

THE IMPACTS OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON INTER-
KOREAN RELATIONSHIP (1971-1976)

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ผลกระทบของการสานสัมพันธ์ระหว่างสาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนกับสหรัฐอเมริกา
ต่อความสัมพันธ์ของสองเกาหลี (1971-1976)



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จงหัว ชุน : ผลกระทบของการสานสัมพันธ์ระหว่างสาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนกับสหรัฐอเมริกา ต่อความสัมพันธ์ของสองเกาหลี (1971-1976) (THE IMPACTS OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON INTER-KOREAN RELATIONSHIP (1971-1976)) อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก: ศ. กิตติคุณ ดร. ไชยวัฒน์ คำชู, 67 หน้า.

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้ประเมินผลกระทบของการสานสัมพันธ์ระหว่างสาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนกับสหรัฐต่อความสัมพันธ์ของสองเกาหลี ช่วงระหว่างปี ค.ศ.1971 ถึง 1976 โดยการใช้ทฤษฎีเกมเป็นกรอบของการวิเคราะห์โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งเกมความลำบากใจของนักโทษเพื่อสร้างตัวแบบความลำบากใจของผู้นำประเทศเกาหลีเหนือและผู้นำของประเทศเกาหลีใต้ ผลการศึกษาที่สำคัญพบว่า (1) การสานสัมพันธ์ระหว่างสหรัฐกับจีนในช่วงต้นทศวรรษ 1970 เป็นโอกาสในเชิงภาวะวิสัยให้เกาหลีเหนือและเกาหลีใต้ทอดความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างกัน ซึ่งตั้งแต่นั้นมีข้อตกลงหยุดยิงในสงครามเกาหลี เกาหลีเหนือและเกาหลีใต้มีความพยายามคืนดีกันเป็นครั้งแรกใน ค.ศ. 1971 แต่การคืนดีกันระหว่างสองฝ่ายนี้ดำเนินมาได้เพียงห้าปี ความสัมพันธ์ของสองประเทศก็กลับมาขัดแย้งกันอีกครั้งในปี ค.ศ. 1976 (2) โดยการวิเคราะห์เกมความลำบากใจของผู้นำเกาหลีทั้งสองฝ่าย ได้แสดงให้เห็นว่า การคงความตึงเครียดบนคาบสมุทรเกาหลีเป็นทางเลือกที่มีเหตุผลที่สุด (3) หลังทบทวนข้อเท็จจริงทางประวัติศาสตร์และผลได้ผลเสียของการลดความตึงเครียดบนคาบสมุทรเกาหลี วิทยานิพนธ์นี้ได้พิสูจน์ให้เห็นแม้ว่าประเทศเกาหลีทั้งสองฝ่ายเลือกที่จะหันหน้าเข้าหากันในช่วง ค.ศ. 1971 ถึง 1976 แต่ความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างทั้งสองฝ่ายประสบกับปัญหาอุปสรรคอันเป็นผลมาจาก ทางเลือกที่ดีที่สุดของความลำบากใจของผู้นำเกาหลีทั้งสองประเทศนี้ คือ การคงความขัดแย้งต่อไป และ (4) การประยุกต์ใช้ทฤษฎีเกมเป็นเครื่องมือในการวิเคราะห์ความขัดแย้งบนคาบสมุทรเกาหลีเป็นประโยชน์ต่อการทำความเข้าใจความสัมพันธ์ของสองเกาหลีในปัจจุบัน

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This thesis examines the impacts of the rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on inter-Korean relationship during 1971-1976. It employs the Game Theory as framework for analysis, particularly, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game to build a model of the two Korean Leaders' Dilemma. The central findings of this thesis are: 1) the rapprochement between China and the US objectively provided an opportunity for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to move towards détente. Since the Armistice of Korea War, the first reconciliation between North and South Korea happened in 1971; However, its reconciliation between two Koreas lasted only five years and then broke up again after 1976; 2) by analyzing the matrix of the Two Korean Leaders' Dilemma, it is shown that maintaining the tension on the Korean Peninsula was the most rational choice to make; 3) after reviewing the historical facts and the cost of reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula, the thesis proves that even though the two Koreas chose to approach each other during 1971-1976, this relationship suffered a setback as a result of the best option of the Two Korea Leaders' Dilemma which is to maintain in conflict; 4) Applying the Game Model as a heuristic device to analyze conflict in the Korean Peninsula was useful for understanding the current Inter-Korean relationship.

Field of Study: Korean Studies

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the 1940s, the main global geopolitical structure was already shaped and strengthened by two blocs, one led by the United States of America (henceforth abbreviated to U.S.), and the other one led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) as the two superpowers. This tension state between the two super powers before 1991 was well-known as the Cold War. As an outcome of the ideological and political conflicts between the two blocs, the former Japanese colony, Korea, who was under the Allies' trusteeship, was divided into two parts: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K. or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (R.O.K. or South Korea). The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Communist Bloc. Consequently, the two Germanys reunified peacefully. However, two Koreas remained the same as two separated states.

In 2016, another remarkable year for East Asian countries and region, the Asia-Pacific Rebalance Policy initiated by the 44th American President Barack Obama, which played a key role engaging in the regional international relationship, came to an end. A former businessman, Donald Trump has elected as the 45th American president, who does not seem inclined to continue Obama's foreign policy routine. Hence, it is hard to predict whether he will continue the rebalancing foreign policy in

Asia or not.

Meanwhile, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) has grown to be a huge economic power with the second largest GDP in the world. Their military power corresponds with the high economic growth. Also, in Chinese Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party seized power and tended to cooperate with the U.S. and Japan to conflict on the reunification progress of "One China."

Compared with those unstable cases, the Korean Peninsula suffered the impact of every regional security crises. North Korea has a young leader Kim Jong Un insisting on carrying on serious nuclear tests even if the international community puts serious sanctions on North Korea. Kim Jong Un props up the hate propaganda toward South Korean and the American government, and Kim Jong Un stirs up troubles on the regional issues of East Asia. In contrast, South Korea had a flexible and capricious foreign policy during the Park Geun-hye Administration. For instance, the Sino-Korean relationship reached a peak when Park Geun-hye visited Beijing during the Celebration of Anti-Fascism Military Parade in 2015. After the continuous North Korean nuclear testing in 2016, the bilateral relationship of Sino-Korea worsened after Park Geun-hye decided to satisfy the need for self-defense and install THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea. By installing THAAD, South Korean and the U.S. can strengthen their military alliance again. Meanwhile, the Japan-Korean relationship was also tested by the disputed island (Dokdo 독도) and

the comfort women issues, combining with the sharing of military intelligence issue. In May 2017, South Korean voted for a new president, Moon Jae-in, who was from the progressive party that once started the détente with North Korea. However under the nuclear shadow, both the Koreas returned to a period when mutual distrust and negative treatment occupied the entire Peninsula. Is conflict the only scenario to deal with this tense moment?

1.1 Historical Background

After the Second World War, the Allies liberated Korea from the Japanese colonist governance. However, under the trusteeship, Korea was not truly independent yet. Instead, the Korean Peninsula was divided at the 38th Parallel and controlled by the U.S and U.S.S.R respectively. Later on, the Wartime Alliance of the Second World War broke down. Thus the U.S and U.S.S.R. became enemies. The two Korean governments with different political ideology accordingly failed to construct a unified Korean national state. As a result, South Korea, and soon after North Korea, were founded as two independent countries in 1948, despite both Koreas claimed the official sovereignty of the full Korean Peninsula. Following the foundation of two Koreas, North and South Korea joined their ideological camps.

With the will to reunify the Peninsula and the ambition character of the Communist expansion, North Korea suddenly attacked South Korea overwhelmingly

in 1950, which started a three years' regional war. However, the "civil war" of the two Koreas unsurprisingly was converted into a superpowers' proxy war that included not only the two Korean armies but also the troops and supports from the two blocs (Eberstadt, 2001). In 1953, neither side could triumph over the other side. Eventually, the two sides agreed to an armistice in the Korean Peninsula. This armistice reached broader than of two Koreas as one of another severely strained battlefield in the frame of the Cold War. Since then the reunification or sovereign competition constituted the major dynamic relationship between two Koreas.

During the 1950s, the U.S. was the only global super power with both the financial capacity and the armed force to lead the Western Bloc or Capitalist Bloc. Using the Marshall Plan, the U.S. affected the economy of the Western European countries. Meanwhile, the U.S. mobilized anti-Communists with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to defend them against the Eastern Bloc. In other words, the U.S. was the virtual commander of the NATO troops and the Western Bloc.

