

INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN WORLD HERITAGE
MANAGEMENT: CASE STUDIES FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA



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พลวัตเชิงสถาบันและความสามารถในการปรับตัวในการบริหารจัดการมรดกโลก: กรณีศึกษาภูมิภาค
เอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้



วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาการวางแผนภาคและเมืองดุษฎีบัณฑิต
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มณฑิรา อุณาภูล : พลวัตเชิงสถาบันและความสามารถในการปรับตัวในการบริหารจัดการมรดกโลก: กรณีศึกษาภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้. (INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN WORLD HERITAGE MANAGEMENT: CASE STUDIES FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA) อ.ที่ปรึกษาหลัก : รศ. ดร.อภิวัฒน์ รัตนวราหะ

ในช่วงระยะเวลา 40 ปีที่ผ่านมา สถาบันบริหารจัดการแหล่งมรดก (heritage site management institutions) ต้องเผชิญกับการขยายขอบเขตของการปฏิบัติ มโนทัศน์ของ “มรดก” มีวิวัฒนาการ และการบริหารจัดการแหล่งมรดกก็มีความซับซ้อนมากขึ้น โดยต้องรับมือกับภัยคุกคามในระดับโลกและประเด็นการพัฒนา อย่างไรก็ตาม สถาบันบริหารจัดการแหล่งมรดกจำนวนมากยังคงยึดถือแนวปฏิบัติและขอบเขตหน้าที่ตามแบบแผนเดิม งานวิจัยนี้ศึกษาถึงความสามารถของสถาบันบริหารจัดการแหล่งมรดกโลกในการตอบสนองในเชิงสถาบันต่อบริบทการปฏิบัติงานที่เปลี่ยนแปลงไป การติดตามประเมินผลในระดับโลกพบว่าพื้นที่มรดกโลกต่างๆ กำลังเผชิญกับความซับซ้อนที่เพิ่มมากขึ้นด้วยความยากลำบาก มีพื้นที่มรดกโลกจำนวนมากอยู่ภายใต้การเฝ้าระวัง และบางแห่งต้องได้รับการเฝ้าระวังเป็นเวลายาวนานหลายปี ความเปลี่ยนแปลงที่เกิดขึ้นได้ยากลำบากนี้ชี้ให้เห็นถึงความจำเป็นที่ต้องมีความเข้าใจถึงพลวัตเชิงสถาบันและกลไกการเปลี่ยนแปลงที่ลึกซึ้ง

งานวิจัยนี้พัฒนาจากองค์ความรู้ด้านการเปลี่ยนแปลงเชิงสถาบัน โดยเน้นศึกษาด้านความสามารถในการปรับตัว (adaptive capacity) เป็นกรอบการวิเคราะห์ปัจจัยที่มีผลต่อการส่งเสริมหรือยับยั้งการเปลี่ยนแปลงภายใต้แรงกดดัน แนวคิดด้านความสามารถในการปรับตัวได้ถูกนำไปใช้อย่างกว้างขวางในบริบทของการเปลี่ยนแปลงสภาพภูมิอากาศ แต่ยังไม่ได้ถูกประยุกต์ใช้ในการศึกษาวิจัยด้านการบริหารจัดการพื้นที่มรดกโลก กรณีศึกษาของงานวิจัยนี้ประกอบด้วยพื้นที่มรดกโลก 3 แห่ง ที่มีลักษณะเป็นชุมชนเมืองในภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ ได้แก่ นครประวัติศาสตร์พระนครศรีอยุธยาในประเทศไทย วัดพูและแหล่งตั้งถิ่นฐานโบราณที่เกี่ยวข้องในพื้นที่ภูมิทัศน์วัฒนธรรมจำปาสักในสาธารณรัฐประชาธิปไตยประชาชนลาว และจอร์จทาวน์ ซึ่งเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของแหล่งมรดกโลก เมืองประวัติศาสตร์ในช่องแคบมะละกา ร่วมกับมะละกาประเทศมาเลเซีย

จากการศึกษาข้อมูลเชิงประจักษ์ งานวิจัยนี้นำเสนอปัจจัยของความสามารถในการปรับตัวในการบริหารจัดการแหล่งมรดกโลก 6 ปัจจัย ได้แก่ กรอบความเข้าใจ (cognitive frame), ความสามารถในการเรียนรู้ (learning capacity), มาตรการกำกับดูแล (governance), ความสำคัญ (relationships), ความสามารถกระทำการ (agency), และทรัพยากร (resources) งานวิจัยนี้ยืนยันถึงรอรดประโยชน์ของแนวคิดและระเบียบวิธีด้านความสามารถในการปรับตัวเพื่อเป็นเครื่องมือวิเคราะห์นอกเหนือจากบริบทของการเปลี่ยนแปลงสภาพภูมิอากาศ โดยใช้วิเคราะห์เพื่อสร้างความเข้าใจต่อความสามารถของสถาบันในการปรับตัวและเปลี่ยนแปลง อย่างไรก็ตาม งานวิจัยนี้พบว่ากรอบการประเมินความสามารถในการปรับตัวที่มีอยู่ในปัจจุบันยังมีข้อจำกัด โดยยังขาดการวิเคราะห์ถึงกระบวนการที่มีพลวัตและปฏิสัมพันธ์ระหว่างกระบวนการ เพื่อลดข้อจำกัดนี้ งานวิจัยนี้จึงเสนอการปรับกรอบแนวคิดด้านความสามารถในการปรับตัวให้คำนึงถึงปฏิสัมพันธ์ระหว่างปัจจัยต่างๆ ที่มีผลต่อความสามารถในการปรับตัว และผลของแต่ละปัจจัยที่มีต่อพลวัตเชิงสถาบันในภาพรวม ข้อเสนอแนะเชิงนโยบายจากการศึกษาวิจัยนี้อาจนำไปประยุกต์สำหรับการปรับปรุงกรอบนโยบาย กฎข้อบังคับ และโครงสร้างองค์กรบริหารจัดการมรดกโลก ในการปรับตัวเพื่อรองรับหน้าที่ที่นอกเหนือจากการอนุรักษ์และบริหารจัดการพื้นที่มรดกในรูปแบบเดิม ตอบสนองต่อความซับซ้อนที่มากขึ้นและการขยายขอบเขตของการปฏิบัติ

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5873805025 : MAJOR URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING

KEYWORD: adaptive capacity, World Heritage, institutions, Southeast Asia, boundary of practice

Montira Unakul : INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN WORLD HERITAGE MANAGEMENT: CASE STUDIES FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA . Advisor: Assoc. Prof. APIWAT RATANAWARAHHA, Ph.D.

Over the past 40 years, heritage site management institutions have had to contend with expanding “boundaries of practice”: the evolution of heritage concepts and the emergence of global and transnational threats and broader sustainable development issues. Yet, many heritage site management institutions are still mired in conventional heritage mandates and approaches. This study looks at the ability of World Heritage site management institutions to adapt to this changing landscape. Global monitoring exercises show that World Heritage sites are struggling with this increased complexity, with many sites under active monitoring, sometimes for years. The sluggishness of change suggests that a deeper understanding of the institutional dynamics and pathways of change is needed.

Building on the literature on institutional change, this study focuses on adaptive capacity as the lens to understand the factors which support or inhibit change in the face of mounting pressures. Well-developed in the context of climate change, the concept of adaptive capacity has so far not been applied extensively to the study of World Heritage management. The research examines three World Heritage case studies which are historic urban settlements in Southeast Asia: the Historic Town of Ayutthaya in Thailand, Vat Phou and Associated Ancient Settlements within the Champasak Cultural Landscape in Lao PDR, and George Town in Malaysia, part of the serial nomination of the Historic Cities of the Straits of Malacca, along with Melaka.

Drawing upon the empirical data, six factors of adaptive capacity are proposed in the context of World Heritage site management: cognitive frame, learning capacity, formal governance structures, organizational relations, agency and resources. The dissertation confirms the utility of adaptive change concepts and methodology as an analytic device beyond the context of climate change in understanding the inherent characteristics of institutions to adapt and transform. However, it finds that the existing adaptive change frameworks have their limitations, not capturing dynamic processes and interactions. In response to this, a refined framework for adaptive capacity is proposed to understand the interactions among different factors of adaptive capacity and their contributions to shaping overall institutional dynamics. The study has policy implications on re-structuring World Heritage policy, regulatory frameworks and organizational structures to move beyond conventional heritage conservation and management to deal with the greater complexity associated with expanding boundaries of heritage practice.

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This dissertation is dedicated in the memory of my mother, Maleewan Horayangura, who was my dedicated field research companion while undertaking my undergraduate and master’s degree theses. Her presence in this journey has been much missed.

Montira Unakul




TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT (THAI).....	iii
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH).....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
LIST OF TABLES.....	xiii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xv
Chapter 1 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Research questions and framework.....	12
1.3 Scope of research.....	15
1.4 Research design and methodology.....	17
1.5 Limitations of the study.....	21
1.6 Structure of the dissertation.....	23
Chapter 2 Cultural heritage, institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity.....	24
2.1 Introduction.....	24
2.2 Expanding boundaries of practice in (World) heritage.....	24
2.2.1 Redefining heritage: evolving concepts.....	29
2.2.2 Expanding challenges in conservation and management.....	34
2.2.3 Heritage and sustainable development.....	37
2.2.4 Reframing heritage management and governance.....	42
2.3 Institutional dynamics.....	44

2.3.1 Institutions and change	45
2.3.2 Dilemmas of modern state-centred (heritage) institutions	49
2.3.3 World Heritage institutions.....	51
2.3.4 From centralized to polycentric institutional systems	53
2.4 Adaptive capacity.....	56
2.4.1 Adaptive capacity of institutions	59
2.4.2 Adaptive capacity and World Heritage	62
2.4.3 Assessing adaptive capacity.....	63
2.5 Proposed analytical framework for institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity	67
2.5.1 Analytic framework for institutional dynamics	69
2.5.2 Analytic framework for adaptive capacity	71
2.5.2.1 Cognitive frames	72
2.5.2.2 Learning capacity	73
2.5.2.3 Agency	74
2.5.2.4 Formal governance structures.....	75
2.5.2.5 Relationships	76
2.5.2.6 Resources	77
Chapter 3 Research methodology.....	81
3.1 Introduction.....	81
3.2 Overall approach: comparative case study	81
3.3 Literature review.....	83
3.4 Scoping	83
3.5 Case study design.....	84

3.6 Process of selecting case studies.....	86
3.7 Selected case studies.....	96
3.8 Data collection	101
3.9 Data analysis.....	105
3.10 Concept mapping.....	106
3.11 Reliability and validity.....	109
Chapter 4 Historic City of Ayutthaya	110
4.1 Introduction.....	110
4.2 Background	110
4.2.1 Introduction to the site	110
4.2.2 Significance of the site.....	113
4.2.3 Management and governance institutions	115
4.3 Expanding boundaries of practice at the site.....	122
4.3.1 Evolving conceptualizations of heritage	122
4.3.2 Emerging management pressures.....	126
Flooding.....	126
Restoration of monuments	130
4.3.3 Changing management practices.....	134
Revision of Master Plan and regulations.....	135
Upgrading restoration standards: individual buy-in, institutional resistance	147
4.4 Institutional dynamics in the context of expanding boundaries of practice	153
4.5 Factors of adaptive capacity.....	161

4.5.1 Investing in information and knowledge: Cognitive frame and learning capacity	161
4.5.2 Encouraging appropriate institutions: Agency, formal governance structures, relationships	164
4.5.3 Increasing resources	166
4.6 Conclusion: Reflecting on institutional dynamics, adaptive capacity and expanding boundaries of practice	168
4.6.1 Polycentric institutional setting.....	168
4.6.2 Formal-informal interaction.....	169
4.6.3 Expanding boundaries of practice	170
4.7 Summary of chapter.....	172
Chapter 5 Vat Phou and Ancient Settlements in the Champasak Cultural Landscape	174
5.1 Introduction	174
5.2 Background	174
5.2.1 Introduction to the site	174
5.2.2 Significance of the site.....	176
5.2.3 Management and governance institutions	178
5.3 Expanding boundaries of practice at the site.....	185
5.3.1 Evolving conceptualizations of heritage	185
5.3.2 Emerging management pressures.....	189
5.3.3 Changing management practices.....	197
5.4 Institutional dynamics in the context of expanding boundaries of practice	210
5.5 Factors of adaptive capacity.....	220

5.5.1 Investing in information and knowledge: Cognitive frame and learning capacity	220
5.5.2 Encouraging appropriate institutions: Agency, formal governance structures and relationships	221
5.5.3 Increasing resources	221
5.6 Conclusion: reflection on institutional dynamics, adaptive capacity and expanding boundaries of practice	222
5.6.1 Polycentric institutional setting.....	222
5.6.2 Formal-informal interaction.....	223
5.6.3 Expanding boundaries of practice	224
5.7 Summary of chapter.....	225
Chapter 6 George Town	226
6.1 Introduction.....	226
6.2 Background	226
6.2.1 Introduction to the site	226
6.2.2 Significance of the site.....	228
6.2.3 Management and governance institutions	233
6.3 Expanding boundaries of practice at the site.....	250
6.3.1 Evolving conceptualizations of heritage	250
6.3.2 Emerging management pressures.....	254
6.3.3 Changing management practices.....	261
6.4 Institutional dynamics in the context of expanding boundaries of practice	280
6.5 Factors of adaptive capacity.....	288
6.5.1 Investing in information and knowledge: Cognitive frame and learning capacity	288

6.5.2 Encouraging appropriate institutions: Agency, formal governance structures, relationships	291
6.5.3 Increasing resources	292
6.6 Conclusion: Reflecting on institutional dynamics, adaptive capacity and expanding boundaries of practice	293
6.6.1 Polycentric institutional setting.....	293
6.6.2 Formal-informal interaction.....	295
6.6.3 Expanding boundaries of practice	296
6.7 Summary of chapter.....	298
Chapter 7 Conclusion	300
7.1 Revisiting research objectives and overall findings	300
7.1.1 Determinants of adaptive capacity	309
7.1.2 Institutional dynamics.....	321
7.1.3 The nature of institutions.....	329
7.1.4 Navigating boundaries of practice	331
7.2 Contributions of the study	335
7.2.1 Contributions to World Heritage studies.....	335
7.2.2 Contributions to institutional change and adaptive capacity studies.....	336
7.2.3 Policy implications.....	337
7.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research	341
REFERENCES	343
APPENDICES.....	358
Appendix 1: Scoping matrix for case study selection	359
Appendix 2: Interview guide	365

Appendix 3: Excerpt of coded interview data	367
Appendix 4: Post-training questionnaire results at Ayutthaya.....	376
Appendix 5: Organigramme of Ayutthaya World Heritage site management agency	380
Appendix 6: Organigramme of Vat Phou Champasak World Heritage site management agency.....	381
Appendix 7: Organigramme of George Town World Heritage site management agency	382
VITA.....	383



LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1 Shifts in heritage concepts, management challenges and governance	27
Table 2 Analytic framework for institutional dynamics and factors of adaptive capacity.....	68
Table 3 Proposed factors of adaptive capacity	71
Table 4 Scoping criteria for initial site selection	86
Table 5 Types of World Heritage sites	88
Table 6 World Heritage sites facing management challenges	91
Table 7 Timeframe under World Heritage Committee scrutiny	92
Table 8 Prevalent types of World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia in concern	94
Table 9 Different institutional management systems at World Heritage sites	95
Table 10 Short-listed World Heritage sites for case study selection (*selected site) ..	96
Table 11 Comparative overview of case studies	100
Table 12 Summary of data sources.....	103
Table 13 Sample of data coding	105
Table 14 Scope of Master Plan for Ayutthaya	119
Table 15 Comparison between original Master Plan (1993) and the Updated Master Plan (2018)	136
Table 16 Comparison between the UNESCO-IHE flood risk mitigation plan and disaster sub-plan in updated Master Plan (2018)	144
Table 17 Visitor arrivals at Vat Phou World Heritage Site (in number of persons)	190
Table 18 Visioning exercise identifying key issues for heritage and development among the local population	196

Table 19 Overview of Champasak Cultural Landscape Master Plan	197
Table 20 Technical staff composition of Vat Phou World Heritage Site Office (2018)	203
Table 21 Decisions of the Vat Phou World Heritage Office on Building Construction Control.....	205
Table 22 Stakeholders identified by George Town Heritage Management Plan.....	235
Table 23 Graded heritage buildings in Penang.....	239
Table 24 Main sections of the Heritage Management Plan.....	240
Table 25 Organizations dealing with various aspects of heritage management	241
Table 26 Comparing functions between local government and World Heritage office as delineated in the SAP.....	246
Table 27 Criteria of World Heritage towns in Southeast Asia.....	250
Table 28 Main sections of the SAP.....	264
Table 29 Sources of institutional rigidity and dynamism	305
Table 30 Cross-case comparisons of institutional change and factors of adaptive capacity affecting institutional dynamics.....	307
Table 31 Final set of factors proposed for assessing adaptive capacity.....	310
Table 32 Typology of institutional dynamics	323

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1 Conceptual framework	15
Figure 2 Conceptual expansion of heritage	33
Figure 3 Expansion of management practice	36
Figure 4 Sustainable development and heritage: three dimensions.....	39
Figure 5 The SES framework	58
Figure 6 Adaptation and transformation	61
Figure 7 The six dimensions of the Adaptive Capacity Wheel (ACW).....	66
Figure 8 Proposed conceptual framework.....	79
Figure 9 Proposed model of institutional change	80
Figure 10 World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia in concern	93
Figure 11 Expanding boundaries of practice at case study sites	98
Figure 12 Distribution of interviewees.....	102
Figure 13 Example of concept map showing conceptual nodes and interrelationships	107
Figure 14 Example of concept map with annotations of institutional dynamics	108
Figure 15 Remaining urban layout and cultural properties in Ayutthaya island.....	111
Figure 16 Scope of Ayutthaya World Heritage site.....	114
Figure 17 Pre-existing Ayutthaya Land Use Plan (1990) showing residential, commercial and industrial uses previously permitted in the archaeological site	118
Figure 18 Ayutthaya Master Plan (1993) zoning, showing new archaeological protection area (in brown).....	118
Figure 19 Institutional ecology for managing Ayutthaya World Heritage site	121

Figure 20 Mapping of actors at Ayutthaya World Heritage site	122
Figure 21 Proposed extension areas for managing Ayutthaya’s wider territory.....	124
Figure 22 Additional gazettement of the remaining parts	125
Figure 23 Repeated flooding at Wat Chaiwattanaram in 1995 (top) and 2011 (bottom)	128
Figure 24 Floodwaters about to engulf the historic city.....	129
Figure 25 ICOMOS experts point out extensive reconstruction and poor masonry skills.....	133
Figure 26 Physical scope of the updated Master Plan (2018) is unchanged, with no geographical expansion	136
Figure 27 Proposed land uses under the updated Master Plan (2018)	138
Figure 28 UNESCO-IHE mapping of flood risk actors at Ayutthaya	141
Figure 29 Flood prevention system for Ayutthaya island communities and Historic Park proposed by the provincial Department of Town and Country Planning	143
Figure 30 Temporary and localized approach to flood risk protection by FAD	146
Figure 31 Qualitative conceptual mapping of institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity: Ayutthaya	160
Figure 32 Location of Vat Phou (Source: Champasak Province Authority, 2016)	175
Figure 33 Planned landscape showing Vat Phou temple complex and the Ancient City.....	177
Figure 34 Zone designation in the World Heritage Management Plan	179
Figure 35 Institutional ecology for managing Vat Phou World Heritage site.....	183
Figure 36 Mapping of actors at Vat Phou	184
Figure 37 New gas station in agricultural landscape along new Route 14A (2012) ...	193
Figure 38 New core area indicated in dotted red line, superimposed on original World Heritage Zones.....	199

Figure 39 Study showing integrity of the cultural landscape, with low integrity areas in red.....	200
Figure 40 New zoning map, regularizing developed areas as new “Urban Zones” ..	201
Figure 41 Preferred reinforced concrete construction (above) compared to permissible wooden farm house (below) within the agricultural landscape.....	207
Figure 42 Unauthorized demolition of terraced house in Champasak town	209
Figure 43 Qualitative conceptual mapping of institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity: Vat Phou.....	216
Figure 44 Qualitative conceptual mapping: future scenario for connecting heritage and sustainable development voiced by stakeholders in planning Vat Phou.....	219
Figure 45 Location of George Town	227
Figure 46 World Heritage zoning for George Town.....	230
Figure 47 Examples of early and late Straits Eclectic style (left and right).....	231
Figure 48 Land use of Penang heritage site.....	234
Figure 49 Institutional ecology for managing George Town World Heritage site	236
Figure 50 Mapping of actors at George Town.....	238
Figure 51 Role of various heritage organizations within scope of the SAP	244
Figure 52 George Town’s vernacular architecture of shophouses creating a contiguous roofscape (Source: ArtAsia).....	256
Figure 53 Flowchart of SAP procedures	269
Figure 54 Hotel demolition in process.....	272
Figure 55 Net population change from 2009-2013	277
Figure 56 Qualitative conceptual mapping of institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity: George Town	287
Figure 57 Refined model for adaptive capacity, showing institutional dynamics and interaction among factors of adaptive capacity.....	303

Figure 58 Existing adaptive capacity frameworks developed by (top) Gupta et al (2010) and (bottom) Phillips et al (2013).....	304
Figure 59 The role of learning in expanding boundaries of heritage concepts and practice	332
Figure 60 Navigating expanding boundaries of practice within centralized institutional systems	333
Figure 61 Navigating expanding boundaries of practice within polycentric institutional systems	334



Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Since the World Heritage Convention was adopted in 1972, over 1,000 sites have been inscribed onto the World Heritage List. From the very first recognition of iconic sites such as the Pyramids in Egypt and the Great Wall in China, the List today encompasses a range of sites that span a widening definition of heritage, particularly cultural heritage. To the extent that World Heritage is the poster child – rightly or wrongly – for the heritage sphere writ large, this growing diversity on the World Heritage List reflects more inclusive notions of cultural heritage. From the conventional recognition conferred on monuments, historic buildings, towns, and archaeological sites, the List today encompasses *inter alia* cultural landscapes both rural and urban, industrial heritage sites, cultural routes and vernacular heritage.

Global monitoring exercises reveal that the World Heritage sites are struggling with ever more complex issues than ever. A statistical analysis conducted between 1979 and 2013 by the World Heritage Centre showed that the main issues identified by the World Heritage Committee affecting conservation across the world include: “management and institutional factors”, “buildings and development”, “social and cultural uses of heritage”, “transportation infrastructure” and “other human activities” (UNESCO, 2014c). Within the Asia-Pacific region, sites face problems associated with “local conditions affecting physical fabric”, “social/cultural uses of heritage”, “buildings/development”, “pollution” and “transport infrastructure” (ibid). Within Southeast Asia, the official Periodic Reporting exercise conducted in 2010 (whereby States Parties self-report on their implementation of the World Heritage Convention and the state of their sites) identified that the top issues are “local conditions affecting physical fabric”, “social/cultural uses of heritage”, “climate change”, “sudden ecological or geological events” and “buildings/development” and “transport infrastructure” (UNESCO, 2012c).

These accumulated challenges are taking a toll on World Heritage sites. Out of the total number of World Heritage sites, 54 are on the List of World Heritage in Danger, indicating that there is an ascertained or potential threat for losing the Outstanding Universal Value which defines the *raison d'être* of the site. Aside from sites that are in Danger, there are sites that are under close monitoring in terms of their State of Conservation by the World Heritage Committee. The situation at these sites is not so dire, however, there are concerns that this significance may be under considerable, and yet remediable, threat. Between 2000 and 2009, the number of sites under State of Conservation monitoring tripled from 34 to 104, while the number of sites in Danger quadrupled from 4 to 17 (Leitao, 2011). These numbers underreport the actual situation as there are far more sites facing conservation and management issues which have not registered on the radar of the World Heritage Committee.

In Southeast Asia, as of June 2019, there were 38 World Heritage sites in total, encompassing 16 natural sites, 21 cultural sites and 1 mixed site (UNESCO, 2019). Over half, or 20 sites, have been identified as having issues related to conservation and management. Three sites have been or are currently in Danger. Fourteen sites have been subject to Reactive Monitoring, while two have been the target for Advisory Missions.

A site can be under active monitoring by the World Heritage Committee for up to 10 years or even longer before being deemed to have graduated from this situation of concern. These cases of chronic poor management practice suggest that there are underlying failures to effectively reform management and governance institutions. Targeted efforts to raise technical capacity and improve management measures through training projects or revising management plans do not seem to translate into more systemic capacity to deal with conservation and management issues, particularly with mounting environmental and socio-economic pressures as well as more complex notions of heritage.

The intractability in resolving heritage problems points to a growing gap between the complexity of heritage issues and the capacity of heritage institutions to handle such complexity. This complexity has multiple dimensions. The dissertation proposes the rubric of expanded “boundaries of practice” as a way of framing and making sense of these various dimensions of complexity. It posits that these expanding boundaries of practice are placing a strain on management institutions, resulting in the worrisome patterns of management failure seen globally at World Heritage sites.

The first dimension is in terms of a conceptual expansion of the boundaries of heritage itself. Over the past 40 years, there has been a significant enlargement of the concepts of heritage from a focus on monuments and site to landscapes to living heritage and now to heritage and well-being (as thoroughly explained in Wijesuriya and Wood 2018.) The conceptual expansion of heritage may have spatial implications, such as in the case of historic landscapes, where it becomes necessary to consider the larger setting of a site beyond just a single building or group of buildings. This correlation with spatial expansion is not always the case, however, with other emergent categories of heritage such as industrial heritage.

Secondly, an unprecedented host of issues is now affecting heritage sites. The challenges that face cultural heritage conservation today are more multi-dimensional and far-reaching than the issues that the cultural heritage profession grappled with 40 years ago. Climate change, rapid urbanization, industrialization, infrastructure development, the commodification of heritage and the explosion in global tourism are putting heritage sites around the world under greater pressure than ever. The conceptual expansion is related to the expansion in the management issues. As the definition of cultural heritage becomes broader, as reflected in the types of sites that are now recognized on the World Heritage List, the types of challenges encountered become more complicated. For instance, unlike conserving a single temple, dealing with a cultural landscape or a historic urban landscape has to take into account a wide range of issues related to economic, social and environmental dimensions, as

well as a larger network of stakeholders at all levels. However, not all issues arise because of the enlargement in heritage concepts, such as the uptick in disasters which may affect any type of heritage site.

While the restoration and reconstruction efforts of post-World War II Europe grappled with technical issues of material authenticity and historical accuracy, culture and cultural heritage are now implicated in a very fundamental way in contemporary discourse and policy debates on sustainable development. The conservation of the material artefacts of cultural heritage is no longer seen as an end unto itself. The protection of cultural heritage is now considered a means to safeguard diverse cultural values. As such, the safeguarding of cultural heritage is fundamental to the safeguarding of cultural rights, which is in turn an inalienable part of the rights-based approach to sustainable development. Increasingly, the recognition of the importance of culture and the good management of cultural heritage resources is becoming a fundamental pillar in the overarching global strategy being pursued by the United Nations and the development community at large, post-Millennium Development Goals.

With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015, heritage is now firmly embedded into this overall global framework linking individual and societal well-being in all dimensions. Heritage is reflected in many of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Within SDG 11, which makes a commitment to making “cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”, Target 11.4 specifically addresses World Heritage by aiming to “strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage”. Heritage is also seen as an enabler or as a driver to achieve the other goals related to fundamental aspects of well-being such as reducing poverty (SDG 1), ending hunger (SDG 2), promoting good health (SDG 3) and ensuring access to water and sanitation (SDG 6). Heritage is also harnessed as a pre-requisite for quality education (SDG 4), for sustaining economic growth (SDG 8) and protecting the environment (SDG 15). The adoption of the New Urban Agenda

further contextualizes the potential of heritage as a driver for sustainable development in an urban context.

These two shifts in concept and in management scope have an implication for the third aspect which is expanding heritage management practice to deal with these evolving notions of heritage sites, with more extensive footprints and more complex socio-environmental demands at play. From a primary concern about physical conservation in the 1970s, heritage management now encompasses ecological issues, settings, intangible cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, rights, disasters, livelihoods, the nature-culture continuum, visitor management and sustainable development. The engagement with heritage needs to be deepened within the existing confines of the culture sector and broadened to contribute to other sectors as well. As definitions of cultural heritage have become more encompassing, the paradigm of cultural heritage management has shifted away from statist, technocratic approaches to one of broad-based consensus-building, particularly at the local level, a shift which reflects the political framework of the period and global trends in the dialectic between culture and development.

However, the reality is that most World Heritage management institutions are mired in narrow conventional heritage mandates and practices. Some organizations have historical legacies dating back 100 years, with expertise in epigraphic studies, archaeological excavation or monument restoration. Many are now dominated by senior executives who were educated in the 1970s when the Venice Charter was the touchstone for heritage conservation, focusing on authenticity in physical conservation. Most are staffed mainly by architects and archaeologists. Few are equipped to deal with the gamut of emerging issues that now faces the heritage world.

The mitigation of disaster risks is a revealing example. Within the World Heritage official discourse and policies, disaster risks are still considered a relatively new emerging problem that site management agencies have been attempting to formulate responses to. It was only in 2007 that an official strategy was issued by

the Committee, enjoining States Parties to enhance their readiness in dealing with disasters at World Heritage sites. In comparison, for more technical issues like stone conservation or wood conservation, modern conservation professional guidelines, standards and trainings have been developed over the past century. Within the Southeast Asian region, to date, the site management authorities have only been able to produce a disaster risk management plan for one or two World Heritage sites in each country. The actual implementation of the plans, or other forms of policy-making or capacity building for either preparedness or response is even less. Following disasters, the types of measures that have been put in place are typically quite narrow and heritage-centric. In many cases, the emergency situation was not enough to engender closer long-term coordination with other sectors in order to create multi-sectoral responses at an urban or territorial scale such as rerouting infrastructure, changing land use designations or drawing upon local knowledge still existing in long-time resident communities to find more holistic solutions to reduce risks or to strengthen emergency preparedness.

A more fundamental structural issue is the well-embedded governance mechanism of the World Heritage Convention and accordingly World Heritage sites which privileges the role of the state, or at least, state-dependent channels. The World Heritage Convention, as an international legal instrument, behooves its States Parties (that is, States that are party to the Convention) to establish, empower and fund the governance mechanism and institutions to implement the Convention. Specifically, in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, the primary obligation of State Parties is “ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage” (UNESCO, 1972). This mechanism holds the state responsible and ultimately accountable for a type of public goods, cultural heritage or more specifically, cultural heritage sites. In the case of World Heritage, they can be considered global public goods (Serageldin, 1999). The governance system through the mechanism of the nation-state is embedded in the global architecture of the United Nations system, with roots in the post-Westphalian norms of state-centred governance. It extends across sectors

ranging from healthcare to education and the provision of other public services, along with the maintenance of global peace and order. In an increasingly post-nation state scenario, this system is being called into question, with the rise of both trans-national phenomena (ranging from haze to ISIS) and very localized concerns and movements.

Yet for World Heritage, despite the rather recent inclusion of communities as one of the pillars (the so-called “5C’s”) in implementing the Convention, the fact remains that the mechanisms for managing World Heritage sites are still dominated by centralized state-dominant systems, and the official processes of the Convention at a national and global level are still contingent upon the final authority of the state. The official monitoring and reporting mechanisms are conducted entirely within state-dominated channels, and management systems still give an outside role to the state through legislative, financial and other levers of control. Attempts to open up the process to community groups and other stakeholders are increasingly seen, especially in countries where such inclusive governance approaches are mandated by law. However, within many countries in Asia, this remains the exception rather than the norm. Such involvement may be restricted to superficial consultation, rather than ownership or accountability.

Moreover, the official mechanisms of the World Heritage Convention are reliant on formal channels and the manipulation of formal institutional rules, such as reforms in legislation, regulations and plans, normally at the behest of state authority. At a philosophical level, scholars have queried the extent to which such formal processes or state authority is appropriate or even possible over cultural heritage. Miura (2011a) notes that heritage is a concept which is difficult to define, while Herbert (1989) suggests that it is “among the undefinables”. Likewise, Scott (1998) has criticized the limits of the high modernist project of state administration which strives to make legible existing processes which are inherently complex and defy such reductive approaches. What happens when something so ephemeral is subjected to the grasp of the state or confined to formal processes, at least for

official governance purposes? And yet, such formalized, state-led mechanisms are the prevalent mode of practice in heritage management, not least due to the state's deep-seated interests in manipulating heritage for the purposes of national identity, political discourse and economic gains. At a global level, despite the rhetoric championing a more inclusive approach, this has not translated into changes in the global governance mechanism which filters down from the World Heritage Committee to States Parties and to the relevant line ministries and local authorities, and back upwards. Such official concerns are often confined to narrow issues of heritage management, and rarely address more structural underlying issues that affect heritage management outcomes such as equity and distributive justice in broader social, economic or environmental terms. At a local level, heritage management is often still ultimately conducted within the framework of long-established formalized and officialized mechanisms of government, again, within narrow heritage terms. The blunt instruments of the state often have a totalizing, essentializing or ossifying effect, which is counter to the nuanced, multi-valent and dynamic nature of cultural heritage.

This reluctance or inability or slowness to change heritage management approaches can be ascribed to systemic factors at an institutional level. The literature on institutional change suggests that this kind of shock to the system should trigger changes in existing governance institutions. However, where there is substantial institutional inertia, institutional change may come about in a more incremental fashion. Institutions are defined as “systems of rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide interactions among the occupants of the relevant roles” (IDGEC 1999). Comprising both formal and informal rules, institutions are inherently conservative (Gupta and Dellapenna, 2009). Indeed, institutions tend to be self-reinforcing; previous interactions, views and power relations contribute to a process of institutionalization which entrenches both formal and informal rules (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2006). In this context, the capacity of an institutional system to

adapt or transform, particularly in response to external stimuli, should be further investigated.

Building on the literature of institutional change, this study will focus on adaptive capacity as the lens to understand the factors which support or inhibit institutional change in the face of mounting pressures and evolving heritage frameworks, in the context of World Heritage site management. Gupta et al (2010) define adaptive capacity as “the inherent characteristics of institutions that empower social actors to respond to short and long-term impacts either through planned measures or through allowing and encouraging creative responses from society both ex ante and ex post. It encompasses: the characteristics of institutions (formal and informal rules, norms and beliefs) that enable society (individuals, organizations and networks) to cope with climate change, and the degree to which such institutions allow and encourage actors to change these institutions to cope with climate change.”

Bettini et al (2015) make a further distinction between resilient adaptation (to be able to absorb shocks and perturbations within the existing objectives) or transformative adaptation (whereby the system is reconfigured to meet fundamentally different objectives). They define adaptive capacity as, “The ability to mobilize and combine different capacities within a system, to anticipate or respond to economic, environmental, and social stressors, in order to initiate structural or functional change to a system and thereby achieve resilient or transformative adaptation.” Furthermore, they propose that institutional agency should be looked at as a determinant of adaptive capacity. Institutional agency is felt to be an important dimension in putting adaptive capacity into practice. They propose that adaptive capacity “should include the skills and resources needed to adapt, along with the access, influence, and the capability to harness and combine these system attributes into adaptation processes. Without this agency element within definitions, studies risk continuing to miss critical insights into how system capacities can be

mobilized for adaptation, and how this can be achieved in different social contexts” (ibid).

There is a broad consensus among scholars of adaptive capacity that there are three main issues in defining adaptive capacity, as identified by Janssen and Ostrom (2006): resources, information and knowledge, and institutions that permit evolutionary change. This broad framework has been further detailed by other scholars notably the well-received six-part Adaptive Change Wheel (ACW) created by Gupta et al (2010 Gupta et al. (2010)), which creates metrics for understanding how institutions contribute to adaptive capacity among social actors.

Well-developed in the context of climate change, the concept of adaptive capacity has so far not been applied extensively to the study of World Heritage management. The adaptive capacity of heritage sites, particularly World Heritage sites and cultural heritage, is a relatively new area of research, emerging mostly in the past five years. These studies are confined to adaptive capacity in the specific context of climate change. This area of scholarship is a subset of a larger and more well-established body of knowledge that concerns the impacts of climate change on heritage (see Cassar 2005, Bandarin 2007, Lefevre and Sabbioni 2018). It overlaps with a separate but related stream of work on managing disasters and other risks at heritage sites and World Heritage sites (see Jigyasu 2004, Mackee 2014, Korca 2018).

Beyond the issue of climate change, the assessment of adaptive capacity as a conceptual and analytical device has not yet been applied to the study of World Heritage site management in general. Especially, its use has not been considered in terms of assessing the capacity of a system to adapt to a host of factors and pressures that disrupt existing governance and management institutions. Given the methodological advances that have been made in assessing adaptive capacity, this tool holds tangible promises for untangling other complex heritage governance issues. This study aims to adapt existing frameworks for assessing adaptive capacity as a means of better understanding institutional mechanisms driving the ability of World Heritage site institutions to respond to emerging challenges.

The study seeks to unpack the evolution in heritage practice by delving into the institutional mechanics of change, by questioning how change comes about at the level of organizations, individuals and other social actors interacting within an institutional system. The current heritage literature tends to paint this evolution in broad brushstrokes, highlighting major milestones such as the 1994 Nara Conference and new international conventions or doctrinal recommendations. Moreover, there are gaps in understanding practice at the level of World Heritage sites, the interactions of institutional actors involved, and how governance and management institutions negotiate such evolutions in their everyday operations. The study also addresses a gap in the literature regarding uncertainties in the role adaptive capacity plays in generating system change and in the ability to operationalize adaptive capacity in practice (Adger and Vincent 2005; Lemos et al 2007a).

Reflecting its inherently conservative nature, institutional innovation within the heritage sphere has been slower than in other sectors, where the past two decades have seen fertile experimentation in the reform of governance systems. At the heart of such reforms is the acknowledgement of failures in state-centred approaches to governance predicated upon the authority of the nation state that is rooted in the 17th century Westphalian system. Scholars and practitioners have identified constraints in state institutions and tools, particularly true in areas where *metis* (intangible local knowledge and capacities) is important. The concerns identified by Scott (1998) in fields as diverse as forestry and town planning are even more pronounced with cultural heritage, which is fluid and multi-faceted and thus not easily categorized, recorded and governed.

Centralized state-centred heritage management systems often face limitations. With the volume of heritage buildings under their purview, state heritage agencies are perennially cash strapped. Unable to compete with the private sector on the job market, they often face a lack of qualified in-house personnel. Technological knowhow is typically lagging, with a reliance on basic often manual tools and techniques. Their hierarchical decision-making mechanisms are not

nimble, particularly in the case of unanticipated occurrences and especially disasters. Furthermore, they are not designed to be participatory and therefore struggle to engage meaningfully with external stakeholders and laterally with other sectors, even other state agencies.

Yet even in the heritage field, governance reforms are occurring, albeit more slowly. Heritage sites are now seeing the emergence of alternative management models such as public-private partnerships or multi-actor network governance models which are more polycentric. In comparison to the more centralized model of heritage management under the primary authority of a heritage agency, the more polycentric models seem to offer the possibility to overcome some of the limitations of state governance.

1.2 Research questions and framework

This conundrum is the starting point for my inquiry: how are these literally antiquated heritage organizations and institutional systems able to adapt in the face of increasingly complex issues in managing World Heritage sites and the shift from a purely heritage agenda to a broader agenda encompassing development issues and other concerns? Where institutional innovations are seen, what factors have facilitated such transformations? Reflecting upon the researcher's two decades of professional practice in the area of heritage management, this study provides an opportunity to unpack some of the underlying factors shaping World Heritage institutions and their evolutions.

The thesis is framed around the following key research question:

- In the face of expanding boundaries of heritage practice, what determines the adaptive capacity of World Heritage institutions and how do different determinants of adaptive capacity interact in shaping various institutional dynamics?

The following sub-questions are posed:

- Institutional dynamics: How do different determinants of adaptive capacity interact in shaping various institutional dynamics, through formal and informal processes?
- The nature of institutions: How do centralized versus polycentric institutional systems differ in terms of adaptive capacity and institutional dynamics?
- Navigating boundaries: Do institutions have more adaptive capacity in responding to issues within or outside of existing boundaries of practice?

The study seeks to develop a refined framework for understanding adaptive change and characterizing institutional dynamics in the context of World Heritage site management. This will form the basis for a deeper understanding of the institutional mechanisms of transformation of current World Heritage institutional arrangements, which are increasingly found to be inadequate in facing issues of greater complexity in site management. Accordingly, this will form the basis to contribute to the literature as well as enhance policies related to World Heritage management.

Against these questions, the literature on institutional change and adaptive capacity suggests a number of propositions, some of which are in opposition. The researcher seeks to confirm which of these propositions are substantiated by the empirical evidence from this study on cultural heritage management in a rapidly evolving context, and to add further nuance to the propositions in the field of cultural heritage management.

- In terms of adaptive capacity, the study will use as a starting point a model of adaptive capacity that is synthesized from key models prevalent in the existing literature, and will refine it further. The proposed model includes six factors of adaptive capacity which will be elaborated further in Chapter 2.

- Regarding institutional dynamics, the received wisdom from the literature holds that while formal rules may change, informal rules tend to be persistent; these persistent informal rules undermine the extent of institutional change. This belief remains to be confirmed in the context of cultural heritage management.
- On the question of the adaptability of centralized versus polycentric institutional systems, the literature presents two lines of thought. On the one hand, multiple institutional orders or alternatives may provide an opportunity for actors to exercise greater agency (Clemens & Cook, 1999). On the other hand, the greater the degree of institutionalization, the lower the degree of uncertainty, and hence the lower the need for persistent rules, which encourages strategic agency and action (Beckert 1999, Dorado 2005).
- Finally, concerning the issue of navigating expanding boundaries, a school of scholarship in institutional change ascribes an important role to “jolts in the form of social upheaval, technological disruption, competitive discontinuities, or regulatory changes [which] might enable institutional entrepreneurship” (Greenwood et al, 2002). On the other hand, other scholars find that “people are equally likely to create something new both as a reaction to crisis as well as a reaction to stasis” (Senge, 1990).

For each of these questions, the study seeks to take an inductive approach to shed light on these propositions and to identify which ones are applicable in the context of different heritage management institutions.

The conceptual framework for the research draws upon the theories and mechanisms of institutional change and more specifically adaptive capacity. The research posits that expanding boundaries of heritage should lead to changes in heritage management practice. However, the level of changes that occur depends upon the various factors of adaptive capacity as well as the nature of the institutional system that is in place for heritage management. Together these

variables will influence the type and extent of institutional dynamics that occur in response to expanding boundaries of heritage. This will be explained more in Chapter 2.




Figure 1 Conceptual framework

Adaptive capacity is selected as a particularly suitable theoretical approach for this study as it provides a clear framework to dissect and understand how institutions are able to change – or not – in response to a host of evolving pressures and fundamental assumptions. Beyond the issue of climate change, it seems to have potential to be used as the approach to understand other forms of institutional transformation, in this case, in the field of heritage management. In terms of characterizing the actual phenomena of institutional change that occurs, the study will rely on the typology suggested by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) which adds further depth to the adaptive capacity analysis, but allowing individual changes and overall dynamics to be identified.

1.3 Scope of research

The research will focus on World Heritage site management practices in the context of Southeast Asia. As widely acknowledged, World Heritage sites tend to draw higher attention in terms of investment, development pressure, visitation and policy making, and are thus exposed to extreme versions of the expanding boundaries of practice introduced above. The intention of the World Heritage Convention is for World

Heritage sites to represent the vanguard in heritage management, both in conceptual and operational terms. In this sense, standards and practices set at World Heritage sites are meant to inform and influence practice in general within each country. By focusing on World Heritage, the study thus has the potential to shed light and provide recommendations not only relevant for World Heritage management, but also for broader institutional systems of heritage site management. Moreover, the fact that World Heritage sites are all subject to the same overall framework of the World Heritage Convention and the mechanisms of the World Heritage Committee allows for a certain comparability among the selected sites, as will be explained in Chapter 3.

Southeast Asia has been selected as the field of inquiry as the range of heritage site typologies represented and the management challenges faced in Southeast Asia straddles the central range of the global spectrum. In this way, conclusions from this study may be applicable to sites that are both more and less progressive. As identified in the latest Periodic Report Heritage reporting on World Heritage issues, site management agencies in the sub-region are coping with bread and butter conservation issues, perennial struggles in balancing visitor and resident demands, as well as with larger and emerging multi-sectoral issues like urbanization, disasters and other emergencies. In terms of governance systems, the majority of cultural heritage sites in Southeast Asia are managed in a fairly standard technocratic manner, mostly by site management agencies under the authority of Ministries of Culture or their equivalent, although new models are also emerging.

The study's unit of analysis is the "site management institution". This includes, but is not limited to, the site management agency. Within the World Heritage system, the site management agency is the organization which is officially charged with the planning, execution, monitoring and reporting of management actions at a World Heritage site. In addition to the designated site management authority, the study will also examine the other actors which have a recognized arrangement in contributing to managing the World Heritage site. The primary focus will be on organizational actors, although in the context of an inhabited site,

residents and individual actors will also be taken into account as having influence on heritage practices as conducted by the site management institution. The site management agency may need to negotiate with, mobilize, counter or neutralize these other actors, depending on the situation and context. However, the main unit of analysis remains the organizational actors which dominate the institutional system.

Moreover, in line with the definition of institutions prevalent in the institutional studies literature, the institutions that will be studied will also be taken to encompass formal rules (policies, laws, regulations) as well as informal rules (social norms, customary beliefs, working practices). Together, these will constitute the larger governance eco-system within which the site is managed, and the object of study in this dissertation.

1.4 Research design and methodology

The research will use a comparative case study approach to analyze adaptive capacity in the context of different institutional governance models demonstrating different degrees of centralization or polycentricity. The selected case studies aim to provide insights into different institutional dynamics and highlight contrasts in adaptive capacity due to socio-institutional factors embedded in each system.

Following an initial scoping process, the following three case studies which are historic urban World Heritage settlements in Southeast Asia were selected: the “Historic Town of Ayutthaya” in Thailand, “Vat Phou and Associated Ancient Settlements within the Champasak Cultural Landscape” in Lao PDR, and George Town in Malaysia, part of the serial nomination of the “Historic Cities of the Straits of Malacca” along with Melaka. The three case studies represent three different institutional models of heritage management, respectively: a technocratic heritage agency working in a vertical silo mode with limited lateral connection to other sectors, a partnership approach with a site management agency working alongside municipal agencies and a private tourism concession company, and a polycentric

governance approach with multiple agencies tasked with different dimensions of heritage management in the context of a decentralized government.

All three sites have been subject to monitoring by the World Heritage Committee in the past decade, in response to management challenges that were deemed serious enough to trigger official response from the Committee. The concerns of the Committee in turn led to a range of policy and planning responses from the respective site management institutions. However, the extent to which these responses translated into actual practice was a function of the various factors of adaptive capacity which will be discussed below.

The selection of the cases aims for theoretical replication (Yin 2013), in which the selected cases predict “contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons”. The three cases differ in terms of their governance structures, their political setting and history, the role of government, private sector and civil society in policy processes and implementation. The comparison seeks to establish “a framework for interpreting how parallel process of change are played out in different ways within each context” (following Skocpol and Somers 1980, in Collier 1993). While the three models are located at different points of economic development and political complexity, it should be noted that the three are not necessarily meant to present a progression in terms of evolving from one model to the next. Nor does the comparison seek to identify an ideal model for heritage management as such. Given the specificities of each case, the study aims more to develop propositions that generalize analytically from each case to illustrate determining factors in the practices of adaptive capacity.

Ayutthaya was struck by catastrophic floods in 2011 and then had to deal with a secondary crisis triggered by World Heritage Committee’s criticism of poor quality of post-flood restoration. This led to updating the site’s Conservation and Development Master Plan and development control regulations, and to initiate training in upgrading conservation skills and knowledge.

At Vat Phou, the construction of a new regional road, Route 14A, which commenced in 2010, upended the widely-held belief that the World Heritage site was limited primarily to the Vat Phou temple complex, not the larger cultural landscape. As a result of two Reactive Monitoring Missions conducted to the site by UNESCO and ICOMOS experts, the Lao government put into motion the drafting of a Cultural Landscape Master Plan and associated urban development regulations.

George Town faces challenges in dealing with the historic city not just as an ensemble of significant buildings, but rather, as a multi-layered living historic urban landscape. Concerns raised by the World Heritage Committee led the government to strengthen the organizations related to World Heritage management, namely, opening up a World Heritage office in George Town which was promised in the nomination dossier, upgrading the Heritage Department within the City Council of Penang, and establishing a Technical Review Panel. A Special Area Plan for the historic city centre was also developed, and initiatives aimed at safeguarding intangible cultural heritage have been carried out.

The challenges faced by the three case studies reflect difficulties in coping with the expanded boundaries of practice for each site. There is the conceptual expansion in the type of heritage site that has to be managed as well as a concomitant expansion in the management challenges that fact the site. For Ayutthaya, the management issues expanded from conserving individual monuments to dealing with disasters at a territorial scale. In the case of Vat Phou, the conceptual expansion also had a physical spatial dimension as well, from a narrow focus on a monument complex to the entire surrounding landscape. In the case of George Town, the challenges had to do with conserving not just the historic townscape but also sustaining living heritage represented in the long-time residents and their intangible cultural heritage and trades.

The study relies on an inductive approach using qualitative empirical data. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants representing a range of organizations at all levels from local to national and in both heritage and related

sectors: heritage management agencies, local government, provincial government, other related agencies (planning, public works), national heritage ministry, local and foreign experts working at the site, and civil society organizations. Interviews were conducted during field visits conducted in 2018-2019. Follow up correspondence was undertaken to further clarify pending issues.

The data from the interviews was deepened and triangulated through document analysis. A range of documents were selected, mostly reflecting formal rules and processes: heritage management plans, urban plans, heritage management and conservation regulations, building control regulations, official reports, building statistics, newsletters of heritage organizations and NGOs, as well as news articles.

Official World Heritage documents were also analyzed as a way not only of tracking the changes that were occurring, but also to juxtapose the official narratives prepared by the governments reporting to the international community against the other narratives provided by working level staff about the realities of change and implementation, or lack thereof. These included the State of Conservation Reports prepared by the countries as well as the responses from the World Heritage Centre and Advisory Bodies (in the form of synthetic State of Conservation analyses) and World Heritage Committee decisions which commented on the management responses.

Furthermore, to get a sense of the dynamics of informal rules and processes, and their interaction with formal rules, participant observation was carried out through participating in meetings and consultations conducted mostly by the heritage agencies. Where direct participation in meetings was not possible, due to various constraints, publicly available videos of meetings, especially public consultations, were reviewed.

The interview data were transcribed and coded. Data and coding were tabulated using a spreadsheet. Initial codes were assigned directly describing the content of the data, and then assigned to higher-level analytic codes drawn from the

literature on adaptive change. The coding identified key socio-institutional factors for systemic change, spanning both formal and informal aspects. These represent dimensions of adaptive capacity which present an evolution of the frameworks drawn from the literature on systems change.

As the next step, qualitative conceptual mapping of these factors of adaptive capacity was undertaken for each case study to better understand the interaction and influence of these factors in shaping the mechanisms of systemic change. The institutional dynamics were analyzed and annotated within the conceptual mapping, in order to understand if institutions were being created, maintained or disrupted within the overall system.

At the end, cross-case comparison was undertaken to generalize insights about the mechanisms and institutional dynamics of adaptive capacity within World Heritage management systems. Pattern matching was used to identify areas of similarity and difference in the adaptive mechanisms and institutional dynamics emerging through the cases, with a view towards generalization.

1.5 Limitations of the study

The study deep dives into three case studies in Southeast Asia, which encompass different heritage typologies and specificities in terms of cultural, legal, social and political contexts. The specificities of each case preclude it from being understood as a representative for a class of objects, for instance, taking Vat Phou to stand in for all cultural landscapes. Moreover, even within Southeast Asia itself, there is a diversity that is not necessarily accounted for within these three selected sites. Finally, whereas the selected case studies can be characterized using the various variables of interest in the study's research question (for instance, Ayutthaya's institutional management system can be described as being largely centralized while those at Vat Phou and George Town can be described as being polycentric), caution should be applied in understanding these sites as ideal archetypes representing each of these variables, either in the Southeast Asian context or beyond.

Furthermore, while the study attempts to extract more generic findings and models from the three comparative case studies to characterize the dynamics of institutional change in cultural heritage site management, these findings should be understood first within the context of these particular case study sites. Therefore, the pattern matching that is undertaken in the analysis to discern threads underlying the three case studies should likewise be contextualized against the differences among the three sites. For instance, Ayutthaya, being managed largely as a relic archaeological site, does not have to contend with local socio-economic issues arising in more densely inhabited sites such as Vat Phou and George Town.

In terms of the reliability of the data, the study relies upon a combination of data sources: interviews with key informants in heritage and related non-heritage fields, document analysis of official and unofficial documents related to the heritage site and its management, and participant observation mostly of consultation and official meetings at the sites. This provides a fairly comprehensive grasp of the formal rules at play in a site, from the policy to the legislative and regulatory setting. To a certain extent, informal rules can be discerned, both through direct observation and from anecdotal accounts. However, these data sources present limitations in getting at the full range of informal rules, the complexities of interactions among the various actors and deep-seated and possibly extra-legal interests that may shape the course of institutional change.

With a view towards future research, these generic findings will need to be revisited in further studies in order to be generalized more broadly in the context of other sites and other situations. This includes generalizing the findings to apply to non-World Heritage sites, sites outside of the geographic footprint of the study, and other types of heritage sites. Further studies can also apply complementary methodological approaches to deepen the findings from this study, such as more ethnographic techniques which could shed more light on the informal rules, unsaid realities and underlying issues that constrain or shape practice. The limitations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

1.6 Structure of the dissertation

This chapter introduces the research question and provides an overview of the thesis. Chapter 2 conducts a review related to three strands of literature: cultural heritage, institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity. Based on these conceptual underpinnings, Chapter 2 ends by introducing the proposed framework to be used to analyze institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity at the case study sites. Chapter 3 explains the methodology used in the thesis, with each stage of the research presented in detail. The chapter ends with a discussion of validity and reliability.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the case studies: “Historic Town of Ayutthaya” in Thailand, “Vat Phou and Associated Ancient Settlements within the Champasak Cultural Landscape” in Lao PDR, and George Town in Malaysia, part of the serial nomination of the “Historic Cities of the Straits of Malacca” along with Melaka.

Each case study chapter is structured to first contextualize the selected World Heritage sites within the expanding boundaries that they face. Against this backdrop, it analyses the institutional dynamics and the factors of adaptive capacity which have proved to be key determinants of transformation, or lack thereof, in each case. By way of concluding, it offers reflections on institutional dynamics, adaptive capacity and expanding boundaries of practice. In this sense, the chapters first present what changes were manifested in each case, before unfolding the mechanics of how this change occurred. They end by discussing the implications of these mechanisms for adapting or transforming the institutional system for each World Heritage site in response to new demands.

Finally, Chapter 7 revisits the research questions and presents the findings from the case studies in a synthetic manner. It explains the contributions of the study to World Heritage studies, institutional theory and adaptive change studies. Finally, it outlines various policy implications and identifies areas of future research.

Chapter 2

Cultural heritage, institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity

2.1 Introduction

This research is situated in three major streams of literature related to heritage and specifically World Heritage, institutional change and adaptive capacity. This chapter traces shifts in the conceptualization and management of heritage, which raises questions about inadequacies of existing heritage institutions. Second, it provides a theoretical context for unpacking heritage management institutions against the backdrop of evolving notions of the role of the state. It examines reinventions of governance institutions by moving away from centralized systems to more polycentric models and considers the implications for heritage institutions. Third, the chapter reviews the conceptual basis for adaptive capacity and various models for assessing the adaptive capacity of institutions. The chapter ends by proposing a framework for understanding adaptive capacity which will be applied to the World Heritage case studies which follow in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

2.2 Expanding boundaries of practice in (World) heritage

This research builds upon the professional and academic literature on heritage and specifically World Heritage, with a view to responding to gaps that still exist, particularly at the nexus of policy, practice and scholarship. As will be seen below, there is an extensive body of literature on heritage principles and practices and their transformation over time produced by different “tribes” in the heritage field, with a somewhat reductionist snapshot as follows. Heritage insiders, both expert individuals and bodies such as UNESCO and ICOMOS, have created a corpus of doctrinal texts, commentaries and technical guidelines which are presented as being authoritative (Ahmad, 2006; F Bandarin, 2007; Jokilehto, 1999; Rossler, 2000; Stovel, 1995). Some of these insiders operate at the level of policy setting; others are technicians, with deep and arcane knowledge on conservation materials and techniques (Pereira

Roders, 2013; Tan, 2015). As can be seen in the pace of issuing new ICOMOS charters in the past decade alone, the business of producing and re-producing heritage standards is surprisingly dynamic, although hard-core traditionalists still remain as guardians of the older doctrines. Within the heritage profession itself, there is a group of reformers producing self-reflexive scholarship which calls into question some of these established norms, such as the now prevalent practice of values-based conservation, with the aim of tweaking the system to make the heritage project more equitable and effective (Leitao, 2011; Mason, 2004). One sub-set of heritage reformers are specialists focused on advancing specific niches within heritage practice, such as disaster risk management or community engagement, which are recognized as being critical for shaping the future of the profession (Jigyasu, 2014; Lisitzin, 2005). A more critical stance is taken by scholar-practitioners who often straddle the heritage world as insiders-outsiders, offering pointed commentary and sometimes constructive criticism on the failings of heritage policy and practice as it exists, while at the same time continuing their work as heritage professionals (Logan, 2012; Nasution, 2012; Widodo, 2018). Finally, outright skepticism of the heritage project and its totalizing effects (both intended and unintended) are expressed by other scholars, including those under the umbrella of critical heritage studies (L. Smith, 2006; Winter, 2014).

This study is positioned within the reformist range of this spectrum, neither stridently upholding received heritage doctrine nor dismissing the heritage enterprise entirely. Rather, it takes as its starting point an observation that there is gap between heritage discourse and aspirations, particularly at a global level, and the realities and limitations of heritage practice at a local level. While the vanguard of the heritage profession has already leapt ahead to champion rights-based approaches to heritage and specialized topics such as industrial heritage, many of the actual heritage agencies working on the ground, at least in Southeast Asia, are still grappling with basic conservation and management issues dating back to the Venice Charter. The results of this gap between discourse and practice are seen in the operational outcomes and shortcomings in managing World Heritage sites. And yet, the World

Heritage monitoring mechanisms are narrowly confined to prescribing technical fixes to the problem, whereas scholar-critics point out that more structural solutions related to institutional reform are needed, rooted not only in the realm of conservation but in the broader political economy.

