

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

ทุนวิจัย

กองทุนรัชดาภิเษกสมโภช

รายงานผลการวิจัย

รัฐและองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนไทย: ความเหมือนและความแตกต่างของลักษณะองค์กร  
และบทบาทภายในสาธารณกิจและนโยบายสาธารณะ

โดย

ผู้ช่วยศาสตราจารย์ ดร. พิษณุ เจริญพงษ์

กันยายน 2544



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**ชื่อโครงการวิจัย** รัฐและองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนไทย: ความเหมือนและความแตกต่างของ  
ลักษณะองค์กรและบทบาท ภายในสาธารณกิจและนโยบายสาธารณะ

**ชื่อผู้วิจัย** ผู้ช่วยศาสตราจารย์ ดร. พิษณุ เสงี่ยมพงษ์

**เดือนและปีที่ทำวิจัยเสร็จ** กันยายน 2544

### บทคัดย่อ

ในปัจจุบัน องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชน (NGOs) ได้มีบทบาทมากขึ้น ภายในกระบวนการ  
นโยบายสาธารณะไทย งานวิจัยนี้ศึกษาคุณลักษณะบางประการของ NGOs โดยเปรียบเทียบ  
กับคุณลักษณะขององค์กรภาครัฐไทย รวมทั้งศึกษาบทบาทและความสัมพันธ์ขององค์กรทั้งสอง  
ประเภท นอกจากนี้ งานวิจัยมุ่งเน้นศึกษาเปรียบเทียบประเด็นนโยบายสองด้าน คือด้านสิ่งแวดล้อม  
และสวัสดิการสังคม

โครงการวิจัย ใช้แบบสอบถามเป็นเครื่องมือในการเก็บข้อมูลจากองค์กรภาครัฐและ  
NGOs ที่มีขอบข่ายการปฏิบัติงานในประเด็นนโยบายด้านสิ่งแวดล้อม และสวัสดิการสังคม โดยใช้  
มุมมององค์กรของผู้ปฏิบัติงานภายในองค์กรที่ศึกษา และทำการวิเคราะห์เปรียบเทียบองค์กรและ  
นโยบายสองประเภทนี้ เกี่ยวกับคุณลักษณะ บทบาท และความสัมพันธ์ขององค์กร

งานวิจัยพบคุณลักษณะเชิงบวกของ NGOs เช่น ความมีจิตสำนึกเชิงสังคม ประสิทธิภาพ  
ประสิทธิภาพ ประสิทธิผล ของการปฏิบัติงาน ความผูกพันของผู้ปฏิบัติงานกับองค์กร และความรู้สึกถึง  
การได้รับผลตอบแทนสูงในการปฏิบัติงาน รวมทั้งการมีบทบาทสูงขององค์กร ในกระบวนการ  
นโยบายสาธารณะ นอกจากนี้ การระบุดึงคอร์ปชั่นภายใน NGOs ยังต่ำกว่าภายในองค์กรภาคร  
รัฐ อย่างไรก็ตาม ในขณะที่ทั้งสององค์กรต้องปฏิบัติภารกิจร่วมกันภายในนโยบายสาธารณะ  
ความแตกต่างด้านลักษณะองค์กร และทัศนคติ เช่นความแตกต่างในการมุ่งเน้นการปฏิบัติงาน ไป  
ยังผลประโยชน์ของประเทศ กับผลประโยชน์ของท้องถิ่น เป็นเหตุของความขัดแย้ง ระหว่างองค์กร  
ทั้งสอง ลักษณะร่วม ที่พบอยู่บ้างระหว่างสององค์กร เช่นการมีจุดประสงค์เชิงสังคมที่หลากหลาย  
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องค์กรทั้งสองประเภท ได้เสริมบทบาทซึ่งกันและกันภายในนโยบายสาธารณะ สำหรับนโยบาย  
สองประเภทหลักที่ศึกษา พบว่ามีความขัดแย้งระหว่างองค์กรภาครัฐและ NGOs ในนโยบายด้าน  
สิ่งแวดล้อม มากกว่าในนโยบายด้านสวัสดิการสังคม โครงการวิจัยได้พยายามอธิบายปรากฏ  
การณ์ดังกล่าวไว้ที่ช่วงท้ายของรายงานผลการวิจัย



**Project Title :** Governmental and Nongovernmental Organizations in Thailand: Similarities and Differences in Their Characteristics and Roles within Public Services and Public Policy.

**Name of the Investigator :** Pisanu Sangiampongsa, Ph.D. (Assistant Professor)

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#### **Abstract**

There has been an increase in the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the Thai policy process. This study examines some of their characteristics by comparing them to those of public organizations. Their roles in public policy as well as their relationship with public organizations are also studied. This study focuses further attention on two policy types – environment and welfare.

A survey on public organizations and NGOs involving in the environmental and welfare policy areas, through the perception of the organizations' employees, is used as the method of data collection. Comparative analyses are performed on two organizational and two policy types with respect to some characteristics and roles of the organizations in the policy process.

The study results found many positive characteristics of NGOs, such as their high level of altruism and civic consciousness, effectiveness, efficiency, commitment and high sense of reward among their employees, as well as their active roles in public policy. Less corruption is reported from NGOs than from public organizations. However, while the two organizations share tasks in the policy process, differences in organizational characteristics and attitudes, such as their different focus on national versus local interests, likely contribute to conflicts between them. Few shared traits, such as their multiple social goals could be the focal point in the effort to build relationship between them, so that they can complement and supplement each other's role in public policy. In terms of the two policy areas, environmental policy area exhibits a high level of conflict in public organizations and NGOs' relation. A more pleasant work atmosphere in the form of more cooperative effort is found in welfare policy area. An attempt to explain such empirical finding is offered at the end of the study's report.

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## Introduction

Today, the roles of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as part of the civil society, have increased tremendously throughout the public policy process. They help aggregate demands in policy formulation and help implement public policy. Such increase in their roles is sometimes viewed as privatization and coproduction of public policy (Savas, 1987; Brudney & England, 1983). It is the intention of this study to understand them as one kind of organizations with roles in public policy through empirical testing.

Most scholars regard NGOs as an important part of the civil society, as they are non-state in nature. Jumbala and Mitprasat (1997) provided several observations regarding the NGOs sector, in that they must not be part of government; they must not be profit making; and they must have altruistic objectives. This is in contrast with private, for-profit organizations such as businesses that are also non-state, since they operate to produce goods and services with the aim to create profits. For NGOs, they usually direct their effort and resources toward the disadvantaged. Many NGOs assist people to become self-reliant and sufficient in their lives. Many of them operate across countries, trying to transfer more resources from the richer to the poorer countries. This study has an aim, therefore, to study NGOs in many aspects, by comparing them to public organizations, since they are both involved in the public policy process.

In public policy, there are kinds of policy in which the two types of organizations operate. This study will compare and contrast public organizations and NGOs involving in environmental and welfare policy areas. Ripley and Franklin (1986) categorize public policy into four separate types. The environmental policy area, with concern in the protection of the environment, should be placed into the protective regulatory policy. Its examples are the discouragement of the consumption of certain commodities, such as gasoline, cigarettes, and foam products as well as the discouragement of certain acts, such as strip mining. These products and activities have adverse effects on the environment. On the other hand, the social welfare policy, which usually involves the relocation of resources from the more wealthy to the less wealthy people, should be



placed in the redistribution policy. Some of its examples are jobs placement programs, jobs training programs, as well as various types of aid to disadvantaged families and children.

According to Ripley and Franklin (1986), regulation and redistribution policies comprise the two most controversial and coercive kinds. With regulatory activities administered by the government, people are required to act or not to act in certain ways, such as refraining from smoking in some public areas or limiting the amount of pollution released from factories. For redistribution policy, the wealthy class of people will be displeased with the transfer of their resources to the poorer class of people. While for the former, people are forced to pursue or refrain from certain acts, some people's resources are taken away from them and given to others, for the latter type of policy.

Today, both public organizations and NGOs have roles in these two policy types. The government is, by function, involved in environmental protection and control as well as public welfare services. Altruistic people voluntarily set up philanthropic organizations that provide services such as food and shelters to the indigent. Some NGOs, usually by ways of environmental movement and actions, focus their roles in environment, ecology-related issues with an objective to have a sustainable resource use. Sometimes known as environmental activists, they work alongside public organizations, such as Pollution Control Department and Royal forest Department (Pongsapich, 1995). Since these two organizational types have to work together in public policy issues, relationship among them, as one topic of interest in this research, will be explored thoroughly.

Taking-off from these points, this study mainly examines NGOs empirically by comparing them to public organizations, their counterpart in two policy areas -- environmental and welfare policies. The comparisons will be geared toward the following specific aspects.

1. Organizational characteristics. Since NGOs are mostly created voluntarily in democratic societies, some characteristics within the organizations must be different from those of public organizations operating in similar policy areas. Such characteristics

to be studied are, for instance, organizational efficiency and effectiveness, corruption, as well as organizational goals.

2. NGOs' roles in the public policy process. Their roles are compared to those of public organizations in similar policy areas. Also, the relationship between the two organizational types is examined.

3. Altruism and civic consciousness of NGOs. Again, these NGOs' characteristics are compared to those of public organizations.

The assessment of these aspects are based on the views and perceptions of individuals who work in NGOs and those in public organizations. It is assumed that being employees of these organizations, these individuals should prove to be valuable in reflecting and revealing the three aspects of inquiry.



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## Survey of Related Literature

The literature is divided into four parts for a more effective and thorough review. These are organizational characteristics; roles of actors in the public policy process; altruism and civic consciousness; and environmental and welfare policy areas. Following are detailed descriptions of each part.

### 1. Literature related to organizational characteristics.

Some earlier studies on organizations compare public organizations to business, for-profit organizations for better understanding of both types of organizations. Generally, public organizations pick up the social functions that are not performed by the private counterpart. These functions, such as income distribution and law enforcement, are undertaken by the government due to the market failure. With different sets of objectives between the state and for-profit organizations, differences are found with respect to certain characteristics, such as operating efficiency or the tendency to reduce costs in operation, effectiveness or goals achievement, competition in operation among similar agencies, internal control, external control or accountability or public scrutiny, personal reward or work satisfaction, legal and financial constraints, characteristics of goals, and operational flexibility (Rainy, Backoff, & Levine, 1976; Perry & Rainey, 1988).

It is the intention of the present study to examine NGOs by comparing them to public organizations in the same way as the comparisons between public and for-profit organizations. But more recent studies also did theoretical surveys on NGOs. Vakil (1997) specifies organizational characteristics such as accountability, transparency, and efficiency as beneficial attributes to be studied. Uphoff (1993) makes a theoretical comparisons of bureaucratic / public organizations, market-oriented organizations, and voluntary associations in terms of their structure and roles. For example, bureaucratic organizations usually possess and exercise coercive power, which is appropriate for assuring compliance such as the enforcement of environmental preservation. For-profit organizations, with respect to the environmental issue, will operate or produce goods and services while preserving the environment as long as



such actions generate greater profits than costs to them. Not-for-profit, voluntary organizations operate by ways of agreement, understanding, and social pressure. While making comparisons among the three organizational types, Uphoff contends that they all have values and flaws. Even though NGOs have become increasingly accepted as a means of promoting economic, social development, and democratization in the Third World, voluntary activities tend to be volatile and subject to changes in the public mood and climates of opinion. By the same token, at tough times such as when there is a high scarcity of resources, for-profit firms tend to attribute too high a weight to self-interest in the process of resource acquisition. In the similar vein as Uphoff (1993), Daft (1989) discusses three means of control in organizations: bureaucratic, market, and clan. The clan control strategy relies on the use of values, commitment, tradition, shared benefits, and trusts among organizational members in the operation.

## 2. Literature related to actors within the public policy process.

With the increase in the roles of NGOs throughout the public policy process, the line that separates the publicness between state and non-state organizations become increasingly unclear. Bozeman (1989) sees the publicness in all organizational types because they all are affected by political authority. But the publicness in all organizational types in this study is viewed from the perspective that all organizations -- public, for-profit, and non-profit alike -- all affect the public or society in some ways -- directly or indirectly, and in the short term or in the long term. An example would be the effect of a smoker or a polluting firm has on the society as a whole.

With more participation in the public policy process of NGOs along with their effects on the public life and society, their roles in public policy, politics, and society have become increasingly discussed. Daft (1989), in the discussion of organizational life cycle, in which organizations originate and progress, the latter stages of their development – formalization and elaboration stages – usually require reorganization. This is true for most public organizations in Thailand, as they naturally tend to privatize and decentralize tasks in order to prevent too high a degree of bureaucratization. In a way, over-bureaucratization in public organizations by means of

de-concentration of functions by the creation of branches from the central governmental offices is believed to do more harm than good to the political system and society of a democratic country. In this way, positions and working space within the Thai public policy process are open for the non-state sector. On the theoretical ground of the public sector economics, Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) and Stiglitz (1988) discuss the possibility for the non-state sector to participate in many kinds of public service delivery or policy implementation, which is mainly due to the exclusion and / or rival consumption in most public goods. Savas (1987) explores various means of privatization. Public service delivery by voluntary organizations is considered one particular type of privatization. Also, the increase in the roles of NGOs as the civil society can be regarded as counter-balancing the roles of public and for-profit sectors. Sangiampongsa (1998) views the roles of these latter two sectors, sometimes, as those of collusion type in the system of state corporatism. In the Thai case, such collusion works to benefit both the state and for-profit organizations at the detriment or cost incurred on the society. Examples are large and mostly construction projects, through the contracts between the state and for-profit companies, that could be viewed, on another angle, as environmental destruction.

