



CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS: DEVELOPMENT AS A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEBUILDING IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

In answering *how Development in southern Thailand can be understood as contributing to Peacebuilding*, section 3.1 will first give a look at a range of possible developmental contributions to Peacebuilding in Southern Thailand, using Burke's (2011) categories developed to analyze foreign development aid donors in the deep south, and furthermore will elaborate on other examples that stretch beyond his focus of foreign aid donors. Next, section 3.2 will explore the how various outcome-oriented strategies define measures of success of peace work in Southern Thailand; ultimately seeking to understand to what ends or toward what outcomes, using various means, can Development contribute to various measures of success for Peacebuilding. Finally, after using these two static categories, the last section will take into account the possibility of a dynamic contribution to Peacebuilding. This will be explored first through the analysis of the interdependent nature of three conflict intervention frameworks, and secondly through examples used to illustrate not only these various approaches but also the development of more progressive approaches to Development and Peacebuilding.

3.1 Development Actors and their Contributions to Peacebuilding in Southern Thailand

In Burke's (2011) study on foreign aid in southern Thailand, the IMT-GT, ADB, WB, UNDP, UNICEF, and TAF were the chosen case studies used to represent three different categories of development aid in the context of the conflict in southern Thailand. The following analysis will elaborate on the categories and examples identified by Burke (2011), and will further broaden the analysis to consider all development actors in the region, as opposed to the foreign donors that Burke (2011) studied.

The **first group**, comprised of IMT-GT and ADB, were categorized under “Modernising, Marginalising, and Conflict Blindness”. Although their intention was to improve trade links in the end these projects “unwittingly furthered perceptions of horizontal inequality in the Far South... [ultimately] playing into subnational political and social dynamics” (Burke, 2011: 232). This form of Development aiming solely toward economic development, similar to Mainstream Development efforts that privilege and prioritize the economic aspect of development, relates to the growth-based forms of Development, particularly through its method of trade, that seeks to improve conditions (Development as an aim) via increased GDP. Burke rightly categorizes these approaches as ‘modernization,’ and like Development efforts that solely seek a rise in GDP without consideration to the human aspect of Development, the context of social relations, and the quality and nature of this economic improvement or change, these efforts can often ‘marginalize’ usually the most vulnerable in society. Further, taking into consideration that these projects were endeavored with a blind eye to the context in which the economic development was being pursued, this ‘top-down’ strategy of Development risked reinforcing the very structures that perpetuate drivers of the conflict (ie. injustice- procedural and substantive- and thus inequality). This highlights that Development, alone and especially in situations of violent conflict and complex emergency, must not be assumed to have a positive contribution to Peacebuilding.

Although Burke’s (2011) research specifically focuses on international development aid to the deep south of Thailand, the same category still applies for all development actors. In expanding this analysis, other examples of ‘modernization, marginalization, and conflict blindness’ are exemplified by the central government development policies that can be seen as contributing to both root and compounded proxy causes of the violent conflict in the south. Unique to this conflict is the role that Development, namely central governmental development, has already contributed the state in the conflict in the deep south of Thailand. As much as Development can be

used as a vehicle for progressive change in promotion of social, substantive, and procedural justice, it can also be used as an instrument to conserve the status quo of political order and power relations.

In the **second group** of foreign aid donors in the deep south, UNDP and the WB were identified as agencies where the government interface posed a barrier to addressing the conflict. In these cases, peacebuilding approaches were initially blocked by the government. Burke (2011) centers his analysis on the interface between the government and the development agencies' ability to negotiate and propose its project in the face of the government's sovereignty on what it permits foreign aid donors to pursue within its territory. Although perhaps the question of sovereignty is specifically reserved to foreign development actors, in expanding this analysis, this category will also take into account other barriers to peacebuilding efforts that development actors, foreign or local, may encounter.