In response, the study intends to unpack the mechanisms of heritage practice at the level of institutional practitioners in a wider context. It seeks to better understand how evolving concepts, pressures and governance ecologies (particularly those filtering in through global mechanisms like World Heritage) contribute to transforming – or not – formal and informal rules of engagement on the ground, which would be needed for structural change in holistic site management to occur. In so doing, this dissertation contributes to deepening knowledge in two ways: by analyzing the inter-linkages between heritage policy and concepts with practice through site-based studies and by interrogating World Heritage through the lens of institutional studies.

This study looks at World Heritage sites in the context of expanded “boundaries of practice” which place a strain on heritage management institutions and their capacity to address emerging challenges. Boundaries of practice are proposed to be broader than boundaries of knowledge, which may be limited to passive absorption of new knowledge, which may not be translated into behavioral change or action.

Practice is taken as the locus of analysis. Drawing on the work of de Certeau and Bourdieu in the field of sociology, practices are understood as “embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding” (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, & Von Savigny, 2001). In organizational research, the details of practice are the linchpin for change: “Without accompanying changes in the way work gets done, only the potential for improvement exists” (Garvin, 1993). A practice orientation in institutional theory focuses on understanding the “knowledgeable, creative and practical work of

individual and creative actors” in shaping institutional processes within a “field of practices” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

The past 40 years have seen significant shifts in the conception of heritage, and with it, attendant shifts in the way that heritage is governed. The literature identifies three major shifts: (i) in terms of evolving definitions of heritage, (ii) increasing complexity in heritage management, which has to confront challenges beyond narrow conservation concerns in order to engage with emerging threats and sustainable development issues, and (iii) the necessity for heritage institutions to adapt their management and larger governance practices accordingly.

These shifts are previewed here below, reflecting the comprehensive mapping done by Thompson and Wijesuriya (2018), and will be explained further in the succeeding sections.

Table 1 Shifts in heritage concepts, management challenges and governance

	1960s-1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Evolving concepts	Conservation of physical fabric	Values-based conservation	People-centred approaches	Heritage for sustainable development
Conceptual archetypes	Monuments and archaeological sites	Landscapes	Living heritage	Heritage and well-being
Expanding challenges	Material authenticity and integrity	Setting Ecology Social fabric	Intangible cultural heritage/ Traditional knowledge/ Rights	Disaster resilience/ Livelihoods/ Nature-culture continuum/ Sustainable development

	1960s-1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Reframing management and governance	Technical conservation	Broader management/ Multi-disciplinary/ Systems approach	Participatory approaches	Heritage adding value/ Adding value to heritage

Adapted from Thompson and Wijesuriya (2018)

Shifts in the heritage world in general are more acutely reflected in the context of World Heritage, given the outsize platform that the World Heritage project has come to occupy in both heritage discourse and practice, both globally and at more local levels. Within each country, they normally attract special attention and investment. As bearers of Outstanding Universal Value, World Heritage sites, and their associated processes, are often upheld as exemplars of heritage. Admittedly, given the ponderous and politicized processes and mechanisms of intergovernmental World Heritage governance (Logan 2012, Schmitt 2009), there is often a lag in the adoption of new concepts in the World Heritage framework. However, once incorporated into the World Heritage regime, such concepts are amplified, in the sense that World Heritage provides a high visibility soapbox for emerging heritage doctrine and regulations to be disseminated and reproduced. The subsequent reification of these concepts as part of international heritage discourse and practice has been called to task (Smith 2006, Winter 2014), but such pushback has not yet diminished the overall momentum of the World Heritage machine.

2.2.1 Redefining heritage: evolving concepts

The emergence of legal instruments protecting monuments from the mid-1800's onwards in Europe and North America established the tone for "modern conservation practice" (Jokilehto, 1999). Set in the context of the age of Enlightenment, conservation as a new discipline was part of a positivist, objectivist quest for scientific proof for knowledge production. The concomitant emergence of professionals in archaeology and architecture mutually reinforced this focus on monuments and ancient sites, who came to dominate the new field of conservation with their self-aggrandizing expertise.

The Athens Charter of 1931, with an exclusive focus on the restoration of historic fabric, presaged the emergence of the 1964 Venice Charter which became the touchstone for professional conservation practice following World War II. The Venice Charter strove to define "the principles guiding the preservation and restoration of ancient buildings" which are seen as part of the "unity of human values" and "common heritage" (ICOMOS, 1964).

In their thorough review, Thompson and Wijesuriya argue that the Venice Charter marks the first of three distinctive stages that can be traced in the heritage sector up to the present day: (i) from 1964-1994 seeking to "defend monuments and sites as islands"; (ii) from 1994 onwards with the Nara Document on Authenticity setting the scene where "other voices, multiple horizons are recognized"; (iii) and from 2010 onwards, where "policy work shaped by intersectoral alignment for a more dynamic role for heritage in broader sustainable development" (2018).

During the first stage, subsequent heritage charters drawn up following the Venice Charter and extending into the 1980s continued this defensive mode, although it expanded the remit of the sector beyond buildings to include gardens, towns and other urban areas. These documents included the Declaration of Amsterdam (1975), the Resolution of the International Symposium on the Conservation of Smaller Historic Towns (1975), the Florence Charter on Historic

Gardens (1982), and the Washington Charter on the Conservation of Historic Towns and Areas (1987).

Born in this era, the 1972 Convention concerning the World Cultural and Natural Heritage in its definitions foreshadowed some of the innovations which would emerge in subsequent decades. In encompassing both cultural heritage and natural heritage in a single instrument, the drafters of the Convention were prescient about framing heritage as “part of a biocultural continuum” (ibid) and of seeing the main thrust of the Convention as transmission of the heritage to future generations. However, professional practice associated with the conservation and management of World Heritage sites throughout the 1970s and 1980s was still bound by the doctrinaire approach inculcated by the Venice Charter.

In the second stage, the adoption of new landmark doctrinal texts in the heritage field marked the shift away from monumental and built heritage to embrace other forms of heritage as well as other forms of heritage practice. Notably, recognition increased for heritage categories such as vernacular heritage, industrial heritage, cultural landscapes (Rossler, 2000) and historic urban landscapes (F. Bandarin & Van Oers, 2012). Beyond heritage sites, UNESCO also pushed forward with recognition for other forms of cultural heritage, with new conventions recognizing underwater cultural heritage and intangible cultural heritage in 2001 and 2003, respectively.

Thompson and Wijesuriya argue that the turning point of the second stage was marked by the Nara Document on Authenticity (1994) which emphasized the importance of cultural relativism in heritage practice and counters the Eurocentric roots of modern conservation practice which had become universalized through the suite of international charters promulgated by the (almost exclusively European) bastions of heritage expertise such as ICOMOS.

The shift that began with the Nara Document on Authenticity was further reinforced by the Burra Charter (in its fifth edition by 1999). Acknowledging the

different notions of heritage between its settler and indigenous populations, the Burra Charter marked a shift from the Eurocentric concept of heritage monuments and sites to the concept of heritage places which encompass landscapes and other non-built features that resonates more strongly with its indigenous peoples. The Burra Charter introduces the notion that heritage should be understood and managed in the specific local socio-cultural contexts to which it belongs, and by engaging with a diversity of stakeholders to which the heritage is significant.

In contrast to the Venice Charter, the Burra Charter considers a more inclusive definition of heritage, encompassing “all types of places of cultural significance including natural, indigenous and historic places with cultural values” (ICOMOS Australia, 1999). Instead of the Venice Charter’s focus on “monuments and sites”, the Burra Charter speaks of “places”, meaning “site, area, land, landscape, building or other work, group of buildings or other works, and may include components, contents, spaces and views” (ibid). With regards to “cultural significance”, the Burra Charter casts a wide net, taking in “aesthetic, historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present or future generations” (ibid). Furthermore, it goes on to acknowledge that “places may have a range of values for different individuals or group” (ibid).

The values-based approach to heritage management has become widely practiced, not only in Australia, but also in Canada, New Zealand, Scotland, Ireland and England, both at the federal level or at the provincial level. In addition, outside the Anglo realm, this approach has also influenced transformations in other countries, such as China, which has developed a key document, the Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China, that espouses a values-based management philosophy and process.

The rubric of cultural landscapes pushed the conceptual boundaries beyond cultural heritage to reflect the interaction with nature. In a sense, it provides a means to operationalize the intention of the World Heritage Convention to protect “the combined works of nature and of man”, per Article 1 (UNESCO, 1972). Cultural landscapes were adopted in 1992 by the World Heritage Committee, extending protection to landscapes designed and created by humans, organically evolved landscapes, and associative cultural landscapes, where the people have “powerful religious, artistic or cultural associations of the natural element rather than material cultural evidence, which may be insignificant or even absent” (Rossler, 2000).

Beyond cultural heritage and natural heritage, the Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape, adopted in 2011, calls for a holistic approach to managing a city’s resources which also includes the human dimension as well. The Recommendation defines the historic urban landscape as “the urban area understood as the result of a historic layering of cultural and natural values and attributes, extending beyond the notion of a ‘historic centre’ or ‘ensemble’ to include the broader urban context and its geographical setting” (UNESCO, 2011). To encompass all these different dimensions, the Recommendation advocates that the planning process should start with a participatory mapping to determine which heritage values need to be protected for transmission to future generations. Physical elements reflecting these heritage values need to be incorporated into a wider framework of city development, so that development projects will pay attention to areas of vulnerable heritage. Appropriate partnerships and local management frameworks should be established to ensure coordination of the various activities between different actors, both public and private.




Figure 2 Conceptual expansion of heritage

The growing recognition of living heritage sites, as reflected in the new concepts of cultural landscapes and historic urban landscapes, puts a renewed focus on the role of people and the importance of their embodied knowledge and practices. This shift in thinking was given additional impetus by the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage which puts communities at the core of its work. The 2003 Convention requires the explicit involvement and agreement of the communities in all activities of safeguarding intangible cultural heritage (ICH) in order to “create, maintain and transmit such heritage” (UNESCO, 2003). Communities are now more central to the World Heritage cognitive frame and mechanism, with communities being added as the fifth “C” in the World Heritage global strategy.

As a means of recognizing diverse values associated with a heritage site, values-based approaches have gained credence internationally, and have been enshrined into the World Heritage Convention. By adopting a participatory approach to identifying heritage and its multiple values (from historic, aesthetic, architectural, social, scientific to economic), heritage is seen as having value beyond dimensions of materiality (Mason, Maclean, & de la Torre, 2003).

Beyond forms of heritage, the definitional expansion of heritage reflects power struggles in the politics of heritage and in the discourse of heritage. Ndoro (2005)

makes the case in his evocatively titled *Your Monument, Our Shrine* how Great Zimbabwe, a site of sacred significance for generations of inhabitants, is reduced by outside experts to a fossilized archaeological artifact for consumption by tourists. As a corollary of the field of subaltern studies, heritage of various subaltern groups is also gaining greater political and social foothold: heritage associated with minority groups, dissenting heritage, dissonant heritage. The assertion of these forms of heritage narratives, often in contravention of official heritage narratives, presents a form of resistance in the politics of heritage.

2.2.2 Expanding challenges in conservation and management

Climate change, unprecedented rates of urbanization, industrialization, infrastructure development, the commodification of heritage and the explosion in global tourism are putting heritage sites around the world under greater pressure than ever. The most recent ICOMOS “Heritage at Risk” publication covering the period 2014-2015 notes that, “apart from the general risks to heritage from natural disasters and physical decay of structures, there are certain patterns in human activity endangering our heritage, such as risks from war and inter-ethnic conflicts. Human-made risks from development pressures caused by population growth and progressive industrialisation are reported from all parts of the world, resulting in ever-greater consumption of land, destroying not only archaeological evidence, but entire (even protected) cultural landscapes, either by planning tourist development facilities ... or building commercial and residential tourism units.... Mining... and uncontrolled alarming contamination from mining activities and sewage pollution is reported” (ICOMOS, 2017).

Unlike the technical issues of physical heritage conservation, such as biological or structural decay which were the earliest concerns of the conservation profession, these contemporary challenges represent an unprecedented degree of complexity. They involve a wider range of stakeholders and multiple sectors beyond the heritage sector. Beyond the conventional focus on monuments, conservation has become a

part of the larger exercise of “the management of heritage” (Thompson & Wijesuriya, 2018).

In the context of cultural heritage sites in Southeast Asia, the Second Periodic Report for World Heritage Sites in 2011 identified local factors (ie, microorganisms), natural disasters, climate change, pollution and unfavorable human activities as key factors whose negative effects outweighed their positive effects (UNESCO, 2012c). Interestingly, the development of infrastructure and service and tourism, which are popularly believed to have a major impact on heritage sites, were found to have both positive effects as well as negative effects. This line up of challenges in Southeast Asia is revealing as it showcases the struggles of heritage site management agencies to deal with bread and butter conservation issues. On top of that, they also have to cope with perennial struggles in balancing visitor and resident demands, as well as with larger and emerging multi-sectoral issues like urbanization, disasters and other emergencies.

As the definition of cultural heritage becomes broader, as reflected in the types of sites that are recognized on the World Heritage List, the types of challenges encountered become more complex. In comparison to conserving a single temple, dealing with a cultural landscape or a historic urban landscape has to take into account a wide range of issues related to economic, social and environmental dimensions, as well as a larger network of stakeholders at all levels.




Figure 3 Expansion of management practice

To illustrate the complexity of these challenges, the interlinked issues of climate change and natural disasters will be looked at in more detail below as an example. Climate change is a growing concern for the historic environment, with coastal and riverside flooding, subsidence, wind and storm damages as well as changes in rainfall patterns and temperatures all posing a threat to heritage sites (Cassar 2007, Sabbioni et al 2006). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have provided evidence that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level) (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007).

Climate change can exacerbate existing risks facing heritage sites, or they could introduce new mechanisms of damage, decay or even destruction. Well-intentioned efforts to protect or strengthen heritage properties from climate change may in fact lead to inadvertent damage. A study undertaken in the United Kingdom by Cassar et al (2005) mapped the impacts that could result from various forms of climate change. Flooding can lead to major problems, especially along coastal areas

where salinity of the water poses a risk. Rising temperatures can accelerate the deterioration of materials. High winds can cause structural damage to buildings and could dislodge trees. Historic buildings often cannot cope with the increased volume of rainfall, leading to both decorative and structural damage, and the growth of mold and insects.

Climate change is increasing the frequency and intensity of climate-related hazards. As heritage is frequently in a state of vulnerability (due to poor condition, low maintenance, damage from visitors and lack of hazard proofing), it may be not well-equipped to withstand the range of external hazards (Cannon, 2015). Beyond impacts to built heritage, disasters wreak havoc on human lives, livelihoods and well-being. Disaster management agencies, however, are not often well-prepared to deal with disasters affecting heritage. In part, they may have different perspectives from local populations about which risks need to be treated. “Unless the culture of the people and organizations that connect with heritage is understood, it is less likely that [heritage] can be protected in advance of a hazard or valued afterwards for recovery” (ibid).

2.2.3 Heritage and sustainable development

There has been a shift within the conservation profession from total conservation to change management approaches that engage with the possibility for sustainable development. Even so, embedded within this rhetoric about sustainable development is the core kernel of conservation. Hence, Gustavo Araoz, during his tenure as President of ICOMOS, ostensibly calls for a paradigm shift, but this still revolves around preservation in his call for “Preserving heritage places under a new paradigm” (Araoz, 2011).

This enduring focus on sustaining the heritage place itself versus the contributions of heritage towards larger goals of sustainable development have led to a bifurcation in the debate about heritage and sustainable development (Logan & Larsen, 2018). On the one hand, ensuring the sustainability of heritage places has

led to more reflexive considerations of how heritage practices need to be rethought, such as the recognition of the role of local stewards as custodians of their heritage sites. On the other hand, “heritage principles and practice could and should contribute to wider social, cultural and environmental sustainability” (ibid). Beyond this binary framework, Logan and Larsen offer a more fine-grained differentiation that illustrates the linkages between heritage conservation and sustainable development: (i) “sustainable heritage” which reflects “an inward looking perspective concerned with whether...heritage itself is being sustained for new generations, (ii) “heritage vs. sustainable development” which sees one “as a threat to the other”, (iii) “sustainable development for heritage” which is “about adapting development paths to the needs and requirements of heritage conservation” and (iv) “heritage for sustainable development” which sees the potential of heritage to contribute to “solving wider sustainability challenges” (ibid).

Within the development profession, the latter framing has gained currency, with heritage increasingly being viewed as integral to sustainable development (Hosagrahar, Soule, Girard, & Potts, 2016). Soini and Birkeland (2014) propose that culture can be included in three ways in the sustainable development discourse. First, as a fourth pillar of sustainable development, on par with the three existing pillars of social, economic and environmental. Secondly, with culture acting as a driver for development, thus acting in a transversal manner across the three existing pillars. Thirdly, as being fundamental for development, thus creating a new paradigm for sustainable development thinking itself.

Building on these approaches, another way to look at the linkage between heritage and sustainable development would be to consider three dimensions. The first is to ensure the sustainability of the heritage resources themselves, ie to manage sites in a way that their significance is not compromised, for instance, by inappropriate land uses, overly intensive tourism or from disaster risks. The second dimension looks at the contribution of heritage resources within the culture sector to sustainability in socio-economic terms: the use of local knowhow or materials in

creating jobs and livelihoods through crafts or cultural tourism, for instance. The third dimension sees heritage as a driver for broader sustainable development in other sectors, such as education or public health, for instance, by ensuring sensitivity to cultural and social mores in providing social services, thus making them more attuned to local needs and thus more relevant and more likely to yield better development outcomes.




Figure 4 Sustainable development and heritage: three dimensions

The interrelationship between culture and sustainable development can be traced back to the landmark World Conference on Cultural Policies held in Mexico City in 1982 which already tabled the links between culture and development. Despite high-level conferences in the following World Decade for Cultural Development from 1988-1997, culture was explicitly absent from the Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000.

Unlike its predecessor, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in 2015 explicitly refers to culture and heritage. “It is the first international agenda to acknowledge the power of culture for creating decent work and economic growth, reducing inequalities, protecting the environment, promoting gender equality and building peaceful and inclusive societies” (UNESCO, 2018). Within the 17 Sustainable

Development Goals and their 169 targets, cultural heritage is considered to contribute to SDG 4 (quality education), SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 6 (clean water), SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities), SDG 13 (climate action), SDG 14 (life below water), SDG 15 (life on land), SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) and SDG 17 (partnerships). Target 11.4 specifically calls for safeguarding cultural and natural heritage.

Culture and heritage are being mainstreamed into other sectors and even enshrined in seminal official texts like UN Habitat's New Urban Agenda which call for "including culture as a priority component of urban plans and strategies" (Art. 124). The sustainable turn in heritage is reflected in recent conceptualizations of heritage, such as Historic Urban Landscapes. By providing this new holistic framework for dealing with the multiple components within an urban setting that encompasses buildings, other urban features, the environment, and underlying geography, the Historic Urban Landscape concept offers a model for reconciling "not only the urban multi-layered function, but also development agendas" (Reed et al 2016, Van Oers & Pereira Roders 2014).

Driven by the United Nations-wide mission towards sustainable development, in 2015 the World Heritage Committee adopted the Policy Document for the integration of a sustainable development perspective into the processes of the World Heritage Convention. The policy reflects the earlier Budapest Declaration on World Heritage that was adopted in 2002 by the World Heritage Committee calling for appropriate and equitable balance between conservation, sustainability and development. The policy (UNESCO, 2015) responds to:

"the need to achieve appropriate balance and integration between the protection of the Outstanding Universal Value of World Heritage properties and the pursuit of sustainable development objectives and called upon States Parties to ensure that sustainable development principles are mainstreamed into their national processes related to World Heritage, in full respect of the Outstanding Universal Value of World Heritage properties."

Reflecting the different dimensions threatening harmonious co-existence and sustainability in its broadest sense, the policy is framed by four dimensions: environmental sustainability, inclusive social development, inclusive economic development and fostering peace and security. With the threat of planetary collapse, environmental sustainability responds to “ensuring a stable climate, stopping ocean acidification, preventing land degradation and unsustainable water use, sustainably managing natural resources and protecting the natural resources base, including biodiversity” (UN Task Team on the post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012). The need for greater social inclusion reflects critiques of World Heritage regimes as failing to consider communities, indigenous peoples and other key stakeholders. As World Heritage sites have seen the gap between have and have-nots grow larger, inclusive economic development has become more pressing, raising questions “whether, in economic terms, [a given World Heritage space] promotes locally driven businesses, livelihoods and economies” (Logan & Larsen, 2018). Finally, as war, civil conflict and violence are on the uptick, the need for peace and security becomes more fundamental, and also more elusive.

Thompson and Wijesuriya (2018) flag this broader perspective for World Heritage that is finally infusing into both heritage and development discourse and, to a certain extent, practice, as the third stage in the evolution of heritage conceptualization since the 1960s. From originally being confined in its own disciplinary silo with a bunker mentality in trying to defend monuments and silos, the future of heritage is now seen as being inextricably linked with larger realms of sustainability. As articulated by the Kyoto Vision drafted on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the World Heritage Convention in 2012: “only through strengthened relationships between people and heritage, based on respect for cultural and biological diversity as a whole, integrating tangible and intangible aspects and geared toward sustainable development will the ‘future we want’ become attainable” (UNESCO, 2012b).

2.2.4 Reframing heritage management and governance

This transformative new perspective on heritage in its broader context throws light on the “inadequacy of current approaches” to heritage practice and of existing international heritage guidance (Thompson & Wijesuriya, 2018). Despite the conceptual evolution which accelerated since the 1990s, heritage practice and heritage institutions are still deeply rooted in its earlier bedrock dating back to the Venice Charter.

The reorientation towards development goals unsettles heritage policies and practice from an association with aesthetic discourse. Similar to what Roy (2005) terms “the aestheticization of poverty” in the context of dealing with urban informality, heritage has been largely concerned with “aesthetic upgrading rather than the upgrading of livelihoods, wages, political capacities” (Pereira Roders, 2013). Within this emerging conceptual framework, the literature identifies the need for further development of both theory and methodology to actualize the integration of cultural resources as a fundamental tenet for sustainability. In addition, institutional capacities and mandates also need to evolve as well.

Boccardi (2018) singles out one key challenge as “the mandate of heritage agencies and practitioners in this new approach since responsibilities are no longer limited to certain designated spots but extend in a capillary fashion over entire territories...‘all deeply interconnected within the bio-cultural continuum’”. How are these conventional heritage institutions, comprising both organizations and their associated legal and technical armatures, able to govern World Heritage sites in a new age of complexity? How do specialized technical organizations, some with a century’s worth of history in archaeological excavations or brick monument restorations, deal with issues outside their traditional comfort zone, including development issues? How do heritage practitioners, particularly those currently in senior leadership positions who came of age three decades ago, adjust to these evolving ideas? What kinds of disruptions are being seen in World Heritage governance systems, and do such disruptions affect the management authorities’

ability to cope with the changing nature of conservation and management challenges, in response to the larger development agenda?

These questions have a profound implication for enlarging the practice of heritage management in terms of both institutional competency as well as individual competency. In defining a professional competency framework for World Heritage Sites in Southeast Asia, the experts convened by UNESCO defined the bounds of what are deemed core competencies as being separate from the usual technical competencies associated with each professional stream (museum curatorship, archaeology and so forth). Instead, the core competencies take into account the ability to uphold laws and regulations; apply heritage policy, principles, process and ethics; deal with community, rights and knowledge; undertake heritage education and interpretation; and orient practice towards sustainable development (UNESCO Bangkok, 2018). In addition to the core competencies, a set of managerial competencies were also defined, related to various aspects of organizational management such as financial and human resource management. Subsequent surveys of professional heritage management bodies and educational institutions producing heritage professionals revealed that most heritage organizations either at the level of entire organizations or at the level of individual practitioners were lacking mastery if not familiarity with a number of these core or managerial competences. Likewise, educational institutions were also doing a patchy job of exposing students to the entire range of these competencies as well. Confronted with these gaps, the majority of educational institutions contacted were still not convinced about the need to expand their offerings to align with these broader scope of competencies. Similarly, the heritage organizations indicated that they faced constraints in reconfiguring their staffing profiles and in acquiring additional competencies.

The natural heritage world, always a forerunner for cultural heritage, has raised the need to reframe the overall governance of protected areas, including those which are World Heritage sites. The Fifth World Parks Congress in South Africa in

2003 unveiled a proposal for governance principles in the 21st century (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003). Taking a cue from the suite of good governance principles formulated by UNDP in 1997, this proposal articulated five principles as follows: (i) *legitimacy and voice* – which measures the level of participation and the level of consensus orientation (notwithstanding the concerns above), (ii) *direction* – which measures strategic vision on the part of leaders and the public, (iii) *performance* – which calls for both responsiveness (institutions and processes serve all stakeholders) and effectiveness and efficiency (ensuring that needs are met while making the best use of resources), (iv) *accountability* – which includes both accountability (to the public and to institutional stakeholders by decision makers in all sectors) as well as transparency (based on the free flow of information), and finally (v) *fairness* – which calls for equity and the rule of law (legal frameworks should be fair and enforced partially). Of these five principles, the proposal emphasizes the importance of *legitimacy and voice* and *fairness*, as enshrined in various international treaties and protocols. These principles as a whole reflect the growing notion that World Heritage governance can and should be used as a mechanism for distributive justice in the context of a broader understanding and role for heritage, beyond narrow conservation goals.

2.3 Institutional dynamics

As the boundaries of heritage concepts and management issues have expanded significantly in the past 50 years, this has placed an onus on heritage institutions to likewise adapt as well. However, a cursory look around shows that many institutions in this sub-region are still firmly rooted in the past, in terms of legislation, knowledge systems and practices. In particular, many senior management leading key heritage organizations especially government agencies are a product of the 1960s or 1970s, when they were exposed to the tenets of the Venice Charter as the main guiding principle for heritage work. As a result, their policy directives still reflect some of the earlier eras of thinking in defining heritage and developing responses. Some

institutions, having inherited colonial-era legislation, organizations, and knowledge products such as inventories, have even older systems to contend with.

While the need for heritage institutions to evolve is increasingly clear, what remains to be addressed is the capacity for such institutions to evolve. The extent to which heritage institutions can adapt and transform, particularly in the face of expanded boundaries of practice as introduced above, can be understood within the context of the rich literature on institutional dynamics.

2.3.1 Institutions and change

There are multiple definitions of institutions. Institutions have been defined as “cultured-cognitive, normative and regulative elements that ... provide stability and meaning to social life ... Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines and artifacts” (W. R. Scott, 2001). Gupta et al use the definition that institutions are “systems of rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide interactions among the occupants of the relevant roles” (IDGEC Scientific Planning Committee, 1999). North clarifies further that institutions are “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws and property rights)” (1990).

Informal rules are further defined as (i) “rules that are not written down, or are not enforced by the state”, (ii) “ethical codes or moral “norms” which are internalized and directly reflected in players’ preferences” and (iii) rules that are “not deliberately designed, but are nevertheless followed because deviating from the rule is not individually rational if others follow it” such as “social norms” (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). Such informal rules form the backdrop within which formal institutions are embedded (Williamson, 2000).

The study of institutions and their evolution suggests that institutions are inherently conservative, and react incrementally to deal with problems (Gupta & Dellapenna, 2009). This evolutionary process in institutional change harkens back to Veblen's (1899) notion of habits of thought. Institutions become entrenched through a process of institutionalization, whereby previous interactions, views and power relations become self-reinforcing (Garud et al 2007, Klijn and Koppenjan 2006). Historical developments create an ethos of path dependency which limits the system's ability to change or innovate. With path dependence, initial conditions have an outsized role in determining institutions and allows for inefficient equilibria to persist. Pahl-Wostl et al (2013) point out that "historical investments and institutional path dependencies have generated an interdependence of system elements, e.g., institutional design, technical infrastructure, knowledge, and distribution of power, that guarantee the functioning of a system and the convergence of expectations of actors".

The persistence of informal rules is important in undermining institutional change, noting that "following a change of formal rules, the informal rules ...survive the change", so that the results "tends to...produce a new equilibrium that is far less revolutionary" (North, 1990). North further points out that informal constraints represent the major source of institutional inertia, as they change slowly in an evolutionary manner. In this way, new formal rules may not have any effect if "people generally expect others (including those charged with enforcing the rule) to act in a way which makes it effective" (Aoki, 2001), thus ensuring that the 'rule-in-form' becomes a 'rule-in-use'.

Changing informal rules, particularly related to traditional norms, requires addressing underlying power structures. Senge (1990) explains that "Resistance to change is neither capricious nor mysterious. It almost always arises from threats to traditional norms and ways of doing things. Often these norms are woven into the fabric of established power relationships. The norm is entrenched because the distribution of authority and control is entrenched. Rather than pushing harder to

overcome resistance to change, artful leaders discern the source of the resistance. They focus directly on the implicit norms and power relationships within which the norms are embedded.”

In fact, the feedback loop between formal and informal rules is iterative. Changing informal rules needs to feed back into the formal rules system again, to ensure that actors move “beyond the discourse on the need for change to structural change in regulatory frameworks and management practices” (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). She explains further that “informal settings provide space for experimentation, which can lead to the revision of assumptions and paradigms, i.e., reframing, whereas formal policy processes are required to secure the outcomes of learning and develop binding commitment” (ibid). More specifically, “research needs to devote more attention to how informal settings promoted by scholars in adaptive governance and transition management are linked to clearly delineated jurisdictions and embedded in formal multilevel governance systems” (A. Smith & Stirling, 2010).

Cautionary tales from the development sector abound, where well-meaning programmes introducing change “often fail if they do not redress the fundamental structural problems” (Lemos, Boyd, Tompkins, Osbahr, & Liverman, 2007). Moreover, “it is important to understand empirically how these challenges can be overcome, especially in cases in which building adaptive capacity involves redistributive policymaking that can be met by fierce political opposition” (ibid).

How exactly does change come about? Conventional wisdom holds that institutional change is often triggered by exogenous shocks. Echoing other scholars in institutional studies, Greenwood et al (2002) propose that “jolts in the form of social upheaval, technological disruption, competitive discontinuities, or regulatory changes might enable institutional entrepreneurship”, that is, bringing about structural change in institutions. Another precipitating factor might be complex, multi-faceted problems, such as environmental issues (N. Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000) which drive actors across organizations to create institutional change.

However, scholars have come to feel that ascribing such an outsize role to exogeneous shocks is perhaps not the only explanation for institutional change. In his work on learning organizations, Senge (1990) cautions against the “mistaken belief that fundamental change requires a threat to survival. This crisis theory of change is remarkably widespread. Yet, it is also a dangerous oversimplification.” From empirical data that shows that people are equally likely to create something new both as a reaction to crisis as well as a reaction to stasis, Senge notes further that “We both fear and seek change” (ibid).

The work of Eisenstadt (1980) and DiMaggio (1988) laid the foundation for studies in new institutionalism, institutional entrepreneurship and institutional work which placed a greater emphasis on endogenous factors, particularly the agency of actors within the system who can affect institutions. Actors and organizations are able to exercise strategic behaviors to influence institutional processes, in terms of creating institutions, supporting institutions or even abolishing them (ie, deinstitutionalization. DiMaggio proposed that “organized actors with sufficient resources [can] contribute to the genesis of new institutions in which they see ‘an opportunity to realize interest that they value highly’ (1988).

At the same time, actors and organizations are not immune to institutional pressure, as institutions function both as enablers and as well as sources of constraints in influencing the behavior of actors and organizations. The level of institutionalization in the system affects the level of agency that can be exercised by participants within the system. For instance, having multiple institutional orders or alternatives may provide an opportunity for actors to exercise greater agency (Clemens & Cook, 1999). Furthermore, institutions that are less mandatory could be easier to deinstitutionalize. Similarly, unstructured systems may provide more opportunities to create change. On the other hand, other scholars (Beckert 1999, Dorado 2005) hold the opposite view, arguing that the greater the degree of institutionalization, the lower the degree of uncertainty, and hence the lower the need for persistent rules, which encourages strategic agency and action.

Extending beyond institutional entrepreneurship, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) have developed the field of “institutional work” which is premised on the proposition that institutions need constant work to be reproduced. Such work is done by “culturally competent actors with strong practical skills and sensibility who creatively navigate within their organizational fields” through “practices which might lead to institutional innovations that are themselves institutionally embedded” (ibid). They have identified three forms of institutional work that actors conduct: creating institutions, maintaining institutions or disrupting institutions.

Within their framework, creating institutions requires “the ability to establish rules and construct rewards and sanctions that enforce those rules” (ibid). Maintaining institutions involves “supporting, repairing or recreating the social mechanisms that ensure compliance” (ibid). Furthermore, it should be understood that “maintaining of institutions must be distinguished from simple stability or the absence of change: rather, institutional work that maintains institutions involves considerable effort, and often occurs as a consequence of change in the organization or its environment” (ibid). Finally, disrupting institutions often stems from “actors whose interests are not served by existing institutional arrangements, and who will work when possible to disrupt the extant set of institutions” (ibid). This draws upon DiMaggio’s work on institutional entrepreneurship and Bourdieu’s insight that disruption is motivated by the differential allocation of capital by institutional structures which embeds conflicts among actors.

2.3.2 Dilemmas of modern state-centred (heritage) institutions

In his seminal work, *Seeing Like a State*, Scott (1998) argues that the “search for rational order in aesthetic terms” is a hallmark of high modernism, where the state seeks to rationalize knowledge in order to be able to govern. Scott critiques such state-centric, expert-based epistemologies of governance; this view from above disregards “metis”. Planning techniques such as the masterplan reduce the illegibility of the world into an untenable artificial rationality. Technical knowledge

which simplifies the complications of local context and knowhow is prioritized in a utilitarian effort to bring about progress. Scott's thesis echoes the Foucauldian thesis of governmentality which argues that expert knowledge has been mobilized by bureaucracies to govern the "conduct of conduct" of populations by "rendering the world thinkable, taming its intractable reality by subjecting it to the disciplined analyses of thought" (Rose & Miller, 1992). In so doing, social problems become "amenable to interventions by administrators, politicians, authorities and experts" (Rose, 1993).

Foucault (1980) theorizes that the state itself, as the repository of sovereign power, has been supplanted by new methods of power, with "methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus... Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law". With the breakdown of the sovereign power vested in the nation state arises the multiplicity of forms and sources of authority (Rabinow & Rose, 2006). Hardt and Negri in their epic "Empire" chart the "unravelling of nation-state based systems of power and emergence of less dichotomous patterns of inequality" (2000). Ong introduces the notion of "assemblages of power" where "interacting powers (state and people) recognize the situated mix of resistance, accommodation, and manipulation, and uncertain outcomes" (2012).

Fissures in the apparatus of centralized state power are manifested in multiple forms of resistance which contest the very practices of modernity. Resistance is sited in two main actors: the masses and the state itself. Far from being powerless, Scott charts the many forms that the powerless and weak survive and resist subjection, domination and hegemony. In his studies of peasant resistance and insubordination in Southeast Asia, he suggests that a "hidden transcript" of covert discourse is carried out against the public forms of social subordination. Such forms of "everyday resistance" include the creation of alternative social spaces, seen through the Foucauldian lens of power relations where particular spaces are connected with the "social construction of space, discourses and strategies of inclusion and exclusion"

(1998). Hardt and Negri note that “contemporary capitalism, although seemingly impervious to anti-systemic challenge, is in fact vulnerable at all points to riot and rebellion” (2000). They introduce the notion of the multitudes – in the form of globalized labor force – which has the ability to transcend structural barriers and cross borders in search of opportunity.

The state itself becomes an agent of resistance when it deploys states of exception. Agamben, following Schmitt, frames this maneuver as “I, the sovereign, who am outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law” when the state uses its own sovereign power to act outside the law (2005). In the context of urban planning, Roy characterizes the very act of reproducing state power as the capacity to “construct and reconstruct categories of legitimacy and illegitimacy” (2005). Ong notes that the state exercises this power of exception in a flexible manner, for instance, favoring capital when the economy is booming, but favoring labor when the social situation is volatile. She notes that “the state goal is to manipulate any political situation in order to achieve an implicit state-people bargain that trades acceptance of political authoritarianism for sustained improvements in economic and social well-being” (2012).

2.3.3 World Heritage institutions

In the World Heritage literature, the term “institution” is frequently taken to mean organization; with respect to site management institutions, World Heritage official documents mean the state-mandated “site management agency”. However, to be true to the actual definition, heritage institutions should be considered the full range of actors and rules in operation. Thus, other organizations should be considered, not only site management agencies, but also local and regional government, government agencies from other sectors, traditional social groups such as clans, private concessions, and other civil society actors, to name a few. In terms of formalized rules, heritage institutions would include legislation related to heritage, urban planning, land use and environment, among others; management plans, masterplans and conservation plans; and various regulations such building codes;

and various technical guidelines including conservation guidelines, tourism guidelines, disaster risk mitigation strategies and others. In the context of heritage, informal rules in the form of indigenous management systems have always been an important form of regulating practice, particularly in customary settings. These are gaining greater credence in modern heritage management practices and are being given explicit recognition in the World Heritage Operational Guidelines and other key references. Beyond such traditional practices, informal rules in terms of other established practices and norms are at play in all aspects of heritage systems, such as social mores, operational working routines and norms for interpersonal interaction.

The modern practice of heritage management within the global governance framework of UNESCO and the World Heritage system is still largely predicated on the role of the nation state, centralized state institutions and experts wielding technical knowledge. All three institutions are under assault, not only in the context of the heritage sector, but also within the terrain of contemporary governance in general. This section seeks to provide a deeper context for understanding the dilemmas now faced by current heritage institutions as outlined above in terms of the disruptions destabilizing the fundamental underpinnings of these institutional systems.

The rise of modern heritage practice is coincident with the birth of modernism and employs the devices of modernism. “Heritage discourse is wedded to modernity. Ontologically, it proceeds from modern secular rationalism”, argues Byrne (2014). The construction of heritage, and its use in creating narratives of the modern nation state, have been the subject of extensive scholarship, which will not be the subject of this review. Rather, this section will look at criticisms of institutional mechanisms associated with the modern state, as it reflects on the practice of heritage.

Within the heritage sector, critics have questioned how state-dominated governance predicated upon expert values and knowledge “set the agendas or provide the epistemological frameworks that define debates about the meaning and nature of the past and its heritage” (L. Smith, 2006). The authorized role of experts

becomes even more worrisome as experts strive to maintain their privileged position “of their knowledge claims within both state apparatuses and wider social debates” (ibid). Dissenting views gleaned from empirical observation suggest that the state and experts are in fact far from all-knowing and rational, including in the governance of World Heritage sites (Rugkhapan, 2017).

2.3.4 From centralized to polycentric institutional systems

As state-centred institutions are increasingly called into question, the past two decades have seen a shift away from centralized state apparatuses as the only locus of governance. “State-centred system of governance has been replaced by some form of distributed governance, in which governance power is spread among a wide range of range of actors of many different types” (Kempa, Shearing, & Burris, 2005). Such new models of governance provide an alternative, though not a panacea, to the ills of the dysfunctional state: too weak, too strong, old models that are paralyzed or new models that are exploited by the strong (ibid).

The concept of polycentric governance was introduced by Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout and Robert Warren (1961), and provided the basis for subsequent work by Elinor Ostrom in the study of governing common pool resources.

“Polycentric connotes many centres of decision making that are formally dependent of each other. Whether they actually function independently, or instead constitute an interdependent system of relations, is an empirical question in particular cases. To the extent that they enter into various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior. To the extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a ‘system’” (ibid).

As an alternative to simple systems modeled on two main actors, the market and the state, polycentric systems provide a more complex framework to analyze multiple actor and institutional arrangements interacting at multiple scales and multiple levels. Empirical studies show that complex polycentric systems did not result in chaos, but rather, autonomous actors could develop productive arrangements and enhance efficient outcomes in managing resources.

The new polycentric models of governance depend on state actors (who still continue to exercise power) as well as non-state actors – private corporations, NGOs, the media, citizen’s groups, cooperatives and other civil society parties – who operate both at a local and international level. Echoing insights from the latest developments in institutional theory as explained above, these actors are able to exercise agency, thus challenging “earlier theories of rational, but helpless, individuals who are trapped in social dilemmas” (E. Ostrom, 2009). Yet, Ostrom raises a caveat that these actors are not always successful, depending on the context they face. “Various aspects of the context in which individuals interact affect how individuals learn about the situation they are in and about the others with whom they are interacting” (ibid). “Polycentric systems are assumed to enhance innovation, learning, adaptation, trustworthiness, level of cooperation among participants, and the achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales” (E. Ostrom, 2010).

Various arrangements exist for polycentric systems, and Ostrom is quick to caution that there are no set governance models that work consistently, nor is there a set of rules associated with successful systems or a single theory that can be applied to all settings. As an illustration of the forms of polycentric systems, along with their promises and shortcomings, this section will raise two models that have gained credence and popularity in various sectors: partnerships and network governance.

Under the rubric of ‘partnerships’, a range of actors is being mobilized in the act of governance, often by the state itself. Particularly in the neo-liberal context,

actors in the private sector are perceived to have the capacity to use market processes to deliver services. The state in this instance attempts to 'govern at a distance' by using regulation to govern the actions of partners who are authorized under law or under contract to undertake service provision in the public interest (Abrahamsen 2004, Freeman 2000, Eggers and O'Leary 1995). Such partly privatized modes of governance promise to deliver improvements in terms of efficiency. Multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank have championed such public-private partnerships as the means to extend the resources of the state in the name of 'reinventing government'.

This positive view of such private partnerships is outweighed by a considerable stream of cautionary literature which points to the ability of the most powerful corporate actors "to hijack weak systems of accountability in service of their own motivations... The potentiality of doing things differently in terms of harnessing non-state entities to actually do the business of governance (as opposed to merely service provision) has so far been retained as an interesting theoretical story" (Kempa et al., 2005). The rise of "private government" can go to the extreme where the state itself becomes governed by non-state actors (Freeman 2000, Macauley 1995). Corporations wield power over states in terms of the "threat of flight of capital" which is enabled by a globalized economy. In the case of crony capitalism, the state itself is implicated in undermining its own official authority, by enabling the siphoning off of state resources into privatized hands (W. Li, Roland, & Yang, 2018).

Casting a more inclusive net, "network governance" presents another alternative which includes not just the state and private entities but also a range of other non-state actors. Champions of network governance note that networks arise as a response to "failures of markets, failures of hierarchical coordination, and to society and technological developments" (Provan & Kenis, 2008). More specifically, network models are found suitable when "the need for safeguarding and coordinating exchange inhibits parties from using market mechanisms for customized,

complex tasks, and the need for adapting exchanges inhibits parties from using hierarchies” (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997).

Within the context of the advanced information economy and late modernity, Castells sees the rise of networks as the primary mode of social and institutional organization, primarily in terms of the flow of information (2000). Ostrom examines the role of networks in terms of the internal political dynamics and their impacts as seen in how they distribute collective benefits. Scholars of international diplomacy like Slaughter examine how networks operate increasingly across state boundaries, with an architecture of networks of capital, knowledge and international bureaucratic linkages (2001).

However, given the range of actors and motivations involved, network governance has to contend with its own internal contradictions. Networks face a (i) “tension between the need for administrative efficiency and inclusive decision making”, (ii) “tension between the need for internal and external legitimacy”, and (iii) “tension between the need for flexibility and the need for stability” (Provan & Kenis, 2008). As with distortions of power within public-private partnerships, in network governance models, the involvement of a range of actors opens up the risk that overall outcomes become dominated by individual interests. In diffuse systems of collective governance, “wealthy groups emerge as the most successful category of people in seizing the levers or governability” (Kempa et al., 2005).

2.4 Adaptive capacity

Given the growing recognition of the limitations of existing institutions, to what extent can they actually change? While the literature identifies many sources of viscosity, institutions are not completely rigid; they are produced and reproduced by social practices and other systemic attributes which are dynamic.

The ability of a system to adjust will be examined in this study within the framework of ‘adaptive capacity’. Adaptive capacity has been selected as the primary analytical lens in this dissertation, as it provides a clear framework to unpack

and interrogate different dimensions of institutional dynamics. Drawing upon earlier work on various forms of governance (such as Ostrom et al, 1961), the theory and associated analytical methodologies developed under the banner of adaptive capacity are not only confined to examining the performance of different institutions against indicators such as efficiency or effectiveness. Rather, adaptive capacity looks particularly at how institutions adapt to new stimuli and game-changing disruptions, primarily the far-reaching issue of climate change. In this way, it lends itself to the research questions of this dissertation, which examine how heritage management institutions react to change in the form of expanding heritage boundaries.

Originally rooted in the natural sciences, the concept of adaptive capacity has been further elaborated within the social-ecological literature, which examines the dynamics of social-ecological systems. Social-ecological systems (SES) are complex, integrated systems in which humans are part of nature (Berkes & Folke, 1998). Ostrom and colleagues have developed a framework for understanding the actors and variables which interact within an SES, based on a dynamic view of policy processes as systems. The SES framework builds on the Nobel Prize-winning scholarship on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. According to McGinnis and Ostrom (2014), “The SES framework was originally designed for application to a relatively well-defined domain of common-pool resource management situations in which resource users extract resource units from a resource system.”




Figure 5 The SES framework

While this dissertation will not explicitly use the SES framework as an analytical device per se, the underlying logic of this framework will be useful as a reference when carrying out the conceptual mapping to identify the various factors of adaptive capacity and their interaction with each other. The SES framework treats “the dynamics of a resource system as a mostly exogenous force, that is, as a driver of changing circumstances and not something directly under the control of the actors making policy in those settings”, whereas “policy processes as the core analytical concern” (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014). The distinction between exogenous factors and endogenous factors in the subsequent analysis will be useful in describing and analyzing the dynamics of the various systems to be studied.

The vast majority of the social-ecological literature on adaptive capacity in the past twenty years concerns climate change adaptation, although it has also been applied to organizational change studies and complexity theories (such as Weick and Sutcliffe 2001, Duit and Galaz 2008) . Adaptation has become a central concern of the work of policy makers, scholars and practitioners dealing with climate change, in

the midst of accelerated climate change, which is bringing about unpredictable changes. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that “Adaptation to climate change has the potential to substantially reduce many of the adverse impacts of climate change and enhance beneficial effects – though neither without cost nor without leaving residual damage...” (McCarthy, F. Canziani, Leary, J. Dokken, & S. White, 2001).

Adaptation is a function of adaptive capacity, which is considered one of the three measures of vulnerability, along with exposure and sensitivity. As early as 1996, the IPCC has been inquiring “how adaptable is a particular system to climate change – that is, to what degree are adjustments possible in practices, processes, or structures of systems in response to projected or actual changes of climate? This issue is important for both ecological and social systems because it is critical to recognize that both types of systems have capacities that will enable them to resist adverse consequences of new conditions or to capitalize on new opportunities” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1996). Relating to these two intertwined strands of ecological systems and social systems, “adaptive capacity in ecological systems is related to genetic diversity, biological diversity, and the heterogeneity of landscape mosaics. In social systems, the existence of institutions and networks that learn and store knowledge and experience, create flexibility in problem solving and balance power among interest groups play an important role in adaptive capacity” (<https://www.resalliance.org/adaptive-capacity>).

2.4.1 Adaptive capacity of institutions

Gupta et al in their seminal paper define adaptive capacity as “the inherent characteristics of institutions that empower social actors to respond to short and long-term impacts either through planned measures or through allowing and encouraging creative responses from society both ex ante and ex post. It encompasses: the characteristics of institutions (formal and informal; rules, norms and beliefs) that enable society (individuals, organizations and networks) to cope with climate change, and the degree to which such institutions allow and encourage

with climate change, and the degree to which such institutions allow and encourage actors to change these institutions to cope with climate change.” Similar definitions are offered by Yohe and Tol 2002, Smit et al 2000, Weick and Sutcliffe 2001. The framework developed by Gupta et al is notable as the first to systematically address adaptive capacity of institutions, as opposed to earlier work which looked into other units of society - households, organizations, local communities and nations.

Bettini et al (2015) make a further distinction between resilient adaptation (to be able to absorb shocks and perturbations within the existing objectives) or transformative adaptation (whereby the system is reconfigured to meet fundamentally different objectives). They define adaptive capacity as “The ability to mobilize and combine different capacities within a system, to anticipate or respond to economic, environmental, and social stressors, in order to initiate structural or functional change to a system and thereby achieve resilient or transformative adaptation” (ibid). They propose further that adaptation is brought about in the system through a reflexive and iterative mechanism as follows: “1. recognize feedback from the operating context; 2. assess this feedback in terms of how it affects the current system’s structural integrity; 3. assess the implications of this feedback for the system’s functional purpose; 4. determine, based on the outcomes of the two previous steps, what type of adaptation is needed, resilient or transformative; and 5. reconfigure for resilient adaptation or transform to deliver new outcomes” (ibid).




Figure 6 Adaptation and transformation

Source: Bettini et al (2015), based on Gunderson and Holling (2002)

The distinction and connection between adaptation and transformation is illustrated in the diagram for the adaptive cycle developed by Gunderson and Holling (2002). Adaptation occurs within the boundary of an existing system, whereby structural changes can be made, but within the overall existing objectives and parameters of the old system. However, when these fundamental objectives of the system itself are changed, this can lead to transformation. Within this framework, the connectedness of a system refers its structure, whereas the potential of a system refers to its functional purpose.

Despite these studies, there is a gap in the literature regarding the identification of practical determinants of adaptive capacity (Adger and Vincent 2005; Lemos et al 2007). Bettini et al (2015) point to the need to better understand “how system

attributes are combined under particular conditions and within particular contexts to create the capacity to adapt”.

2.4.2 Adaptive capacity and World Heritage

The adaptive capacity of heritage sites, particularly World Heritage sites and cultural heritage, is a relatively new area of research, emerging mostly in the past five years. These studies are confined to adaptive capacity in the specific context of climate change. This area of scholarship is a subset of a larger and more well-established body of knowledge that concerns the impacts of climate change on heritage (see Cassar 2005, UNESCO 2007, Lefevre and Sabbioni 2018). It overlaps with a separate but related stream of work on managing disasters and other risks at heritage sites and World Heritage sites (see Jigyasu 2004, Mackee et al 2014, Korke 2018).

Heath (2008) analysed the adaptive capacity of World Heritage sites in Australia, however, the key factors of adaptive capacity for this analysis were not articulated. Philips (2013) undertook a study of three World Heritage sites in the United Kingdom to look at adaptive capacity to climate change. The study proposes a conceptual model for assessing adaptive change, primarily drawing upon the ACW as a starting point. It finds that the heritage sector is lacking capacity, particularly access to best practices and tools for climate change adaptation. Intersectoral collaboration also needs to be reinforced, particularly between the heritage sector and the emergency response agencies.

Since these two early studies, there has been growing interest in this topic, and case studies conducted on various sites. Daly (2018) looks more broadly at vulnerability, and assesses adaptive capacity as a component of overall vulnerability of the heritage values inherent at archaeological sites. The study proposes a six-step methodology, but does not propose a conceptual framework for assessing vulnerability, particularly adaptive capacity in detail. Government heritage agencies in Australia, Ireland, and the United States have issued guidance notes on adaptation

strategies for cultural resources, while other heritage organizations such as the International National Trusts Organization are mobilizing the heritage sector to initiate climate action. The role of traditional knowledge in improve adaptive outcomes at heritage sites has been proposed (Carmichael, 2015).

In the realm of natural heritage, UNESCO (2014a) itself has issued a practical guide for climate change adaptation for natural World Heritage sites, offering recommendations for assessing and mitigating the impacts of climate change. Mcleod (2016) has investigated the need for conservation organizations to reflect local community inputs in conducting adaptive capacity assessments as part of improving conservation planning and management. The importance of the social dimensions in social-ecological systems is underscored, when expert-led assessments differed from the perspective and priorities of local stakeholders.

However, beyond the issue of climate change, the assessment of adaptive capacity as a conceptual and analytical device has not yet been applied to the study of World Heritage governance in general, in terms of assessing the capacity of a system to adapt to a host of factors and pressures that disrupt existing governance and management institutions. Given the methodological advances that have been made in assessing adaptive capacity, and the promise this holds for untangling other complex heritage governance issues, this study aims to adapt existing frameworks for assessing adaptive capacity as a means of better understanding institutional mechanisms driving the ability of World Heritage site institutions to respond to emerging challenges.

2.4.3 Assessing adaptive capacity

Assessing adaptive capacity is difficult as “capacity is a latent condition that can only be observed when realized through some form of concrete adaptation” (Lemos et al., 2007). That said, within the rich literature on ecological-social systems, there is a broad consensus among scholars that there are three main issues that determine adaptive capacity, as identified by Janssen and Ostrom (2006): (i) investing

in the production, distribution and communication of information and knowledge, (ii) encouraging institutions that permit evolutionary change and learning, and (iii) increasing level of resources (ibid). Put another way, this corresponds to an institution's ability to learn, to decide and to act.

This broad three-part framework has been further detailed by other scholars notably the well-received Adaptive Change Wheel (ACW) created by Gupta et al (2010) in the context of climate change adaptation. The ACW creates metrics for understanding how institutions contribute to adaptive capacity among social actors. The ACW covers six dimensions and 22 criteria. The dimensions were developed following a literature review and brainstorming, which allowed existing dimensions proposed by other scholars to be clustered together to ensure that the final proposed criteria would be distinct. The dimensions and their subsidiary criteria are arranged into a wheel formation, modeled in part on the Vulnerability Scoping Diagram developed by Polsky et al (2007).

The ACW can be used as an assessment tool and contains a scoring mechanism for gauging performance within each dimension, aimed at both scholars and policy makers. The creators of the ACW provide a caveat that “even if an institution appears to create adaptive capacity, this does not automatically mean that society will use this capacity and be able to successfully adapt” (Gupta et al., 2010). The six dimensions of the ACW are: variety, learning capacity, room for autonomous change, leadership, availability of resources and fair governance.

- Variety refers to how institutions “encourage the involvement of a variety of perspectives, actors and solutions” (ibid). Given the complexity of many situations, adaptive capacity is dependent on having room for “multiple frames of reference”, the involvement of different actors at different levels and from different sectors in the governance process, a range of different policy options that can be deployed as solutions, and the willingness to tolerate short-term redundancy for the sake of reaching long-term solutions.

- Learning capacity refers to institutions that “enable social actors to continuously learn and improve their institutions” (ibid). The capacity to learn is predicated upon trust, and institutional patterns are needed that promote mutual respect and trust. Two types of learning are included: single loop learning (“the ability of institutional patterns to learn from past experiences and improve their routines” and double loop learning (“evidence of changes in assumptions underlying institutional patterns” (ibid). Learning also requires an openness towards uncertainties.
- Room for autonomous change refers to institutions that “allow and motivate social actors to adjust their behavior” (ibid). This requires having continuous access to information, particularly by accessing data within institutional memory; being able to act according to plan, ideally by providing such plans in advance of any occurrence such as disasters; and the capacity to improvise, which requires reinforcing social capital to increase the “capacity of individuals to self-organize and innovate” (ibid).
- Leadership refers to institutions that “can mobilize leadership qualities” (ibid). Systems should make room for leaders who are visionary; entrepreneurial, that is, stimulate actions and undertakings; and encourage collaboration between different actors.
- Availability of resources refers to institutions that “can mobilize resources for implementing adaptation measures” (ibid). In addition to the obvious human resources (which encompasses expertise, knowledge and labor) and financial resources which are needed to enact policy measures, authority is also identified as a key resource. One source of authority is statutory authority, whereby “institutional rules are embedded in constitutional laws” (ibid).
- Fair governance refers to institutions that can “enhance principles of fair governance”. Fair governance includes legitimacy of institutions, equity (which weighs whether institutional rules are fair), responsiveness to society, and whether the institutional patterns are accountable.



Figure 7 The six dimensions of the Adaptive Capacity Wheel (ACW)

In addition to these factors, other scholars have identified agency as another factor which should be considered. Reflecting previous work (Brown and Westaway 2011 et al, McClanahan and Cinner 2012), Cohen et al (2016) propose agency as one of the practical factors determining adaptive capacity. In their framework, “agency” means the ability of different actors to make their own choices or to take part in making decisions that will influence their ability to cope with or drive change. Their framework also has four other dimensions, namely: assets, flexibility, learning and social organization. Assets includes resources (human, financial and authority). Learning refers to the ability to learn from past experiences or, more radically, to change underlying assumptions. Learning also reflects institutional memory in the

form of on-going processes to monitor and evaluate policy experiences. Flexibility refers to the ability to engage with new ideas. Social organization includes attributes related to leadership.

Unlike the emphasis on human agency at an individual level which is espoused by Cohen et al, Bettini et al (2015) propose that institutional agency should be looked at. Institutional agency is felt to be an important dimension that responds to the gap regarding putting adaptive capacity into practice. They suggest that adaptive capacity “should include the skills and resources needed to adapt, along with the access, influence, and the capability to harness and combine these system attributes into adaptation processes. Without this agency element within definitions, studies continue risk continuing to miss critical insight into how into how system capacities can be mobilized for adaptation, and how this can be achieved in different social contexts” (ibid).

2.5 Proposed analytical framework for institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity

This dissertation will use two frameworks to analyze qualitative empirical data from a comparative case study of selected World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia with different management systems. First, a typology of institutional dynamics will be used to characterize the overall level of change and the change seen in specific interactions at each case study. Second, a framework defining dimensions of adaptive capacity will be used to unpack the factors which contribute to the manifestations of change within the system, or lack thereof. In this way, the mechanisms of adaptive change at play in specific processes of systemic change will be better understood.

These two frameworks have been selected as, combined together, they will provide a means to understand both the mechanisms and levers of institutional change that occur in a system. By identifying and analyzing the various factors of

adaptive capacity, this allows to unpack the variables which exert an impact on the overall process of change, as well as on different steps in the pathway of change that occurs. By using the typology of institutional dynamics, this allows the researcher to characterize the types of change that occur, giving a sense whether the system is moving forward, stuck, or actually moving backwards. This sense of dynamics is then linked to the factors of adaptive capacity in a descriptive and explanatory manner, to explain different phenomena of dynamics. Combining the two gives more depth to the analysis of institutional change than simply understanding factors of adaptive capacity but not capturing the sense of institutional dynamics, or vice versa.