Theoretical and political possibilities have led to increased activities and roles of NGOs as the civil society force in today's globalization era and in the democratization process among many Third World countries, including Thailand (Rodan, 1997; Clarke, 1994). The roles of NGOs represent a higher level or a more direct way of political participation of the non-state sector of society in the system of representative democracy. The role of the state, on the other hand, is automatically constrained or sometimes seen as dwindling in some places through de-bureaucratization and privatization (Clark, Heilman, & Johnson, 1995/1996). The necessity of cooperative efforts between the state and NGOs throughout the public policy process might be unavoidable if they want to avoid confrontation and conflicts. Discussions on the new kind of governance by such methods as minimizing the state's roles, inter-organizational networking or public and private partnership are common in modern days' public policy



literature (Brudney & England, 1983; Rhodes, 1996; Fredericksen & London, 2000; Grubbs, 2000). Today's public policy without the consultation with the non-state sector will likely be unsuccessful (Tyler, 1994 – 1995), while the cooperation between the state and non-state sectors in public program implementation should result in social capital, leading, in turn, to program success (Brown & Ashman, 1996). Not only do NGOs assist the state in delivering some services to the public, they could also have the role of cross-checking the state as a protection against the possibility of its abuse of power (Foley & Edwards, 1996).

In public policy, policy formulation and implementation are sometimes separately analyzed for a more thorough understanding of the policy process. In policy formulation, NGOs take the role of policy advocacy, trying to influence the decision making of elected officials (Lowry, 1995). In Rinquist's study (1994) regarding policy influence in state pollution control in the U.S., a significant positive relationship is found between a strict water pollution control and the strength in the environmental groups' pressure. In policy implementation, the roles of NGOs have been witnessed in service delivery. Such roles are beneficial in terms of increasing consumers' choices. NGOs' services could supplement the median level of provision, which is usually the quality and level provided through governmental services. With more number of organizations in operation, information and technology have a better chance to be further developed. They can be shared between the state and non-state actors. Some studies also found non-profit organizations to be flexible, effective, innovative, and altruistic in operation, which help them gear efforts to certain groups with low visibility (Nyland, 1995; Berman & West, 1995; Hayes, 1996). NGOs' operation also creates more jobs for the society (Meyer, 1995).

However, NGOs also receive criticisms on certain aspects. They are criticized for their lack of accountability, since they are not dependent on the legislature and usually do not face a very high degree of supervision or control from other organizations (Gates & Hill, 1995). This is contradictory to public organizations that are generally more prone to be supervised by legislators and some independent



organizations. Also, NGOs are known to develop specialized efforts and specific roles, sometimes in the form of focusing on limited issues or limited problem areas, such as gearing services to particular groups of people or to certain locations. This can have adverse effects, as a more complete understanding of public policy issues and problems may require a broader, more general scope of vision, activities, and efforts (Hayes, 1996).

### 3. Literature related to altruism and civic consciousness.

Altruism and civic consciousness are part of the interest in this study, since they are a source of motivation for people to increase their roles in public policy. Schwartz (1970, 1973) and Herberlein (1971) found that prosocial behaviors are a result of two main factors, which are an awareness of consequences of those behaviors (AC) and an ascription of responsibility (AR) or a sense of personal responsibility in pursuing such behaviors. Therefore, most of the time, prosocial acts take place as people realize social benefits as a result of those acts and as people bring the responsibility in pursuing the acts toward themselves rather than pushing it to other people. Sangiampongsa (1995) found that there is also the perception of costs in pro-environmental behaviors, as another factor that determines people's environmental behaviors. The present study will examine AR as well as the perception of costs in some prosocial behaviors among those working in public organizations and NGOs, while leaving out AC, since most middle class people should already be well aware of benefits of prosocial behaviors to the society.

### 4. Literature related to environmental and welfare policy issues.

Perhaps similar to most countries, the environmental degradation and resource depletion, while becoming an important policy issue in Thailand, have caught interest of more people, especially the middle class. In the Thai NGOs, most of their staff come from the educated, middle class background, sitting somewhere on the divide between the elitist decision makers and rural, grassroots, marginal people (Hirsch, 1997). With the interest and movement of the environmental NGOs in environmental policy, the Thai political climate has changed for the past few decades,

whereby coalitions of interests are formed among the NGOs and the grassroots people to articulate and pressure demands on environmental issues. The environmental movement among NGOs and their coalition is mainly due to the fact that people's lives are affected as a result of many governmental projects, such as dam constructions and conservation forests. This movement in the non-state sector has gained political significance, as some of its success could be witnessed, such as campaigns to prevent construction of Nam Choan Dam and Kaeng Krung Dam (Jumbala & Mitprasart, 1997). Occasionally confrontation, conflict, and sometimes violence take place between NGOs and governmental agencies such as pollution control agencies and some public enterprises. Recent cases of conflict are, for example, waste water treatment projects, dam constructions, and the building of Thai-Malaysian natural gas pipelines as well as the construction of natural gas separation factories (Thabchumpon, 1997).

For the public welfare, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare as well as other related agencies such as certain divisions and departments of the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health are mainly responsible for this type of public policy. But many NGOs such as Duang Prateep Foundation and Foundation for Children are also known to deliver some welfare services to those in need, such as disadvantaged children and women. Unlike welfare states in European countries and the U.S., Thailand has traditionally relied on family and friends for such welfare as the caring for the young, the elderly, and the disabled (Vatikiotis, 1996). As such, social welfare services delivered mainly by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, albeit increasing steadily from the past, has rarely been sufficient. Perhaps, the large number of NGOs focusing on welfare issues and services are the result of inadequate governmental services. Crone (1993) states that a redistribution policy by all means confronts and displeases certain portions of socioeconomic elites. Therefore, redistribution is by nature difficult for any state, in that it must possess both the intention and political capacity to challenge powerful group interests in the relocation of their wealth to the poorer people. In the mean time, when the capacity and intention are difficult to find, the reliance of welfare on friends and family as well as on NGOs likely continues in Thailand, along with other non-

welfare states. Midgley (1993) discusses the problems in social welfare implementation in the Third World countries, whereby social security programs fail to reach the vast majority of the population living in conditions of poverty and deprivation. Midgley suggests that more innovative approaches that possibly differ from the western welfare system should be explored.



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## Procedure and Methods

The strength of this study is its empirical research on NGOs by, on one dimension, comparing them to related governmental agencies and, on another dimension, the comparison of environmental and welfare policy areas. The comparative study should enhance the understanding of NGOs as an organizational type as well as their roles in the two policy areas. The comparisons in organizational characteristics and policy involvement among organizations could perhaps be made by gathering such information from those employed in the organizations. This is, therefore, the study of organizations based on the views and perceptions of employees in public organizations and NGOs that are involved with environmental and welfare policy areas as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The main model of the study.

Types of organizations Policy areas	Public organizations	NGOs
Environment	<u>Quadrant 1</u> n = 60 mean (DVs) = SD =	<u>Quadrant 3</u> n = 60 mean (DVs) = SD =
Welfare	<u>Quadrant 2</u> n = 60 mean (DVs) = SD =	<u>Quadrant 4</u> n = 60 mean (DVs) = SD =

Note : n = number of respondents / samples.

mean (DVs) = means of dependent variables, as listed in the section of Survey

Instrument and Variables.

SD = standard deviation.

## Sampling

Organizational employees were sampled from the following four types of organizations and policy areas corresponding to the main model of the study illustrated in Figure 1.

1. Sixty samples were randomly selected from employees involving with program implementation in the following public organizations that deal with environmental issues. (Quadrant 1 in Figure 1).

- Urban Environmental and Area Planning Division (Office of Environmental Policy and Planning, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment).
- International Environmental Affairs Division (Office of Environmental Policy and Planning, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment).
- Natural and Cultural Heritage Conservation Division (Office of Environmental Policy and Planning, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment).
- Environmental Information Division (Department of Environmental Quality Promotion, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment).
- Factory Environmental Technology Bureau (Department of Industrial Works, Ministry of Industry).
- Hazardous Substances Control Bureau (Department of Industrial Work, Ministry of Industry).
- Environment Division (Department of Mineral Resources, Ministry of Industry).
- Water Quality Management Division (Pollution Control Department, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment).
- Air Quality and Noise Management Division (Pollution Control Department, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment).

- Pollution Management Coordination division (Pollution Control Department, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment).
- Bureau of Energy Regulation and Conservation (Department of Energy Development and Promotion, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment).
- Forest Enforcement Research Division (Royal Forest Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives).
- Watershed Management Division (Royal Forest Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives).
- Fishery Planning and Policy Division (Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives).
- Marine Fisheries Division (Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives).
- Fish Inspection and Quality Control (Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives).

2. Sixty samples were randomly selected from employees involving with program implementation in the following public organizations that deal with social welfare issues. (Quadrant 2 in Figure 1).

- Payathai Shelter for Girls (Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare).
- Center for the Elderly's Social Welfare, Din Daeng (Same).
- Payathai Shelter for Infants (Same).
- Shelter for Adolescents (Same).
- Ratchavithee Shelter for Girls (Same).
- Thanyaburi Shelter for Women (Same).
- Thanyaburi Shelter for the Homeless (Same).
- Rangsit Shelter for Infants (Same).
- Center for Job Training for the Handicapped (Same).
- Center for Women, Central Region (Same).



- Pakkret Shelter for Infants (Same).
- Nonthaburi Shelter for the Homeless (Same).
- Pakkret Shelter for Boys (Same).
- Shelter for Handicapped Infants (Same).
- Shelter for Mentally-Disabled Infants (Same).
- Office of Public Welfare, Area 2 – Din Daeng (Same).
- Office of the Secretary (The Office of Accelerated Rural Development, Ministry of Interior).
- Planning and Project Division (The Office of Accelerated Rural Development, Ministry of Interior).
- Research and Evaluation Division (The Office of Accelerated Rural Development, Ministry of Interior).
- Child Welfare protection Division (Department of public Welfare, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare).
- Skills Development Promotion Division (Department of Skills Development, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare).
- Labor and Social Welfare Studies Bureau (Office of the Permanent Secretary for Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare).
- Women and Child Labor Division (Department of Labor Protection and Welfare, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare).
- General Affairs Division (Office of the Permanent Secretary for Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare).
- Department of Employment (Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare).

3. Sixty samples were randomly selected from employees involving with program implementation in the following NGOs that deal with environmental issues. (Quadrant 3 in Figure 1).

- Local Development Institute.

- Green World Foundation.
- Thailand Environment Foundation.
- Thai Institute for Rural Development.
- The Environment and Community Development Association.
- Recycle Paper for Trees.
- Environmental Engineers Association of Thailand.
- Rajchapruk Project Foundation.
- Appropriate Technology Association.
- Media Center for Development.
- The Foundation of the Protection of Environment and Tourism.
- Friends of Asian Elephants.
- Sueb Nakhasathien Foundation.
- Wildlife Fund Thailand under the Royal Patronage of H.M. the Queen.
- Alternative Energy for Projects for Sustainability.
- Network for Rights to the Thai Wisdom.
- Agricultural Certification of Thailand.
- Foundation for Anti Air Pollution and Environmental Protection.
- Y.M.C.A. Bangkok.
- Project for Ecological Recovery.

4. Sixty samples were randomly selected from employees involving with program implementation in the following NGOs that deal with social welfare issues. (Quadrant 4 in Figure 1).

- Foundation for Women.
- Group for Development and Education for Children.
- The Center for the Protection of Children's Rights.
- Sikkha Asia Foundation.
- Duang Prateep Foundation.
- Welcome House : AIDS Response Program.
- Saeng Tien Group Foundation.

- Arom Pongpangan Foundation.
- Care – Thailand.
- Path – Thailand.
- Urban Community Foundation.
- Foundation for Thailand Rural Restoration Movement under Royal Patronage.
- Foundation for Children.
- Holt Sahathai Foundation.
- Friends of All Children Foundation.
- Dr. Sem Foundation.
- Sos Foundation of Thailand under the Royal Patronage of H.M. the Queen.
- World Vision Foundation of Thailand.