The anti-Communist countries appeared to be a monolithic entity, some countries like Western Germany and South Korea maintained the Hallsteinⁱ- Doctrine. which means any countries keeping diplomatic relationships with Eastern Germany or North Korea could not build up a relationship with either Western Germany or South Korea. Western Germany and South Korea followed the U.S to determine their diplomatic affairs. Within the Western Bloc, some other nations like France (1958),

Canada (1970) and Italy (1970) broke the Cold War frame and established diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. (Kimiya, 2011).

After struggling fiercely during the Vietnam War, American president Richard Nixon presented a speech in Guam in 1969. He stated that the U.S. should reduce its security contribution to Asia and shift American force from Asian countries to Europe and the Middle East, and let Asian countries be in charge of their security. This statement is well known as the political definition of the Nixon Doctrine. Because of this new American tendency, all the American Asian-Pacific Allies had to adjust their foreign policy to adapt the changing environment (Do, 2016).

In contrast to the Western Bloc, the members of the Eastern Bloc or Communist Bloc were suspicious, mostly of the U.S.S.R., and the bloc was irrational in dealing with its internal relationships. Due to the hegemonic control by the U.S.S.R., intractable “little-brothers” could be punished directly by a military attack, such as Czechoslovakia in the period of the Prague Spring. No doubt that when the P.R.C. joined the nuclear possessor club, China was increasingly threatened by the U.S.S.R. As a result, the relationship between the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. worsened. The political and ideological dissidence between the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. deteriorated into border clashes, which led the P.R.C. to consider easing the tensed relationship with the U.S. Moreover, during that time, the P.R.C. suffered from the Cultural Revolution and diplomatic isolation. For this reason, in 1969 the Foreign Minister of

the P.R.C., Chen Yi, stated that China should utilize the contradictory relationship between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to improve the Sino-US relationship. Thus, since 1970 the Chinese government put forward an unconventional policy to break out from the diplomatic stalemate with the U.S. and finally launched “the Ping-pong Diplomacy” (Shen, 2014).

Coincidentally, not only did the P.R.C. attempt to launch the rapprochement, but the U.S. also welcomed it due to the American desire to wind down the Vietnam War. Therefore, Nixon took a chance to negotiate secretly and made a rapprochement with the P.R.C. consequently then the P.R.C. was recognized by the United Nations as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.” It created a great stir among the Western Bloc.

Even though South Koreans realized that Communist China would replace Nationalist China in the UN eventually, but they did not expect it to become a reality rapidly. In just one year, Nixon formally but secretly visited China and launched the process of a diplomatic rapprochement. Furthermore, as the other opponent of China in the Korean War, South Korean President Park Chung-hee also deemed this changing position could lead to an unbalanced situation on the Korean Peninsula, which might increase the position of North Korea (Wang, 2011).

Another active member of Eastern Bloc- North Korea - successfully sustained a balance between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. and as a result, was supported by both

countries after the armistice of the Korean War. At the end of the 1960s, with the powerful military assistance provided by Leonid Brezhnev, after restoring the relationship with Chinese Communist Party, Kim Il-sung became confident and even aggressive on both the economic and the military field. After South Korean former president Syngman Rhee resigned from his presidency in 1960, Kim Il-sung proposed a reunification solution: that both Koreas participate in a Korean Federation (W. 崔. Choi, 1989). However, Chyung Ilhyeong, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea reacted that whether the reunification between two Koreas happened or not, or Korea should not absorb the other one into its regime. Moreover, even if there would be a sort of reunification, the form of the country should be democratic, in which a general election among all the Korean people living in the Peninsula should set for a unified National Assembly under the supervision of the U.N. (Wei, 2008).

As Park Chung-hee led a coup d'état and took over the power of South Korean government in 1961, Kim Il-sung assessed that the U.S. organized the coup for smashing the people's movement and preparing for war, and later deemed that South Korean fascist overthrow the government. (German Democratic Republic, 1961) Kim Il-sung set about agitating for the Southern Korean citizens to overthrow the Park Chung-hee administration. He also sent a guerrilla force in an attempt to assassinate the ruling elite class of the Southern authority, like the Blue House Raid (also known as January 21 Incident). Sometimes North Korean soldiers called for the conflict

around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and killed both American and South Korean soldiers. The situation was similar to the one before the Korean War broke out in the sense that the border conflicts and skirmishes between the two Koreas increased sharply (Park, 2009). Also, North Korea challenged the patience of the U.S. by capturing the American spy ship USS Pueblo (AGER-2) and shooting down the EC-121M Warning Star, a radar surveillance aircraft of the U.S Navy in 1969.

Meanwhile, South Korea obtained precious support by establishing a diplomatic relationship with Japan from 1965 and by dispatching the army force to fight in the Vietnam War with the U.S. When the secret rapprochement between the U.S. and the P.R.C. disclosed, Park Chung-hee could not just sit back. He also regarded the situation as a trigger to change the diplomatic position of South Korea from no-touch with the Red regimes to a pragmatic approach(Do, 2016).

Consequently, on August 15th, 1970, Park Chung-hee took the opportunity of the 25th anniversary of the National Liberation Day Celebration Speech to propose that the Korean Peninsula reunited peacefully. At first, North Korea did not react to Park's speech until the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai acknowledged Kim Il-sung that Henry Kissinger secretly visited China. (Shen, 2014) In August of 1971, Kim Il-sung announced that "we are ready to establish contact at any time with all political parties, including the Democratic Republican Party, and all social and individual personages in South Korea."(Oberdorfer, 1998) in the title of "*The Revolutionary*

Peoples of Asia Will Win in their Common Struggles Against US Imperialism” (Chae, 2014)

Since the armistice of the Korean War signed eighteen years, the rivalries between North and South Korea, both of them changed into a willingness to negotiate at the first time, and then a tentative contact with each other was formally launched, using the Red-Cross Society of both Korea as a link. In the next year, the two Korea agreed on the July 4th, 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué with three main principles in conclusion:

1. Unify two Korea without foreign interference.
2. Unify peacefully.
3. Transcend the differences but value national unity("DOCUMENT RETRIEVAL of The July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué," 1972).

Some researchers believe that “America’s détente with China brought two other enemies to the table: North and South Korea” (Do, 2016). Dramatically, in 1976, the relationship between two Korea broke apart again overwhelmingly due to the Axe Murder Incident or the so-called as the Panmunjom Incident.

1.2 Purpose of Research

For a better understanding of the recent Inter Korean relationship, Game Theory is mainly used as a method to analyze this Inter-Korean Relationship Studies.

Under the rapprochement between the P.R.C. and U.S, it discovers that: 1) how the two leaders from North Korea and South Korea were able to deal with the historical turning point and adjust their foreign policy to survive at the beginning of the 1970s. 2) How the duration of 1971 to 1976 becomes an important period for the inter-Korean relationship. 3) why the conflicts between two Koreas returned in 1976. Compared with those historical experiences, this thesis would explain the status quo of the inter-Korean relationship from 1971 to 1976, and try to draw a lesson from the attempts of détente in the 1970s.

1.3 Questions

Considering that Park Chung-hee was one of the most vibrant anti-Communism leaders and Kim Il-sung was one of the deifying Communist leaders in their time, why they started to have a direct bilateral dialogue of reunification in 1971? After five years why they gave up the dialogue in 1976?

With the above question, this paper attempts to integrate the chronic inter-Korean issues from 1971 to 1976 into one issue and analyze why the two Koreas had to come into conflict after a short period of rapprochement by applying Prisoners' Dilemma. This research starts from the East Asian historical background, and then apply the Game Theory to testify about the history of two Koreas inter-relationship in the 1970s.

1.4 Hypothesis

The dialogue on unification between two Koreas started in 1971 due to the rapprochement between the U.S. and China. However, the dialogue failed to sustain after 1976, owing to the two Korean Leaders' dilemma by calculating their military, economic and international relationships costs.



CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Inter-Korean Relationship (1971-1976)

The inter-relationship between the two Koreas is the subject often talked about in various academic works. The subject has been looked from various angles thoroughly. In various references, it found that a “One Korea” Policy used to be the main principle applied by both Koreas. Accordingly, the reunification of the Korean Peninsula and the governing legitimization of each Korea were the twin problems between the two Koreas. Thereby when talking about the Inter-Korean relationships in the 1970s, reunification and legitimization cannot be ignored. Rather, the subjects have repeatedly emerged. Obviously, most of the researchers have tried to uncover the relationship between economic and political aspects. In contrast, only a few of the researchers discuss the subject from cultural and civic communication aspects. Therefore, most of the studies interpreted the relationship, which merely exists as a formal official relationship between the two governments.

There are three books named “*Korea and the World, beyond the Cold War,*” “*Korea’s Future and the Great Powers*” and “*The Two Koreas and the Great Powers.*” They all provided a basic source for observing the inter-Korean relationship from politics, economics, defense and foreign policy under the influence of the four

major Great Powers: the U.S, China, Russia and Japan from the Cold War to the period of After Cold War. In “*Korea and the World, beyond the Cold War,*” there are details of several contradictions between the two Koreas:

1, Domestic political concerns and constituency support overriding foreign and security policy agendas.