Table 2 Analytic framework for institutional dynamics and factors of adaptive capacity

	Typology of institutional dynamics			
	Regressing	Maintaining	Disrupting	Creating
Factors of adaptive capacity	<i>To be identified from the research: factors and interaction among factors leading to regressing dynamics</i>	<i>To be identified from the research: factors and interaction among factors leading to maintaining dynamics</i>	<i>To be identified from the research: factors and interaction among factors leading to disrupting dynamics</i>	<i>To be identified from the research: factors and interaction among factors leading to creating dynamics</i>

2.5.1 Analytic framework for institutional dynamics

The paper will build upon the typology of institutional work developed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) to characterize the dynamics of institutional change: *creating institutions, maintaining institutions* or *disrupting institutions*. A fourth institutional dynamic is proposed as well: *regressing*, which could be considered a variant of disrupting (in the sense that it disrupts the status quo) and maintaining (in the sense that it pushes the institutional arrangement back to an earlier state).

To create institutions, Lawrence and Suddaby identify three categories of activities. The first category sees actors undertaking political work in which they “reconstruct rules, property rights and boundaries that define access to material resources” (ibid). These are manifested in advocacy activities, defining rule systems or boundaries of membership, and vesting of rule structures that confer property rights. The second category of activities attempts to reconfigure the belief systems of actors by constructing identities such as professional identities, changing normative associations, and constructing normative networks. Finally, the third category of activities are “designed to alter abstract categorizations in which the boundaries of meaning systems are altered” (ibid). This involves mimicry (associating new practices with existing sets of practices or rules in order to ease adoption), theorizing and educating actors in “skills and knowledge necessary to support the new institution” (ibid).

Actors can maintain institutions through ensuring adherence to rule systems. This involves enabling (through creating rules that support institutions), policing (by ensuring compliance), deterring (by “establishing coercive barriers to institutional change”) (ibid). Actors can also maintain institutions by reproducing existing norms and belief systems. The specific actions could include valorizing and demonizing positive and negative examples of institutionalized beliefs, mythologizing an institution’s history, or embedding and routinizing an institution’s foundations into participants’ regular practices.

State and non-state actors can disrupt institutions by disconnecting rewards and sanctions from some established set of rules or procedures. A second mechanism is by disassociating a practice from its moral foundations, thereby making practices which were once antithetical now acceptable. This is normally a tactic used by elites who are able to leverage their prestige to bring about disruptive change. Finally, actors can disrupt institutions by undermining core assumptions and beliefs, either through “innovations which broke existing institutional assumptions [or] gradual undermining through contrary practice” (ibid).

Finally, this study proposes the additional dynamic of ‘regressing’ based on initial empirical observations from the field. Whereas the literature presents models of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization, where institutions are built up and maintained or else taken apart, respectively, ‘regressing’ is posited as an additional dynamic where institutions are purposively pushed back to an earlier state of knowledge, mandate or practice. This represents a form of disruption, albeit not a forward-moving one nor an innovative one, as nothing new is created. In the sense that the institution arrangement is rolled back to an antecedent state, this set of actions could also be considered a perverse form of maintenance, in reinforcing an earlier, proto-arrangement.

Within these diverse dynamics, Lawrence and Suddaby observe that different actors are capable of exerting varying levels and forms of agency: “the different forms of institutional work demand different categories of actor, ones that are immune or somehow less affected by the governance mechanisms of their institutional environment” (ibid). In the case of disrupting institutions, “the ability of an actor to engage in practices that exist just outside of the normative boundaries of an institution reflects a high level of cultural competence; thus, normative work of this sort is mostly likely to be accomplished by members of a field or organization with sophisticated understanding of the cultural boundaries and meanings of institutions.... [In] undermining beliefs or assumptions, [requires] an actor ... capable of working in highly original and potentially counter-cultural ways” (ibid).

2.5.2 Analytic framework for adaptive capacity

The study proposes the following dimensions of adaptive capacity which present an evolution of the frameworks drawn from the literature on systems change. These factors are listed below, presented alongside parallel or overlapping frameworks. These factors are drawn from the Adaptive Capacity Wheel and other frameworks, and correspond to the three key determinants derived from the literature by Janssen and Ostrom (2006) that lead to the creation of adaptive capacity: (i) investing in information and knowledge, (ii) encouraging appropriate institutions and (iii) increasing resources.

Table 3 Proposed factors of adaptive capacity

Key determinants of adaptive capacity from literature	Proposed factors	Description	References to
Investing in information and knowledge	Cognitive frames	Values, aspirations, problem frames, logical frameworks	Gupta et al, Bettini et al
	Learning capacity	Single loop, double loop, triple loop learning	Janssen and Ostrom, Gupta et al, Bettini et al, Cohen et al, Pahl-Wostl et al
Encouraging appropriate institutions	Agency	Empowerment and ability to decide and act, reflecting authority / status	Cohen et al, Bettini et al
(Formal institutions)	Formal governance structures	Formal structures: legislation,	Bettini et al

Key determinants of adaptive capacity from literature	Proposed factors	Description	References to
		organizations, regulatory processes	
(Formal and informal institutions)	Relationships	Connections between and within organizations and actors	Janssen and Ostrom, Bettini et al, Cohen et al, Yohe and Tol
Increasing resources	Resources	Financial resources, human resources, social capital	Janssen and Ostrom, Gupta et al, Cohen et al, Yohe and Tol

2.5.2.1 Cognitive frames

Cognitive frames reflect the values and the aspirations that are underlying assumptions of existing systems (Bettini et al., 2015). The importance of cognitive frames is reflected in definitions of institutions that emphasize the role of human cognition, for instance, as “rules and shared meanings ... that define social relationships, help define who occupies what position in those relationships and guide interaction by giving actors cognitive frames or sets of meanings to interpret the behaviour of others” (Fligstein, 2001).

Pahl-Wostl et al (2013) propose that structuring and reframing the problem is considered the first step in learning processes. This reframing exercise more easily occurs in informal settings which “provide space for experimentation, which can lead to the revision of assumptions and paradigms ... whereas formal policy processes are

required to secure the outcomes of learning and develop binding commitment” (ibid).

2.5.2.2 Learning capacity

Learning capacity is almost universally identified as one of the key factors for adaptive capacity (Janssen and Ostrom, 2016; Gupta et al 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al 2013). Within the literature on adaptive capacity, learning is sometimes coupled with innovation. Cohen et al (2016) define learning capacity as seeking new information, trialling new techniques and taking up new innovations. Senge (1990) states that "learning in this context does not mean acquiring more information, but expanding the ability to produce the results we truly want in life".

Learning capacity is closely linked to shifts in cognitive frames. Changing underlying values through shifting cognitive frames is fundamental for transformative change. Argyris and Schoen (1978) propose the differences between incremental learning (single-loop learning) and higher order learning (at that time, limited to double-loop, and consequently expanded to include triple-loop learning). Pahl-Wostl (2009) defines these three processes as follows: “Single-loop learning refers to an incremental improvement of action strategies without questioning the underlying assumptions. Double-loop learning refers to a revisiting of assumptions, e.g., about cause-effect relationships, within a value-normative framework. In triple-loop learning, one begins to reconsider underlying values and beliefs and worldviews, if assumptions within a worldview do not hold any more.” Thus, structural change requires triple-loop learning.

In addition to cognitive shifts, two other preconditions are needed for effective learning. Higher levels of learning (multi-loop learning) “require informal settings, but are only effective, i.e., leading from reframing to transformation, if connected to formal processes” (ibid). As a corollary, learning occurs at both individual level and through societal learning. Both the social-ecological literature

and management literature dealing with organizational change concur that the relationship between individual learning and societal learning are interlinked.

In his work on learning organizations, Senge (1990) notes that “Organizations learn only through individuals who learn. Individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning. But without it no organizational learning occurs.” But individuals can be constrained by organizations. Gupta et al (2010) finds a symbiosis between the individual and institutional level learning in that adaptive institutions are those that permit actors to learn and to “question socially embedded ideologies, frames, assumptions, claims, roles, rules and procedures that dominate problem solving” (ibid). Furthermore, “redesigning institutions often calls for ‘unlearning’ past insights, routines, fears and reflexes” (ibid).

2.5.2.3 Agency

Beyond the ability to learn, adaptive change also requires the ability for an institution to decide and to act. Agency is significant in bridging from learning to practice. Agency refers to the ability of a social actor to make decisions and act, with a particular focus in this study on institutional agency. The role of actors and their agency is particularly instrumental given the growing recognition that heritage places are negotiated and practice is the locus of analysis (Markusen, 2004). Within the sociology of practice in the tradition of Bourdieu and de Certeau, “whereas a process-oriented theory articulates a sequence of events that leads to some outcome, a practice theory describes the intelligent activities of individuals and organizations who are working to effect those events and achieve that outcome” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

This framework proposes that agency reflects an institution’s authority and status, as these are the underlying determinants that enable an institution to decide and act. Gupta et al (2010) refer to authority as the “provision of accepted or legitimate forms of power”, and clarify that it derives from legal and political

mandate. Status may be conferred formally, through the standing of an organization or actor in formal bureaucracies, or may indicate more status in more informally-defined social hierarchies. Such status may be explicit or implicit, and there may be a discrepancy between the two. For instance, within a local government, the heritage department may have equal footing with the civil works department on paper, but the actual status of the civil works department may be higher in terms of political and economic clout.

Within the literature on institutional theory, the role of agency was central to early institutional studies, and was reintroduced as a central notion for explaining institutional change from an endogenous point of view, rather than focusing mainly on the role exogenous shocks. However, the paradox of embedded agency (Holm, 1995) raises the “tension between the tension between institutional determinism and agency: How can organizations or individuals innovate if their beliefs and actions are determined by the institutional environment they wish to change?” Given the inertia of such institutionalized contexts, this study will examine how embedded agency can be a force for maintaining existing institutions, as opposed to the more positive connotation of agency as an enabler of creative change. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) note that “Although definitions of institution emphasize their enduring nature” (Hughes, 1936), institutions rely on the “action of individuals and organizations for their reproduction over time” (Berger, 1996; Giddens, 1984).

2.5.2.4 Formal governance structures

As above, an important part of adaptive capacity is to encourage “appropriate institutions that permit evolutionary change and learning to be incorporated” (Lemos et al., 2007). As institutions include both formal and informal rules, for the purposes of this study, they will be captured in different factors.

Formal governance structures refer to the legislation, organizations, regulatory processes which constitute the formal rules within a system (following Bettini et al,

2015). Organizations will be an important focus of analysis in the case studies, and tracing how their remits, capacities and practices change will reflect the extent to which organizations are able to evolve and learn. The interaction between informal and formal mechanisms will also be captured here, in the sense that for institutions to change their ways of working in a sustainable manner, new learning and mindsets need to be translated and codified in formal structures. Most likely, this will take the form of new policies, plans, laws and guidelines.

In a sense, for such formal rules to change would already require the action and interaction of various other factors. At the same time, they would themselves be factors of interest in driving ultimate manifestations of change in the system – whether in terms of implementation practices or in conservation and management outcomes. In this sense they could be considered either interim outcomes or causal factors, or both, depending on the specific interaction being examined and at which stage of the overall situation.

2.5.2.5 Relationships

This study will expand from the factor of “organizational relationships” as defined by Bettini et al (2015) to a more broad sense of “relationships”. Originally, the factor of “organizational relationships” encompassed both the “the informal connections and interactions between key ... management organizations” (ibid) as well as formal mechanisms for collaboration and consultation. In this sense, they reflect both informal and formal rules in place within a system. This study proposes that it is important to consider not only relationships among organizations, but indeed, to take into account relationships with other actors who play a key role within the system, both at an individual level as well as an organizational level. However, these relationships will be seen through the lens of interaction within the established site management frameworks, rather than to consider all issues of interest among various stakeholders.

Relationships are intertwined with agency and its implicit factors of authority and status. Thus, increased formal coordination or collaboration may not in fact change the underlying level of trust or respect among organizations, nor the ability of one actor to persuade another actor. These nuances will be looked into in the analyses of the case studies.

This factor will take into account both external as well as internal relations, as the openness or resistance to change relationships within an organization may prove to be equally significant as the interaction among different actors in influencing the adaptive change of the overall system.

2.5.2.6 Resources

Resources are needed in order to change institutional rules, as well as to implement such changes. The ability of institutions to generate financial and human resources is prevalent in the literature (Gupta et al., 2010; Yohe & Tol, 2002). To streamline various aspects of resources which are proposed variously by different scholars as separate factors, Gupta et al propose that financial resources include access to technological resources and human resources include knowledge, skills and labor.

In addition, for the purposes of this study, social capital is also proposed to be considered as an element under resources. Social capital is defined by the OECD as “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups”, reflecting the work of Putnam (2000) and other sociologists. Fligstein (2001) defines social capital as “one’s position in a web of social relations that provide information and political support, and considers the concurrent ability to draw on that standing to influence others’ actions.” Particularly in the context of heritage sites, forms of non-statutory power like suasion may be called upon to manage the site and its inhabitants, which requires social capital to be effective.

2.6 Conceptual framework and proposed model of institutional change

Returning to the research question and drawing upon the work related to institutional change and adaptive capacity, the following conceptual framework is proposed. The framework links four key components: changes in heritage concepts and management challenges, the various factors of adaptive capacity defined above, the nature of heritage management institutions and finally, changes in heritage management practices.

In particular, it suggests that changes in heritage concepts and management challenges are inputs that cause change in institutional systems in heritage management. The extent of institutional changes in heritage management, spanning both formal rules and informal rules, thus represent the outputs in this framework. These changes can take the form of changes in formal rules, changes in informal rules, or both. The literature suggests that informal rules are stickier and more resistant to change than formal rules. This framework will be applied during the analysis to examine which types of rules change, and due to what factors.

The level of change that can come about in actual heritage management practice is mediated by two key issues: (i) factors of adaptive capacity within the institutional system (namely, cognitive frame, learning capacity, relationships, governance structures, resources and agency) and (ii) the nature of the institutional system, ie, whether the system is centralized or polycentric in nature.




Figure 8 Proposed conceptual framework

At this initial stage, the factors of adaptive capacity are considered as individual factors, following the existing models in the literature such as the ACW proposed by Gupta et al, 2010. All six of these factors have been proposed to be important aspects in contributing to adaptive capacity, however, the precise interaction between the factors remains to be teased out through the empirical data and analytical process. In this sense, there is yet not a clear sense of hierarchy among these factors, and all factors will be considered of equal weight in exerting an influence in defining an institution's adaptive capacity.

Meanwhile, the subsequent analysis will also consider the nature of the institutional system, as the difference between centralized institutional systems and polycentric institutionalized systems is identified in the literature as an important aspect affecting change outcomes. The literature largely suggests that polycentric systems are more dynamic and more likely to exhibit changes. This conceptual framework is proposed to look into the different possibilities and pathways of change that are characteristic of polycentric systems versus centralized systems.

Within this overall framework, a model for institutional change and changes in heritage management practice is proposed below, which interlinks the factors of adaptive capacity which are proposed above. This model groups the factors of adaptive capacity within the three main pillars proposed by Janssen and Ostrom

(2006): investing in knowledge and information, encouraging appropriate institutions and increasing resources. The model suggests that investing in knowledge and information (through learning and cognitive change) are the starting point. To enable institutional change to occur, appropriate institutions and resources need to be increased. This will lead to changes in practice, both in terms of formal rules and informal rules.




Figure 9 Proposed model of institutional change



Chapter 3

Research methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will introduce the methodology used in the research. The conceptual underpinnings of the research approach will be explained. Then, each stage of the research is presented in detail. The chapter ends with a discussion of validity and reliability.

3.2 Overall approach: comparative case study

The study uses the case study method which allows for a close scrutiny of the complex institutional dynamics of interest within their context. Multiple case studies were chosen to undertake a comparative study. The comparative approach “sharpens our power of description and plays a central role in concept-formation by bringing into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among cases. Comparison is routinely used in testing hypotheses and it can contribute to the inductive discovery of new hypotheses and to theory-building” (Collier 1993). The case study approach permits an in-depth examination of heritage management institutions, tools and dynamics across different contexts.

Various data sources, primarily qualitative, were drawn upon, primarily semi-structured interviews and documentary sources both primary and secondary. The analysis was conducted using an initial conceptual framework developed from existing theory related to heritage and adaptive change, which was further refined. At the end, cross-case comparison will seek to generalize insights and propositions about the mechanisms and institutional dynamics of adaptive capacity within World Heritage governance.

The study is primarily exploratory and descriptive in approach. The case study method allows for contemporary events to be included, and to deal with the fact that the researcher has little control over events (Yin 2013). It lends itself to answering “how” questions, which is appropriate to this study. It relies on an inductive approach to generate conceptual and theoretical findings from the research.

The selection of the cases aims for theoretical replication (ibid), in which the selected cases predict “contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons”. The selected cases aim to providing insights into different institutional dynamics and highlight contrasts in adaptive capacity due to socio-institutional factors embedded in each system. The cases “differ in terms of the key variables that are the focus of analysis, thereby allowing a more adequate assessment of their influence. Hence the selection of cases acts as a partial substitute for statistical or experimental control” (Lijphart 1971). Given the complexities of each case, this approach accommodates mining and amplifying the specificities of each case within a common frame provided by the study’s overall theoretical proposition, with a view to expanding and generalizing theories, what Yin terms analytical generalization as opposed to statistical generalization (2013).

The case study method is frequently used in heritage studies, including in the domain of World Heritage. While there are World Heritage studies which employ more quantitative approaches, such as studies of World Heritage status on property prices or tourism arrivals, the majority of studies are more qualitative in approach. Among the options for qualitative studies, the case study method is commonly used within this field a means to interrogate questions of a “how” or “why” nature, and has proven suitable to analyze complex situations with multiple factors at play.

Single heritage site case studies provide an in-depth look at the mechanisms operating at specific heritage sites, such as Dearborn and Stallmeyer’s (2010) study of transformations in the architectural and urban character of Luang Prabang, Lamprakos’s inquiry into craftsmanship and the manipulation of heritage discourse in

Sanaa (2015) or Chen's analysis of intangible cultural heritage as part of the construction of "experiencescapes" in the World Heritage site of Macao (2018). These single case studies permit a longitudinal study of great depth. Whereas their methodologies may be adaptable for future use, and their insights may resonate more widely, their policy implication may have certain limitations beyond the specific case.

Multiple case studies tend to take look at an issue from a comparative perspective, such as Leitao's inquiry into the protection of the larger surroundings of World Heritage settlements (2011), the use of planning techniques in the preservation of historic Chinatowns (Rugkhapan, 2017), or the examination of different responses to climate change at World Heritage sites (Phillips, 2013). These comparative studies allow for delving into the particularities of each case, using various sources of data and information. At the same time, the use of multiple case studies allows, not for statistical replication, but rather for understanding the different nuances of an issue as seen in different contexts through a uniform lens of inquiry established by the research framework. Finally, the multiple case study approach also provides the possibility to apply the findings or recommendations in a broader manner in a way that a single case study may not.

3.3 Literature review

A literature review was carried out, looking broadly at several strands of research and professional practice: World Heritage management, institutional change, the role of the state in changing governance paradigms, and adaptive capacity. The initial literature review identified key concepts and gaps in the existing scholarship.

See Chapter 2 for the literature review and the conceptual framework.

3.4 Scoping

Scoping was carried out by using primary and secondary documentary sources to frame the scope of the study. Within limitations of time and budget, cultural World

Heritage sites in Southeast Asia were selected as the geographic scope for the study, to optimize the author's professional expertise and prior knowledge and contacts in this area.

The scoping helped to (i) better understand the issues being faced by World Heritage sites in the sub-region, (ii) develop possible criteria for case study selection, and (iii) short-list possible case studies.

State of Conservation reports, World Heritage Committee decisions, monitoring reports including the most recent round of Periodic Reporting for the Asia-Pacific region, and assessment reports for the sites in Southeast Asia were reviewed. This review provided insights not only into the range of issues faced by World Heritage sites, but also the typology of sites facing conservation concerns severe enough to be under active monitoring by the World Heritage Committee. It allowed for an initial listing of factors of adaptive capacity related to the World Heritage Committee's monitoring and recommendations.

3.5 Case study design

The unit of analysis is the 'site management institution'. This encompasses the organizations, formal and informal rules that provide the framework for the conservation and management of the World Heritage site. This includes regulatory instruments, planning documents such as World Heritage management plans, as well as other routines and procedures related to the protection and development of World Heritage sites. It spans both statutory as well as customary mechanisms.

Within this 'site management institution', the key organization is the site management authority, which is the entity officially charged with the planning, execution, monitoring and reporting of management actions at a World Heritage site within the World Heritage system. It is the ultimate target of decisions made by the World Heritage Committee, in the sense that it is responsible for the on-the-ground follow up to these decisions. From a symbolic as well as operational point of view, it has a representative function, being the first point of call for both national and

international counterparts and partners who are involved in the management of the site. The site management authority may take the form of an office with sole authority over the site. On the other hand, the site management authority may share its responsibilities with other entities. In the widest possible sense, this could include everything ranging from resident monks to homeowners, tourism operators, government agencies at various levels, private investors, youth groups, NGOs and so forth.

For the purposes of this dissertation, the primary focus for the analysis will be the actual designated site management authority and entities with which it has a formal, legal or contractual arrangement in managing the World Heritage site and responding to the decisions of the World Heritage Committee. The other entities will be considered part of the larger governance eco-system within which the site management authority operates, and which it has to find a way to engage with, depending on the situation.

Southeast Asia has been selected as the field of inquiry as it occupies a middle ground in the World Heritage sphere, and thus the conclusions from this study have the potential to inform a wide range of sites beyond the region, both more and less progressive. It is not at the vanguard of heritage discourse, unlike countries that have already enlarged its conception and protection of heritage to items such as Modern heritage or industrial heritage. Yet it is at a transitional point in widening this conversation, with examples such as the recent interest in the Death Railway in Thailand or proto-hominid sites in Myanmar signaling the way forward from the more entrenched categories of ancient palaces and cities. Similarly, in terms of governance systems, while the majority of sites are managed in a fairly conventional bureaucratic manner (more on this below), the other forms of less hierarchic or centralized governance have taken hold over the past decade, with a long enough track record to shed lessons learned for a wider range of sites. The range of management challenges it faces is typical compared to many World Heritage sites across the globe, including hot issues such as urbanization pressures.

3.6 Process of selecting case studies

The selection of case studies was arrived at by a two-step sampling process. In the first step, a review of all cultural World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia was conducted, against the scoping criteria below. This scoping process enabled the short-listing of sites which either met the criteria and represented the range of possible options under certain criteria. In the second step, the final case studies were selected through purposive sampling.

The scoping criteria for initial site selection were developed within the framework of the study's main research question related to the ability of World Heritage sites with different institutional management systems to adapt their practices to "expanding boundaries of practice", notably, evolving heritage concepts and expanding management issues. To reflect the research objectives, the criteria were developed as follows.

Table 4 Scoping criteria for initial site selection

	Description of criteria	Selection requirement
Criterion 1	World Heritage site status?	Yes
Criterion 2 <i>Reflecting expanding boundary of heritage concept</i>	Type of heritage site categories (reflecting to some extent different scales of sites)	To include representation from: monumental complex/ archaeological site, cultural landscape, historic town/historic urban landscape
Criterion 3 <i>Reflecting expanding boundary of heritage challenges</i>	Site facing management challenges? (under scrutiny from World Heritage Committee)	Yes
Criterion 4	Overlapping time frame under	Timeframe should overlap for

	Description of criteria	Selection requirement
	scrutiny from World Heritage Committee	selected sites
Criterion 5	Prevalent type of sites under World Heritage scrutiny in Southeast Asia	To include representation from: monumental site affected by disaster, cultural landscape, historic town
Criterion 6	Different type of institutional management systems	To include representation from: centralized, polycentric (partnership), polycentric (network governance)

(i) Criterion 1: Status as a World Heritage site

While sites under preparation process for World Heritage nomination were initially considered, given that World Heritage sites are subject to a well-defined framework for management which is actively put into action by the World Heritage Committee, its advisory bodies and UNESCO, it was ultimately decided only to pick sites that were already World Heritage sites, in order to ensure a uniform overall framework.

(ii) Criterion 2: Sites reflecting a range of heritage categories (as a proxy for expanding concepts and definitions of heritage)

Archaeological sites and monumental complexes are the most well-established typology in terms of conventional conceptions of heritage. They are well-recognized under legal protection frameworks and professional practice, as well as among the public at large. They include the most iconic World Heritage sites in this sub-region such as Angkor and Borobudur.

Within Southeast Asia, two types of sites are considered emergent: cultural landscapes and historic urban landscapes or living towns. Cultural landscapes are a more recent category of heritage site. Although the actual interaction of people with

their natural and built environments goes back millennia, this symbiotic relationship and the importance of preserving both object and setting was not officially recognized within international heritage practice and more specifically within the World Heritage Convention until recently. Historic urban landscapes emerged as a conceptual framework for managing heritage settlements in 2005, which implied paying attention to the built heritage, including not just the monumental structures but also the surrounding urban fabric, along with environmental as well as social components in a holistic manner. In this manner, the historic urban landscape concept lends itself well to the management of living towns.

Embedded in the typology of heritage site is the scale of the site. To give a sense of the scale, the size (in hectares) of each site is included below. Generally speaking, landscape sites tend to be the most extensive, followed by archaeological sites, towns and finally, single monuments. A couple of archaeological sites stand out, such as Angkor and Sukhothai, which are assemblages of monuments set within vast ancient planned settlements, and in terms of scale could be interchangeably considered landscapes. However, as they were not nominated to the World Heritage List under the landscape rubric, they are classified here as archaeological sites.

Table 5 Types of World Heritage sites

Country	Monumental complex/ archaeological site	Cultural landscape	Historic town/ historic urban landscape
Cambodia	Angkor (40,000 ha) Preah Vihear (154 ha)		
Indonesia	Borobudur (25 ha) Prambanan Sangiran Early Man (5,600 ha)	Bali (19,519 ha)	
Lao PDR	Plain of Jars (174 ha)	Vat Phou (39,000 ha)	Luang Prabang (820 ha)

Country	Monumental complex/ archaeological site	Cultural landscape	Historic town/ historic urban landscape
Malaysia	Lenggong Valley (398 ha)		Melaka Georgetown (109 ha)
Philippines	Baroque Churches	Rice Terraces of the Northern Cordilleras	
Myanmar	Pyu Ancient Cities (5,809 ha)	Bagan (18,146 ha)	
Thailand	Ayutthaya (289 ha) Sukhothai (11,852 ha) Ban Chiang (30 ha)		
Vietnam	Hue (315 ha) Ho Citadel (155 ha) My Son (142 ha) Thang Long (18 ha)	Trang An (6,226 ha)	Hoi An (30 ha)

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Criterion 3: Sites facing management challenges (as a proxy for expanding management issues)

While most World Heritage sites face problems of some kind, only a selected number of sites are deemed to have a threshold of problems serious enough to merit active scrutiny by the World Heritage Committee. At the outset, for the scoping exercise, the initial selection identified sites facing management challenges, with the assumption that some of these management challenges stem from difficulties in adjusting to emerging issues such as disasters, coping with living heritage and dealing with sustainable development issues. The sections below will deal more

in depth with whether such problems stem from expanding boundaries of practice per se.

Out of 38 World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia, a total of 20 natural and cultural sites were identified as being “of concern”, that is, facing at least one of the following three situations, in decreasing order of severity: (i) included in the Danger List, (ii) subject to Reactive Monitoring or Advisory Missions, (iii) under State of Conservation monitoring (SOC). The cultural World Heritage sites identified as being of concern are as follows.



Table 6 World Heritage sites facing management challenges

Name of site	Management challenges that triggered WHC scrutiny (starting in)	Stimulus from World Heritage Committee
Angkor Preah Vihear	Post-war, neglect (1992) Management systems (2009)	Danger Listing, SOC Reinforced Monitoring, SOC
Bali Borobodur Prambanan Sangiran Early Man	Management systems (2014) Management systems (1995) Earthquake, volcano (1995) Management, interpretation (2002)	Advisory Missions, SOC Reactive Monitoring, SOC Reactive Monitoring, SOC Reactive Monitoring, SOC
Luang Prabang Vat Phou	Development (1996) New Route 14A linked to local development (2011)	Reactive Monitoring, SOC Reactive Monitoring, SOC
Melaka/Georgetown	Uncontrolled development in living town (2008)	Reactive Monitoring, SOC
Pyu Ancient Cities	Management systems (2014)	SOC
Baroque Churches Rice Terraces of the Northern Cordilleras	Ritual uses (1997) Changes in traditional ways (1999)	Danger, Reactive, SOC Reactive Monitoring, SOC
Ayutthaya	Flooding (2011) and subsequent poor restoration of monuments	Advisory Mission, SOC
Hue Trang An	Encroachment (2006) from post-flood response (1999) Impacts of tourism (2016)	Reactive Monitoring, SOC SOC

(iii) Criterion 4: Similar time frame under World Heritage Committee scrutiny

Given that the global framework for World Heritage management is constantly evolving, which in turn shifts the requirements of the World Heritage Committee and its Advisory Bodies and effects the way in it monitors and assesses the condition of sites, an additional criterion was to use an overlapping time frame for the period under scrutiny.

Table 7 Timeframe under World Heritage Committee scrutiny

Name of site	Monitoring since	Before 2000	During 2000-2010	2010-onwards
Angkor Preah Vihear	1992 2009	X	X X	X
Bali	2014			X
Borobudur	1995	X	X	
Prambanan	1995	X	X	X
Sangiran Early Man	2002		X	X
Luang Prabang	1996	X	X	X
Vat Phou	2011			X
Melaka/Georgetown	2008		X	X
Pyu Ancient Cities	2014			X
Baroque Churches	1997	X		
Rice Terraces of the Northern Cordilleras	1999	X	X	X
Ayutthaya	2011			X
Hue	1999	X	X	X
Trang An	2016			X

(v) Criterion 5: Prevalent types of sites under World Heritage scrutiny

For the sake of maximizing the study's policy impact, an additional criterion focused on the prevalent types of sites which are under World Heritage scrutiny. As a class of objects, these types of sites, due to their inherent nature and systemic shortcomings in conceptual and regulatory infrastructure in the sub-region, seem to face challenges in coping with management issues.

A classification revealed that half of the World Heritage sites "in concern" in Southeast Asia are natural heritage sites. Among the cultural World Heritage sites with conservation and management concerns, there were three main types of sites were predominant: monumental complexes affected by disaster risks, cultural landscapes and living towns.




Figure 10 World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia in concern

Specifically, the cultural sites that fall within this category are:

Table 8 Prevalent types of World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia in concern

Monumental complex affected by disaster risks	Cultural landscape	Historic town/ historic urban landscape
Prambanan	Bali	
	Vat Phou	Luang Prabang
		Melaka/Georgetown
	Rice Terraces of the Northern Cordilleras	
Ayutthaya		
	Hue Trang An	

(vi) Criterion 6: Sites with different institutional management systems

Finally, to enable a comparative analysis to test the prevailing hypotheses in the institutional literature about the impacts that different institutional management systems have in creating or blocking change, sites with different institutional management systems were selected. The main characterization is if the sites are predominantly centralized versus polycentric systems (following Ostrom et al).

For this purpose, “centralized” means a site whose heritage management is under the primary responsibility of one agency. This includes sites that have multi-agency, multi-ministerial committees, but are still managed on a day-to-day basis by one main agency. In addition to the primary agency in charge of heritage management, there may be some form of secondary involvement from other departments such as tourism or hydrology, which is normal given the division of labor within a government system.

For polycentric sites, two main types are distinguished here: (i) sites with some form of public-private partnership, mainly in terms of having a private concession operating at the site alongside the heritage authority and (ii) sites with multiple agencies in charge of various aspects of heritage management.

Table 9 Different institutional management systems at World Heritage sites

Centralized (heritage management primarily under one agency)	Polycentric – public-private partnership	Polycentric – network governance
Angkor Preah Vihear		
Sangiran Early Man	Borobudur Prambanan	Bali
	Vat Phou	Luang Prabang Plain of Jars
Melaka		Georgetown
Pyu Ancient Cities		Bagan
		Baroque Churches Rice Terraces
Ayutthaya Sukhothai Ban Chiang		
Hue Hoi An Thang Long Ho Citadel	Trang An	

3.7 Selected case studies

The initial scoping exercise screened for sites that met the criteria of being a World Heritage site, represent a range of heritage categories, been under scrutiny from the World Heritage Committee within an overlapping time frame of, and represent a range of types of institutional systems in their heritage management.

The following matrix represents the short list emerging from the scoping exercise, organized by type of heritage site and management institutional structure.

Table 10 Short-listed World Heritage sites for case study selection (*selected site)

	Centralized	Polycentric - partnership	Polycentric – network governance
Monumental site	Ayutthaya*	Prambanan	
Cultural landscape		Vat Phou* Trang An	Bali Rice Terraces
Town			Luang Prabang Melaka and George Town*

The conventional centralized approach, that is, in the hands of a heritage authority is still used with monument sites. On the other hand, the more complex types of heritage sites, being cultural landscapes and towns, involve a more polycentric institutional structure, with multiple agencies involved with various aspects of heritage management.

After the initial scoping and establishment of the sampling frame, three case studies were selected through purposive sampling: Historic Town of Ayutthaya in Thailand, Vat Phou and Associated Ancient Settlements within the Champasak Cultural Landscape in Lao PDR, and George Town, which was enlisted as part of the serial site of the Historic Cities of the Straits of Melaka along with Melaka in Malaysia.

Three cases were selected to capture the diversity in approaches to governing World Heritage sites, which is central to the research question, and could not be answered by a single case study. Selecting three also tries to avoid the pitfalls of two case studies, which could create an artificial sense of binary comparison and generalization, with two poles of experiences and models being established through the study. Within the limited resources of the study, three case studies allow for undertaking in-depth inquiry necessary to understand the dynamics of each case.

All three sites have been subject to monitoring by the World Heritage Committee in the past decade, in response to management challenges that were deemed serious enough to trigger official response from the Committee. Ayutthaya was affected by massive flooding in 2011 and subsequent poor restoration of monuments initiated thereafter. Vat Phou was affected by the construction of a new highway in 2010. George Town was placed under scrutiny in 2009 for uncontrolled development. The fact that this period is roughly contemporaneous for all three sites allows for a shared macro geo-political context as well as a consistent strategic policy from the World Heritage Committee in dealing with the sites and their management issues.

These challenges reflect difficulties in coping with the expanded boundaries of practice for each site. There is the conceptual expansion in the type of heritage site that has to be managed as well as a concomitant expansion in the management challenges that face the site. For Ayutthaya, the management issues expanded from conserving individual monuments to dealing with disasters at a territorial scale. In the case of Vat Phou, the conceptual expansion also had a physical spatial dimension as well, from a narrow focus on a monument complex to the entire surrounding landscape. In the case of George Town, the challenges had to do with conserving not just the historic townscape but also sustaining living heritage represented in the long-time residents and their intangible cultural heritage and trades.




Figure 11 Expanding boundaries of practice at case study sites

The study focuses on the period that the three sites were under external scrutiny, which are overlapping: Ayutthaya from 2011 onwards, Vat Phou from 2011 onwards and George Town from 2008 onwards. This overlapping time frame ensures that a consistent framework regarding globally-derived heritage management principles and practices are being applied in the management of the sites. This provides a common referent given the on-going evolutions in heritage theory which have seen new advancements and disjunctions, which should shape practice.

The three case studies represent three different institutional models of heritage management: centralized system with a technocratic heritage agency working in a vertical silo mode with little lateral connection to other sectors, polycentric system with a public-private partnership approach with the introduction of a concession company, and a polycentric system with a network governance approach. The three cases differ in terms of their governance structures, their political setting and history, the role of government, private sector and civil society in policy processes and implementation. The comparison seeks to establish “a framework for interpreting how parallel process of change are played out in different ways within each context” (following Skocpol and Somers 1980, in Collier).

While the three models are located at different points of economic development and political complexity, it should be noted that the three are not necessarily meant to present a progression in terms of evolving from one model to the next. Nor does the comparison seek to identify an ideal model for heritage management as such. Given the specificities of each case, the study aims more to develop propositions that generalize analytically from each case to identify varying factors of adaptive capacity.

Two final considerations in the case selection process were, first, the potential of the study to contribute to the existing scholarship, especially on World Heritage and at the intersection of World Heritage and adaptive capacity. A number of the short-listed case studies have been exhaustively documented, both in the scholarly literature and through professional projects which have resulted in numerous publications, notably Bali, Luang Prabang and the Rice Terraces of the Northern Cordilleras. Therefore, these were not selected.

Secondly, it was also necessary to consider the accessibility of data, within the limited resources of the study. This involved both access to informants and documents, as well as language issues; the researcher is proficient in the working languages at these three selected case study sites.

In summary, the selection of the case studies provides the basis to interrogate the main research question related to how World Heritage institutions display adaptive capacity in responding to expanding boundaries of practice.

Table 11 Comparative overview of case studies

	Ayutthaya	Vat Phou	George Town
Institutional model	Centralized (sole technocratic heritage agency)	Polycentric (heritage agency + private concession + district government)	Polycentric (network with multiple actors)
Expanding heritage concepts	From single monuments + archaeological site → territorial scale heritage	From core monumental site → landscape (rural, townscape)	From monuments + sites + townscapes → living heritage
Expanding challenges	Disaster (flooding and damage to monuments)	Development pressures on landscape (new road)	Development pressures on built and social fabric of historic town (new construction)
Implications for expanding locus of practice	From conservation of monuments + archaeological site → disaster management and recovery	From conservation of core monumental site → landscape management	From managing urban fabric → sustaining living heritage

3.8 Data collection

The study relies on qualitative empirical data drawn from: document analysis, interviews and participant-observation.

Site visits were undertaken to each of the sites during 2017-2019, with three visits to Penang, three visits to Vat Phou and five visits to Ayutthaya. Site visits provided an opportunity for both observation of the state of conservation of the heritage sites, participant-observation in meetings, workshops, consultations and conservation activities, as well as to conducting interviews. Interviews were also conducted off-site with a number of key informants during regional or international meetings, which sometimes provided interviewees an opportunity for greater candor, once removed from their usual settings and institutional roles.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants who have an active role in heritage management or related aspects at the three sites. The informants represent a range of organizations at all levels from local to national and in both heritage and related sectors: heritage management agencies, local government, provincial government, other related agencies (planning, public works), national heritage ministry, local and foreign experts working at the site, and civil society organizations. Interviews were conducted during field visits in 2018-2019, using an interview guide as a starting point. In certain cases, follow up interviews or email correspondence was undertaken to further clarify pending issues. In total, 24 informants were contacted regarding Ayutthaya, 22 were contacted regarding Vat Phou, and 20 were contacted regarding George Town. The anonymity of the interviewees is protected, as some of the information provided is sensitive.

The distribution of interviewees in itself reflects the range and degree of involvement of various stakeholders with the regular management of the World Heritage site. At Ayutthaya, the single heritage organization dominates in heritage management; within the organization, Bangkok has an outsized voice. For Vat Phou, other local, provincial and national agencies as well as foreign donors had greater

involvement, alongside the heritage office. Meanwhile, for Penang, there is a more even spread of relevant organizations, with multiple heritage-related agencies. Most of the action takes place at the level of Penang state or municipality, however, with a limited federal role.




Figure 12 Distribution of interviewees

The data from the interviews was deepened and triangulated through document analysis. A range of documents were selected, mostly reflecting formal rules and processes: World Heritage management plans, urban plans, heritage management and conservation regulations, building control regulations, official reports, building statistics, newsletters of heritage organizations and NGOs, as well as news articles.

Official World Heritage documents were also analyzed as a way not only of tracking the changes that were occurring, but also to juxtapose the official narratives prepared by the governments reporting to the international community against the other narratives provided by working level staff about the realities of change and implementation, or lack thereof. In particular, a close textual analysis was conducted of the State of Conservation Reports prepared by the countries as well as

the responses from the World Heritage Centre and Advisory Bodies (in the form of synthetic State of Conservation analyses) and World Heritage Committee decisions which commented on the management responses. The State of Conservation reports were tracked across the years that the sites were under scrutiny, to understand (i) which were the issues of concern, (ii) which issues were addressed, and which issues were not addressed, (iii) extent to which each issue was addressed (output level, outcome level), (iv) consonance between the priorities of the World Heritage Committee and that of the State Party.

Furthermore, to get a sense of the dynamics of informal rules and processes, and their interaction with formal rules, participant observation was carried out through participating in meetings, workshops, conferences and consultations conducted mostly by the heritage agencies. Where direct participation in meetings was not possible, due to various constraints, publicly available videos of meetings, especially public consultations, were reviewed.

Table 12 Summary of data sources

Stage of research	Data / technique	Data sources
Scoping and case selection	Document analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Individual World Heritage site profiles (whc.unesco.org) ● State of Conservation assessments by World Heritage Centre and Advisory Bodies ● State of Conservation reports prepared by State Parties
Case study analysis	Interviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Personnel at: ● World Heritage site management office ● Other local organizations working on heritage issues ● Municipal government

Stage of research	Data / technique	Data sources
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Other provincial agencies ● National heritage agency ● Other national agency (ie, planning) ● Experts - local ● Experts - international ● Civil society (NGOs) ● Private sector
	Document analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● World Heritage management plans ● Urban plans ● Specialized plans such as disaster risk management ● Heritage management and conservation regulations ● Building control regulations ● Official reports ● Building statistics ● World Heritage Committee decisions about each site ● State of Conservation assessments by World Heritage Centre and Advisory Bodies ● State of Conservation reports prepared by State Parties ● Newsletters of heritage organizations and NGOs ● Media articles and social media

Stage of research	Data / technique	Data sources
	Participant observation	Meetings/workshops/conferences/ consultations organized at site level

3.9 Data analysis

The interview data were transcribed and analyzed through coding. Data and coding were tabulated using a spreadsheet. Initial codes were assigned using “open coding” to directly describe the content of the data. The open coding process allowed for breaking up the interview data into discrete units reflecting key ideas. Through inductive analysis, higher-level codes, ie “themes”, drawn from the literature on adaptive change were assigned to larger clusters of data.

Codes were refined through this process, as not all data fit the existing categories neatly. In the end, the coding identified key socio-institutional factors for systemic change, spanning both formal and informal aspects. These represent the proposed dimensions of adaptive capacity. As the codes were refined iteratively, the final factors of adaptive capacity presented in Chapter 7 represent an evolution from the original framework drawn from the literature on systems change and adaptive capacity.

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Table 13 Sample of data coding

Informant	Interview data	Open code (descriptive)	Theme (Factor of adaptive capacity)
VP informant 1	14B - no donor, province supposed to find \$	Financing	Financial resources
	14B - No funds for infrastructure	Financing	Financial resources

	2 story houses illegal - only allow farm shelters and conservation buildings	Illegal construction	Governance structure
	50% ask permit, 50% don't	Illegal construction	Governance structure
	Some are old time residents, want to upgrade houses	Illegal construction	Flexibility
	Local authorities - 50% favor the people (“ao jai prachachon”)	Illegal construction	Relationships
	Local authorities - 50% favor the office (“ao jai rao”)	Illegal construction	Relationships
	Otherwise, people will sue (“fong ti sapa”)	Illegal construction	Relationships
	Cannot implement the Heritage Fund	Heritage Fund	Resources

Mapping was undertaken of the sequence of events as they unfolded, to give a sense of the temporal dimension of the institutional dynamics. Similarly, a mapping of stakeholders and their involvement with the heritage agenda was also undertaken

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3.10 Concept mapping

Qualitative concept mapping was undertaken to analyze each of the case study sites. The mapping provided a pictorial method to organize and interrogate the data, not in the form of the raw data, but rather, in the form of the higher-level codes that reflected the different factors of adaptive capacity. This technique was adapted and developed further from Bettini et al (2015), who in turn drew from the Trochim (1989) and Novak and Canas (2008).

The different factors of adaptive capacity were displayed as conceptual nodes. Arrows showed the connections and the way that each factor influenced each other. The mapping provided a visual technique to explore the relationships between different factors to structure the information in a manner that encompasses all the key findings from each case.




Figure 13 Example of concept map showing conceptual nodes and interrelationships

(Source: Novak and Canas 2008)

The technique used by Bettini et al (2015) to analyze and indicate the type of change that was occurring between nodes was also adopted in this study's analysis. Annotations were provided for each arrow to reflect whether institutional arrangements were being maintained, disrupted or created, in line with the institutional dynamics framework of Lawrence and Suddaby (2006). As a result, this mapping provided a means to analyze and display areas of dynamic change or resistance to change within the overall institutional system. By noting which factors were involved in these different dynamics, it was possible to articulate which factors

contributed to the different manifestations of adaptation in the overall system, both to facilitate change or to slow down or stop adaptation from occurring.




Figure 14 Example of concept map with annotations of institutional dynamics
(Source: Bettini et al, 2015, based on Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006)

This mapping technique was developed further in this dissertation. Instead of organizing the nodes simply by conceptual linkages, the nodes were organized to reflect a temporal sequence of events as they unfolded over time. This gave an additional layer of information to show how change was occurring in the system over time. From a comparative perspective, as the study period was roughly the same for each case study, this also provided a way to compare the level of dynamism and iterative change that was occurring between one site and another.

For each case study, the conceptual mapping was refined a number of times, to sharpen the analysis as well as to clarify the resulting visual display to show the changes that were occurring in each institutional system. From a comparative perspective, certain patterns began to emerge across the three case studies, in terms of the different factors of adaptive capacity, how they interacted with each other, and how they shaped heritage management practice at the site. This allowed for a synthetic schema of institutional adaptive capacity in World Heritage site management to be proposed in Chapter 7, which provides a useful analytic device for future World Heritage studies

3.11 Reliability and validity

In order to ensure reliability and validity, the study undertook the following approaches. Multiple sources of evidence were consulted as a means of triangulating and cross-checking the data. This included posing the same question to different interviewees, including multiple persons in the same organization, if possible. Depending on affiliation, role and level, however, this not surprisingly led to different responses sometimes, reflecting different world views and perspectives on the same situation, which in itself was revealing. The interview data was also triangulated against documentary evidence, both published and unpublished. Secondly, during the data analysis process, particularly in the qualitative concept mapping, rival explanations were considered to reflect different mechanisms and relationships among the conceptual nodes. Through iterations in the mapping, re-checking other data sources, and seeking further clarifications from informants or documentary sources, this provided the means to refine the findings. Finally, peer reviews by colleagues in the heritage profession were undertaken at two stages: at the design stage and to review progressive research results. This helped to ensure that the study was being framed and conducted in a more rigorous manner, vis-à-vis established and emerging concepts within heritage studies and professional practice.

Chapter 4

Historic City of Ayutthaya

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 presents the first case study, the Historic City of Ayutthaya World Heritage site in Thailand. Among the case studies, this site represents the most centralized management model, with the site under the primary responsibility of the Ayutthaya Historic Park office under the Fine Arts Department, which has a rigid mandate in conservation and limited lateral connections with other agencies. The chapter first provides an overview of the site's significance and its management and governance institutions, encompassing organizations, regulations and plans. Then it introduces the expanding boundaries of practice at the site, occurring in response to the catastrophic 2011 floods: efforts to introduce disaster risk management and the subsequent attempts to improve monument restoration practices. In the final section, the chapter analyzes the institutional dynamics that occurred in response to this incident. In closing, the chapter examines how various factors of adaptive capacity inherent in this case study interacted to bring out the relatively minimal changes in heritage management practices at the site.

4.2 Background

4.2.1 Introduction to the site

Founded in the 14th century, Ayutthaya is acknowledged as the second kingdom following Sukhothai. Located at the confluence of the Lopburi, Chao Phraya and Pasak rivers, the ancient capital was strategically designed to be well-defended. Evidence from contemporary accounts and maps show a well-planned network of fortifications, canals and moats. Operable water gates ensured the management of water in the canal network.

Through adroit diplomacy, the kingdom cultivated commercial and diplomatic ties with other major powers at the time. The city was a major trading entrepot, with

connections with both Asian and European partners. The commercial successes created great prosperity which was reflected in the density and elaboration of its ancient buildings, notably the temples. At the height of the Ayutthaya kingdom in the seventeenth century, contemporary accounts state that the kingdom had over fourteen thousand “pagodas...[whose] magnificence are Arguments of their Piety” (Tachard, 1981 in Krairiksh, 2011). The Ayutthaya school of art and architecture evolved through three distinctive periods, drawing upon Sukhothai and Khmer influences which reflected Hindu-derived concepts of the divine monarch. In 1767, the city was reduced to ruins, but it continued to serve as a template in the layout of the new capital of the later Rattanakosin dynasty in Bangkok. Today, the remaining extant temples number over 300 in total.



Figure 15 Remaining urban layout and cultural properties in Ayutthaya island

(Source: UNESCO Institute for Water Education)

Abandoned after its fall, Ayutthaya became the object of attention again under the reign of Rama IV. Under the command of the king, the provincial governor Phraya Boran Rachatanin undertook comprehensive surveys and restored

the ancient palace grounds. Under Rama V, the entire city island put under protection as crown property; other owners were not allowed. In 1911, under King Rama VI, the Fine Arts Department (FAD) was formed, followed fifteen years later by an archaeological department, laying the foundation for the current management of the Ayutthaya and other historic properties.

In 1932, following the end of absolute monarchy, the land title for the crown property and abandoned temples (*wat rang*) were transferred to the Ministry of Finance, with the intention of enlivening the city again. An accelerated programme of development of the city island was initiated. The Pridi Thamrong Bridge was built to link the island with the mainland. Roads were built and land parceled out for sale.

Under the government of Field Marshall Phibun Songkram, the government began to pay attention to conservation at strategic sites, with a view to promoting nationalism under the banner of “nation, religion and king”. Following a major programme of work at Sukhothai initiated by Luang Wichit Wathakan in 1940, the government also began to promote conservation as well as tourism activities at Ayutthaya. The restoration of important monuments such as Wat Mahathad, Wat Rachaburana and Wat Phra Si Sanphet was initiated. In 1967, cooperation was launched between the City Planning Department under the Ministry of Interior, the Ayutthaya Municipality and the FAD. An allocation of 1 million Baht was provided to the FAD in 1968. Tourism infrastructure was also developed, including parking lots and roads.

With mounting pressures from looting and new urban development, particularly on the eastern side of the island, a total of 1,810 rai (289 hectares) was gazetted as ancient monument zone (*thi din boranasthan*) under the Royal Gazette announcement on 27 July 1976. Six years later, the Ayutthaya Historical Park project was launched. Subsequently, studies began for drafting the first masterplan to conserve and develop the ancient capital and its environs.

The protected area centered around the Royal Palace precinct and its immediate surroundings, which had a concentration of the most significant temples and monuments. This is essentially the western half of the historic island, including key monuments like Wat Phra Si San Phet, Viharn Mongkon Bophit, Wat Phra Ram, as well as the ancient palace complex.

4.2.2 Significance of the site

In 1991, the “Historic City of Ayutthaya”, was listed in the first batch of World Heritage sites from Thailand, along with Ban Chiang and the Historic City of Sukhothai and Associated Cities. It was recognized under criterion (iii) which refers to being testimony to an ancient civilization, namely:

“Criterion (iii): The Historic City of Ayutthaya bears excellent witness to the period of development of a true national Thai art.” (UNESCO, 2019a)

In connection with this single criterion, the original ICOMOS assessment of the site primarily noted the importance of “the remains of tall *prang* (reliquary towers) and Buddhist monasteries of monumental proportions, which give an idea of the city’s past size and the splendor of its architecture”.

In addition to the temple remains, the other key attributes of the site’s Outstanding Universal Value were further fleshed out in the retrospective Statement of Outstanding Universal Value that was prepared and submitted by Thailand to the World Heritage Committee in 2010. These included the urban planning and the hydraulic management system of the ancient city.

The Ayutthaya World Heritage site occupies 289 hectares and coincides with the footprint of the Ayutthaya Historical Park. As such, and contrary to popular misunderstanding, the World Heritage site does not include other prominent monuments outside this perimeter, such as Wat Chai Wattanaram, which is popularly recognized as one of the most iconic monuments of the city. Nor does it include the various foreign enclaves – the Portuguese Village, the Dutch Village, the Japanese Village – located downstream of the ancient city. It also does not include the

monuments of Ayodhya, to the eastern side of the island, nor those located in the surrounding periphery outside the island.




Figure 16 Scope of Ayutthaya World Heritage site
(Source: whc.unesco.org)

4.2.3 Management and governance institutions

The Historic City of Ayutthaya World Heritage site is managed as a historical park under the Act on Ancient Monuments, Antiques, Objects of Art and National Museums, BE 2504 (1961), amended BE 2535 (1992), which is enforced by the Fine Arts Department. In addition, other individual monuments outside the historic park are also protected under the same law. Technical conservation work is regulated under the Regulations of the Fine Arts Department concerning the Conservation of Monuments BE 2528 (1985).

In addition to the legal protection of the monuments, other related laws in force at the site include the Ratchaphatsadu Land Act, BE 2518 (1975), the City Planning Act BE 2518 (1975), the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, BE 2535 (1992), the Building Control Act BE 2522 (1979) as amended BE 2535 (1992), and municipal regulations.

Within the historic park, the FAD maintains its authority over conservation and development-related decisions. The concept of “historic park” provides the conceptual and legal basis for protecting Ayutthaya as a contiguous zone. The historic park model was first initiated by the Fine Arts Department at Sukhothai, as a means of providing a protective blanket for the site. The Sukhothai Historic Park project was launched with the following aims: “to revive the historical atmosphere of the ancient city by preserving and restoring ancient edifices, reviving the landscape, improving communications systems and developing the community. The historical park has been divided into five sections according to categories of land use, including areas for housing, farming, preserved forests and public facilities and utilities. The finished project will present the historical structures of Sukhothai against the agricultural scenery of the area” (Fine Arts Department, 1984).

The land title in the Ayutthaya Historic Park is largely held under the Ratchapatsadu Land Act (92.89 percent), with the following categories: land where citizens can build houses; land allocated for government use including other agencies aside from the FAD, such as the Department of Religious Affairs,

municipality, and the vocational educational department; abandoned monument (*boransathan rang*), areas under the control of the FAD; and infrastructure such as roads, canals and ditches. The remainder of the historic park land (9.13 percent) is held under private land title (Fine Arts Department, 1993).

In terms of organizational responsibilities within the FAD, the Ayutthaya Historical Park is under the immediate responsibility of the Office of the Ayutthaya Historical Park, which comprises a small technical unit with archaeologists, civil engineering technicians (*chang yotha*) and artistic technicians (*chang silpakam*) alongside administrative staff. The office reports to the 3rd FAD Regional Office which covers five provinces including Ayutthaya. (See Appendix 5 for more details). Out of 70 staff, only seven technicians have direct responsibilities in designing and monitoring restoration work, alongside four archaeologists. The *chang yotha* and *chang silpakam*, who are graduates with vocational certificate/diplomas either in construction or in art, respectively, are responsible for assessing and documenting the damage to a monument, drafting the restoration plan, and supervising the implementation of work.

Neither the Historical Park Office or the Regional Office have in-house architects, landscape architects, engineers nor conservators. Such specialized professional skills are only available in the main FAD office in Bangkok. In particular, the Office of Architecture under the FAD main office is responsible for checking and approving the restoration designs prepared by the local technicians in Ayutthaya.

The management of the site is undertaken within the framework of the current Master Plan for the Project to Conserve and Develop the Historic City of Ayutthaya (1994-2001) which was drafted by a team led by Sumet Jumsai and approved by the Cabinet in 1993. The Master Plan was originally prepared for an 11-year period, but due to concerns from the National Economic and Social Development Board that rapid encroachment was threatening Ayutthaya, the time period was cut down to 6 years. Though the plan was originally prepared within the scope of a time-bound project, it continues to be in use, with the justification that

the various proposals within the Master Plan have not been fully accomplished yet, over 25 years later.

The Master Plan (Fine Arts Department, 1993) has the overall objective to conserve and develop the Historic Park of Ayutthaya, in order to bring about:

“local development and revive [Ayutthaya] as a historical and archaeological tourism destination, in line with the Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan...which emphasizes conservation and development of art and culture to be in balance with socio-economic development.”

The then-DG of the FAD, Somkid Chotigavanit, admits that “A criticism of the Master Plan is that it is too focused on tourism and deficient in providing for archaeological study of the site prior to its transformation” (Chotigavanit & Siribhadra, 1995).

The main thrust of the Master Plan is to create two zones: a Nucleus Zone (the Historic Park) and a Buffer Zone (the remaining part of the island and surrounding areas around the island). However, the main focus of the Master Plan is to regulate the Nucleus Zone, while the surrounding areas are meant to be treated in a second phase of the Master Plan. In response to the problem that “the appearance of Ayutthaya is generally untidy as well as disorganized [with the] modern town interfer[ing] with the historic city”, the Master Plan called for the removal of modern buildings and housing clusters from the Historic Park, leaving behind just four hundred families. In this way, the Master Plan represents a radical departure from the Ayutthaya Land Use Plan of 1990, which permitted the residential, commercial and even industrial uses within the core archaeological area.




Figure 17 Pre-existing Ayutthaya Land Use Plan (1990) showing residential, commercial and industrial uses previously permitted in the archaeological site



Figure 18 Ayutthaya Master Plan (1993) zoning, showing new archaeological protection area (in brown)

The Master Plan defines eight sectoral plans which call upon the cooperation of various authorities. The Master Plan names the FAD, the Ayutthaya Municipality, Ayutthaya Province, Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) and the Industrial Development Department as the key implementing agencies below. In addition, other involved stakeholders that are explicitly named by the DG of the FAD in the foreword to the Master Plan include the Department of Religious Affairs, Department of Urban Planning and the Treasury Department. Meanwhile, in its endorsement of the plan, the NESDB additionally identifies the Crown Property Bureau and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment as responsible agencies as well.

Table 14 Scope of Master Plan for Ayutthaya

Plans	Key agency	In response to problem identified by FAD
Plan 1. Archaeology, history and ancient monuments	FAD	Inconsistency in restoration work, with both over-restoration at some monuments, and neglect at others
Plan 2. Development and improvement of key infrastructure	Ayutthaya Municipality	Modern infrastructure has destroyed ancient remains. Drainage problem. Lighting and other amenities lacking.
Plan 3. Environment and landscape improvement	FAD	Unattractive modern city has “obscured historic atmosphere”
Plan 4. Development of communities in the Historic Park	Ayutthaya Province	20 percent of park occupied
Plan 5. Relocation of	Ayutthaya Province, in	Incompatible land use

Plans	Key agency	In response to problem identified by FAD
factories and re-landscaping	cooperation with FAD, TAT, municipality, Industrial Development Department	
Plan 6. Educational and tourism + private concessions	TAT	Inadequate tourism infrastructure and facilities, and insufficient hosts
Plan 7. Socio-economic development (handicraft village) + private concessions	Industrial Development Department	Compensation and improved livelihoods for residents
Plan 8. Historic Park office and staff development	FAD	Small number of staff overwhelmed. Offices too close to monuments.