#### Survey Instrument and Variables

This study employs a survey instrument as the method for data collection. Such instrument was designed particularly for the present study in order to gather appropriate information in accordance with the study's objectives. The information which becomes variables in the study comprises organizational characteristics, organizational roles and inter-organizational relationship in the public policy process, and altruism / civic consciousness among those employed in the organizations. The survey instrument was pretested one time with the evening, graduate class of the Master of Public Administration Program at Faculty of Political Science. The majority of the students are public officials in various areas of civil service and public enterprises. The main purpose of the pretest was to increase the clarity and conciseness of the statements and questions in the instrument. The pretest result shows that the respondents spent approximately ten to fifteen minutes in completing the questionnaire. A revision of the questionnaire was made using the suggestions of respondents in the pretest, with an expectation that the revised instrument comprises clear statements and questions. Graduate students at the Department of Government, Faculty of Political Science were



hired and instructed to take the survey instrument with a cover-letter to the selected organizations and return with completed questionnaires.

The questionnaire with a cover-letter is located in the appendix of this report. The first part of questionnaire comprises general, background information of respondents. The second part of the survey consists of fifty-two items of statements / questions which quantitatively assess or measure variables, becoming the dependent variables in the study. Each of 52 items has the measurement scale of one to seven, provided on its right side. Respondents were instructed to select only one response from the one to seven scale for each item. Variables are composed from the items by a series of summation among the items. Variables, their measurement, scale, and meanings are listed in Table 1.

Table 1

Variables, Measurement, Scale, and Meanings

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1. Variable = Formal.

Measurement : Items 1 – 3 : Maximum possible score =  $7 * 3 = 21$

Minimum possible score =  $1 * 3 = 3$

Item 1 : หน่วยงานของท่านให้ความสำคัญแก่ภาพลักษณ์ของหน่วยงาน

Item 2 : หน่วยงานของท่านมีระเบียบแบบแผน การปฏิบัติงาน

Item 3 : หน่วยงานของท่าน มีลำดับชั้นการบังคับบัญชา (เจ้านาย – ลูกน้อง)

Scale : มาก / ชัดเจน (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย / ไม่ชัดเจน (1)

Meaning : The level of formalization / internal control in the organization.

7 = High level of formalization / internal control.

1 = Low level of formalization / internal control.

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2. Variable = Commit.

Measurement : Items 4 – 6 : Maximum possible score =  $7 * 3 = 21$

Minimum possible score =  $1 * 3 = 3$

(Table 1 continued)

Item 4 : ท่านรู้สึกรักหน่วยงานที่ท่านปฏิบัติงานอยู่

Item 5 : ท่านมีความผูกพันกับหน่วยงานที่ท่านปฏิบัติงานอยู่

Item 6 : ท่านพยายามปกป้องหน่วยงานของท่าน เมื่อมีผู้วิจารณ์หน่วยงานของท่าน

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Commitment of employees in the organization.

7 = High level of commitment.

1 = Low level of commitment.

### 3. Variable = Reward.

Measurement : Items 7 – 10 : Maximum possible score =  $7 * 4 = 28$

Minimum possible score =  $1 * 4 = 4$

Item 7 : ท่านรู้สึกว่า มีแรงจูงใจที่ทำให้ท่านอยากปฏิบัติงานที่หน่วยงานของท่าน

Item 8 : ท่านชอบทำงานเพื่อสาธารณประโยชน์

Item 9 : ท่านรู้สึกว่า งานของท่านมีความสำคัญแก่สังคม

Item 10 : ท่านรู้สึกมีความมั่นคง ในหน้าที่การงาน

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Sense of personal reward that employees receive at work.

7 = Sense of high reward.

1 = Sense of low reward.

### 4. Variable = Effective.

Measurement : Items 11 – 12 : Maximum possible score =  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score =  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 11 : หน่วยงานของท่านบรรลุเป้าหมายของหน่วยงานที่ได้ตั้งไว้

Item 12 : หน่วยงานของท่านช่วยแก้ไขปัญหาสังคม

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Organizational effectiveness / goal achievement.

7 = High level of effectiveness / High level of goal achievement.

1 = Low level of effectiveness / High level of goal achievement.

(Table 1 continued)

5. Variable = Efficient.

Measurement : Items 13 – 14 : Maximum possible score =  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score =  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 13 : หน่วยงานของท่าน ประหยัดงบประมาณในการปฏิบัติงาน

Item 14 : ผลที่ได้รับจากการปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน คำนึงถึงงบประมาณที่ใช้ไป

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Organization, operational efficiency / Cost effectiveness.

7 = High level of efficiency.

1 = Low level of efficiency.

6. Variable = Accountable.

Measurement : Items 15 – 18 : Maximum possible score =  $7 * 4 = 28$

Minimum possible score =  $1 * 4 = 4$

Item 15 : สังคมตรวจสอบการปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน

Item 16 : หน่วยงานอื่น ตรวจสอบการปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน

Item 17 : หน่วยงานของท่าน มีกฎหมายควบคุมการปฏิบัติงาน

Item 18 : สังคม ตั้งความหวังกับการปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Accountability of the organization to society / External control.

7 = High level of accountability.

1 = Low level of accountability.

7. Variable = Flexible.

Measurement : Items 19 – 20 : Maximum possible score =  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score =  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 19 : หน่วยงานของท่าน สามารถเปลี่ยนแปลงการปฏิบัติงานให้เข้ากับสถานการณ์

Item 20 : เมื่อมีเรื่องด่วน หน่วยงานของท่าน ปฏิบัติการตอบสนองด้วยความรวดเร็ว

Scale : เห็นด้วย (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  ไม่เห็นด้วย (1)



(Table 1 continued)

Meaning : Organizational, operational flexibility / Extent of adaptability.

7 = High level of flexibility.

1 = Low level of flexibility.

8. Variable = Multiple.

Measurement : Items 21 – 22 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 21 : การปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน มีหลายเป้าหมาย

Item 22 : การปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน เกี่ยวข้องสัมพันธ์กับหลายกลุ่มคน

Scale : เห็นด้วย (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  ไม่เห็นด้วย (1)

Meaning : Multiple goals of an organization.

7 = An organization has multiple goals.

1 = An organization does not have many goals.

9. Variable = Conflict.

Measurement : Items 23 – 24 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 23 : หน่วยงานของท่าน มีหลายเป้าหมายที่ขัดแย้งกัน

Item 24 : หน่วยงานของท่าน พบกับความต้องการที่แตกต่างกันของหลายกลุ่มคน

Scale : เห็นด้วย (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  ไม่เห็นด้วย (1)

Meaning : Conflicting goals of an organization.

7 = An organization has conflicting goals.

1 = An organization does not have conflicting goals.

10. Variable = Interest.

Measurement : Items 25 – 26 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 25 : หน่วยงานของท่านปฏิบัติงาน โดยเน้นผลที่จะเกิดขึ้นแก่ประเทศเป็นหลัก

Item 26 : ในการปฏิบัติงาน ควรให้ความสำคัญกับผลที่จะเกิดขึ้นแก่ประเทศ มากกว่าท้องถิ่น

Scale : เห็นด้วย (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  ไม่เห็นด้วย (1)

(Table 1 continued)

Meaning : Focus of an organization on national versus local interests.

7 = An organization emphasizes national interests.

1 = An organization emphasizes local interests.

11. Variable = Vague.

Measurement : Items 27 – 29 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 3 = 21$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 3 = 3$

Item 27 : ท่านเข้าใจเป้าหมายของหน่วยงานของท่าน

Item 28 : หน่วยงานของท่าน มีการดำเนินงานที่ประเมินความสำเร็จได้ลำบาก

Item 29 : การปฏิบัติงานในหน่วยงานของท่าน มีเป้าหมายระบุไว้เป็นรูปธรรมชัดเจน

Scale : มาก / เห็นด้วย (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย / ไม่เห็นด้วย (1)

(Scale for Items 27 and 29 is reversed.)

Meaning : Vagueness of organizational goals.

7 = An organization has vague goals.

1 = An organization has clear goals.

12. Variable = Corruption.

Measurement : Item 52 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 1 = 7$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 1 = 1$

Item 52 : ท่านคิดว่าการคอร์รัปชัน ภายในหน่วยงานของท่าน

Scale : เห็นด้วย (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  ไม่เห็นด้วย (1)

Meaning : Corruption in an organization.

7 = High extent of corruption in an organization.

1 = Low extent of corruption in an organization.

13. Variable = Relation.

Measurement : Items 30 – 32 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 3 = 21$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 3 = 3$

Item 30 : มีการปฏิบัติงานร่วมกัน ระหว่างหน่วยงานภาครัฐกับ NGOs

Item 31 : มีการแลกเปลี่ยนข้อมูลในการปฏิบัติงาน ระหว่างหน่วยงานภาครัฐกับ NGOs

Item 32 : มีการช่วยเหลือกัน ระหว่างหน่วยงานภาครัฐกับ NGOs

(Table 1 continued)

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Relationship between public organizations and NGOs.

7 = High level of relationship.

1 = Low level of relationship.

14. Variable = Roles.

Measurement : Items 33 – 35 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 3 = 21$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 3 = 3$

Item 33 : หน่วยงานของท่าน มีโอกาสนำเสนอประเด็นปัญหาสังคมที่ควรได้รับการแก้ไข

Item 34 : หน่วยงานของท่าน มีโอกาสผลักดันร่างกฎหมาย

Item 35 : หน่วยงานของท่าน มีบทบาทดำเนินงานเพื่อสาธารณประโยชน์

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Organizational roles in public policy.

7 = High level of organizational roles in the public policy process.

1 = Low level of organizational roles in the public policy process.

15. Variable = Limit.

Measurement : Items 36 – 37 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 36 : หน่วยงานของท่านพบข้อจำกัดด้านกฎหมาย ในการปฏิบัติงาน

Item 37 : หน่วยงานของท่านพบข้อจำกัดด้านการเงิน ในการปฏิบัติงาน

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Work limitation / constraints of an organization

7 = High level of work limitation / constraints while operating.

1 = Low level of work limitation / constraints while operating.

16. Variable = Perception.

Measurement : Items 38 – 40 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 3 = 21$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 3 = 3$



(Table 1 continued)

Item 38 : NGOs เป็นทางเลือกในการปฏิบัติงานของภาครัฐ

Item 39 : NGOs สามารถช่วยแบ่งเบาภาระงานของภาครัฐ

Item 40 : มีความจำเป็นต้องปฏิบัติงานร่วมกัน ในระหว่างภาครัฐและ NGOs

Scale : เห็นด้วย (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  ไม่เห็นด้วย (1)

Meaning : Perception / attitude toward NGOs.

7 = Good perception toward NGOs.

1 = Not very good perception toward NGOs.

17. Variable = Relation-society.

Measurement : Items 41 – 43 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 3 = 21$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 3 = 3$

Item 41 : หน่วยงานของท่าน มีความคุ้นเคยกับปัญหาสังคม

Item 42 : การปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน สอดคล้องกับความต้องการของประชาชน

Item 43 : สังคมให้การสนับสนุนการปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Relationship between organization with the society.

7 = Good relationship between organization and society.

1 = Not very good relation between organization and society.

18. Variable = Innovation.

Measurement : Items 44 – 45 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 44 : หน่วยงานของท่าน มีการทดลองสิ่งใหม่ ๆ ภายในขอบข่ายงานที่ทำ

Item 45 : ตัวท่านเอง มีการทดลองสิ่งใหม่ ๆ ในการปฏิบัติงาน

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Innovation / Initiation / risk taking of an organization.

7 = High level of innovation.

1 = Low level of innovation.

(Table 1 continued)

19. Variable = Behavior.

Measurement : Items 46 – 47 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 46 : ท่านแยกขยะ เพื่อประโยชน์ในการนำวัสดุบางอย่างกลับมาใช้ใหม่

Item 47 : ท่านพยายามรักษาความสะอาดในที่สาธารณะ

Scale : มาก (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  น้อย (1)

Meaning : Prosocial behaviors of organizational employees.

7 = High level of prosocial behaviors.

1 = Low level of prosocial behaviors.

20. Variable = AR (Ascription of responsibility).

Measurement : Items 48 – 49 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 48 : ท่านถือเป็นหน้าที่ของท่านที่ต้องแยกขยะ เพื่อนำวัสดุบางอย่างกลับมาใช้ใหม่

Item 49 : ท่านถือเป็นหน้าที่ของท่าน ที่ต้องรักษาความสะอาดในที่สาธารณะ

Scale : เห็นด้วย (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  ไม่เห็นด้วย (1)

Meaning : The extent of AR.

7 = High AR / Accepting the responsibility of pursuing prosocial acts.

1 = Low AR / Not accepting the responsibility of prosocial acts .

21. Variable = Cost.

Measurement : Items 50 – 51 : Maximum possible score :  $7 * 2 = 14$

Minimum possible score :  $1 * 2 = 2$

Item 50 : การแยกขยะเพื่อนำวัสดุบางอย่างกลับมาใช้ใหม่ เป็นภาระหนักสำหรับท่าน

Item 51 : การรักษาความสะอาดในที่สาธารณะ เป็นภาระหนักสำหรับท่าน

Scale : เห็นด้วย (7)  $\longleftrightarrow$  ไม่เห็นด้วย (1)

Meaning : Perception of costs in prosocial behaviors.