With regard specifically to the government, in cases of peripheral interstate conflict, in which one of the main actors in the conflict is the state, outside intervention, development or otherwise, can be a difficult task to negotiate. The experience of UNDP and WB, in fact, represent a large deal of the development efforts failure, which is a combination of both a reluctant and suspicious government as much as an inflexible and perhaps even an uncommitted development agency that ultimately results in ineffectivity. Even INGOs and IGOs who do establish development projects toward Peacebuilding in the south still have to deal with the continual interface and issues of government compliance and approval throughout their work, as INGOs and IGOs often have to interact with government officials, local and national, and agencies on a continual and regular basis. (Burke, 2011)

Other barriers, that INGOs, IGOs, and even NGOs may encounter in the deep south of Thailand is a reluctance of locals to engage, participate, and trust in a given

development organization. This may arise from issues of trust due to suspicions of ulterior motives, fear of participation, given social pressures or repercussions, as much as the pressure or adherence to local societal norms and values. For example, there are several local CSOs in southern Thailand who do not accept funds from the US government or US funded organizations. Further, in the deep south civilians often expressed a certain level of fear of ‘too much participation’ or political activity or community organizing, as it might draw attention to them in a way that would attract military or government personnel’s interest, for suspicion of insurgent related activities.¹ Even when discussion arose on who would sit on a local committee being proposed to act as a liaison between the local villagers and the military in the area, one young man commented that there weren’t many options since most all of the active community members and leaders had already been taken by the military.² In this sense local development efforts and actors are not without barriers themselves, not only in the securing of funding, but also in creating their own space to act, regardless of issues of sovereignty. It is clear that governmental development funds are largely reserved for a specific type of development, namely economic development that does not risk structural or institutional changes. In this way, support for community development efforts, especially in a broader more comprehensive sense, can be limited, and further even discouraged given governmental pressures and potential consequences of action.

Finally, the **third group** highlights UNICEF and TAF, as examples of “continued small yet valuable steps” in the direction of Peacebuilding (Burke, 2011: 234). Here Burke (2011) notes the importance of both of the agencies’ ability to interface with the government, without conceding their own purpose and ideals. UNICEF is a specific case, as its internationally accepted cause and prestigious reputation earned it a special place and purpose in all of Thailand, not excluding the deep south. TAF, on the other hand, is a much smaller organization that specifically focuses on the deep south. However, it is able to manage its relations with the

¹ Observation of Deliberative Dialogue, Yala, 20 June 2011.

² Observation of Deliberative Dialogue, Yala, 20 June 2011.

governments and maintain its political inspiration and intention, mostly through its close connection with local partners, as much local CSOs and local governmental agencies, who over the course of decades have created relationships that aid in the interface, understanding, and trust of those who directly deal with TAF. This, coupled with their broad understanding of Development (with its focus on justice, rights, and equality- acknowledging and addressing the structural context of Development) as well as a high prioritization and commitment to Peacebuilding in their development agenda, is what helps to distinguish TAF as a positive case study for its developmental contribution to Peacebuilding, according Burke (2011).

This approach that supports local CSOs in seeking to address the local needs, desires, and concerns of the people of the deep south greatly contrasts with top-down approaches that do not take into consideration the importance of the local peoples aspirations or feelings, and in fact can be considered a more human-centric, bottom-up, alternative approach to Development.

3.2 Identifying Outcome Oriented Approaches

Having considered the range of developmental contributions in situations of complex emergency, and moving forward in understanding how Development can serve as a meaningful contribution to Peacebuilding in Southern Thailand, it is necessary to review on what levels and in what ways *successful* outcomes can be determined. The desired outcomes³ vary depending on the conflict management approach endeavored. According to Ropers (2004: 264), conflict settlement is considered results-oriented, meaning it seeks “political settlements with stabilizing effects.” This responds to conflict settlement’s notion of conflict as a problem of the status quo and political order. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, views conflict as “a catalyst for social change”, and as such measures of success are process-oriented, focused primarily on the relational dimension of change, namely “improved

³ Recognizing the use of outcome mapping- where outcomes are measured by behavioral changes of secondary beneficiaries, here it is noted that the term ‘outcomes’ takes the more conventional meaning, referring specifically to the identification of various results intended by the three main conflict intervention discourses.