The Master Plan set up a national inter-ministerial Steering Committee chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, which is tasked with ensuring intersectoral coordination, approving plans and monitoring progress of work on an annual basis. The Committee is supported by a Technical Sub-Committee and an Administrative Sub-Committee, chaired by the Governor of Ayutthaya Province. These committees provide the platform for cross-sectoral coordination. However, in practice, they are convened irregularly, and the day-to-day operational responsibility for managing the site is largely in the hands of the FAD. The key agencies with an operational mandate in heritage management are as follows:



Figure 19 Institutional ecology for managing Ayutthaya World Heritage site

Within this hierarchical and centralized organizational ecology (seen in the yellow field of operations), an indicative mapping of actors proposes levels of influence and levels of interest in the heritage agenda at Ayutthaya. The key actor with the responsibility for heritage site management is identified as the FAD, which has relationships and links with other actors. The department is seen to have strong operational links with the Ministry of Culture and with private contractors in undertaking conservation work. However, its links to the provincial and municipal government, and to other government agencies, is a passive consultative link. These other agencies are felt to have a lukewarm interest in the World Heritage site. The FAD's links to local institutions, vendors and residents is weak, while its relationship with NGOs is even less robust. The mapping also suggests different types of influence being wielded by the different actors, with FAD and government agencies largely relying on statutory authority. Yet, the forms of influence created by negotiation/alliance building/resistance which are exercised by local institutions are comparably powerful, as these actors regularly defy the heritage regulations and the heritage regulator. Statutory authority in this case cannot control these competing sources of authority.




Figure 20 Mapping of actors at Ayutthaya World Heritage site

4.3 Expanding boundaries of practice at the site

4.3.1 Evolving conceptualizations of heritage

Is the World Heritage site of Ayutthaya an assemblage of monuments and archaeological ruins? A cultural landscape with relics of the ancient capital? A living historic urban landscape?

The official World Heritage name, the 'Historic City of Ayutthaya', suggests something of the scale and character of the site with the intention to cover the built form, urban morphology and ancient infrastructure such as the water system. The Statement of Outstanding Universal Value refers to the city as "an archaeological ruin" with important features at both an urban and architectural scale. In terms of integrity, the Statement notes that (UNESCO, 2019):

"the urban morphology, the originality of which is known from contemporary maps of the time prepared by several of the foreign emissaries assigned to the Royal Court. These maps reveal an elaborate, but systematic pattern of streets and canals throughout the entire island, dividing the urban space into

strictly controlled zones each with its own characteristic use and therefore architecture. The urban planning template of the entire island remains visible and intact, along with the ruins of all the major temples and monuments identified in the ancient maps. Wherever the ruins of these structures had been built over after the city was abandoned, they are now uncovered.”

This larger vision of the site is contradicted in the statutory scope of the site recognized by the World Heritage Committee which only accords recognition to the Historic Park area, which does not even cover the entire footprint of the city, let alone the surrounding periphery. This larger scope is not simply a geographic one, as it would provide the conceptual template to recognize, and thus protect, the functioning of the ancient urban settlement in its various dimensions, and not just a limited number of key monuments.

Indeed, the holistic management of Ayutthaya and its environs was already foreseen in the 1993 Master Plan. In addition to the Historic Park, the FAD also proposed actively managing six other zones radiating outwards from the historic park: five additional zones surrounding the periphery of the island and one zone covering other remaining area in the historic island. Using the Dutch inspired concept of “polders”, these zones would provide a landscape-scale mechanism for managing water inundation, retention and drainage of the larger urban-rural areas. These six areas would constitute the protective buffer encasing the Nucleus Zone of the Historic Park.





Figure 21 Proposed extension areas for managing Ayutthaya's wider territory
(Source: FAD, 1993)

This tension between the narrower vision and the more comprehensive vision of the site continues to be unresolved. In statutory terms, this extended level of protection was partially carried out under Thai law when the FAD gazetted an additional 3,000 rai in 1997, extending the coverage of the archaeological site to cover the entire historic island. However, statutory conservation protection for the surrounding areas outside of the historic island has not yet been enacted.



*Figure 22 Additional gazettement of the remaining parts
of the historic island in 1997*

(Source: FAD, 1993)

At the time of submitting the retrospective Statement of Outstanding Universal Value in 2011, the FAD indicated its plans to extend the World Heritage property boundary as well. However, this has not yet been carried out to date:

“An extension of the World Heritage property is under preparation which will cover the complete footprint of the city of Ayutthaya as it existed in the 18th century, when it was one of the world’s largest urban areas. This will bring other important ancient monuments, some of which are outside of the presently-inscribed area under the same protection and conservation management afforded to the current World heritage property. In addition, new regulations for the control of construction within the property’s extended boundaries are being formulated to ensure that the values and views of the historic city are protected. With these changes, all new

developments in the modern city of Ayutthaya will be directed to areas outside of the historic city's footprint and the inscribed World Heritage property.”

An addition layer of tension is between the preservation of ruins and allowing modern day occupation, accompanied by power lines and other modern development which is seen as a source of problems disturbing the historic city. This internal contradiction can be seen in the statement of then-DG of FAD regarding the 1993 Master Plan (Chotigavanit & Siribhadra, 1995):

“Modern buildings and housing clusters will be moved out of the Nucleus Zone. However, four hundred families will be allowed to remain, with assistance provided to help them adjust to a changing environment and to preserve Ayutthaya as a living city.”

This desire to keep some of the communities flies in the face of the template of the historic park established by Sukhothai, which was conducted in line with the prevailing notion of preservation which emphasized objects and buildings with little regard for extant communities. The Masterplan of Sukhothai explains that one of the objectives of the historic park is “to keep the registered governmental area under the control of the Fine Arts Department by making sure that no additional people settle or use the area” (Fine Arts Department, 1984). For existing communities, “At least one-third of the 600 families living within the old city walls will be relocated. ... Houses that will be relocated include those houses which block the pathway to or obstruct the viewing of the ancient sites. The new settlements area will be located inside and outside the city walls. The villagers involved should be given adequate compensation” (ibid).

4.3.2 Emerging management pressures

Flooding

Along with other disaster risks, flooding has been pinpointed as a growing threat to World Heritage sites worldwide. UNESCO's comprehensive review of

challenges in the new millennium noted that, “Even when sophisticated prevention techniques are in place, floods still have the potential to cause immense damage to cultural and natural heritage. Above all, with climate change, the danger of severe flooding is growing in many parts of the world”, with the Asia-Pacific region being most affected by far (F Bandarin, 2007).

Seasonal flooding has been a perennial phenomenon at Ayutthaya, and indeed, part of the DNA of the site. The very selection of the site, in the low-lying deltaic plain of the Chao Phraya River, was strategic, with floodwaters provided a cordon of defense for the city to thwart attackers in the past. In living memory, the site has experienced two major floods: in 1995 and in 2011. A former senior FAD official, who was stationed in Ayutthaya during the 1995 floods, expressed a sanguine attitude to dealing with the floods at that time.

“The whole island was flooded then, but it was possible to continue living in the historic city. I just stayed on the upper floor of my house. My staff came to pick me up by boat and send me back by boat every day. In the olden days, people lived with the canals. They used them as a source of domestic water, transportation route and for ceremonies...The water comes, then it goes. It doesn't stay around forever.”

Similarly, consultations with older local residents revealed not only tolerance, but even fond memories of rainy season, with children fishing and swimming in the floodwaters surrounding their houses. This attitude regards floods as part of normal life in the Central Plains of Thailand, and not a cause for concern. In terms of their possible effect on the monuments, a number of Thai conservation experts also posited that the builders of the monuments knew well about the annual cycles of water and would have planned accordingly. Furthermore, they pointed out that the monuments have in fact withstood various high water events over the centuries and have still managed to retain their form and stability, thus indicating their robustness.



Figure 23 Repeated flooding at Wat Chaiwattanaram in 1995 (top) and 2011 (bottom)

Reflecting this line of thought, FAD site management officials continued to downplay the risk from flooding, even in the run up to the massive 2011 floods. ‘Flooding’ was not included as a ‘factor affecting the conservation of the property’

in the Periodic Report submitted by Thailand to the World Heritage Committee in 2010.

However, the discourse about flooding escalated into panic mode in 2011 following a series of tropical storms which affected 65 provinces in the country including Ayutthaya. Flooding became viewed as a ‘disaster’. The historic island of Ayutthaya was inundated for over a month, with low-lying areas submerged up to two meters. With the island sloping down towards the southwest, the historical park bore the brunt of the most prolonged flooding. Wat Chai Wattanaram and other monuments were also affected, along with archaeological sites such as the Portuguese Village. Unlike in 1995, where water overflowed from the Chao Phraya River on the western flank of the island, in 2011, the floodwater entered from the northeast corner, near the Hua Ro community, due to breaches in water barriers upstream. Within 24 hours, the floodwater spread to the rest of the island, catching residents and authorities off-guard.



Figure 24 Floodwaters about to engulf the historic city

(Source: NASA)

The unprecedented scale of the flooding, the rapidity of inundation throughout the island, the height of the water and the prolonged length of time of inundation turned the incident into a disaster. In the absence of adequate warning or scientific predictions, the local residents and staff relied on previous experience to guide their actions. One FAD staff member who experienced both flood events said:

“In 1995, the floodwater reached up to the door knobs, so I removed all the things that were lower than that. I had no idea that the water would go up higher, so a lot of property was destroyed.”

Without adequate preparation, equipment to fight the floodwater such as sand bags, water pumps and boats were requisitioned and deployed to the monument sites on an emergency basis. Museum staff were stationed at the museum to keep watch over precious artefacts, with colleagues delivering supplies by boat. Floodwater was pumped out of affected sites until water engulfed all areas, leaving no outlets for the water to be drained.

Emergency expert assessments conducted with assistance from UNESCO in November-December 2011 revealed that the immediate impact of the flooding on the monuments was not as serious as feared, in terms of foundation settling or major structural problems. However, potential concerns were raised about longer-term impacts of rising damp and salts and other pollutants from the floodwater on murals and decorative works, which were not immediately apparent but would become more serious as the months passed. In addition, experts from Venice and other sites that have experienced previous emergencies and emergency response measures warned against the potentially more serious problems that would follow in the post-disaster phase.

Restoration of monuments

The major national and international media attention on the flooding of Ayutthaya triggered a wave of support. International partners acting in a show of solidarity with Thailand also extended their assistance. Following a pledge by then

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton during a visit to Thailand shortly after the flooding emergency, a major American grant was provided for Wat Chai Wattanaram. The German government likewise initiated a demonstration conservation and training project, focused on decorative plaster work at Wat Ratchaburana. Corporations and private individuals also provided donations, such as the project funded by Krung Sri Ayutthaya Bank at Wat Senasanaram to repair the damaged mural paintings.

By far, the largest budget source was from the Thai government itself. An unprecedented budgetary allocation of Baht 356,344,000 was provided by the Thai government to support emergency repairs and restoration for 94 temples at the site.¹ This is in comparison with the normal portfolio of no more than 10 projects which would be typical annual workload for Ayutthaya. According to FAD staff on the site, due to the rushed time frame for proposing and approving the budget, it was not possible to conduct a detailed survey of the actual damage before determining the course of action. Moreover, much of the site was still inundated with floodwater, and not passable except by boat, making site visits even more difficult. Instead, without much visual or other more technical evidence, staff were asked to provide a list identifying monuments to be repaired and estimating the rough budget required for each monument in order to secure the funds.

The result was a great quantity of work undertaken in haste on the basis of questionable data, leading to speculative conservation decision making, sketchy restoration plans and poor quality of technical workmanship and use of materials. Moreover, some of the projects were conducted on temples that mostly had pre-existing damage, not damage from the floods per se. The interventions were characterized into major projects (involving extensive restoration, structural work and reconstruction) and minor projects (cleaning and repair of external plaster work). For major projects, heavy engineering work using reinforced concrete was undertaken to brace and support monuments. Experienced contractors were hard to find and the

¹ The total budget for the five-year period from 2011-2015 was Baht 632,566,034, dealing with the conservation and development of 145 monuments in total.

FAD staff were unable to provide adequate supervision due to the large concurrent number of projects.

In response to field reports regarding the visibly altered appearance of many monuments, Thailand was pressured to invite an official ICOMOS Advisory Mission in 2014 to assess the condition of the site, the post-flood responses and especially the quality of restoration work. The Advisory Mission (Nishiura & Dilawari, 2014) concluded that:

“The craftsmanship or workmanship can only be rated moderate to poor. Considering the monuments are part of a World Heritage property of Outstanding Universal Value, the workmanship does not reflect experienced craftsmen who know their job. This was evident from the way the bricks were laid...”

The ICOMOS mission singled out the use of cement as one particularly egregious offence in comparison with international conservation best practice. It observed (ibid) that:

“The conservation approach for repair has not been clearly understood as some monuments during the past (50 years ago) have been completely rendered in cement. Some others are rendered partially or in patches, perhaps to show a ruinous effect, however this may be detrimental to the fabric as it is more vulnerable to decay until and unless regular consolidation does not happen. Similarly the Fort has only its gates rendered but not the entire structure which seems more of an aesthetic decision rather than one undertaken for conservation reasons. ... The mission recommends that such works should be carried out based on scientific conservation principles while at the same time respecting the use of local materials and skills as these have been time tested. Many of these buildings support the OUV of the property.”

Reflecting the concerns of the mission, the World Heritage Committee in 2015 requested Thailand to take action by: (i) undertaking training programmes for craftsmen, (ii) to update the Management Plan, in order to deal with flood related issues and other concerns, (iii) organize an international symposium to debate brick monument conservation, (iv) and to refrain from new construction and establish appropriate control mechanisms (UNESCO, 2015).



Figure 25 ICOMOS experts point out extensive reconstruction and poor masonry skills
 Source: Nishiura and Dilawari (2014)

In a sense, the censure of the FAD's restoration work is not new. Thai experts such as Piriya Krairiksh have scathingly criticized the FAD for its penchant for heavy reconstruction of monuments, saying that the 1985 amendment of the Act on Ancient Monuments "defines restoration as 'the act of putting back to a former state' that contradicts internationally accepted conservation practice. The department explained that even though a restored monument could not be considered an original work of art, it would have a longer life span than one that had not been preserved and would best show how the original might have looked" (Krairiksh, 2013). Likewise, international experts have also noted the use of

inappropriate techniques and materials, such as the World Monuments Fund's observation that the "team of experts were able to retrace old interventions that were carried out with cement-based mortar, cement-lime based grout and stainless steel rod used to 'repair' cracks" (D'Ilario, 2016). In any case, the international attention from the World Heritage Committee and ICOMOS elevated the level of concern to the point that the FAD was forced to respond.

4.3.3 Changing management practices

The international scrutiny sparked off concern at all levels of the Thai Government. The Minister of Culture and senior FAD executives were called to provide clarifications to the National Legislative Assembly and to Cabinet about the criticism. They allayed these concerns by explaining that the problems in fact were not so severe, and measures were underway. Specifically, the Fine Arts Department since 2015 has been carrying out programmes related to:

- Updating the Master Plan, including provisions for disaster risk reduction, and regulations for development control
- Training programme for craftsmen and professionals in conservation skills to upgrade quality of monument restoration

However, as of April 2019, the updated masterplan has yet to be considered by the Cabinet, while the development control regulations have not even been approved by the DG of the FAD yet. This means that over seven years after the flood, and five years after the Advisory Mission, there has been no actual statutory level implementation resulting from this "crisis" and the World Heritage Committee's decision yet.

The most active line of response has been the conservation training programme. Even so, the level of internal momentum within the FAD behind the conservation training is questionable, given that it largely relied on support from external partners in organizing the training. From the point of view of long-term outcomes, great challenges remain for institutionalizing the training gains, in terms of practical

implementation in actual conservation work and long-term continuity of the training. Beyond these activities, there has not been any systematic investment in reinforcing the key structural limitations in the FAD's operations, namely, no increase in the number of staff positions nor in budgetary allocation. There has been no official revision in conservation standards or restoration working practices, such as formulas and techniques for historic plasterwork, resulting from the training.

Revision of Master Plan and regulations

The revised Masterplan for Ayutthaya (2018-2027) that has been produced is structured along the lines of the earlier Master Plan (1993-2001). Two notable areas of continuity are the geographic scope of the Master Plan and its underlying principles.

Seventeen years after the expiration of the original Master Plan, the extended geographic reach that was originally proposed for the Phase II Masterplan was not put into effect. The proposed extension of the World Heritage site was similarly not carried through. The revision of the Master Plan initiated in 2016 in fact has returned to the original and most limited footprint. Whereas the earlier Master Plan already suggested an expansion of management scope from the Historic Park to the other adjacent six zones surrounding the park, the revised Master Plan limits the focus to the main core protection zone only, which is the Historic Park itself. It does not even consider the whole historic island, which had already been legally gazetted and protected as an 'archaeological site' since 1997.




Figure 26 Physical scope of the updated Master Plan (2018) is unchanged, with no geographical expansion

Maintaining the original geographical and technical scope of the 1993 Master Plan was justified on grounds of allowing the FAD to pick up remaining loose ends, since there were many outstanding action items due to inadequate budgetary allocation over the years. The content of the updated masterplan was fairly unchanged, as follows:

Table 15 Comparison between original Master Plan (1993) and the Updated Master Plan (2018)

Sub-plans under Master Plan (1993)	Sub-plans under Updated Master Plan (2018)
Archaeology, history and ancient monuments	Archaeological research
Development and improvement of key infrastructure	Ancient monument conservation
Environment and landscape improvement	Improvement of roads and canals

Sub-plans under Master Plan (1993)	Sub-plans under Updated Master Plan (2018)
Development of communities in the Historic Park	Land use monitoring and community improvement
Relocation of factories	Landscape improvement
Education and tourism	Public relations and tourism promotion
Socio-economic	Community income promotion
Historic Park office and staff development	Disaster mitigation * (new addition)

The underlying principles of the updated Master Plan continue to hold on to the original thinking, particularly with regards to dealing with the community. The updated Master Plan (2018) enjoins “people to live non-intrusively with archaeological monuments” because residential communities are seen as detracting from the “scenery of historical site...[through] land encroachment within archaeological site” (Fine Arts Department, 2018b). Not only does it propose to complete resettlement of communities from the earlier Master Plan in Area 6, it also proposes to displace additional communities in Area 7.




Figure 27 Proposed land uses under the updated Master Plan (2018)

Some twenty years after the adoption of these early historic park Master Plans, such provisions in the revised Master Plans represent a disconnect with legal and philosophical changes in the international heritage community, where the displacement of residents has become verboten. For indigenous populations, legal instruments such as UNDRIP are now in place to secure the rights of communities to continue their habitation and livelihood patterns. The idea of living heritage has been increasingly promoted, in the increasingly ‘people-centred approaches’ to heritage which emphasize “the importance of both the living aspects of heritage in terms of both continuity and change. Heritage components were considered as part of a living environment” (Thompson & Wijesuriya, 2018).

Limits to accepting outside ideas in disaster risk management

The experience from the 2011 floods highlighted the importance of coordinating water management at the national, regional and local levels. Weesakul (2016) points out the importance of comprehensive flood management plans, strategies and water management at the scale of river basins, in this case, for the

Chao Phraya River system as a whole. Beyond the issue of just water management, Ratanawahara (2016, 2016a) underscores the necessity of coordinating land use and development, which has a major impact on flood prevention and mitigation.

In the case of Ayutthaya, the urban plan for Ayutthaya has ringed the eastern perimeter of the historic city with built-up area mostly dedicated to industrial land uses. The replacement of agricultural land, which has a natural ability to absorb and detain floodwater and other run-off, with non-permeable surfaces concentrates the volume of water which is directed to the other areas, in this case, the heritage site. This pattern of land use development in favor of urbanization and industrialization, coupled with the channelization of the river in upstream provinces throughout the route of the Chao Phraya River, creates downstream impacts on the management of water at the historic city of Ayutthaya. The reaction of industrial estates in Ayutthaya, which suffered extreme damages in 2011, to create localized flood protection systems to barricade each factory complex from water influx, further exacerbates this problem.

Managing flooding at Ayutthaya, therefore, needs to be carried out at both a macro level as well as a micro level. Planning at the macro level is under the purview of national authorities, with the Royal Irrigation Department being the main agency in charge of water management in the country. Regional and urban planning is undertaken by the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board and the Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning. The National Water Resources Board has established River Basin Committees for each of the country's 25 river basins. The Land Development Department has produced land use plans at the river basin level.

At a micro level, for the historic Ayutthaya island, the city government of Ayutthaya is tasked with dealing with flood protection and response for the whole island, while the FAD has a smaller focus within the boundary of the historic park and isolated monuments located outside the historic park. While it is not the duty of either the FAD nor the city government to plan flood management at a provincial

or regional scale, it would be expected that the micro level responses should be designed in alignment with larger scale strategy or policy. Likewise, macro scale policy making should be informed by the micro-scale needs, which should be communicated by the local agencies to the high-level national coordination platforms. For instance, measures undertaken at the Ayutthaya Historical Park should be the final down-stream efforts in terms of local protection, to be carried out in coordination with upstream measures that should focus on diversion of water or other means of management.

The 2011 flooding, in its intensity and heavy impacts, could have been the wake up call to create closer collaboration among macro and micro level approaches to managing water in the case of Ayutthaya as part of the entire Chao Phraya River basin. However, even in the aftermath of the flood, there continued to be a lack of coordination between the macro level and the micro level in terms of policy and practical operational measures in mitigating flood risk and responding to emergencies. According to a stakeholder mapping and analysis conducted by UNESCO-IHE in 2014, the Historic Park had only limited collaboration or informational exchanges with the other relevant authorities at the provincial and national level related to water and disaster management. The figure below shows only informational flows with the municipal and provincial authorities and the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, weak collaboration with the Department of Town and Country Planning and no direct connection with the Royal Irrigation Department or local communities. In this sense, this lack of vertical or lateral organizational connection makes it hard to put into place a policy or operational framework to deal with disasters at a larger scale. As experience shows, in order to spare a sensitive area such as a World Heritage site, water needs to be diverted or detained upstream, which is not possible if the FAD operates in isolation.




Figure 28 UNESCO-IHE mapping of flood risk actors at Ayutthaya

(Source: UNESCO-IHE)


This localized approach that the FAD still maintains, despite the lessons of the 2011 floods, and is clearly seen in the new disaster mitigation sub-plan prepared as part of the revised Master Plan. This sub-plan was drafted in response to the 2011 floods and also to the specific request from the World Heritage Centre.² The disaster sub-plan “aims to protect the archaeological sites and artifacts from various risks such as flood, fire as well as robbery” (FAD 2018). The sub-plan calls for (i) developing or improving plans, guidelines and coordination related to disaster mitigation and response and (ii) mitigation measures, evacuation plans, and reduction of vulnerability of the monuments and museum.

² Indeed, even this sub-plan was not created without opposition. Despite the clear need for measures to deal with disaster risk which is now recognized as a prominent threat, during a preliminary review of the Masterplan in late 2018, the Ministry of Culture actually instructed this plan to be suppressed. Only vociferous negotiation from the FAD allowed the plan to be retained. This reveals the limitations of changes in cognitive frame among different levels of government particularly among more higher, politicized levels.

It should be noted that the scope of this sub-plan is confined to the scope of the Ayutthaya Historical Park, and does not extend to the entire island, which would be a logical footprint in terms of natural geographical boundaries. It also does not attempt to refer to a larger provincial or river basin level, which would be the scope needed to address the flooding problem in a more comprehensive manner.

The scope of the disaster sub-plan is at odds with planning responses and recommendations developed by other parties, which acknowledge the territorial-scale approach needed to deal with the problem of flood control and management. For instance, the Ayutthaya provincial Department of Town and Country Planning (สำนักงานโยธาธิการและผังเมืองจังหวัดพระนครศรีอยุธยา, 2013), proposed a large-scale protective barrier encircling the entire island and its periphery. While this was a rough idea, it is similar in scale to the footprint of the aborted phase II Masterplan, and could have been the basis for more strategic upstream coordination for planning risk mitigation for the larger landscape between the FAD and other authorities. Instead, the other agencies are only seen as having a supporting role to FAD in protecting isolated heritage objects.





บริเวณที่ก่อสร้างระบบป้องกันน้ำท่วมชุมชนและอุทยานประวัติศาสตร์ในเกาะเมืองพระนครศรีอยุธยา ความยาว
 Figure 29 Flood prevention system for Ayutthaya island communities and Historic
 Park proposed by the provincial Department of Town and Country Planning

Similarly, recommendations at three spatial scales (regional, municipal and local) were proposed by the Flood Risk Disaster Mitigation Plan that was prepared by the UNESCO Institute for Water Education (UNESCO-IHE) with national and international experts from 2013-2015, with funding from the Asian Development Bank. Based on extensive computer simulations and consultations with the FAD, local agencies and community members, the plan suggested a number of hard and soft measures for mitigating flooding. Despite the FAD being the principal client for this plan, none of these recommendations were reflected in the disaster sub-plan prepared for the revised Master Plan.

A comparison of the content of the two plans shows the disjunct in scales in resolving the flooding problem. The expert-proposed plan emphasizes the need to plan from macro (provincial and regional) to meso (city scale) to micro scale (historic park and monuments). It calls for macro-scale policy and infrastructure such as regional mitigation and interprovincial by-pass channels. At city scale, it suggests reviving ancient canals for drainage, creating a ring-road dike around the island, and adding detention capacity. At the localized scale, it proposes measures to protect individual archaeological sites and monuments.

Table 16 Comparison between the UNESCO-IHE flood risk mitigation plan and disaster sub-plan in updated Master Plan (2018)

Proposed measures in the UNESCO-IHE flood risk mitigation plan	Proposed measures in the disaster sub-plan in updated Master Plan (2018)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regional mitigation measures 2. Ayutthaya bypass channel 3. Chainat-Pasak canal 4. Local measures 5. Multifunctional detention ponds 6. Improve drainage by reviving ancient canals 7. Raising U-thong road-cum-dike 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Review and put in place various measures, emphasizing work that has not happened in previous Master Plan 2. Draft an Emergency Response plan 3. Draft an Emergency Evacuation plan 4. Draft a Disaster Mitigation plan for the WHS 5. Prepare the monuments to deal with disaster risks

By comparison, the disaster sub-plan proposed under the Master Plan focuses on various plans for the Ayutthaya historic park and to reduce the vulnerability of monuments. Indeed, beyond just planning rhetoric, in terms of actual working practices, as late as 2018, senior management of the FAD still touted the Wat Chai Wattanaram model of using protective wall, flood barrier and drainage pump as the preferred method to deal with floods.

The deep-seated belief in the workability of existing practices could be seen in the reaction of technical staff to the expert-proposed mitigation plan. In response to the proposal to raise U-Thong Road to function as a dike to barricade against incoming river water, using projections of water level predicted for 100-year floods, FAD staff questioned this assumption, saying that this was too extreme a scenario. Indeed, this assumption is normal in planning for hydrological disasters especially in the context of climate change. More controversially, the expert plan also proposed designating certain low-lying and marshy archaeological areas, such as the Suan Somdej and the Beung Phra Ram, into temporary detention areas to manage water for the whole historic island. These areas could be enhanced to hold water for short periods before being discharged through improved drainage systems. This notion was also greeted with consternation by FAD staff who objected to an archaeological site being purposely subjected to such water exposure. In this case, deep-seated beliefs held sway in the face of scientific proof and rational logic, as in fact, the topographical contours in those areas are the lowest in the island, making them naturally the *de facto* water detention areas anyway.³

The fairly insular as well as localized working method that FAD continues to adopt poses a challenge in dealing with large-scale, multi-sectoral issues like disaster risk management that requires a territorial approach. Upstream strategic coordination would be required between the FAD's plans and larger plans at the national level or at the level of the larger river basin. However, this was not the case. Actual cooperation is limited to the FAD's participation in the Ayutthaya provincial Disaster

³ Completed in 2015, the expert-proposed plan was shelved by the FAD, to the extent that the present staff at the Ayutthaya Historic Park had never heard or seen it. Instead, the disaster sub-plan was drafted as an in-house effort by a team of FAD staff as part of the updated Master Plan (Fine Arts Department, 2018a). Yet, despite the limited acceptance of the Flood Risk Disaster Mitigation Plan, it figured prominently in the official report from Thailand to the World Heritage Committee: "In parallel the Fine Arts Department is carrying the Disaster Risk Mitigation Plan for the Historic City of Ayutthaya on the basis of the result of UNESCO project. In addition the Fine Arts Department is going to review the Master Plan for Conservation and Development of the Historic City of Ayutthaya Phase II and will integrate Disaster Risk Mitigation Plan into the master plan as recommended by the experts from ICOMOS" (Government of Thailand, 2015).

Prevention and Mitigation joint committee. However, this committee appears to be focused on monitoring flood levels and mobilizing personnel to install protective measures and water pumps at key monuments such as Wat Chai Wattanaram, rather working than at a more strategic or planning level.

The perception of the fairly peripheral role of other agencies can also be seen in an emergency response proposal developed by a FAD staff (Fine Arts Department, 2013). FAD is identified as being responsible for “temporary protection to historic structures” and “save the museum objects” (ibid). Meanwhile, the Ayutthaya municipality is supposed to “support, facilitate and evacuate” (ibid). Meanwhile, the Provincial Office of Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation is seen as the “spokesman to inform the updated situation and action” (ibid).



Figure 30 Temporary and localized approach to flood risk protection by FAD

This silo working style is not confined to the issue of disasters. Similarly, in the update of the “Notification on Rules and Procedure in Pursuing Permission of Building Construction within Ayutthaya City Island’s Archaeological Area” (1997), this

was also a solo operation by the FAD. As originally drafted, the Notification provides height limits in three zones of the Ayutthaya city island: 8 meters in the World Heritage site/Historic Park, 12 meters in the central part of the city, and 15 meters in the densely urbanized commercial areas. It also required buildings to “have hip and gable roof and Thai style design”. The 2018 revision of the Notification provides “more comprehensive guidelines and procedures for regulating land use change and new construction. In addition to restricting building height, the updated version also regulates new constructions, additions, alterations, permissible uses, open space requirements, as well as the procedures for requesting permission” (Government of Thailand, 2018). The revision was drafted by a working committee composed of key FAD architects and staff from both Ayutthaya and Bangkok. As of April 2019, the draft Notification had not yet been approved by the FAD DG, and thus had not yet been consulted officially with the local authorities. The lack of official involvement of other agencies in a matter which overlaps well into the mandate of the local municipality and the Department of Town and Country Planning does not bode well for the enforcement of such an instrument. Indeed, a cursory glance around Ayutthaya provides ample proof of failure to comply with the original version of the regulations, both in terms of height limit as well as roof style.

Upgrading restoration standards: individual buy-in, institutional resistance

The FAD cooperated with UNESCO Bangkok from 2016 to 2019 to organize a series of activities responding to the World Heritage Committee’s primary concern about the poor quality of restoration of the monuments following the flooding. This capacity building programme aimed at the heart of the FAD’s mandate in conserving heritage: restoring monuments and archaeological sites. While the subject matter was well within the organization’s existing boundary of practice, the training activities attempted to upgrade existing working protocols and standards, thus pushing the envelope in terms of professional competence. This attempted to create institutional change both at the level of the organization as well as at the level of

individual practitioners, both professional staff like architects and engineers as well as craftspeople like masons and civil engineering technicians.

In a nutshell, the programme undertook: (i) a situation analysis of the existing craftspeople and conservation system working at Ayutthaya, including management of projects and procurement of materials; (ii) pilot training for craftspeople and for conservation professionals, (iii) development of curriculum for craftspeople and for conservation professionals, (iv) on-site training at a selected monument in Ayutthaya, (v) formulation of recommendations for long-term improvement of conservation work by the FAD, (vi) preparation of an MOU between the FAD and the Department of Skills Development under the Ministry of Labor, with the intention to create a system to certify qualified *chang anurak* or conservation craftspeople.⁴

The training covered not only practical building skills regarding brick laying and the use and application of lime mortar and plaster. The programme also introduced the idea of “values-based conservation” which is the prevailing approach in the international community but still not familiar in Thailand. The participants tested ways of investigating the condition of the pilot monument, using a variety of techniques to record and analyze its state of conservation. Scientific experts introduced the properties of materials and provided guidance in the scientific testing of building materials, in order to be able to specify harmonious materials for use in the conservation work. Site visits were arranged to producers of brick and traditional lime. Field tests were undertaken to compare different formulas of brick and lime mortars and plasters. The use of new technologies such as Ground Penetrating

⁴ In total, over the course of two pilot workshops and five on-site training workshops at a pilot monument, a total of 60 technicians were trained, including 40 from the FAD itself and 20 from private contractors who work frequently with the FAD. In addition, 50 professionals were also trained, encompassing all the disciplines in the FAD related to ancient monument conservation: architects, landscape architects, engineers, archaeologists and conservators. The cooperation programme received funding from the Crown Property Bureau and later on from the Siam Cement Group, as well as a small grant from the UNESCO Netherlands Funds-in-Trust arranged by the World Heritage Centre.

Radar, 3D scanning and computerized photogrammetry were also demonstrated, to complement manual survey and investigation methods in use by the FAD.

The training had to overcome several institutionalized practices within the FAD. The use of cement is widespread within the FAD, not only because of its quick-setting speed, but also for its perceived strength, even though it is detrimental to historic building fabric. Yet, with very few exceptions among a few individuals, the use of cement is not only sanctioned, but it is officialized in FAD's technical standards as well as in actual practice. Many staff and contractors genuinely believe it is a more effective building material, being stronger and quick to set. Most are skeptical that it has negative effects in the long term. Many technicians and even some professionals are unfamiliar with the chemical processes that creates harmful effects. Even senior technicians, with decades of experience supervising on-site projects, were not aware of how lime works and sets, and the role of materials such as pozzolans.

More fundamentally in terms of practice, there was a gap between the so-called scientific process (having to follow a precise formula derived from chemical analysis of historic building samples) versus allowing masons to follow their own intuitive feel. Many technicians said that "*chang roo eng*" (we craftsmen will know by ourselves) and they use their own experience to guide them in mixing the materials, by adding a bit more water or sand or lime until the mixture feels "ready" for use. Individual masons or individual companies may develop preferences for certain formulas, out of habit. This makes it difficult to accept new formulas that may be imposed by the scientific process or even the FAD's standard formula.

After being introduced to international conservation protocols which in theory should be applicable at a World Heritage site, contractors and FAD staff initially expressed either reluctance or an inability to follow the international process of developing customized formulas for each material based on the specific composition

of the existing site.⁵ Owners of contractor firms wanted to get a single formula which can be applied, for ease of work. FAD technicians noted that it takes up to six months to properly slake lime by submerging it in water, and two months to produce custom orders of brick, which is impossible given the limited time of the fiscal year and the need to comply to the lowest tender. Many of the technicians felt that the newly introduced formula was too weak or “*jeud pai*” (too bland). The deviation from the more accustomed ratios they are used to created reluctance to follow the formula, even if it was painstakingly derived from a series of tests of samples from the ancient monuments and in theory the most friendly formula for the restoration work.

However, at the conclusion of two years of training, many participants began to appreciate the new knowledge and skills more. Through hands-on training, they were able to personally experience and test various scientifically-derived lime plaster and mortar samples, which provided personal proof of concept from repeated classroom lessons on conservation techniques and materials science. In the course evaluation, they indicated that they actually gained a broader understanding of conservation methodology and the role of different disciplines. The technicians in particular learned about the properties of traditional lime mortars and plasters. During hands-on tests, they accepted that it was quite workable, and because it dries more slowly than cement, made it possible for them to ensure a smooth finish to the surface.

However, when asked about implementing the new knowledge, the majority expressed doubts that the conservation techniques and materials introduced during the programme could be applied. Most of the technicians interviewed at the end of the training process, both external contractors and FAD staff in charge of restoration

⁵ For lime mortar used in pointing, the FAD standard formula calls for cement : lime : sand (medium or rough grain) in a total ratio of 1 : 8 : 24. The production process requires mixing lime and sand in a ratio of 1 : 2 (lime : sand), slaking with water for 48 hours, then mixing this lime putty with white cement in a ratio of 1 : 6 (lime putty : cement). During the practical training at the pilot monument, a formula of approximately 1:4 (lime : sand, no cement) was used, based on an analysis of the original materials (Koanantakool et al, 2016).

design and project management, essentially said things would be the same, with no change.

Participants identified many systemic issues for improving conservation work and developed recommendations for the FAD administration.⁶ One key issue is limitations in timeframe. While conservation work by nature should be a slow, meticulous process, in fact, most of the Thai conservation projects are designed as one-year projects. By the time a contractor is selected and funds released, there is often only six to eight months before the end of the fiscal year in September. This creates an enormous time pressure to keep moving ahead with the work, making proper investigation or analytical work difficult, encouraging contractors to cut corners in procuring traditional materials and requiring the use of speedier modern alternatives such as cement.⁷

In a post-training questionnaire conducted one year later, there were mixed results in terms of actual application and the impact of the training on operational practice. Some trainees still felt that the new scientifically-tested materials were not good enough yet to be used in real projects, demonstrating a fixed mindset and skepticism of the training. However, a number of respondents reported a more

⁶ In addition to time constraints, the range of other organizational obstacles identified by the FAD trainees themselves included: (i) constraints in the budget for project execution do not allow for the proper conservation sequence to be followed, including analytic testing, (ii) outsourcing model for hiring contractors puts the focus on completing work on time and within budget, with tendering awarded to lowest bidder rather than for technical quality, (iii) difficulty to enforce technical guidance including formulas of materials, (iv) lack of effective quality control to monitor the actual execution, (v) lack of a system to vet or select qualified *chang*, as well as to pay higher rates

⁷ The lack of time combined with lack of specialized staff, leads the FAD to err on the side of doing more, using an engineering mindset to ensuring redundancy. For instance, in stabilizing monuments, the first inclination is to introduce reinforced concrete structures, without a scientific calculation if such structures are in fact necessary. Ironically, this ends up inflating costs. Sometimes, on-site investigation will reveal that certain approved measures are not needed. However, as the government contracting procedure makes it difficult for a contractor to do less work than stated in the contract, contractors sometimes have to execute work that further investigations in the field show are not strictly necessary. This not only creates a negative impact on the authenticity of the monument, but it also uses budget unnecessarily.

positive attitude to adopting and applying their training knowledge. Almost half the responses showed that trainees made changes in their conservation planning process, especially during the pre-restoration investigation, which is work that is within their individual control and decision making. Yet, only a quarter of responses demonstrated that the knowledge had actually been applied in real restoration projects, as this would have a larger budgetary requirement, and thus require the approval of their superiors and the organization's planning and budget process. The relatively low rate in translating training into practice was ascribed by the respondents to a range of obstacles at an organizational level, ranging from lack of support from high-level decision makers, to limitations in time frame, budget and staff. (See Appendix 4 for more details.)

What this reveals is that at an individual level, there was some learning and changes in thinking as well as in application. However, this learning could not overcome established organizational procedures and protocols. Although recommendations from the project were tabled to the FAD's leadership several times, there was no organizational response to improve the perceived problems in the current working system for conservation, which would need to be overcome in order to improve conservation standards and quality of work. The deep-seated and seemingly unchangeable nature of these obstacles need to be understood within the institutional identity and constraints of the Fine Arts Department, which will be analyzed below.

4.4 Institutional dynamics in the context of expanding boundaries of practice

The institutional dynamics at the case study sites will be analyzed using the two frameworks introduced in Chapter 3. The first framework seeks to provide an overall description of the dynamics of the institutional system as a whole, by further adapting the typology proposed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006): creating dynamics, maintaining dynamics and disruptive dynamics, plus the additional proposed regressing dynamics. In this way, the overall trajectory of the institutional system as a whole can be seen. The institutional dynamics result from the interaction of various factors of adaptive capacity which were proposed in Chapter 2. The second framework will be applied in section 4.5 which delves in detail into each factor of adaptive capacity operating at Ayutthaya.

The overall institutional dynamic in terms of adaptive capacity at Ayutthaya is strongly characterized by **maintaining dynamics**. This conforms with the expected results for centralized, top-down institutional regimes which are likely to display less adaptive capacity in general and less learning capacity in particular. That said, there was some change, which played out in two different ways for the case of restoring monuments and for dealing with disaster risks.

For the issue of disaster risk, the flooding event of 2011 provided incontrovertible evidence of the real risk of floods. Following the massive inundation affecting Ayutthaya, including major monuments being submerged under deep water, it was inevitable that **learning capacity** took place, resulting in shifting the **cognitive frame** at Ayutthaya to recognize the risks posed by flooding. Recognition of the risks, however, did not necessarily translate into action or a framework for action.

This shift in the cognitive frame led to an injection of major funding into Ayutthaya, disrupting, at least in the short term, the **resources** and the **formal governance setting** of the site. However, it should be noted that all the projects

carried out in the aftermath of the flood, while representing a major change in the volume of funding channeled to Ayutthaya, were all still monument restoration projects. This, despite the fact that the post-flood expert analysis showed that the monuments themselves did not suffer much damage directly from the flooding. In this sense, the underlying **cognitive framework** for managing Ayutthaya had not much changed from the normal practice of the FAD, which still saw their primary intervention at the site as monuments conservation.

This inability to change institutional perception at a more fundamental level from an ensemble of monuments to thinking at a more urban territorial scale can be traced by to what is known in the literature on institutional change as the paradox of **embedded agency**. Embedded agency occurs when organizations confront tension between institutional determinism and agency, making it difficult for them to “innovate if their beliefs and actions are determined by the institutional environment they wish to change” (Leca et al 2008). The FAD sees itself as the champion for heritage safeguarding having the sole legal mandate under the Act on Ancient Monuments, Antiques, Objects of Art and National Museums. The organization also views itself as the sole stronghold of technical knowledge and knowhow in these fields, accumulated over its 108-year old history. Its organizational mandate has become deeply institutionalized and thus difficult to alter.

Nonetheless, with external pressure from the World Heritage Committee, technical support from UNESCO and domestic concerns about preventing future impacts from flooding, the FAD participated in a series of training and consultative workshops under a UNESCO project to develop a flood risk mitigation plan based on scientific hydrological modelling. While the results and recommendations from the scientific modelling were disregarded, the process initiated the drafting of a Disaster Risk Mitigation plan by FAD staff. The stand-alone plan again was set aside. The difficulty to engage with external technical advice again traces back to **embedded agency**, where long-held institutional beliefs could not be changed in the face of new inputs, including scientific evidence.

Attempts to engage with other agencies in Ayutthaya in the course of this project were equally fruitless. The municipality had its own parallel proposal for fighting the flood, using German-manufactured steel plates that could be installed around the perimeter of the island and stored when not in use. The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation likewise had its own protocols in place, and heritage was a minor issue compared with evacuating residents to safety.

Ultimately, the FAD drafted its own disaster plan, which took the form of a sub-plan in the updated Master Plan for Ayutthaya. On the one hand, this represented a disruption in the formal **governance structure** of Ayutthaya, as disaster had never been considered a management issue for the FAD before, despite previous flooding events. The international rhetoric around disaster risk reduction and World Heritage, bolstered by political pressure and supported by internal converts within the FAD staff, helped to bring about this new development. However, the plan was prepared on FAD's own terms, without external involvement, neither by international experts nor by relevant Thai agencies such as the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.

The extreme event at Ayutthaya proved unable to alter the external **relationships** in dealing with the World Heritage site, with the existing silos maintained between the different agencies. The increased coordination which occurred during the emergency event and response did not translate into long-term platforms or mechanisms for collaboration. This is particularly striking given the macro-level nature of the flood event, which affected the entire Chao Phraya River basin and the nature of controlling its impacts, which are also at a territorial scale. When asked about macro-level coordination, it was notable that the site manager at Ayutthaya admitted that they did not have knowledge about national disaster mitigation plans for managing the Chao Phraya River basin, and instructed staff to look on the internet to find out more information, which itself indicated the lack of a functioning working relationship between them.

The self-imposed limitations created by **embedded agency** and lack of functional lateral **relationships** materialized in another manner: in the geographic and scope of the updated Master Plan for Ayutthaya which is the mother document for the disaster sub-plan. The updated masterplan completely ignores the earlier draft Phase II Master Plan which proposed an extension of the protection zone to encompass the rural periphery surrounding the historic city island, in line with the recommendations already put forth in the original Master Plan. However, this idea of expansion was shelved by the updated Master Plan, which limited the focus to the core protection zone, ie the Historic Park.

This **regressing dynamic** in the face of a situation of greater complexity and multiple stakeholders allows the FAD to remain in a bubble where it wields relatively undisputed statutory authority within its own silo and its own area of statutory control. By re-emphasizing its focus on the core protection zone rather than the larger area, it has made a choice that limits the menu of management options and tools it can use. Any flood risk management that can occur at this limited footprint would only be last-resort measures, without the possibility of slowing down water upstream through water detention and other measures. Accordingly, eight years after the 2011 flood and despite the lessons and experiences accumulated from the event, the FAD today continues to **maintain** its normal practice to protect individual monuments and to strengthen the perimeter walls and embankments of monuments, as can be seen as the interventions at Wat Chai Wattanaram. This involves increased monitoring of the flood warning status during rainy season and installing sand bags, which is a stop-gap measure. By not engaging with the geographically larger area, and the enlarged network that is involved, the FAD is ultimately reducing the effectiveness of disaster protection for the monuments. This episode illustrates how **learning capacity** is constrained by agency, specifically an institution's **embedded agency**, as well as unaltered external **relationships**, which translates into a **maintaining** and even a **regressing** overall institutional dynamic.

This limited evolution in the institutional dynamics resulting from the flood event related to disaster management can be compared to the dynamics concerning the restoration of monuments. Echoing the prescient advice of a Venetian expert assessing the damage at Ayutthaya in 2011 who warned the Thai authorities to beware not only the flood of water, but also the flood of money that will come, the historic budget allocation from the government funded a major restoration at multiple locations across the site which was widely criticized for its poor quality. Concerns identified by UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee led to questions being raised in the National Legislative Assembly about the conservation situation of Ayutthaya. The World Heritage Committee recommended Thailand to undertake training to improve the quality of conservation using both traditional craftsmanship as well as scientific conservation techniques, which in theory should have provided the impetus for a shift in cognitive frame.

This criticism, however, did not at first lead to any change in **cognitive frame**, which was necessary to acknowledge that there was indeed a problem that needed to be addressed. Two senior FAD technical specialists explained separately that:

“At first, we just organized some training because of the [World Heritage Committee’s] recommendation in order to show that we did something.”

This initial lack of change in cognitive frame again can be attributed to the embedded **agency** of the FAD, which is strongly confident in its mandate as the sole technical agency in charge of conservation in Thailand, and thus the sole authority in terms of knowledge and expertise.

Following three years of training activities, some changes in cognitive frame at an individual level were seen. A number of participants in the workshops expressed a new-found appreciation for using traditional materials such as lime as well as the value of a multi-disciplinary and scientific-based approach to conservation. Some of the individuals engaged in this process demonstrated learning – not only in the post-

course evaluations (which usually tend to be over-inflated), but also in actions carried out in their professional life following the course. There has been an increase in the number of staff getting in contact with the colleagues in other units, such as the conservation team to seek their help with materials analysis, indicating greater internal collaboration across silos within FAD and changes in **relationships** at an individual level.

However, the individual learning among the operational level staff has not filtered upwards into the formal systems of the FAD, nor has it changed the **cognitive frame** of the higher-level management regarding the improvements needed in conservation and restoration standards and process. Following several workshops, recommendations were developed by the participants and addressed to the Director General of the FAD to enlarge the time frame of projects to provide adequate time to undertake necessary scientific studies before designing the restoration plan, and to increase the time and budget needed during actual restoration work to allow for traditional lime to be used. However, none of these recommendations have been taken up, as a result, the **formal governance structures** remain essentially the same. When asked to explain problems with the quality of restoration, senior officials of the FAD blame the **lack of staff** rather than lack of knowhow, funding or limitations within its procurement system, budget time frame or working process.

In terms of **financial resources**, senior management officials also repeated that money was not a problem affecting quality of work, although this was an issue raised by their technical and operational staff. This indicates that high-level decision-making staff, who are in charge of controlling large budget envelopes may not see the lack of funds as a problem per se at the level of the overall institution. However, their failure to invest in necessary training, equipment or additional studies for conservation work is felt at the downstream level by staff who have to cope with unchanged budget ceilings even while attempting to change their own practices.

In summary, the **governance setting** and **resources** which are maintained clashes with the individual level **learning** among staff at the operational level, some of whom now recognize the necessity to implement conservation work differently, and are willing to work more closely with other internal departments through closer **relations**, but ultimately do not have the necessary support from the organization to do so. This leads to **maintaining** the overall approach and quality of restoration work.

Both of these cases dealing with disaster management and restoration standards resulted in **maintaining dynamics**, though through different pathways. In the case of evolving after the disaster, what resulted was a change in the **formal governance setting**. However, this change in formal rules did not translate into implementation due to **embedded agency** which saw an organizational retreat into a statutory zone of comfort rather than the necessary lateral networking and changes to practice which would be needed. For the monument restoration situation, change was even more difficult to come by – as the FAD as an organization felt the need to defend its institutional integrity and expertise in conservation and moreover, had already a century's worth of established regulations, work processes and knowhow which proved difficult to alter. Therefore, the **cognitive frame** was only changed at the individual level, that did not feed into changes in the **formal governance setting**, which in turn prevented changes to occur at a sustained organizational level. Ultimately, the root cause in both cases is the embedded agency of the heritage management body, which is particularly tenacious in the case of a centralized, top-down institution with a strong historical mandate and sense of organizational identity.

AYUTTHAYA




Figure 31 Qualitative conceptual mapping of institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity: Ayutthaya

4.5 Factors of adaptive capacity

4.5.1 Investing in information and knowledge: Cognitive frame and learning capacity

In the context of Ayutthaya, creating changes in cognitive frame and learning capacity proved to be crucial for initiating institutional change. And yet it proved to be difficult, both at an individual level and especially at an organizational level.

The major shift for FAD as an organization was from viewing floods as a fact of life to becoming a threat causing disaster and endangering the heritage site. Before and during the 2011 flood event itself, access to information regarding flood scenarios and projected impacts were limited, as the situation was highly dynamic and government information was not fully transparent or timely. This left site management officials relatively unprepared and made the monuments and the museums vulnerable. Emergency response was carried out on the fly, on an improvised basis, based on existing solutions. While solutions like sandbags may have worked for smaller scale floods, they proved unable to cope with the scale of the flooding.

Following the flood event, FAD engaged with various disaster capacity building and consultation activities, initiated both by themselves and outside agencies. However, the individual learning happened at the level of technicians and technical professionals, not at the level of decision makers. What became apparent is a disconnect between learning at these levels, without a feedback system from bottom to top. Therefore, the organizational change which occurred, in the form of commissioning a new disaster risk management sub-plan as part of the revised Master Plan, essentially disregarded the individual learning that had been occurring. The new disaster sub-plan was essentially undertaken in parallel with previous technical workshops and studies related to flood risk mitigation, with limited overlap of personnel.

It proved more difficult to begin changing cognitive frames and there was initially less learning capacity when it came to the issue of monument restoration

which is central to the mandate and organizational identity of the FAD. There was more resistance both on an individual basis and on an organizational basis to changing well-established ways of doing things and existing knowledge and beliefs. As noted by Gupta et al “redesigning institutions often calls for ‘unlearning’ past insights, routines, fears and reflexes” (2010).

However, once learning activities were carried out, again, individual-level learning was observed for some, ranging from practitioners to professional staff. For individuals who were convinced by the exposure to new information and had their perceptions altered, the investment in learning proved to be fruitful. Indeed, the learning was able to have a greater impact than in the case of the disaster training. They were able to critically interrogate and synergize the new information with existing expertise and knowledge that they already had. Moreover, as the new learning was directly relevant to their existing work, and already within the accepted mandate of the organization, they were able to find ways to incorporate the new knowledge and skills, and even to make it their own. For instance, one of the training participants explained that:

“The real working time is limited, so it’s difficult to apply all stages of the conservation process from the training, so we only pick the stages that do not affect the timeframe of the project.”

For individuals who were not convinced, they continued to maintain their pre-existing patterns of thought and behavior. Reasons for not changing their behavior were the same reasons cited by the adopters of new knowledge (ie, constraints in working time frame, and so forth). The fact that all the staff work within the same system within the same constraints, but some were able to change not only their cognitive mindset but also their behavior, while others did not, indicated the importance of individual learning. For instance, a senior local technician at Ayutthaya said, in commenting on the super meticulous work being undertaken at the Wat Chai Wattanaram cooperation project under US cooperation:

“If we had all that time and money, our work would be perfect too.”

By citing the shortage of budget and time as the biggest constraint in delivering a quality product, this indicates that for the more resistant staff, knowhow is not the self-perceived problem and that training or external inputs have little impact in teaching them.

The individual level learning created changes in the perception and attitudes of some personnel towards the necessity of improving conservation practices. But again, failure to engage with decision makers meant that the individual level cognitive changes did not translate into organizational learning or changes at an institutional scale. The results from the individual-level learning were not institutionalized in the form of new codified regulations, guidelines or protocols, or in continued capacity raising and outreach both within the organization and to outside stakeholders.

In both cases related to the flooding and to the monument conservation, learning was characterized as single loop learning, with incremental improvements to existing institutional processes and instruments, related to conservation of monuments and archaeological sites. Underlying values and assumptions were not changed by evidence from external scientific data or by international norms and practices. The fact that some individuals demonstrated learning, and were able to exercise and apply it within their own scope of work, proved that individuals were not overly constrained by their organizational setting. In this sense, these individuals who have started implementing innovative work procedures by finding a way to reconcile new methods within the framework of the existing system can be considered institutional entrepreneurs. The “ongoing experience of contradictory institutional arrangements enables a shift in collective consciousness that can transform actors from passive participants in the reproduction of existing institutional arrangements into institutional entrepreneurs” (Leca, Battilana, & Boxenbaum, 2008).

However, any individual learning seems to have occurred despite of, rather than because of the organization. The role of agency will be looked at below to explain this.

4.5.2 Encouraging appropriate institutions: Agency, formal governance structures, relationships

Agency was a key factor in determining, or more precisely, constraining institutional change for Ayutthaya, particularly at the organizational level. In this case, the institutional environment of the FAD was sufficiently deterministic so as to constrain the organization and individual actors. This situation reflects the paradox of embedded agency.

Beyond just maintenance, it can be argued that FAD as an organization is intent on self-reproduction, making institutional innovation difficult. For institutional change to occur, change agents must be able to construct a frame that “emphasize[s] the failings of the existing institutionalized practices and norms and demonstrate that the institutionalization project will assure superior results in order to coalesce allies and reduce inherent contradictions” (Leca et al., 2008). For reasons of institutional “face”, being able to officially admit such failings especially to an external audience is difficult, even though internally there may be doubts and uncertainties about existing practices, particularly among younger staff members. However, the differential in individual status within the organizational hierarchy prevents such potential institutional change agents to effect much change within the scope of the existing institutions.

That said, while questioning basic organizational routines was not easy to sell on its own as a justification for organizational change, intertwining proposals to improve practices with the deployment of new technology became more acceptable and attractive. For instance, bringing up the need to improve initial surveys for the sake of improving the restoration design and final outcomes tended to be met with resistance by more senior decision makers (who countered that these preliminary steps were already part of the established procedures, even though in reality they

are seldom carried out in great detail or sometimes at all). On the other hand, introducing technologies such as 3D scanning and geo-physical surveys using Ground Penetrating Radar made it possible to create interest in this preliminary stage, “exploiting fascination with novel practices and styles present in any social group to become ‘fashion setters’ in creating institutions that can interest and attract decision makers” (Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) in (Leca et al., 2008). In this way, younger staff could leverage individual agency and build coalitions among like-minded colleagues to explore the use of such technologies as a platform to strengthen institutionalized gaps in the organization’s practice.

Changing formal governance institutions was possible in the context of the increased attention to disaster risk management, but not possible in the context of improving monument restoration practices. As noted above, “higher levels of learning... are only effective if connected to formal processes” (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013), meaning changes in legislation, organizations and regulatory processes. From the point of view of embedded agency, it was easier to innovate new instruments in new areas with few existing regulations and guidelines in place, which did not require much “unlearning”. Even so, the production of a new disaster risk management sub-plan should only be considered a shallow form of institutional change – as there were no accompanying changes in organizational structure, regulations or legislation.

Moreover, embedded agency can get in the way of changing relationships, which may be necessary to bring about changes in outcomes. The FAD’s interactions with other agencies particularly in the disaster sector were not deepened as a result of the 2011 flood crisis. By deriving its authority primarily from the Act on Ancient Monuments, Antiques, Objects of Art and National Museums, this creates a strong organizational culture constrained by its well-defined and unique mandate, as the only agency operating in this field. This insular sense of organizational culture, coupled with practical considerations in terms of shortages in staff and funding, creates such a tightly focused day-to-day operational routine which limits the time or the cognitive space to seek and create new alliances. Moreover, such inter-agency

cooperation would require a directive and investment of resources at an organizational level, which was not forthcoming among senior decision makers. Putting a heritage agency into a crowded field like disaster management with multiple actors is bound to short-change the organization, given its relatively low status among other sectors and its lack of expertise in this field. However, within the organization, internal silos proved to be easier to overcome at the individual level, as a follow up from the individual learning in monument restoration training, which emphasized the importance of inter-disciplinarity.

4.5.3 Increasing resources

The availability of resources was the ultimate but not the main determining constraint against bringing about long-term change at Ayutthaya, with resource flows reflecting embedded norms and power relations.

The massive financial injection in 2012 following the flood proved to be a one-shot occurrence and was not followed up with a permanently increased budget allocation for Ayutthaya. This could have provided the means to either try new innovations or to expand the scope of work to address more systemic problems underlying the flooding such as landscape-scale drainage systems. Greenwood et al (2002) note that “financial assets can be used during early stages of the process to bypass sanctions likely to be imposed on the institutional entrepreneur who questions the existing institutions by opponents of the proposed change”. Instead of funding such innovations, the funding supported a large number of restoration projects. Increased resources by itself thus is not sufficient for bringing about institutional change, in the absence of other factors.

At the same time, lack of resources can hobble the possibility of institutionalizing longer-term organizational transformation in response to initial cognitive changes and learning. Staff who were convinced about the need to undertake thorough condition surveys as well as scientific materials analysis explained that it was only possible for them to carry through with the latter, but not

the former. However, they did not raise the possibility that they could seek additional resources, beyond existing regular allocations, for instance in the comment:

“There is no budget for condition survey, but we can put the scientific materials testing in the restoration project.”

