of the self-governing committee of Mae Salong, claims that General Duan Xi-wen was not only devoted to the resettlement and development of Mae Salong and dependent villages of the Fifth Army, but also provided constructive suggestions to the Cabinet of Prince Kukrit Pramojin in 1972 that Thailand should consider improving its relationship with „Communist China“. (He was a military consultant to the cabinet by then).

In participating in discussion with villagers of Mae Salong, I was informed that Mae Salong was endowed big grants in farming tea, plums, and pears by the Thai government as a substitute for opium because of Duan's close relationship with the Thai government and army. The Thai government has also promoted the tourism industry of Mae Salong since the late 1970s. Today, tourism and tea farming are the pillars of most villagers' economic security in Mae Salong.

After Army 3 and Army 5 disarmed to the Thai government, self-governing committees and township compulsory committees responsible for infrastructure emerged as substitutes for charismatic figures in guiding the development of the ex-KMT refugee communities. The constitutions of the two institutions resemble that of bureaucratic institutions of Thailand, which reveals the social integration of the ex-KMT refugee communities into Thai society.

Compared with General Duan and the Fifth Army, General Li and his Third Army are less well-known. This is perhaps surprising considering that the Third Army was still collecting intelligence when the Fifth Army had already made efforts in pursuing normal economic development. Bertil Lintner claims that the Third Army was still collecting intelligence about Burma, PRC, Laos and Thailand for Taiwan until the early 1990s.

“I have a Shan friend that was hired as Burmese interpreter by two KMT intelligence facilities known as „elephant cages“ in Lampong and Khon Koeh until 1992. The only academic record of the presence of such kind of intelligence agencies is in Richard Gibson’s *The Secret Army* that will soon be published in Singapore this year. You may also search this book on the Amazon now. Gibson was a previous U.S diplomat to Chiang Mai” (Bertil Lintner, personal interview, 4th July, 2011).

While General Li was warned by the Thai government in 1973 that his army should stop escorting and dealing in drugs, evidence suggests that the Third Army still had connections with drugs lords. The first piece of evidence is that Li’s house was bombed by a Kokang man, Peter Yang, who was sent by Khun Sa (Bertil Lintner, personal interview, 4th July, 2011). One of the explanations for the bombing is the dispute about drugs between Li and Khun Sa. Another indication is the „Piang Luang incident“. In October 1985, Piang Luang village under the control of the Third Army

suffered the intrusion of the Black Panther border army under the pretext of searching for drug dealers (Qin, 2009). In the 20 days of harassment, many innocent female villagers were raped, males were killed and property ransacked. It is said that the “Piang Luang Incident” may have resulted from Li’s continue escorting and accommodating of drug lords, although it is also possible that the Black Panthers violated human rights without any solid evidence of drug-related activity.

Unlike General Duan, General Li did not have a good personal relationship with the Thai military, leaving the victims of Piang Luang vulnerable.

“Lao Li (Li Wen-huan) reported what happened in Piang Luang to both Taiwan and Mainland China, but for some reasons unknown, he received no response from either side” (Ajarn Ma, focus group discussion, 18th June, 2011).

“In fact, the Black Panthers also intruded into Mae Salong in 1992. Two intoxicated Black Panthers shot at the stone arch of a temple at Mae Salong, and also attempted to shoot the self-defensive soldiers who stopped them. The defense soldiers shot them dead after several warnings were ignored. Because of the good relationship with the Thai military built by General Duan, Mae Salong successfully explained the whole course of the issue, obtaining the understanding and support of the a supreme commander of the Thai army. The defensive shooting of the two soldiers from Mae Salong was justified. From then on, the Black Panthers seldom appeared in any ex-KMT villages without appropriate reasons, let alone violating the human rights of the villagers.” (Zhang Guo-qiang, personal interview, 19th June, 2011).

Most veterans of the intelligence army from Santisuk were not granted Thai citizenship, though many lives were lost in guarding roads for Thailand in the effort to capture Miao communists. Not being recognized by Thai government as anti-communists heroes, having no such a prominent leader like General Duan, veterans of Santisuk are still stateless people.

“After the anti-communist war, the Thai government established monuments and a history museum for the Third and Fifth Armies, but the two armies never told the Thai government that we also took part in many other battles. It was Mrs. Ai who took only 60-70 former intelligence soldiers to capture the headquarters of Miao communists in Mt Khaw Ya. Our intelligence soldiers also contributed to defending roads for Thailand during the 1970s. So many of our brothers died and got disabled for Thailand, but they don’t get any compensation, remaining stateless. Mr. and Mrs. Ai Xiao-shi are illiterate, and our beloved Principal Bao Da-ping sent by Taiwan was assassinated by Khun Sa in 1979. We seldom have seen a leader like General Duan, which can articulate our difficulties to Taiwan and Thailand and negotiate with them for the benefits of our brothers” (Ajarns Ma, Wu, Han, Yang, Zhao, focus group discussion, 18th June, 2011).

5.3.3 PRC: from Opponent to Donor?

Because of the consistent armed harassments by ex-KMT remnants on the border until 1973 (Qin 2009), Mainland China remained hostile toward these groups until the end of the 1980s when the ex-KMT anti-communist guerrillas disarmed to Thai government. I was informed on my fieldtrip at Mae Salong and Santisuk that it was under diplomatic pressure from the PRC that the Royal Thai government forced the KMT armies to submit their weapons in 1984.

The ending of the Cold War between the U.S. and the PRC, and the mitigated cross-Strait tension did not automatically conclude the intelligence activities of the ex-KMTs against Mainland China. Abram Shulsky defines intelligence as part of the ongoing „struggle“ between nations, therefore, the cross-Strait tension is partially represented by the consistent intelligence activities of the ex-KMT guerrillas in northern Thailand until the 1990s.

Michael Warner describes intelligence as secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities. According to this theory, intelligence contains foreign ingredients aside from secrecy. Nevertheless, intelligence is also involved in intra-state struggles, such as that between Mainland China and Taiwan. To this day, there is no theory of intelligence touching upon the impact of intelligence identity on the agents, particularly, those unprofessional ones in the post-military era. During the Cold War, the CIA hired innumerable Aka, Lahu, Miao, Shan and KMT Han Yunnanese as temporary agents to collect intelligence about communists in South East Asia and China. Difficult though it is to trace the development of all highland peoples, it is observable that the development of the undercover world tends to be further weighed down by previous intelligence experiences and, in this case, the lower social status of the intelligence army and the Third army.

Generalizing the association between culture and intelligence, John Dziak categorizes states like the Soviet Union (and PRC) as „counter-intelligence states“ in which intelligence agencies evolve out of an almost paranoid concern about threats to regime survival rather than a policy-need for information. This theory is proved to be ideologically biased, insofar as the presence of the ex-KMT guerrillas was indeed threatening the national security of the PRC during the Cold War. Interestingly, the response of the PRC was not only counter-intelligence activities, but also the roll-out of the „United Front“.

General Li's patriarchal leadership has showed amiability to the PRC since late 1980s (Chang, 1999) because of its dispute with Taiwan. For this, the Consular General to Chiang Mai un-officially visited Tham Ngob for Li's birthday on junior Li's (General Li's son's) invitation in 1993, although there he encountered the hostility of the conservative headmen and villagers. In 2006, Arunotai, Yang and Mai Nongbour invited the Consular General to Chiang Mai to their villages and Chinese schools. This was because the Oversea Chinese Affairs Committee (OCAC) in Taiwan had severed educational support to the Chinese schools of the ex-KMT refugee villages and schools were facing severe financial crisis. Since 2006, for showing voluntary amiability towards the PRC, stateless students from Arunotai and some other villages in Chiang Mai have been given the opportunity of being granted PRC citizenship to allow them to study at the Overseas Chinese University in Mainland China (Chen 2010). According to an expert on the media at the National Taiwan University, Chen Wen-zheng, such kind of stateless ex-KMT descendents need pay nothing for higher education nor Chinese nationality, but do need 6000 Baht for accommodation annually.