communication, interaction, and relations between parties; respect for different collective identities” (Ropers, 2004: 264). Lastly, for Conflict Transformation, where conflict is seen as “a non-violent struggle for social justice”, the measures of success are process and structure-oriented, in that goals and successes are defined by the “elimination of socio-economic inequalities between identity groups, good governance, power sharing, the creation of cross-cutting civil society structure, building conflict management capacities at the grassroots level,” (Ropers, 2004: 264). This relates to the structural dimension of Conflict Transformation, in that it seeks “deliberate intervention to provide insight into underlying causes and social conditions that create and foster violent expressions of conflict, and to openly promote nonviolent mechanisms that reduce adversariness, minimize and ultimately eliminate violence, and foster structures that meet basic human needs (substantive justice) and maximize participation of people in decisions that affect them (procedural justice)” (Lederach, 1999: 83).

Before analyzing the impact on conflict intervention, it is important to deconstruct the conflict so as to understand the discourses at play, since these also affect the development intervention and its intended contribution to the conflict. With regard to the conflict in the deep south of Thailand, the two primary discourses are that of 1) economic grievances and injustice, and 2) identity and government legitimacy⁴. One discourse is not above another, in fact, all issues need to be addressed in ending the violent conflict in a meaningful and sustained way; however, it is important to distinguish what these two discourses represent in terms of the conflict, as to highlight where the developmental contribution is being directed. According to leading expert Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, the second discourse (that of identity for the people of the deep south of Thailand and government legitimacy in the deep south of Thailand) is what he considers the heart or core of the conflict. It is that issue by which violent groups are able to justify their otherwise ‘unprovoked violence’. However, it is the nature of protracted violent conflict that makes the

⁴ Interview conducted with Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Deep South Watch, Pattani, 24 June 2011.

compounded or proxy causes of violence of equal consideration in managing the de-escalation of violence and overall transformation of the conflict. The first discourse, which refers to economic grievances and injustices (or substantive and procedural injustices) are issues that perhaps do not justify unprovoked violence, but nevertheless contribute to the perpetuation of attitudes, perceptions, behaviors, reactions, and ultimately conflict manifested in violent incidents, that themselves then take on a life of their own in further cycles of violent revenge.

Conflict Settlement: Results-Oriented

Specifically as it relates to the conflict in southern Thailand, a lasting political settlement is of particular importance. As McCargo (2008: 187) expresses “without more fundamental political changes, probably around some form of locally mandated autonomy alongside peace negotiations and a restriction of the military to narrowly defined security functions under civil authority, development expenditures will not end what is effectively a politically motivated and localized conflict.”

Traditionally, conflict settlement takes place on the level of high government officials, and many would contend that such high level officials are the ones capable and able to reach settlements of lasting political stability. However, in the case of southern Thailand, given the heart of the conflict and the unsettled political legitimacy of the state, and given the fluid and unsecured nature of the conflicting party’s power and ability to enforce decisions, more than ever political solutions that are rooted in a broad base of local legitimacy will be essential.

Yet, answering the political question of state legitimacy in the south is only part of the main drivers of the conflict identified. Although a political solution is of particular importance for this conflict, [since by resolving the issues at the heart of the conflict (identity and government legitimacy), violent incidents on either side will

have little justification], solely addressing the core of the conflict is necessary but most likely will not be sufficient. The issues that compound and perpetuate violence must also be addressed, as it is wisely noted that violence in the deep south not only relates to 30 years of grievances, but to the result of yesterday's violence⁵. As such, Development efforts must also focus on process-oriented outcomes that stress the changing in perceptions of animosity and that focus on communication and interaction that promote "respect for different collective identities" (Ropers, 2004: 264).