2, Economic interests emerging as greater than political and security interests.

3, Multilateral diplomacy and institutions gaining prominence as a regional forum for policy coordination and adjustment. (Kihl, 1994)

Meanwhile, the security order in the bipolar system complicated the Greater Regional order and produced issues beyond the natural two rival parts of the Peninsula, These influences determined by the major powers such as US, China, Russia and Japan (Kihl, 1994).

Shen Zihua wrote an article with the name “*Facing a historical opportunity: the Sino-U.S. Rapprochement and the Sino-North Korean relations 1971-1974*”. It depicted the reaction of D.R.P.K. to the historical moment of the rapprochement between the U.S and China. Shen Zihua mentioned when Kim Il-sung first learnt that China shifted towards amicable relationship with the U.S, he felt betrayed by his Chinese Ally. Later he changed his attitude and regarded that rapprochement as a

bargaining with the U.S., in which North Korea could also improve the relationship with South Korea, at least decreasing the tension on the Korean Peninsula. However, Kim Il-sung over-estimated the North Korean international position and the negotiation between the U.S. and P.R.C on the topic of Korean security problem. Kim Il-sung's unrealistic expectation of the reunification had a negative impact on the result of the Chinese diplomatic effort on North Korea-US relationship and the efforts for a long-term détente with South Korea. (Shen, 2014)

A Korean researcher Chae Ria's "Diplomatic War: Inter-Korean Relations in the 1970s" is a newly published article which included a summary of the previous studies about the topic of the Inter-Korean relationship. Chae Ria concluded the past research could divide into three categories: 1) analyzing the foreign policies of both Koreas; 2) discussing the effect of the two Korean dialogue; 3) analyzing the security tension of the incidents during the 1970s. With the materials she used, she divided the period into three parts: 1971-1972 starting the dialogue; 1973-1974 abandoning the dialogue and 1975-1976 the way back to aggressive statements and accusations. As a result, she indicated that the truth of the bilateral dialogue period was covered up by the name of "Reunify Attempt," but eventually turned out to be a period of fierce competition or "diplomatic war" (Chae, 2014).

Another Chinese historian Cao Zhongping mentioned four domestic factors affecting on the Inter-relationship between two Koreas with three questions, which

also inspired other researchers to review the Inter-relationship between the two Koreas of the 1970s from a Chinese perspective. He mentioned

1, when the two Korea leaders faced the reunification issue, which one would be the determining factor, the whole Korean national interest or each hierarchy group's interest?

2, when the two Koreas decide to talk to each other, is the decision a tactical option or a strategic transformation?


3, what is the major consideration for the rapprochement between two Koreas? Political factors, or economic factors?

4, when the two Korea would like to negotiate and improve their bilateral relationship, should there be a unilateral or a multilateral approach, should the government dominate all of the communication?

In this article, those Cao's questions will be considered and developed from the previous studies(Cao, 2005).

Compared to the previous works, they all have some limitation on the aspect of the selection of documents, due to the language obstacles. Shen Zhihua has used the published Chinese documents and the previous Communist Countries decoded archives, while also taking the American National Security Council (NSC)'s archives as a reference. Moreover, Chae Ria has mainly used abundant archives from the U.S.

and South Korea in both the English and Korean language. Because she could not read in Chinese, the weak point of her paper was that it lacked the Chinese perspective. Cao Zhongping had his master degree from North Korea so that he could observe North Korea from its internal situation. However, the study of North Korea was sensitive in China, especially analyzing the relationship between North Korean and China. Even though both Shen and Cao's work are objective and trustful, comprehensively, they cannot be critical to present the real Korean problem. With the resources from the Chinese, English, Korean and Japanese languages, it adopts various national perspectives, so that this thesis will overcome the deficiency of the previous works.



2.2 Game Theory and two Koreas

There are also several models of Inter-Korean relationship depicted by Game Theory that can derive from various types of games using the historical background from the Korean War to the recent Nuclear Crisis. Some of them used the terms like “firm” and “moderate” to describe the relationship between the two Koreas in the matrix (Unsigned, 2014). However, a book named *The Road from Estrangement to Reconciliation* used the terms like “estrangement” and “reconciliation” could be illuminating to paint my matrix of the Inter-Korean relationship.

Amongst those Inter-Korean relationship articles that applied with Game Theory, Mushakoji Khinhide, at Sophia University in Tokyo, published an article presenting the reunification issues of two Koreas and the external powers affecting the Korean reunification by applying a Game Theory model. As reunification issues were the determining factor for the two Koreas during the Cold War, any discussion of the inter relationship research for the 1970s cannot avoid touching on reunification. In the article, Mushakoji tried to build a model for the main players- the two Korean governments with their respective allies.

Mushakoji considered the two Koreas and their allies as four players and set it as two Prisoners' Dilemma with the idea that although the two Koreas are independent decision makers, the allies or bloc behind them linked to hegemonic concern. In the setting of the game, each player has two choices: violent or peaceful,

presented as V or P. Hence, considered the possible choice of each bloc; the players will face four options, i.e. V-V, V-P, P-V, and P-P. When all players made the decision simultaneously, there are 10 possible outcomes in a game matrix that explained all the 10 outcomes or circumstances which could happen in reality (Mushakoji 1970).

By analyzing the meta-game with the approach developed by Nigel Howard (Mushakoji 1970), Mushakoji denoted 1 as the payoff of the loser and 4 for the winner's payoff, while in a draw, each player would obtain 2. He found out that V-V: V-V was the only equilibrium for all players, namely all-out war, which might cause an aggressively global risk. If it could be considered utilitarian, there were quasi-equilibria in the game as shown as V-P: V-P, P-P: V-P, V-P: P-P, and P-P: P-P in Table 1. In a word, at least one divided player should adopt a Peaceful strategy. In his conclusion, Mushakoji applied the Prisoners' Dilemma to prove his assumption that

1, the unification problem could fit the game model;

2, the divided countries cannot succeed with unification without the support from their allies; moreover;

3, at least one player in the four should seek for a peaceful strategy which could mean the great powers maintain neutrality while there would be a provocation between two Koreas (Mushakoji 1970).

Table 1 Quasi-Equilibrium of Two Koreas Unification Game

		North Korea - His ally		
		V-P	P-V	P-P
South Korea -His Ally	V-P	(2,2)	(4,1)	(4,1)
		(3,3)	(1,1)	(3,3)
	P-V	(1,4)	(3,3)	(3,3)
		(1,1)	(2,2)	(2,2)
	P-P	(1,4)	(3,3)	(3,3)
		(3,3)	(2,2)	(3,3)

* quoted from the Table 6 (Mushakoji 1970)

As Mushakoji mentioned at the end, the deductions of the game model on the unification on the Korean Peninsula had no predictive value but a heuristic one. Even if there were a perfect game model to match a certain political issue, the complexity of the reality would be out of the range of explanation of that model. Thus, this Two Korean Leaders' Dilemma would depict with a similar approach with the same heuristic purpose to explain and prove the reason why the relationship between two Koreas deteriorated after a short period of rapprochement in the 1970s.

Another important resource from Hee-min Kim, who applied Game Theory to interpret Korean political and historical issues by a phase with the book "Korean

Democracy in Transition- A Rational Blueprint for Developing Societies.” In the second chapter, “Kim’s’ Dilemma and the Politics of Rivalry: An Analysis of the Democratic Opening and the 1987 Presidential Election “ illustrated this type of Game Theory based paper.

In Kims’ Dilemma, Kim Hee Min tried to follow a structure: he mentioned the historical background of the 1987 South Korean Presidential Election, set the condition of the Game, designed the game and calculated the Expected Utility of the two possibilities with equations and finally discussed the game with historical facts.

When Kim Hee Min calculated the Expected Utility (EU) of the two Presidential Candidates, he used an equation with the brief term of P (possibility), B (benefits) and C (costs), and simplified the equation as:

$$EU(\text{choice 1, choice 2}) = P(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/1 [B(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/1 - C(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/1] + P(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/2 [B(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/2 - C(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/2] + P(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/3 [B(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/3 - C(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/3] + \dots + P(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/x [B(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/x - C(\text{choice 1, choice 2})/x] \text{ (H. Kim, 2011)}$$

After learning this model, it is clear that the possibility could demonstrate by calculating the cost and the benefits of each of the choices respectively. Only in a case that the benefit is larger than the cost, and then the utility which is summed up with the difference value between the benefit and cost could be regarded as the

significant factor in the outcome of each choice. It seems that in the following article, analyzing the benefits and costs of each player's choices are necessary.



CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Game Theory

The notions of Game is a sport or a joyful competition, but for Game Theory specifically, it emphasizes more on the strategic choices. Henry Hamburger identified Game Theory as “the players making decisions that affect each other.” He said the theory is “not only tic-tac-toe and chess but also a wide variety of real-life situations from the domains of political science, economics, sociology, and social psychology” (Hamburger, 1979). He also explained the purpose of Game Theory that is: who could make what decisions; what we could guess about the other’s decisions; what will be the results of the various possibilities; and which results are preferred by whom? Further on, he defined another two criteria for a game-theoretical analysis:

- 1, in a game, the decision is the key question to study, so there should be nobody who has no decision to make.

- 2, after making a decision, the results and the value of results (payoff) of various players are determined, so there should be nobody who has no preference among the possible outcomes of the situation (Hamburger, 1979).

Within thousands and millions of games, Prisoner’s Dilemma is one of the symmetric games. “A symmetric game is one that looks the same to both players. If

they both do the same, they both get the same. A symmetric game is one where the payoff is determined by what you do, not by who you are” (Hamburger, 1979).

The term of Prisoner’s Dilemma came from a classic case in which the two suspects are taken to confess to a crime separately in the interrogation room. Moreover, the inquisitors posed the situation that if the suspect A would inform against the other suspect B in case that suspect B did not inform him back, A could be free, and B would be jailed for 10 years. If the two suspects keep quiet, both of them would be imprisoned for 1 year; but if both of the suspects would inform against each other simultaneously, and then both of them could be imprisoned for 5 years. In another word, it is a game of cooperation and betrays.

When the two players make their decision, no one could know the other’s choice. According to the representation above, under the circumstance that both of the players are rational and care their benefits for the most, the best choice of either suspect is informing against the other one, however, for the inquisitors, it is to obtain the evidence of the criminal facts. Hence, the two suspects could not enjoy their so-called BEST choice, which is to put his accomplices into jail and save himself from the criminal state. In fact, the results mostly move to an even worse choice that both of the suspects have to inform against their accomplices. The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a symmetric game could describe in the below table

Table 2 Prisoner's Dilemma Matrix

		B	
		I	II
A	I	1,1	0,10
	II	10,1	5,5

Table 2: I on behalf of the strategy of not informing on the other one, II on behalf of the strategy of informing on the other one.

Look at the table, if A picks II, the lower-left cell is greater than the other three ones, so A should prefer to II. For B, II works in the same way, so it goes to B too. Here comes another notion that II is the dominant action for both A and B. Even though A may not be able to know B's choice, by analyzing the situation and choices A has, A could guess that for pursuing the best result for himself, B must choose the choice of II. In the same way, B could also guess the same, that A would choose II for saving himself from the worst situation. In the end, both of them chose II and the result moves to (5, 5), namely both of them have to be imprisoned for 5 years.

Despite the fact that the two suspects would like to be free but are imprisoned finally, none could change their choices, because any change may cause an even worse payoff. For this solution, there is another notion called Nash equilibrium.

Martin J. Osborne defined Nash equilibrium in his book *An introduction to Game Theory* as

“A Nash equilibrium that no individual player may profitably deviate with the requirement that no group of players may profitably deviate, the notion of the core makes an assumption that is unnecessary when interpreting a Nash equilibrium. A single player who deviates from an action profile in a strategic game can be sure of her deviant action because she unilaterally chooses it. However, a member of a group of players that choose a deviant action must assume that no subgroup of her comrades will deviate further, or, at least, she will remain better off if they do” (Osborne, 2004).

Moreover, this Prisoner’s Dilemma model has been verified and explained in some other stories.

“The Prisoner’s Dilemma models a situation... The game is important not because we are interested in understanding the incentives for prisoners to confess, but because many other situations have similar structures” (Osborne, 2004).

One of the models called The Arms Race derived from the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this game, there are also four outcomes that: two countries both have a nuclear weapon, no countries have a nuclear weapon, and one of them has a

nuclear weapon. According to the theory mentioned before. The best outcome for each player is that it has a weapon but the other does not. Moreover, the second best outcome is that none of them have the weapon due to the high expense to develop them. At least both of them have the weapon, so it goes to balance. The worst case is that only the other one has a weapon. (Osborne, 2004)

Meanwhile, there is another Hawk-Dove game may match the setting of the two Korean Leaders' Dilemma. In the fighting of prey, the key notion of this game is that the time of giving up. If one of the predators quit first, the other one would enjoy all the prey. So the best outcome is waiting for the other one giving up. If no one quite, then a conflict is not avoided. Consequently, each player has some possibility to win the entire prey. What if the two players choose to share the prey, at least they could keep half of the prey.(Osborne, 2004) It shows in the table below:

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CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY
Table 3 Hawk-Dove Matrix
B

		Hawk	Dove
		Hawk	$0.5(V-t), 0.5(V-t)$
A	Dove	$0, V$	$0.5V, 0.5V$

Table 3: V on behalf of Victory, and t on behalf of time.

3.2 Model

Applying Game Theory to explain a political issue is common. Therefore, the complicated issues as two Koreas would be summarized as a one-time static game to set a game much more exercisable and clearer. Although the process of interaction between the two Koreas has to be simplified, the essential relationship between the players, the choices of the players would present clearly.

In the 1970s, the decision of the North and South Korean leaders affected the situation of the Inter-Korean relationship (Chae, 2014). It was the first time that both Koreas had an opportunity to deal with the inter-Korean issue without the direct supervision of the great powers. However, right before this historical moment, both Koreas involved in the risk of war. In behind, when Kissinger visited China, he also expresses a suggestion that China should help North Korea from making more military provokes. (Kissinger, 2010) On the other hand, the requirements of South Korea to strengthen their Air Force and even develop nuclear weapons with the American aid were refused by the U.S. (Lawler, 2010)

According to this background introduction, Park Chung-hee and Kim Il-sung, as two authoritarian leaders, suddenly but predictively started a bilateral relationship without any notice. This fact matched a basic set of a game. We could consider integrating this period of attempts to a one-time game. As integration, simplifying this game to fit the Arms Race Game, it could be regarded as a static game as each

Korean leader would not be able to know the real purpose of the other one at the moment of 1971, and they prefer not to trust each other as usual.

Assuming that the Korean inter-relationship in the early 1970s that dominated both Korean leaders' competition and negotiation could be describe as a simple 2x2 matrix Game in the name of the Two Korean Leaders' Dilemma, i.e. the two Korean Leaders as two players.

According to the NSC files, the US wished to deter North Korea under the principle that notice but not threaten North Korea. Thus, facing the rapprochement between the P.R.C. and U.S., Park Chung-hee was aware of the potential influence on the Korean Peninsula, the strategy to improve the relationship with China was obviously a rational choice(Chung, 2008). However, in the circumstance of the U.S. decreasing its troops in South Korea and the domestic political opposition raising up in the election, there was an urgent need for South Korea to adopt a strategy of engaging in a negotiation with North Korea (Chae, 2014). Due to vain attempts by military provocation, North Korea's strategy encountered a series of shocks and a turning point, particularly, when the U.S. knocked upon and then opened the Chinese door. Moreover, there was another significant change between the two Koreas in the economic field. South Korea first caught up and surpassed North Korea in 1969 (D. J. Lee, 2010). Besides that, the two Koreas' military scale corresponded similarly for the first time in the history after the Korean War. Moreover, therefore the

two Koreas stood at a similar level of national development. Hence the condition of the two leaders completely satisfied the qualification of being a player in the Prisoner's Game.

Based on the above explanation, the two players, i.e. South Korean leader Park Chung-hee and North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, had two options, mainly "Reconciliation" (détente with other Korea) or "Estrangement" (no détente with other Korea). Since each player has two strategies, there are four possible outcomes of the game. If both Korean leaders would like to talk with each other, the outcome is "Reconciliation" and "Reconciliation" (Reconciliation, Reconciliation). If one Korea would like to talk but the other not, the outcome is (Reconciliation, Estrangement), or (Estrangement, Reconciliation). If none of them would like to talk, the outcome is (Estrangement, Estrangement). Then assume that the two Koreas had the same interest to gain more benefit for their regime and reduce military threat simultaneously. Simply, the Two Korean Leaders' Dilemma Game could be depicted vividly as a symmetric game (H. Kim, 2011).