Likewise, beyond financial resources, staff also pointed to the need to invest in more human resources. For instance, in order to carry out high quality masonry repair work in line with the new standards they have been introduced to, a senior mason explained the organization needs to increase the in-house team of skilled workers so they can have continuity of knowledge and skills, instead of relying solely on outsourced workers who may or may not have adequate training. However, despite repeated requests, his team has not received any new allocations of workers. This indicates that investment of resources from the centralized top-down budget approval process have not changed, despite desires of line staff to change practices which require more funds and personnel.

The solution proposed by staff at multiple levels was to simply plan projects over a multi-year time frame. This would allow the limited staff and resources to be commensurate with the long process that is needed for designing and implementing conservation work to a high standard. In this way, one senior staff member suggested that the first year would be devoted to documentation and condition survey, the second year to installing temporary support structures, the third year would focus on designing the restoration plan, and execution would start in the fourth year. A more brief version would have the preparatory work in the first year with implementation starting in the second year.

However, in reality, there is high pressure to execute projects. Sometimes, the pressure comes from outside the FAD, with politicians at the local level or pressure from the Ministry. It has proved difficult to secure approval from decision makers to

introduce this new project phasing and budgeting process, due to various entrenched interests and attitudes. Therefore, unless these underlying norms are altered, resource patterns will not change, thus holding back innovation. Moreover, even if resource patterns change due to exogenous variables, like the flood, this by itself is not sufficient to bring about change in the rest of the system.

4.6 Conclusion: Reflecting on institutional dynamics, adaptive capacity and expanding boundaries of practice

4.6.1 Polycentric institutional setting

The case study from Ayutthaya supports the proposition that “centralized regimes have lower adaptive capacity and transformative capacity than polycentric systems” (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013).

In the case of Ayutthaya, the management system stipulates a number of organizations and actors, but regarding conservation, the FAD is ultimately accountable, with other agencies having a more peripheral role. For instance, when a problem is raised in the media or in government, it is the department or its home organization, the Ministry of Culture, which must be called to explain to higher authorities.

This is the most prevalent model in operation at heritage sites in the region, as many cultural heritage agencies got their start when heritage consisted mainly of monuments or archaeological sites, rather than more complex, multi-actor sites like historic landscapes. A government agency, mostly under the Ministry of Culture, is typically in charge of archaeological sites and historic buildings and, by default, of other more emergent types of sites as well. In comparison to the other case studies that will follow, this model of centralized technocratic governance appears to give the FAD certain advantages. Most importantly, it arms the agency with both statutory authority and in-house technical capacity.

However, wielding such authority becomes both an enabler as well as a constraint. On the one hand, within the scope of its accepted mandate and established workplans, an organization with a unique mandate and statutory authority is able to take action unilaterally, without prolonged and costly negotiations to create consensus. For instance, it is within the sole authority of the DG of the FAD to gazette land as archaeological land. On the other hand, sticking closely to the established organizational mandate can lead to the ossification of the organization, as circumstances change more rapidly than the evolution of an organization's capacity, its mandate, and the legal and regulatory instruments at its disposal.

When other organizations have a smaller stake and less accountability for the mission at hand, in this case, World Heritage management, the sole organization with accountability tends to act conservatively and defensively. It is less likely to view external inputs in a constructive manner. There is less opportunity to learn about other issues outside of one's direct mandate, and thus less opportunity to innovate one's thinking and practice. Unlike in a polycentric system, with multiple actors with active roles and overlapping mandates, in a centralized system, there is less onus to work together towards a joint solution. This results in an insular working style, with self-developed solutions for problems even when in-house capacity is lacking.

4.6.2 Formal-informal interaction

The case study from Ayutthaya provides further support to the observation that informal rules are persistent, and can undermine the transformative impact of altering formal rules. At the same time, it also demonstrates how formal processes are needed to institutionalize gains from informal settings in order to bring about systemic transformation.

The formal changes that came about, which resulted from single loop learning, ran up against deep-seated patterns of thought, behavior and organizational culture. This encompasses both institutional and individual beliefs that current conservation practices are sufficient and acceptable, even in the face of new contradictory

information. It includes a sense among working level staff of being powerless to change established working practices (ie, tendering to outside contractors, racing against the clock, compromising on materials, dealing with the intractability of the decision making system.) Another form of informal rules is the difficulties posed by overcoming the internal impenetrable silos within the organization as well as external silos with outside organizations as well. These informal rules proved difficult to alter in a relatively short time span, and in the absence of radical transformation of the organization as a whole.

For instance, these informal rules ended up preventing any change in the formal rules governing the organization's conservation practices, ie, the regulations and working processes related to monument restoration. However, they did have an effect in promoting face-to-face interaction among different divisions, which led to the "formation of informal actor networks [which] plays an important role in the early phase of change" (Olsson et al 2006 in Pahl-Wostl 2013). However, these informal connections were not capitalized upon further, as the literature shows that it is important to manage transformation by "the design of largely informal transition arenas with strong leadership by small groups of innovators" (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). No such champions of change emerged who could leverage the growing level of openness among those whose mindsets had been converted, and thus the outcomes from the training and recommendations remain non-binding. Likewise, there were no "social entrepreneurs" who could bridge both formal and informal processes to facilitate such change.

4.6.3 Expanding boundaries of practice

The Ayutthaya case study sheds interesting light on the capacity and dynamics for institutional change within and outside of established boundaries of practice, particularly in the context of a centralized institutional system.

Within established boundaries of practice (ie, within the regular mandate, well-established working processes, accustomed realms of knowledge) it proved initially more difficult to convince actors, both at an individual level and at the

organizational level, of the necessity for change. The system is so institutionalized, with its ethos and practices so “mythologized” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), that it becomes difficult to demonize negative examples of institutionalized beliefs or to unlearn existing practices.

Ironically, in the realm of the unfamiliar, outside the organization’s and individuals’ boundary of practice, it proved to be easier to accept that some form of change is required. In this way, cognitive shifts could occur. There was sufficient buy-in about the necessity for change to bring about some changes in formal rules. Learning occurred at the level of basic understanding, but not mastery. The learning process thus hit a ceiling relatively quickly. It was difficult to translate learning into practice at an organizational level as larger institutional factors – resources, relationships, organizational changes like staffing – were not changed. At an individual level, learning could also not translate so easily into practice as the limited level of new knowledge gained was difficult to apply within existing practices, given the distance between the existing body of practice and the new bodies of knowledge that had been introduced. This resulted in relapsing into pre-existing patterns of behavior.

In contrast, within the existing boundary of practice, if actors could be convinced of the necessity for change, and embarked on the learning process, the learning could end up having more dividends and impact. Individuals on their own were able to incorporate the learning, which tops up their existing knowledge and expertise, into their regular work, as the new topics are within their existing set of responsibilities. Even if organizational-level support (financial or technical resources and other enabling factors) were not forthcoming, individual actors were able to exercise their agency to fruitfully apply the learning and translate it within the bounds of their own practice. This limited the scale of impact to very specific locations and projects, but it was nonetheless a starting point. However, the ability of the organization to take on such new learning was more difficult, given the self-limiting factors imposed by embedded agency.

Thus within existing boundaries of practice, the process of change is more difficult to initiate, and requires exogenous pressure or internal champions. But once initiated, it is able to build up on existing knowledge and practices, and thus bring about incremental change.

On the other hand, it is easier to admit the need for change outside of existing boundaries of practice, as it does not cast aspersions on the integrity and capability of a centralized institution reliant on a dominant top-down organization. In a face-saving manner, these new issues can be chalked up to being “unknown unknowns”, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, even if in fact, they could very well be “known unknowns”. However, bringing about transformation in the institution to enable corresponding changes in practice requires not just incremental changes as before, given the radically different nature of the problems. Rather, quantum changes are required: in reconstructing rules, in reconfiguring belief systems, by reconstructing professional identities, by altering boundaries of meaning systems (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Higher-level learning, ie, double or triple loop learning, is needed to alter such underlying rules. But such quantum changes are difficult to bring about when centralized organizations have a strong sense of identity and entrenched processes, and are unable to alter their mandates and other instruments accordingly.

4.7 Summary of chapter

Ayutthaya illustrates the case where a centralized institutional landscape dominated by a singular, top-down organization with a fixed mandate and sense of purpose struggles to deal with expanding boundaries of practice. In this case, there were two in-case narratives. First, in attempting to put in place disaster risk management, which is an issue outside the organization’s usual boundary of practice, it was possible to put in place a new disaster plan, that is, to change the formal governance structures. Hidden behind this superficial change, however, was deeper-seated institutional resistance: to accepting external expertise in flood mitigation, to

changing operational practices in protecting monuments from flooding, to creating new partnerships with other government agencies, and to physically expanding the geographic scope of site management in a way which would offer innovative, territorial scale approaches to managing the larger footprint of the historic city. Second, with regards to a core responsibility – monument conservation -- within the organization’s usual boundary of practice, it proved difficult in this case to change the formal governance structures to improve standards of restoration work. Instead, only individual learning and adaptations in practice were seen. However, without a feedback mechanism to decision-making levels, no long-term change at the level of the organization could be effected, in terms of policies, investment of resources or staff.



Chapter 5

Vat Phou and Ancient Settlements in the Champasak Cultural Landscape

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 focuses on the second case study, Vat Phou and Ancient Settlements in the Champasak Cultural Landscape in Lao PDR. This is one of the two polycentric institutional models, using a public-private partnership with a heritage management agency, a private tourism concession company and the local district government jointly taking care of the World Heritage site. The chapter presents an overview of the site's heritage significance, then traces the expanding boundaries of practice which were seen when the construction of Route 14A was initiated in 2010. The chapter ends with an analysis of the institutional dynamics and factors of adaptive capacity which permitted the site management institutions to react with a series of new plans and regulations to expand the scope of managing the site, which were operationalized to a certain extent.

5.2 Background

5.2.1 Introduction to the site

The World Heritage site of Vat Phou and Ancient Settlements in the Champasak Cultural Landscape is located in Champasak Province in southern Lao PDR on the western bank of the Mekong River, downstream from the provincial capital of Pakse. The site dates from the 5th to 15th centuries and centers around the eponymous Khmer temple complex which was an ancient Hindu pilgrimage site. The site comprises a vast planned landscape which stretches from the Phou Kao mountain to the Mekong River. It also includes the archaeological remains of ancient settlements, including an Ancient City on the banks of the river.




Figure 32 Location of Vat Phou

(Source: Champasak Province Authority, 2016)

The temple complex is arranged in an east-west axial configuration with a ceremonial path from man-made *barays* up the mountain. The mountain and the Mekong river are believed to be part of the sacred landscape, with sacral water running down from the mountain and ancient *lingas* found in the riverbed. An ancient road connects directly from the site southwards to Angkor, linking Vat Phou with the larger Khmer territory, with ancient structures en route to service the ancient travellers.

Since the decline of the site following the 15th century, Vat Phou has been the object of research and revival mainly during the past 100 year period. During French control over then Indochina, the Ecole française d'Extrême Orient carried out documentation and attempts to hypothesize the historic condition of the complex. At the same time, the past glory of Vat Phou was also instrumentalized by the former royal family as political leverage against the colonial powers.

In the mid-1990s, extensive international cooperation was carried out to assist with the preparatory stages prior to the World Heritage nomination of Vat Phou. Through UNESCO, Italian, Japanese and French support, the temple complex was documented and stabilized. Within the wider setting, archaeological and geo-physical surveys were carried out, to determine traces of ancient remains.

5.2.2 Significance of the site

The Vat Phou and Ancient Settlements in the Champasak Cultural Landscape site was inscribed onto the World Heritage List in 2001. Its Outstanding Universal Value is recognized as follows: “The Champasak cultural landscape, including the Vat Phou Temple complex, is a remarkably well-preserved planned landscape more than 1,000 years old.” The site was inscribed under three criteria:

“Criterion (iii): The temple complex of Vat Phou bears exceptional testimony to the cultures of south-east Asia, and in particular to the Khmer Empire which dominated the region in the 9th-14th centuries.


Criterion (iv): The Vat Phou complex is an outstanding example of the integration of a symbolic landscape of great spiritual significance to its natural surroundings.

Criterion (vi): Contrived to express the Hindu version of the relationship between nature and humanity, Vat Phou exhibits a remarkable complex of monuments and other structures over an extensive area between river and mountain, some of outstanding architecture, many containing great works of art, and all expressing intense religious conviction and commitment” (UNESCO, 2019b)

The site spans 39,000 hectares, and encompasses historic Champasak Town, once the seat of the now deposed royal family of Champasak. A total of 55 villages are included within the perimeter of the World Heritage site, which spans three administrative districts: Champasak, Phonthong and Pathumphone.

The monumental remains represent an important example of early and classic Khmer architecture from the 7th-12th centuries. The Vat Phou temple complex includes the main sanctuary itself on the mountain, as well as other buildings and stupas flanking the ceremonial axis. The other significant monumental complexes are Hong Nang Sida and Thao Tao to the south of the temple complex and Tomo Temple located across the river on the eastern bank of the Mekong.

The landscape bears the traces of centuries of development, with civil works and settlements, some of which provide testimony to the early stages of urbanism in Southeast Asia. An extensive hydrological system organizes the ecological landscape and the agricultural landscape, with rice farming as the primary mainstay for the local population.



*Figure 33 Planned landscape showing
Vat Phou temple complex and the Ancient City*

(Source: Zoom.earth)

5.2.3 Management and governance institutions

The institutional arrangement at Vat Phou in governing the World Heritage site is polycentric and multi-level. There are several organizations which are directly involved in managing the site, which are guided under different regulatory frameworks and underlying interests. In practice, within the decentralized governance system in Lao PDR, the local government at the provincial and district level have an out-size role in shaping management practices at the site.

The national Law Concerning National Heritage, which entered into force in 2005, provides the primary legislative and regulatory framework for the conservation and management of Vat Phou World Heritage site. It succeeds the Decree of the President on the Preservation of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage No. 03/PR adopted in June 1997. In addition, the national Land Law demarcates control of land. At the provincial level, the Provincial Decree on the Regulations for the Preservation of the Historical Site of Vat Phou and the Areas Related to Vat Phou, No. 38/88 (October 1988) establishes the protective designation of the site, along with measures for the protection of the site. At the provincial level, development is also guided by the Champasak Province Master Plan for Tourism and the Provincial Development Plan for Transportation, Post and Construction.

An official World Heritage management plan was prepared at the time of the nomination of the site and was adopted in 1988 under the authority of the 1997 Presidential Decree and thus is considered a statutory document. The management plan provides regulations for the management of the site, covering conservation of the monuments and the larger heritage setting, tourism and community development. It is associated with 5-year action plans meant to guide specific short-term activities at the site in response to current priorities.

The management plan zones the World Heritage site into four zones, each with its own regulations. Zone 1 is the cultural landscape zone which occupies the entire footprint of the site. Zone 2 is the Sacred Environment Zone. Zone 3 is the

archaeological research zone, and Zone 4 is the Monument Zone. Unlike other World Heritage sites, Vat Phou does not have a buffer zone, due to the large extent of Zone 1 which was argued as having a big enough footprint to buffer development from the key heritage ensembles.




Figure 34 Zone designation in the World Heritage Management Plan

The management plan vests the authority for coordination and decision-making at cascading levels from the national level to the provincial level to the district level. Decisions regarding major new infrastructure, for instance, require approval at the national level, whereas smaller interventions can be approved at the lower level. At the national level, the National Inter-ministerial Coordinating Committee (NIMCC) was set up to coordinate the overall management of the site. However, it no longer exists and has been superseded by the National World Heritage Committee, which was established in 2008 and is chaired by the Vice Prime Minister. At the provincial level, the Provincial Heritage Committee, chaired by the Deputy Governor of Chamapasak Province, provides operational oversight to the Vat

Phou World Heritage Site Office. The Champasak District Heritage Committee takes decisions on the most local-level interventions.

The Vat Phou World Heritage Site Office (WHSO) functions as the site management agency and is charged with ensuring that the entire site is protected in accordance with the World Heritage Management Plan. It has two reporting lines, to its home ministry, the Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism through the national Heritage Department, and to the Champasak provincial government.

Despite the comprehensive physical scope of the management plan, in terms of statutory control, the heritage authorities are limited by the fact that under Lao legislation, the primary area designated as “Cultural Land” under the terms of the Land Law is the monumental Zone 4, where the Vat Phou temple complex is. This renders this core complex alone under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism. As cultural land, the only allowable activities are related to conservation; no new building is allowed. The rest of the property does not enjoy the same level of protection.

As such, the site management authority is really only authorized to protect the monuments, and is reliant on suasion to influence other authorities in the protection of the larger cultural landscape comprising the town, the villages and the rural landscape. In theory, heritage coordination committees at the provincial and district level provide the platform for such intersectoral decision-making on issues related to heritage, including the construction of new buildings and infrastructure. However, in practice, the Vat Phou WHSO is stymied by the fact that it occupies a relatively lowly status compared to other full-fledged “departments”. This forces the Vat Phou WHSO into constant, often unsuccessful, negotiations with the District Governor, the District and Provincial Departments of Public Works and Transport and other agencies such as the water supply department.

Moreover, the Vat Phou World Heritage site management office is further limited by the fact that it is beholden to the provincial government which grants its annual budget and ultimately signs off on key decisions. Within the decentralized governance system in Lao PDR, the provincial government, and more precisely, the governor, wields key decision-making power, both within legal and extra-legal channels. The Champasak provincial government, in particular, as the stronghold of the Siphandone political clan linked to the former president, has been pointed out by scholars for how state sovereignty can be instrumentalized for individual gains within the political patronage system. Unlike in Luang Prabang, where the World Heritage site coincides with not only the ancient but also modern seat of power and economic activity in the province, in Champasak province, the center of political and economic activity is at the provincial capital city of Pakse, and Champasak town remains a backwater with a history of under-investment, even despite its World Heritage status.

The authority of the Vat Phou WHSO has been further limited with the granting of a tourism concession to manage the monumental complex of Vat Phou in 2010, through connections with the provincial authorities. This 15-year concession was given to Yingchokchai Company, which now manages all three major tourism attractions in Champasak province: Vat Phou, Khonepapeng water fall and Somphamit water fall. The concession company is required to provide visitor services at the site (electric buggies, toilets, food and beverage outlets), basic cleaning and landscaping of the site. It is also tasked with developing secondary visitor destinations around the main temple precinct, but has no plans yet for the Ancient City, Champasak town or Tomo temple.

According to the terms of the contract with the private concession company during the period 2010-2025, a fixed annual sum from ticket receipts should be provided to the provincial government: 1.4 billion Kip (approximately USD 170,300). Any revenue above this amount is retained by the private concession company. Of the amount turned over to the provincial government, 10 percent (equivalent to USD

17,000) is supposed to be allocated to the World Heritage Fund. However, to date, no funding has yet been allocated to the Fund nor to the conservation of Vat Phou.⁸

In the absence of any ticket proceeds, the Vat Phou WHSO has been reduced to a paltry financial allocation from the provincial government. Up to 2017, the annual allocation was 70 million Lao Kip (approximately USD 8500) and has since declined. This allocation is barely able to cover essential management costs, such as fuel for monitoring rounds and attending official meetings, stationery and supplies, and hosting official events. A senior Vat Phou official decried that the budget of the office does not even allow it to respond to basic requests from residents who need assistance with conservation nor does the provincial government provide any supplementary allocation when needed, such as responding to disaster events such as the big typhoon Krissana in 2017. (Salaries and utilities costs are paid separately.)

At the local level, village committees and mass organizations (such as the Women's National Front and other civil society armatures of the socialist government) provide the channels to disseminate management decisions and regulations to the residents of the site. A Village Liaison Committee was earlier set up to coordinate between the Vat Phou WHSO and the villages, but this has been disbanded, although teams within the office in charge of development and landscape control are in frequent communication with the villages. These local representatives are also invited to attend meetings and to take part in consultations, although their engagement is limited by the top-down process of the site's management wielded by government agencies. That said, the needs of the local population are cited by the government officials as a consideration in the governance of the site, and has had an impact in shaping policies to be more accommodating to the residents.

⁸ An official with the national Tourism Department noted that in Lao PDR, many concessions are awarded to cronies, with unfair concession agreements, and that in these situations, there is no recourse. The literature explains that corruption linked to concessions is part of the economic reality of the Lao state and its patronage politics.

In addition, Vat Phou continues to benefit from the bilateral assistance of international teams contributing to the conservation and management of the World Heritage site. While earlier Italian and Japanese support have tapered off, there are Korean, Indian and French teams now operating on site, as of 2019. The French in particular, have had a sustained presence, not only in archaeological work through the Ecole française d'Extreme Orient, but also supporting site management. This includes technical guidance and financial assistance in realizing the Cultural Landscape Master Plan.

A mapping of these stakeholders and their level of involvement in the Vat Phou World Heritage site reveals the operational responsibilities at the site. Given the number of actors directly involved with different aspects of heritage site management, the mapping takes on a horizontal configuration, unlike the more vertical field at Ayutthaya. It can be seen that the Vat Phou World Heritage site office shares operational responsibilities with the District government. The figure indicates in dashed lines the part of the system which is still not operational, which involves the provincial government, the concession company and the Heritage Fund that is supposed to benefit from a share of tourism proceeds. However, this revenue capture mechanism is not yet put into place.




Figure 35 Institutional ecology for managing Vat Phou World Heritage site

An indicative mapping of the levels and levers of influence wielded by the actors at Vat Phou also reveals a more complex situation than at Ayutthaya, in part because of the inhabited nature of the site. The Vat Phou WHSO answers to both the provincial governor and to its direct line ministry, in the form of the national Heritage Department. It maintains operational relationships with these entities, as well as to the District Government. However, its relatively low hierarchical status deprives it of the needed authority to influence these other actors, not only agencies but also local residents as well. This is seen in the consultative links it has with these other actors, including with the concession company, which enjoys a close relationship with the provincial government and overpowers the heritage office. Even residents, through the act of resistance and non-compliance, can be seen to have higher influence than the Vat Phou World Heritage authorities. The office's work is made more difficult by the relatively low interest that the other agencies and residents have in safeguarding heritage. Only the heritage agencies and teams maintain a strong interest in the heritage agenda. However, even the high-level National World Heritage Committee in actual fact wields less influence than the provincial government, in the context of Lao PDR's decentralized system.




Figure 36 Mapping of actors at Vat Phou

5.3 Expanding boundaries of practice at the site

5.3.1 Evolving conceptualizations of heritage

The inscription of Vat Phou in 2001 was one of the first waves of World Heritage cultural landscapes, following the official recognition of this category in 1992 in the Operational Guidelines of the World Heritage Convention. As defined by the 1999 version of the guidelines in use at the time of Vat Phou's inscription, cultural landscapes (UNESCO, 1999):

“are illustrative of the evolution of human society and settlement over time, under the influence of the physical constraints and/or opportunities presented by their natural environment and of successive social, economic and cultural forces, both external and internal.”

Within the sub-category of a designed landscape, the qualifications of Vat Phou as a World Heritage site were justified as follows:

“The Champasak cultural landscape, including the Vat Phou Temple complex, is a remarkably well-preserved planned landscape more than 1,000 years old. It was shaped to express the Hindu vision of the relationship between nature and humanity, using an axis from mountain top to river bank to lay out a geometric pattern of temples, shrines and waterworks extending over some 10 km. Two planned cities ... are also part of the site, as well as Phou Kao mountain. The whole represents a development ranging from the 5th to 15th centuries, mainly associated with the Khmer Empire.

“By the end of the 12th century, the entire landscape between Phou Kao Mountain and the east bank of the Mekong River was designed and engineered to create a virtual ‘heaven on earth’ in conformity with Hindu cosmology” (Government of Lao PDR, 2000)

In its evaluation of the property, ICOMOS underscored the fact that the Champasak landscape retains a high level of integrity (Young, 2005):

“...the only known early cultural landscape in south-east Asia, preserving both good and relatively undamaged evidence for the ways in which [ancient peoples] engineered their landscape to meet both their practical and spiritual needs...[It] is the only known landscape of its sort to survive in all its essential parts”

Belying the certitude of the narrative expressed in the nomination dossier, the actual evidence for the extent and the components of this designed cultural landscape were less clear. Geo-physical prospecting surveys conducted prior to the nomination focused mainly on the remains of the ancient city of Shresthapura. There is little documentation (as demonstrated by the lack of maps, excavation drawings and other supporting data) for the other territorial scale features cited in the nomination dossier, ie, “road patterns that were established...the management and reorganization of waterways ... the channelling of the rivers, the development of canals and the construction of barays to produce a surplus to support the temples and an urban elite” (Government of Lao PDR, 2000). Indeed, the nomination dossier itself states that the site mainly holds “archaeological potential ...to provide in the future the evidence for all the evidence of the society that supported them (ibid).

The opacity of this archaeological potential – invisible to laypersons and still undocumented or unevidenced by experts – has rendered the site as a cultural landscape difficult to manage. Despite the fact that the very name of the site clearly indicated its recognition on the basis of its landscape qualities, in practice, the landscape notion was clearly not internalized in the conceptual, legal or administrative approach to the management of the site. A long-time senior heritage official confided to visiting experts in 2015 that the authorities did not realize in fact that the World Heritage site was a landscape and thought that it was considered an archaeological site. French advisor Castel (2017) cites that, “The Lao authorities agreed to this project without knowing that the classification would put the emphasis on the landscape. A draft Land Use Plan, drawn up in 2003, foresaw building possibilities without including any specific landscape considerations.” Castel further

observes that, as late as 2010, “the local Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Public Works technicians, as well as the authorities, did not fully understand the object of the [cultural landscape] classification” (ibid).

Educational materials prepared at the time by the heritage authorities themselves were also limited to the main monument complex. The UNESCO-ICOMOS Joint Reactive Monitoring Mission in 2012 pointed out that, “Interpretation materials, such as the currently available site pamphlet (“The Ancient City - The Sanctuary - The Spring”), should include the attributes of the entire World Heritage property, not only those found in the Monument Management Zone” (DiStefano, Han, & Wijesuriya, 2012).

Tracing the evolution of the five-year action plans adopted by the management authorities from 2001 onwards, we can see that items pertaining to restoration or stabilization of monuments have been the first priority for implementation, followed by archaeological excavation to unearth traces of the other ancient activities in the area. (Nishimura, 2011; Vat Phou World Heritage Site Office, 2011, 2019; Young, 2005). The financial resources from both national and international sources have also focused on the monuments or the archaeological research. Similarly, the technical expertise deployed at Vat Phou has been mainly architects and archaeologists, both within the foreign teams as well as the staff of the Vat Phou WHSO itself. In 2002, shortly after inscription, the office included 17 staff, and priority areas of needed training were all conservation-oriented: “Stone Monument restoration (Architect, Engineer) - Stone cutter and carver - Site Manager - Educational programme officer - Stone objects conservator - Curators - Archeologist” (Government of Lao PDR, 2002)

In the first decade following World Heritage inscription, the Laotian authorities demarcated and put in place the essential maintenance and security measures for the main Vat Phou monumental complex. This included assigning staff and organizing patrols within the zone, improving understanding of Zone 4, and temporary protection for the sanctuary. With Italian support, the monumental

causeway was conserved and the restoration of the Nandin Hall was partially completed. With Japanese support, a bypass drainage system was installed to manage erosion on the sacred mountain and stabilize the main sanctuary area. The Japanese also supported a small site museum to house artefacts unearthed from the on-site conservation work and excavations. The French supported the collection and cataloguing of artefacts.

Support to monumental works continued in the second decade. Through additional sources of French assistance, demonstrative restoration of the eastern porch of the Southern Quadrangle was carried out. With Indian bilateral assistance, the Northern Quadrangle was restored, followed by works on the Southern Quadrangle. A Korean bilateral project to reassemble Hong Nang Sida temple was launched.

Beyond the monumental zone, the main initiatives took the form of archaeological campaigns conducted on various sites, with French support through EFEO and with Italian support channeled through the Lerici Foundation. These have unearthed significant archaeological discoveries, for instance, a complex at Vat Sang O north of the Ancient City, believed to provide evidence of pre-Angkorean settlement. However, being very localized in approach, these could not be deemed to cover the landscape scale nor to shed insights into larger spatial connectivity, though they begin to give a sense of chronological development of the site.

The conservation approach at Vat Phou up until the early 2010s had not dealt with other dimensions of the larger landscape. Action items listed in successive action plans from 2001 onwards, for instance, to tackle erosion along the Mekong riverside or to conserve Champasak Town remain as pending items, for lack of interest or funding, or both. The action plans do not identify the need to improve the understanding and consequently interventions for the agricultural system, hydrological system and ecological system which define the larger landscape.

Among the larger public, most visitors are under the impression from the tourism literature and promotional advertising that the temple complex is in fact the extent of the World Heritage site. Similarly, for Laotian residents and visitors, the primary association with the site's significance is with the temple itself, which is now venerated as a Buddhist shrine. During the annual Vat Phou festival in February, the main destination is to pray and offer incense and candles at the shrine, with scant attention paid to the surrounding archaeological remnants or other landscape features. The contemporary association with the cultural landscape for the local villagers has less to do with its now forgotten Hindu roots, but more with its recent layers of Laotian occupation and its associated Buddhist and other spiritual and mythical beliefs.

5.3.2 Emerging management pressures

From monument conservation to managing the cultural landscape

The cognitive mismatch between the definition of the World Heritage site as a cultural landscape and the management practices still focused on monuments and archaeological sites was largely downplayed in the first decade following its inscription. The failure to take into account the larger landscape did not yet present a major problem at first, though it eventually proved to be both a blessing and a curse.

The misunderstanding of the site as being primarily the Vat Phou temple complex has limited the generative potential of the cultural landscape as an attraction for investors and visitors alike. Unlike Lao PDR's other World Heritage site, Luang Prabang, which received over 755,000 visitors in 2018, the problem at Vat Phou is under-tourism and therefore development pressures have been limited. While there has been an increase in visitor numbers since World Heritage inscription, this has not fully tapped out the full potential of the site as a multi-faceted and spread out destination.

Table 17 Visitor arrivals at Vat Phou World Heritage Site (in number of persons)

	Domestic	International
2000	6600	7300
2001	14,000	8600
2002	11,000	13,000
2003	16,000	17,000
2004	27,000	18,000
2005	19,000	16,000
2006	21,000	17,000
2007	12,000	33,000
2008	18,000	32,000
2009	20,000	35,000
2010	18,000	30,000
2011	43,000	37,000
2012	53,000	47,000
2013	37,000	66,000
2014	37,000	59,000
2015	39,000	53,000
2017	49,000	51,000
2018	53,000	52,000

Source: Vat Phou World Heritage Site Office

At Vat Phou, most visitors are day trippers from Pakse, who are able to complete their visit to the temple complex in less than half a day. Few visit the other attractions of the World Heritage site: the nearby Hong Nang Sida or Thao Tao which are in partial ruins and would give a sense of the monuments prior to restoration, Tomo which would require a trip across the river, the sacred mountain which is still largely inaccessible, the Ancient City which is still largely underground and thus hard to understand, Champasak town itself which has a collection of colonial-influenced historic buildings as well as temples, or the rural landscape.

Successive projects since the early 2000s by development partners such as the Asian Development Bank have been investing in preparing tourist trails, visitor centres and informational brochures to lure tourists into staying longer in the site. These projects have not succeeded. For instance, several generations of trails have been marked out and launched, before fading away into obscurity, with signage and other infrastructure being abandoned due to lack of use. To date, a heritage official reports that “*less than 1 percent of visitors spend the night in the site*”, thus depriving local businesses from any direct or indirect income.

With lack of tourism pressure, the tourism-driven development and urban densification seen at Luang Prabang has therefore not affected Vat Phou much. Development at Champasak has been relatively minor, thus limiting the dramatic transformations such as mass conversions of houses into accommodations and other tourism services, the upgrading of public spaces, the out-migration of local residents and the attendant impacts on the character of Luang Prabang which have been well documented. Conversions of houses mostly accommodate the endogenous growth of the local residents to upgrade or expand their houses for their own family use.

The relatively light nature of impacts, however, is largely due to lack of pressure rather than effectiveness of management enforcement or cooperation among local residents or agencies. With the exception of enforcing a 12-meter height limit in Champasak Town itself, the other urbanized areas distributed in the rural areas of the World Heritage site – with over 40 villages in all – have been essentially been evolving with little monitoring or control.

In part, the inclusion of this larger landscape and its embedded villages in the World Heritage site to begin with – on the basis of as-yet-discovered archaeological potential which is not widely understood or visualized by the general public – has created an on-going problem for justifying development control. The experts taking part in the Reactive Monitoring Missions by UNESCO and ICOMOS raised questions about justifying the inclusion of all 400 square kilometers in the World Heritage site, wondering if it all contributes to the Outstanding Universal Value of the site or not.

The lack of attention to and benign neglect of the larger Champasak cultural landscape during the first ten years of World Heritage status become reinforced in the cognitive framework and working practices of the residents, local authorities and even the Vat Phou WHSO, which had neither the time nor the resources to deal with controlling the larger landscape. Finally in 2010, the issue came to a head with the construction of a new regional road, Route 14A, based on an initial study in 2003. The road traverses the entire width of the World Heritage site from north to south, passing through open agricultural landscape and veers close to the Ancient City. The road connects from the provincial capital of Pakxe to the World Heritage site, and further south to the small towns in Soukouma district.

Built by a private company, Doungdy Company, under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement, the road is operated as a toll road. This road significantly reduces the travel time from Pakse to Vat Phou. Previously the trip would take well over one hour, travelling from Pakse down the eastern bank of the Mekong River on Route 13, then crossing a river ferry to access Champasak town at the Phapin pier. The overland trip on Route 14A, by contrast, takes a mere 40 minutes.

The construction of Route 14A upended the widely-held conviction that the World Heritage site was limited primarily to the Vat Phou temple complex, not the larger cultural landscape, and put the management of Vat Phou under international public scrutiny by the World Heritage Committee. Earlier warnings from the World Heritage Committee were emphasized further by Christopher Young in preparing the action plan for the site for 2005-2010 (2005):

“The Committee is clearly concerned about the cultural landscape as a whole and not just about Vat Phou. If the Committee’s concerns are not dealt with, they could in the future put the site on the List of World Heritage in Danger or even think about deleting the site from the World Heritage List altogether if they thought that its Outstanding Universal Value had been lost.”

However, these warnings went unheeded, and construction of the road finally proceeded when funds were secured by the province in 2010. When tipped about the construction of this road, which had commenced without the required notification or agreement of the World Heritage Committee, the Committee raised concerns that the road would impact the site, particularly in terms of impacting the integrity of the landscape. Specific concerns included the visual impact of the road, particularly from the vantage point of the temple, as well as the archaeological impact from both the construction and use of the road. The most worrying impact was from urban development, so-called ribbon development, that was anticipated to occur along the sides of the road.



Figure 37 New gas station in agricultural landscape along new Route 14A (2012)

In response, the World Heritage Committee (UNESCO, 2012a) requested Lao PDR in 2012 in its decision 36COM7B.64 to:

“Develop a comprehensive land use plan that addresses zoning, use, potential infrastructure development and guidelines for facilities”

And, upon receiving an initial land use plan, the Committee followed up in 2014 with decision 38 COM 7B.17 (UNESCO, 2014b):

“Further urges the State Party to develop an expanded Master Plan based on a landscape approach, taking into account the nature of the property as a cultural landscape, and its attributes of OUV, and to ensure that local land use zoning plans conform to the Master Plan; this Master Plan should provide an overall strategic landscape protection and development framework.”

For the authorities, the crisis of the Route 14A construction had an impact in forcing them to contend with the underlying cognitive mismatch in governing the site. The necessity of safeguarding the larger cultural landscape and limiting development impacts became a new issue for not only the Vat Phou WHSO, but also the local authorities and other sectoral agencies notably the Department of Public Works and Transport, who was implicated in the roadworks, as well as the district government which had to contend with the threat of uncontrolled urbanization along the road. For the residents within the Champasak landscape, the new attention on controlling heritage impacts opened up their ongoing construction activities, up till then largely tolerated, to a new level of regulation and monitoring.

From defending heritage to facilitating local development

Beyond the conservation dimension, the road construction pushed the public discourse around the management of Vat Phou into the issue of local development. With growing discontent triggered by the strict control measures from the World Heritage, a senior local official voiced the concerns of the local population that:

“The road may have an impact on archaeology, but livelihoods will be improved. UNESCO may have requirements, but people need to generate income.”

He also remarked that:

“[Unlike at Luang Prabang] in Champasak, the [protected] area is wide. We need to develop due to local needs. We have no water supply, no road, but we need this convenience to give benefits.”

The primary narrative offered by local officials and heritage authorities alike is that the road was meant to provide better connectivity for local populations, to ensure better access to markets and social services. It is true, in fact, that Champasak town, once the seat of the royal family of Champasak, to this day does not have a daily market. Local residents often had to make the once arduous trip to Pakse for regular supplies. An equally likely benefit is for tourism purposes, as the new road also renders the site more accessible, particularly to the daytrippers from Pakse who form the majority of the visitors to the site.

At the same time as the new road project in 2010, a water supply project was also initiated to serve Champasak Town. Under a nation-wide secondary towns improvement project financed by the Asian Development Bank, the initial design proposed the construction of two 25-plus meter high water towers in the historic town. Due to concerns voiced by the World Heritage Committee, the project was shifted to the southern perimeter of the World Heritage site, thus eliminating the heritage impacts. However, the re-design also reduced the service footprint of the project to the residents in the southern quadrant of the site, thus not fully resolving the concerns of the local populace.

In this way, the planning discourse regarding management at Vat Phou was enlarged by these incidents into the third stage of the evolution of heritage practice proposed by Thompson and Wijesuriya (2018) with “a more dynamic role for heritage in broader sustainable development, and the resulting benefits for society and for heritage.” A visioning exercise to identify priorities for Champasak’s future conducted by the Agence Francaise de Developpement with diverse local stakeholders representing local government, village representatives in early 2019

revealed an equal concern to pursue both heritage and development, as noted in the table below. Both sets of issues were deemed vital for Vat Phou's identity and its future growth and prosperity.

Table 18 Visioning exercise identifying key issues for heritage and development among the local population

Heritage themes	Development themes
Diversity of exceptional heritage Ways of life and tradition Awareness of heritage Landscape protection Control of urbanization	Transportation and infrastructure Benefits for local population Regional connectivity Social services Touristic services
Transversal themes	
Sustainability over time Capacity building Coordination	

These themes were subsequently linked into vision statements for Champasak explicitly connecting heritage with sustainable local development. One vision proposed three main poles of future development: (i) local well-being, (ii) awareness of heritage and (iii) capacity. Heritage is seen as the driver for local development, leading to more diversified livelihoods, increased jobs and income. Local authorities, communities and youth would have an active role in the protection of the World Heritage site. Vat Phou would become a centre for learning for heritage at the national and international levels, with other agencies gaining necessary capacity in heritage issues.

5.3.3 Changing management practices

As a consequence of the World Heritage Committee's request, the Laotian government suspended the further construction of Route 14A since 2013. In reality, most of the road had been completed and put into operation, therefore only a short five kilometer section is suspended from kilometer 29 to kilometer 34, which is located in close proximity to the northwest corner of the Ancient City. Up until 2019, the suspended portion of the road remains non-operational, pending funding to upgrade a bypass road for heavy traffic, to complete the suspended portion of Route 14A and to implement traffic control measures to minimize heritage impacts.

To respond to concerns about controlling the urban development fallout from the new road, the Vat Phou WHSO put into motion the drafting of a landscape master plan, with financial and technical support from the French bilateral project "Priority Solidarity Fund for the Enhancement of Southern Lao Heritage". The preparation of the master plan, involved first a reflection on the landscape qualities that had been rather vaguely articulated in the original nomination dossier. In addition to the built heritage and archaeological dimension, new landscape studies expanded the conceptual boundaries of heritage to include contemporary heritage in the form of post-Khmer urban heritage, natural and agricultural heritage and more modern layers of heritage that have accumulated at the site over time. Beyond the heritage aspect, it also took into account the hydrological and geographical context.

Table 19 Overview of Champasak Cultural Landscape Master Plan

Section	Key content
Identification and characteristics of the Champasak Cultural Landscape and its surroundings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Creation of the Champasak landscape ● UNESCO-listed World Heritage site (demarcation, classification and integrity)
Issues and scope of the Master Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Heritage included in the Master Plan (historical and landscape criteria, integration of

Section	Key content
	contemporary heritage, cultural landscape as palimpsest) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Development issues (management issues, core area and buffer area)
Measures relating to the protection and enhancement of the cultural landscape	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Measures for guiding the urban development of Champasak ● Management and implementation of the Master Plan (legal framework, translation of the Master Plan into the Land Use Plan, management and participation)
Appendices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Calendar of the revision procedure of the urban planning documents ● Provincial Government approval of the revision ● Regulation of the Land Use Plan for the classified area (Building Code) ● Order of the Provincial Government on the monitoring of works

Ironically, the result of these studies about the various aspects of the landscape was not to flesh out more nuanced regulations for providing more comprehensive protection for the landscape, as per the intention of the World Heritage Committee. Instead, it led to bifurcating the World Heritage site into a core area with stricter controls in line with the original World Heritage submission, and a surrounding area functioning as the de facto buffer area with more leeway for the living populations to pursue local development improvements. One of the lead authors of the Master Plan explained that “the level of constraints [in the original management plan] cannot be homogenous over such a large territory.... The criteria of authenticity and integrity [which] are required conditions for UNESCO classification... are more difficult

to establish when the classification concerns living spaces spread over a large territory” (Castel, 2017).




Figure 38 New core area indicated in dotted red line, superimposed on original World Heritage Zones

A study conducted by the Vat Phou WSO identified the Sacred Mountain, natural and agricultural area and monument zone as having higher integrity, while the recent hydraulic works and recent infrastructure and building development as having lower integrity. The Master Plan extends concessionary measures to these so-called low integrity areas, which are mostly areas of residential clustering. In this way, the Master Plan provided as an opportunity to regularize the incremental development that had been occurring over the decade since World Heritage inscription, by explicitly zoning those areas as “Urban Areas”. Furthermore, additional areas were also designated for future urban expansion.

The more development-friendly orientation of the Master Plan is clearly articulated by the Vice Governor of Champasak Province in his preface (Champasak Province Authority, 2016) to the printed Master Plan:

“[The historic site of Champasak] provides an opportunity for guiding the development of the area in a sustainable way, while promoting tourism and in doing so creating jobs and income for the local people. At the same time, increased construction and heavier road traffic need to be organized to avoid damage to the site’s integrity. It is with this intent that the Master Plan was developed, in order to best combine the need to protect the heritage of the classified area and enhance the site while promoting the development of touristic activities with respect for the environment.”




Figure 39 Study showing integrity of the cultural landscape, with low integrity areas in red

The landscape Master Plan was accompanied by the preparation of a more operational Land Use Plan as well as the development of detailed regulations controlling construction in the form of a Building Code (*rabiab kumkrong singpuksang*). The zoning plan under the new Land Use Plan overlays the original four zones with the new Core Area, encompassing the Monument Management Zone (Zone 4), the Archaeological Research Zone (Zone 3) and the Sacred Environment Conservation Zone (Zone 2). The remaining area is designated the new buffer area, containing “places that have undergone recent changes [and] ... local heritage not significant for the World Heritage site” (ibid). It designates Urban Zones (U), Natural Zones (N) and a Sacred Zone (S). Within both the Core Area and the Buffer Area, pockets of Urban Zones are designated, even within areas of high archaeological sensitivity. The protection of the remaining landscape is through designation under “N” as rice cultivation areas.




Figure 40 New zoning map, regularizing developed areas as new “Urban Zones”

Initiated in 2011 and largely finished by 2014, the Champasak Cultural Landscape Master Plan was formally approved by the Champasak Provincial Government In 2016, and subsequently by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, which is the authority overseeing urban planning in Lao PDR. The Master Plan was submitted to and acknowledged by the World Heritage Committee in its regular monitoring of Vat Phou since the road incident started.

The attempts by the Vat Phou WHSO to extend its reach to the larger cultural landscape through the urban planning mechanism was innovative as it stepped beyond its usual niche in architecture and archaeology. The fact that the Office had to go beyond its home ministry to seek the national level authorization is also unusual. The Master Plan document notes it is:

“the culmination of five years of work, of coordination between the ministries, and consultation with involved districts and villages, under the supervision of the Provincial Heritage Committee”.

A senior heritage official explains that having the new Building Code has been useful to streamline the working system, as the original World Heritage Management Plan “*didn’t have details. It only had restrictions for 12 meter building height, no use of concrete and no digging below 50 centimeters. With the new Building Code, it is more clear.*”

The Vat Phou WHSO readjusted its staffing structure slightly in 2011 to take on this new orientation. The internal division for Urban Protection (*kum krong muang*) expanded its remit to Urban and Landscape Protection (*kum krong tiwtad lae kampattana*), with two sub-divisions covering “Landscape and Urban Planning” (*pumitad lae pungmuang*) and “Green Space Management” (*peunti sikiew*). Although the office has not had any major staffing increases since 2007-2009, an ongoing French-funded project helped to bring on board junior staff to deal with GIS, mapping and urban planning, supplementing the existing technical capacity in architecture, engineering, conservator, museums and archaeology. An assessment

conducted by French expert Paul Trouilloud (2012) found that training related to urban planning was well received:

“L’équipe technique des ingénieurs et architectes a clairement bénéficié des études auxquelles ils ont participé et sont demandeurs de la poursuite de formations. Les échanges avec d’autres universités et la collaboration avec d’autres étudiants a été une source de motivation supplémentaire.”⁹

Table 20 Technical staff composition of Vat Phou World Heritage Site Office (2018)

Training	Number
Architects	3 staff
Archaeologists	1 staff + 3 seasonal staff
Civil engineer	4 staff
Hydrological engineer	1 staff
Surveyor	2 staff
Agriculture	3 staff
Stone conservator	4 staff
GIS/urban planning	1 staff
Construction monitoring	1 staff

Following the adoption of the new plans and associated guidelines, local information sessions were conducted by the Vat Phou World Heritage Site Office through schools and villages. These have been held in 17 village, mostly the urban ones, delivered through both school workshops and village workshops. The school workshops target teachers and students, while the village workshops target village chiefs and residents, with an estimated 70-80 percent participation rate. Over 200-

⁹ The technical team of engineers and architects has clearly benefitted from these studies and demand additional training. The exchanges with other universities and the collaboration with other students was a source of additional motivation.

300 people join each workshop. During the workshops, the Vat Phou management office staff explain the heritage significance of the site and the regulations related to urban planning and building construction. The staff make an effort to make the sessions interactive, offering small prizes to those who can answer questions correctly. The workshops have been conducted on a regular basis, providing an opportunity to further reinforce the previous messages and to clarify further.

In addition to providing information, the Vat Phou office has attempted to make the building permissions process as user-friendly as possible. The official permit form can be purchased from the Vat Phou office for only Lao Kip 10,000, compared to the going rate of Lao Kip 70,000 if purchased from the district office. That said, the process requires the applicant to fill in a three-page form, including photo, which has to be signed by the village chief as well as neighbors, as well as submit architectural drawings of the proposed construction. This process in itself must be daunting for the average resident, with limited access to technical professionals, and can be a deterrent to those who are not fully committed to abiding by the rules.

However, in terms of actual implementation, the Master Plan has been less effective in regulating the landscape. According to the heritage authorities, the Master Plan has been most effective in controlling new buildings along the Route 14A. As a public deterrent, one building along the new road that was built without proper permissions was torn down by the authorities in 2013, as a warning and to heighten awareness about the new focus on preserving the landscape. The heritage authorities maintain that along the roadway, which is surrounded by rice paddies, the only buildings that have been built are of a temporary nature. When pressed further, it turns out that a number of the temporary agricultural shelters have now morphed into actual houses that were built by homeowners, ostensibly to give them more convenient access to their fields. However, the authorities are reluctant to undertake more demolitions. A heritage official has explained that it is “*roonraeng*

geun bai” (too violent) and that Lao government policy does not encourage such behavior “*ya hai mi matrakarn roonraeng*” (do not have any violent measures).

The building construction procedures require the request to be sent from the village authorities (*ban*) to the Vat Phou World Heritage Site office, which will review the request and issue a technical recommendation, on the basis of the conformity of the proposed building to the building code, the Land Use Plan and the Landscape Master Plan. The file is then sent to the Champasak District Department of Public Works and Transportation and ultimately to the District Government for final authorization.

Table 21 Decisions of the Vat Phou World Heritage Office on Building Construction Control

	2014	2015*	2016
	20 cases	42 cases	26 cases
Residential building construction	10 approved 3 not approved (buffer zone)	23 approved 2 not approved	13 approved 2 not approved (1 near Route 14A, 1 near archaeological area)
House demolition	1 not approved (heritage listed)		
Farmhouse construction	1 approved		
Fence construction	1 approved		2 approved
Commercial building construction	2 approved	Approved: 4 stores 1 warehouse 4 gas stations Not approved:	1 office approved 2 commercial houses approved

		1 game cock arena <i>Transferred to district committee</i> 1 store	
Modifying house	1 not approved (buffer zone)		1 approved
Digging	1 not approved (near Ancient City)	1 approved	2 approved 1 not approved (near Ancient City)
Earth works		5 approved	
Cemetery access			1 approved
Phone antenna			1 approved

**Temporary increase before the new Landscape Master Plan entered into force*

(Source: Vat Phou WHSO)

The record of construction requests received by the Vat Phou WHSO shows that relatively few requests are in contravention of the rules. However, these numbers under-represent the incidences of non-compliant construction in two ways. First, the technical recommendation by the Vat Phou World Heritage Site Office is not always honored by the district authorities. “*The District Government lets things go too easily,*” says a heritage official.



Figure 41 Preferred reinforced concrete construction (above) compared to permissible wooden farm house (below) within the agricultural landscape

More worrying, less scrupulous homeowners simply embark on their building projects without seeking any approval. A heritage official explains that the relatively high rate of compliance among permit-seekers is self-selecting, “*If they understand [the regulations], then they ask for a permit. But if they don’t understand, then they don’t ask a permit.*” Two other senior officials both estimate that 50 percent

of residents submit permits while 50 percent of residents do not submit permits. For instance, in 2018, 26 permits were granted but around 40 new houses were built. The senior site management officer says, *“The people don’t like wooden houses, they think concrete buildings are better. So they often use the wrong materials, but they do it in advance (tam pai kon). For instance, we recommend to build only a wooden farmhouse in the fields, but they already go ahead with laying a concrete foundation.”*

One heritage official ruefully notes that the residents are well aware of the routine weekly monitoring, which happens on Thursdays. Residents seeking to sidestep the law start excavating on Friday, so that they can begin erecting posts and pouring concrete on Saturday, to ensure the work is well-advanced by the time the next monitoring visit occurs. In this instance, the Vat Phou office has no recourse but to get the homeowner to sign an affidavit (*bot banteuk*) that they will, at their own expense, remove the new construction if it is found to have any adverse heritage impact.

Likewise, for unauthorized demolitions, the owner must sign an affidavit promising to rebuild the demolished building as a replica of the old building. This affidavit has to be signed by the village chief, the District Heritage Committee, the Vat Phou World Heritage Site Office, the village committee and the house owner.

Although the new Landscape Master Plan and its accompanying Land Use Plan and Building Codes present a new regulatory framework for Vat Phou, it was not accompanied by changes in enforcement mechanisms. Illegal construction activity in Vat Phou is not yet held accountable to any punitive measures. Unlike in other cities, there is no fine associated with failure to abide by building bylaw, which is calculated as a percentage of the construction cost. This was a key issue repeatedly raised by various officers in explaining the Vat Phou WHSO’s difficulty in enforcing construction regulations:

“Our rules are not strict yet (mai ded kad).” (National Heritage Department senior officer)

“The law is not strict, we can only issue reminder but no fine.” (Vat Phou WHSO officer)

“We need punitive measures like fines and requirements to rectify mistakes.” (Vat Phou WHSO officer)

The inability to promulgate punitive measures in Champasak reveals an underlying resistance within the district and provincial authorities legislation to crack down on such building activity. After many awareness raising sessions and involvement in both national and international meetings, the other departments are still not invested in the importance of the heritage and its protection. The lack of ownership of the Landscape Master Plan was revealed in a telling moment. When asked to comment on the Master Plan, two years after its adoption, a senior local official at first responded that he was not familiar with the document, before taking back his comment after quickly perusing the volume.



Figure 42 Unauthorized demolition of terraced house in Champasak town

5.4 Institutional dynamics in the context of expanding boundaries of practice

The level of institutional change seen at Vat Phou – in terms of change in the organizations, the regulations, and the coordination mechanisms – will be unpacked further below, with more insights into the interplay between formal and informal rules, as well as the various factors of adaptive capacity. As with Ayutthaya, two frameworks will be used: (i) overall description of the dynamics of the institutional system as a whole, based on the typology proposed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) (creating dynamics, maintaining dynamics and disruptive dynamics, plus the additional proposed regressing dynamics) and (ii) factors of adaptive capacity as proposed in the initial framework in Chapter 2.

The overall institutional dynamic in terms of adaptive capacity at Vat Phou is a mixture between a **disruptive dynamic** seen within the heritage sector and a **maintaining dynamic** within the larger political economy system of Champasak. The disruptions have clashed with the maintaining forces, thus limiting the overall capacity of the institutional system to change. The concept mapping of Vat Phou, based on the socio-institutional factors identified from the coding exercise, is per the diagram below.

The regime at Vat Phou demonstrated **learning capacity**, notably the heritage management office being able to step outside its usual comfort zone of monuments and archaeological sites. Most clearly, the issue with the new road triggered the development of a new **cognitive framework** (most strongly within the heritage agency, but to a lesser extent with other agencies as well) by reorienting management practice towards a cultural landscape management scale and using an urban planning approach. This had a disruptive effect in the formal **governance structures**, with the creation of the cultural landscape master plan and urban and building regulations.

Expanding beyond the normal focus on the Vat Phou monument complex to encompass the rural and urban landscape created the necessity to engage more with other stakeholders – both local government agencies as well as residents. The fact that this new master plan was endorsed by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, demonstrated a willingness of the Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism to recognize the issue of urban planning as the appropriate instrument rather than relying solely on heritage tools, and thus to relinquish the issue of World Heritage to the regulatory mandate of another Ministry.

Moreover, in terms of **relationships**, the new necessity of dealing with the urban and rural landscape required more regular coordination between the heritage and non-heritage stakeholders. This took the form of regular advocacy sessions with villages and schools, as well as more frequent meetings among the local agencies in Champasak district.

The **ability to translate learning into practice** was limited, as evidenced by the growing rather than diminishing number of infractions in illegal construction and demolition within the heritage landscape. Several key factors proved to be limiting to implementing the new formal governance measures: **resources, relationships** and **agency**.

Despite the enlarged scope of site management, **financial resources** for the heritage authorities were not increased, and indeed were cut. A senior heritage official said, “*We see the problems, but we don’t have funds to implement.*” Similarly, a high-ranking national heritage executive explained, “*The finances are not yet aligned.*” The protection of the site suffered serious funding cuts when the new tourism concession was instituted in 2011. This collapse in the revenue stream, coupled with provincial government budget cuts, reflects a disinterest by the provincial government to invest in Vat Phou. The drop in domestic funds has created a reliance on external donor funding within the site management authorities.

At the outset, such external donor support could be seen to have had a positive effect. For instance, the role of international donors has boosted **technical capacity**, with a handful of new young staff and new knowhow gained from training or on-the-job exposure. This has helped to cope with the attrition of senior staff due to retirement and death.

At a deeper level though, dependency on donor funding has compromised the **agency** of the site management office. Without financial independence, it is increasingly unable to monitor and guide the actions of international teams, nor to retain its independent counsel or experts to provide technical advice to counter conservation and management actions that the office does not agree with. Moreover, when it is beholden to foreign teams for financial assistance for even basic technical functions as well as financial support for staff training and allowances, then the ability of the Vat Phou office to maintain an independent agenda and its own critical stance is reduced.

Such external factors have further eroded the status of the site management office, whose status in the political hierarchy and role in the political economy of Champasak province has been low. A structural problem in terms of **relationships** is that the site management agency mainly has statutory control over the monument zone which is designated as “Cultural Land” in the Land Law, while the rest of the landscape is under the control on a de jure basis by the municipal government and on a de facto basis by local residents. Moreover, despite being a statutory body wielding the heritage laws in their hand, their authority is further weakened as the building control regulations have no punitive measures, and therefore no sanctions for non-compliance. Finally, in terms of authority, heritage officials have complained that *“the province will not upgrade us to a department level unit”* and that *“the district governor will not authorize us to make decisions regarding building and development control...he wants to keep power in his hand”*. Another senior heritage official explained that the office is *“under the control (karn chi nam) of the provincial government, so negotiation power is limited”*.

With weak funding, technical and authority, it can be said that the site management agency has to increase its reliance on the remaining resource which it can control, which is its **social capital**. The closeness of the site officers with the local residents (through kinship ties and other connections within a small rural society) gives site officers the ability to gain the trust of local residents, using the power of suasion rather than statutory authority conferred by the law. However, it also makes it difficult for them to crack down harshly on any infractions by the same people. When their higher official status is overshadowed by their lower kinship status (as a younger relative speaking to an older relative), their monitoring or technical functions are effectively neutralized. Maitreemit notes that this phenomenon is particularly apparent during the Vat Phou Festival where the Vat Phou management office staff essentially revert to being local residents (*chao ban*) joining the revelry, with barely any enforcement functions (2018).

The blind eye towards the infractions could be seen on the one hand as a manifestation of the lack of authority of the heritage authorities. On the other hand, such selective *laissez faire* can be seen as a tactic by the heritage authorities to conserve and deploy a significant resource, which is their social capital. By being overly harsh, they risk to lose the trust and good relations with the people, making it difficult for them to seek cooperation in more serious cases. For the district government, such lax enforcement has a different motivation as it is a way to curry favor with its political constituents.

Various informants explained the willingness to tolerate infractions with the notion that the state has compassion for the people, that is “*hen jai prachachon*” (*we feel for the people*). This is also expressed as “*nisai khon lao, hen jai gan*” (it’s the Laotian way to feel compassion for each other). This is cited particularly when the people are perceived to have no other recourse “*mai mi tang leuak*”, for instance that they do not have any other land on which to build, hence they are forced to build in a particular location, even if it is inappropriate from a heritage point of view. Likewise, the tacit approval for a water supply project to finally go

ahead in 2019 in the middle of the heritage town was also justified as serving the needs of the people.