7 = Perceiving prosocial acts as costly or a burden in some ways.

1 = Not perceiving prosocial acts as costly or a burden.

Variables from Table 1 comprise dependent variables entering a series of two-way analyses of variance. There are two independent variables in the analyses. One is organizational types (Organizations), varying between public organizations and NGOs. The other one is types of policy (Policy), varying between environment and welfare.



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## Result

### Study Samples : General characteristics

Sample of the study consists of respondents who are employees involving with program implementation in randomly selected public organizations and NGOs in environmental and welfare policy areas. With the total sample size of 240 respondents, they are categorized for the purpose of comparative analyses into four sub-samples, each consisting of sixty respondents. For the demographic characteristics of the whole sample, there are 57 male and 183 female respondents. Since the study asked for a cooperation from employees in the selected organizations, they could freely decline to respond to the survey. And other respondents were asked to participate in the study, so that each sub-sample has a total of sixty respondents. As such, it seems that female employees were more cooperative in making themselves available for the study than do male employees. The mean age and the mean length of time in the organizations among the respondents are 33.31 years (SD = 8.95) and 5.75 years (SD = 6.06), respectively. A majority of respondents or 66 percent (159 respondents) hold an undergraduate degree, while 18 percent (43 respondents) have certificates, professional, professional training, or other diplomas below an undergraduate degree. Sixteen percent (38 respondents) hold advanced degrees, that are above undergraduate degrees.

### Variables in the study

Variables are assessed by the questionnaire items. The items were grouped by series of summation to form variables for further analyses. Table 2 lists means and standard deviations of each variable as well as their maximum and minimum possible scores. These latter scores are the highest and lowest possible values that a respondent can indicate for each variable. They are listed in Table 2 for the purpose of their comparison to the mean value of each variable. Each variable's mean can, then, be preliminarily judged whether it has a high or a low value, as compared to its maximum and minimum possible scores. As one may expect, respondents tend to reply in the positive direction of a variable, which is usually true for variables that possess

conspicuous negative or positive connotations. For instance, high levels of efficiency (Efficient), effectiveness (Effective), and commitment toward an organization (Commit) are reported, resulting in high mean values of 10.54 (SD = 2.32), 11.10 (SD = 11.85), and 17.30 (SD = 3.18), respectively, as compared to the maximum and minimum possible scores of these variables. By the same token, a low level of corruption in organizations (Corruption) is reported with the mean of 2.71 (SD = 1.86), in comparison to the maximum possible score of 7.0 for this variable. On the other hand, for variables with somewhat neutral implications, such as national versus local interests (Interest), the mean responses are usually located around the midpoint between the maximum and minimum possible scores. With a debatable issue of whether an organization will place an emphasis on national or local interests while operating, the mean result of 8.10 (SD = 3.35) for this variable is around mid-way between maximum and minimum possible scores. However, the judgement of a low or a high mean is usually subjective and could be debated endlessly. The comparative nature of this study will help make this kind of judgement more objective.

Table 2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Maximum and Minimum Possible Scores of Variables

Variables	Mean	SD	Maximum possible	Minimum possible
1. Formal	16.38	3.11	21.00	3.00
2. Commit	17.30	3.18	21.00	3.00
3. Reward	23.17	3.48	28.00	4.00
4. Effective	11.10	1.85	14.00	2.00
5. Efficient	10.54	2.32	14.00	2.00
6. Accountable	20.50	4.38	28.00	4.00
7. Flexible	11.46	1.99	14.00	2.00
8. Multiple	11.30	2.27	14.00	2.00
9. Conflict	8.53	2.85	14.00	2.00
10. Interest	8.10	3.35	14.00	2.00

(Table 2 continued)

Variables	Means	SD	Maximum possible	Minimum possible
11. Vague	9.03	2.91	21.00	3.00
12. Corruption	2.71	1.86	7.00	1.00
13. Relation	14.73	4.74	21.00	3.00
14. Roles	15.48	4.02	21.00	3.00
15. Limit	10.04	2.46	14.00	2.00
16. Perception	15.75	4.03	21.00	3.00
17. Relation-society	16.75	3.16	21.00	3.00
18. Innovation	9.43	2.72	14.00	2.00
19. Behaviors	11.30	2.39	14.00	2.00
20. AR	11.94	2.16	14.00	2.00
21. Cost	5.58	3.33	14.00	2.00

#### Results of two-way analyses of variance (Two-Way ANOVAs)

It is the intention of this study to explore similarities and / or differences between organizational types (Organization) and policy areas (Policy), the independent variables, and their effects on dependent variables. Table 3 shows the results of twenty-one factorial ANOVAs, while Table 4 shows means and standard deviations of those dependent variables in each category of organizational and policy type.



Table 3

Results of Two-Way ANOVAs for Twenty-One Dependent Variables by Organization and Policy

Dependent variables /				
Source	df	SS	MS	F
1. <u>Formal.</u>				
Organization (O)	1	69.34	69.34	7.30 **
Policy (P)	1	1.50	1.50	.16 ns
O * P	1	.20	.20	.02 ns
Error (Residual)	236	2241.45	9.50	
2. <u>Commit.</u>				
Organization (O)	1	82.84	82.84	8.49 **
Policy (P)	1	14.50	14.50	1.49 ns
O * P	1	21.00	21.00	2.15 ns
Error (Residual)	236	2301.65	9.75	
3. <u>Reward.</u>				
Organization (O)	1	47.70	47.70	4.11 *
Policy (P)	1	92.50	92.50	7.96 **
O * P	1	3.50	3.50	.30 ns
Error (Residual)	236	2742.28	11.62	
4. <u>Effective.</u>				
Organization (O)	1	30.10	30.10	9.45 **
Policy (P)	1	39.20	39.20	12.31 **
O * P	1	.00	.00	.00 ns
Error (Residual)	236	751.48	3.18	

(Table 3 continued)

Dependent variables /				
Source	df	SS	MS	F
5. <u>Efficient.</u>				
Organization (O)	1	75.94	75.94	14.91 **
Policy (P)	1	5.10	5.10	1.00 ns
O * P	1	2.60	2.60	.51 ns
Error (Residual)	236	1202.02	5.09	
6. <u>Account.</u>				
Organization (O)	1	33.00	33.00	1.74 ns
Policy (P)	1	.94	.94	.05 ns
O * P	1	69.34	69.34	3.65 as ( $p = .057$ )
Error (Residual)	236	4486.72	19.01	
7. <u>Flexible.</u>				
Organization (O)	1	7.00	7.00	1.78 ns
Policy (P)	1	.04	.04	.01 ns
O * P	1	5.10	5.10	1.29 ns
Error (Residual)	236	931.52	3.95	
8. <u>Multiple.</u>				
Organization (O)	1	.94	.94	.18 ns
Policy (P)	1	1.50	1.50	.29 ns
O * P	1	.34	.34	.07 ns
Error (Residual)	236	1229.22	5.21	
9. <u>Conflict.</u>				
Organization (O)	1	324.34	324.34	47.45 **
Policy (P)	1	.20	.20	.03 ns
O * P	1	.10	.10	.02 ns
Error (Residual)	236	1613.15	6.84	

(Table 3 continued)

Dependent variables /				
Source	df	SS	MS	F
<b>10. Interest.</b>				
Organization (O)	1	185.50	185.50	17.90 **
Policy (P)	1	.00	.00	.00 ns
O * P	1	51.34	51.34	4.95 *
Error (Residual)	236	2445.55	10.36	
<b>11. Vague.</b>				
Organization (O)	1	96.27	96.27	12.38 **
Policy (P)	1	93.75	93.75	12.06 **
O * P	1	.42	.42	.05 ns
Error (Residual)	236	1835.30	7.78	
<b>12. Corruption.</b>				
Organization (O)	1	203.50	203.50	78.81 **
Policy (P)	1	4.54	4.54	1.76 ns
O * P	1	7.70	7.70	2.98 as (P = .085)
Error (Residual)	236	609.42	2.58	
<b>13. Relation.</b>				
Organization (O)	1	448.27	448.27	22.38 **
Policy (P)	1	205.35	205.35	10.25 **
O * P	1	.42	.42	.02 ns
Error (Residual)	236	4726.90	20.03	
<b>14. Roles.</b>				
Organization (O)	1	180.27	180.27	11.61 **
Policy (P)	1	4.82	4.82	.31 ns
O * P	1	18.15	18.15	1.17 ns
Error (Residual)	236	3664.70	15.53	



(Table 3 continued)

Dependent variables /				
Source	df	SS	MS	F
<b>15. <u>Limit.</u></b>				
Organization (O)	1	53.20	53.20	9.10 **
Policy (P)	1	10.84	10.84	1.85 ns
O * P	1	5.10	5.10	.87 ns
Error (Residual)	236	1379.52	5.85	
<b>16. <u>Perception.</u></b>				
Organization (O)	1	324.34	324.34	22.85 **
Policy (P)	1	196.20	196.20	13.82 **
O * P	1	14.50	14.50	1.02 ns
Error (Residual)	236	3350.45	14.20	
<b>17. <u>Relation-society.</u></b>				
Organization (O)	1	52.27	52.27	5.77 *
Policy (P)	1	194.40	194.40	21.45 **
O * P	1	1.67	1.67	.18 ns
Error (Residual)	236	2138.67	9.06	
<b>18. <u>Innovation.</u></b>				
Organization (O)	1	93.75	93.75	13.41 **
Policy (P)	1	16.02	16.02	2.29 ns
O * P	1	6.67	6.67	.95 ns
Error (Residual)	236	1650.50	6.99	
<b>19. <u>Behaviors.</u></b>				
Organization (O)	1	46.82	46.82	8.60 **
Policy (P)	1	28.02	28.02	5.14 *
O * P	1	.27	.27	.05 ns
Error (Residual)	236	1285.30	5.45	

(Table 3 continued)

Dependent variables /				
Source	df	SS	MS	F
<b>20. AR.</b>				
Organization (O)	1	9.20	9.20	1.99 ns
Policy (P)	1	7.00	7.00	1.51 ns
O * P	1	6.34	6.34	1.37 ns
Error (Residual)	236	1091.52	4.63	
<b>21. Cost.</b>				
Organization (O)	1	34.50	34.50	3.13 as (p = .078)
Policy (P)	1	14.50	14.50	1.31 ns
O * P	1	.34	.34	.03 ns
Error (Residual)	236	2605.15	11.04	

\* p < .05      \*\* p < .01  
 ns p > .05      as p = approaching significance

Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations of 21 Dependent Variables by Organizational Types and Policy Areas

Dependent Variables	Policy areas	Organizational types				Group total	
		Public org		NGOs		Mean	SD
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
1. Formal	Environment	16.87	2.76	15.73	3.38	16.30	3.13
	Welfare	16.97	3.18	15.95	2.96	16.46	3.10
	Group total	16.92	2.97	15.84	3.17	16.38	3.11
2. Commit	Environment	16.17	3.74	17.93	2.56	17.05	3.31
	Welfare	17.25	3.34	17.83	2.70	17.54	3.04
	Group total	16.71	3.57	17.88	2.62	17.30	3.18

(Table 4 continued)

Dependent Variables	Policy areas	Organizational types				Group total	
		Public org		NGOs		Mean	SD
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
3. Reward	Environment	21.98	4.05	23.12	3.13	22.55	3.65
	Welfare	23.47	3.61	24.12	2.69	23.79	3.19
	Group total	22.73	3.89	23.62	2.95	23.17	3.47
4. Effective	Environment	10.33	1.77	11.05	1.81	10.69	1.82
	Welfare	11.15	2.07	11.85	1.42	11.50	1.81
	Group total	10.74	1.96	11.45	1.67	11.10	1.85
5. Efficient	Environment	10.02	2.14	11.35	2.02	10.68	2.17
	Welfare	9.93	2.68	10.85	2.14	10.39	2.46
	Group total	9.98	2.41	11.10	2.08	10.54	2.32
6. Accountable	Environment	21.47	3.78	19.65	4.46	20.56	4.22
	Welfare	20.27	4.94	20.60	4.17	20.43	4.56
	Group total	20.87	4.42	20.13	4.33	20.50	4.38
7. Flexible	Environment	11.13	1.93	11.77	2.12	11.45	2.04
	Welfare	11.45	2.15	11.50	1.72	11.48	1.94
	Group total	11.29	2.04	11.63	1.93	11.46	1.99
8. Multiple	Environment	11.40	1.89	11.35	2.47	11.38	2.19
	Welfare	11.32	2.24	11.12	2.48	11.22	2.36
	Group total	11.36	2.07	11.23	2.47	11.30	2.27



(Table 4 continued)