From 2006 to 2009, ex-KMT refugee villages in Chiang Mai obtained education resources from Mainland China. However, the situation changed abruptly in the May of 2009 when the Principals of the „pro-communist“ schools were recalled (Chen, 2010). Since then, a „pro-Taiwan“ atmosphere is pervading and no more PRC resources access the ex-KMT villages in northern Thailand. “Successive Consulate Generals to Chiang Mai did not give enough attention to the KMT villages”, says the official who used to work for the Consulate during our conversation about the present ex-KMTs in northern Thailand.

Do these factors mentioned above symbolize the influence of the so-called „discourse of Cold War“ alone? Or, are there any other obstacles to the access of PRC resources to the KMT villages? Undeniably, ideology is still a consideration in those villages and it is embodied by the use of words such as „pro-communist“. The recall of

the „pro-communist“ school Principals also implies the existence of an anti-communist complex. But why do the ex-KMT refugee communities still maintain the complex, while the high-ranked officials in Taiwan are making efforts towards reunification and improved relationships, particularly since Ma Ying-jeou“s election.

First, as Teun A. Van Dijk argues in his *Ideology: A multidisciplinary Approach* (1998), access to public discourse is crucial to the formulation of ideologies, while social elitism contribute to the formulation of more detailed and explicit ideologies. Van Dijk assumes that relevant experiences of group members are the determinants to whether an ideology is accepted successfully. This theory sheds light on the formulation of the anti-communist complex. “We hate CCPs because they persecuted our families and confiscated all of our private wealth,” Ajarn Ma from the Chinese school of Santisuk said to me when asked about her impression of the PRC. Obviously, the better educated ex-KMTs fail even to separate the political party from the state, in that there is only one ruling party in China. “But we hate them less now as they are devoted to the construction of a stronger and wealthier China of which we are proud now. We teach our students to sing the national anthem of the PRC now”, several other teachers claimed concomitantly.

Under the guidance of the KMT elites, namely, Chiang Kai-shek and his loyalists, the ex-KMT guerrillas regarded the CCP as evil and supposed that PRC was in calamity under the rule of the CCP. As refugee warriors intending on returning to the home country and reestablishing the previous regime, the ex-KMT guerrillas launched untold numbers of attacks on the border of China from 1950 to 1973. Undeniably, they paid an enormous cost in terms of lives, broken families and stifled development of the communities; they also took many innocent lives and broke untold families in Mainland China. Nevertheless, they recognized only the cost to themselves and internalized their suffering as their discovery of the brutality of the CCP regime, insofar as they held the ideologically-driven belief that those who were killed by them were merely evil communists. Combining their experiences of suffering with the

image of the CCP as devils inculcated by Chiang Kai-shek's regime, the ex-KMT leaders and communities formulated the profound ideology of no compromise and no forgiveness to PRC for over half a century.

Second, the forced isolation of the communities for decades has rendered the static reproduction of the Chinese ideologies controlling them. "From 1998 onwards, we just dared to return to the Mainland for visiting and began to build business networks without being reprimanded by the old people for being friendly to our communist enemy", said Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang, which is the earliest KMT village to have opened up to outsiders. Insufficient communication with the external world disables the access of new ideologies into the ex-KMT communities. Extending Van Dijk's argument that an ideology won't be formulated unless it has access to public discourse, one can deduce that no ideology can be formulated should it fail to access to public discourse. Due to decades of isolation from mainstream Thai society and the long distance to Taiwan, the public discourse of the KMT refugee communities has been sealed, which hinders access of new ideology, and the new acknowledgment of the Mainland by Taiwan since 2008.

Third, the emigration of the younger generation and the aging population also account for the stagnant ideology of the villagers regarding the CCP and PRC. Mrs. Liu and many other villagers from Santisuk and Mae Salong told me that the only hope they bear is to see their descendents settle in major cities of Thailand and Taiwan after graduating from university and never need return to the mountains. Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang, a headman of Mae Salong explicates his concern and worry about the survival of Chinese traditions and language, since most young people have emigrated. Mae Salong is only one out of some 100 ex-KMT villages in northern Thailand. As the majority population in many villages consists of poorly educated older people who uphold absolute loyalty to ROC, there is no surprise that the reproduction of ideology is deadlocked. After all, they have been subjected to

Thainization, which hampers the impact of novel Taiwanese ideologies in some ways, if not all.

In view of these factors, it is possible to explain why the ex-KMT communities in northern Thailand are still holding anti-CCP discourses and ideology to this day when the Nationalist government in Taiwan is making efforts to boost the cross-Strait relationship. The rejection of resources from Mainland China is also attributable to a pragmatic consideration that the sustainability of this aid is uncertain.

However, do all ex-KMT communities treat the PRC resources in the same way? Principal Yang and Mrs. Ai who is the chairman of the Chinese school of Santisuk said

“Santisuk receives much less assistance from Taiwan quasi-officially than Mae Salong or Tham Ngob, but our children bear equal right to study and find employment outside of the village. For this consideration and our stubborn anti-communist experience, we have noticed that educational resources from both the Mainland and Taiwan are crucial. Although we don’t beg to either side of the Strait, we wish both Taiwan and the Mainland can give us a hand in education” (Yang Gu-qin & Li Yuxian, focus group discussion, 18th June, 2011).

“Yunnan Yuxi Institute sent their president and teachers to our village twice in 2006 and 2008, telling us that they would develop a program when they returned to help us improve quality of education. I was responsible for communicating with them, but received nothing from them after their visits. We don’t understand why people from the Mainland do things like this.” (Ajarn Wu, personal interview 16th June, 2011).

While they feel pity that the villages in Chiang Mai rejected Chinese resources, teachers of Santisuk and Mae Salong both expressed their understanding, insofar as the Taiwanese resources are reliable if they discard those from Mainland China. In response to this, an anonymous Chinese diplomat stated

“We highly appreciate the cooperation of Thai government for accompanying our diplomats” visit and donation to the ex-KMT villages. But we also recognize that Thailand is an independent sovereign state that has always been our friend. Considering many previous ex-KMTs and their descendents have been granted Thai citizenship, it is technically difficult for the PRC to lend consistent official help to the development of the ex-KMT communities without engaging in the risk of intervention.”

Aside from being a potential donor, China is also the location of the hometowns of the majority of the ex-KMTs in Thailand. From 1993 onwards, some official missions from the PRC and Yunnan Province, in particular, have visited Mae Salong and General Lei Yu-tian to explore how the KMTs refugees resettled and developed in a foreign land. Although the Mae Salong self-governing committee rejected material aid provided by the mission for ideological considerations, villagers of Mae Salong began visiting their hometowns in Yunnan in large numbers. “Two of my brothers married Chinese ladies, one from Shenyang, one from Guangzhou and they reside in Bangkok now”, said Ms Yang of Guoqin Tea House in Mae Salong warmly, when she was aware of my PRC background. Simultaneously, travelling in the Golden Triangle and visiting the headquarters of the Fifth Army in Mae Salong has become a fashion among tourists from Mainland China. From 2008 to 2011, Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang’s tourist agency has accepted over 200 tourists from the Mainland and his agency is one of some twenty tourist services in Mae Salong. In addition, several managers of other guesthouses, hotels and travel agencies told me that they are plan to keep the Mainland-based visitors under control, because they lack

confidence in dealing with the „communist tourists“ who might argue with them about the merits and guilt of the KMT and CCP parties.