Despite no organized political outlet like voting, given the Lao socialist governance system, the local people have proved to a formidable force to contend with. Similar to their non-compliance with urban planning regulations, the local people were likewise able to exercise their agency to counter the new commercial regime imposed by the tourism concession. When it took over the tourism operations of the site, the concession increased the ticket prices and started to levy entrance fees for local people attending the Vat Phou Festival. Laotian visitors, numbering over 100,000 during the festival, protested the new ticketing regime as being counter to the religious function of the event, which has historically been open to visitors and pilgrims. As a result, the concession company and the government eventually had to cave in and drop the ticketing scheme during these days, even though it was the peak visitation event all year, with visitation on the three days of the festival essentially equivalent to the total number of visitors all year round.

The combined effect of greater responsibilities, but limited financial and technical resources and lowly status have created an overreliance on social capital on the part of the Vat Phou WHSO. This has further tamped down the **agency** of the heritage site office, in turn further constraining the effectiveness of its monitoring and enforcement in its expanded area of responsibility.

As a reaction to its relative powerlessness to control urbanization and even the activities within the monument zone under control of the politically-connected concession company, the heritage site office appears to have **retreated** to its remaining area of firm control. For instance, the refusal by the heritage site office to allow a donor to construct a laboratory building next to its office appears to be an act of over-compensation, by being overly strict with its own land use while standards elsewhere are sliding. *“The World Heritage Committee has already expressed concern about the density of the monument zone, so we have to limit*

construction,” said a senior heritage official, while in fact, multiple new buildings for tourism purposes have been built or enlarged by the concession in the same area.

To boost its **agency**, the heritage site office has tried to leverage the authority of international bodies, notably UNESCO, in helping it to negotiate with other partners and to establish the centrality of World Heritage within the Vat Phou political economy discourse. This can be seen in its annual convening of the International Coordinating Meeting. While essentially performative in its role, without any technical or managerial decisions taken during the meeting, the actual event itself provides a platform that has expanded beyond just a few foreign donors to involve many local government agencies, village representatives and Laotian universities in foregrounding the World Heritage site and obligations. This intentional effort in mobilizing key constituents such as UNESCO demonstrates the social skills of the Vat Phou WHSO. “Because they can seldom change institutions alone, institutional entrepreneurs must typically mobilize allies [and] develop alliances and cooperation” (Leca et al., 2008).

The Vat Phou WHSO also proposes to create new alliances to smooth its operational capacity. In assessing construction activities, the office suggests that officials from the Vat Phou WHSO, the Department of Information, Culture and Tourism and the Department of Public Works and Transport undertake site visits jointly, to discuss and then agree upon a technical recommendation to the District Governor. To take it a step further, the office is even proposing to set up a one-stop shop where residents can come to consult the three authorities together in planning their new construction projects, and which will also review the request together as well. Whether this administrative response will be enough to overcome underlying factors creating resistance to heritage safeguarding remains to be seen.




Figure 43 Qualitative conceptual mapping of institutional dynamics and adaptive capacity: Vat Phou

The Vat Phou case reveals a cognitive and regulatory flexibility in terms of re-orienting its formal institutional structures towards a new approach to conservation focusing on management of the broader cultural landscape. However, this adaptation in the system has not been able to overcome entrenched informal institutional realities in terms of power differentials and lack of investment in the protection of the site. The inability to effectively enlarge its practice to cover the widened area of responsibility has driven it to **retreat** (to its area of undisputed authority) as well as to try to also **create new alliances** to bolster, if not its actual statutory authority, at least its perceived standing within the network of stakeholders.

The **learning capacity** in the system has not translated into a sustainable shift in the management of the site. The enlarged boundaries of practice from a monument assemblage to a landscape in fact have put stress on the management capacity, leading to poorer enforcement. The underlying reason cited by local informants is that World Heritage listing of Vat Phou has not brought any tangible benefits to the local community. This issue was used to explain both disinterest and lack of cooperation among residents as well as the local government itself. Unlike in Luang Prabang, where World Heritage status and the heritage buildings and attributes are the driving force of a booming tourism economy, in Vat Phou, the economic and social benefits of being a World Heritage site are negligible. As a result, both local people and local government agencies are not keen to invest in heritage protection, saying “*mi moradok (dae) mai dai arai keun ma*” (we have heritage but we get nothing in return) or “*(moradok) yang mai dai ao nguen ma hai rao*” (heritage has not yet shown us the money). Whereas in Luang Prabang, heritage has been placed at the centre of local government development policy and strategy, including financial allocations, at Vat Phou even gaining cooperation to avoid negative impacts is difficult, let alone pro-active measures like investment.

In terms of the long-term horizon, many stakeholders propose a second shift in the **cognitive frame** for managing the site towards a sustainable development approach. This would be a demonstration of triple loop learning, where there is a

fundamental paradigm shift to dealing with Vat Phou. Local stakeholders repeatedly refer to the importance of improving local welfare. This would require adding the additional dimension of “well-being” for the local communities as a central pillar of managing Vat Phou, alongside the original mandate and capacities related to safeguarding of the monuments and the expanded concern for the urban and rural landscape. If investing in Vat Phou heritage is seen as an essential driver for local well-being, then resources would be increased and the status of the heritage site office would also be upgraded accordingly, which would strengthen the safeguarding of the landscape. This is captured in the subsequent diagram.






Figure 44 Qualitative conceptual mapping: future scenario for connecting heritage and sustainable development voiced by stakeholders in planning Vat Phou

5.5 Factors of adaptive capacity

5.5.1 Investing in information and knowledge: Cognitive frame and learning capacity

The learning capacity and subsequent changes in the cognitive frame proved to be important in instigating the partial transformation of the management and governance institutions at Vat Phou. As per scholars who assert exogenous explanations for institutional change, the crisis of the Route 14A construction, and the subsequent attention created at the international and national level, did indeed generate the political momentum needed to first change the discourse around Vat Phou and second to provide the resources to begin creating new institutional rules. The creation of the Landscape Master Plan displayed a capacity for various actors to undergo double loop learning, by changing some of the fundamental tenets in the earlier approach to managing the site, which was originally focused more on conserving monuments and archaeological remains. This was backed up by building technical capacity through training activities and new recruitments, equipping the heritage authorities to handle new professional responsibilities related to city planning, while exposing the other authorities and local population to heritage matters. The technical capacity building has succeeded to the point that the Vat Phou WHSO has now been acknowledged as a mentor in the area of urban planning within the national heritage system, and was called to provide support to the neighboring province of Savannakhet in early 2019.

At the same time, the scholars who remind about the inherently slow-moving nature of institutional change are vindicated in the sense that this initial cognitive shift did not transform the system sufficiently to affect actual practice, as seen in lack of cooperation in enforcing the new Master Plan. Moreover, the initial cognitive shift and the double loop learning could not address the underlying tensions between conservation and development in a truly transformative manner which would have aligned interests and actors more closely. While attempting to defuse some of these tensions through making more allowances for construction in non-core heritage areas, the new institutional measures did not actually revolutionize the

system to the point where heritage is seen as a driver for local development. This triple loop learning is being seen in discourse, as in the visioning exercise for the future of Vat Phou Champasak, but not yet in the formal rules, and thus not yet in practice.

5.5.2 Encouraging appropriate institutions: Agency, formal governance structures and relationships

The ability to translate learning into practice stumbled on the capacity of the system to encourage appropriate institutions. The heritage sector saw the most adaptation, with learning leading to new organizational structure, operational tasks and responsibilities. However, the formal governance structures in terms of the planning and regulatory instruments only changed partially, with new regulations that were not accompanied by punitive measures. Likewise, more frequent coordination meetings provided the basis to break down silos and encourage exchange among the different sectoral departments. However, the increased coordination may have improved personal connections and contributed to trust, but it did not revamp the underlying relationships and hierarchies.

Agency proved to be a major factor determining the ability of an organization to take ownership and to assert control. In a polycentric setup like Vat Phou, where multiple organizations are empowered in overlapping jurisdictions, the limited agency of the heritage site organization proved to be a perennial source of weakness in terms of authority. Its inability to upgrade its status to a full-fledged department contributed to its continuing difficulties to override or influence the district Department of Public Works and Transport or the district governor.

5.5.3 Increasing resources

Likewise, in terms of creating change at the level of practice, the lack of adequate resources proved to be another important obstacle. The initial boost of interest in the site starting around 2011 channeled more technical support from counterpart ministries notably the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and international partners, notably the French team and UNESCO. This was helpful in

the first stage of partially changing the institutional rules. However, this did not translate into longer-term improvements in resources that were needed to impellent such changes.

With its lowly status and the still limited regard for heritage within the provincial government, the Vat Phou WHSO was unable to leverage more support from regular sources either in terms of financial or staffing in the long term. In fact, a catastrophic funding cut in the form of diverting tourism revenue to a new concession severely hampered the Office's capacity to discharge its functions.

5.6 Conclusion: reflection on institutional dynamics, adaptive capacity and expanding boundaries of practice

5.6.1 Polycentric institutional setting

The case study of Vat Phou supports the hypothesis that polycentric institutional arrangements are conducive to adaptation – up to a certain level. The fact that the Vat Phou WHSO has only a partial statutory mandate over the World Heritage site requires it to deal with the provincial and district authorities, other line departments, as well as the local residents. This has forced the heritage office to consider other agendas than the heritage agenda, which is unlike other heritage departments who view their mandate more narrowly. The fact that the office sees its immediate reporting line as being the provincial government, and has some sense of distance from the national Heritage Department, also allows it to be less rigid in discharging its functions beyond just conservation.

Maintaining its stance within this negotiated territory has required the office to be nimble in framing a management response to the multi-sectoral problems associated with the cultural landscape, creating alliances in developing and trying to implement a new suite of urban plans and regulations for the site. It was able to readjust the World Heritage restrictions in order to provide a way out (“*hai tang awk*”) to the local people by allowing more intensive development in the newly-established buffer zone, while maintaining strict control over the core zone. This demonstrates a strategic tactic in making the heritage agenda more responsive to

local needs, instead of stridently protecting the heritage at all costs, which would not win it any friends either among the people or the other departments.

5.6.2 Formal-informal interaction

The linkage between formal and informal rules in operation at Vat Phou demonstrates the importance of informal rules in facilitating or undermining adaptation capacity. The literature emphasizes the importance of reflecting informal gains from learning into formalized rules backed up by statutory or legislative authority. In the case of Vat Phou, what was needed was a deeper change in the underlying informal rules to ensure that learning did not only translate into new governance structures, but also into practice.

It was relatively easy to change the formal rules starting in 2011 not long after the crisis started, particularly the planning and regulatory instruments related to managing the cultural landscape which involved multiple sectors at multiple levels. To an extent, the structure of the Vat Phou WHSO was changed accordingly. However, the implementation of these new formal rules was stymied by the underlying informal rules. With its minimal status, authority and resources, the office struggled to assert its authority against the other departments and to control the behavior of the local people. It certainly could not stand up against the political alliances between the provincial government and the tourism concession, which deprived it even further of both financing as well as authority. The intransigence of local people, a conscious act of resistance without any consequences either in terms of fines or in terms of crackdown by more powerful district or provincial authorities, played upon the close ties between the people and the heritage authorities. The authorities were in fact forced not just to tolerate, but to actively cultivate such ties, in order to retain its social capital. Once the authorities were seen as not enforcing the rules, this further eroded their credibility to transform the rules-in-form into rules-in-use. Within the framework of institutional work proposed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), the failure to construct rewards and sanctions to enforce the rules meant that the act of creating this new institutional framework was incomplete.

5.6.3 Expanding boundaries of practice

The relatively high level of adaptive capacity at Vat Phou enabled the institutions to face up to new sets of issues which did not have a pre-existing management or governance framework in place. The distributed responsibilities for managing the site within the polycentric institutional system on the one hand created conflicts (ie, between the Department of Public Works and Transport and the Vat Phou WHSO). On the other hand, the very nature of overlapping authorities allowed for more flexibility in the system as a whole. This supports the view of institutional scholars (Clemens and Cook, 1999 in Leca et al, 2008) who posit that having multiple institutional orders make a system less “institutionalized” and rigid, and may allow actors to exercise greater agency. In this sense, the Vat Phou WHSO did not face the dilemma of being locked into its normal mandate – heritage conservation focusing on monuments and archaeological sites. Indeed, it was able to confront a relatively new issue – managing cultural landscapes – by using innovative tools and approaches – city planning – and by creating new alliances with the required partners.

However, the second expansion in the boundary of practice at the site – from heritage management to facilitating sustainable local development – has only started. The system exhibited triple loop learning in the sense that the planning discourse at Vat Phou has now shifted to give equal weight to development issues. The new Landscape Master Plan attempts to give space, literally, for more development to occur within the World Heritage site, particularly in the newly demarcated buffer zone. However, the potential gains from linking heritage to development has not yet changed mindsets and behavior among the local and provincial authorities and local people. The authorities continue to under-invest at Vat Phou instead of seeing such investment as having a fruitful payback. The local people who continue to disregard the heritage rules see them as onerous restrictions rather than measures to continue to enhance the value of the site, including as a visitor destination.

5.7 Summary of chapter

As at Ayutthaya, Vat Phou was challenged with both a conceptual and geographic expansion in heritage, which triggered changes in both discourse and to a certain degree practices related to heritage management. From a focus on protecting the Vat Phou temple complex, the site management institution had to recalibrate itself to dealing with the protection and management of the larger Champasak landscape. The polycentric institutional system at Vat Phou proved to be more dynamic than at Ayutthaya, and new alliances were created to produce a series of new planning documents to respond to the new situation. However, operating in a polycentric context ultimately proved to be a source of difficulty for the heritage agency, which needed to compete with the other organizations for resources and power. As at Ayutthaya, a second narrative presented itself at Vat Phou, in the form of another cognitive shift which is now being talked about, but which has not yet translated into either formal or informal rules, or into action: the shift from simply protecting heritage to seeing heritage as a driver for local development. Within Lao PDR, the institutional system for managing Luang Prabang World Heritage town already puts heritage at the centre of its development strategy, leading to the heritage agenda being well resourced and highly prioritized. Putting in place a similar cognitive shift at Vat Phou could have the potential to transform the institutional ecology at the site.

Chapter 6

George Town


6.1 Introduction

Chapter 6 looks at the case of George Town, part of the serial World Heritage site of the Historic Cities of the Straits of Malacca, along with Melaka. This represents the most complex institutional ecology among the three cases, with a highly polycentric system with multiple organizations operating at the municipal and Penang state level. The chapter traces the evolution of the system after concerns were raised by the World Heritage Committee regarding uncontrolled building development, shortly after the site's World Heritage inscription. The highly dynamic institutional adaptations that occurred are analyzed in terms of the factors of adaptive capacity. At the same time, factors of resistance which limited change in other areas are also noted.

6.2 Background

6.2.1 Introduction to the site

Strategically located on the Straits of Malacca, one of the world's busiest sea trading routes, the city of George Town was founded in 1786 by the British trader Francis Light, in a natural harbor on the northeast tip of the island of Penang. As a trading post of the East India Company (EIC), the settlement was laid out in the pattern of other British colonial towns, with a fort, esplanade and civic buildings. It also served as an administrative center for the EIC, until the administrative center was transferred to Singapore. For a period of time, Penang was grouped with Melaka and Singapore as part of the Straits Settlement under the EIC administrative structure.



*Figure 45 Location of George Town
(Source: Heritage Management Plan)*

As a free port, the city was a magnet for immigrants including Chinese, Indians, Armenians and Europeans, along with local Malays. Different ethnic groups established enclaves with the Chinese and Indians clustering in the gridded core of George Town. Different Chinese dialect groups (notably the Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew and Hakka) set up roots around their respective clan associations (*kongsi*) and temples, and retained their cultural practices (food, dialect, customs) including architectural identity. The Indian settlers historically clustered along Chulia Street, with the Muslim community anchored by the Kapitan Keling Mosque and the Hindu community around the Sri Mahamariamam Temple. The Malay town was to the south around Prangin Canal, with the Acheen Malay Mosque as its physical and spiritual landmark. The Europeans predominantly settled on the northern perimeter of the city, around the civic centre.

For almost two centuries, Penang flourished as a multi-cultural trading hub. However, the cessation of Penang's free port status in 1969 led to a precipitous

economic downturn, mass unemployment and emigration of younger working professionals and elites. The lack of economic activity led to the decline of its historic waterfront and downtown area. Penang turned to a new growth strategy reliant on manufacturing fueled by Foreign Direct Investment, launched by the-then Chief Minister Lim Chong Eu. Manufacturing enabled Penang's fortunes to turn around. However, the historic city core continued to decline, in part because of the Rent Control Act which depressed rents.

An urban renewal effort initiated in the early 1970s resulted in razing several historic blocks and the construction of the KOMTAR complex on the southern edge of the historic city, which awakened preservation concerns among the public. The Central Area Planning Unit (CAPU) of the city council formulated an early conservation plan for the city, which became incorporated into the town plan, Interim Zoning Plan 1/73 which was gazetted by the State Government in 1974.

The heritage movement continued to gain steam, among both civil society and the public sector. The Penang Heritage Trust was founded in the 1980s, followed by other groups set up in the 1990s such as ArtsEd. The government gazetted the National Heritage Act in 2005 and appointed a Heritage Commissioner, in part to spearhead the country's efforts to nominate its first cultural World Heritage site: George Town and Melaka.

6.2.2 Significance of the site

In 2008, the site was enlisted on the World Heritage List as part of a joint nomination with the historic city of Melaka under the banner of 'Melaka and George Town, Historic Cities of the Straits of Malacca'. Reflecting the multi-culturalism of the sites, the Outstanding Universal Value of the site was recognized on the grounds of three criteria:

“Criterion (ii): Melaka and George Town represent exceptional examples of multi-cultural trading towns in East and Southeast Asia, forged from the mercantile and exchanges of Malay, Chinese, and Indian cultures and three successive European

colonial powers for almost 500 years, each with its imprints on the architecture and urban form, technology and monumental art. Both towns show different stages of development and the successive changes over a long span of time and are thus complementary.

Criterion (iii): Melaka and George Town are living testimony to the multi-cultural heritage and tradition of Asia, and European colonial influences. This multi-cultural tangible and intangible heritage expressed in the great variety of religious buildings of different faiths, ethnic quarters, the many languages, worship and religious festivals, dances, costumes, art and music, food, and daily life.

Criterion (iv): Melaka and George Town reflect a mixture of influences which have created a unique architecture, culture and townscape without parallel anywhere in East and South Asia. In particular, they demonstrate an exceptional range of shophouses and townhouses. These buildings show many different types and stages of development of the building type, some originating in the Dutch or Portuguese periods.”

The World Heritage property covers 109.38 hectares, and is bounded by the Straits of Malacca on the northeast, Love Lane to the northwest, Gat Lebu Melayu and Jalan Dr Lim Chwee Leong to the southwest corner. The buffer zone consists of an additional 150.04 hectares (not including the sea buffer), which is bounded by the sea around the harbor, Jalan Dr Lim Chwee Leong to the southwest corner and Jalan Transfer to the northwest corner.



Figure 46 World Heritage zoning for George Town


In total, there are 5,013 historic buildings, with 2,569 in the World Heritage property and 2,444 in the buffer zone. Diverse buildings from different religious traditions (Muslim mosques, Hindu temples, Christian churches, and Buddhist temples) are key attributes, notably along the so-called Street of Harmony, which has become emblematic of the city. Other prominent sites include the colonial-era edifices in the civic precinct, clustered around the northern seafront. In a nod to its Chinese majority population, communal buildings such as the Chinese association halls built by immigrants hailing from different clans, provinces, and language groups, also have a prominent place in George Town's heritage narrative. Residential architecture included the Indo-Malay bungalow which was based on indigenous

Malay buildings married with brick construction technology and the Anglo-Indian bungalow which adapted colonial Georgian revival architecture to the local climatic context (such as Suffolk House and Syed Alatas building). Wealthy Chinese families constructed grand courtyard mansions combining a Chinese plan with European ornamentation. On the waterfront, commercial warehouses (*godowns*) were constructed next to the busy port areas. Clan jetties extending into the water housed Chinese workers.

By far, the majority of the buildings composing the urban fabric are shophouses, with George Town housing the largest extant collection of shophouses in the historic Straits Settlement. The mixed-use buildings typically accommodated a family business on the ground floor and housing above. The terraced shophouses shaped the character of the city's streetscape, with covered five-foot walkways at ground level adjoining the street and providing continuous passage. Tan (2015) and Jenkins (2013) have classified the shophouses into six distinctive typologies that evolved over two centuries: the utilitarian early Penang style (1800s-1850s), southern Chinese Eclectic style (1840s-1910s), early Straits Eclectic style (1890s-1920s), the highly decorated late Straits Eclectic style (1920s-1930s), Art Deco style (1930s-early 1960s) and early Modern style (1950s-1970s).



No. 88 & 90, Armenian Street



No. 118, Armenian Street

Figure 47 Examples of early and late Straits Eclectic style (left and right)

(Source: Heritage Management Plan)

The successive waves of immigration and co-mingling which occurred gave rise to a diversity of cultural practices and communities that is the hallmark of Penang's multi-ethnic living heritage. Malay, Chinese, Indian, Arab and European communities co-existed side-by-side, both figuratively and literally, with different groups living in close proximity in the historic city centre. They have continued to retain distinctive identities through food, language, festivals, artistic expressions, and other customs. Major festivals such as the Hindu Thaipusam, the Chinese Feast of the Hungry Ghost, or the Buddhist Vesak Day animate the public spaces of the city and are partaken in by various residents. In addition, interchange among the groups resulted in diverse hybrid cultures. Penang is a major centre for the Peranakan community of Straits Chinese, fusing Chinese with Malay culture, as seen in distinctive cuisine and traditional clothing. The marriage of South Indian men with Malay women and inter-marriage among Arab settlers and Malay women also gave rise to more hybrid cultural manifestations.

The traditional trades associated with the various settlers and locals were often organized along ethnic lines and clustered in different parts of the city (Chin, 2014). Culinary arts included an array of Nyonya sweets (*kuih*), candy floss, soy sauce, tofu, Tamil string hoppers, and other food items. Fine artisans engaged in silversmithing and Indian goldsmithing. Traditional clothing items such as the Malay songkok, Nyonya beaded shoes and *kebayas* were meticulously crafted by hand. Ritual goods such as joss sticks, wooden deities (*ang kong*), Teochew-style festive lanterns, flower garlands continue to be made, along with decorative Indian-style *kolam* powder decorations. Other shops offered traditional cosmetics and beautification services such as facial threading and *henna* designs. Everyday items once in popular use such as trishaws, bolster pillows, rattan furniture, lanterns and hand-made soap were also produced in family-run businesses. Collectively, these commercial enterprises have given life to George Town's economy and their day-to-day activities enlivened its neighborhoods for centuries. Over the past two decades, many of these trades have faced a downturn, however, with the artisan population aging and dwindling,

economic pressures in the form of higher rents, and the consumers' shift to industrialized commodities.

6.2.3 Management and governance institutions

George Town has a highly polycentric institutional system for heritage governance which operates at multiple levels and reflects the involvement of multiple landowners and statutory bodies. At the time of George Town's World Heritage inscription in 2008, many of the specific heritage organizations and regulations that are in place today had not yet been developed, although many of the provisions in use now had been earlier foreseen as part of the World Heritage nomination preparation process.

Within Malaysia's federal system, George Town has a multi-level governance structure, although in practice much of the heritage governance is locally driven at the state level. In the case of Penang, its long-time status as an opposition state has heightened its self-reliance and internal politics within a tightly knit political ecosystem. The key government actors at the federal level are the Ministry in charge of heritage (whose name and remit keep evolving over time), the Commissioner of Heritage, and the National Heritage Council. Physical planning is overseen through the National Physical Planning Council and the Directorate of Town and Country Planning. At the state level, the state authority is the Penang State Executive Council spearheaded by the Chief Minister. The State Planning Committee, chaired by the Chief Minister, decides on planning policies, while the State Heritage Committee is meant to supervise heritage issues. At the local level, the City Council of Penang Island, the Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang (MBPP), has statutory functions, under its Planning, Building, Engineering, Urban Services and Licensing Departments and its Landscape and Heritage Units.



Figure 48 Land use of Penang heritage site

At the time of World Heritage inscription, land ownership was roughly split between the public sector (45 percent) and private entities (55 percent) (State Government of Penang, 2008). State-owned land and properties includes public buildings, some religious buildings, roads and public spaces. Among the private owners, there are 40 major landowners, notably the Chinese class associations (*kongsis*) and religious institutions such as the Muslim Endowment Board. The distribution of property in multiple hands requires the involvement of a wide range of local stakeholders. The Heritage Management Plan (2008) listed over 20 other entities whose involvement was deemed necessary for the management of the site, in addition to those key statutory agencies already mentioned.

Table 22 Stakeholders identified by George Town Heritage Management Plan

Type	Name of entity
Public sector entities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● State Town and Country Planning Department ● State Tourism Action Council ● Penang Development Corporation ● State Public Works Department ● Other State technical departments (National Electricity Board, Telecoms and other telcos, Waterworks, Fire Department, etc.) ● Penang State Museum ● Penang Port Commission
Private sector and civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang (Islamic Religious Council of Penang) ● Chinese Clans (<i>kongsi</i>) and Associations ● Hindu Endowment Board ● Nanyang Folk Culture Group ● Badan Warisan Malaysia ● ArtsEd ● Various Chambers of Commerce ● Various sports and recreation organizations ● Hoteliers, travel, guides and transport agencies and associations ● Chinese Town Hall

As seen in the extensive list of organizations above, and unlike the other two case study sites, Penang has an unusually active civil society, particularly NGOs operating on all issues – from protecting consumers to sustainable transport to environmental sustainability. It is widely acknowledged that in the area of cultural

heritage, heritage NGOs have been at the forefront in setting the agenda and pressuring the government at federal, state and local levels to take action both on policy level issues and specific incidents. In Penang, heritage NGOs not only perform a vocal watchdog function through the press and other public channels, they are also appointed onto state bodies and committees – for instance, to serve in the Penang city council and the State Heritage Committee.

For World Heritage, civil society organizations have played an instrumental role in pushing the state government to even acknowledge the value of George Town’s heritage. They conducted extensive documentation and consultations which formed the basis for the World Heritage nomination dossier. A substantial part of the intellectual and regulatory groundwork for protecting historic George Town was laid by heritage advocates working with government counterparts, such as the development of the “Draft Design Guidelines for Conservation Areas for the Inner City of George Town” which was adopted by the municipal council in 1987. Li (2011) goes so far as to suggest that it was an alliance between the NGOs and reformist members of the state government that pushed through the successful World Heritage nomination.




Figure 49 Institutional ecology for managing George Town World Heritage site

Reflecting the polycentric nature of the heritage site management system in George Town, the map above shows the field of operational World Heritage mandate as being both wide and deep, with multiple actors directly involved in various aspects of managing the site. In addition to GTWHI as the World Heritage office, the site is also governed by the Penang City Council in terms of statutory control over the built and urban environment. The Penang State Government controls the overall policy direction for the island. Meanwhile, Think City is seen to be at the center of different alliances that operate towards both heritage and urban management goals.

A mapping of the different forms of influence and interconnectivity at the site shows a corresponding level of complexity and linkages. Unlike at Ayutthaya and Vat Phou where there is a reliance on statutory forms of authority, at least for official government entities, at George Town, even some organizations set up by the government rely on suasion or negotiation/alliance building as the primary forms of authority. Like at Vat Phou, the mapping suggests the centrality of the state government of Penang, which is actively connected to both state and municipal levels of governance and exerts control even over entities set up as quasi-independent agencies. The stance of individuals differ between tenants in the old city, who are closely connected with the cultural identity and life of George Town, versus property owners, who largely have more commercial rather than heritage interests in mind. Their efforts in redeveloping the city one property at a time are held in check by the statutory authority of the municipal government. Meanwhile, the heritage office maintains dialogue channels with them, using powers of persuasion in its absence of statutory power.




Figure 50 Mapping of actors at George Town

Still evolving legal framework

In terms of legal framework, the management of the site is conducted under a combination of heritage and urban laws at the federal level: National Heritage Act (2005), Town and Country Planning Act (1976), Local Government Act (1976) and the Street, Drainage and Building Act (1974). In addition, a State Heritage Enactment was adopted later in 2011. At the municipal level, the site is subject to a number of by-laws: Uniform Building By-Laws (1986); By-Laws under the Street, Draining and Building Act and the Local Government Act; as well as by-laws relating to petty traders, advertisements, food, business and entertainment. It is also subject to rules and regulations that operationalize the federal acts related to heritage and town and country planning.

The main statutory mechanism in governing the historic city is through the authority of the Town and Country Planning Act, using a spatial planning approach under three levels of plans: State Structure Plan that lays out policy, a Local Plan and the Special Area Plan. At the time of nomination, Penang already had a State Structure Plan (2007), and a Local Plan was under preparation, while a Special Area

Plan was proposed as a way to provide more detailed regulations under statutory authority. The State Structure Plan identifies the nominated area and the buffer zone as a conservation area. The State Structure Plan specifies that “Conservation aspects shall be integrated with comprehensive development in Heritage Preservation Areas (Inner City George Town)” and “Adaptive reuse of heritage buildings in the city centre shall be encouraged” (State Government of Penang, 2008).

The richness of its heritage and the international-level recognition of George Town belies the relatively light protection afforded by available heritage mechanisms. At the time of inscription, the site as a whole had no legal status in terms of protective gazettelement. The National Heritage Register had only one property listed at the time of George Town’s inscription: St. George’s Church. This has since increased to include other important properties such as Fort Cornwallis, Kapitan Keling Mosque, Khoo Kongsi and the Penang State Museum Board Building. A list of heritage buildings in the state has just recently been compiled.

At the individual building level, 66.5 percent of the buildings were identified as having heritage significance. Category I heritage buildings have exceptional interest and require strict conservation. Meanwhile, Category II heritage buildings are non-monumental, and make up the majority of the city’s urban fabric, notably its shophouses. The protection of the heritage properties is meant to be undertaken with reference to the Guidelines for Conservation Areas and Heritage Buildings (2007), which superseded the earlier 1987 version.

Table 23 Graded heritage buildings in Penang

Type	World Heritage area	Buffer Zone	Total
Category I heritage buildings	57	14	71
Category II heritage buildings	1658	1914	3572

Source: Heritage Management Plan

Specific to World Heritage governance, a Heritage Management Plan was prepared and approved in February 2008 by the State Planning Committee, as part of the requirements for World Heritage nomination. It was drafted as a non-statutory document offering technical guidance, and as such was not binding. The Plan identified key gaps in the management of George Town and provided recommendations on strengthening regulatory, administrative and technical capacity with a view to future World Heritage-instigated pressures.

Table 24 Main sections of the Heritage Management Plan

Main sections of the plan	Key content
Description of the site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Overview of heritage features ● Existing legal status, ownership and protective measures
Statement of Significance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Key values and justification for nomination
Management issues and challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Identification of major threats to the site as a whole ● Identification of other issues related to development (tourism, infrastructure, public transport) and specific heritage attributes (clan jetties, civic precinct, historic commercial centre, living heritage, monuments and archaeology)
Policy aims and management objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provisions for enhancing the administrative structure of the site, with the upgrade or establishment of: State Heritage Committee, Heritage Department, World Heritage Office, State Heritage Fund, Technical Review Panel
Action plan, implementation and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Identification of steps needed for implementation, to be determined by the future State Heritage

monitoring	Committee
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The fate of this Plan was short-lived, however, as it was superseded by the Conservation Management Plan (CMP) and Special Area Plan (SAP) formulated shortly after the World Heritage nomination, which will be explained below in section 6.3.3. That said, many of its key provisions, notably the administrative arrangements, were subsequently put into action and further adopted in the new CMP/SAP. The official custodian of the CMP at the federal level is the Department of National Heritage which is empowered under the National Heritage Act 2005. At the operational level, however, most of the management responsibilities are undertaken by organizations in Penang.

Fragmented institutional governance for heritage management

Unlike the other case study sites and many other World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia, George Town World has multiple organizations that have been established for the purpose of dealing with various aspects of heritage management following the site's inscription. In a short period of 10 years, a total of six state or para-statal independent organizations have been set up in Penang with varying official mandates related to the site. In addition to this, civil society groups have also sprung up to undertake an independent monitoring function.

Table 25 Organizations dealing with various aspects of heritage management

Year established	Name	Function	Status / Reports to
2008 July	State Heritage Committee (supersedes previous State Heritage Conservation Committee)	Monitor the management of the Site and to be responsible for the implementation of the Heritage Management Plan	State, chaired by Chief Minister
2009	Cultural Heritage	(now defunct)	Independent

Year established	Name	Function	Status / Reports to
January	Advisory Group (CHAT)	Share information, knowledge and problems and lobby for right policies to be implemented to serve and sustain the built and cultural heritage of George Town	coalition of experts
2009	Think City	Regenerate hollowed out urban areas through creative solutions	Khazanah Nasional Berhad (national sovereign fund)
2010 April	George Town World Heritage Incorporated	Liaise with the local authorities as well as State and Federal agencies on all matters pertaining to the Site which are currently outside the purview of the statutory system	Board, chaired by Chief Minister of Penang
2010	Technical Review Panel	Assess planning and building designs which have been submitted on sites within the Core Area and Buffer zone	MBPP, chaired by president of council

Year established	Name	Function	Status / Reports to
2011	Heritage Department (supersedes previous Heritage Unit under the Building Department)	Physical management of the site, inspection and periodic monitoring of physical development	Part of MBPP
2015	George Town Conservation and Development Corporation	Joint venture between Chief Minister Incorporated (CMI), Aga Khan Trust for Culture and Think City to undertake public realm projects	Chief Minister of Penang

To enhance statutory enforcement, Penang set up three bodies within the state and local government shortly after World Heritage inscription: the State Heritage Committee, the Heritage Conservation Department within the MBPP, and the Technical Review Panel (TRP). The Heritage Conservation Department was upgraded from its former status as a unit under the Building Department of MBPP. Its main function is to check on applications for development in heritage areas and to monitor compliance with the building conservation regulations. The TRP supports the MBPP decision-making process regarding building construction, demolition or restoration.




Figure 51 Role of various heritage organizations within scope of the SAP

George Town World Heritage Inc (GTWHI) was established as the *de facto* World Heritage site management agency in 2010. The office was incorporated as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) rather than as a regular government unit.¹⁰ The choice to set up an SPV is justified frankly in the SAP as “Local authorities have their limitation, which includes the lack of expertise and experienced staff, lack of incentive and motivation, financial constraints, and the bureaucratic constraints to hire and reward good staff or punish wayward ones, that will form a stumbling block in the efforts on heritage and conservation management” (State Government of Penang, 2016). To overcome this, “the need to set up special purpose vehicle to assist the state and local governments in the conservation of their historic cities has long been felt” (ibid).

Set up under the authority of Penang state, the board of GTWHI is chaired by the Chief Minister of Penang. The board members include the State Secretary, the

¹⁰ Initially, the Penang Heritage Center took on the functions as the *de facto* site manager for the World Heritage site. Established in 1996, it operated under the Penang State Economic Planning Unit.

State Financial Officer, the Penang State Councillor for Tourism Development, Arts, Culture and Heritage; the State Assemblyman for Komtar and Political Secretary to the Chief Minister of Penang State Assemblyman for Pengkalan Kota; and the Mayor of the City Council of Penang Island.

Not only is GTWHI dependent on the state for policy direction, it is also primarily dependent on the state for funding as well. Starting off with a skeleton team of five staff, a termite-ridden building and little heritage expertise in 2010, the GTWHI has since grown in both staff and resources. By 2018, it had 36 staff and an operating budget of 3 million RM with an additional 2 million RM of project funding, primarily from the state. In this sense, it essentially functions as an organ of the state government, albeit with greater flexibility in recruiting staff and sourcing external expertise.

Interestingly, unlike World Heritage site management agencies in many countries, the GTWHI functions without any statutory authority. According to the SAP, the primary function of the GTWHI is to “manage and liaise with the local authorities as well as State and Federal agencies on all matters pertaining to the site which are currently outside the purview of the statutory system, including branding, promotion, tourism and liaison with State, Federal and International organizations and agencies for betterment of the site. Bearing in mind that this is a living site, the WHO also liaises with the community that lives and works there” (State Government of Penang, 2016). The SAP underscores this division of labor further by detailing all the non-statutory functions the GTWHI is tasked with at the local level.

Table 26 Comparing functions between local government and World Heritage office as delineated in the SAP

Local government (statutory functions)	World Heritage office (non-statutory functions)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Planning and building control 2. Urban services 3. Enforcement 4. Licensing 5. Infrastructure development 6. Legal services 7. Formulation and adaptation of policies 8. Sourcing development funds (from state and federal governments) 9. Technical advisory 10. Road construction and management and utility works 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Education and awareness 2. Monitoring and implementation of CMP 3. Monitoring the heritage premises 4. Maintenance of the registry 5. Provide incentives 6. Implement projects (enhancement, cultural, maintenance and landscaping) 7. Raise funds 8. Reporting of performance and activities 9. Review plan 10. Publicity 11. Conduct studies and research 12. Manage heritage trust fund 13. Capacity building

(Source: SAP, section B3-21)

Its lack of statutory authority by design constrains it from being able to take on the enforcement functions expected of most World Heritage site agencies. For instance, if it finds any infractions, it has to liaise with the local authorities, which can be a cumbersome process. On the other hand, this lack of statutory burden confers a flexibility in creating new mechanisms for conservation and development that would be difficult under a regular government bureaucracy.

Although outside the official organigramme for managing the World Heritage Site as designated in the HMP and the SAP, another organization has had an important impact on George Town: Think City. Think City was established in August 2009 as a subsidiary of Khazanah Nasional Berhad, the national sovereign fund, to manage the 20 million RM funding from the Federal Government to Penang. The allocation was part of a larger budget of 50 million RM set aside for the newly inscribed World Heritage site of George Town and Melaka through the auspices of the Heritage Act which has a provision for a Heritage Fund. Penang's status as an opposition state made it politically unpalatable to directly provide the funds to the State Government.¹¹ According to guidelines from the Ministry of Finance, the special allocation was earmarked for the private sector and civil society groups and could not be used for public buildings, which already had their own budget allocations. (This restriction in funding channel also continued to undercut the hand of the State government as well).¹²

¹¹ Within the Malaysian federal system, states are heavily dependent on the federal government for funding. Although George Town is the larger site, the larger portion of the budget, 30 million RM, was provided to the Melaka State Government. Not only was Melaka under the control of the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party, but in the national heritage narrative, Melaka was privileged as a strong hold of Malay heritage. The political shock in March 2008 putting the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in charge of the Penang state government had major repercussions on federal-state relations. At that time, DAP was an opposition party to the national coalition dominated by UMNO. This political alignment compounded Penang's heavily Chinese status as a minority state (with over 60 percent Chinese population) that has long been sidelined following the introduction of Malay-centric social, economic and political practices favoring *bumiputera* (son of the land) and Muslim interests in the late 1960s. In order to maintain control over another key sector that was poised for expansion, the federal government also restructured tourism administration and funding via federal agencies instead using state-based entities such as the local Penang Tourism Action Council and the State Executive Council (The Star 5 April 2008, in Li 2011).

¹² The original budget request was made by the Penang State Government for 25 million RM, with the breakdown as follows: RM 19.5 million RM for restoration in the core zone, including "restoration of shophouses, religious buildings and monuments, upgrading of landscape, transportation and traffic systems, programmes to promote tourism, cultural activities and other intangible heritage, and preparation works to curb natural disasters"; RM 1.3 million for integrated GIS and inventory of buildings within the heritage zone; RM 750,000 for preparing an integrated management plan which would include conservation guidelines; RM 1.2 million for preparing a manual

Set up as an SPV, Think City has an independent board of directors. Unlike GTWHI, the Think City board is not chaired by the Chief Minister nor dominated by state and local politicians. With a loose and self-defined mandate, unearmarked funding, and even less of a regulatory function than GTWHI, it has been able to innovate solutions in the urban space, starting with conservation in the public realm and crossing the lines into creative industries, business improvement and urban environmental upgrades. Think City works by establishing partnerships with civil society, private and public sector and international organizations. With a lean operating team, it relies on well-established global leaders to provide intellectual inputs and credibility. Past invited partners have included Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, the Prince's Trust, the Project for Public Spaces and the Getty Conservation Institute.

Think City was originally tasked to “carry out efforts in promoting and preserving the living culture and heritage areas” through “initiating projects relating to the rejuvenation and transformation of George Town” (Khor et al, 2017). Instead of focusing just on conservation, which would duplicate the duties of the already established GTWHI, Think City saw its role as positioning Penang within the larger urban conurbation. In theory, this model was meant to provide a mechanism to find common ground between the conservation requirements imposed by the World Heritage Listing, and the limitations of good will, knowhow and financial resources faced by most residents and property owners.

Think City devised the George Town Grants Programme as a decentralized mechanism to award the federal funds to local entities as a means to catalyze widespread action in turning around the then-dilapidated inner core of the city. The grants were meant to facilitate a wide range of residents and property owners to have the technical ability and financial means to undertake conservation, with a focus on projects contributing to the public realm such as streetscapes and

to guide building owners in repair and maintenance works; and RM 2.5 million for establishing a World Heritage Office at an existing building on Armenian Street (Dielenberg, 2009).

community-held properties. The grants programme provided public grants on a matching basis to over 200 projects. Over a four-year period from 2010-2013, the programme disbursed RM 16.3 million. By far, the greatest number of projects were built conservation projects, accounting for 49 percent of the whole budget. Grants were also given for capacity building (11 percent), intangible heritage (15 percent), and shared spaces (25 percent) (Khor, Benson, Liew, & James, 2017).

Think City has proved to be a serial institutional entrepreneur, catalyzing the creation of new entities to address various local problems in Penang, some of which have been more successful than others. For instance, it has facilitated setting up the Little India Improvement District, the George Town BIDS to implement a business improvement district, and even joined forces with other organizations outside of Malaysia to establish the Southeast Asian Creative Cities Network.

Its most recent venture is the George Town Conservation and Development Corporation (GTCDC). This SPV was established in 2015 as a joint venture between the Penang State Government's investment arm Chief Minister Incorporated (CMI) which is tasked to optimize returns on state properties, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture and Think City. GTCDC builds upon Think City's initial cooperation with the Aga Khan Trust for Culture in terms of technical advice in developing the 'Strategic Master Plan' addressing selected key parts of the public realm in the World Heritage site. Through GTCDC, the State Government in cooperation with the city council has undertaken 17 projects for improvement of the public realm with a total cost of 48 million RM, such as Armenian Park and Backlanes and the China Street Ghaut streetscape upgrading (ibid).

Beyond localized projects, GTCDC is now tackling large scale masterplanning of key state-owned properties per the Strategic Master Plan. The Chief Minister notes these projects will use a different approach to demonstrate that "conservation and development can be self-sustaining", meaning financially self-sustaining (Chow, 2018). The Executive Director of Think City explains further that the venture aims to also "improve the visitor experience and develop a new economy based on culture"

(ibid). Key projects will include the North Seafront (seawall and promenade), Fort Cornwallis, and the East Seafront with its many underused port facilities. The new approach of GTCDC is meant to be both financially advantageous to the state while ensuring more public benefits as befitting a World Heritage site. For instance, at the East Seafront, the State was able through GTCDC to negotiate a better deal than the original offer from a private company that would have secured a 99-year concession offering basic services in operating a cruise ship terminal. The new agreement provides for improved design and a more holistic connection from the terminal with the rest of the World Heritage site, thus allowing more public access and benefits for non-cruise users.

6.3 Expanding boundaries of practice at the site

6.3.1 Evolving conceptualizations of heritage

In a sense, the World Heritage recognition of George Town and Melaka for its living urban heritage is a relatively new phenomenon. The other World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia that are also living towns are recognized solely on architectural or urban criteria.

Table 27 Criteria of World Heritage towns in Southeast Asia

Site	Year of inscription	World Heritage criteria	Justification of Outstanding Universal Value
Luang Prabang, Lao PDR	1995	(ii), (iv), (v)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● (ii) Fusion of Lao traditional architecture and 19th and 20th century European colonial style buildings ● (iv) Architectural ensemble built over the centuries ● (v) Unique townscape...blending of two distinct cultural traditions

Site	Year of inscription	World Heritage criteria	Justification of Outstanding Universal Value
Vigan, Philippines	1999	(ii), (iv)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (ii) Unique fusion of Asian building design and construction with European colonial architecture and planning • (iv) Exceptionally intact and well-preserved example of a European trading town
Hoi An, Viet Nam	1999	(ii), (v)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (ii) Material manifestation of the fusion of cultures over time • (v) Well-preserved example of a traditional Asian trading port

The conceptual framing of these World Heritage towns as being urban architectural ensembles is typical of the era of heritage practice up until the mid-1990s, which was still focused on material fabric, architectural authenticity and urban integrity. This corresponds with the tail end of the first stage in heritage evolution proposed by Thompson and Wijesuriya, with heritage practice still focused on “defending monuments and sites” (2018). In this era, other sites further afield were also similarly recognized on architectural and urban criteria such as Lijiang Old Town in China (under criteria (ii), (iv) and (v) in 1997, relating to cultural exchange as seen in built or urban remains, building typology and settlement patterns, respectively) or San Gimignano in Italy (under criteria (i), (iii), and (iv) in 1990, relating to outstanding design, traces of civilization and building typology, respectively).

This narrow framing of the Outstanding Universal Value of the living towns failed to take into account their qualities in terms of (i) holistic understanding of the

urban landscape in its multiple dimensions, including the value of non-monumental architecture, and (ii) living heritage, ways of life and expressions of local culture. Following their World Heritage inscription within the narrow rubric of “urban architectural ensembles”, heritage management practices at these sites were accordingly designed to primarily deal with their buildings and townscapes. With significant investments of time, funding and technical expertise, all three examples from Southeast Asia have been able to maintain the character of their historic townscapes to a large degree. However, beyond preserving physical heritage components, these sites have experienced challenges in dealing with larger multi-faceted issues that were not in the original purview of their definition and management.

While historic monumental properties are normally protected under well-defined laws, the integrity of the larger urban landscape – comprising vernacular buildings, public spaces, streetscapes, ecological systems – often did not have inventories, regulations or other protective mechanisms. Similarly, local cultural practices did not have mechanisms to anticipate or cope with pressures which threatened their continuity – changing social mores which disrupted traditional institutions, market forces crowding out local residents in terms of access to affordable goods and real estate, leading to gentrification and commodification. Hence, in Luang Prabang, for instance, conservation concerns were identified relating to “social cohesion and changes in the local population and community” as well as shortage of housing resulting from the explosion in visitor accommodation and infrastructure (UNESCO, 2007b). Retroactive measures – for instance, inventories of its Intangible Cultural Heritage – were only recently undertaken, which at this stage may prove too late to counter the problems that have already occurred.

These cautionary tales showcase the problems that arise when heritage institutions – organizations, professionals, regulations, laws – are still primarily geared to protect buildings and urban areas, and are not able to fully anticipate, interface or manage issues related to the larger urban territory and to living heritage. While

increasingly diffused into heritage discourse and practice from the 1990s onwards, these two concepts were given formal heritage recognition and further impetus with the adoption of the Historic Urban Landscape Recommendation and the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, respectively.

The Historical Urban Landscape Recommendation reflects the evolution of the changing notions of urban heritage (Joshi, 2018). The 1968 Recommendation Concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works identified historic quarters as an object of salvage or rescue. The 1976 Nairobi Recommendation looked more broadly at historic and architectural areas and their surroundings. The 1987 Washington Charter defined the need to understand urban patterns and to maintain the relationship between buildings and open spaces in historic urban areas. The term historic urban landscape finally emerged with the 2005 Vienna Memorandum on World Heritage and Contemporary Architecture – Managing the Historic Urban Landscape, but its primary thrust was to call for sensitive contemporary design within historic contexts.

In the context of Malaysia, the new living World Heritage town of George Town required rethinking the existing governance institutions and mechanisms available at the state level and the national level. As noted in the section above, most of the legal and intellectual infrastructure in place at that time mostly catered to dealing with mostly built heritage or with regulating urban planning and development. Meanwhile, specific mechanisms for addressing intangible heritage and the intersection of living heritage and cities were relatively new. For instance, in terms of federal governance, although the National Heritage Act includes provisions covering intangible cultural heritage, the planning documents note that the scope of the Department of National Heritage is primarily on the conservation of monuments and sites, particularly those of national interest. Likewise, the heritage unit within the local planning authority in Penang was also only tasked with monitoring and enforcement of built heritage conservation. These limitations created challenges in

adequately meeting new management pressures that emerged following the inscription of George Town.

6.3.2 Emerging management pressures

Maintaining the integrity of the historic urban landscape

From the outset, George Town faced challenges in dealing with the expanded conceptual framework of managing the historic city not just as an ensemble of significant buildings, but rather, as a multi-layered Historic Urban Landscape. This would entail attention not only to listed heritage buildings, but to take a holistic view of all natural, cultural and human resources within the broader urban context and its geographical setting (UNESCO, 2011). In this way, “conservation and urban planning practices [would be integrated] with the wider goals of urban development, while taking into account traditions and values of diverse cultures” (Widodo, 2018). The suite of tools and regulatory instruments at its disposal were not yet fully in place nor adequately enforced.

Even the demarcation of the site already represented a compromise. Notably, earlier drafts of the World Heritage nomination had proposed the entire footprint of the core zone and buffer zone for World Heritage status, which would have encompassed a total of almost 260 ha for only the core zone alone. This would have afforded strict protection for almost the entire historic building stock up until the historic limits of the city at Prangin canal to the south. This larger core area would in turn be protected by an even more extensive buffer area, which is now subject to intense development pressure. The initial thinking to protect this entire larger area reflected the fact that it contained both tangible and intangible heritage of comparable significance to the area that finally ended up being nominated for World Heritage. However, concerns that this expansive area would limit the city’s development potential too greatly led to shrinking the site.

These development pressures revealed themselves just months after the inscription of George Town as a World Heritage site, when four high-rise constructions were reported in November 2008. This led Malaysia to face criticism from the World

Heritage Committee. While seemingly a small matter – just four buildings out of a site comprising over 5,000 buildings – the incident had the potential to set a worrisome precedent for the newly-minted World Heritage site. Allowing the projects to go ahead would signal the government’s willingness to tolerate non-compliance with the new heritage regulations. In light of the inevitable property boom that would follow World Heritage listing, making a quick and decisive move was also necessary in order to dissuade any future infractions.

Following an assessment mission fielded in April 2009, the World Heritage Centre and ICOMOS expressed concern that the impact from the projects would warrant the inscription of the property on the List of World Heritage in Danger. Two of the projects were within the World Heritage property and two were within the buffer zone. The buildings, ranging from 12 to 28 stories, were found to be in contravention of the height limit of 18 meters stipulated in the management documents submitted with the World Heritage nomination.

The main concerns revolved around the projects’ visual impacts on the low-rise townscape. Prior to 2000, over 10,000 pre-war shophouses blanketed the historic town. Ranging from two to three stories high, the buildings with their terracotta roofs provided a contiguous context for the more monumental religious buildings and civic buildings. Flanking narrow streets, the shophouses created enclosed streetscapes punctuated by larger openings in the form of squares and communal spaces. The adjoining buildings were characterized by a variety of roof profiles and façade designs. In this way, the overall uniformity in form and scale was enlivened by the architectural diversity of individual buildings. The urban morphology in terms of urban blocks, street patterns and patterns of voids created by internal courtyards and open spaces has also retained a high degree of integrity.




Figure 52 George Town's vernacular architecture of shophouses creating a contiguous roofscape (Source: ArtAsia)

Compared to other historic Straits settlements such as Phuket and Singapore, George Town and Melaka had managed to maintain their historic urban centres, both in terms of the sheer volume of remaining buildings and their intact urban setting, as well as the mercantile and cultural activities which brought them to life. In contrast, the other cities had seen major demolition and redevelopment schemes, leading them to lose their character amidst unrestrained modern construction and influx of new populations. For this reason, the OUV of George Town and Melaka included criterion (iv) which recognizes its outstanding architectural and townscape value particularly in terms of its collection of shophouses.

In light of the likely threat to George Town's OUV, the World Heritage Committee (UNESCO, 2009a) expressed concern that:

“The introduction of a provision in the protective measures for George Town allowing for buildings higher than 18 metres in the World Heritage property and its buffer zone under certain circumstances, as well as the lack of legal mechanisms that would enable the Federal Government to exercise control on the property, constitute a potential threat for the Outstanding Universal Value of the property.”

Presciently, the Heritage Management Plan submitted as part of the nomination package in 2008 already identified the three greatest threats to the site's significance as follows: “(a) Development Pressure from Infrastructure and Real Estate projects, (b) Non-Compliance with Conservation Plans, Policies and Guidelines, (c) Gentrification and loss of community cohesion” (State Government of Penang, 2008). Though not explicitly mentioned in the World Heritage nomination documents,¹³ clearly it was an open secret that there were “existing development plans that have been granted planning permission and building plan approval prior to 2007 ... [and] which have yet to be built but are now not in consonance with the new Guidelines for Conservation Areas and Heritage Buildings approved by the State Planning Committee in August 2007”.

In addition to these controversial private sector projects, however, the Heritage Management Plan had more serious concern about high-impact public sector projects. At the time of nomination in 2008, Penang was already debating controversial “infrastructure development which have been directly planned at Federal Government level such as the Penang Monorail Project [and] the Northern Corridor Economic Region Development (NCERD) programme.” Following the

¹³ Th World Heritage Committee raised eyebrows about the timing of this information just a few months after the inscription, pointedly chastising the Malaysian State Party that it “regrets that information on these development proposals and the status of their approval, as well as on the modification of the protective regulations, was not provided by the State Party in the Nomination File and during the evaluation process” (UNESCO, 2009a)

election of the once-opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) in 2009, the State Government itself now has been pushing a major new transport masterplan with over 70 kilometers of new highways (cutting through the Penang Hills, soon to be nominated as a UNESCO Man and Biosphere Reserve) and Light Rail Transit (touching upon the southern boundary of the World Heritage site and criticized for archaeological, visual and congestion impacts). These proposed mega-projects continue to have potential impacts both directly and indirectly upon the World Heritage site and its larger context.

Sustaining the city's living heritage

The massive development pressure on George Town posed a second problem for the site, in terms of impacting not just the integrity of its built fabric, but also its social fabric as well. The HUL framework calls for assessing the vulnerability of a site's key attributes to socio-economic stresses as a starting point in planning sustainable city development. In the case of George Town, the long-time residents, in essence, the carriers of the city's living heritage, proved to be highly sensitive to change. Most of them were older and of limited economic means. As many were engaged in traditional and local trades, their exodus has also led to the disappearance of many of the city's distinctive cultural practices. The hollowing out of the historic downtown was cited by all key informants as the major problem facing George Town today.

The repeal of the Rent Control Act in 1997, and the skyrocketing rents that followed, set in motion the downward spiral that has been squeezing out many of George Town's long-time residents. Enacted in 1966, the Rent Control Act regulated rental rates of pre-war buildings constructed before 31 January 1948. It covered over 12,500 residences in Penang, of which over 7,500 were in the historic downtown area. The controlled rental rates were about 10-20 percent of current market prices (Lee, 2000). By artificially suppressing property rates and, furthermore, making it difficult to evict tenants, the Act helped to keep the inner city affordable, inadvertently ensuring the retention of the historic building stock by dissuading property owners to invest in

renovations or new construction projects. While this resulted in much physical decay and dilapidation, it also created secure tenure for downtown residents, with some 16,000 households benefitting in all (ibid). Many were descendants of original settlers and continued to ply their traditional trades and maintain tight-knit social ties, which were the hallmark of the site's multi-cultural significance.

Following a two-year transition period, the final death knell of the Act in 2000 saw major increases in rents, increasing by 50 percent to as much as 300 percent (Atsumi, 2003). Many long-time tenants either could not afford to pay and were evicted; others chose not to pay the new hiked-up rates. In any case, this led to an exodus of residents and businesses from downtown neighborhoods. Many shophouses were put up for sale, although prices were eventually pushed down by the glut in supply as well as the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

The out-migration of George Town's residents was further exacerbated by the World Heritage listing in 2008. As many World Heritage sites have faced the same phenomenon of gentrification, it was not unanticipated. Nevertheless, the effects can be considered an unintended consequence of the costly physical restoration schemes to a certain extent, as well as the failure to incentivize local residents to stay on and to place a premium on safeguarding intangible cultural heritage. The population in the World Heritage site dropped precipitously from 18,660 residents in 2007 to 10,159 in 2009, and has continued to decline (Khazanah Research Institute, 2017). An additional 591 households left in the period between 2009 and 2013 (ibid). Between 2008 and 2012, property prices in George Town went up from 2209 RM per square meter to 3,929 RM per square meter (Think City, 2017). Many property owners sold off their buildings or renovated their properties to attract new commercial enterprises, particularly in the booming hospitality and tourism businesses.

The fact that over 60 percent of residents were tenants made their toehold on the historic city very tenuous as rents increased with market pressures. Old residents were outpriced from inner George Town, and old businesses were

shuttered to make way for other uses. According to surveys undertaken by Geografia, over the period of 2009-2013, the World Heritage Site lost 231 residences and 102 businesses, while the number of hotels and restaurants/bars grew by 36 and 46, respectively (Khazanah Research Institute, 2017). “Many of the shophouses and other buildings have been given new life through ‘adaptive reuse’ – restaurants and cafes, internet centres, budget lodgings and backpacker’s hostels, high-end boutique hotels, specialty shops, corporate offices and art galleries-cum-coffee shops – but the fact remains that these are largely businesses and commercial establishments” (Ooi, 2016). Vacant properties also increased by 211 within this time period, indicating that some newly-vacated units were left in limbo, creating impacts on the streetscape as well as the cohesiveness of urban neighborhoods.

New residents may have little connection to the historic city, or its various cultural roots. Yet, despite the demographic changes, some of the city’s traditions have survived and even continue to flourish, such as its renowned culinary traditions and its major festivals. These continue to attract young practitioners and a wide audience, both local and outsiders.

However, other aspects of George Town’s intangible cultural heritage, one of the key elements in its World Heritage recognition, have become vulnerable. The George Town Heritage Action Group has estimated that some 20 percent of traditional traders and craftsmen have disappeared between 2012 and 2018 comparing to baseline data from an exhaustive survey of traditional trades undertaken earlier (The Star, 2018). The exodus not only of older people, but also younger residents and families from the city centre has compounded the problem of cultural transmission, creating a generational gap in passing on knowhow and skills. The lack of demand for some of these traditional artisanal products, due to shifting consumer tastes, has made it difficult to attract younger practitioners. Revitalizing traditional trades and driving residents back to the city centre are cited by GTWHI as two of the key challenges facing the site (Ang, 2016).