Dependent Variables	Policy areas	Organizational types				Group total	
		Public Org		NGOs		Mean	SD
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
9. Conflict	Environment	9.70	2.36	7.42	3.10	8.56	2.97
	Welfare	9.68	2.36	7.32	2.57	8.50	2.73
	Group total	9.69	2.35	7.37	2.83	8.53	2.85
10. Interest	Environment	9.45	3.06	6.77	3.44	8.11	3.51
	Welfare	8.52	3.13	7.68	3.23	8.10	3.20
	Group total	8.98	3.12	7.23	3.36	8.10	3.35
11. Vague	Environment	10.25	2.63	9.07	3.00	9.66	2.87
	Welfare	9.08	2.67	7.73	2.85	8.41	2.83
	Group total	9.67	2.70	8.40	2.99	9.03	2.91
12. Corruption	Environment	3.95	1.90	1.75	1.20	2.85	1.93
	Welfare	3.32	1.85	1.83	1.36	2.58	1.78
	Group total	3.63	1.90	1.79	1.28	2.71	1.86
13. Relation	Environment	12.40	5.15	15.22	4.74	13.81	5.13
	Welfare	14.33	4.57	16.98	3.20	15.66	4.15
	Group total	13.37	4.94	16.10	4.12	14.73	4.74
14. Roles	Environment	15.03	4.23	16.22	3.59	15.63	3.95
	Welfare	14.20	4.48	16.48	3.37	15.34	4.11
	Group total	14.62	4.35	16.35	3.47	15.48	4.02

(Table 4 continued)

Dependent Variables	Policy areas	Organizational types				Group total	
		Public Org		NGOs		Mean	SD
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
15. Limit	Environment	10.87	1.87	9.63	2.28	10.25	2.17
	Welfare	10.15	2.27	9.50	3.09	9.82	2.72
	Group total	10.51	2.10	9.57	2.70	10.04	2.46
16. Perception	Environment	13.43	4.25	16.25	3.89	14.84	4.29
	Welfare	15.73	3.79	17.57	3.04	16.65	3.54
	Group total	14.58	4.17	16.91	3.54	15.75	4.03
17. Relation-society	Environment	15.30	3.25	16.40	2.94	15.85	3.13
	Welfare	17.27	3.44	18.03	2.28	17.65	2.93
	Group total	16.28	3.48	17.22	2.74	16.75	3.16
18. Innovation	Environment	8.72	2.58	9.63	2.54	9.18	2.59
	Welfare	8.90	2.87	10.48	2.56	9.69	2.82
	Group total	8.81	2.72	10.06	2.58	9.43	2.72
19. Behaviors	Environment	11.23	2.37	12.05	2.37	11.64	2.40
	Welfare	10.48	2.40	11.43	2.18	10.96	2.33
	Group total	10.86	2.41	11.74	2.29	11.30	2.39
20. AR	Environment	11.75	2.45	12.47	1.83	12.11	2.18
	Welfare	11.73	2.15	11.80	2.13	11.77	2.13
	Group total	11.74	2.30	12.13	2.00	11.94	2.16

(Table 4 continued)

Dependent Variables	Policy areas	Organizational types				Group total	
		Public org		NGOs		Mean	SD
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
21. Cost	Environment	5.75	3.17	4.92	2.93	5.33	3.07
	Welfare	6.17	3.70	5.48	3.45	5.83	3.58
	Group total	5.96	3.43	5.20	3.20	5.58	3.33

#### Interaction Effects of Organization and Policy

It was expected that the results of two-way ANOVAs would display a number of two-way interactions between Organization and Policy on dependent variables. But only one significant interaction effect was found, with respect to Interest ( $F(1, 236) = 4.95, p < .05$ ). Two interaction effects were found to be approaching significance in two dependent variables – Accountable and Corruption ( $F(1, 236) = 3.65, p = .057$  and  $F(1, 236) = 2.98, p = .085$ , respectively). With such interaction effects, three diagrams are drawn with respect to these three dependent variables for a clearer picture of the effects.

**Figure 2.** Interaction between Organization and Policy with respect to Interest.

(Note : Refer to Table 4 at Variable Interest for means used in the diagram.)






Figure 2 shows an ordinal interaction between Organization and Policy with respect to Interest. Public organizations in both environmental and welfare policy areas place a higher emphasis on national interests than do NGOs in both of these policy areas. But as indicated in the diagram, the difference between public organizations and NGOs in their emphasis on national and local interests is much higher in environmental policy area than in welfare policy area. The simple main effect of Organization on environmental policy is highly significant ( $F(1, 236) = 20.79, p < .01$ ), while that on welfare policy is not significant ( $F(1, 236) = 2.04, p > .05$ ). These results suggest that in the environmental policy area, NGOs clash with public organizations, in terms of their focus on national or local interests.

**Figure 3.** Interaction between Organization and Policy with respect to Accountable.

(Note : Refer to Table 4 at Variable Accountable for means used in the diagram.)





Figure 3 illustrates a disordinal type of interaction between Organization and Policy with respect to Accountable. In environmental issue, public organizations reported a higher degree of accountability or external control than do NGOs, with a

corresponding simple main effect of  $F(1, 236) = 5.23, p < .05$ . In welfare policy issue, although NGOs reported facing a somewhat higher accountability than do public organizations, the simple main effect test does not show a significant result ( $F(1, 236) = .17, p > .05$ ). These results imply that public organizations must operate with a particularly high degree of public scrutiny in the area of environment.

Figure 4 shows another ordinal interaction between Organization and Policy, with respect to Corruption. The diagram indicates a higher report of corruption incidence in public organizations than in NGOs, regardless of public policy issues. This is why the main effect of Organization, as indicated in Table 3, is highly significant ( $F(1, 236) = 78.81, p < .05$ ). And the simple Organization main effect test shows significant results at both policy areas ( $F(1, 236) = 56.24, p < .01$  for the environment policy and  $F(1, 236) = 25.80, p < .01$  for welfare policy). Nevertheless, with an approaching significant two-way interaction effect between Organization and Policy ( $F(1, 236) = 2.98, p = .085$ ), as reported in Table 3 at the Variable Corruption, the corruption incidence in public organizations is less frequent in welfare policy.

Figure 4. Interaction between Organization and Policy with respect to Corruption.

(Note : Refer to Table 4 at Variable Corruption for means used in the diagram.)



There are no more significant interaction effects in the results of 21 two-way ANOVAs. Further focus is, henceforth, geared toward main effects in each of the two independent variables with respect to each dependent variable.

### Organization Main Effect

There are sixteen significant main effects and one approaching significant main effect of Organization with respect to the dependent variables. Fourteen of these main effects are highly significant beyond the .01 level. Table 3 exhibits particularly high F values with respect to Corruption, Conflict, Perception, and Relation. These results suggest that public organizations and NGOs differ significantly from each other in the incidence of corruption, the extent of conflicting goals of the organization, as well as on their perspectives toward NGOs and relationship between the two types of organizations. Table 5 summarizes significant main effects of Organization and their meanings in each dependent variable by looking at group total means or marginal means of public organizations and NGOs

Table 5

Significant Main Effects of Organization, with Marginal Means, F Values, Meaning of the Effects in Each Dependent Variable

Dependent Variables	F	Means (Organizations)		Meanings
		Public	NGOs	
Formal	7.30 **	16.92	15.84	Public organizations have a more formalized operation than do NGOs.
Commit	8.49 **	16.71	17.88	Employees in NGOs are more organizationally committed than those in public organizations.
Reward	4.11 **	22.73	23.62	Employees in NGOs feel more personally rewarded at work than do those in public organizations.



(Table 5 continued)

Dependent Variables	F	Means (Organizations)		Meaning
		Public	NGOs	
Effective	9.45 **	10.74	11.45	Effectiveness or reported goals Achievement is higher in NGOs than in public organizations.
Efficient	14.91 **	9.98	11.10	There is higher efficiency or cost effectiveness in the operation of NGOs than in public organizations.
Conflict	47.45 **	9.69	7.37	There are more conflicting goals in public organizations than in NGOs.
Interest	17.90 **	8.98	7.23	NGOs focus their operational results on local interests more than do public organizations .
Vague	12.38 **	9.67	8.40	Public organizations have goals that are more vague than do NGOs.
Corruption	78.81 **	3.63	1.79	There is a higher reported corruption in public organizations than in NGOs.
Relation	22.38 **	13.37	16.10	Employees in NGOs reported a working relationship between public organizations and NGOs more than those in public organizations.
Roles	11.61 **	14.62	16.35	People in NGOs feel that they have more roles in public policy than do those in public organizations.

(Table 5 continued)

Dependent Variables	F	Means (Organizations)		Meanings
		Public	NGOs	
Limit	9.10 **	10.51	9.57	Public organizations reported more work limitation than NGOs.
Perception	22.85 **	14.58	16.91	People in NGOs tend to see the significance of their roles, while those in public organizations do not perceive NGO's roles as very significant.
Relation-Society	5.77 *	16.28	17.22	NGOs tend to be more closely related to society than do public organizations.
Innovation	13.41 **	8.81	10.06	NGOs have a higher tendency toward innovation and risk taking than do public organizations.
Behaviors	8.60 **	10.86	11.74	People in NGOs behave more pro-socially than do those in public organizations.
Cost	3.13 as	5.96	5.20	People in NGOs perceive a lower cost in prosocial behaviors than do those in public organizations.

\* p < .05    \*\* p < .01    as approaching significance

### Policy Main Effect

There are seven Policy main effects indicated in Table 3. Such effects are more thoroughly described in Table 6, which lists group total means or marginal means of environmental and welfare policy areas, F values, as well as meanings of the effects, in accordance with each dependent variable.

Table 6  
Significant Main Effect of Policy, with Marginal Means, F Values, and the Meaning of  
Such Effect in Each Dependent Variable

Dependent Variables	F	Means (Policy areas)		Meanings
		Environment	Welfare	
Reward	7.96 **	22.55	23.79	Working in welfare organizations seems to be more rewarding than in environmental organizations.
Effective	12.31 **	10.69	11.50	Reported effectiveness or goals achievement is higher in welfare organizations than in environmental organizations.
Vague	12.06 **	9.66	8.41	Environmental organizations tend to have goals that are more vague than do welfare organizations.
Relation	10.25 **	13.81	15.66	There is a higher degree of reported relationship and cooperation between public organizations and NGOs in welfare organizations than in environmental organizations.
Perception	13.82 **	14.84	16.65	Welfare organizations have more positive attitude toward NGOs than do environmental organizations.
Relation- Society	21.45 **	15.85	17.65	Welfare organizations reported a closer relation to society than environmental organizations did.



(Table 6 continued)

Dependent Variables	F	Means (Policy areas)		Meanings
		Environment	Welfare	
Behaviors	5.14 **	11.64	10.96	People in environmental organizations tend to behave more pro-socially than do those in welfare organizations.

\*\* p < .01

### Zero-Order Correlations

Along with results of two-way ANOVAs, this section shows some of the interesting results of zero-order correlations between some pairs of variables in the study. These results are used to supplement the results of ANOVAs. For instance, organizations expressing work limitation tend to report a high level of conflicting goals (Pearson Correlation  $r(\text{Linit, Conflict}) = .21, p < .01$ ). Correspondingly, in the results of two-way ANOVA, public organizations reported a higher degree of work limitation and more conflicting goals than do NGOs. There is a negative correlation between conflicting goals of an organization and the level of effectiveness or a reported goal achievement in an organization (Pearson Correlation  $r(\text{Conflict, Effectiveness}) = -.21, p < .01$ ). Public organizations exhibit both conflicting goals and low level of effectiveness or goal achievement. Also, reported active roles in public policy tend to conform with a high level of initiation and risk taking (Pearson Correlation  $r(\text{Roles, Initiation}) = .30, p < .01$ ). From the two-way ANOVAs on these variables, NGOs reported a high level of both characteristics, in comparison with public organizations. In addition, organizations reporting a high relationship between public organizations and NGOs tend to have positive attitude and perception toward NGOs (Pearson Correlation  $r(\text{Relation, Perception}) = .47, p < .01$ ). Some other pairs of relationship between variables are shown in Table 7.

Table 7

Zero-Order Correlations in Some Pairs of Variables and Their Meanings

Variables (Pairs)	Correlation	
	r	Meanings
Vague, Conflict	.27 **	An organization with vague goals, more goal conflicts.
Role, Initiation	.30 **	More roles in public policy, more initiation.
Limit, Conflict	.21 **	More work limitation, higher extent of goal conflicts.
Role, Vague	-.14 *	More roles in public policy, less extent of vague goals.
Role, Reward	.13 *	More roles in public policy, more sense of reward among employees.
Formal, Account	.30 **	More formal an organization, more accountable it is to the public.
Interest, Corruption	.15 *	An organization with an emphasis on local interests, less corruption. An organization with an emphasis on national interest, more corruption.
Interest, Conflict	.21 **	More focus on national interest, more conflicting goals. More focus on local interest, less conflicting goals.
Interest, Limit	.17 **	More focus on national interest, more work limitation. More focus local interest, less work limitation.
Conflict, Corruption	.48 **	More conflicting goals, more corruption.
Conflict, Efficient	-.27 **	More conflicting goals, less efficiency.