5.3.4 Khun Sa: A competitor

Although the rise and fall of Khun Sa has more connection with the ethnic conflict of Burma than the international-political transformation of post Cold War Asia, Khun Sa had constantly been the competitor of the ex-KMTs until he surrendered to Yangon in 1996.

The competition between the two sides is of two types: drug trafficking and jockeying for regional dominance. Shi Bing-ming attributes the lasting battles between Santisuk and Hin Taek to the competition between Ai Xiao-shi and Khun Sa over drug trafficking. Principal Yang and all 15 respondents in Santisuk I interviewed during the fieldtrip claimed that Ai has very strict rules and punishment policies in dealing with drug trafficking and use. Bertil Lintner points out that one of the reasons that Khun Sa sent a young Kokang, Peter Yang, to bomb General Li's home in 1984 was the opium issue.

Khun Sa attempted to integrate the ex-KMT remnants in northern Thailand with the Third Army of General Li and the Fifth Army of General Lei (successor to General Duan) in the early the 1980s (Qin 2009). Khun Sa's ambition of establishing an independent Shan Republic involved him into wars with a number of armed forces on Thai-Burma border, including Ai Xiao-shi's army in Santisuk from 1983 to 1996.

“We used to have a feud with the Zhangs (Khun Sa's Chinese family name), since Khun Sa assassinated Principal Bao Da-ping who was such an important contributor to the resettlement of the intelligence army in 1977 and the establishment of Santisuk

Chinese School. Besides, Khun Sa launched a 13 years' war in attempting to coerce our ethnic Wa army to fight for his ambition of building a Shan Republic. We hate to be enslaved by such a drug lord. But now, everything has been encroached by history: Khun Sa died 4 years ago, and his staff officer Zhang Su-quan also died in Yangon two weeks ago. As for me, the so-called „Wa Prince“, has been having strokes for years.” (Ai Xiao-shi, personal interview, 18th June, 2011).

5.4 Conclusion

The advocacy of the target groups for the relevant parties is not identical in regard to their differing survival and development status and loyalty to the anti-communist political ideology. When an ex-KMT community, particularly its leader, determines to advocate for one of the relevant parties more than another, the community is endowed more aid as a consequence. But the aid from the relevant parties also sways the decision-making of the target groups; after all, most of the ex-KMT communities have recognized that successful development is more important than anything else nowadays.

CHAPTER VI

COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN SECURITY EFFECTS: CASE STUDIES IN SANTISUK AND MAE SALONG

6.1 Introduction

In 2003, Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen proposed a protection-empowerment framework for attaining “human security”, implying both top-down and bottom-up approaches.

“Protection (*top-down approach*) refers to the norms, processes and institutions required to shield people from critical and pervasive threats... Empowerment emphasized people as actors and participants in defining and implementing their vital freedoms... People empowered can make better choices and actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities.” (Ogata 2003).

As Chapter 4 discussed the effects of the top-down approach on the ex-KMT refugee communities, this section focuses how the bottom-up approach impacts the human security of the ex-KMT villagers on the economic, community, education and nationality dimensions. Advocacy and governance are overlapping in some circumstances.

6.2 Why Apply the Human Security Approach?

The simplest answer to this question is that the intricate structure of international politics and multidimensional human insecurities in the new context of post-Cold War Asia require a more structuralized and inclusive analysis about the survival and development of the target groups. In order to analyze the impacts of international-political transformation, the thesis primarily relies on the state-centric security paradigm of neo-realism as discussed in the previous chapters. (This particular analysis is determined by a Cold War taint of neo-realism as well as the nature of the target groups as a „Cold War legacy“.) The analysis of this section, however, is oriented by the human security approach.

With the discussion of Chapter 5 in mind, apart from General Duan's decision of sending his army as volunteers to fight with Miao Communists, the advocacy of the ex-KMT refugee communities, particularly by the leaders, was prone to be more spontaneous than long-term planned responsiveness when examined through the lens of international-political transformation. Additionally, the human security defense of the target groups remained scattered despite the emergence of NGOs that strove to establish an organized mechanism for the defense.

In this chapter, communal governance sheds more light on the limitations and contributions of the dispersed coping strategies. And the diversity of the human security issues is tested on four primary dimensions that also affect human securities on other dimensions because of the interrelatedness of the system. Facing the structural transformation of international politics, the absence of structuralized (well-organized and responsive) coping strategies inevitably leaves the target groups open to a series of interconnected human insecurities. The human security approach is necessary and valuable as a lens for analysis in this chapter, insofar as it provides a more inclusive and systemic framework for security analysis than the neo-realistic security paradigm.

This thesis takes the perspective of the UNDP's human security approach, which emphasizes the interrelatedness of diverse security mechanisms and the importance of development as a security strategy. Moreover, the thesis takes its stance on the complementarity instead of incompatibility between the national/state security and human security.

6.3 The local context of two case studies: Mae Salong & Santisuk

6.3.1 Mae Salong

The village of Santikhiri, commonly known as Mae Salong, is located in the mountainous region of Mae Fa Luang 75 kilometers northwest from Chiang Rai City. According to the headman, Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang, there are around 8000 Han Yunnanese (ex-KMTs and their dependents) living in the center of the valley of Doi Mae Salong as well as another 8000 minorities of Aka, Lisu, Lahu, Yao and Hmong (sub-group of Miao) inhabiting the peripheral area of the valley. During the Cold War, the Han Yunnanese KMTs hired the minorities for opium cultivation and the caravan business. Now, the minorities come to Han Yunnanese's tourism agencies, hotels and tea gardens for professional training and employment.

In 1951, the ex-KMTs military remnants in Burma and northern Thailand were re-organized to be Yunnan Anti-Communist Salvation Army, and General Li Mi was appointed as the chief commander. General Duan Xi-wen was the army commander of the Fifth Army until he passed away in 1980 (Chang 1999). The Fifth Army was allowed to resettle in Mae Salong by the Thai government in reward for their role in eradicating the Miao Communists in battles from 1970 to 1975. In response to the emergency of Miao Communists' revolt in Phetchabun Province, Mae Salong again sent 400 ex-KMT soldiers to protect roads and fight against the Miao Communists

stationed in Mt. Khaw Ya and Khaw Khor. The Thai government ratified the agenda of granting all ex-KMTs of Mae Salong Thai citizenship in 1982 in reward for the capture of Miao Communists (Sa 2009).

General Duan died in 1980, and General Lei Yu-tian took over in the administration of Mae Salong, and in 1987, Mae Salong was demilitarized by Thailand. After that, the General Lei military leadership gave its way to a style of self-governing committee that played and still plays a significant role in the development of the village. Under the support of both Taiwan and Thailand, Mae Salong has established a successful tourism industry. Tea farming has replaced Cold War opium cultivation, becoming the major agriculture produce of Mae Salong. Nowadays, Mae Salong has transformed from the foothold of the Fifth Army to be one of the most developed villages of ex-KMTs in northern Thailand.

6.3.2 Santisuk

As introduced in the Chapter 5, Santisuk was the foothold of the ex-KMT intelligence army. There are about 2000 people (210 households) in this village. “Mrs Banyen said only 170 out of more than 1,000 villagers had been granted Thai nationality” (Bangkok Post, 2000). Principal Yang told me personally that 20-30% of the villagers are stateless.

The intelligence army was also known as the First Independent Division, the Intelligence Mainland Operation Bureau, or Guangwu Troop¹. The intelligence army

¹ Guangwu is the posthumous title of one emperor of Han Dynasty. As the most successful feudal ruler in Chinese history, his ruling is addressed “Guangwu Prosperity” by historians. Chiang Kai-shek named the intelligence army Guangwu troop for his hope of retaking mainland of China. The intelligence army was responsible for collecting intelligence of Mainland China and Burma, waging military operations to the southwestern border of the PRC, and assassinating important CCP figures. (Yang, personal interview, 15th June, 2011)

was established in 1965 by reorganizing the non-Li and Duan ex-KMT armies on the Burma-Thai border, since Taiwan, had lost confidence on General Li Wen-huan and General Duan Xi-wen (Qin 2009). The army was disbanded in 1975, and the village was built in 1977 (Yang, participant observation, 18th June, 2011).