6.3.3 Changing management practices

Occurring just months after the World Heritage Listing, when enthusiasm and good will were at their peak, the timing of George Town's first management crisis related to the four high-rises created strong momentum for changing management practices. Malaysia was eager to report substantial progress to the World Heritage Committee and to the international heritage community. Within the short span of a year after listing, the Malaysian authorities officially pledged to undertake a number of steps beyond the specific requests raised by the World Heritage Committee either at the time of inscription or from the official mission. Some of these had already been foreseen in the earlier Heritage Management Plan. As explained earlier, these included strengthening the organizations related to World Heritage management, namely, creating a World Heritage Office in George Town, strengthening the Heritage Department within the City Council of Penang, and establishing a Technical Review Panel.

Managing the historic urban landscape: a plethora of plans

In response to the problem of managing the historic urban landscape, the Malaysian government promised to take action to strengthen the regulatory framework for controlling new development, particularly high-rise construction. The Heritage Management Plan submitted at the time of nomination did not carry any statutory weight. The World Heritage Committee was also concerned about the lack of a conservation plan for the heritage buildings, as well as the presence of legal loopholes that allowed for contravening the 18-meter height limit.

The government initiated the preparation of a Special Area Plan (SAP) for the inscribed property and buffer zone that would provide planning controls and guidance at a more detailed level. The SAP was put together by a Kuala Lumpur-based consulting firm, under the auspices of a consortium consisting of the Penang State Town and Country Planning Department, the National Heritage Department, the Penang Municipal Council and GTWHI.

Whereas the term ‘historic urban landscape’ does not appear once in the original Heritage Management Plan or in the 800-page nomination dossier, the SAP specifically highlights the HUL approach as a key principle in its overall framework for conserving the site. It observes that the OUV of George Town World Heritage site is “intricately tied to their historic urban landscape (HUL). The conservation framework recommends the use of a landscape approach for identifying, conserving and managing the historic areas” (State Government of Penang, 2016). In keeping with the HUL Recommendation, it further underlines the importance of looking beyond the historic centre to embrace the “broader urban context and its geographical setting” (ibid).

Honoring the initial concern of the World Heritage Committee, the SAP has been relatively effective in maintaining the low-rise skyline within the George Town core area. Looking back after 10 years of World Heritage status, the international expert who had been involved in official monitoring over this period finds that the controversial 18-meter height limit that was put into effect has been largely respected, maintaining the overall townscape within the historic town core. Most new development was found to be taking place at an appropriate scale and form. Important vistas, such as the view corridor framing the clock tower that was threatened by one of the high-rise projects, have been retained intact. However, other observers have raised concerns about the comprehensiveness in safeguarding various aspects of George Town’s authenticity and integrity, both at a building scale and a larger urban landscape scale.

From the outset, the framework of the SAP was cloudy. Within the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, the SAP is the most detailed level of plan, and is nestled under the Structure Plan and the Local Plan.¹⁴ At the time, Penang

¹⁴ The Structure Plan “is a written statement, accompanied by indicative maps, diagrams and illustrations, formulating the policy and general proposals of the State Government in respect of the development and use of land in the state, including measures for the improvement of the physical living environment, the improvement of communications, the management of traffic, the improvement of socio-economic well-being of the people of the state and the promotion of economic growth, and for facilitating sustainable development. Meanwhile, the

did indeed have a State Structure Plan, gazetted in 2007, but the Penang Local Plan 2020 was still under preparation. A draft Local Plan was approved by the Municipal Council in 2008, but has not been gazetted by the State Government and thus never enforced to date. Despite being lower in hierarchy than the Local Plan, the Special Area Plan for the World Heritage Site went ahead, in responding to concerns from the World Heritage Committee.

In fact, the World Heritage Committee (UNESCO, 2009a) requested two plans:

“develop the ... Special Area Plans for the inscribed property and its buffer zone, based on a careful analysis of important views, typologies and urban fabric the composition of the social fabric of George Town”,

“submit a comprehensive conservation plan dealing with all the buildings and its schedule for implementation in both cities, to develop measures for decreasing motor traffic, and to improve the definition of key indicators for monitoring the urban and architectural heritage components.”

Moreover, the Committee also requested Malaysia to upgrade the “Guidelines for Conservation Areas and Heritage Buildings” by giving it regulatory teeth in the form of “Regulations”.

Meanwhile, the Penang State Government and the Municipal Council, in its budgetary proposal for federal funding in 2009 requested for support to prepare an “integrated management plan which would include conservation guidelines for the

Local Plan “contains a detailed map, a written statement, accompanied by diagrams, illustrations and descriptive matters, formulating proposals for the use and development of land, including the protection and improvement of the physical environment, the preservation of the natural topography, the improvement of the landscape, the preservation and enhancement of character and appearance of buildings, the improvement of communications and any other matters specified by the State Planning Commission” (George Town World Heritage Incorporated, 2016).

administration, management, conservation and development of the core and buffer zones”. Such a plan seems to be conceived in lieu of the original Heritage Management Plan that was submitted along with the World Heritage nomination in 2008.

Finally, Think City, in cooperation with the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, also formulated a “Strategic Management Plan”. Completed in 2014, this was meant to guide strategic conservation and development projects, with a focus on detailed masterplanning in four public realm districts: the North Waterfront, the East Waterfront, the Clan Jetties, and the marquee Street of Harmony.

The resulting document, ostensibly in the form of a Special Area Plan, essentially became a portmanteau for the various overlapping requests and competing interests of different parties, combining in a single document the elements of: a heritage management plan, a conservation plan, a detailed local plan, conservation regulations as well as detailed district masterplans. As a reflection of its multiple roots and aspirations, the text of the SAP document refers to itself variously as “Conservation Management Plan (CMP)” or “SAP” or sometimes “CMP/SAP” and even “management plan”. The Penang State Department of Town and Country Planning’s own informational documents suggest that the SAP in fact acts as the conservation management plan for George Town. Entitled the “George Town Historic Cities of the Straits of Malacca Special Area Plan”, the hefty 400-page document contains the following:

Table 28 Main sections of the SAP

Main sections of the SAP	Key content
Part A – About George Town WHS	A1 Introduction A2 Description of the property A3 History A4 Significance A5 Strength, opportunities, challenges, and threats
Part B - Vision and	B1 Vision and conservation principles

Main sections of the SAP	Key content
management strategies	B2 Management strategies B3 Management mechanisms B4 Incentives
Part C - Development guide plan for George Town WHS	C1 Introduction C2 Landuse zones C3 Building categories, types, styles C4 Vistas, enclaves and streetscapes C5 Public realm C6 Circulation and access C7 Infrastructure
Part D - Guidelines for the conservation areas and heritage buildings in George Town WHS	D1 Introduction D2 Types of permit D3 Conservation practice D4 Category I buildings D5 Category II buildings D6 Infill and replacement D7 Signage and lighting
Annexure A	Heritage Buildings Form and Styles in George Town WHS
Annexure B	Planning and Design Guide for Public Realm

(Source: SAP, Overview of the Special Area Plan (2016))

Pulled together in slightly over a year, the draft SAP was submitted by February 2011 per the World Heritage Committee's deadline. However, the

finalization and entry into force took another five years, with gazettelement taking place only in September 2016. The lengthy process involved a number of steps: (i) establishing a public hearing committee (January 2011), (ii) undertaking a publicity programme (from April to May 2011), (iii) organizing a press conference (April 2011), (iv) briefing sessions (April and May 2011), (v) public hearing (August 2011), (vi) press notice (April and May 2011), and (vii) presentation and approval by the State Planning Commission (December 2012 and March 2013 respectively).

Two reasons are offered by the heritage authorities for the delay in gazettelement: first, time was needed for undertaking the Malay translation of the SAP. Secondly, the second annexure, namely the Public Realm guidelines emanating at a later date from Think City, needed to go through the whole process before the entire SAP was gazetted. The final public consultation steps took part on an accelerated schedule between January and February 2015, but SPC approval was only received in June 2016. Rugkhapan (2017) has raised doubts about the claims regarding the time needed to finalize the Malay translation, given that draft versions were already used in the consultation process.

The counter-explanation offered by civil society is that the long delay allowed for special interest projects to be passed before the strict SAP guidelines attained statutory power. In its call for action to the new Penang state government in 2018, the Penang Forum consortium of NGOs pointed to “various crises (high-rises, swift-breeding for birds’ nest-harvesting, illegal conversions, evictions) as well as many new infill buildings and haphazard renovations [which] took place in the 8-year gap before the gazetting of the UNESCO-endorsed Special Area Plan.”

Even after gazetting the SAP, critics have raised concerns about its enforcement. For instance, it has been difficult for government officials to keep up with the swift-moving private sector operators and to crack down on illegal conversions and renovations which are subject to stringent procedures in the SAP. Proceeding with illegal construction has widely been the norm, leading one homeowner to remark, “The contractors are going through red tape on their own

terms [ie often ignoring rules and regulations] and they think that getting a summons from the Penang Island City Council is the only way to obtain a permit!” (Khor et al., 2017). “Among the most common destructive works are the hacking of plastered brick walls, the removal of structural walls, plastering with modern cement instead of lime, replacing wooden floors with concrete floors, the destruction and removal of heritage features such as timber doors, timber frames, shutters or windows, traditional roof structures and tiles, old floor tiles, etc. Illegal works may take place after office hours and during weekends, or behind closed doors, thereby avoiding detection” (Penang Forum, 2018).

Part of the non-compliance may be ascribed to the complexity of the planning process itself. Representatives of MBPP’s Heritage Department and the GTWHI both noted that existing procedures in the SAP may not be easily understood by the average contractor or building owner. Terms such as “façade” were already found to be quite technical for the typical resident, let alone complex explanations about authenticity and vernacular architecture. Furthermore, the multi-step procedure was criticized to be long, slightly repetitive, as well as expensive, creating a deterrent for compliance.

Even people acting in good faith have to be able to understand, navigate and pay for the three main categories of permits which are required: (i) repair permits (for work that does not increase the overall area and does not involve additional structure), (ii) planning permission (for new structures or infill sites, demolition of heritage buildings, or extensions, change of use), and (iii) building plan applications (for erection of new buildings or extensions). A Heritage Impact Assessment report is required for planning permissions while a Dilapidation Report is required for repair works and building plan application.

The procedure involves a pre-consultation process at the One Stop Centre with an initial review by the Technical Review Panel, before the applicant submits the official request for another review by the One Stop Centre again. Projects that require both a Planning Permission and a Building Plan application have to go

through the TRP twice – adding up to over 200 days of processing time for the permits alone. The HIA report costs 10,000 MR and up to 20,000 MR for a Category 1 building, the Dilapidation Report another 15,000 MR and a conservation plan between 20-30,000 MR. Given the limited number of heritage professionals in Penang, it was pointed out that there is a semi-monopoly on such heritage consultancies, creating a non-competitive market. This seller’s market has resulted in the quality of some HIA reports being of worrying quality sometimes, such as using cut and paste to recycle similar text for different projects, thus defeating the intent of such assessment.



Figure 53 Flowchart of SAP procedures

Such onerous procedures should in theory lead to two undesirable outcomes: (i) buildings being left untouched and dilapidated or (ii) illegal or unpermitted construction activity, as explained above. With regard to the former, George Town already had a stock of dilapidated units left over from the Rent Control era, which continued to be vacant. Although this continued to be raised as a concern, according to GTWHI, the ratio of dilapidated buildings reduced significantly from approximately 10 percent in 2008 to only about 2 percent in 2016.

Beyond the World Heritage site, the continued delays to gazette the Local Plan also created a regulatory vacuum in controlling development of the larger historic urban landscape that forms the contiguous context for the World Heritage Site. Echoing other citizens' groups, Nasution (2012) contends that "with no Local Plan, redevelopments are still approved in an *ad hoc* manner. In the recent past, heritage bungalows have been conveniently disposed of through illegal demolition for the fine is small enough to be factored into the cost of development. The architecturally important prewar mansions and bungalows along the northern coast and the suburban 'green belts' are being replaced one by one with office blocks and condos, transforming the hinterland of the World Heritage Site into a veritable concrete jungle." In the absence of such control, she recalled the warning of Aga Khan experts in 2010 that "the World Heritage Site might be imminently walled in by 'fifty mini-KOMTAR towers'" (ibid).

Similar delays plagued the Penang State Heritage Enactment which was finally adopted in 2011, much later than Melaka Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Heritage Enactment that entered into force in 1988, with subsequent amendments in 1993 and 2008. But to date, a Penang State Heritage Commissioner has not yet been appointed. The enactment therefore is not fully operational, and has not yet been seriously applied to protecting heritage at an urban scale.

The legislative foot-dragging has been called into question as being symptomatic of deeper-seated reluctance by the state authorities to safeguard Penang's heritage. Scholars and commentators have suggested that despite the SAP, urban development in George Town has carried on with business as usual. Ariffin (2015) comments, "It is disappointing to note that after so many years, except for the restoration of a few historic monuments, little has been achieved in the implementation of the proposals... At least, some attempts have been made to take into account such opinions and to revitalise the core areas. However, it is important to note that these are isolated efforts and urban conservation has played only a very small role in the normal planning process of GTWHS."

Multiple incidents of state negligence have been pointed out by heritage watchdogs and scholars, and even UNESCO itself. The UNESCO-ICOMOS Reactive Monitoring Mission following the 2008 high-rise incident noted that the State Planning Commission actually acted in contravention of its own guidelines in granting approval to three of the projects (UNESCO, 2009b):

"Indeed, the technical staff of the City Council had recommended not approving these proposals, since they were in contradiction with the 18 meters height limit established in the Guidelines which were in use at the time. The developers, however, appealed to the State Planning Commission, the highest planning authority for the State of Penang, which overruled the Council and upheld the appeals, meaning that the City Council had no legal option but to issue the planning approvals. At the same time (August 2007), the State Planning Committee introduced the above-mentioned provision allowing for exceptions to the 18 meters height limit".

One clear example of accommodating the private sector can be seen in the construction of hotels following World Heritage inscription. The SAP places clear restrictions on hotels, with hotels being permissible mainly in the Tourism and Leisure zones, as well as the Waterfront and Trade zones. Furthermore, the SAP also

forbids budget hotels. However, in reality, hotels were already located throughout the historic city, and World Heritage status led to a boom of new hotels of all classes opening up in contravention of the zoning and planning guidelines. Rugkhapan (2017) tracked the travails in controlling illegal hotels, noting the weakness of government enforcement efforts and the defiant non-compliance of hotel operators, which together undermined the effectiveness of the SAP's provisions regarding hotels. In lieu of cracking down on the proliferation of illegal hotels, in April 2014, the municipal government initiated a process of legalizing them (called *pemutihan*, literally "whitening") by encouraging illegal hotels to apply for licenses. Meanwhile, the government also attempted to impose a moratorium on new hotels. At the time, Rugkhapan tallied up over 130 unlicensed hotels were in operation, with over half in the World Heritage site. To attain legal licenses, hotels had to obtain planning approval for any adaptive reuse conversions and to comply with parking requirements and other regulations. The initial six-month period for legalization did not yield sufficient cooperation by hoteliers. The government then announced a lighter Temporary Operational Licensing scheme instead, cutting down costs from a prohibitive 100,000 RM to a mere 1,200-2,400 RM. This proved to be more popular, but still did not gain total compliance. Ironically, despite such efforts, by the end of 2014, the number of unlicensed hotels had actually increased to 194 in the state, with 95 in the World Heritage site (ibid). By October 2015, most but not all of the unlicensed hotels had obtained a temporary permit. The government extended the deadline for the temporary license scheme by another year, and began to crack down more seriously by closing down four hotels. However, the number of unlicensed hotels continued to rise undeterred, climbing to 221 by November 2015 (ibid).



Figure 54 Hotel demolition in process

(Source: The Star)

More blatantly, the state and local authorities themselves have been complicit in sanctioning the actual demolition of heritage properties. While the State has indeed been crucial in protecting some heritage properties in the greater Penang island area, such as Suffolk House, other demolition cases in the larger historic urban landscape reveal its selective enforcement of the State Heritage Enactment. Demolition incidents are regularly chronicled in Malaysia's vocal press and protested by civil society. Following one such occurrence, involving the removal of listed colonial bungalows along Peel Avenue in order to sell the land to a private hospital in 2018, the Penang Heritage Trust (FMT Reporters, 2018) lamented to the media:

“...If the state sets the example of selling its own heritage buildings without any conditions for their preservation, and the city council approves the demolition of those buildings, how then will our authorities have the moral fibre to impose restrictions on others?”

Meanwhile, in its defense, the state government “touted the land-sale as a catalyst for double-digit growth in the state’s economy in medical tourism and creating new jobs in the process” (ibid).

The situation appears to be getting more aggravated. Starting in 2018, the island has seen a major development frenzy in the hands of the state authorities. The landslide victory by Dr Mahathir Mohamad in 2018 brought a political sea change to Penang – after 10 years as an opposition state, it suddenly became part of the ruling coalition. Former Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng was appointed Finance Minister. However, instead of enjoying federal largesse, the scandals with 1MDB and other financial crises have created a national fiscal deficit, forcing the ruling state party in Penang to seek its own funding. Aside from the ambitious Penang Transport Master Plan mentioned earlier which grazes the southern edge of the World Heritage property, the State is also pushing forward various large-scale schemes, including the reclamation of new islands to the south of the island for commercial development purposes. High-rise redevelopment adjacent to the western perimeter of the World Heritage buffer zone, once known as Millionaire’s Row for its stately mansions, is altering the skyline and density of the contiguous area to the site.

Such incidents – from the very eve of World Heritage inscription to its tenth anniversary – suggest that the machinations of the state government and property development interests continue to operate unabated, to the detriment of the heritage agenda. Penang is the second major city in Malaysia and a big economic powerhouse with a thriving manufacturing and tourism industry. There is tremendous real estate development pressure on the old town. Scholars such as Li (2011) and Terence-Gomez (2019) suggest that business interests, particularly in real estate, have long been intertwined with the machinery of state politics. The heritage policies and institutional mechanisms put in place in response to World Heritage listing and even the early crisis with the high rises have not been able to shift the fundamental power balance in decision-making in Penang.

Sustaining the city’s living heritage

As a starting point for values-based management of the site, the SAP encompasses “equal recognition to the living and the built aspects of the urban landscape and recognition to the tangible and intangible components of each” (State Government of Penang, 2016). Living heritage features prominently in the SAP section on ‘significance’, with explanations of different ethnic groups and their festivals, foods and religions.

However, the SAP runs up against constraints in actually dealing with this broad vision of heritage in that it draws its sole authority from the Town and Country Planning Act 1976. As an urban planning instrument, the plan, by its nature, is limited to regulating buildings and the urban environment. Thus, the statutory meat of the plan contains extensive guidance on land use, built heritage, vistas, enclaves and streetscapes, public realm, circulation and access and urban infrastructure. Detailed conservation guidelines are given for conserving heritage buildings, including appropriate works, alteration, infill design and signage and lighting.

Similarly, there is a dearth of high-powered regulatory instruments dealing with the urban population and their embodied cultural practices and ways of life. The most germane piece of legislation is the National Heritage Act (2005) which introduced the protection of intangible cultural heritage for the first time, and empowers the Heritage Commissioner to declare items of intangible cultural heritage as heritage objects and include them in the National Heritage Register. However, to date, most of the items listed on the National Heritage Register are still buildings and sites. In addition to listing, the Commissioner is also meant to promote owners or custodians of intangible cultural heritage to “develop, identify, transmit, cause to be performed and facilitate the research on the intangible cultural heritage” (Government of Malaysia, 2005). That said, much of the onus of intangible cultural heritage safeguarding is at the state level, but there is no clear state agency with statutory authority that is charged with dealing with this issue.

The existing local heritage organizations have tackled the issue of living heritage through two main lens: mostly as an intangible cultural heritage safeguarding

issue and to a lesser extent as a gentrification issue. In some cases, these two issues have been conflated, perhaps to cross purposes: in technical forums and in the media, the out-migration of long-time residents has often been framed as a loss of intangible cultural heritage, which is part of the site's Outstanding Universal Value. Accordingly, intangible cultural heritage type tools have been deployed, with limited success in terms of arresting the attrition of the town's residents and their embodied cultural knowledge. Four main types of intangible cultural heritage initiatives have been undertaken so far: inventorying, documentation, festivals and transmission schemes.

Under the 2003 Convention for Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage, the inventory exercise is a starting point only. Rather, inventories should form the basis for identifying the viability of the particular form of intangible cultural heritage, and if found to be vulnerable, an appropriate strategy for safeguarding should be developed. Likewise, documentation should not be conducted simply for the sake of documentation. At the heart of the safeguarding effort is the transmission of knowledge from one generation to another. Typical strategies involve introducing intangible cultural heritage in schools or setting up training from elder practitioners to a younger generation. In the absence of an organization with a clear mandate to deal with intangible cultural heritage in George Town, various organizations have been involved.

GTWHI's marquee programme is the annual George Town Heritage celebrations, which is organized on a different theme each year and is meant to showcase various aspects of the city's intangible cultural heritage – from food to traditional games to rituals. GTWHI has also undertaken various inventory and documentation projects. Oral histories were collected from residents of Chulia Street, recording their memories of living in the post-war period from 1945-1970. It commissioned the “Directory of Traditional Trades and Occupations”, which inventoried traditional trades, craftspeople and cultural practitioners from 2011-2012. Undertaken in cooperation with the Penang Heritage Trust, the inventory provided a

snapshot of the number and status of all the traditional trades typical of the old city – totaling 63 types of trades in all.

The PHT has two long-running programmes: the Penang Living Treasures programme and the Penang Apprenticeship Programme for Artisans (PAPA). The Living Treasures programme recognizes master practitioners of a dying craft, which boosts their profile and draws attention. It also provides a small monthly stipend to the person. A total of ten Living Treasures are appointed at any one time, and hold their award for life, which limits the numbers who can be recognized. The Apprenticeship Programme seeks to pair up practitioners with the younger generation for them to learn these dying skills, with the aim to revive these crafts and make them attractive for the contemporary market. This transmission programme has faced challenges, as not all artisans are interested in teaching, and not all students are serious about taking on the craft as their vocation.

Meanwhile, Think City furnished a total of 74 grants to support intangible cultural heritage projects. Most of these were documentation, publications and one-off lectures, festivals and performances. Not all the projects identified in the intangible cultural heritage category were actually relevant – such as a publication on heritage trees or an archive of historic maps. An independent expert assessment of the grants scheme found that the projects related to intangible cultural heritage “was the least effective aspect of the programme” (Khor et al., 2017).

Finally, ArtEd has run a slate of programmes aimed at youth, with the goal of encouraging them to engage with their cultural heritage, including intangible cultural heritage. These include activities that encourage young people to engage with older residents and artisans through trails, workshops, cultural mapping activities, festivals and performances.

Looking in the overall picture in terms of safeguarding intangible cultural heritage, the various projects conducted by the different organizations have been targeted more at raising awareness, rather than inter-generational transmission of

knowledge and skills, which is the heart of sustaining intangible cultural heritage. Only the Apprenticeship scheme, and to a certain extent the ArtsEd youth engagement projects, were targeted explicitly at transmitting knowhow to a younger generation. Moreover, the small-scale nature of most of these initiatives limits their impact.

For the purposes of retaining the city's dwindling population, these intangible cultural heritage efforts have not been well-matched to the problem at hand – which involves rising rents, rising land prices and heavy costs of conservation to meet the heritage regulation. Different tools are needed to more effectively counter the root causes stemming from the economics of the rental and housing market, particularly with investment pouring in from commercial investors, both domestic and foreign. However, for the first ten years after World Heritage listing, there were surprisingly few policy responses to the crisis of hollowing out George Town.




Figure 55 Net population change from 2009-2013

(Source: Geografia, 2014)

Affordable housing and rents are the key stumbling block in retaining existing residents in the old town. As experienced in other World Heritage sites, the physical conservation requirements themselves have had an unintended side effect in

pressuring residents to leave heritage properties. In a survey conducted in 2014 among 400 residents in the old town, Lim et al (2014) found out that:

“Market forces prevail and owners are very much tempted to sell as it is now very profitable to do so. If the owners do not sell, they face problems in repairing and maintaining the property. The owners’ main grouse is the lack of funds as heritage properties require maintenance and repairing constantly to upkeep the property to the standard required by the authority. The survey shows that 66% of the respondents mentioned that they lack funds to conserve and repair their properties. This financial problem is compounded by the fact that the residents are from the lower income group and yet the cost of repairs are high due to specialised work and materials needed to maintain heritage houses.”

One path-breaking initiative to tackle the affordable rental problem head-on was undertaken by Think City, PHT and GTWHI in collaboration with the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights in 2010-2011. The programme set up a pilot Community Development Fund for a shophouse complex on Armenian Street owned by the Hock Teik Cheng Sin Temple Trust. Out of ten units, over half had been in the same hands for three generations. Reflecting the situation of other shophouses in the historic city, the tenants worried about their security of tenure, while the landlord felt unable to adequately maintain the property due to low rents. The Community Development Fund aimed to provide low-income tenants with secure tenure, at a mutually-agreeable rental rate between tenants and landlord. The pilot required dual funding, from Think City to support the landlord to restore the roof and façade, while funds from the Asian Coalition for Community Action supported tenants to make necessary repairs on the inside of their units. The funding to the temple was provided on the basis of agreeing to stabilize rents for a ten-year period, with subsequent rent increases to be carried out in line with inflation rates. By involving the tenants as partners in the scheme, this empowered the tenants and created deeper trust with the landlord. The Temple Trust itself felt that this arrangement

helped to minimize maintenance costs, which have been a major burden to be factored into rental rates. More importantly, it has also renewed their historic role in taking care of community members, and thus achieved social if not monetary gain.

Following the initial pilot scheme, the Community Development Fund concept was introduced to five more communities facing eviction and other problems. However, skepticism among the stakeholders and the turnover of key personnel in GTWHI and ThinkCity prevented the model from being upscaled. Only a decade later has the Hock Teik Cheng Sin funding model has been upscaled by GTWHI. In 2018, GTWHI launched the 'Heritage Seed Fund', using a State financial allocation to provide subsidies for building restoration using the appropriate mandated materials and techniques. Thinking beyond just the restoration of the building itself, the Heritage Seed Fund also aims to help residents to secure their livelihoods linked to local trades, by providing marketing support. In this way, the new Heritage Seed Fund would benefit both built heritage conservation as well as promote intangible cultural heritage, while enabling local residents to keep staying in the historic town. While promising, it is too early to tell how popular the scheme will be, and how much effect it will have in stemming the tide of out-migration from the city centre.

At the same time, the new mayor of Penang started a programme for "Repopulating George Town". He has proposed an initiative to support transforming shophouses into modern co-working and co-living spaces. Traditional tradespeople would receive affordable rates to rent ground floor spaces for commercial use, while the upper floor would be subdivided into two units for residential tenants. MBPP initiated the pilot scheme at Kimberly Street on a row of Council-owned shophouses, with the expectation that private shophouse owners would follow suit, promising that they would gain a return on their investment. However, given that most of the properties in George Town are in private hands, it is unlikely that the provision of affordable units by the few publicly owned properties will be sufficient to turn the tide. Without more robust incentives or stricter legislation governing private

landlords' behavior, it is dubious how this venture will be able to be replicated at a scale that will make a visible impact.

6.4 Institutional dynamics in the context of expanding boundaries of practice

As with Ayutthaya and Vat Phou, two frameworks will be used to analyze the institutional dynamics operating within the heritage management system in George Town: (i) overall description of the dynamics of the institutional system as a whole, based on the typology proposed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) (creating dynamics, maintaining dynamics and disruptive dynamics, plus the additional proposed regressing dynamics) and (ii) factors of adaptive capacity as proposed in the initial framework in Chapter 2.

The overall institutional dynamic in terms of adaptive capacity at George Town is strongly characterized by **creative** and **disruptive** dynamics in terms of institutional change. As a highly polycentric system, with a large number of involved actors, the case of George Town exhibited the greatest level of dynamism among the three case studies. This was seen in the multiple cycles of disruption and new institution establishment that were seen in the same comparable time period of roughly a decade with the other two cases. The presence of a vocal civil society was instrumental in driving learning capacity. However, underlying informal factors which remain unchanged contributed to **maintaining** outcomes, particularly related to living heritage and private building stock.

The study period starts with the inscription of George Town as a World Heritage site in 2008, which was a major factor in creating a significant shift in the **cognitive frame** for the city, which had long neglected and overlooked its heritage resources. The recognition of the value of heritage, indeed at the highest levels in terms of Outstanding Universal Value, changed the narrative of the city, and became central to the public persona of George Town, as seen in its promotional material, policies, publications and public speeches.

The new cognitive frame of World Heritage – bolstered by external pressure from the World Heritage Committee in its scrutiny of the site for high rise constructions in 2009 – resulted in the creation of a brand-new formal **governance structures** to manage World Heritage. As noted above, instead of assigning the World Heritage management task to an existing agency, the State Government set up GTWHI as the World Heritage office. Within the municipal government, the Heritage Conservation Department and Technical Review Panel were established, to exercise and provide advice on the statutory protection of heritage buildings, respectively. The SAP was drawn up to provide detailed guidance, mostly on land use and building control.

While minimally **resourced** at first, these entities have grown stronger over time, with increased budgets and technical staff. The GTWHI in particular has demonstrated the flexibility of being an SPV with its ability to hire new staff, initiate new ventures and seek international partners and experts to respond to emerging demands, such as disaster risk reduction and materials conservation. This has shifted its operational scope beyond an initial focus on the buildings, townscape and intangible heritage, demonstrating a reflexive adjustment in its **cognitive frame** in managing the George Town World Heritage site.

Demonstrating the dynamic institutional landscape in Penang, another cognitive shift also occurred through Think City's experience in managing the George Town Grants Programme. Disbursing the 20 million RM to stakeholders in a collaborative manner required a major investment of time and energy on the part of Think City to manage, with mixed results. Assessments of the grants programme led Think City to a second cognitive shift. As a way of maximizing impact, its focus evolved to target area-based rejuvenation, directing initiatives on a selected number of streets. It also began investing in public realm improvements as a means to improve overall impact as well as drive up property prices.

With this shift in approach, Think City began to leverage heritage value in the public realm through public private partnerships. Notably, it restructured

relationships to create new alliances with the State Government to set GTCDC in 2015. In another manifestation of its maverick approach, Think City also brought on board an international agency, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, as a partner in the venture, mainly to provide expert technical **resources**, seeking validation from international brand names to provide an authoritative gravitas in its work. Through the GTCDC, the State Government in cooperation with the city council, is now tackling large scale masterplanning of key state-owned properties such as the Fort and the cruise terminal.

The eagerness of State Government to engage in this public-private partnership demonstrates the power of the new cognitive paradigm for how heritage becomes a value-adding proposition rather than a drain on resources, which is seen with the regulatory approach to managing the World Heritage site through enforcement of heritage regulations. By aligning the financial interests of both the state and private sector operators, while ensuring that conservation standards are met and the wider public also benefits from the heritage resources, this approach creates a win-win-win for all parties concerned.

The full political backing and the investment by the State Government in GTCDC contrasts with the obstacles facing the management of the private building stock which forms the lion's share of George Town and the efforts to sustain long-time residents and their embodied culture and heritage in the old town. Neither of these agendas offer the possibility of economic benefits in the same manner as the refurbishments of state-owned property through public-private partnerships. Indeed, retaining old-time mostly working class residents in their original homes would stand in the face of more lucrative businesses and real estate investments.

Since George Town has become a World Heritage site, instances of infractions by the local government itself have not abated. The SAP, the primary regulatory document to guide the protection of George Town, took over five years to be gazetted. The state has also been slow with the Penang Local Plan and the State Heritage Enactment. This vacuum has allowed the state and local authorities to sell

off or sanction the demolition of heritage buildings, without a monitoring or punitive mechanism. A high-level Penang state official commented that “*state and private sector have to band together to compete for Penang’s survival [as an opposition state].*” However, these cozy relations have not tapered off since the once opposition state became part of the ruling party in 2018. If anything, the island has seen a major development frenzy.

The tenacity of these underlying pro-development **relationships** that are the lifeline for political survival in Penang have constrained the **agency** of heritage organizations and initiatives. Special watchdog initiatives have been successively launched by heritage NGOs to monitor the site before withering away, ostensibly due to “*lack of support and reciprocity*” from the authorities. Although civil society continues to influence the heritage agenda, through public pressure, education, outreach and media, its voice is increasingly sidelined. The maturation of other heritage institutions that have been set up since 2008 has reduced the prominence of organizations like the Penang Heritage Trust, which was once the only real heritage player in what is now a crowded field. Inter-agency competition and the creation of different niches – with GTWHI seen as having a mandate in education and ICH, Think City now focusing on the public realm, and the Heritage Department regulating built heritage – have fragmented and undercut the authority of the heritage lobby as a whole. As a partner, appointee and organ of the authorities, respectively, these organizations are dependent on the state and local authorities for funding or authority, and thus necessarily have to self-censor any criticism of transgressive government actions. This constrains their ability to fully advocate and implement the heritage agenda in the face of the underlying realities of Penang’s political economy.

The final sticking point, which itself can be seen as another manifestation of the deeper reluctance to prioritize heritage, is the failure to expand the **formal governance mechanisms** to create the necessary regulatory tools and mechanism to deal with the main problems now facing the future of George Town: the linked

issues of gentrification and the exodus of Penang residents who are the bearers and practitioners of the city's living heritage. This phenomenon could be seen as a continuation of the decline already triggered by the repeal of the Rent Control Act, but no doubt exacerbated by the World Heritage listing. As many World Heritage sites have faced the same phenomenon, it was not unanticipated. There have been no measures to constrain property prices or to incentivize local residents to stay on, particularly those who are practitioners or transmitters of intangible cultural heritage.

In the first ten years of World Heritage status, there has not been an effective management mechanism devised to counter this problem. The SAP, the overall guiding instrument for conserving the site, is ultimately an urban planning document, and thus limited to stipulating land use, urban design and building conservation. Tools related to safeguarding intangible cultural heritage, such as inventories and support to festivals, have been used, but they do not get at the heart of the depopulation problem, nor have they been effective at actually ensuring the long-term transmission of intangible cultural heritage.

Economic theory suggests that in the case of publicly-produced private goods, as the shophouses can be argued to be, the right measure is to provide subsidies to encourage the market to provide such goods. Finally, after ten years of population decline, two new schemes along this vein were launched, demonstrating learning from past pitfalls. While the George Town Grants Programme provided funding for conservation, it did not subsidize the on-going maintenance and rental costs which would provide both owner and tenant with a mutually acceptable solution. The launch of the new Heritage Seed Fund in 2018 intends to fund restoration work in return for secured tenancy agreement for a five-year period at lower-than-market rents. Meanwhile, the municipal government initiated a programme to "Repopulate George Town" by transforming city-owned shophouses into modern co-working and co-living spaces at lower-than-market rents. However, the mayor himself admitted that the scheme was unlikely to retain families, and was targeting students, which would not address loss of cultural knowhow. While well-


designed, these measures are still quite limited in scale, starting with 3 million RM funding and six shophouses respectively. Therefore, it is unclear if they are merely anomalies that are not perceived to pose a threat to the larger development trajectory of Penang, or whether they signal a new turning point.

In summary, the **learning** and **cognitive shift** associated with George Town's World Heritage listing put into action two different pathways within the overall institutional ecology for heritage management, reflecting the influence of the agency of the participating actors.

The first pathway (seen in yellow at the bottom part of the following conceptual mapping on the next page) started with a creative burst in the establishment of a slew of **formal measures** in the form of new heritage-related institutions and organizations. Unlike at Vat Phou or Ayutthaya, these agencies have not been burdened by any institutional baggage which self-limits their agency. For them, technical and financial **resources** have not been an insurmountable problem as such, and these organizations have been able to mobilize resources to a certain extent. The inadequacy of existing management and regulatory tools and the failure to innovate new tools have also been an obstacle. More fundamentally, the lack of political support and the entrenched pro-development institutional structure have dampened the **agency** of the heritage bodies, including civil society groups, and ultimately stymied their ability to stem the problems related to gentrification and exodus of local people, along with their traditional and cultural knowhow. Without a realignment of incentives to forge new alliances or measures to fill the demand-supply gap driven by market pressures, the heritage agenda will continue to backslide.

The other pathway (seen in green at the top half of the conceptual mapping) is to piggyback off the prevailing power networks, and to align pro-development interests of the public and private sector with the heritage agenda. This can be seen in GTCDC's efforts in their latest stage of work on public realm projects at Grade I monuments. They were able to come up with a new governance mechanism for

capitalizing on the city's public heritage sites by forging new alliances and synergizing various key stakeholders interested in profit-making or heritage protection. Exercising its agency to consciously choose to focus on public properties which are under state ownership and the highest level of heritage protection laws could be seen as a tactical move. Instead of getting embroiled in complicated negotiations with a multitude of stakeholders required in neighborhood conservation efforts, it conserves the energy and time of the partner agencies and delivers high-visibility results. However, it does not address the pressing issues dogging most of the 5,000 privately-owned buildings that are still in living use that constitutes the site – which reflect the expanded boundary of heritage practice related to HUL and living heritage. In this sense, while seeming a creative act of innovation, in fact, this programme could also be read more deeply as an act of retreating back to the most conventional form of heritage conservation – protection of state-owned monuments.



6.5 Factors of adaptive capacity

6.5.1 Investing in information and knowledge: Cognitive frame and learning capacity

The high-rise crisis coupled with the new inscription of George Town were important factors that sparked awareness and led to a cognitive shift among various actors in acknowledging the demands of being a World Heritage site. In fact, most of the actions that were taken – drafting the SAP, setting up the GTWHI – were already foreseen in the Heritage Management Plan, so they were not new ideas per se. Some of the provisions had already been discussed for a long time among heritage boosters, but did not gain traction until federal and state leadership came to realize the new stakes at hand.

Learning capacity at an organizational level has been greater in George Town compared to the other case studies. Three of the key operational organizations – GTWHI, Think City and the Heritage Department – were founded in the past 10 years, making them free of the weight of history and institutional baggage that accumulates over decades, and thus more open to learning and to changing their cognitive mindset. Of these, only the Heritage Department holds statutory power and has a legally-mandated role to fulfill. The other two are SPVs and have a flexibility in determining their scope of work, and are not locked down to a certain rigid organizational identity and mandate. For instance, GTWHI was able to create new programmes related to object conservation and disaster risk management following flooding in 2017, even though these were not issues foreseen in the original organigramme or Heritage Management Plan. Even though staff were not trained in these issues, they were able to learn – including from the internet and other non-conventional sources – to gain enough knowledge in these domains to be able to engage with invited experts and to provide support to residents in George Town.

The key legal and regulatory instruments used in managing George Town's heritage are all recently created as well. The Heritage Act dates from 2005. The Guidelines for Conservation Areas and Heritage Buildings were revised in 2007,

superseding a previous 1987 version. The draft SAP was initially completed in 2011. Again, the relative newness of these instruments creates a certain improvisational quality in their early application, as the provisions need to be interpreted from scratch, without years of case precedents to refer back to or be bound by. The very act of deploying these instruments for site management then became a learning process as well, for the enforcing officials, for the homeowners and tenants, and for the advisory committee members.

The lack of in-house technical capacity has been cited as a bane that hobbles the ability of organizations to function effectively. For instance, Rugkhaman (2017) points out the limited staff and technical background of the Heritage Department under MBPP. It could be argued that this lack of in-house capacity is only an issue if additional capacity cannot be augmented, either internally or externally. In fact, intentional lack of in-house capacity can create space for more learning, greater flexibility and possibly more innovative and diverse solutions. Think City, with its lean operational model and lack of a heavy corps of in-house experts, was able to think out of the box in framing issues. Instead of treating all problems as heritage problems requiring heritage solutions (as a normal heritage organization is tempted or forced to do), it found different angles to tackle the standard urban conservation symptoms – as a business improvement issue, or in terms of greening the city or livability. These required an open mind and a willingness to take on and subject partners to a steep learning curve as many of the solutions were new in the context of Penang.

Among the public at large, a survey conducted in 2012 suggested that a steady stream of workshops, festivals and other learning opportunities has raised people's appreciation of heritage, compared with 2006 before World Heritage listing. The report shows that:

“The study in 2006 reported that 71% of the respondents indicated it was important to protect historic buildings while 13% said otherwise. The remaining 16% indicated that they have no opinion

on the subject. This survey undertaken six years later revealed that historic buildings have become even more important to the residents...83% of the respondents of the survey in 2012 indicated that it is important to protect the historic buildings. This shows an increase of 12% from the previous survey. Currently, only 6% said it is not important to them as compared to 13% in 2006.” All three categories of ‘owner’, ‘tenant’ and ‘others’ (workers/owner’s relatives) unanimously agreed that it is important to protect the historic buildings. ... More than 80% of the respondents with primary and secondary education, as well as certificate and diploma holders now opined that it is important to protect historic buildings” (Lim, Khoo and Ch’ng 2014).

Moreover, the increased heritage awareness also translated into an increased willingness to pay in terms of investing in buying a heritage property. “The 2012 survey found that the respondents with postgraduate and professional qualification were most willing to pay more (50%) while those with secondary school qualification (35%) were at least willing to pay more, followed closely by diploma holders (37%)” (ibid).

This finding is attributed to the steady information and public campaigns conducted in George Town since listing. While Malaysia promised the World Heritage Committee to organize an annual World Heritage Day as a way to increase awareness, in fact, starting in 2010, GTWHI has been staging a month-long festivities under the banner of the George Town Festival. Taking on a didactic quality since 2013 (when gentrification began to empty the city of its living heritage), the Festival shines a spotlight on a different heritage aspect of the World Heritage site, as a means of raising awareness.

6.5.2 Encouraging appropriate institutions: Agency, formal governance structures, relationships

The cognitive shifts in George Town have led to creating a raft of new formal governance structures, in the form of multiple plans, new pilot initiatives, regulations, organizations and committees. However, all the organizational learning has not managed to fully overcome the mismatch between the complex reality of the site and the legacy of the pre-existing statutory urban planning system and conventional approaches to heritage management. While George Town is a living heritage site and a historic urban landscape, the suite of official regulatory and management tools that have been developed are still mostly limited to conservation of static built architectural and urban heritage: the SAP, the conservation guidelines, and TRP and other advisory mechanisms. Meanwhile, the gentrification issue was initially tackled using intangible cultural heritage safeguarding tools from the heritage toolbox, which did not address the deeper economic problems which were driving residents to leave.

At a glance, the creation of multiple new organizations seems to have totally re-arranged the relationships within the system, by introducing various new actors to take on new functions. Among these new front-line organizations, there has been a lot of fluidity in the early stages, with alliances created to pool knowledge and funds to cope with the emerging challenges of a new World Heritage site. As each organization has matured, they have grown more separate, with clearer organizational identities for themselves.

That said, the underlying relationships at the entire level of Penang itself have been harder to change. Meaning to say, despite the new operational actors introduced to supplement existing State and local-level bodies, the key players pulling the strings remain unchanged: the State government and its business allies. This intractable reality has undercut the agency of the operational agencies in terms of their independence in heritage decision making and implementation, particularly

those bodies who are lower in the hierarchy and are under the direction of the State government.

6.5.3 Increasing resources

The availability of resources has been an important enabler for institutional change in George Town. Malaysia, as the most prosperous country among the three case studies, does not face the same hard constraints as Lao PDR in terms of resources. However, factors like national financial mismanagement which came to the fore in the late 2010s have created artificial restrictions in funding which have had an impact across a range of government services including the heritage sector.

The RM 20 million federal allocation channeled via Think City and disbursed via the George Town Grants Programme had a catalytic impact both financially as well as psychologically. As restoration projects were disbursed on a matching basis, this had the effect of doubling the initial investment from the Federal government, along with creating commitment from multiple groups throughout the city who were grant beneficiaries who had to put skin in the game. Although the George Town Grants Programme wound down in 2013, as planned, Think City has been able to create new models for leveraging funds through new partnerships, notably with the state government. This has been especially necessary as it faced radical cuts from its main funder in the delayed wake of the 1MDB scandal.

Meanwhile, GTWHI has also benefited from increased support from the state government as well. It has been able to grow its organization in terms of staff and core funding to expand and deepen its role across a widening range of heritage issues. New ventures like the Heritage Seed Fund are also bankrolled by the State.

The increasing reliance on funding from the state government creates a greater dependency; the more beholden to the state government, the more circumspect in their dealings with the state these organizations may become. It also makes these various organizations, and the institutional system as a whole, more vulnerable to

changing whims and policies by the State government, who may choose to disinvest in heritage, given underlying development pressures.

In terms of technical resources, the SPV model has proven to be highly adaptable in allowing GTWHI and Think City to source external expertise from Malaysia and abroad. In its initial years, GTWHI relied on local heritage experts, many from heritage NGOs. Unlike regular government agencies, they are able to invite international experts, often leading regional or international figures, to provide technical inputs in training activities or projects. This has helped to round out the available knowhow in Penang, which is still limited to a handful of practitioners. In comparison, the federal and municipal level Heritage Departments have not been able to augment their technical capacity much. Furthermore, while the municipal Heritage Department has an important statutory role, as it is not perceived to be the site management agency, it does not have access to international training opportunities that are offered to GTWHI.

6.6 Conclusion: Reflecting on institutional dynamics, adaptive capacity and expanding boundaries of practice

6.6.1 Polycentric institutional setting

In comparison with Ayutthaya or Vat Phou, the governance system for George Town is highly polycentric, which has translated into dynamic institutional behavior, more innovation and more transformation. Whereas it is normal for World Heritage sites to fall under different forms of jurisdiction at different levels, in the case of George Town, there are multiple organizations who directly share the responsibility in various aspects of managing the World Heritage site. GTWHI is the *de facto* World Heritage site management agency, while statutory control of the built environment is under the city authorities. Think City started as a major source of funds in the early days of the World Heritage site through its grants programme, and has since morphed to become a facilitator of partnerships between the state government and other entities in undertaking public realm projects. Whereas the Federal ministry in charge of cultural heritage ostensibly has the ultimate statutory authority with regards to

heritage matters, in operational practice, the ultimate authority in Penang is the State government, including both in carrying out and overriding heritage-related decisions.

The combination of multiple organizations, being relatively young and relying on relatively new laws and regulations amplifies the dynamic qualities of the polycentric system even more. Having several active organizations, sometimes working in parallel, sometimes working in competition, sometimes working together, has proven to be a driver of institutional innovation. New programmes have been launched regularly tackling a range of issues, some short-term, some long-term or recurrent. Various alliances have emerged and have shifted over time. Alliances with outside reputable organizations, such as the Aga Khan or UNESCO, have introduced new ways of thinking into the equation, not only relying on existing sources of knowledge and practices.

Over the same comparable period of ten years under study in the three case studies, George Town has gone through at least two parallel cycles of programming and cognitive shifts as seen in the conceptual diagram above, with different organizations driving action on different topics, and creating new institutions along the way. Meanwhile, at Vat Phou, relying mainly on the energy and initiative of the Vat Phou World Heritage Site Management Office, managed to get through planning and implementing one cycle (regarding the landscape master plan). In combination with other actors, the Vat Phou office is beginning to create a new shift in programming, by altering the governance discourse towards sustainable development issues. Ayutthaya, on the other hand, bogged down within the rigid context of the FAD, was barely able to get through one cycle partially, resulting in a non-endorsed plan and a training programme, but as yet no institutionalized formal implementation.

Polycentricity has its downfalls as well though. Having multiple organizations has created a coalition of bed partners which overlap and compete, sometimes resulting in confusion. The many-cooks-in-the-kitchen syndrome is apparent in the hybrid document that is the SAP which is a mashup of a conservation management

plan with a local plan with a district masterplan. In terms of competition, monitoring of built heritage is a core function of the Heritage Department, which has the legal mandate to crack down on infringements. In its role as site manager, GTWHI also undertakes monitoring, but it is not easy to reconcile all the different data together.

The coalition approach has created divisions of labor and specializations – with ICH being spearheaded by GTWHI, Think City now focusing on big public realm projects, and the MBPP in charge of built heritage and townscape enforcement. On the one hand, this could be seen as efficiently allocating resources and responsibilities. On the other hand, turf wars have made it difficult to pass the baton and to cooperate in scaling up and embedding initiatives in a long-term framework. For instance, some of the innovative initiatives that Think City has piloted with world-class partners, such as enlivening public space, have languished as demonstration projects, without being mainstreamed into regular planning and management practice in the hands of the local government and World Heritage site management office, who prefer to initiate their own programmes from scratch.

6.6.2 Formal-informal interaction

For all the changes that have emerged in George Town in terms of new formal governance mechanisms and instruments, at the of the day, the pace of change at the site has been determined by the informal rules underlying the institutional system.

Dealing with a site that contains over 10,000 residents and over 5,000 building units presents challenges in terms of the multiple interests at play in any issue. Creating trust has been crucial in laying the groundwork for any implementation of the SAP and other regulations, as well as specific projects. This has required an investment of time and social capital through informal channels and platforms, in order to put in place an enabling environment for the formal rules to kick in.

Beyond convincing individual stakeholders, however, the capacity for change in George Town is constrained by the covert power structure. Vested economic and

political interests in the public and private sector dominate decision making, thus overriding heritage conservation concerns in the face of development interests. The long-intertwined interests between the state government and real estate developers skews decision making in George Town towards commercial development outcomes. Even the choice to set up GTWHI as a SPV which is ostensibly independent but in fact is ultimately influenced by the state authorities for instruction and funding, and without any statutory authority to protect heritage interests, makes it structurally difficult for the site management office to counter any initiatives emanating from the state that may adversely impact on the heritage. This is compounded by its relatively anodyne functions in focusing on intangible cultural heritage, education and awareness raising issues. The SPV mechanism actually has become a way for the State government to extend its control, through a more direct route which cuts through layers of bureaucratic red tape which would actually protect a government agency.

The recent initiatives from the GTCDC in optimizing financial gains alongside heritage objectives within a larger framework of urban transformation seems to be a new model that could reduce these structural conflicts. By aligning the interests of multiple stakeholders across the public and private sector, this reduces inherent contradictions towards a shared goal. However, given that GTCDC has been operating in the public realm which is under state ownership, it is unclear how this model would extend to private properties which form the bulk of the World Heritage site, and whose redevelopment is creating the negative social impacts facing George Town and its residents today.

6.6.3 Expanding boundaries of practice

Overall, the George Town case study lends further credence to the concept that multiple institutional orders make a system less “institutionalized” and rigid, and may allow actors to exercise greater agency in responding to challenges both existing and emerging. The combination of different organizations distributed risk in the system in terms of organizational inaction or resistance on the part of any one

individual organization, especially in dealing with unfamiliar issues. This allowed the system as a whole to be more responsive both to issues within established boundaries of practice as well as outside these boundaries.

Within established boundaries of practice, in this case, existing urban planning and building conservation frameworks, not surprisingly, statutory organizations took the lead to develop new regulatory instruments and mechanisms. Their solutions were bound within the scope of their mandates and the overarching laws, such as the Town and Country Planning Act. In this sense, the underlying conceptual thinking was fairly conventional. Owing to the fact that the organizations in George Town were fairly young, such as the newly-set up Heritage Department, there was less resistance compared with the case of Ayutthaya where institutional practices and norms were more deeply entrenched, making it difficult for either individuals or the organization to accept shortcomings in their existing practices.

Meanwhile, non-statutory agencies demonstrated more innovation and responsiveness in dealing with emerging issues outside boundaries of practice. In part, this was born of necessity because many of these new issues did not have any pre-existing plans or regulations or schemes in place. For instance, with the affordable housing scheme, Think City was able to introduce a completely new model for community funding. However, it proved difficult to translate this innovation – both conceptually out of the box, as well as outside existing governmental organizational channels – into regular practice and to institutionalize it.

Multiple organizations also allow for different approaches to be introduced to deal with unfamiliar topics, if not in direct competition per se, then in terms of testing different concepts. Instead of all hopes hinging on the efforts of one organization, having various organizations try out their own programmes had several benefits. It allowed different aspects of the problem to be tackled, and to reach out to different audiences and constituencies. For instance, the issue of intangible cultural heritage, was picked up by several organizations – some from a

documentation angle, some from a public education angle, some from an active learning and intergenerational transmission angle.

6.7 Summary of chapter

Unlike at Ayutthaya or Vat Phou, the expanding boundary of heritage practice at George Town did not have a spatial dimension. Rather, it was a more conceptual one, from managing the built townscape to also dealing with the living heritage of the old town. The highly polycentric institutional system at George Town facilitated the innovation of various responses to the emerging needs by introducing new plans and creating new committees and organizations. Numerous new alliances were also initiated, either to consolidate political authority or to share knowledge and build up technical authority. The presence of multiple organizations working in the heritage space with fluid mandates made it possible for a wide range of heritage issues to be addressed – not only limited to conserving buildings, but also upgrading public spaces, promoting intangible cultural heritage, excavating archaeological sites, conserving objects and promoting creative industries linked to the local culture and heritage. A combination of competition and tacit turf demarcation spurred these various organizations into action.

However, despite the changes in plans and organizations, the tenacity of underlying formal and informal rules meant that change was not as transformative as it needed to be to address all the management problems that were surfacing. Notably, the lack to push through with key institutional mechanisms such as the State Local Plan or State Heritage Commissioner created lacunae in protecting even the most straightforward of heritage components – individual historic buildings. This lacunae reflected deeper underlying informal rules in place that reflect the local politics which favors real estate development.

Two in-case narratives demonstrate how the formal-informal tensions embedded in the political system could be used to further heritage protection or could undercut the heritage agenda. In one narrative, the pro-development instincts

were harnessed in a constructive win manner through the creation of public-private partnerships to develop and conserve state-owned public heritage properties. However, in the other narrative, it was clear that heritage agencies and efforts could not overcome the underlying development interests to fight illegal hotel conversions or to retain old time residents as real estate prices shot up. Even with increased financial and technical resources, efforts at learning through training programmes, and the establishment of new organizations to provide building permit reviews and monitoring, the unchanged pro-development cognitive framework ended up thwarting conservation efforts.



Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Revisiting research objectives and overall findings

In the context of mounting pressures on World Heritage sites, this thesis looks into the ability of World Heritage governance institutions to deal with changes of various kinds, by forming – for failing to form – institutional responses in terms of adaptation or transformation. This concern is driven by the growing number of sites which are officially under monitoring by the World Heritage Committee, and the greater number of sites which are not officially monitored but nonetheless face issues of increasing complexity. Many of these sites are under monitoring for years, reflecting the intractability of the issues that they struggle to resolve, sometimes without resolution.

The thesis is premised on the initial observation that many World Heritage governance institutions are antiquated. With their traditional mandates in conservation rooted in the Venice Charter era, they are stretched in dealing with expanding boundaries of practice brought about by new manifestations of heritage and emerging management issues. The sluggishness of change at many sites suggests that the current World Heritage institutional arrangements may not be effective in addressing root causes necessary to bring about systemic transformation, and that a deeper understanding of the institutional mechanisms of such pathways of change is needed.

The thesis adopts the analytical framework of adaptive change theory and applies it to a range of management challenges, not related to its regular domain of climate change. This framework is used alongside theories of institutional change in order to unpack the institutional dynamics of three selected case studies of World Heritage sites in Southeast Asia: Ayutthaya (Thailand), Vat Phou and Associated Ancient Settlements in the Champasak Cultural Landscape (Lao PDR) and George

Town (Malaysia). All three case studies had to deal with a number of challenges associated with both conceptual expansion of heritage notions, as well as broadening management challenges, which pose a strain on existing knowhow, legislation and regulatory frameworks as well as existing organizations, relationships and informal rules.

The thesis is framed around the following key research question:

- What determines the adaptive capacity of World Heritage institutions, in the face of expanding boundaries of heritage practice?

The following sub-questions are posed:

- Institutional dynamics: How do different determinants of adaptive capacity interact in shaping various institutional dynamics, through formal and informal processes?
- The nature of institutions: How do centralized versus polycentric institutional systems differ in terms of adaptive capacity?
- Navigating boundaries: Do institutions have more adaptive capacity in responding to issues within or outside of existing boundaries of practice?

This section will present findings from the three case studies in a synthetic manner, with a view to putting forward observations which may inform institutional reforms in World Heritage governance and the practice of heritage management.

Overall findings

First, the study proposes a refined model for analyzing and characterizing adaptive capacity, as illustrated below. This model confirms the utility of the six key factors of adaptive capacity which were proposed in Chapter 2: cognitive frame, learning capacity, formal governance structures, resources, relationships and agency. This model is synthesized from these three particular case studies and shows the interaction among different factors of adaptive capacity as analyzed from these

cases. Other schemas could be developed in the future depending on the context and the empirical evidence.

In this refined model, shifts in cognitive frame and learning could drive changes in formal governance structures and formal relationships. Translating from these changes in formal structures into implementation, however, could be compromised if resource flows are not enhanced and if unsympathetic informal relationships remain unchanged.

Agency is posited as a key factor that feeds into all stages of potential transformation, from the initial stage of learning, to alteration of formal structures, to implementation. Agency is divided into (i) agency to learn, which comprises changes in cognitive frame and learning capacity; (ii) agency to alter formal rules, as seen in the ability to influence formal relationships, formal governance structures and resources; and finally, (iii) agency to put new rules into practice, which is influenced and often undermined by informal relationships which are manifestations of embedded power relations and interests. Agency itself is influenced by other factors such as relationships and the availability of resources, which may undercut the agency of a particular actor and thus impede its ability to carry out change.




Figure 57 Refined model for adaptive capacity, showing institutional dynamics and interaction among factors of adaptive capacity

This representation of the interaction of the various factors differs from existing well-known frameworks such as the Adaptive Capacity Wheel developed by Gupta et al and more recently scholarship such as Phillips (2012) which present the factors of adaptive capacity as discrete elements alongside one another, without a sense of their dynamics or temporal unfolding.




Figure 58 Existing adaptive capacity frameworks developed by (top) Gupta et al (2010) and (bottom) Phillips et al (2013)

With regards to the sub-question on institutional dynamics, the cases underscore two issues which can facilitate or block institutional adaptation: the relationship between informal and formal rules, and the relationship between individual and organizational change. First, all three case studies show informal rules are persistent, and can undermine the transformative impact of altering formal rules. Secondly, they also demonstrate how formal processes are needed to institutionalize gains from informal settings in order to bring about systemic transformation. This was clear at Ayutthaya when individual-level learning and changes in behavior did not translate into FAD-wide changes.