(Table 7 continued)

Variables (Pairs)	Correlation	
	r	Meanings
Conflict, Effective	-.21 **	More conflicting goals, less effectiveness.
Perception, Relation	.47 **	More positive attitude toward NGOs, more reported relationship between public organizations and NGOs.
Perception, Interest	-.13 **	More positive attitude toward NGOs, more focus on local interest.
Relation-society, Accountable	.35 **	An organization with a closer relationship with society, more accountable it is to the public.
Relation-society, Role	.47 **	An organization with a closer relationship with society, more accountable it is to the public.
Relation-society, Perception	.35 **	An organization with a closer relationship with society, a more positive attitude it has toward NGOs.
Relation-society, Effective	.44 **	An organization with a closer relationship with society, more effective it is.
Role, Effective	.41 **	More reported role in public policy, more effective.
Role, Efficient	.21 **	More reported role in public policy, more efficient.
Commit, Reward	.70 **	More commitment in an organization, higher sense of reward among employees.
Commit, Behavior	.19 **	More commitment in an organization, more prosocial behaviors among employees.



(Table 7 continued)

Variables (Pairs)	Correlation	
	r	Meanings
Reward, Behavior	.19 **	More sense of reward from work, more prosocial behaviors among employees.
Commit, AR	.26 **	More commitment in an organization, higher AR among employees.
Reward, AR	.31 **	More sense of reward from work, higher AR among employees.

\* p &lt; .05

\*\* p &lt; .01

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## Discussion

The results of analyses mainly indicate both the effects of organizational and policy types on the series of dependent variables of interest. Therefore, further attempts are to interpret such significant effects.

### Types of Organizations and Public Policy in General

With more non-state types of organizations involving in public policy, this study brings NGOs more to our understanding, in relation to public organizations, through its empirical findings. Political Science and public policy literature has listed a variety of reasons for the increase in non-profit sector's roles in public policy. The state and for-profit sectors of the economy are known to exhibit certain unfavorable characteristics by their nature. The government, throughout the policy process, is usually caught in too high a level of politics and a tardy bureaucratic procedure. The for-profit sector or the market sector, on the other hand, needs a profit and money making incentive for its involvement in public service delivery through privatization. Without such incentive, the provision of some essential services will be lacking. The voluntary, altruistic, and philanthropic nature of NGOs could make services and roles of this sector an alternative in the public policy process. In addition, the present trend revolves around familiar terminologies such as globalization, privatization, good governance, inter-organizational networking, co-production of public policy, and more limited roles of the state (Rhodes, 1996; Hayes, 1996).

The present study provides empirical findings mainly on characteristics and roles of NGOs and public organizations as actors in the public policy process. Employees in NGOs seem to show a high commitment to their organizations. And they express a sense of rewarding work experience. NGOs seem to operate efficiently and effectively. As compared to public organizations, NGOs have a much less reported incidence of corruption. This trait, in particular, is usually considered promising and attractive in most Third World countries where corruption in the government is widely known and cited. NGOs, also reported a very active role throughout the policy process. They are more innovative and risk taking than are public organizations. NGOs also reported having a

close and productive relation with society, usually with more concern with local interests, as opposed to national interests. And in their own self-report, they see themselves as a significant actor in the public policy process. Their altruism is clearly shown in their prosocial behaviors and a low perception of cost in such behaviors. The altruism and other positive characteristics found in this study such as work commitment and close relation with society among NGOs could probably be explained by the fact that approximately half of the staff in the nonprofit organizations usually consists of volunteers. The proportion of employees' salaries in this sector's budget is, therefore, comparatively less than that of public employees' salaries in the public sector's budget (The Bureau of the Budget, 1997; National Statistical Office, 1997). In addition, the high levels of commitment and sense of reward are found by this study to be very closely related to the high level of altruism, as reflected in prosocial behaviors and ascribed responsibility. This study also found that people in NGOs are more altruistic than are those in public organizations, as suggested by their prosocial behaviors and perception of cost in such behaviors. Therefore, a large part of NGOs' commitment and sense of reward in their work throughout the public policy process is perhaps attributable to their altruism.

The empirical findings of this study could be added to the literature of previous research. Earlier studies on for-profit and voluntary organizations suggest the traits of efficiency, risk-taking and innovation, effectiveness, and clearer goals in these organizations as compared to their state counterpart (Raiman, Backoff, & Levine, 1976; Vakil, 1997). Nonprofit organizations are known to have an active role, operating alongside the government, in public policy. In policy implementation, the operation of non-state sector is believed to take a burden off the government in functions that could be performed by the non-state sector. Particularly when societal needs arise or when circumstances change such as during the time of increased incidence of illnesses such as the early times of HIV / AIDS epidemic, the need for new not-for-profit organizations were high, due to the unfamiliar nature and course of illness, its public perception, and types of people and families living with AIDS and HIV (Chambre, 1995; Lowry, 1995).



Berman and West (1995) describe the role of nonprofit organizations in the provision of homeless shelters. Increases in the need of emergency shelters provided by nonprofit organizations are due to, for instance, a high work load of community organizations, rises in unemployment, the scarcity of housing for low-income people, and the insufficient city funding for housing programs. Their study also found a higher satisfaction in the use of shelters that are provided by nonprofit organizations than those of state organizations.

The literature on nonprofit organizations also discusses their role in policy advocacy. These organizations help articulate interests, particularly those of the disadvantaged, in the policy formulation stage. They advocate for some public policies or policy changes. In Rinquist's study (1994), environmental groups are found to comprise an influence on the direction of state's water pollution policy. The roles of the environmental pressure groups, counterbalanced those of other organized interests such as the mining industry that desired weaker pollution control programs.

Other literature cites the working relationship between state and nonprofit sectors. Brown and Ashman (1996), for instance, study public program implementation in Africa and Asian countries with cooperation between state and nongovernmental actors. The cooperation between the two sectors helps lead to the program's success, as cooperation is regarded as an asset or social capital that usually increases the chances of program success. Berman and West (1995) also found various types of collaborative efforts between the government organizations and nonprofit organizations in the provision of programs for the homeless.

With the present study, one important focus is on the empirical differences and similarities of the state and NGOs. The analyses show more differences than similarities, with respect to the organizational characteristics of NGOs and public organizations. But the results of analyses also show important differences between the two that might imply their conflicting relations.

Firstly, the organizational attitudes and emphasis regarding national and local interests differ significantly. Public organizations in this study reported to pay more

attention to national interests than do NGOs. In fact, this finding should not be surprising, as NGOs are known to be particularistic, while public organizations seem to be more universal in their scope of operation (Hayes, 1996). NGOs, by their nature, tend to develop a specialist role and a focus on specific sets of public problems, issues, groups of people, or locations of operation. For example, some NGOs in Thailand operate only in certain localities, such as certain provinces. By the same token, certain NGOs focus their operation on certain groups, especially those with low visibility in society and public policy issues, such as autistic children, persons with multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy or cerebral palsy, the alcoholics, drug addicts, or ex-mental patients. The state, on the other hand, usually has to be concerned with a broader view of issues. With an increase in the shared roles in public policy, but also with the differences in focuses on national versus local interests, different attitudes, opinions, and even actions are the likely results, with respect to a particular public policy issue. For example, working on environmental issues from a national perspective and a local perspective might differ considerably. In fact, the debate on national versus local concern itself seems to be one important part of many environmental issues in Thailand. Effects of dam construction and natural gas pipelines from a national perspective and interest could contradict with local interest. While such projects can be illustrated to benefit the nation as a whole, they can also be shown to become a burden to the livelihood of local people. Such differences in national versus local emphases in interests can result in a clash and conflict between public organizations and NGOs.

Secondly, the extent of perceived relationship differs considerably between the two organizational types. NGOs tend to report a higher level of working relationship and, hence, a cooperation or willingness to cooperate. This difference might be due to the fact that public organizations used to have a monopolistic role in public policy. Part of that mentality perhaps still persists nowadays among public officials, making them feel less need to cooperate with NGOs. On the other hand, probably feeling as if they are given an opportunity to step into a new territory or the public policy process, NGOs tend to be more willing to cooperate.



Thirdly, and, perhaps most importantly, the perception regarding the significance in the roles of NGOs in public policy is different between NGOs and public organizations. As one might expect, NGOs would likely and do, in fact, see themselves and their role as significant throughout the public policy process. However, public organizations tend to see such role as less significant. Such view from public organizations could irritate NGOs, possibly producing conflict among themselves as working partners. It is also worthwhile to note that reported positive relationship between the two organizations goes along with perceived significance of NGOs.

Aside from these three differences in perception, the two organizational types also differ in many other aspects of comparisons, such as the degree of formality, efficiency, and effectiveness in operation. Such differences can imply that NGOs can complement or supplement some characteristics that are lacking in public organizations in sharing roles in the public policy process. But on the other hand, the differences can also imply a clash in attitude and opinion and, in turn in the operation of the two organizations. Foley and Edwards (1996) discuss two possible roles of the civil society. The first role is cooperative and, therefore, harmonious with the state. Such role is complementary or supplementary to that of the state. However, a more aggressive role of the civil society is that of a counter-weight or counter-balance to the state's roles. These latter roles are, for instance, the overseeing for a transparent and corruption-free government. This study found a relatively high incidence of corruption in the state sector. It also found a high public scrutiny or external control faced by public organizations particularly in environmental issues. Such scrutiny faced by state sector possibly comes from the counter-balancing role of the civil society, which has become stronger in Thailand. This second type of roles can be regarded as necessary in the process of democratization, since it could effectively assure a more transparent and corruption-free public sector. But this role likely results in confrontation and conflict between the state and civil society.

Despite the growing importance of the civil society and NGOs in public policy and even in international affairs as well as some tendency to demonize the state while



deify the civil society, one ought to realize limitations as well as advantages of all organizations. Public organizations are regularly viewed as a coercive type of organizations. This makes public organizations sound authoritative and negative (Uphoff, 1993; Wapner, 1995). But law enforcement is at times unavoidable. Part of environmental policy, for instance, is by nature coercive in its effort to curtail some behaviors that are environmentally harmful. The market incentive can be used only part of the time when situations allow the use of price mechanism to encourage or discourage some behaviors. Voluntary acts, such as pro-environmental behaviors, rely on mutual agreements and social pressure among members of a community or society. But results of such voluntary acts, albeit sounding attractive and liberal, are slow and, at times and places, unreliable. Coercive forces employed by the state, such as state's supervision or the imposition of fines for non-compliance to environmental laws and regulations assure more timely results (Uphoff, 1993). Even though this study empirically found positive characteristics of NGOs, such as effectiveness, efficiency, employees' commitment and sense of rewards, and less reported corruption, other traits are more neutral in nature, such as their less formalized organizational structure or less internal control than the public counterpart as well as their main focus of operation on local interests. It is more cumbersome to categorize such traits among NGOs as positive or negative. They are more likely seen as simply existing characteristics, similar to the existing formalized organizational structure and emphasis on national interests of public organizations.

Other scholars also discuss other limitations of non-profit organizations. In addition to particularism, the lack of democratic accountability is also listed as a possible drawback in the operation of NGOs in the public policy process (Gates & Hill, 1995; Hayes, 1996). Public organizations face control mechanisms such as supervision from parliamentary committees and subcommittees as well as from independent organizations, such as the Administrative Court and the Human Rights Committee. They also depend on budget appropriation through the parliament generally as their sole financial source. This makes budget control automatically possible from the elected

body toward public organizations. On the other hand, even though some NGOs receive some funding from the government, they generally can garner multiple funding sources, such as donation and contribution from their foreign and domestic affiliations. International organizations, such as UNICEF, UNESCO, and WHO, have supported Thai NGOs. Foreign NGOs, such as Terre des Hommes, also provide funding and other assistance to their affiliated Thai NGOs (Pongsapich & Kataleeradabhan, 1994). Generally seen as less corrupt, nonprofit organizations do not face similar kinds of supervisions as do state organizations. This present study finds a supporting evidence of this fact in the report of less organizational limitation or constraints as well as a lesser degree of external control particularly in the area of environmental issues on the part of NGOs, as compared to public organizations. In addition, NGOs are found in this study to be more innovative and risk taking than public organizations. Such innovation, despite its values in certain aspects, could, on the other hand, jeopardize the democratic accountability (Gates & Hill, 1995). Concerns are made regarding the extent to which NGOs' decision making and innovative acts are overseen by other external agencies, especially some sorts of elected bodies in order to assure their representativeness to the public or society. This study also found a close connection between the tendency to innovate and a high report of roles in public policy. NGOs reported more of both traits than do public organizations. In any case, all organizations, state or non-state, should be overseen by external organizations with respect to their intentions and operation in order to avoid the abuse of power.