Ai Xiao-shi's Wa Chinese men composed the bulk of the intelligence army; today 60-70% of the population in Santisuk is ethnic Wa Chinese (Ai xiao-shi, personal interview, 18th June, 2011). In Santisuk, nearly all Wa ex-KMT veterans are illiterate. They were given Han names their Han military superiors when they joined the army in 1950s.² According to my study, most villagers of Santisuk are illiterate or semi-illiterate and unemployed.

6.4 Community security

Most ex-KMT villages were created in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Song in the early 1970s when the Cold War ceased in Asia. As the founders of the KMT communities, General Li, General Duan and ethnic Wa leader Ai Xiao-shi and his wife automatically undertook the task of leading the resettlement and development of the communities.

The governance capability of the leaders, however, varied from person to person, which resulted in different human security statuses of the three main communities. Since the 1980s, self-governing committees of the ex-KMT villages

² The year cannot be confirmed, because the Wa were so primitive when they joined the intelligence troop that did not use any calendars. Ai Xiao-shi's Wa army was derived from Ximeng Ethnic Wa Self-Administrated Prefecture, Lincang (Pu'er City now), Yunnan Province of China. Ai Xiao-shi claimed that he launched a military revolt in the 1950's against Communist China because of an issue of a farm policy undermining the benefit of his village. (Ai was a Wa sawbwar, nicknamed „Wa Prince“ when fighting with Khun Sa for an important path of drug trafficking during the 1980's and 1990's)

replaced the leadership of the military leaders. General Lei Yu-tian and General Li's family abdicated power in favor of these self-governing committees. The diminishing military control reveals the self-empowerment of the ex-KMTs in a decentralized momentum. The villagers of Mae Salong assume that the abolishment of self-defensive troops undermines the social justice of their communities.

“We assume that disbandment of the self-defensive troop is a mistake of General Lei for his purpose of maintaining his dominance over Mae Salong, since we recognized how important the troop was to the security and stability of our community. The self-defensive volunteers were so helpful for solving problems for tourists. Besides, the troop was well devoted to infrastructural construction and tax collection. Most importantly, the self-defensive troop also defends Mae Salong from external offences, such as the harassment from the Black Panthers in 1992” (Mr. Wang, personal interview, 20th June, 2011).

The self-defensive organization of Santisuk also played a role in drug control.

“We trust the self-defensive organization under the guidance of Mrs. Ai more than Thai police in drug control. My youngest son was so much spoiled by his mom who is an illiterate that she even borrowed money from other villagers to purchase drugs for him. It was Mrs. Ai (Madam Li Yu-xian) and the self-defensive organization that came to my house nearly every day in two years to dissuade my wife from borrowing money to buy ecstasy for our son. But unfortunately, he became addicted to methamphetamine after quitting ecstasy, committing theft in the village. I called the Thai police to imprison him, but they released him in 15 days. Mrs. Ai made an ultimate decision on my behalf in 2007 of sending this silly boy to the jail in Wa Special District of Burma for 3 years³. It seems he has quit using heroin since he came back last year.” (Mr. Cai, personal interview, 16th June, 2011).

Self-governing committees of both Santisuk and Mae Salong maintain the right to sentence crimes that are not very severe, and even determine punishment without the presence of the Thai police and courts. Once suspects are arrested, they will be judged openly in front of the whole village, which is considered beneficial to defend the norms of the whole community, at least in the opinion of the ex-KMT villagers who follow the traditional Chinese morality. Thai policemen only come up to the village once when it is extremely necessary.

The presence of the communal authorities as well defends social justice. Mr. and Mrs. Ai at Santisuk, Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang and several governors of the self-governing committee of Mae Salong, assume the responsibility as social arbiters for dispute mediations. During my three-hour interview on the first day, Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang received four to five different calls from the villagers that asked him to solve disputes of distribution (inheritance) and land division between neighbors and new migrants' resettlement. Under such circumstances, the community security of the two villages I visited was effectively guaranteed, and very few crimes occurred in the past decades until recently, when the communities have had increasing connections with the external environment. Yet, this is only one side of the coin. The endangered economic security of Santisuk brings drug problems to the community, which in turn undermines the health security of Thailand.

6.5 Economic security

From the mid 1970s, General Duan had taken advantage of his amiable relationship with the Thai government and military to promote economic

³ Majority of the population of Santisuk are ethnic Wa Chinese derived from Ximeng Township of Lincang, Yunnan. Ai Xiao-Shi and his Wa army stationed in northern Wa State before joined the KMT intelligence army in 1950's. Therefore, Santisuk has strong Wa identity, and even the Han Yunnanese here take Wa State as a "half hometown". Punishments to the drug users of Santisuk hew are subject to the law of Wa State.

development in Mae Salong. The Thai government officially sent agricultural experts to test the soil of Mae Salong, teaching the villagers how to farm tea on the land that was unfavorable to any crops but opium and a little drought rice. The tourism industry has boomed in Mae Salong since late 1970's under the help of the Thai government as discussed previously. Now the livelihood of most villagers in Mae Salong relies on either tea exportation or the tourism industry. (Zhang Guo-qiang, personal interview, 18th June, 2011).

The successor of General Duan, General Lei did not contribute as much as his predecessor. Villagers of Mae Salong complained that General Lei accumulated lots of money for himself by selling the weapons when the Fifth Army disbanded in 1987 and embezzled the donations from the FCRA. The early 1990s saw the rise of Thainized institutions such as a self-governing committee that marginalized the power of General Lei through guiding the economic development of the village successfully. Every family in Mae Salong now has tap water due to the effort of the compulsory township committee, which is responsible for infrastructure development and maintenance.

Today, Mae Salong no longer has the image of a refugee village: 90% of the villagers in Mae Salong have Thai citizenship or both Thai and Taiwanese citizenship with which they possess medical insurance, right to attend senior high schools in Thailand and the opportunity to go to Taiwan for study and employment. Most villagers like to work in Taiwan for better payment than in Thailand, and then they can introduce investment from Taiwan to Mae Salong for tea farming, export and tourism. (Zhang Guo-qiang, personal interview, 18th June, 2011).

In comparison, the livelihood of Santisuk is poorer. Merely three years ago, electricity and tap water started to be available, and the average annual income is around 25,000 Baht per household per year.

“People in Santisuk do not have regular jobs. We mostly make living on intra-villager retail, repairing and construction for other families. Big bosses come and go without leaving investments, because the cost of transportation from Santisuk even to Mae Chan makes the price of any agricultural produces incompetent in the markets. The Thai government sent experts to teach our villagers skills for farming plum, litchi and corn, but seldom helps us find markets. We called the Thai relevant institution for buying the fruits ten days or half month before harvests. But they came so late that litchi nuts had rotted mostly” (Principal Yang and Ajarn Wu, participant observation, 17th June, 2011).

It is necessary to point out that the Thai government lends agricultural assistance to the villagers in Santisuk for preventing them from opium cultivation.

The last five years have seen a new trend of rubber plantation booming in Santisuk. With technical training and market analysis from the Thai government, the villagers are conservatively optimistic about the benefits that will come with the harvest in two more years. However, people are also aware of the environmental risk rising with the thriving rubber plantation. “We have thousands of acres rubber plantation now, and we found the trees suck too much water” Ajarn Wu said to me about his concern and worry when he showed the plantation on the mountains to me. Another issue about rubber plantation is that villagers have to purchase saplings by themselves due to the absence of investment. Each sapling is 50 Baht, which is expensive to most villagers. Therefore, the future of rubber plantation remains uncertain to the economic security of Santisuk (Ajarn Wu, personal interview, 16th June, 2011).