The weakness in the purely results-oriented outcome that manages to find a 'win-win' political agreement is that even *if* a 'fair agreement' is made at a high level, because of the nature of conflict- "always a complex set of *interactions* and *relationships* that, over time, relate grievances to modes of behavior and to psychological states of mind, each of which in turn comes to constitute feedback loops that can perpetuate, escalate, or even render possible some movements toward conflict resolution" (Jabri, 2006: 2) – high level agreements do not necessarily ensure lasting peace on the ground, that is ultimately dependent on the interaction and relationship between people.

Moreover, like top-down approaches to Development efforts, decisions at 'the top' may never reach 'the bottom' as they were supposedly intended. For example, if conflict settlement is seen as a 'problem of political order', even if a new political order is established with new leaders, if the structure and institutions through which these actors operate remains unchanged it will be very difficult to ensure that these new leaders are held accountable and that this new power will be distributed equally.

⁵ Interview conducted with Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Deep South Watch, Pattani, 24 June 2011.

Conflict Resolution: Process-Oriented

Like Peacebuilding, Development is also process-oriented in nature, meaning that the means of Development can be equally important as the ends and thus outcomes. With regard to Development as a contribution to Peacebuilding, the interaction and relations of the people in pursuit of a given end point can be a desired outcome in itself.

In this way community development can be seen as a contribution to Peacebuilding by the nature of its own process too. In this way, process-oriented outcomes focus more on the quality of development endeavored, the change in terms of relational and personal dimensions of Conflict Transformation (Lederach, 1999). Reimann (2004: 5) explains how this approach especially emphasizes “the need to change mutually negative conflict attitudes and values among parties in order to increase cooperation and communication between them.”

The “preferred practical approach” for process-oriented outcome are usually Track II methods, specifically through “direct civil society conflict management [particularly] at the middle-ranking leadership level (Ropers, 2004: 264), or, as according to Reimann (2004: 47) and Bigdon and Korf (2004: 343), this may also be considered open to all NGOs and INGOs involved in conflict resolution or with a specialized expertise in citizen diplomacy or civic mediation, respectively.

By focusing on the quality of interaction between conflicting groups and by “[emphasizing] the need to change mutually negative conflict attitudes and values among parties in order to increase cooperation and communication between them” (Reimann, 2004: 5), development actors can gear their approach toward process-oriented outcomes. However, in consideration of meaningful and lasting outcomes for peace, this process-oriented approach is considered necessary, but, when pursued

alone, insufficient in addressing the multidimensional and complex situations of violent protracted ethnopolitical conflict (Reimann, 2004). In referring back to the two dominant discourses at play, a process-oriented approach would be useful in addressing grievances and social injustices, attitudes and behaviors that perpetuate violent conflict. However, process-oriented approaches pursued in the context of highly unequal structural context will not be able to change laws and institutions that perpetuate structural violence, and essentially address what is known as the core of the conflict. For this, Francis (2004) would argue that empowerment for action is the only way to address such inequalities and move in the direction of negotiations that address the core and drivers of the conflict.

Conflict Transformation: Process and Structure-Oriented

Structure-orientated outcomes have the potential to overlap with the political settlements of results-oriented outcomes particularly of development actors when “the reform of oppressive rules and practices” (Bigdon and Korf, 2004: 353) are brought to a political decision-making space, however they must be recognized as two separate concepts. In the traditional sense, conflict settlement’s results-oriented outcomes are supposedly without necessary consideration to the root or proxy causes of the conflict. However, as previously stated, structure-orientation is much more than just this. It, like Lederach’s (1999a: 83) structural dimension of Conflict Transformation, aims to “foster structures that meet basic human needs (substantive justice) and maximize participation of people in decisions that affect them (procedural justice)”.

In considering the context of development actors in the deep south of Thailand, it is useful to situate Development actors and their purpose in the larger scheme of the conflict. By in large they do contribute and work primarily on a Track III level, however “capacity building, trauma work, grassroots training, development, and human rights work” (all identified by Reimann (2004) as Track III strategies

taken by development actors) may be pursued in ways that are not necessarily structure and process-oriented; and further *without* attention to the process-oriented outcomes or without an awareness of the political context of its work risks missed opportunities and even reinforcement of conservative⁶ political structures, or structural violence.