Compared with the result of four possible outcomes of this Two Korean Leaders' Dilemma Game, it seems that if both Korea would choose "Reconciliation," which both of them could bring a peaceful strategy to calm down the tension on the Korean Peninsula. Conversely, by choosing "Estrangement," the Korean Peninsula may not exclude any possibility to become involved in another Korean War. Besides

choosing the same option to deal with one another, they may also choose a different one. In case, one player who would choose “Estrangement,” and the other one would choose “Reconciliation,” according to the Arms Race model, the peace offering player may fall into the risk of dangerous threatened by the aggressive side. In details, assuming North Korean leader Kim Il-sung and South Korean leader Park Chung-hee as the two players, the two Korean Leaders’ Dilemma will be illustrated as

Table 4 Two Korean Leaders’ Dilemma Matrix (a)

		Kim Il-sung	
		RECONCILIATION	ESTRANGEMENT
Park Chung-hee	RECONCILIATION	Reducing the tension of the Korean Peninsula	North Korea gained advantage
	ESTRANGEMENT	South Korea gained advantage	Maintaining the tension of the Korean Peninsula

Table 4. “The Two Korean Leaders’ Dilemma” Matrix (a) shows the two Korean Leader’s outcomes.

Reviewing the history from the 1950s, Kim Il-sung was the one who first started the Korean War and marched across the 38th Parallel towards the Southern part of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore Park Chung-hee has the reason to guess that if Kim Il-sung had a chance to unify the Korean Peninsula by force, he never wasted trials not to use force. Therefore, with this presume, when Park Chung-hee made a decision, he also needs to think that if Kim Il-sung already chose the “Estrangement,” the best choice for him just is that picks the same choice as Kim Il-sung.

Similarly, Kim Il-sung also learns from the history of the Korean War that if the South Korean leader had a chance to across the 38th Parallel line, he also would like to reunify the Korean Peninsula by force and exterminated the Communists in North Korea. With this conjecture, Kim Il-sung could believe that the choice of “Estrangement,” as the first choice of Park Chung-hee is a matter of course.

In sum, both the leaders presumed that the other one would choose “Estrangement,” then follow the other’s same choices is the safest option. Hence, when a leader chose “Estrangement,” coincidentally, the other one chose “Conciliation,” the outcome turns to be the best choice. If both of the leaders chose “Conciliation,” namely a peaceful, option is the second best choices. The most dangerous choice for the two Koreas is that only the other Korea chose “Estrangement.” Comparably, the tension situation is much dangerous than the peaceful one. So when both of them chose “Estrangement,” the outcome is even

worse than the second best choice that both of them chose Reconciliation and Reconciliation. Consequently, the other outcome goes with the result of the Prisons' Dilemma, shown in the following table:

Table 5 Two Korean Leaders' Dilemma Matrix (b)

		Kim Il-sung	
		RECONCILIATION	ESTRANGEMENT
Park Chung-hee	RECONCILIATION	S, S	W, B
	ESTRANGEMENT	B, W	T, T

Table 5. Matrix (b) indicates players' preferences among those outcomes. The term B, S, T, and W denote the Best, Second, Third and Worst outcomes.

From Table 5, it is clear to see that all the outcomes. Followed by the ranking Best > Second Best > Third Best > Worst, it is clear to say that either player would go for the payoff B (Best) rather than payoff S (Second), equally, they would prefer payoff T (Third) than payoff W (Worst).

According to the Prisoner's Dilemma, when Kim Il-sung and Park Chung-hee made different decisions, the only one who chose "Estrangement" could gain the most benefits from the game. At least choosing "Estrangement" has the guarantee

not to fail at the beginning, or may gamble the best outcome among all the four, in the case that the other goes to “Reconciliation.” So for achieving more benefits, either player should prefer Estrangement rationally.

Since each of the players has a dominant strategy, for North Korean leader, the dominant strategy is the right column; in the upper row, Kim Il-sung’s choice goes to “Estrangement.” Meanwhile, Park Chung-hee's choice goes to “Reconciliation”; the result made Kim Il-sung his Best (B) outcome.

The South Korean leader also has a dominant strategy which is in the bottom row and in the left column, which Park Chung-hee also wishes that Kim Il-sung could choose “Reconciliation” when he chose “Estrangement.” Therefore, Park Chung-hee's choice may rely on the right column

While in the bottom row and the right column, if both leaders chose “Estrangement,” the war risk increased significantly. In the same way, when the two leaders all decided on the same Reconciliation choice, the outcome goes to their second best outcome. Consequently, either player prefers B (Best) to S (Second) with the same preferring that T (Third) to W (Worst).

We can see from the above analysis that, the dominant choices are the right column for North Korea and bottom row for South Korea. Apparently, both have the same choice: “Estrangement.” Assuming both Koreas would like to use their

dominant strategy. Then the result would meet in the left column and bottom row, namely, the two Koreas prefer the strategy of (Estrangement, Estrangement) which is the Nash Equilibrium of this Two Koreas Dilemma. In another way, by maintaining the tension on the Korean Peninsula, both of the Koreas receded from rapprochement is their most rational choice.

The irony of this result demonstrates that if the two Koreas decision makers would not be rational and do not choose their dominant strategies but chose their second best option. As a new result, the payoff could be moved to (Reconciliation, Reconciliation), which results in reducing the tensions in the Korean Peninsula, which pragmatically seems better than the theoretical best choice. Moreover, this result also matched the analysis of Mushakoji's two Korean Unification model.

The benefits for the two Koreas are the adjustment and adaption to the change in the international political environment and the establishment of a relatively secure Korean Peninsula for economic development and domestic governance. When we compare the utilities, it is necessary to calculate the cost for each player. By reviewing the key historical points, in next chapter, the benefits and the cost of each of Korea will be analyzed heuristically.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

4.1 South Korean Internal Costs

South Korea achieved industrialization from the 1960s with the political, economic dynamic of building “the developmental state.” In support of achieving the “export-oriented” economic structure, laborers’ interests had to sacrifice. Meanwhile, the democratic requirement rose up to fight against the systematic political repression, in which the young candidates like Kim Dae-Jung became potent challengers (Lie, 1998).

Following the democratic problems, there were several tough social problems which Park Chung-hee had to deal with, such as

- 1, the rise of the labors movements.
- 2, the awakening of intellectuals and the discontent with authoritative bureaucrats.
- 3, the growth of the opposition party and the enlightening of democracy.
- 4, the sluggish economic development affected by the oil crisis and the labor cost rising.
- 5, the deterioration of the balance of international payment.

What one of the solutions Park Chung-hee's came up with was to create the Reform System (유신체제) to strengthen his power and maintain the powerful repression. Moreover, the excuse with which Park Chung-hee repressed the democracy movement was anti-Communism (Cao, 2005). Imagine if the relationship between the two Koreas got too close, how would Park Chung-hee deal with the threat of North Korea and Communism, and how would he call upon the people in the South to follow his ruling.

On April 3rd, 1974, a group of South Korean intellectuals and students published the democracy declaration, criticizing the high-handed governance of Park Chung-hee and appealed for the following items:

- 1, punishing the corruption and monopoly
- 2, reducing the tax and protecting the low-income families
- 3, ensuring labor freedom.
- 4, releasing the imprisoned patriots and stopping the Reform System.
- 5, dismissing the KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency)
- 6, exposing the illegal foreign investment.

According to the contents of the declaration, the demand of the students had no connection to the Communist movement, but in the end, the students were

suppressed by the police and accused of advocating Communism (Cao, 2005).

In the same period, the laborers' movement joined with the democratic movement, which used to be confined to the urban intellectuals. Chun Tae Il, a tailor in a garment factory at Pyeonghwa Market, publicly committed suicide to react to the failure of the efforts to improve the working conditions of employees like him. This incident represented the emergence of the labor union and the energy of the working class (J. J. Choi, 1993).

Soon after the deadly incident, Korean Christian Churches also radicalized and became human rights organizations. Therefore, the close network of dissident groups was composed of urban intellectuals, progressive students, urban working class and the radical South Korean church. However, another Democratic fighter, the opposition party, which led by Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young Sam, dedicated their efforts to challenge the authoritarian regime but were not as radical as the dissident group. Besides those social classes, the bourgeoisies and the middle class who had enjoyed the remarkable achievements of the national development made a choice to prioritize economic growth over a democratic system. Ultimately they embraced the prosperity and remained in the conservative position (J. J. Choi, 1993).

Park Chung-hee realized the important role of the economic development which created a guarantee for his authoritarian regime. In fact, as an agricultural nation without abundant natural resources, Park Chung-hee knew that he had only a

few choices to develop the South Korean economy. He had to intervene in the domestic manufacturing and combined the state and the market together, which is called dirigisme, or state-guided capitalism (W. T. Kim, 2001).

Even though Park Chung-hee led South Korean to achieve an economic miracle, the essential problems of the Korean economy remained. First, the national economy was planned by modernized military oligarchs. Second, as guided capitalism, the government strongly controlled the economic process. Third, the priority for industrial reform was given to conglomerates (*Chaebol*) system; finally, the lack of raw materials and a consumer market determined the direction of the South Korean economy (Park, 2005).