Santisuk rarely acquired external aid until Principal Yang and other headmen were introduced to a missionary couple from Taiwan in 1990's, Mr. Wang Ji-xiong

and his wife. From 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Wang gave regular donations for improving the accommodation and school construction of Santisuk. Gradually, Santisuk has accorded the attention of a number of Taiwanese Baptist civil societies, and the houses of 60 households out of the 210 have been improved.

“Taipei gives us little support. Last month, the daughter-in-law of a famous previous leader of the Mainland came to Mae Sai, distributing 500,000 Baht to each Chinese school of the ex-KMT communities at presence. Principals of several schools located in Chiang Mai even came for the donation under the arrangement of the Yunnan Association. Santisuk was forgotten again” (Mrs. Ai, also known as Madam Li Yu-xian, 18th June, 2011)

Another issue related to the economic security of the ex-KMT refugees is the “Certificate of Granted Field”. In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek promised all KMT soldiers a piece of land in Mainland China should they champion his ambition of retaking the Mainland one day. Along with the international-political transformation, this promise remains, at present, undeliverable and without hope. Nearly forgotten, this promise was recalled during a KMT veteran’s visit to Beijing in 1988. The old man went to claim his land granted by Chiang Kai-shek under the Marco Polo Bridge, but was told that the CCP government never recognized what Chang Kai-shek granted. The veteran vented out his discontent with the Nationalist government in an interview with Taiwanese mass media, which pushed Lee Teng-hui to ratify a document that delivered economic compensation for the certificate to the ex-KMT veterans.

With the efforts of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee and the self-governing committees of the ex-KMT villages, some veterans have received (should they still be alive) 50,000 Baht for those under 60 years when registered, and 200,000 Baht for those above 60, whereas some have not received anything due to a variety of administrative complexities. Principal Yang, who is also a member of the self –

governing committee of Santisuk, told me that the major obstacle for the veterans in Santisuk to acquire monetary compensation was the issue of illiteracy. Few veterans in Santisuk are able to write ones' own names, to recall their birthday, parents' names, and when they started to serve in the army, which is indispensable information in the application. "The self-governing committee is still helping us, to negotiate with the delegators from Taiwan to access the monetary compensation with which we can purchase our coffins and give our grandchildren school education", said Mr. Suo and Mr. Cai, who were officers of the intelligence army.

6.6 School Construction

When Ogata argues that empowerment emphasizes people as factors and participants in defining and implementing their vital freedoms, she gives recognition to the capability of the people (communities) in achieving the goal of human security. Ogata also argues that universal basic education is emphasized as a policy priority in fulfilling the empowerment agenda of the Human Security Commission. But her comments fail to answer exactly how to fulfill the goal of universal basic education - only stressing the contribution of the civil societies. In this case, both external assistance from Taiwanese quasi-official organizations and NGOs and the inherent efforts of the community leaders are both supportive to the school construction. In 1966, Xinhua Chinese school of Mae Salong was established by General Duan. From the early 1970s onwards, Taiwan enrolls students from northern Thailand as part of the strategy of establishing the image of an "Orthodox" China. General Duan strived to send the stateless students of Mae Salong and other villages of the Fifth Army to Taiwan by negotiating with the Thai government for departure permission.

In contrast with General Duan, General Li prevented villagers of the Third Army to go to Taiwan in order to consolidate his familial control over the community (Chang 1999). Opposite strategies partially lead to different development statuses of

the villages attached to the two armies. Bertil Lintner claims that the KMT villages in Chiang Mai are less prosperous than those in Chiang Rai in general. And Mr. Zhang Guo-qiang attributes the prosperity of Mae Salong to the investments and donation from those who have studied in Taiwan. In the school history exhibit of Xinghua Chinese School of Mae Salong, Chinese articles of students praise General Duan's concern about Chinese education.

“Grandpa Duan did not want us to be the same as other highlanders such as Lahu, Lisu, and Aka who have lost their native language skills. Without the Chinese school, we would not have so many successful alumni whose generous investments promote the development of Mae Salong remarkably. Without Chinese education, we will be like the tree without root.”

The Chinese school of Santisuk was established in 1977 when Mr. Ai Xiao-shi's troop resettled in the area. Compared with Xinghua Chinese school of Mae Salong, the Santisuk Chinese School obtains much less funding, and school buildings are simple and crude. Like all Chinese schools in northern Thailand, the school hours of Santisuk Chinese School is from 4 pm to 6:30 pm, after Thai school hours and full day on Saturday. For such education, students only need to pay 800 Baht per semester (four months). Still some children don't attend the school due to poverty or the ignorance of their parents.

According to Chawaler Lertchalolarn and Paitoon Sinlarat from Chulalongkorn University, human security in education means that education in every aspect must enable human beings to realize their potential, survive in their society and environment, and have a good quality of living and have their dignity (2006). The families that I interviewed at Mae Salong are a lot wealthier than those at Santisuk, in that many villagers of Mae Salong study and are employed in Taiwan where they are paid 30% to 40% more than in Thailand. It is the Chinese education in

northern Thailand that endows the students in northern Thailand opportunities to receive university education in Taiwan. The investments of those who are employed in Taiwan plays a major role in enriching Mae Salong, assuring the economic security of the villagers.

Santisuk does not have such resources as there are only 6 persons out of 2000 villagers who have been educated in Taiwan, and since the Chinese education of the village started much later, and education funding is far from sufficient.

“We collect symbolic tuition fee for the Chinese education. But 800 baht is too little per semester to convince good teachers to stay (Santisuk Chinese school has about 300 students and 12 teachers). Education cannot rely on volunteers to come and go in a few months, although this saves the budget” (Principal Yang, focus group discussion, 21st June, 2011).

During my four days of interviews in Santisuk, one person’s presence warned me of the severe problem of teacher shortage. A man around 45 years emerged at the Chinese school in the morning of 17th June, 2011. His Beijing dialect grabbed my attention from afar. Principal Yang and several other teachers (they are all ex-KMT intelligence veterans) gave the Beijinger a polite introduction about my academic background of Chulalongkorn University, as well my Beijinger identity. They also told me the man, Ajarn Zhang, taught Chinese culture at Santisuk Chinese School in the 1990s for months.

“I can give you some exclusive materials for your thesis writing. You need intelligence of the U.S, Taiwan, Mainland China or Thailand?” Ajarn Zhang asked me. I was shocked badly with sweat when was asked such kind of sensitive question in an ex-KMT village. I told him that I was merely a Chula student and he did not need to

share his extremely secret intelligence. Next day, I was informed that he was a legacy of “June 4th Incident”, 1989⁴.

“Zhang was so appealing to us because of his university education background that I invited him to teach Chinese culture here, but soon, I found he never use formal education materials, rather, taught our young children fortune-telling, very backward superstitious opinions or anti-Beijing rumors. Meanwhile, teachers reported that always tried to sell intelligence to anybody. I fired him even we needed teachers so badly. My counterparts, principals of Tham Santisuk Teahouse, Huae Mo, had the same issue with him. You see how much we need good teachers.” (Principal Yang, personal interview, 18th June, 2011).

6.7 Nationality⁵

Statelessness is decided by conflicts between international and national laws. While nationality is considered as the crucial prerequisite of people’s overall wellbeing, international law allows states broad discretion in deciding who shall be citizens, recognizing that nationality depends on municipal law. This is because the international law is set up on the consensus of sovereign nation-states. Since none of the duty-bearers signed and ratified refugee or statelessness protective treaties, their conducts towards the ex-KMT refugees were completely spontaneous in accordance with their respective benefits on interior, foreign affairs, and humanitarian ethics.