Further, it is important to recognize two more interrelated points, firstly, that development actors are considered as peripheral actors in the analysis and identification of the most active and powerful actors in a conflict, especially in the conflict in Southern Thailand⁷. Their contribution is considered indirect, as opposed to other more active and more powerful actors in the conflict. However, having recognized this, it is also important to acknowledge the nature of their connection to the people- the level in which *they* are most active and powerful- is very meaningful in moving beyond elite decision-making, or even in bringing top level negotiations down to a lived and realized reality.

3.3 The Dynamism of Developmental Contributions to Peacebuilding

Although this analysis has, thus far in the above two sections, posed three static categories (group one, group two and group three contributions to Peacebuilding; results-oriented, process-oriented, and process and structure-oriented outcomes), it is also worth considering that development actors can contribute on various levels and pass through different ‘categories’ throughout the history of their own development as an organization, as their contribution can develop, evolve, and change form. In this way, developmental contributions together, as a whole, can be and perhaps, as is suggested here, must be dynamic in order to make a meaningful contribution to Peacebuilding. To do so, first the inter-related and inter-dependent nature of the various peacebuilding discourses will be explored to show how

⁶ Conservative, as in as in ‘conserving’ power relations

⁷ Interview conducted with Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Deep South Watch, Pattani, 24 June 2011.

contributions at all levels are necessary and in fact reinforce one another. Further, examples of these contributions will be highlighted from various developmental actors contributing to Peacebuilding on different levels in the deep south.

Although, as previously noted, conflict settlement's results-oriented outcomes may reach an agreement on the top level, this does not necessarily ensure its success and implementation on the ground. Conversely, it could also be argued that Conflict Transformation on the ground, will most likely need a symbolic and meaningful law, political or legal change in order to reinforce and insure its sustainability. In this way, both conflict settlement and Conflict Transformation, two different approaches and different frameworks, actually reinforce one another. Further, in expanding this analysis to include conflict resolution, in a similar situation conflict settlement may happen on top levels but remain superficial without the rebuilding of relationships and trust to make those agreements meaningful. Similarly, rebuilding trust on the ground, without the insurance and institutionalization of those ideals on the legal and political level, risks an easy default on untrusting and unjust relationships and behaviors. Moreover, coming full circle in this triad of interdependent connections, at the very basic level, rebuilding relationships between parties is about rebuilding trust; in this way the empowerment of civil society, grassroots training and capacity building, and human rights work will only go so far in building peace if the fundamental relationships between the two parties are not addressed.

Having explained the dynamic relationship between these three frameworks, examples of various development actors in the south will be used to illustrate these different approaches, highlighting their necessity, interdependence, as well as the dynamic contribution of the organization, them self, a changing an evolving force in this equation, as much as the evolution of the nature of the development actors' contributions as a whole.

The first example will highlight a result-oriented developmental approach that also reflects this latter concept relating to the trend in political advocacy that has become more and more prevalent in recent years in the deep south. A civil society

network, consisting of the Citizen Network for Governance Participation in the Southern Border Provinces, Deep South Watch, Civil Society Committee Southern Border, and Political Development Foundation, with support from the academic Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity, Prince of Songkla University, Phra Pokklao Institute, together from January of 2009 to January of 2011, conducted 49 forums with Thai Muslims, Thai Buddhists, government officials, police, military, civilian, local politicians and religious leaders, teachers in public and private schools, women groups, academics, students, and interviewed general public and former members of underground organizations in order to understand their needs, desires, and concerns. The result of these discussions produced eight specific points that guide a piece of common ground rooted in the suggestions of over 1,400 participants for the Pattani Maha Nakhon (Greater Pattani City) Model, a proposed special administrative area, as a possible legal solution to the conflict in the deep south. This results based approach, using a broad base of voices from the people below, of many careers and vantage points, is this civil society network's contribution toward and intention for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the deep south. This example shows that developmental contributions can aim toward politically stabilizing outcomes rooted in legislation. However, a noted shortcoming of this effort is the need for a strong base of people representing and supporting the success of these reforms and the success of this peace if these reforms are achieved; this base is perhaps best endeavored by a Conflict Transformation approach.