As a tool for the government intervention in the economy, Park Chung-hee implemented five years economic plans just like Kim Il-sung in the North. However, the first five years plan, which initiated from 1962 failed due to unrealistic and overestimated goals. Nevertheless, the second five years plan (1967-1971) promoted South Korea from a purely agricultural state to an industrialized state. Moreover, the entire foreign business policy had been set to encourage exports with the subsidies provided by the South Korean government (Wei, 2008). That meant the more South Korean could sell the more money they could gain. Thus the main task for Park Chung-hee was how to accelerate industrial transformation from light industry into chemical and heavy industry (W. T. Kim, 2001). Meanwhile, he also needed to reform

and liberalize the import and export policy so that the international market would welcome South Korean products (Wei, 2008).

From then on, the South Korean economy with its export-dynamism, required a huge industrialization engine and a broad market to digest its products. By introducing top global technology and inviting the best scholars to train South Korean researchers, Korea could facilitate the accomplishment of the third five years plan. On the other hand, by expanding new markets provided South Korea with a great opportunity to guarantee the expanding industrial production. Hereupon it can be concluded that the growth of the Korean economy relied upon a strategy of the raw materials bringing-in and the mature products going abroad (Xu, 2017).

Investment played an important role in the industrialization period, at the same time it could also steer the national economic lifeline. For that reason, Park Chung-hee was extremely cautious about the Foreign Direct Investment, especially in the fields which might challenge South Korean products. Because the economic growth demanded external investment on a great scale(Wei, 2008).

In a word, it is certain that a peaceful environment on the Korean Peninsula 1) enabled South Korea to achieve the huge development; 2) and conversely it was a prerequisite for the huge development. Moreover, the peaceful environment could either obtain from the détente of North Korea or seek protection from the U.S.

4.2 South Korean External Costs

The U.S. used to be the single and the largest contributor to South Korea during and after the Korean War. As a protector of South Korea, the U.S. had a comprehensive and enduring relationship with South Korea on both economic and military fields. From the U.S. perspective, South Korea was the largest recipient of its Foreign Aid to the Third World since the 1950s. There were mainly three approaches to reduce US aid to South Korea: 1), Size the military or even withdraw from the Korean Peninsula. 2), let Japan share the American burden in South Korea. 3), Encourage South Korea to share the burden throughout the recovery of its economy and the development of the society(Park, 1999). From 1963, the economic aids, which South Korea received from the U.S. gradually reduced.

Japan's economy recovered from the Second World War time through the assistance of the U.S. in the Korean War and became a regional rich country again. Japan had the ambition to replace the U.S. in East Asia and play a part in Asian Affairs as the US did. (Liu, 2006) At the same time, Park Chung-hee launched the first and the second five-year plans while facing the problem that was the shortage of investment capital. To make up for the decrease of the American economic aids, Park Chung-hee was eager to normalize the bilateral relationship with Japan and adjust the bilateral US-Korean economic cooperation to US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation. (Wei, 2008) Park Chung-hee's positive attitude to normalize the

Japan-South Korean relationship gave rise to the vehement domestic protests, and also received a serious, severe reprimand from both North Korea and China(Liu, 2006). Some recent scholars emphasized the South Korean position on the Japan-South Korean relationship:

“South Korea’s dependency went deeper: the nature of the North Korean threat, the presence of large numbers of U.S. forces deployed along a tense border, the dearth of options in dealing with China and the Soviet Union until the 1990s, and the legacy of suspicion toward Japan despite its existence as the only real option in the region”. (Rozman, 2008)

After several years’ of development with Japanese funds, Park Chung-hee had no choice but to break into new markets to pursue a worldwide market, especially the countries of the Eastern Bloc. Hence, in 1967 Park Chung-hee ordered his diplomatic staff to try to approach Communist countries except for North Korea, the P.R.C. and North Vietnam(Kimiya, 2011). In August of 1971, one month after Nixon visited the P.R.C., South Korean Foreign Minister, later National Unification Minister Kim Yong-shik said that if the U.S.S.R. could abandon their hostile attitude towards the Republic of Korea, the Korean Government may consider establishing formal diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. (Wei, 2008). In 1973, Park Chung-hee issued “June 23 Announcement”, or the *Nordpolitik*, which made an effort towards normalizing the relationship with the U.S.S.R and P.R.C. (Chung, 2005). In other words,

South Korea would give up its own Hallstein-Doctrine (Chae, 2014).

In 1973, the first global oil crisis appeared, which attacked the global economy and affected both South Korea and Japan. In 1974, the South Korean and Japanese governments signed two agreements to solve the lack of oil. The P.R.C. responded immediately to the agreement between South Korea and Japan. In the Chinese position, both South Korea and Japan violated Chinese Marine sovereignty, and the bilateral agreement should be blamed. Consequently, Chinese government solemnly warned both countries not to continue any arbitrary exploitation. Otherwise, they would have to take responsibility for all kind of results (Song, 2014). Park Chung-hee was aware that the China potentially could influence North Korea and could help reduce tensions the Korean Peninsula. The Foreign Minister of South Korea Kim Yong-shik also stated that the South Korean government should try to find an approach to normalize the diplomatic relationship with the P.R.C. with flexibility and sincerity (Chung, 2008). That oil exploration incident showed that Park Chung-hee had a long way to go to get along well with the P.R.C. Fortunately, the P.R.C. referred South Korea as the South Korean Authorities “(南朝鲜当局) instead of “Park Chung-hee Puppet Regime” (朴正熙傀儡政权) that partly recognized South Korea as an independent country (Chung, 2005).

In the decade of 1960s, South Korea and the U.S. signed more than ten significant agreements to strengthen the bilateral relationship in the field of politics,

economics, the culture, the education and the military. Amongst those agreements, the US-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States signed in 1967 was a milestone for elevating the South Korean sovereignty under the shelter of the American Armed Forces in South Korea (Wei, 2008).

In 1969, after the EC-121M Warning Star was shot down by the North Korean Army, the Prime Minister of South Korea Chung Il Kwon requested in White House that:

- 1, the U.S. should maintain two divisions on the Korean Peninsula or even more after the Vietnam War.
- 2, the U.S. should strengthen its forces to make a balance with North Korean military force.
- 3, A U.S.-South Korean combined force should be deployed in Asia.
- 4, Prevent the guerrilla of North Korean from infiltrating to South Korea and make bases (Lawler, 2010).

When the U.S. published the Nixon Doctrine, as a backdrop of American foreign policy, in 1970, twenty thousands of the US troops were withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula(Ostermann, 2011).The U.S. also brought about a rapprochement with the P.R.C. This fact made Park Chung-hee feel anxious and abandoned. He faced

a dilemma whether to cooperate or not with his alliance partner (Yoo, 2014). Finally, Park Chung-hee realized it was time to adjust his security strategy. As a result Park Chung-hee decided to strengthen the self-defense capacity to bridge the gap between the amounts of Korea's modern weaponry, even nuclear weapons were considered. He also reduced excessive reliance on the American military (Hu, 2012). Before 1973, Operations Plan 5027 was just a series of military operations for defending against a sudden invasion from North Korea and retreating for 50 miles and waiting for the reinforcements. In 1974, this plan had been strengthened to be much more aggressive, which deemed it to be a forward-based offensive strategy (Song, 2014).

In another battle field, the proxy war--Vietnam War, the U.S. and the P.R.C. contested against each other by supporting two Vietnam, so did two Koreas. However, the Vietnam War did not destroy the détente process of Sino-US relations. On the contrary, it pushed it forward (Zhang, 2014). South Korea, as an investor was motivated to join the Vietnam War to obtain economic benefits. For South Korean soldiers, they did not fight for their motherland but money as a job (Armstrong, 2001). Thus, when the U.S. reduced their troops in Vietnam and required Park Chung-hee to add more R.O.K. troops as a substitute for American troops, Pak Chung-hee needed to calculate South Korea's military cost and economic gain from the Vietnam War again, particularly given that he was still nominally involved in an

unfinished Korean War.

Besides those global changes, the UN recognizing the P.R.C. as the only lawful representative of China expelled the “Republic of China” in the principle of “One China” Principle. It was challenging to South Korea’s observer seat in UN and the foreign policy of Taiwan. Would the P.R.C. re-determine the Korean War and bolster North Korea’s attempts to join UN? The Third World countries supported the P.R.C., so in the same way, would North Korea copy the Chinese method and enter UN, to represent the only Korea in the world? Alternatively, would the two Koreas use the 1973 two Germanys case to join UN together? If two Koreas joined the UN together, would it mean that North Korea and South Korea were recognized as two countries by the international society (Wang, 2011)? The case of the Chinese United Nation’s seat changing brought as much crisis to South Korea as the rapprochement of the Sino-US relationship did. At the same time, North Korea received a charge to improve its national image and try to grow its reputation in the UN.