⁴ According to Bertil Lintner, there were many “June 4th students crossed Burma-Thai border or Thai-Laos border, because they were looking for linkage with Taiwan and expected the ex-MT villages scattering on the border help them either go to Taiwan or other countries. Chai Ling was one of those students who went to the U.S from Bangkok. She crossed Mae Sai-Tachilek border control secretly, and then travelled down to Bangkok from where she left Thailand to the U.S by forged passport. Lintner also claimed that many of those students were also stranded by Phathang and failed to go to the West. These people are making living on teaching Chinese or preaching Christianity in the area.

The right to nationality is a basic human right. Ogata argues that respecting human rights is at the core of her protection-empowerment framework of human security. As discussed previously, not all ex-KMT refugees are granted citizenship either in Thailand or Taiwan. That is to say, the human security of the stateless KMT refugees remaining outside of Ogata's protection-empowerment framework of human security, and in turn, exposes to them to intensive insecurities as they lack the indispensable shield of sovereignty. Confined by statelessness, the human security of hundreds of thousands of ex-KMT refugees on the dimensions of livelihood, employment, education and health is undermined.

For Taiwan, under the control of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the ex-KMT refugees were not only economic burdens but also an obstacle of separationism. Chen Shui-bian's persistent ignorance about the presence and merits of the ex-KMT refugees led him to sever connections with all who were born in Mainland China and uphold the discourse of reunification. The illiteracy of many ex-KMT refugees hinders their access to Taiwanese citizenship (explained in the previous chapter). For Thailand, the KMT refugees have long lost their importance, since there is no more communist threat and the security of the northern border is guaranteed. Furthermore, granting citizenship to the ex-KMT stateless persons inflates the cost of governance to the Thai government. Bureaucratic complexity is another barrier in obtaining Thai citizenship; there is nothing to be done by the villagers but pay extra money to acquire it.

⁵The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are key legal instruments in the protection of nationality-less people around the world and in the prevention and reduction of statelessness. The conventions have attracted few ratifications or even accessions; therefore, the expected framework for protecting the human rights of the stateless people has not been fulfilled.

The two principles on which nationality is based in municipal law are: from a national perspective (*ius sanguinis*); and the fact of birth within State territory (*ius soli*). Many variations however exist. In this case, Taiwan exercises *ius sanguinis* rule since 1990's to grant ex-KMT refugees Taiwan citizenship, while Thailand implements *ius soli* to grant the target groups Thai nationality. Implementations of international laws, including human rights laws, hinge on how well nation-states approve international laws and internalize it to be domestic law.

According to the headmen of the two villages, 5% of the villagers of Mae Salong and 20-30 percent of the villagers of Santisuk are stateless, carrying highland refugee ID. Their freedom to move is limited in given districts, such as Mae Chan and Mae Fa Luang. Statelessness also severely impairs the political security of those who are in Taiwan. The KMT Nationalist government enrolled students from northern Thailand from early 1970s to 1994. During this period, the stateless ex-KMTs and their descendants were granted Taiwanese citizenship soon after arrival without considering whether they carried a valid identity from Thailand and Burma. But these rules have been restricted since 1994 and then abolished since the DPP's election in 2000, stranding many ex-KMT stateless people in Taiwan. As they had carried forged Thai passports to travel to Taiwan, they could not go back to Thailand. Yet, Taiwan does not sanction their stay, study and employment by granting them legal identity.

A few months after Ma Ying-jeou's successful election in 2008, there was a series of demonstrations in Taipei, asking for Taiwanese citizenship in response to the issue mentioned above. Such kinds of activities are still happening today, but have transformed from a dispersed form to an organized form with the help of Taiwanese NGOs. In 2009, the Nationalist government enacted a temporary management approach to legalize the stay of the stranded ex-KMT refugees in Taiwan without touching upon the issue of granting citizenship (Taipei News, 2008).

In addition, statelessness badly impairs the other human securities of the target groups in Thailand. First, the stateless ex-KMTs have no medical insurance from Thailand, but they are get sick, age, and need go to hospital often. In the case of Ajarn Ma, he had a stroke several years ago, and his symptoms are still torturing him as he does not have enough money for treatment. He cannot even stand up with stability, and totters his way with a stick very slowly. "See my stroked mouth? I have to use lot of strength to speak clearly to the students," sighed Ajarn Ma. Second, the stateless children are not given a chance to enter senior high schools of Thailand, let alone

university. Education is the determinant of many human securities, particularly economic security.

“Four of my ten children were born in 1960s and 1970s, but were only granted Thai citizenship in 2009. They have passed the age of education completely. Without good education, all of them can only work as cheap labors. I cannot complain to the Thai government; after all, my children and grand children are all Thais now. But just too late...” (Mr. Suo Jing-nan, personal interview, 15th June, 2011).

Third, drug trafficking and use, as well as associating with criminal organizations are undermining personal security and community security of the stateless individuals and their communities.

“Some households of backward villages like Sansituk have not citizenship, children don’t have enough education for formal employment, and parents are not entitled rights to use land to farm. Can you imagine how these people survive? Well, drug dealing is still an approach to income, while all ex-KMT villages disavow they have drug trafficking” (Mr. Zhang Xue-hai, online interview, July, 2011).

“Santisuk village in Mae Chan district of Chiang Rai is believed to be a major gateway for drug smuggling, and a place to launder dirty money...A number of villagers have been blacklisted by the Office of the Narcotics Control Board for being involved in the methamphetamine trade and sheltering Red Wa guerrillas from Mong Yawn of Burma, who are believed to smuggle the drugs into Thailand.” (Bangkok Post 2000).

6.8 Conclusion

The many issues involving the human security status of the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand well represents the complexity and interdependence of human security issues in post-Cold War Asia. The communal governance of the ex-KMT communities reveals that the bottom-up approach (or self-empowerment) of has some positive but limited effects on the human security status of the target groups. Human security demands prevention and inclusive consideration about diverse insecurities (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007), but the communal governance tends to be lagging and spontaneous. This is mainly because the target groups are located within the structural violence⁷ of the international political system, yet, the bottom-up approach is too dispersed in nature to confront these external and internal challenges.

⁷Galtung asserts that structural violence, as opposed to personal or direct violence, is indirect in that ,there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances (Galtung 1969).

CHAPTER VII

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Review of Findings

This thesis has argued that the human securities of the ex-KMT refugee communities in northern Thailand are determined by two main factors: the international-political transformation in post-Cold War Asia and the coping strategies of the ex-KMT communities. These two factors are mutually complementary yet counteractive in shaping and posing impacts on the human securities of the target groups. The discussion is based on Kenneth Waltz's international-political systems theory, modified by the systems theory of neo-liberalism. In the following paragraphs, the discussions and research findings of the previous chapters are reviewed.

Chapter 3 dealt with the international-political transformation in post-Cold War Asia. The "international-political system" in this thesis is defined by what exactly shaped the human security fate of the ex-KMT refugee communities, including policies, activities and interactions of Taiwan, the PRC, the U.S. and Thailand in regards to the target groups (ex-KMT communities). The first finding is that the international-political system has indeed transformed due to the changed capabilities and functioning of the PRC, Taiwan, Thailand and the U.S. The amelioration of the Sino-U.S. relationship was analyzed by application of the game theory. The second finding is that the vicissitude of the unification and separation of China is also the determinant of Mainland-Taiwan relationship in spite of international political system factors functions.