This next example will show how organizations themselves can be dynamic in the evolution of their contribution to Peacebuilding, illustrating how community development in southern Thailand can and has led to more politically aware and proactive peacebuilding efforts using the logic of local empowerment and empowerment for action. Moreover, this example also reflects a development approach that although initially seeking to simply respond to a crisis situation, in the end resulted in a proactive and empowered network of women actively promoting peace and seeking to change attitudes in the deep south.

The Network of Civic Women for Peace⁸ in the Deep South first began to take shape back in 2004 when Ajarn Soriya and some of her students at Prince of Songkla University began working with the families of victims of the conflict's violence. This first phase, best understood as humanitarian or healing work, took the form of volunteers visiting families' homes that were recently affected by the violence to offer psychological support. The events of Krue Se Mosque in April of 2004 helped to determine the needs of this response, as the victims of Krue Se were the poorest of the victims of violence and, in large, had many children per family. Since the government declared those families as 'insurgents', most widows were socially isolated, thus the primary purpose of their work was to provide some social and psychological support in planning for the future- ie. scholarships for the children, a new second job that could accommodate the new domestic situation, etc. In this first phase, with the help of a Bangkok senator, Sapon Supapon, who created a private scholarship fund by Thai citizens' donations, they were able to provide 10,000 Baht/family. This first response, although by no means sustainable or comprehensive, was aimed to meet the immediate needs of the families in recovering and moving forward. The methods aligned with charity in that there was not any agency, power, or choice for 'victims'- they were the recipients of, albeit much needed, resources- social and material support, and in this way the strategy can be seen as a humanitarian response to meeting immediate needs- food, clothes, planning future livelihood, but not yet addressing the attitudes or structural causes of the violence or actively seeking to change attitudes about the violence beyond encouraging resilience.

In a second and third phase of this CSO's work, their funding was formalized by Mahidol's Peace Center and then again by a Thai Research Fund. The volunteers shifted their focus from visiting the women themselves to organizing the women together so that they could provide social support to one another. In 2009, this evolved into the creation of a radio program, *Voices of the Women from the Deep South*. Through sharing their stories these women also sought to inspire other listeners to overcome the crises that they may face, and move forward in a non-violent way.

⁸ Interview conducted with Ajarn Soriya, The Network of Civic Women for Peace in the Deep South, Pattani, 24 June 2011.

With a desire to further build on and develop this social safety net and network for women, this stage more fully realized the importance and potential of these ‘victims’, as the agency shifted and they, themselves, took the role of ‘healers’.

The final phase of this CSO was realized through the EU funding of *civicwomen.com*, a website, magazine, and the same radio program (Voices of the Women from the Deep South), together comprising The Network of Civic Women for Peace in the Deep South. In this current phase the content and message expanded from women sharing their stories to also include interviews with CSO actors as to what they are doing in the current situation. The concept is the same, the voice of active ‘victims of the conflict,’ however this phase has expanded to share the movement of CSOs in the situation of conflict, with the same message of continued perseverance and proactive non-violent efforts for justice in the face of difficulty. Together this network of women and local CSOs work to lobby together and advocate for nonviolent responses to the conflict. In 2011, this network of women, CSOs, and local youth together gave their recommendations to the Secretary of the National Security Council, under a new branch for the deep south under the department of the “Center of Security of Minority Identities”. This experience in itself was also of intrinsic value, since it combined personal and relational transformations with efforts toward structural change as well.

Thus far, this section has showed how developmental contributions can take place on various levels and contribute toward distinct outcomes for Peacebuilding. It has also highlighted the dynamic nature of developmental contributions, both as a whole and for individual organizations. The final example, representing a developmental contribution that debatably contributes to both conflict resolution and Conflict Transformation, will be the discussion of chapter 4, as it is detailed as the selected case study of this research.