The empirical results of this study find more differences than similarities between NGOs and public organizations, which might be attributable to either inter-organizational conflicts and confrontation or inter-organizational cooperation, whereby NGOs operate to complement or supplement services traditionally provided by the state agencies. But similarities between the two types of organizations are also found. Both public organizations and NGOs in this study are found to have multiple goals. Such finding is also not surprising because both types of organizations operate without profit as the primary motive and, thus, are bound to possess a variety of social objectives. In



addition, the reported level of flexibility in operation does not differ between the two organizational types. Moreover, more similarities between them are found within welfare policy area, deserving further discussion

### **Organizations and Two Specific Types of Policy Areas**

It is also the objective of this study to focus attention on two policy areas in which both organizational types actively operate – the environment and welfare. The environment as a policy area is associated with protective regulation, due to its traditional, partial function of prohibiting certain acts. The function of this policy type has the implication of environmental control, as reflected in the actual names of organizations responsible for the control function, such as the Environmental Protection Agency in the U.S. or the Pollution Control Department in Thailand. With such actions as protection, control, prohibition, and requirement; hostility and opposition are bound to occur within the policy process. On the other hand, welfare is associated with redistribution policy. Ripley and Franklin (1986), similar to their description of regulation policy, discuss the nature of conflict revolving around the redistribution policy. The redistribution policy requires a transfer of something of values from certain groups of people to some other groups. That transfer, in theory, must be from the rich to the poor, usually in the form of welfare programs, such as food stamps programs, jobs training programs for the unskilled labor, and housing programs for people with low income (Lowi, 1972; Ripley & Franklin, 1986).

This study found interesting aspects from the comparison between the two policy types. Working in welfare organizations is reported as a more rewarding experience than in environmental organizations. Welfare organizations reported a higher level of goal achievement or effectiveness than do environmental organizations. Environmental organizations possess a higher degree of vague goals than do welfare organizations. There is a higher extent of working relationship between public organizations and NGOs in welfare organizations than in environmental organizations. People in welfare organizations seem to have a more positive attitude or perception toward NGOs than do those in environmental organizations. Welfare organizations also reported a higher degree of relationship with society than do environmental organizations. Lastly, the



higher degree of prosocial behaviors reported from people in environmental organizations than those in welfare organizations could be attributable to the environmental behaviors stated in the survey instrument.

The pattern of results from the comparison between the two policy types seems to indicate a more pleasant working atmosphere in welfare policy area than in environmental policy area. Ripley and Franklin (1986) describe both welfare and environmental policy areas with a high level of conflict and hostility. The results of the present study using the case of Thailand tend to find a particularly higher level of conflict in environmental policy issues. The conflict in the area of environment has been witnessed for the past two or three decades of the Thai political history.

For Thailand, environmentalism is an integral part of politics. Through the discussions regarding environmental politics and movement, environmentalism represents one major change in the Thai politics, whereby coalitions of interests are formed to challenge the centralized decision making of the political elites. In Thailand, people who work in farmlands comprise a marginal, yet very large, grassroots portion of the Thai society. Through the democratization process in Thailand, their political awareness and consciousness have grown, as they increasingly felt that their livelihood consisting of their way of life as well as their means of income earning by the use of natural resources has become adversely affected. Blame on that effect was placed on the environmental degradation resulting from various governmental programs, such as those for forest reserves, national parks, and wildlife sanctuaries. Other often cited programs such as dam constructions and recreational land uses such as golf courses are generally believed by the marginal, grassroots people to benefit mainly the business sector of the economy (Hirsch, 1997). The environmental movement, then, took its course, as an alliance was formed among environmental and developmental NGOs, the academics, and the grassroots people themselves to articulate interests of the latter in the policy process (Jumbala & Mitprasat, 1997). Unconventional means such as protests, rallies, and encampments in front of the buildings of the authorities were used in order to acquire the political space and to make the demand of the alliance heard

inside the Thai public policy process. For the past two or three decades, the roles of environmental NGOs have grown considerably, as more specialized environmental groups were formed mostly as policy advocacy organizations. Many of these groups were sampled and surveyed for the present study. More recent movements are, for instance, successful movements to prevent the construction of Nam Choan Dam and Kaeng Krung Dam as well as the presently ongoing movements against other dam constructions, along with other governmental projects, such as waste water treatment facilities and natural gas pipelines. These projects are believed by the grassroots to contribute to adverse local effects, particularly on their livelihood, while benefiting other more wealthy people in other locations of the country. This represents the clash between the national versus local interests particularly in the environmental policy area, as indicated in the empirical result of this present study.

With NGOs' active roles through the environmental movement usually against many governmental projects, the relationship between the two sectors is unsurprisingly less than harmonious. This can be empirically confirmed by some findings of the present study. Firstly, the reported working relationship between NGOs and public organizations is less harmonious in environmental than in welfare policy areas. Secondly, there are more positive attitude and perception toward NGOs reported from welfare than from environmental organizations. Also, there is a report of higher degree of vague goals in environmental than in welfare policy areas. Vague goals are perhaps an implication of uncertainty with respect to directions and actions of organizations in charge of an issue. While in the welfare policy area, public organizations and NGOs do not differ in terms of their emphases on national versus local interests, they clash in the environmental policy area. Public organizations usually have to be involved with issues that are wider, more universal in scope. NGOs, on the other hand, are usually more particular in scope of operation (Hayes, 1996). National and local interests, many times, contradict each other. For instance, dams construction and operation mean more electricity-generation capacity and perhaps, in the long run, more efficient electricity generation for the whole country. However, for local people, such projects mean a



requirement that there be a resettlement of people away from their original location, where dams are to be built and operated. NGOs usually argue for the emotional attachment among the grassroots, local people to their customary way of life, along with the sacredness of their original locations, which should be left undisturbed. Sympathizing with the local people, NGOs, henceforth, organize their activities via movements to help protect the local interests of the grassroots people, resulting in conflict and confrontation with the state. In terms of accountability or external control, these two organizational types also clash in the environmental area, not the welfare policy area. Public organizations reported facing a much higher extent of public scrutiny than NGOs in the environmental policy area. Possibly, part of the external control comes from the NGOs, in counter-balancing and cross-checking the role of the state.

Therefore, in the Thai case, working atmosphere in the welfare policy area is much more pleasant and less prone to conflict than that in environmental policy area. As such, organizations in the welfare area also reported a higher level of relationship with society than do those in the environmental area. This finding should be supplementary to Ripley and Franklin's discussion (1986) regarding the conflict nature in regulation and redistribution policy types. At present, cooperation between public organizations and NGOs is to be expected in welfare policy area. In the future, more effort of cooperation may be directed at the environmental policy area by perhaps focusing on the similarities between public organizations and NGOs, such as their similar levels of multiple social goals.

What is it, then, about the nature of the Thai public welfare that produces a lower extent of conflict? Findings in this study perhaps do not go so far to answer that question. However, two suppositions will be offered here.

One, conflicts do exist in the welfare policy area; but they are latent, suppressed, and bound to arise in the future, perhaps in the form of welfare movement, just like the environmental movement, or in some other forms. The primary aim of redistribution policy is to equalize income and wealth, usually through a relocation of limited resources (Ripley & Franklin, 1986). This is how the western welfare system operates. The end



result comprises a society with a more equal opportunity among its members and, in turn, a lesser degree of social problems of other kinds (Heywood, 1994). In Thailand, one can find numerous examples or signs of inequality, despair, and poverty, along with other social problems as a result of such inequality. Nevertheless, inequality in access to the nation's resources, at least until present, is an accepted social fact in Thailand, as reflected perhaps in a lesser extent of conflict in the welfare policy area, indicated by the present study. But Crone (1993), states that in order for the welfare change to take place in Southeast Asian countries, political capacity and political will to do so must be in place. The political capacity largely depends on the political and economic structure of a Southeast Asian country. A broad political regime, where a variety of interests are sufficiently represented within the political structure – interest groups, political parties, legislatures both at national and local levels – will provide an opportunity for the welfare change. Together, other elements of the pluralistic democracy, such as the presence of a strong civil society and empowered grassroots people, also contribute to the political capacity. Also, the political will of political leaders who are in both the elected and bureaucratic institutions is necessary, in that they must be motivated enough to challenge the present welfare situation and socioeconomic structure of a country.

Two, the lesser extent of conflict in the welfare policy area might be due to the fact that the environment and welfare as policy types are closely related or even perceived by the Thai as one same type of policy. In Thailand, perhaps similar to many other Third World countries, the grassroots, usually poor, and marginal people comprise a very large portion of the Thai population. Had their livelihood been left unaffected or without the environmental degradation in many ways, no state welfare would have been felt necessary. The Thai families are known to be of an extended kind, with more than one generation living under one roof. The welfare of such a society has traditionally relied on friends and families to care for their family members and friends (Vatikiotis, 1996). Therefore, the unaffected livelihood, to the grassroots, marginal people, could imply existing means of living and means of welfare given by services of friends and families. As such, caring for environmental problems or, in other words, rebuilding

grassroots people's livelihood by restoring the original environment will automatically care for the welfare issues in this country. Midgley (1993) states that instead of borrowing models of social security programs from developed welfare states, Third World countries could seek other innovative approaches to welfare that might not necessarily be similar to that of the western welfare states. Perhaps, with a unique view of welfare and environmental issues as intermingled or closely related, an innovative approach might be primarily to help resuscitate and sustain the environment. With a sustained livelihood of the people, most means of welfare in this country will be automatically present and operating on their own.



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## Conclusion

This study sets off with a primary intention to understand NGOs more clearly, as their roles in the public policy process have increased through the course of democratization in Thailand. Their characteristics and roles in the public policy process are examined by comparing them to the public sector in the ways in which previous scholars compared public organizations to private, for-profit organizations. Since both public organizations and NGOs are known to operate with non-profit, social objectives, their extent of altruism is also studied and compared to that of public organizations. This study, on another comparative dimension, selects two policy areas – the environment and welfare – to be compared between the two types of organizations, since NGOs have been particularly active in these two policy areas, operating alongside the state.

The study results indicate that the two organizational types can be distinguished in many aspects under the study. As expected, for instance, NGOs are more effective, efficient, and less corrupt than public organizations. The level of altruism in NGOs is higher than that in public organizations, as approximately half of the NGOs' staff usually comprises volunteers. NGOs' employees feel more rewarded and committed in their work than do those in public organizations. In terms of their roles in the policy process, NGOs seem to be very active and closely connected to the society while involving heavily in policy formulation and implementation. The two kinds of organizations are also similar to each other in their operation with multiple social objectives and high flexibility. Between the two policy areas in comparison, for the Thai case, the working atmosphere seems to be more pleasant in welfare than in environmental policy areas. The study found more cooperation between the two organizational types, more positive attitude toward NGOs, and reported closer relation between organizations and society in welfare than in environmental policy areas.

With these findings, some conclusions are made. NGOs actually possess positive characteristics and, therefore, are appropriate and should be welcome to operate in the Thai policy process as a complement and supplement to the state's roles. These roles of the civil society are also theoretically necessary if the democratization



process is to progress in Thailand. But the dissimilarities between the two organizational types, while having to work together inside the policy process, unavoidably result, at times, in conflict and confrontation. In any case, no organization is perfect. Despite many positive traits of NGOs, they, too, have limitations. The same is also true for public organizations. But the collaborative efforts could be built upon their similarities, albeit few of them are found, such as their non-profit motive as well as their similar levels of multiple, social objectives. In the Thai public policy, conflict, controversy, and confrontation are more intense in environmental policy area than in welfare policy area. Two suppositions are offered to explain such interesting finding. One, inequality and insufficient state welfare have been accepted as a social fact in Thailand. But change to the existing welfare policy might still arise, perhaps in the same manner as the rising environmental movement and politics. Two, both welfare and environment as policy issues, in the eyes of grassroots people, are closely connected. Therefore, by caring for the environmental issue and, as a result, sustaining their livelihood, the Thai welfare issue is automatically solved at the same time.



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### Suggestions for further work

Toward the final part of discussion, a few suggestions were made. One was the appropriateness and necessity of cooperation between public organizations and NGOs in the Thai policy process, if further democratization is to continue its course. A possible further study question would be how to forge such cooperation, particularly in environmental policy area, where there is high conflict and confrontation between the two organizational types. There could also be an in-depth study on the nature of cooperative atmosphere between them in the welfare policy area. Secondly, this study offered two suppositions in their attempt to explain the lesser degree of conflict and controversy among related actors in the welfare policy area, as opposed to a more conflict-prone, more controversial environmental policy issue. Such suppositions will benefit from further, perhaps empirical, research in its attempt to confirm or reject them.