In light of these factors, Waltz's structural theory incompletely explains the Mainland-Taiwan linkage and underestimates the impact of internal factors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The attitude of the Mainland to Taiwan was not only mitigated by vanishing ideological hostility, but also by the growing desire for Chinese territorial integration and defense. In comparison, the stance of Taiwan is less stable and consistent because of the replacement of political parties. While the KMT has gradually played down the ideology of anti-communism, the DPP's election in 2000 signifies the rise of geo-demographic nationalism that sets more uncertainty in the cross-strait relationship.

The discussion of Chapter 4 focuses on the impacts of the international-political transformation on the target groups. This section finds that it is the altered national interest, particularly national security that drove engaged parties to implement new policies towards the ex-KMT refugee communities in northern Thailand. For the U.S, the ex-KMT remnants lost the role of anti-communist freedom fighters insofar as the U.S. no longer held communists as a threat to the survival of the country and its Asian alliances in early 1970s. Furthermore, the growing problem of domestic drug addiction by war veterans, increasingly undermining public health in the States, drove Washington to push Thailand to contain the drug dealings of the ex-KMT guerrillas.

To Taiwan, the vital interest in retaking the Mainland faded from 1971 onward when Taiwan's United Nations seat was supplanted by the Mainland. But the Nationalist government established a new intelligence army; this led to the disbanding of the Third Army and Fifth Army due to the issues of distrust and funding exhaustion in the two armies. The finding here is that retaking the Mainland was not removed from the list of the KMT government's interests until the rise of indigenous nationalism of the Fujianese that purports an entirely separate identity from the Mainland. Another finding is that Taiwanese non-government forces (NGOs) are playing a contributive role in empowering the target groups. This strengthens Ogata's

argument that civil societies bear responsibility in the protection-empowerment framework of human security.

The vital interest of Thailand during the whole 1970s was in eradicating the Miao Communists. This gave some ex-KMT guerrillas an opportunity to struggle for Thai citizenship and land for resettlement by fighting for Thailand. One finding here is that the Thai government implemented economic preference policies to the ex-KMT communities that eradicated opium in order to secure its own national security in public health and encourage funding from the U.S. Another finding is that the two-pronged diplomacy of Thailand to the Mainland of China and Taiwan gave increasingly positive ramifications for the ex-KMTs. As for the impact from the PRC, the thesis finds that Mainland China is willing to help the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand since the latter no longer endanger the territorial security of the former.

On the issue of the advocacy of the ex-KMTs to the relevant parties (Chapter 5), I subscribe to Zolberg's theory of "refugee warrior" and Teun A. Van Dijk's theory of ideology. The relationship of the ex-KMTs with Taiwan in the post-Cold War era illustrates an extension of the theory of refugee warrior. The ambivalence of the ex-KMT refugee communities' relationship with Taiwan attests that the refugee warriors are not entirely obedient to the regime that they used to champion. From the narratives of informants, it is discerned that the General Duan's Third and Fifth Army irritated Taipei by successive acts of disobedience. Taiwan severed all financial assistance to the two armies and the dependent villages at the end of 1960s. After the deaths of General Duan and General Li, the relationship of the ex-KMT refugee communities with Taiwan stepped into a new age under which Taiwanese NGOs took the place of Nationalist government in promoting the livelihood and economic development of the ex-KMT communities in northern Thailand.

The previous intelligence army was more obedient than the two armies mentioned previously, but less concerned in many respects with human security. From the narratives of the informants, it is determined that the task of gathering intelligence and illiteracy are the two drivers counting for the less concerned situation of Santisuk (intelligence Army). Another finding is that the ideological loyalty to the Nationalist government, countering Taiwanese separationism and the desire for Taiwanese citizenship were the three main strategies that characterized the nature of the target groups as refugee warriors, even though they demilitarized at the end of 1980s. Still, all in-depth interviewees and random respondents from Mae Salong and Santisuk expressed dismay at Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian's separationism, claiming their loyalty to the unification of China by ROC. Several demonstrations of the stateless ex-KMT refugees have occurred since Ma Ying-jeou's election in 2008, asking for citizenship of the ROC and the right to education and employment in Taiwan.

For Thailand, the ex-KMT guerrillas demonstrate the capability to attain self-empowerment as refugee warriors. To find sanctuary in Thailand for resettlement, they transformed into international anti-Communist volunteers during the 1970s. Comparisons between Third and Fifth Army and the intelligence army in their efforts to build ties with the Thai military and government leads to the finding that the Fifth Army, closer to the Thai government and military, achieved better results in obtaining Thai nationality, economic development and institutional integration.

As for the relationship with Mainland China, the thesis finds that the attitudes and practices of different communities are divergent. Concepts and theories about intelligence work by Abram Shulsky, Michael Warner and John Dziak are applied in this section to demonstrate the relationship between the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand and Mainland China. The PRC used to be highly alert to the presence of ex-KMT guerrillas, as the intelligence collection by the guerrillas (not only by the

intelligence army, but also by the Third and Fifth Army) had not been extinguished until the 1990s (Lintner, interview, 4th July 2011).

The responses of the PRC to the continuous intelligence activities of the ex-KMT are not only counterintelligence activities, but also the exercise of “United Front”, which directly favors refugee communities with rich educational resources. The finding is that community feedback differs regarding the education resources from the Mainland. Moreover, the divergent responses are due to ideological and practical considerations. Teun A. Dijk’s theory of ideology and its causal relationship with social practices sheds light on why the ex-KMT communities in northern Thailand retain the anti-communism discourse of the Cold War while Taiwan has officially shown willingness to improve its relationship with Mainland China. But the imbalanced distribution of education and infrastructure resources are giving rise to different voices. For the less-aided communities, leaders and villagers care less whether their resources are from Taiwan or the Mainland, as long as the resources are sustainable and beneficial for school construction, for example. One more finding in this section is that the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand love Mainland China as most of them were derived from Yunnan Province. They are happy to visit the prosperous physical fatherland, albeit adhere to the spiritual fatherland of ROC simultaneously. Fighting with Khun Sa has not only guaranteed the dominance of the ex-KMT guerrillas in drug dealings during the given history, but also affected the communities’ security until Khun Sa surrendered to Yangon in 1996.

The investigation of Chapter 6 describes communal governance and its human security impacts on the ex-KMT communities in community, economic, education and nationality dimensions. Sadako Ogata’s bottom-up approach of the protection-empowerment model is applied to analyze how communal governance can boost or undermine the human security of the target groups.

7.2 Conclusions

In retrospect, the ex-KMTs might be the singular example in which the official militaries of one nation-state that was compelled into the international conflicts directly. Through the extensive literature review and analysis, the target groups' human security questions, problems and contexts were identified through the critical lens of structures, processes and finally formations of international-political transformation in post-Cold War Asia.

Granted that the transformation of the regional system is largely responsible for shaping the human security fate of the target communities, the domestic affairs of China, particularly Mainland-Taiwan and KMT-DPP relationships, well deserve attention. The unification-separation dichotomy regulation of China is an internal trigger-point and still impacts the human security status of the target groups through integrating or splitting China. Certainly, the current issue is likely more complex, especially in light of the resettlement of the ex-KMTs in the host country.

Compared to the dominance of the international transformation theory in shaping the human security fate of the target groups, the coping strategies of the ex-KMT refugee communities matter far less in affecting their own human securities. Advocacy to the relevant parties enabled the target groups to acquire survival and development assistance that promoted their human security status. Yet, the communal governance by the respective leaderships has had very limited effects on the interrelated human securities of the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand.

However, the coping strategies of the communities did somewhat benefit the human securities of the target groups, which also are regarded as successful self-empowerment experiences. This is not only attributed to the forethought of the

previous military leaders, but also to the momentum of the international politics involved. To secure survival, they posed themselves actively on the „grand chessboard“ of the nation-states, transforming identities from warriors to refugee warriors, military remnants to returnees, and international volunteers to resettlement migrants. With these coping strategies to the intentional transformation, the ex-KMTs in northern Thailand delineate themselves from the Zomians¹ of James Scott, who marginalize themselves voluntarily in the region.