4.3 North Korean Internal Costs

Kim Il-sung, as the North Korean leader ruling this country from 1945 to his death 1992, was essentially a dictator. All the North Korean institutions reflected his desire and preference. (D. C. Kang, 2011) Kim’s totalitarian dictatorship was

established step by step through the political purge, idolization, Juche Idea, and successor assignment.

Before Kim Il-sung came back to Korea in 1945, there were some legends about this anti-Japanese colonist hero who led his brave guerrilla to fight against the Japanese in China and the U.S.S.R. When he arrived in North Korea with the victory of having expelled the Japanese from the Korean Peninsula, people could not believe that the “hero” they heard about was a young man. He knew very well that if he would like to undergird his communist regime, he had to perpetuate his heroic myth and create more, to make his people, his soldiers, and peers believe in him as a qualified leader (Sokolski, 2001).

After cleaning up Kim Il-sung’s political opponents, Kim Il-sung was propagandized as the Sun of Korea, the Father of his citizens. The North Korean government announced a hybrid orchid in the name of Kim Il-sung as Kimilsungia and its national flower in the name of the second generation leader Kim Jong-Il as Kimjongilia (Cumings, 2005). In fact, Kim Il-sung had molded himself into an idol, a savior, and a deity of North Korea. There is a record to show the North Korean cult of personality:

Among the myths of Kim Il-sung, the most important place is Mount Paekdu, which both Korean and Manchurian consider as their ancestral origin. According to those myths, the birth of Kim Il-sung at Mount Paekdu

was polished from the old tale. Kim Il-sung waged the national liberation war from Mount Paekdu (K. S. 姜. Kang, 1987).

However, not only was Kim Il-sung depicted as a semi-deity and semi-hero, but his entire family was also propagandized as a patriotic and revolutionary Kim Il-sung's Family Tree (*김일성일가*) was dedicated to the independence of Korea since the 19th century. (Hwang, 1987) According to those embellished Kims' myths, another theory was innovated that for continuing the Great Leaders contribution to the success of the Korean Revolution, the *Mount Paekdu* Bloodline should inherit the revolutionary career.

Within the East Bloc, there was no country which had a similar case of hereditary succession. However, there are two vivid examples from both the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C., where the successors who were opposed to their predecessors, namely Nikita Khrushchev to Joseph Stalin and Lin Biao to Mao Zedong ascended. Kim Il-sung learned about those terrible lessons and decided to assign his elder son Kim Jong-il as the only successor to inherit his power after his death. (Hwang, 1987) Moreover, therefore, Kim Il-sung had considered how to persuade the other Communist countries, particularly the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. to accept his succession decision and go on supporting his, Kims', dynasty.

The North Korean system was a copy of the Sovietization with the proletarian dictatorship and socialism, which the principle that politics controlled by the

Communist Party and the economy was planned by the government (W. T. Kim, 2001). In the political field, Kim Il-sung innovated a term to embody his thought that was called “Juchae Idea” or “self-reliance” in English. It means the independence of the politics, economics, defense, and ideology (Cumings, 2005). Frankly speaking, the so-called self-reliance could not become a reality, due to the geographic location and international background surrounding North Korea. Eventually, North Korea followed in Chinese and Soviet footsteps (H. Y. Lee, 1994). Notwithstanding, Juchae Idea was a powerful tool to control the mind of North Koreans.

“Leisure time in North Korean society, to the extent it exists, is largely spent in ideological indoctrination... after school, students will march with their work units to the square in front of Kim Il-sung’s mausoleum to practice performance..... or they will be in sessions reading about the greatness of Kim Il-sung thought” (Cha, 2011).

The economy of North Korea based on the remaining Japanese reminded industrial infrastructure. After the Socialization reform movement, the direction of North Korea industry in the Seven Years’ Plan went to the heavy industry first, and the light industry second. By the late of the 1960s, due to the conflicts of the Inter-Korean borders, more and more military installations were demanded. Moreover, therefore the weight of the industrial development transferred to military related

industries (K. S. 姜. Kang, 1987).

Victor Cha wrote that “there has not been any real development” in North Korea since the 1960s (Cha, 2011). Thus the problem came out that the expansion of production was not determined by the market and consumer but the regime and army. In sum, there are several problems Kim Il-sung had to overcome:

- 1, a lack of the economic incentives for development
- 2, a lack of the self-discipline in production units
- 3, a lack of motivation for innovation
- 4, a lack of a self-adjustment function for the economy (Hwang, 1987).

To better maintain Kim Il-sung’s regime, he had to continuously mold himself as the Korean national hero, show the superiority of the Communist system, indoctrinate the citizens, and mobilize the laborers. At the same time, he needed a pathetic and poor South Korea to proof his propaganda and his stereotype.

“Kim’s regime was born and bred in absolute hostility to any political authority in the South. Simply, the South is held to be a U.S. Colony, and Southern officials are viewed as nothing more than lackeys of their colonial masters” (Sokolski, 2001).

4.4 North Korean External Costs

The U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. had a long-term relationship with North Korea. The inter-relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. was the main variable of the trilateral relationship of the U.S.S.R.-P.R.C.-D.P.R.K. (Yang, 2006). Since the end of the 1950s, the inter-relationship of the countries in the Eastern Bloc had raised tensions. It was difficult for North Korea to stay relatively neutral and maintain the allied relationship with both the neighbors at the same time. As a result, Kim Il-sung had to reluctantly rely on either the U.S.S.R. or the P.R.C. with a fragile balance. Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. both wished Kim Il-sung would support their position, and place plus place North Korea in its sphere of influence (Ahn, 1980).

Before 1965, North Korea stood up for P.R.C. and criticized the Chauvinism of U.S.S.R., so that the U.S.S.R. stopped providing economic and military aids in 1962. When Park Chung-hee started to negotiate with Japan, Kim Il-sung demanded more resources to compensate for the loss incurred from losing the support of the U.S.S.R. to compete against South Korea. However the P.R.C. could not afford that amount of the aids, so the U.S.S.R. took this chance to win favor with North Korea to pit it against the P.R.C. Soon after, the Cultural Revolution spread, so that from 1966-1968 the Sino-North Korean relationship was strained due to the criticism of Kim Il-sung as a revisionist (H. Y. Lee, 1994). To adapt to this situation, North Korea swung to the U.S.S.R. without entirely cutting down the relationship with the P.R.C. (Yang, 2006).

Kim Il-sung expanded his revolution enthusiastically using anti-colonial nationalism and independence movements throughout the Third World and made North Korea a model of self-reliance. During the 1960s, deploying troops to involved in the Vietnam War, Kim Il-sung expressed his solitary willingness to assist North Vietnam to fight against the U.S. North Korea achieved diplomatic success in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America which most of them were outside of the East Bloc. Fortunately, the rapprochement between the U.S. and the P.R.C. could help North Korea established diplomatic relations with more countries from the West Bloc (Armstrong, 2009).

In 1964 Park Chung-hee opposed any suggestion of unification, which Kim Il-sung offered. Park Chung-hee only insisted that the unification should follow the principle of the liberal democracy and be supervised by UN. In 1966, he said, "The path to unification has to go through modernization, and if modernization means economic independence, then self-reliance is the initial stage of unification" (Y.-h. Koh, 2000). In 1965, South Korean combat troops were sent to the Vietnam battles for exchanging the lavish American aids (Armstrong, 2009).

This annoyed Kim Il-sung decided to set a goal to expand the communism further in South Korea. He planned to build a revolutionary base in the South through economic and defense construction, and to appeal revolutionary movement to overthrow the Southern government; and to obtain the support for North Korean

reunification from the World Arena (B. C. Koh, 1973). Furthermore, Kim Il-sung attempted to use guerrilla raids to overturn the South Korean regime such as: by sending guerrilla forces to assassinate the ruling class of the Southern authority, like Blue House Raid, or even calling for the conflict around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and killing both American and South Korean soldiers. However, those military actions did not have any effective influence on the unification progress. Conversely, it may result in North Korea running a high risk of military attack caused by miscalculation and misjudgment. With the above failure trails, North Korea renewed its unification policy to be a peaceful way in October 1969 (Ostermann, 2011).

The affair of shooting down the EC-121M Warning Star could be regarded as the turning point of the end of the hot war risk period at the end of the 1960s. The attitude of the major players, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., reminded in calm and tried to restrain two Koreas not to involve into a full-scale war (Lawler, 2010). The South Korea diplomatists persuaded the U.S. to strengthen their defense as we mentioned in the previous part. Kim Il-sung also noticed that his military actions did not bring him any practical benefits but provided a cause for the American Armed Forces staying in the Korean Peninsula.