With regards to the sub-question on the nature of institutions, the study supports the proposition in the literature that, on the whole, polycentric institutions are more dynamic than centralized institutional systems. This is particularly clear when there is a single dominant organization whose practices are mythologized and ossified, and does not have other agencies around to spark new ideas or inject a healthy sense of competition. However, the findings from the case studies show that this simple rule of thumb does not always hold true, as there are nuances in the institutional dynamics of both centralized and polycentric systems which may encourage or discourage change from occurring. For instance, in a polycentric system, the literature holds that systems with multiple organizations with overlapping mandates could create competition to produce more innovations. On the other hand, this research finds that the competitive nature of their relationships could actually prevent one organization from adopting and mainstreaming an innovation created by another body, thus limiting the overall impact of such changes.

With regards to the sub-question on navigating boundaries, the study finds that the response of centralized and polycentric institutions to dealing with

expanding boundaries of practice is different. The research findings suggest that a centralized institutional system is able to deal in a more dynamic manner with issues outside existing boundaries of practice – leading to disruptions in cognitive frame, learning and changes in formal governance structures and resources. However, within existing boundaries, such centralized systems are more resistant to adaptation: organizations (and their staff) have a tendency to be mythologized within its existing mandate and thus stymied by embedded agency. As a result, it becomes difficult to change cognitive frameworks, to unlearn, and accordingly, to change governance structures, resource allocations and relationships. In contrast, for polycentric institutionalized systems, the research suggests that there are no distinctions within and outside boundaries of practice. Polycentric systems tend to be more willing to disrupt cognitive frames, to learn, and to put in place new governance structures, alliances and resource flows, regardless of the nature of the management issue or challenge at hand.

Adaptive capacity and institutional dynamics: findings from the case studies

To expand further upon these overall findings, the following sources of rigidity and dynamism are identified in more detail, based on the analysis of the empirical evidence.

Table 29 Sources of institutional rigidity and dynamism

Sources of institutional rigidity	Sources of institutional dynamism
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Persistence of formal rules due to embedded agency (organizational structures and practices are “mythologized”) ● Statutory authority (can become a straight jacket, preventing change) ● Resistance to organizational learning (difficulty “unlearning”) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Polycentric system (overlapping, competing organizations with non-exclusive jurisdiction) ● Non-statutory agencies display more innovation ● Individual learning alters individual practice ● Feedback mechanism between

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Even if some formal rules change (ie new plans), the failure to construct rewards and sanctions to enforce new rules means the act of creating a new institutional framework is incomplete ● Persistence of informal rules (hampers translating learning into practice, especially due to entrenched political alliances and interests) ● Lack of alternative sparks for change (from other organizations, etc in a centralized setting) ● Existing systems more entrenched within existing boundary of practice ● Polycentric system with competing organizations and turf wars – ideas from one organization will not be adopted or mainstreamed by others 	<p>individual learning and organizational learning needed for organizational change</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Aligning interests to create new alliances for mutual gain ● More willingness to do something new outside existing boundary of practice, but institutionalizing such change requires quantum leap (innovate new regulatory mechanisms, new alliances) and higher-level learning (double or triple loop) ● Change is easier to sustain if successfully initiated within existing boundary of practice (extending existing knowledge base and mechanisms without too much new investment) ● Loose mandate and light organizational structure (not weighed down by old staff)
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To contextualize these findings in the case studies, the following cross-case comparisons are presented, with two in-case narratives identified for each case. The comparison shows that it is more likely that formal rules change. However, informal rules are more difficult to change, and they become an obstacle to total systemic adaptation.

Factors of adaptive capacity that are seen in the case studies to be sources of institutional rigidity are: agency, resources, relationships and governance structures.

Sources of institutional dynamism are: cognitive frame, learning (although individual level learning must translate into organizational learning), relationships (easier to change inside an organization than externally) and governance structures.

Table 30 Cross-case comparisons of institutional change and factors of adaptive capacity affecting institutional dynamics

	Changes in formal rules	Changes in informal rules	Sources of institutional rigidity	Sources of institutional dynamism
Ayutthaya: monument restoration	None	Some individual practice in restoration has changed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cognitive frame (hard to change at first) ● Governance structures ● Resources ● Relationships ● Lack of organizational learning/unlearning ● Agency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Individual learning ● Relationships (in terms of ad hoc internal collaboration)
Ayutthaya: disaster management	New disaster sub-plan, but no macro-level regulatory changes	Little change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Relationships ● Agency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cognitive frame ● Governance structures
Vat Phou: landscape	New landscape	Little change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Agency ● Resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cognitive frame

	Changes in formal rules	Changes in informal rules	Sources of institutional rigidity	Sources of institutional dynamism
management	Master Plan, but no sanctions for enforcement		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Relationships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Governance structures
Vat Phou: aspirational local development vision	Changes at level of strategic visioning to emphasize heritage-driven local development	New approach would align formal rules with underlying informal rules	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cognitive frame ● Learning capacity ● Governance structures ● Resources ● Relationships ● Agency
George Town: regulation of private properties and residents	New plans, new organizations	Little change in covert power structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Relationships ● Agency ● Governance structures (lack of stronger regulations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cognitive frame ● Learning capacity ● Governance structures (plans) ● Resources
George Town: public realm PPP	New alliances, new financing mechanisms	Align formal rules with underlying	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Relationships (competition among organizations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Resources ● Cognitive frame ● Governance

	Changes in formal rules	Changes in informal rules	Sources of institutional rigidity	Sources of institutional dynamism
		informal rules	limits impact of mainstreaming pilot schemes)	structures ● Relationships (new alliances)

In terms of overall institutional dynamics in a temporal sense, over the same comparable period of ten years under study in the three case studies, George Town has gone through at least two parallel cycles of programming and cognitive shifts as seen in the conceptual diagram above, with different organizations driving action on different topics, and creating new institutions along the way. Meanwhile, relying mainly on the energy and initiative of the Vat Phou WHSO, Vat Phou managed to get through planning and implementing one cycle (regarding the landscape master plan). In combination with other actors, the Vat Phou office is beginning to create a new shift in programming, by altering the governance discourse towards sustainable development issues. Ayutthaya, on the other hand, bogged down within the rigid context of the FAD, was barely able to get through one cycle partially, resulting in a non-endorsed plan and a training programme, but as yet no institutionalized formal implementation.

7.1.1 Determinants of adaptive capacity

The thesis started with an examination of the established literature related to adaptive capacity in order to begin selecting determinants of adaptive capacity. The broad framework of Janssen and Ostrom (2006) was adopted, which sets up a tripartite pillars related to information, appropriate institutions and resources. Specific factors were drawn primarily from the seminal Adaptive Change Wheel

developed by Gupta et al (2010) and later studies by Bettini et al (2015) and Cohen et al (2016) which highlight the role of institutional and individual agency.

Initial empirical observations helped in the preliminary identification of determinants. Qualitative research from the field, mainly in the form of semi-structured interviews and participant observation, as well as documentary analysis, provided the basis for further refining the adaptive capacity framework in the context of World Heritage governance institutions. Qualitative analysis using coding and conceptual mapping techniques was conducted, yielding a more nuanced understanding of the different determinants of adaptive capacity. This also allowed for refinement of sub-factors related to the main proposed factors, as below.

Table 31 Final set of factors proposed for assessing adaptive capacity

Key determinants of adaptive capacity from literature (Janssen and Ostrom)	Proposed factors	Original sub-factors selected from literature	Refined sub-factors
Investing in information and knowledge	Cognitive frames	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Values ● Aspirations ● Problem frames ● Logical frameworks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Values ● Aspirations ● Conceptual framework, especially related to heritage concepts
	Learning capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Single loop ● Double loop ● Triple loop learning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Single loop learning ● Higher order learning (double

Key determinants of adaptive capacity from literature (Janssen and Ostrom)	Proposed factors	Original sub-factors selected from literature	Refined sub-factors
			and triple loop learning) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Individual learning ● Organizational learning
Encouraging appropriate institutions	Agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Empowerment and ability to decide and act, reflecting authority / status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Status of organization ● Statutory or other form of authority ● Champions of change ● Buy-in at leadership level
(Formal institutions)	Formal governance structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Legislation ● Organizations ● Regulatory processes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Plans ● Legislative or regulatory instruments ● Organizations

Key determinants of adaptive capacity from literature (Janssen and Ostrom)	Proposed factors	Original sub-factors selected from literature	Refined sub-factors
(Formal and informal institutions)	Relationships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Connections between and within organizations and actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal relationships • External relationships • Formal and informal relationships
Increasing resources	Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial resources • Human resources • Social capital 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial resources • Human resources • Social capital

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Investing in information and knowledge: cognitive frame and learning capacity

The evidence from all case studies suggests the fundamental importance of shifting cognitive frames as a prerequisite for institutional adaptation. Altering cognitive frames requires both a modification in discourse but more importantly in practice as well. Without these alterations, it becomes difficult to re-align institutional goals and operations to meet changing realities.

I propose that three aspects of cognitive frames need to be considered in the context of World Heritage governance institutions: (i) values, (ii) aspirations and (iii) conceptual framework, especially related to heritage concepts. Values and aspirations are sub-factors which are already well-articulated in the existing literature on adaptive change, as these drive the long-term visioning, coalition building and planning exercises that shape institutions.

Values, aspirations and cognitive frames which are starkly different from the status quo may require transformative change, not just incremental change. The case studies show that major triggers are needed to spark such change in order to overcome institutional inertia. In the context of World Heritage, raising the alarm by the World Heritage Committee, especially about possible Danger Listing, and the subsequent national shaming that occurs on the global stage, has proven to be a trigger. Another trigger is a dramatic disaster, such as the flooding that affected Ayutthaya. However, both sets of triggers may only be able to initiate change processes, and may not necessarily translate into systemic transformation.

I highlight the importance of conceptual (heritage) frameworks as a key aspect influencing cognitive frames. In the heritage sector, there have been major conceptual changes within the past 50 years. As comprehensively mapped by Thompson and Wijesuriya (2018), heritage practitioners have seen a sea change from being defenders of heritage islands populated by monuments and archaeological sites (1960s-1990s), to acknowledging living heritage which requires opening up to other voices (1994 onwards), and finally to mobilizing heritage in the broader quest for sustainable development (2010 onwards). Many heritage institutions in most countries in this sub-region are still legacies of the first era of heritage work focused on monuments and archaeological sites. However, they are increasingly confronting changing concepts and norms of heritage practice fomenting within international heritage circles. These include not only more expansive definitions of heritage (cultural landscapes, historic urban landscapes, living heritage, along with industrial heritage and Modern heritage, for instance), but also participatory and rights-based

approaches to heritage governance. Whereas many Southeast Asian institutions have become more familiar, and even adept, at adapting their rhetoric to align with international heritage discourse, it can be seen that their efforts at operationalizing such rhetoric are still lagging behind. This signals at best a partial cognitive shift, at least at the level of discourse, but not a total cognitive shift that is needed as the basis for transformations in practice. As will be seen below, other determinants of adaptive change are needed to carry forward the momentum of any changes in cognitive frame, starting with learning capacity.

I propose that learning capacity is closely intertwined with cognitive frames and is the necessary step to transform abstract notions of change into practice and to confront new notions with existing frameworks of habit and operation. I suggest sub-factors related to learning capacity as follows: (i) single loop learning, (ii) higher order learning encompassing both double and triple loop learning, (iii) individual learning and (iv) organizational learning.

The adaptive change and organizational studies literature suggests three types of learning: single loop, double loop (Agyris & Schon, 1978) and triple loop (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). Single loop learning leads to changes in existing routines, double loop learning revisits existing assumptions and triple loop learning requires changing fundamental assumptions. From the empirical evidence, I suggest a more streamlined approach in distinguishing between single loop and higher orders of learning, either double loop or triple loop learning. The key difference is that single loop learning brings about incremental change within existing worldviews and normative frameworks, whereas double and triple loop learning is necessary (but not sufficient) for more transformative changes to eventually occur. So, for instance, Ayutthaya grappling with improving ways of restoring monuments using international acceptable principles or dealing with disasters by preparing monuments and archaeological sites to endure risks falls squarely within single loop learning (which is not, as seen from the case study, an easy task *per se*). Vat Phou and George Town demonstrated higher orders of learning. The work at Vat Phou in developing a

Cultural Landscape Management Plan required revising fundamental assumptions, practices and technical capacity in dealing with the site not only as a monumental temple complex. Beyond issues of heritage management, both Vat Phou and George Town struggled with questions of sustainable development for local residents, which is beyond the limits of heritage plans and regulations, but a key concern facing the long-term viability of the sites. The lack of ready tools to address this issue, despite being well acknowledged, illustrates the limits of existing institutions in the heritage realm.

Where is the learning taking place, and what effect does it have on the overall institutional system? Taking a cue from organizational studies (Senge, 1990) and institutional change theory (Leca et al., 2008), I emphasize the importance of looking at both individual learning and organizational learning. The case studies show that organizational learning needs to begin with individual learning. At the same time, individual learning needs to be institutionalized through organizational learning, so that new skillsets and knowledge by practitioners are enabled by new protocols and practices within the organization. The case studies echo the cautionary note raised in the literature that learning does not necessarily translate into changes in practice due to a variety of factors: knowledge is contested, learning cannot overcome institutional path dependencies and informal learning does not always translate into formal policy making. For instance, at Ayutthaya, learning among individual specialists and workers who underwent training did not feed back into the institutional system as a whole, and organizational learning remained stagnant on the issue of monument restoration. On the other hand, at Vat Phou, the learning associated with expanding boundaries of practice to deal with cultural landscapes has given the Vat Phou World Heritage site management office a new niche within the heritage system in Lao PDR, and the office has even been called upon to provide technical support to other provinces on the issue of mapping and urban planning. The ability of multiple organizations with overlapping mandates to take on new knowledge through innovative alliances in George Town was a driver for comparatively rapid cycles of programmatic turnover, with two cycles of cognitive

shifts happening in the same period of time that Ayutthaya saw one incomplete cycle of change, and Vat Phou embarked on a second cycle of transformation at least at the level of discourse.

The case studies found that organizations with relatively loose mandates were more flexible in learning and thus more adept in adaptation. Technical agencies with extensive and deep expertise (or at least, self-perceived expertise) had a more difficult time “unlearning” old routines in order to learn new approaches (Gupta et al., 2010). Not having a permanent group of staff with a fixed mindset and skillset can actually create space for more learning and more innovative solutions. Within the heritage sector, this means not treating all problems as heritage problems requiring heritage solutions, which is the natural tendency of organizations with strictly defined heritage mandates. This flies in the face of conventional approaches in institutional capacity building within the heritage sector in Southeast Asia, which still places an emphasis on training and growing in-house staff as a priority, usually in technical matters related to conservation. More flexible outsourcing arrangements may in fact prove to be more effective to cope with new issues and emerging problems which may require a more innovative or multi-sectoral approach.

The case studies also indicated the importance of aligning learning across different social actors, including heritage organizations, non-heritage organizations and the public at large. Many of the failures in adapting or transforming heritage institutions could be traced back to resistance among other stakeholders. The regular efforts at public engagement through media, festivals and public campaigns carried out in George Town for instance, have been a way to engage communities throughout Penang, bringing about more awareness about and greater commitment to the heritage agenda as reflected in a professed “greater willingness to pay” for investing heritage buildings. More didactic efforts at Vat Phou in informing other agencies and communities about the new landscape plan and laws were also delivered as part of a conscious effort in creating buy-in for institutional re-design. However, in both cases, greater awareness did not necessarily translate into greater

compliance to actual heritage laws nor could it overcome more deep-seated forms of institutional resistance, as will be looked at below.

Encouraging appropriate institutions: Agency, formal governance structures and relationships

The case studies showed that the ability to put in place appropriate institutions was key to translating shifts in cognitive frame and learning into practice (Lemos et al., 2007). Institutions spanned both formal and informal rules. Changing formal rules proved to be more straightforward than influencing informal rules which are more opaque and rooted in social norms and interests. That said, even changing formal rules themselves was not easy as it required buy-in and investment which was not always forthcoming. Underlying the ability of individuals and organizations to change was their agency.

This research confirms studies that pinpoint agency in terms of learning, deciding and acting as the linchpin for institutional change (Bettini et al., 2015). I flesh the concept out further in more detail by suggesting that agency reflects the following sub-factors: (i) status of the actor, (ii) statutory or other forms of authority, (iii) champions of change, (iv) buy-in at leadership level. In the case of Vat Phou, the site management staff felt that the relatively low status of the World Heritage Site office vis-à-vis other government agencies hobbled their ability to negotiate or to influence decision making outcomes. The financial dis-investment in the office made it even more difficult for the office to maintain its influence, despite its statutory authority.

In the case of Ayutthaya, we could see how agency can prove to be a constraining factor, rather than an enabling factor. In the context of strong institutional determinism, embedded agency thwarts individual or organizational innovation. To bring about adaptation, “culturally competent actors with strong practical skills and sensibility who creatively navigate within their organizational fields” are needed. In the absence of such pro-active champions of change with

enough seniority, or buy-in at the leadership level, it ultimately proved difficult to institutionalize any changes beyond a revised Master Plan which in itself was not a radical departure from its earlier version.

In terms of the formal governance structures, I propose that the following sub-factors are particularly important for influencing institutional adaptation in the heritage context: (i) plans, (ii) legislative or regulatory instruments, and (iii) organizations. Formal governance structures, compared to the other elements of adaptive capacity, are relatively low-hanging fruit, and the case studies show that they saw more change than other factors, and thus in theory had the potential to catalyze larger systemic adaptations or transformations.

The knee jerk reaction among the World Heritage Advisory Bodies such as ICOMOS and subsequently the World Heritage Committee to many situations is to advise the preparation of a plan. Increasingly these plans are becoming *de rigeur*, and in many instances, the exercise of preparing the plan in itself becomes an all-consuming effort among States Parties, instead of tackling more endemic issues. The plan has become a convenient symbol of commitment and institutional resolve, and shorthand for institutional action when reporting to the World Heritage Committee. Plans run the gamut from Management Plans (now essentially required by the Operational Guidelines to the World Heritage Convention), to spatial plans and specialized plans dealing with conservation, disaster risk management, tourism, interpretation or other aspects of site management. In Ayutthaya, the authorities were tasked with updating the Master Plan and preparing a disaster risk management plan in response to the flood. In Vat Phou, the authorities prepared new land use plans and ultimately a Landscape Master Plan to complement an existing World Heritage management plan. In George Town, a Heritage Management Plan submitted at the time of World Heritage nomination fell by the wayside when the World Heritage Committee requested a Conservation Management Plan and a Special Area Plan.

The proliferation of plans belies the fact that preparing such plans is by no means simple. The case studies show that learning must occur in order to shift cognitive frames, and resources and policy-level support must be in place. New plans with new requirements symbolize change that can be threatening to those with vested interests in the existing order of things. For this reason, plans can take a long time to be prepared (such as the updated Ayutthaya Master Plan) or to be gazetted (such as the George Town SAP and Local Plan). Some plans die a quiet death (such as the George Town Heritage Management Plan) or are absorbed into other plans (such as the standalone Ayutthaya Disaster Risk Management Plan, which ended up as a sub-plan within the updated Master Plan, or the George Town Conservation Management Plan which has merged with the SAP for all intents and purposes). Once they come into life, though, plans can take on talismanic power as the seat of authority (hence the last minute effort by Think City to lobby for including its Strategic Plan for the public realm as a late annex to the George Town SAP, ensuring that its suite of projects would become a statutory obligation). In theory, having a plan in place provides a clear framework for management objectives and actions.

Beyond plans, the case studies underscore the equal importance of accompanying legislative or regulatory instruments needed to support each plan and to give it teeth. In Vat Phou, the heritage authorities bemoan the fact that the new Landscape Master Plan and its accompanying Land Use Plan and Building Codes cannot be fully enforced, due to the lack of punitive measures and fines. This allows offending property owners to act with impunity, while the heritage authorities are unable to take them to task. Similarly in George Town, the operational weakness of the Penang State Heritage Enactment makes it difficult for heritage frameworks like the SAP to gain the upper hand over prevailing practices of unauthorized demolition and conversions to make way for new commercial ventures.

The final component of formal governance structures are organizations. I propose three sub-factors as follows: (i) Internal relationships, (ii) external

relationships, and (iii) formal and informal relationships. Creating changes in organizational structures and capacity helps to support the implementation of the plans and other instruments. Organizations may need to acquire new skills and knowledge in order to meet changing demands. Learning organizations demonstrate an ability to not only to acquire new knowledge, but also to modify its behavior to reflect such new knowledge. They are skilled at “systematic problem solving, experimentation with new approaches, learning from their own experience and past history, learning from the experiences and best practices of others, and transferring knowledge quickly and efficiently throughout the organization” (Garvin, 1993). The case studies showed that for both Vat Phou and George Town, learning led to putting in place new organizational structures, tasks and responsibilities.

Lastly, optimizing relationships was also found to be an important factor determining adaptive capacity. This includes (i) relationships between organizations as well as (ii) within organizations, spanning both formal relationships like committees as well as informal relationships based on trust and personal ties. For external relations, the case studies showed that it was relatively straightforward to set up formal mechanisms such as new committees or ad hoc alliances in line with new governance structures. However, these formal mechanisms did not necessarily alter underlying relationships or power gradients, as can be seen at Vat Phou. Despite more frequent meetings between the Vat Phou World Heritage Site Office and other authorities in the context of developing and implementing the Cultural Landscape Master Plan and urban regulations, the more powerful District government and the Department of Public Works and Transport still frequently ignore or overturn the recommendations of the heritage office. Conversely, the case studies suggest that informal mechanisms were more dynamic in altering internal relationships, with internal silos being easier to overcome at an individual level through personal connections among colleagues.

7.1.2 Institutional dynamics

The thesis examined how different determinants of adaptive capacity interacted in shaping the overall institutional dynamics of each case study in responding to expanding boundaries of practice. I have built upon the framework developed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) who propose three different dynamics of institutional change: creating institutions, maintaining institutions, disrupting institutions. They explain that creating institutions requires “the ability to establish rules and construct rewards and sanctions that enforce those rules”, maintaining institutions involves “supporting, repairing or recreating the social mechanisms that ensure compliance” whereas disrupting institutions is a form of de-institutionalization (2006). In addition, I propose institutions that are “regressing” as a fourth dynamic where institutions are purposively pushed back to an earlier state of knowledge, mandate or practice.

The interaction between formal and informal processes is crucial for shaping different institutional dynamics, given the interplay between formal and informal rules. Informal processes often provides more space for experimentation, but informal inputs need to feed into the formal rules system so that structural change can come about in an institutionalized manner (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013).

Each of the case studies was analyzed using conceptual mapping. The mapping provided a visual representation of each set of events (essentially, an action situation in the terms of Elinor Ostrom) into discrete conceptual nodes showing the interaction of various factors of adaptive capacity. First, individual interactions between each node were characterized respectively as creating, maintaining, disrupting or regressing institutions. So for instance, learning that leads to drafting a new plan could be characterized as “creating”. Secondly, based on the cumulative effect of these various individual interactions, an overall characterization of each case study was made as well.

The overall institutional dynamic for Ayutthaya was found to be strongly characterized by maintaining dynamics. This confirms the literature which states that centralized institutional regimes are likely to display less adaptive capacity, especially in terms of learning capacity. Within this overall result, however, there were certain disruptions in terms of cognitive changes and individual learning, however, these did not translate into overall systemic transformation. Ayutthaya also demonstrated regressing dynamics, with the Master Plan going back to an older and more narrow demarcation of the World Heritage site.

The overall institutional dynamic for the mildly polycentric system of Vat Phou was found to be a mixture between a disruptive dynamic within the heritage sector, confronting a maintaining dynamic within the larger political economy of Champasak. This has ultimately limited the overall capacity of the whole system to change.

Finally, for George Town, the overall institutional dynamic is characterized by creative and disruptive dynamics in terms of formal processes. As a highly polycentric system with a great number of actors with active mandates, George Town was very dynamic, with multiple cycles of disruption or creation of new institutions within a 10-year time frame. A vocal civil society helped to drive learning capacity in particular. However, underlying informal factors in terms of relationships which remained unchanged and locked in, which led to undermining the heritage agenda.

Extracting from these case studies, and in combination with the existing literature, I propose a framework for identifying key factors of adaptive capacity and characterizing the interaction of various factors in contributing to institutional dynamics both in single transactions and for an overall situation. As explained in the previous section, some of the factors of adaptive capacity are intertwined or work in concert with each other (cognitive frame and learning capacity). Some of the factors are pre-requisites for others (agency and resources are needed to put new governance structures like plans or regulations into action). Some factors may impede the momentum of other factors (such as relationships which tends to be relatively static, becoming an obstruction for applying new learning.) Within the four

typologies of institutional dynamics, the factors of adaptive capacity have a different profile and role, as below.

Table 32 Typology of institutional dynamics

	Typology of institutional dynamics			
Factors of adaptive capacity	Regressing	Maintaining	Disrupting	Creating
Cognitive frames	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Uncertainties raised by expanding boundaries of practice may cause cognitive frames to regress to more familiar territory which is an idealized or mythologized historical state 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● High resistance to change, unless very clear proof and external pressure that status quo is not working 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Change in cognitive frame is a prerequisite for systemic change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Change in cognitive frame is a prerequisite for systemic change
Learning capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Difficult to engage in learning or even acknowledge that learning may be needed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● At best, single loop learning which leads to incremental change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Single or double loop learning by both key individuals and organization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Double or triple loop learning needed for creating new institutional arrangements that may be founded on

	Typology of institutional dynamics			
Factors of adaptive capacity	Regressing	Maintaining	Disrupting	Creating
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning begins with individual learning as individuals easier to convince • But individual learning difficult to translate to organizational learning 	<p>s is needed for disruption to occur</p>	<p>different underlying assumptions</p>
Formal governance structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regressive cognitive frames and lack of new learning may drive governance structures to revert to older thinking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning can create changes in governance structures, especially in new areas beyond existing boundaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes in governance structures are the main manifestations of institutional disruption, with plans and internal organization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highest level of buy-in is needed to create new institutionalized responses, particularly legislative/regulatory instruments and new organizations

	Typology of institutional dynamics			
Factors of adaptive capacity	Regressing	Maintaining	Disrupting	Creating
		<p>of practice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within existing boundaries of practice, more difficult to change formal governance structures 	<p>al changes being the lowest hanging fruit</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors not burdened by statutory mandates can be institutional entrepreneurs in creating innovative governance structures
Agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of agency may make actors feel stuck in current situation • In a polycentric setting, organizations with strong agency may compete to claim low hanging fruit which might 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embedded agency creates resistance to change • Individual agency cannot overcome lack of organizational agency, without individual champions at 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systemic limitations in status and authority could ultimately undermine agency, thus limiting change in terms of actual implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors with high levels of agency are critical in creating new institutional arrangements

	Typology of institutional dynamics			
Factors of adaptive capacity	Regressing	Maintaining	Disrupting	Creating
	be regressive in content	leadership level		
Relationships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organizations with stronger agency may claim areas of “low hanging fruit” located in the comfort zone of practice, rather than dealing with issues that push the envelope and are more complicated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Difficult to create new alliances needed to implement any new governance structures, due to rigid and isolationist organizational mandate Or difficult to overcome existing embedded power relationships which undermine new governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possible to disrupt and even institutionalize internal and external formal relationships (committees, etc) But more difficult to change informal relationships (which reflect embedded power structures) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possible to disrupt and even institutionalize internal and external formal relationships (committees, etc) But more difficult to change informal relationships (which reflect embedded power structures)

	Typology of institutional dynamics			
Factors of adaptive capacity	Regressing	Maintaining	Disrupting	Creating
		<p>e structures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved internal coordination is more possible, but this relies on individual effort and so is hard to institutionalize 		
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As the act of regressing itself is a form of change, then resources may be needed to transform the system backwards to this earlier stage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of buy-in from organizational leaders keeps resource flows unchanged, thus impeding changes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of resources is critical to achieving full disruption (not only new plans, organizations but also implementation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of resources is critical to achieving full disruption (not only new plans, organizations but also implementation)

	Typology of institutional dynamics			
Factors of adaptive capacity	Regressing	Maintaining	Disrupting	Creating
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Such regressive moves may be able to draw upon older generations of available expertise 			

7.1.3 The nature of institutions

The comparison of the case studies aims to shed light on the question about how centralized versus polycentric institutional systems differ in terms of adaptive capacity. The three case studies were purposively selected to illustrate three different institutional settings for World Heritage governance: a more centralized system (Ayutthaya), a mildly polycentric system (Vat Phou) and a highly polycentric system (George Town). Drawing upon the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, the literature suggests that polycentric systems – whether an interdependent system of actors or independently functioning nodes of decision making – develop productive arrangements and yield efficient governance outcomes. Polycentric systems in other contexts have been found to have superior learning, adaptation and innovation (E. Ostrom, 2010).

The case studies confirm that polycentric institutional arrangements are more conducive to adaptation – but only up to a certain level. The literature notes that polycentric arrangements work when there is communication (what Olsen calls “cheap talk”) which allows coordination, as well as a balance of bottom-up and top-down processes (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). Experience shows that multiple actors locked in different sectoral silos inherently generates conflicts and does not facilitate meaningful coordination, unless interests can be aligned to a larger shared, mutually beneficial goal. In the heritage context, having multiple actors may disadvantage the heritage organization which usually has weaker endowments in terms of authority or resources. On the other hand, having polycentricity within the heritage domain, with several organizations with a heritage remit, may create positive impacts. This arrangement could yield multiple sources of innovation fueled by competition or else create niches of specialization, thus yielding multi-faceted heritage governance that optimizes or pools limited resources.

At Vat Phou, the heritage office has only partial statutory authority over the World Heritage site, and thus has to work actively to create alliances with other actors and to maintain its social capital within this negotiated territory. Being subject

to multiple agendas has led the office to position the heritage project within a broader conceptual framework, transforming the problem frame from a single-minded focus on conservation to finding ways to pursue compatible local development. Rather than construing this as an act of accommodation, it reveals a tactical strategy on the part of the heritage authorities in trying to maintain strict controls in the newly created core heritage zone while allowing more flexibility outside. However, its relatively low status vis-à-vis other actors made it difficult to implement this new management scheme.

In George Town, the multiplicity of actors sometimes working in parallel, in competition or together created a highly dynamic situation which drove institutional innovation. The various organizations who share responsibility in different aspects of managing George Town have injected diverse resources, perspectives and energies into addressing a range of management problems. A variety of new schemes, organizations and programmes have been launched; some have tapered off, while others continue to evolve and gain fresh meaning. Most of the organizations are young, and several key organizations are not burdened with the obligations of statutory authority. This has made them more open to learning and helped them avoid being bogged down by rigid organizational mandates or fixed institutional identities. The relatively small social context of Penang has facilitated personal contacts and communication, at least informally. Having multiple actors has built in checks and balances, with the civil society organizations in particular playing a watchdog role. However, overlapping and competing organizations has sometimes resulted in lack of clarity, unnecessary duplication or turf wars. Moreover, having multiple organizations has allowed the State authorities to exercise its influence by playing off one organization against each other, thus preventing the heritage organizations to present a united front.

In contrast to the situation with polycentric institutions, the observations from Ayutthaya suggest that a centralized statutory organization with a narrow heritage mandate and sole primary responsibility limits adaptation. Having such authority

allows unilateral action, which does not foster a consultative style of working. The organization in charge develops an insular organizational culture: it is more prone to act conservatively and defensively, and less likely to seek or value external inputs, unless required. The need to continually self-validate the organization's credibility may lead to mythologizing the organization in terms of its expertise and competence, which makes it difficult to raise doubts or to question existing protocols and knowledge. Moreover, having to uphold the organization's legacy as its primary *raison d'être* could lead to ossification, as circumstances may change and in fact require fresh thinking, tools and practices.

7.1.4 Navigating boundaries of practice

Do institutions have more adaptive capacity in responding to issues within or outside of existing boundaries of practice? In a world of greater complexity, this thesis has delved into institutional responses against three dimensions of expanding boundaries of heritage practice: (i) in terms of evolving definitions of heritage, (ii) increasing complexity in heritage management issues, and (iii) the necessity for heritage institutions to adapt their management and larger governance practices accordingly.

In the context of the larger evolution in heritage theory, it may be possible to elide the two frameworks of heritage practice and adaptive capacity, particularly learning capacity. I suggest that higher order learning is needed to move from conventional heritage practice focused just on monuments and sites to dealing with expanding concepts of heritage and heritage practice. Within conventional heritage practice, any improvements would fall within the remit of single loop learning. When heritage practitioners and organizations begin to deal with landscapes and living heritage, which requires values-based conservation approaches and people-centred approaches, then double loop learning is needed. While broader in scope, these are still considered within the sphere of heritage practice. However, once we begin to address larger issues of sustainable development, and the role of heritage both as a contributor to sustainable development as well as a beneficiary of

sustainable development, then the discourse and practice need a quantum leap. This requires triple loop learning, in order to break down the established binary thinking and processes that pit conservation against development in a reductionist zero-sum game. The proposition that heritage adds value to sustainable development is still a new notion that requires both shifts in cognitive frames as well as learning, for policy makers and practitioners alike.




Figure 59 The role of learning in expanding boundaries of heritage concepts and practice

Within a centralized institutional system characterized by maintaining characteristics, I suggest that adaptive capacity is higher outside existing boundaries of practice. Outside the organization's and individuals' routine and established mandate, it may be more possible to admit the necessity for change at a cognitive level, at least in the initial stages of programming (ascertaining the problem and formulating strategic goals). This cognitive shift and openness can then translate into efforts to learn and to adapt formal governance structures. However, for total systemic change to occur, deep learning is needed to attain some level of mastery in the new set of issues. Institutionalizing into formal rules and policy making is necessary to ensure that the organizational mandates, resources and relations are re-oriented to meet the new demands.

In contrast, within existing boundaries of practice, the process of change is more difficult to initiate and requires either exogenous pressure or internal champions. But once initiated, it can top up existing knowledge and practice, leading to incremental change. Centralized organizations with well-established sense of organizational identity are more reluctant to admit the need for change within their area of expertise. Getting over the initial stage requires significant investment of time and effort to generate buy in. Once learning begins to occur, however, even informal learning can be applied by individuals to their own professional practice. Ideally, such individual learning would translate into organizational level learning and then change processes. However, within existing boundaries of practice, organizations may be resistant to initiate any reform which may reflect badly on its existing authority and sense of expertise.





Figure 60 Navigating expanding boundaries of practice within centralized institutional systems

The polycentric case studies support the proposition that the presence of multiple institutional orders could make a system less “institutionalized” and less rigid, allowing actors to exercise greater agency, including agency to learn (Clemens & Cook, 1999). This seems to hold true for responding to both issues within and outside of existing boundaries of practice.

Having multiple actors seems to particularly facilitate dealing with new situations which entails greater risk to organizations and individuals, including risk of failure. Polycentricity within the system may help distribute this risk. Distributed nodes of action could also mitigate the consequences of inaction by any one single organization or individual player, given the likelihood that different actors will have different risk profiles and may be spurred into action by a sense of competition. Organizations may thus be able to confront new issues using innovative tools and approaches and creating new alliances.




Figure 61 Navigating expanding boundaries of practice within polycentric institutional systems

7.2 Contributions of the study

7.2.1 Contributions to World Heritage studies

This study contributes to the scholarship of World Heritage studies in three different ways.

First, it proposes the rubric of “expanding boundaries of practice” as a means to interrogate the evolution in heritage practice. It re-examines the work of scholar-practitioners such as Jokilehto (1999), Thompson and Wijesuriya (2018) and Leitao (2011) to break down their conceptual and historical narratives of the modern heritage profession into three areas of change: changes in heritage concepts, changes in heritage management issues, as well as changes in managerial or governance institutions. This rubric provides a tripartite framework for analyzing and explaining the empirical data from the field that will be useful for future studies.

Second, it unpacks the evolution in heritage practice by delving into the institutional mechanics of change, by questioning how change comes about at the level of organizations, individuals and other social actors interacting within an institutional system. The current heritage literature tends to paint this evolution in broad brushstrokes, highlighting major milestones such as the 1994 Nara Conference and new international conventions or doctrinal recommendations. Moreover, there are gaps in understanding practice at the level of World Heritage sites, the interactions of institutional actors involved, and how governance and management institutions negotiate such evolutions in their everyday operations. The study uses the empirical data from the field to map the progression and struggles of heritage institutions from their traditional milieu of monuments and archaeological sites to grappling with new heritage concepts such as landscapes and emerging management challenges such as disasters. It then synthesizes the empirical findings to develop analytical frameworks for institutional change as will be detailed below.

Finally, to undertake this analysis on institutional change, the study is innovative in applying adaptive change theory to World Heritage in a non-climate change context. It suggests the utility of adaptive change concepts and

methodology as an analytic device in understanding the inherent characteristics of institutions to adapt and transform in a broad range of contexts, not just confined to climate change adaptation. Other studies of adaptive change related to heritage have all been focused on climate change. The larger literature on adaptive change is similarly focused almost entirely on climate change. This study shows that the adaptive change framework provides a practical way to reflect upon the rich literature of institutional change in a systematic and well-defined manner. However, it acknowledges that the existing adaptive change frameworks have their limitations as well, not capturing dynamic processes and interactions. This is addressed by a proposed new framework below.

7.2.2 Contributions to institutional change and adaptive capacity studies

This study contributes to the scholarship on institutional change and adaptive capacity in three different ways.

First, it proposes a refined framework for understanding and analyzing determinants of adaptive capacity. Following a review of the literature and drawing upon the empirical data from the case studies, six factors and 20 sub-factors of adaptive capacity are presented. The six factors are: cognitive frame, learning capacity, formal governance structures, relationships, agency and resources. Within the sub-factors, I highlight the importance of distinguishing between individuals and organizations, such as for learning. The difference between formal and informal processes is also stressed, such as for relationships. This refined framework underscores in particular the role of agency as an important factor, which may prove to be enabling or constraining, as in the case of embedded agency.

Secondly, the study proposes a refined model for adaptive capacity as introduced in Section 7.1, which is an advancement from earlier models in the literature such as the ACW proposed by Gupta et al (2010). This model makes visible the interactions among the different factors of adaptive capacity, and suggests that it is important to see how various factors operate either in a mutually supportive or in an oppositional manner. It also traces the role of different factors at different stages

of institutional response. For instance, it points out the importance of resources and relationships in ultimately determining or limiting an institution's ability to implement gains from learning and new governance instruments.

Finally, this study proposes a way to characterize the overall institutional dynamic of any situation using the factors of adaptive capacity as an analytic and explanatory device. Building on the work of Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) and Bettini (2015), it puts forward four typologies of institutional dynamics: creating, maintaining, disrupting and regressing. For each of the typologies, it identifies the key factors of adaptive capacity at play. This conceptual mapping framework will be useful for future studies in analyzing institutions and institutional change.

7.2.3 Policy implications

The findings from the case studies highlight shortcomings in current World Heritage institutions and their ability to cope with new demands. The evolution in heritage concepts and practice away from purely technical concerns to embrace more complex issues with social and environmental dimensions and the sustainable development agenda implies that World Heritage management organizations should have a wider mandate than heritage. This applies both at the level of World Heritage sites as well as the international processes and organizations that govern World Heritage.

In light of the above, the following policy implications are identified, with corresponding recommendations:

- Organizations should be supported to move beyond single-loop learning within conventional heritage conservation issues to higher orders of learning related to expanding boundaries of heritage practice. Fundamental shifts in cognitive frameworks need to be triggered, either by the international World Heritage processes or other mechanisms with sufficient visibility, impact and credibility. Such cognitive shifts must be coupled with learning, especially in the acquisition of new knowledge and skills pertaining to other issues.

Current investments in institutional capacity building are still too narrowly focused on technical conservation issues or stand-alone management issues.

- As an alternative to creating heavy organizational structures which are slow to change and burdensome to maintain, new alliances could be encouraged as a way of addressing a growing range of issues in a more agile manner, bringing together actors from different backgrounds and specializations. Within these alliances, there should be a role for “bridging organizations or individuals, who can link both formal and informal processes” (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). This will help ensure that gains from informal processes can feed into formal policy making and other procedures.
- Encouraging polycentric systems with multiple actors involved in various aspects of heritage could create a healthy sense of competition, put in place necessary checks and balances, distribute risks and pool resources to address the widening dimensions of heritage practice. This includes organizations that may not have a statutory mandate or a pure heritage mandate, as well as civil society organizations. Polycentric systems have been proven to be more dynamic, more innovative and more responsive in many other contexts.
- Governments need to invest in overhauling heritage legislation and regulatory frameworks to be able to cope with new concepts and new management pressures. These have proven to be a significant stumbling block in transforming existing institutions to respond to new demands. New plans which do not have the supporting legislative weight and teeth cannot be implemented effectively otherwise.
- Ministries of Culture with their conventional heritage remit may not be the best home for World Heritage site management agencies, as they tend to treat problems as heritage problems requiring heritage solutions, which may

not always be suitable anymore under current circumstances. Local governments with their more broad-based view of development issues may provide an alternative institutional base for dealing with heritage in a more holistic way, provided they are inculcated with commitment and capacity related to heritage.

- Official World Heritage processes such as Reactive Monitoring can be largely effective in initiating changes. But their narrow focus on technical matters does not provide the support needed to sites in terms of transforming their formal and informal governance structures to translate new learning and new plans into action. Official World Heritage processes need to look into the underlying political economy and institutional structures as well, which are needed to enable transformative change.

The overall implication for global World Heritage governance is a need to shift beyond the existing mechanisms and channels which primarily seek to influence formal institutional rules. The findings from this study show that informal factors – whether changes in cognitive framework, learning at an individual level, knowhow and operational work practices, as well as underlying political alignments – play a major role in determining or undermining the ability of an institutional system to change. In this sense, simply effecting formal change in the form of undertaking new plans, or partial regulatory reform or setting up new formal coordination mechanisms like committees are unable to enact the transformative change that may be necessary to respond to issues of growing complexity.

This concern has particular resonance in the midst of UN-wide reforms which question existing channels of international diplomacy and the architecture of global development and peace-keeping institutions, in the age of the post-nation state. The governance of global public goods such as heritage, particularly World Heritage, likewise needs to be reconsidered in this light. The trickle down mechanism of World Heritage governance from the World Heritage Committee to the national.

authorities to the site authorities has proven to be inadequate to engage with or influence the host of informal rules at play within the system. This reliance on formal mechanisms and rules may intentionally or unintentionally ignore or suppress such informal rules. Seen in another light, the informal rules, which operate pervasively, often put in place through generations of accumulated practices or interests, are unimpeded by such attempts to change formal rules and organizations. The assumption of a global invisible hand acting in the interests of the global public to preserve World Heritage has proven to be easily undermined by very local interest groups.

Thus far, the toolbox of World Heritage management has largely relied on sticks – legislative and regulatory mechanisms – rather than carrots, that is, incentives. The examples from the case studies suggest that using incentives to align interests can be a powerful way to move formal and informal rules in the same direction and to overcome underlying conflicts and points of friction. Aligning interests among different organizations and stakeholder groups is particularly relevant in the midst of the overall conceptual shift away from the narrow endeavor of conserving and managing heritage by itself, to pursue the larger goals of embedding heritage within sustainable development. The rhetoric within UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee as well as among some governments, private sector and civil society counterparts is already well-developed on this issue. To a certain extent, this indicates a cognitive shift which is occurring. However, the governance, management and operational mechanisms do not yet support such as rhetorical and cognitive shifts that see heritage in a broader context: legislation and regulations need to be reformed, stakeholder coordination mechanisms need to be broadened and deepened beyond the current centralized system in place for official World Heritage oversight, learning ways to intersect heritage and sustainable development in an operational manner needs to be carried out.

These recommendations are aimed at moving World Heritage institutions beyond their current techno-bureaucratic limitations.

7.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research

This thesis has attempted to address some of the gaps in the previous work on adaptive capacity in terms of “representing some of the complexities, conflicts and synergies that exist which affect the capacity to adapt” (H. Phillips, 2013). I have identified some of these dynamics through qualitative empirical data from the interviews and other documentary sources, and tried to represent them in the conceptual mapping of factors of adaptive capacity. However, as many of these conflicts or synergies stem from informal rules which may not be possible for informants, particularly those in an official capacity, to express frankly, there may be limitations in painting a full picture of these complexities. In the future, a more ethnographic methodological approach may reduce some of the distance to the informants and thus provide a richer understanding of the underlying issues that affect capacity to adapt. Likewise, in terms of the representation of these dynamics, an even more dynamic presentation may be possible beyond the two-dimensional conceptual mapping that is presented here. While temporal aspects have been implicitly included in the current conceptual mapping and narrative, future work may attempt a more explicit depiction of the temporal unfolding of events and interaction of factors.

As one of the few studies applying the adaptive capacity framework to World Heritage governance and management, this thesis has contributed a more refined version of the framework in terms of identifying factors and sub-factors of particular relevance to heritage issues. In particular, I have looked at a range of conceptual issues and management pressures that are well outside the scope of climate change which is the normal remit of adaptive change studies. In this way, certain factors that are specific to cultural heritage governance and management, such as conceptual frameworks related to heritage, have been proposed. That said, future studies will need to confirm the applicability of these factors in the context of other heritage sites possibly facing other institutional realities, particularly in countries where the heritage profession and practice are either more or less progressive or rooted in very particular localized systems.

Due to limitations of time and funds, only three case studies from Southeast Asia have been chosen. The number of case studies *per se* is not so much a concern given that the thesis aims not for statistical replication but rather theoretical replication (Yin, 2013). However, it is possible in terms of selection bias that these three case studies reflect peculiarities of this sub-region, such as unique cultural patterns or geo-political considerations. From a methodological point of view, cultural factors may have informed the interactions with and responses of the key informants, which may have shaped the data in a certain way. In this sense, future studies conducted in other localities should need to bear these limitations in mind in testing the applicability of the findings.

Finally, though the scope of the study has been established at the outset to be World Heritage sites, there is an implicit intention that the results could be applicable to heritage studies more broadly. This is certainly the intention of the whole World Heritage project, which holds that “World Heritage is exemplary and has implications for managing other less-known properties worldwide” (Boccardi & Scott, 2018). World Heritage sites, however, are subject to specialized processes of monitoring that proved to be key turning points in all three of these case studies. For instance, official Reactive or Advisory Monitoring by the World Heritage Committee in the three selected World Heritage sites were the trigger for institutional transformation of varying degrees. Moreover, the fact that there are higher stakes among the governance institutions at World Heritage sites, which may provoke more responses, is also another special feature. Other heritage sites may not be subject to similar processes or scrutiny, and thus the way that change is initiated or the pathways that change occurs may be quite different for heritage sites that may have only national or sub-national recognition or none at all. This would be another avenue of research to be pursued in the future to establish more widely the way that heritage institutions undergo adaptation or transformation.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Scoping matrix for case study selection

Appendix 2. Interview guide

Appendix 3. Excerpt of coded interview data

Appendix 4. Post-training questionnaire results at Ayutthaya

Appendix 5. Organigramme of Ayutthaya World Heritage site management agency

Appendix 6. Organigramme of Vat Phou Champasak World Heritage site management agency

Appendix 7. Organigramme of George Town World Heritage site management agency



Appendix 1: Scoping matrix for case study selection

Site	State of Conservation (SOC) issues	WH status	Type of site	Centralized system	Polycentric system	Under WHC scrutiny	Period under WHC scrutiny			Prevalent type of site under WHC scrutiny	Short list
							Before 2000	2000-2010	2010-now		
Angkor	Management systems, human resources, legal framework, illegal activities, housing, visitor accommodation, tourism, interpretation, deliberate destruction	X	Monumental	X		X	X	X			
Preah Vihear	Management systems	X	Monumental	X		X					

Appendix 2: Interview guide

World Heritage monitoring

What has been the impact of World Heritage listing on the site?

Following the incident/crisis, what was the impact of World Heritage Committee monitoring on the site?

How has this incident/crisis affected other non-heritage sectors?

What measures have been taken in response to the decision(s) of the World Heritage Committee?

What are the root causes of the incident/crisis?

In your opinion, what improvements are still needed (overall for World Heritage management of the site, or for specific issues)?

Coordination

What other agencies have provided inputs into undertaking this response?

How has the level of World Heritage coordination been affected? At local level? At provincial level? At national level? At international level?

Resources

How has funding been affected? From regular budget sources? From donors? From private sector?

How have technical resources been affected?

How have staffing numbers/technical knowledge/assignments been affected?

Has the status or level of political support for the World Heritage management office changed?

Site regulatory framework

How have the site management policy or regulatory framework been affected?

In particular, how has the process of permits changed?

How has the World Heritage management plan been affected?

Have other plans been affected? Urban plan?

How have the measures for development control or building control been affected?

Change in behavior/practice/implementation

What measures have been undertaken to raise awareness about changed or new management measures? What has been the response among the recipients (other agencies or local people)?

What is the level of compliance with these measures? Have there been any changes in behavior/implementation due to these changed measures? If so how? What problems do you see that make implementation difficult?

Following [training or other activity], what are the prospects for long-term follow up and implementation of these new inputs? What problems do you see that make implementation difficult?

How has conservation practice/techniques at the site been affected?



Appendix 3: Excerpt of coded interview data

Informant	Interview data	Open code (descriptive)	Theme (Factor of adaptive capacity)
VP informant 1	14B - no donor, province supposed to find \$	Financing	Financial resources
	14B - No funds for infrastructure	Financing	Financial resources
	14B - news that civil works plan and proposal to Korea, no answer yet	Road	N/A
	14A - not in use, except when bridge is being fixed (and needs to be fortified)	Road	N/A
	Tours cancelled when bridge is broken, both bridges are old	Road	N/A
	14A - continue have fund as part of toll road, only light vehnicles	Road	Resources
	Farmers moving into field, upgrade houses	Illegal construction	N/A
	Making embankment ponds for water storage	Illegal construction	N/A
	2 story houses illegal - only allow farm shelters and conservation buildings	Illegal construction	Governance structure
	50% ask permit, 50% don't	Illegal construction	Governance structure

	Some are old time residents, want to upgrade houses	Illegal construction	Flexibility
	Local authorities - 50% favor the people (“ao jai prachachon”)	Illegal construction	Relationships
	Local authorities - 50% favor the office (“ao jai rao”)	Illegal construction	Relationships
	Otherwise, people will sue (“fong ti sapa”)	Illegal construction	Relationships
	Cannot implement the Heritage Fund	Heritage Fund	Resources
	Priorities for assistance: 1. heritage conservation centre, 2. heritage interpretation centre for Ancient City, 3. facilities for museum and monument site, 4. access road to Hong Nang Sida-Thao-Tao, 5. conservation equipment	Conservation	N/A
	Governor's instructions: 2014-2016 revision, almost complete except for 2 villages to raise awareness at, including monks too	Illegal construction	Governance structure
	People mostly cooperate, except some infringements	Illegal construction	Authority
	Demolished a house in 2013	Illegal construction	Authority

	along 14A, so now only temporary structures		
	Vat Phou staff now: architects, civil engineer x 4, engineer water x 2, surveyor x 2 (ground survey, theodolite, Total station), agriculture x 3, English/teachers, archaeology x 4 not regular to work with Christine, stone conservator x 4, guide, GIS/urban planning x 1, construction monitoring x 2	Staff	Assets
	Training: FSP project supported to go to PNP national museum course	Capacity	Learning
	Training: Korea project: course, degree scholarship x 1	Capacity	Learning
	VP needs: architectural conservators + engineers	Capacity	Assets
	Ancient City: 5th century, oldest city in SE Asia	Ancient City	N/A
	Tourists don't know - how to open it up for tourists to see so they will visit	Ancient City	Learning
	How to use this to create benefits for the people/local town	Development	Cognitive frame

	Excavate and survey: small site open - will cost \$100,000	Ancient City	Assets
	River erosion protection is needed	Conservation	Cognitive frame
	Enforcement difficult 1. wooden building guidelines are enforced but hard to fine, 2. preferences - don't like wooden houses, think concrete buildings are better	Enforcement	Cognitive frame
	New building code has been issued (blue book)	Regulation	Governance structure
	Request form sent from village (ban) to WHSO to DPWT to chao muang	Regulation	Organization
	Problems: materials are wrong, but often they do it in advance (tam pai kon, don't know rules)	Enforcement	Learning
	What to do: record that this home built without permission. If any problems later with the law, they are responsible (to demolish at their own cost)	Enforcement	Governance structure
	Too violent to demolish ("roon raeng geun bai")	Enforcement	Agency
	Except near Route 14A in	Enforcement	Governance

	2013, 1 house demolished		structure
	People build in rainy season, sneak to do it as (WHSO) can only go in the dry season	Enforcement	Agency
	Recommend to only build it like a field hut (“kieng na”), but already have concrete foundation	Enforcement	Governance structure
	Policy of the Lao government: should not have any violent measures "yaa hai mee matrakarn roonraeng"	Enforcement	Authority
	CLMP has changed working system	Plan	Governance structure
	Before, no “rabiab kum krong sing pluk sarng”, Management Plan didn't have details (only said 12 meters height limit, no use of concrete, no digging below 50 cm)	Plan	Governance structure
	Now regulations more clear in new plan	Plan	Governance structure
	Landscape master plan an attempt to plan at a larger level not just WHS, so include Phou Malong at north and Thad Xangpan at	Plan	Governance structure

	south		
	Re-organize management zone: core = zone 2 and zone 3, parts of zone 1 (Tomo)	Plan	Governance structure
	Buffer = Champasak town to allow development	Plan	Governance structure
	For village at archaeological site, house cannot be built on top of mound, but keep 20 meters away	Plan	Governance structure
	Sala now turned over to concessionaire by district to help with maintenance.	Concession role	Relationships
VP informant 3	WH in evolving situation: policy and socio-economy, so management must also evolve	Overall WH trend	Cognitive frame
	Positive effects (of RMM): improve to have better implementation	Overall WH trend	Cognitive shift
	Over 10+ years, protection mechanism “yung mai klong tua” (coordination at domestic and international levels)	Regulation	Governance structure
	International cooperation: funding and experts	International standards	Resources
	Staff increased	Staff	Human resources

	Upgrade office to "panaek" department, reporting to Governor, and no need to pass other departments, can self-administer ("boriharn eng")	Departmental status	Relationships
	Finances not yet "sod klong" (aligned)	Financing	Resources
	Income – concession contract with the provincial government doesn't benefit conservation	Financing	Resources
	Staff - office needs staff to go to the field, not enough	Staff	Resources
	Should use province funds to do projects with HD expertise, like at other provinces but not VP yet	Financing	Resources
	Local people - in LP awareness high, at VP still limited, need more information	Local people	Learning
	Local people - understand only the temple, actually a wider cultural landscape	Landscape concept	Cognitive frame
VP informant 4	Luang Prabang case: major impacts from RMM - before, no interest before, assume international will the one to do	Overall WH trend	Cognitive frame

	Now, heritage is in the roadmap of the party, under 10 main plans, 32 projects	Overall WH trend	Cognitive frame
	WH is mentioned in all meetings, even in budget meeting (ask if WH needs money)	Overall WH trend	Cognitive frame
	Governance: from department to WH office (can't have 2 DICT departments) but with equal status as department (“hong karn tiab tao panaek”) (2016)	WH office	Authority
	Also, LP upgraded from municipality to city	Governance province	Authority
VP informant 5	Info sessions at villages and schools	Awareness raising	Learning
	Using Q+A, with gifts for answers	Awareness raising	Learning
	Focus on building guidelines (rabiab pluksarng)	Awareness raising	Learning
	Monitoring from Phapin to Dontalad. If find something, then stop building work. VP WHSO to check if near a mound or any archaeological impact? If find brick, then not OK to	Illegal construction	Governance structures

	<p>proceed. If OK to proceed, office to send OK to DPWT Muang to send to District Governor to issue permit to build</p>		
	<p>If don't comply then, have to sign a memo (bot banteuk) that they will have to demolish at their own cost and no compensation, signed by village chief, district heritage committee, VPWHSO, village committee and house owner</p>	Illegal construction	Governance structures
	<p>No fine system yet, so no real deterrent. Should be fine as % of construction cost, which is used in bigger cities (muang luang)</p>	Illegal construction	Governance structures
	<p>Compassion: "Nisai kon Lao, hen jai kan"</p>	Illegal construction	Relationships

Appendix 4: Post-training questionnaire results at Ayutthaya

A post-training questionnaire was administered in April 2019 following completion of training in monument restoration organized by UNESCO-Fine Arts Department at Ayutthaya in November 2018. The following results are extracted from the submitted questionnaires.

Question: Were you able to use the knowledge from the training in your daily work or not? Please give examples.

Area of change	Sample responses	Percentage of responses (n = 19)
Overall conservation process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Assessing the value of archaeological sites and the process of conservation ● Working in a multidisciplinary manner 	10 percent
Condition survey and materials testing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Require testing strength of ancient and new brick in restoration work ● Testing of materials and add step in every project to survey and record of condition and to conduct scientific testing ● Survey of condition and record damage before undertaking restoration plan ● Survey condition before restoration to get as much information before undertaking 	20 percent

Area of change	Sample responses	Percentage of responses (n = 19)
	restoration plan to ensure keeping the original form	
Application to restoration projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Restoration of archaeological sites in Tak and Lopburi ● Restoration of archaeological sites in various places ● Can apply to all projects, depending on situation 	15 percent
Facilitating participatory processa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Training monks ● Giving information to the public about conserving and developing Ayutthaya ● Enabling participation of local people in conserving mural in another wat 	15 percent

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
Question: Did you encounter problems in applying the knowledge from the training. Please explain what kinds of problems you encountered.

Area of obstacles	Sample responses	Percentage of responses (n=19)
Lack of support from high level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The decision makers are not responsive 	5 percent
Time limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The period of time for working does not match the period of 	26 percent


Area of obstacles	Sample responses	Percentage of responses (n=19)
	<p>time for disbursing budget</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The real working time is limited, so it's difficult to apply all stages of the conservation process from the training, so we only pick the stages that do not affect the timeframe of the project ● The time frame for restoration projects has limitations within the budget year ● The alignment of implementation time frame with the budget year 	
Budget limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Difficult to establish the standard rate for conservation workers in each specialization ● The cost of materials and chemicals in the conservation work ● There is no budget for condition survey, but we can put the scientific materials testing in the restoration project 	15 percent
Lack of staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● There aren't always all the professions available, time is a problem, and staff. 	5 percent
Lack of understanding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The public still has a 	5 percent

Area of obstacles	Sample responses	Percentage of responses (n=19)
from the public	misunderstanding about restoration and are still attached to the old principles and thinking	
Problem with materials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The materials that were tested are not good enough yet 	5 percent
No problems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No problems so far, and can be applied in all places ● No problems in actual application, and the information from training can be used to work in a more detailed manner 	10 percent


Appendix 5: Organigramme of Ayutthaya World Heritage site management agency



Appendix 6: Organigramme of Vat Phou Champasak World Heritage site management agency



Appendix 7: Organigramme of George Town World Heritage site management agency



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