As the context of the Cold War is removed, the coping strategies of the Cold War legacy (the ex-KMTs) will be futile sooner or later. And their human security status will predominantly rely on the impacts of the external factors that are beyond nation-states. In sum, the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand outline an unusual migration history. Along with demilitarization and the vanishing old generation, they have mostly integrated into the host state. Their self-empowerment strategies set their foothold for their human security position, and booming civil societies are contributing to improving the human security status of the communities. Still, the ex-KMT“s protection from the relevant states“ influences, protection by their own resources or by the country of their residence, remains insufficient at this time. Empowerment of the ex-KMTs may only really take place with more economic development as well as the rights conferred by citizenship.

¹ Zomia is a geographical term coined in 2002 by historian Willem van Schendel of the University of Amsterdam to refer to the huge massif of mainland Southeast Asia that has historically been beyond the control of governments based in the population centers of the lowlands. The name is from Zomi, a term for highlander common to several related Tibeto-Burman languages spoken in the India-Bangladesh-Burma border area.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

A CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1965: The intelligence army formed.

1968-1970: Four meetings between the Thai and Taiwanese governments were organized to discuss the issue of the Third and Fifth Armies. Li and Duan rejected to give up their forces and go to Taiwan. The Nationalist government finally informs the Thai government that it would no longer take any responsibility for the two armies.

1970-1974: At the end of 1970, the Thai government requested Li and Duan to help combat the Miao Communists in the country. Up to 1972, their troops controlled most of the areas frequented by the Miao Communists in Mt. Phamong, Mt. Yaw and Mt. Luang. Two dependent villages, Phatang and Mae Aeb, were established in 1974 for the families of the stationed soldiers of the two armies. General Li Mi passed away in Taipei in 1973.

1975: The Thai government ended its diplomacy with the Nationalist government in Taiwan and established political links with Communist China. The intelligence army disbanded. Part of the soldiers and weapons were integrated into Khun Sa's forces.

1978: Khmer Rouge controlled part of mountainous region on Thai-Cambodia border. The Supreme Command of Royal Thai Army summoned Duan Xi-Wen and Li Wen-huan emergently for sending Army 5 and Army 3 again for fighting the Communists

in central Thailand. Military officers to Thailand of 16 states visited the anti-Communist front.

1979-1982: The PRC officially claimed stopped all personal and military assistances to Thai Communists. Army 3 and Army 5 sent ex-KMT military remnants captured Mt. Khaw Ya and Khaw Khor in Petchabun Province in 1981. All Thai Communists surrendered by 1982.

1980: General Duan Xi-wen passed away in Bangkok. Lei Yu-Tian succeeded control over Army 5.

1982: FCRA, a semi-official organization which works closely with the Nationalist government in Taiwan sent a service group, composed of a number of experts in agriculture, education, medical care and handicrafts, to northern Thailand. The group has been there to provide aid program to the Yunnanese Chinese refugees.

1984: Ministry of Interior succeeded the Thanization issue of the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand.

1987-1989: The Fifth Army was disbanded in 1987, and the Third Army in 1989.

1990: Movie *A home too far (Yiyu)* displayed.

APPENDIX B

PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS OF SELECTED INTERVIEWEES OF

SANTISUK

No	Name	Birth place	Age	Sex	Ethni-city	Education	Thai lang. ability	ID.
1	Yang Guo-qin	Yunnan	61	M	Han	Chinese secondary	Poor	Stateless (highland Refugee)
2	Mrs. Yang Guo-qin	Yunnan	57	F	Han	Chinese Primary	Poor	Stateless (Highland refugee)
3	Ms. Yang	Santisuk	31	F	Han	Thai senior high & Chinese secondary	Good	Thai (granted in 2008)
4	Ajarn Ma	Lashio, Burma	57	M	Han	Chinese secondary	Poor	Stateless (Highland refugee)
5	Ajarn Han	Yunnan	58	M	Han	Chinese secondary	Poor	Stateless (highland refugee)
6	Ajarn Wu	Lashio, Burma	28	M	Han	Chinese senior high	good	Stateless

7	Ai Bu-le	Ximeng, Yunnan	N/A	M	Wa	Illiterate	Poor	Stateless (highland refugee)
8	Mrs. Ai Bu-le	Lincang, Yunnan	54	F	Han	Chinese primary	Poor	Thai (granted in 2007)
9	Miss Ai	Santisuk	29	F	Wa	Bachelor of law (Chiang Mai University)	Good	Thai (since birth)
10	Cai Wen-zhong	Ximeng, Yunnan	N/A (> 75)	M	Wa	Illiterate	Poor	Stateless (Highland Refugee)
11	Suo Jing-nan	Ximeng, Yunnan	N/A >75	M	Wa	Illiterate	Poor	Stateless (Highland Refugee)
12	Ai Xiao-shi	Ximeng, Yunnan	74	M	Wa	Illiterate	Poor	Stateless (Highland Refugee)
13	Li Yu-xian	Lincang, Yunnan	67	F	Han	Illiterate	Poor	Thai (granted in 2009)
14	Ajarn Zhou	Lashio, Burma	59	M	Han	Secondary Chinese	Poor	Stateless (highland refugee)
15	Xi Shui	N/A	N/A	M	Wa	Illiterate	Poor	Stateless (highland refugee)

APPENDIX C

PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS OF SELECTED INTERVIEWEES OF MAE

SALONG

No.	Name	Birth place	Age	Sex	Education	Thai Lang. ability	ID.
1	Zhang Guo-qiang	Lashio, Burma	57	M	Chinese secondary & Thai senior high	Good	Thai (since 1985)
2	Mr. Wang	Lashio, Burma	59	M	Chinese secondary & Thai senior high	Good	Thai (since 1985)
3	Miss. Lei	Mae Salong	>40	F	Chinese secondary & Thai senior high	Good	Thai (since 1987)
4	Zhang Guo-qin	Pu'er Yunnan	78	F	Chinese primary	poor	Thai since 1999)
5	Miss Yang	Mae Salong	30	F	B.A of diplomacy, Chularlongkorn University) & Chinese senior high	Good	Thai (since 1987)
6	Ajarn Zhou	Mae Salong	>40	M	Chinese Senior high in Taiwan	Good	Thai(since 1986)
7	Ajarn Shen	Mae Salong	>45	F	Chinese Senior high in Taiwan	Good	Thai (since 1990's)
8	Ajarn Li	Mae Salong	>40	M	Senior high in Taiwan	Fair	Thai (since 1990's)

9	Miss. Wang	Kengtung, Burma	19	F	Burmese secondary	poor	Stateless (applying Thai citizenship)
10	An Aka girl	Kengtung, Burma	16	F	Illiterate	Poor	Stateless (applying for Thai citizenship)
11	Miss. Li	Mae Salong	<25	F	University in Taiwan	Good	Taiwanese & Thai

BIOGRAPHY

Ms. Tong Lei was born in Beijing, the People's Republic of China. She obtained a Bachelor of English Literature from the Institute of Tourism, Beijing Union University. After ten years of diligently working for world famous tourism companies, specializing in marketing towards customers in the United States, she went to the U.S for her graduate-level education, and a year later transferred to Thailand for international development studies.

She was always interested in the migration history of the ex-KMT refugees in northern Thailand, and took her own trip to visit the ex-KMT refugee villages before beginning her graduate studies. With her strong interest in the ex-KMTs and her willingness to help the target groups in terms of human rights and human security, Ms.Tong joined the Master's of Arts in International Development Studies at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok in 2010. This provided her with an academic platform to access the target groups in her field research in June 2011.