When the secret rapprochement between the U.S. and P.R.C. came out, Zhou Enlai flew to announce and explain the situation to Kim Il-sung. Since then a new change arose to North Korea, which Kim Il-sung could seize it to improve the

relationship with the U.S. and reunify Korea in his purpose (Shen, 2014). Moreover, a vis-à-vis negotiation with South Korea became possible (Oberdorfer, 1998). Therefore North Korea responded in eight pragmatic stances to let Zhou Enlai convey to the U.S., principally:

- 1, withdrawing all the foreign troops from South Korea;
- 2, stopping the supply of all kinds of weapons including the nuclear weapons;
- 3, dissolving the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK);
- 4, permitting the North Korean representatives to participate in the United Nation Korean Issue discussion (Shen, 2014).

The similar requirement appeared in the second session of the North –South Coordinating Committee in 1973. Both Korean put five proposals forwards:

- 1, No arm race
- 2, Decrease the scale of the army
- 3, No more foreign weapons and other war supplies
- 4, the American troops' withdrawal
- 5, conclude peaceful agreement (B. C. Koh, 1973)

On the other battlefield— U.N., the North Korea government declared that the withdrawal of the American troops from South Korea and the dissolution of The United Nations Committee on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) should be discussed. After that Kim Il-sung tried to employ the international resources including persuading the P.R.C., which just gained the representative seat as the only Chinese government in U.N. to attain his goal within the framework of U.N. (Shen, 2014). Thus, it is very clear that the issue of American Armed Force withdrawal was the most concern of Kim Il-sung.

In fact, South Korea considered how to strengthen the bilateral Ally relationship with the U.S. and win over more international recognition synchronously. Thus, expelling the American Army from the Korean Peninsula could be an incompatible contradiction between two Koreas. Moreover, Kim Il-sung became disenchanted with the high hopes that the U.S. would withdraw the American Armed Forces from South Korea.

Another big issue for both Koreas was the reunification of Vietnam, namely the failure of South Vietnam. It was a great encouragement for Kim Il-sung to imagine that the Communist blocs could have more victories. Thus, it is easy to presume that if the rapprochement with South Korea were not smooth, Kim Il-sung might have another opportunity to reunify South Korea by the armed force.

4.5 Analysis

At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, what made the two Korean leaders make a decision to start a dialogue is their internal and external environment. The nuance of the relationships was shifted by the changes in each Korean condition.

The global trade of South Korean and the autocratic governance of Park Chung-hee emerged to be challenged at the beginning but finally took-off as “the Miracle of Han River.” In short, Park Chung-hee would not like to take an adventure to choose the option of direct conflicting at the first time, as he declared “선평화 후 통일” (Peace goes first then unification) (W. 崔. Choi, 1989). He knew the intention of North Korea to reunify the Korean Peninsula is by force. Nevertheless, at the moment that the U.S. and China started to talk, he still wanted to test the real attitude of the North on dealing with the Inter-Korean relationship.

However, Park Chung-hee himself was not a “Dove” too. In the second lustrum of the 1960s, for obtaining the U.S. military aid, Park Chung-hee stirred up the initial provocation to make Kim Il-sung retaliate. Those actions made a tensed atmosphere in the Korean Peninsula, then created a false impression that North Korea had initially provoked South Korea until the end of the 1960s (Park, 2009). It is obvious that by keeping the American Armed Forces in the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. could objectively provide a safe umbrella for South Korean to focus on the

economic development. Consequently, stimulating North Korea to be seen as an incensed and interminable invader created a direct excuse for the existence of the U.S. in South Korea.

Unlike Park Chung-hee relied upon the American military protection, the Chinese Volunteer Army who rescued the Kim Il-sung's regime from the collapse in the Korean War stayed in North Korea since 1958(S. Kim, 2006). When it came to solving the reunification problem, Kim Il-sung preferred to focus on any approaches only in between two Koreas, such as presenting the Korean Federal proposal, claiming foreign troops should withdraw from the Korean Peninsula. Kim Il-sung gradually realized that the Korean issues would never be a domestic issue but would be comprehensively affected by the major great powers. Moreover, Park Chung-hee never wanted to give up depending on the U.S., especially when the rapprochement between South Korea and Japan went to a positive and cooperative level, Kim Il-sung could not endure anymore because that South Korea would represent the only Korean government to clear up the complicated historical problem with Japan. To take vengeance on Park Chung-hee, Kim Il-sung undertakes several attacks to South Korea during the last lustrum of the 1960s.

As it mentioned before, Kim Il-sung's guerrilla raids and aggressive actions became meaningless when its brinkmanship brought a high risk of a general war and struck the fear of the South Korean citizens. With the failure of the military initiatives

and the international changes in the early 1970s, Kim Il-sung chose to be patient and expected to talk with the U.S. indirectly and with South Korea directly.

Albeit that both the North and South Korea expected there to be a unified Korea, both the leaders knew that peaceful environment is the precondition of unification. Also, the Big Four great powers also applauded the détente talk between the two Koreas (C.-J. Lee, 2001). Therefore, when the two Korean leaders made the decision to start détente with each other, they chose the peaceful option.

However, they also realized that it was impossible to try to launch a quick unification after two decades of military confrontation. Nevertheless, it is undoubted that both Korean leaders used the expectation of both Koreas for the reunification topic to bolster their dictatorial regime. With those examples, it becomes clear that shaping North Korea as the ideal enemy supported the Park Chung-hee's ruling, in the same way as it did Kim Il-sung went.

What if both Koreas finally picked the option of conflict finally, and the situation became worse and worse in Korean Peninsula? It would not happen because, with the understanding of the internal and external factors, both leaders knew that the Inter-relationship between them could not worsen to a full scale of War. Thus, both the Korean leaders rationally would prefer maintaining the tension on the Korean Peninsula to get along well with each other. Before August of 1976, the luck was slightly on the North Korean side. However the balance was broken as

the Axe Murder Incident or the Panmunjom Incident brought Kim Il-sung international blame (Chae, 2014). As one previous observer noted:

“Neither Kim Il Sung nor Park Chung Hee harbored the belief that his indirect dialogue would lead to the unification of the divided peninsula, although this hopeful prospect was, at least briefly, wide-spread among the respective publics of both men” (Oberdorfer, 1998).



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The contemporary world is too complicated to explain the history of the Inter-relationship between the Two Korea in the period of the 1970s with a simple symmetric model. Although there are uncountable limitations in explaining the Inter-relationship between the two Koreas, this Two Korean Leaders' Dilemma Game, along with the historical factors, proved that détente between North Korea and South Korea was irrational. Even though the people of the two Koreas expected for peace on the Korean Peninsula, both governments compete long legitimacy and to become the only representative Korean government in the world.

Firstly, Park Chung-hee made the right decision to improve the relationship with North Korea, to adjust to the new international changes. Soon after, however, he realized that détente with North Korea did not solve all the problems and this disturbed Park Chung-hee's domestic rule. Kim Il-sung held some hope to try to negotiate with Park Chung-hee after his military attempts to overthrow Park's administration. Later he realized that and South Korean Alliance with the U.S. was very solid, so that one of his goals, as the American Troops Withdrawal, could not happen. Consequently, the trail of rapprochement disappeared and evolved into another competition until the abrupt end of the dialogue in 1976.

As time went by, both Koreas continued their repeated game with new strategies. As Kim Jong-un inherited the power from his father Kim Jong-Il, the Mount Paekdu Bloodline, or the Kim's Dynasty, was continued. Meanwhile, the U.S. and South Korea still hold the joint military drill every year and press North Korea consistently on giving up its nuclear program. The P.R.C implements the sanction to punish North Korea's nuclear test, but at the same, time maintains the economic aid to North Korea. It seems that nothing has changed since earlier time, and confrontation is even more dangerous now.

Despite the dialogue of the 1970s failing to produce a peaceful result for both Koreas, but the experiences of the détente are treasurable. Not having the prior Inter-Korean reconciliation, could have been a terrible catastrophe if one Korea, probably South Korea had absorbed North Korea as a reunified Korea. At least, the attempts of building a dialogue provided a piece of the history lesson to the future talks between the two Koreas (S. Kim, 2006).

The current tension between the two Koreas was strengthened by the continuous nuclear and missile tests of the North, and the South's reaction with the THAAD installation. What can we learn from this thesis? Without communication, both players could miscalculate each other's real intentions and continue military competition so that the risk of the conflicts would increase.

However, the international environment has constantly changed, such that no

ideological bloc exists anymore. However, the influences of the superpowers on the Korean issues remain until today, especially the U.S., P.R.C., Japan, and Russia: Big Four. Notwithstanding, the internal and external environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula is distinctly different from that of the decade of the 1970s, but the possibility of a recurring conflict has never disappeared, especially when either side's leader wants to play the relationship "card" between the Koreas to distract domestic and inner political attention.



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