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## Appendix

**แบบสอบถามสำหรับงานวิจัยหัวข้อ**  
**รัฐและองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนไทย : ความเหมือนและความแตกต่างของลักษณะองค์กร**  
**และบทบาทภายในสาธารณกิจและนโยบายสาธารณะ**

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**ข้อมูลเบื้องต้น**

เพศ ชาย \_\_\_\_\_ หญิง \_\_\_\_\_

อายุ \_\_\_\_\_ ปี

จบการศึกษาชั้นสุดท้าย \_\_\_\_\_

หน่วยงานที่สังกัด (ปัจจุบัน) \_\_\_\_\_

อายุงาน ณ หน่วยงานที่สังกัด (ปัจจุบัน) \_\_\_\_\_

คำถามในหน้าถัดไป ตั้งแต่หน้า 2 – 7 มีทั้งหมด 52 ข้อ ในแต่ละข้อคำถาม จะมีช่องคำตอบ 7 ช่อง ที่จัดเตรียมไว้ให้ ช่องคำตอบ 7 ช่องนี้ เป็นระดับของความรู้สึก หรือความเห็นของผู้ตอบ ที่มีต่อข้อคำถามหรือคำกล่าวในแต่ละข้อ เช่น “มาก” (7) ถึง “น้อย” (1) หรือ “เห็นด้วย” (7) ถึง “ไม่เห็นด้วย” (1) เป็นต้น ขอให้ผู้ตอบกากบาท (X) ลงในช่องคำตอบเพียงช่องเดียว สำหรับ 1 ข้อคำถาม ซึ่งจะหมายถึงระดับของความรู้สึก หรือความเห็นของผู้ตอบ สำหรับข้อคำถามแต่ละข้อ

1. หน่วยงานของท่าน ให้ความสำคัญ  
แก่ภาพลักษณ์ ของหน่วยงาน
 

มาก	กลาง ๆ				น้อย	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
  
2. หน่วยงานของท่าน มีระเบียบ  
แบบแผน การปฏิบัติงาน
 

มาก	กลาง ๆ				น้อย	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
  
3. หน่วยงานของท่านมีลำดับชั้นการ  
บังคับบัญชา (เจ้านาย – ลูกน้อง)
 

ชัดเจน	พอประมาณ				ไม่ชัดเจน	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
  
4. ท่านรู้สึกรักหน่วยงานที่ท่านปฏิบัติ  
งานอยู่
 

มาก	กลาง ๆ				น้อย	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
  
5. ท่านมีความผูกพันกับหน่วยงานที่ท่าน  
ปฏิบัติงานอยู่
 

มาก	กลาง ๆ				น้อย	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
  
6. ท่านพยายามปกป้องหน่วยงานของท่าน  
เมื่อมีผู้วิจารณ์หน่วยงานของท่าน
 

มาก	กลาง ๆ				น้อย	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
  
7. ท่านรู้สึกว่ามีแรงจูงใจที่ทำให้ท่าน  
อยากปฏิบัติงานที่หน่วยงานของท่าน
 

มาก	กลาง ๆ				น้อย	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
  
8. ท่านชอบทำงานเพื่อสาธารณ  
ประโยชน์
 

มาก	กลาง ๆ				น้อย	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
  
9. ท่านรู้สึกว่า งานของท่านมีความ  
สำคัญแก่สังคม
 

มาก	กลาง ๆ				น้อย	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

10. ท่านรู้สึกมีความมั่นคง ในหน้าที่  
การงาน
- | มาก | กลาง ๆ | น้อย |   |   |   |   |
|-----|--------|------|---|---|---|---|
| 7   | 6      | 5    | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
11. หน่วยงานของท่านบรรลุเป้าหมาย  
ของหน่วยงานที่ได้ตั้งไว้
- | มาก | กลาง ๆ | น้อย |   |   |   |   |
|-----|--------|------|---|---|---|---|
| 7   | 6      | 5    | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
12. หน่วยงานของท่านช่วยแก้ไขปัญหาลังคม
- | ช่วยมาก | กลาง ๆ | น้อย |   |   |   |   |
|---------|--------|------|---|---|---|---|
| 7       | 6      | 5    | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
13. หน่วยงานของท่าน ประหยัดงบประมาณ  
ในการปฏิบัติงาน
- | ประหยัดมาก | กลาง ๆ | ไม่ประหยัด |   |   |   |   |
|------------|--------|------------|---|---|---|---|
| 7          | 6      | 5          | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
14. ผลที่ได้รับจากการปฏิบัติงานของหน่วย  
งานของท่านคุ้มค่ากับงบประมาณที่ใช้ไป
- | คุ้มค่ามาก | กลาง ๆ | ไม่คุ้มค่า |   |   |   |   |
|------------|--------|------------|---|---|---|---|
| 7          | 6      | 5          | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
15. สังคมตรวจสอบการปฏิบัติงานของ  
หน่วยงานของท่าน
- | มาก | กลาง ๆ | น้อย |   |   |   |   |
|-----|--------|------|---|---|---|---|
| 7   | 6      | 5    | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
16. หน่วยงานอื่น ตรวจสอบการปฏิบัติงาน  
ของหน่วยงานของท่าน
- | มาก | กลาง ๆ | น้อย |   |   |   |   |
|-----|--------|------|---|---|---|---|
| 7   | 6      | 5    | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
17. หน่วยงานของท่าน มีกฎหมายควบคุม  
การปฏิบัติงาน
- | เคร่งครัดมาก | กลาง ๆ | ไม่เคร่งครัด |   |   |   |   |
|--------------|--------|--------------|---|---|---|---|
| 7            | 6      | 5            | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
18. สังคม ตั้งความหวังกับการปฏิบัติงาน  
ของหน่วยงานของท่าน
- | มาก | กลาง ๆ | น้อย |   |   |   |   |
|-----|--------|------|---|---|---|---|
| 7   | 6      | 5    | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |



19. หน่วยงานของท่าน สามารถเปลี่ยนแปลง  
การปฏิบัติงาน ให้เข้ากับสถานการณ์
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
20. เมื่อมีเรื่องด่วน หน่วยงานของท่านปฏิบัติ  
การตอบสนองด้วยความรวดเร็ว
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
21. การปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน  
มีหลายเป้าหมาย
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
22. การปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน  
เกี่ยวข้องกับสัมพันธ์กับหลายกลุ่มคน
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
23. หน่วยงานของท่าน มีหลายเป้าหมาย  
ที่ขัดแย้งกัน
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
24. หน่วยงานของท่าน พบกับความต้องการ  
ที่แตกต่างกัน ของหลายกลุ่มคน
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
25. หน่วยงานของท่านปฏิบัติงาน โดยเน้น  
ผลที่จะเกิดขึ้นแก่ประเทศ มากกว่าท้องถิ่น
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
26. ในการปฏิบัติงาน ควรให้ความสำคัญกับ  
ผลที่จะเกิดขึ้นแก่ประเทศ มากกว่าท้องถิ่น
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
27. ท่านเข้าใจเป้าหมายของหน่วยงาน  
ของท่าน
- เข้าใจมาก                      กลาง ๆ                      น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

28. หน่วยงานของท่าน มีการดำเนินงานที่  
ประเมินความสำเร็จได้ลำบาก
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
29. การปฏิบัติงานภายในหน่วยงานของท่าน  
มีเป้าหมายระบุไว้เป็นรูปธรรมชัดเจน
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
30. มีการปฏิบัติงานร่วมกัน ระหว่างหน่วย  
งานภาครัฐกับ NGOs
- มาก                              กลาง ๆ                              น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
31. มีการแลกเปลี่ยนข้อมูลในการปฏิบัติงาน  
ระหว่างหน่วยงานภาครัฐกับ NGOs
- มาก                              กลาง ๆ                              น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
32. มีการช่วยเหลือกัน ระหว่างหน่วยงาน  
ภาครัฐ กับ NGOs
- มาก                              กลาง ๆ                              น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
33. หน่วยงานของท่าน มีโอกาสนำเสนอ  
ประเด็นปัญหาสังคมที่ควรได้รับการแก้ไข
- มาก                              กลาง ๆ                              น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
34. หน่วยงานของท่าน มีโอกาสผลักดันร่าง  
กฎหมาย
- มาก                              กลาง ๆ                              น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
35. หน่วยงานของท่าน มีบทบาทดำเนิน  
งานเพื่อสาธารณประโยชน์
- มาก                              กลาง ๆ                              น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
36. หน่วยงานของท่านพบข้อจำกัดด้าน  
กฎหมาย ในการปฏิบัติงาน
- พบข้อจำกัดมาก                      กลาง ๆ                              น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

37. หน่วยงานของท่านพบข้อจำกัดด้าน  
การเงิน ในการปฏิบัติงาน
- พบข้อจำกัดมาก      กลาง ๆ      น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
38. NGOs เป็นทางเลือกในการปฏิบัติ  
งานของภาครัฐ
- เห็นด้วย      กลาง ๆ      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
39. NGOs สามารถช่วยแบ่งเบาภาระ  
งานของภาครัฐ
- เห็นด้วย      กลาง ๆ      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
40. มีความจำเป็นต้องปฏิบัติงานร่วมกัน  
ระหว่างภาครัฐและ NGOs
- เห็นด้วย      กลาง ๆ      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
41. หน่วยงานของท่าน มีความคุ้นเคย  
กับปัญหาสังคม
- มาก      กลาง ๆ      น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
42. การปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานของท่าน  
สอดคล้องกับความต้องการของประชาชน
- มาก      กลาง ๆ      น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
43. สังคม ให้การสนับสนุนการปฏิบัติงาน  
ของหน่วยงานของท่าน
- มาก      กลาง ๆ      น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
44. หน่วยงานของท่าน มีการทดลองสิ่ง  
ใหม่ ๆ ภายในขอบข่ายงานที่ทำ
- มาก      กลาง ๆ      น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
45. ตัวท่านเอง มีการทดลองสิ่งใหม่ ๆ  
ในการปฏิบัติงาน
- มาก      กลาง ๆ      น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|



46. ท่านแยกขยะ เพื่อประโยชน์ในการนำ  
วัสดุบางอย่างกลับมาใช้ใหม่
- น้อยมาก                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่ค่อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
47. ท่านพยายามรักษาความสะอาดในที่  
สาธารณะ
- มาก                              กลาง ๆ                      น้อย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
48. ท่านถือเป็นที่นั่งของท่าน ที่ต้องแยกขยะ  
เพื่อนำวัสดุบางอย่างกลับมาใช้ใหม่
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
49. ท่านถือเป็นที่นั่งของท่าน ที่ต้อง  
รักษาความสะอาดในที่สาธารณะ
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
50. การแยกขยะ เพื่อนำวัสดุบางอย่างกลับ  
มาใช้ใหม่ เป็นภาระหนักสำหรับท่าน
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
51. การรักษาความสะอาดในที่  
สาธารณะ เป็นภาระหนักสำหรับท่าน
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
52. ท่านคิดว่ามีการคอร์รัปชัน ภายใน  
หน่วยงานของท่าน
- เห็นด้วย                      กลาง ๆ                      ไม่เห็นด้วย
- |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

ภาควิชาการปกครอง

คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

ถนนอังรีดูนังต์ กรุงเทพฯ 10700

วันที่

เรื่อง ขอความอนุเคราะห์ให้ผู้ปฏิบัติงานภายในหน่วยงานของท่านตอบแบบสอบถาม

เรียน

เนื่องจากผม ดร. พิษณุ เสงี่ยมพงษ์ ตำแหน่ง ผู้ช่วยศาสตราจารย์ ระดับ 7 ประจำภาควิชาการปกครอง คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย กำลังทำงานวิจัยในหัวข้อเรื่อง **รัฐและองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนไทย : ความเหมือนและความแตกต่างของลักษณะองค์กรและบทบาทภายในสาธารณกิจและนโยบายสาธารณะ** ด้วยทุนวิจัยจากกองทุนรัชดาภิเษกสมโภช จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย งานวิจัยนี้ กำลังอยู่ในขั้นตอนการเก็บข้อมูลโดยใช้แบบสอบถามชนิดปลายปิดที่กระจายไปยังผู้ปฏิบัติงานในภาครัฐและองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชน (NGOs) ผมจึงใคร่ขอความอนุเคราะห์และความร่วมมือจากหน่วยงานของท่าน โดยขอให้เจ้าหน้าที่ในระดับผู้ปฏิบัติงาน เช่นผู้ดำเนินงานโครงการต่าง ๆ ที่หน่วยงานนี้รับผิดชอบ ประมาณ 4 – 5 ท่าน ช่วยตอบแบบสอบถามปลายปิด 52 ข้อ ซึ่งจะใช้เวลาตอบไม่น่าจะเกิน 15 นาที

คำถาม 52 ข้อนี้ เป็นคำถามเกี่ยวกับความรู้สึก / ความเห็น ของผู้ตอบ ซึ่งเป็นผู้ปฏิบัติงานภายในหน่วยงานภาครัฐ และผู้ปฏิบัติงานในองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชน (NGOs) เกี่ยวกับลักษณะและบทบาททั่วไปของหน่วยงาน และจะมีประมาณ 5 – 6 คำถาม ที่ถามเกี่ยวกับความคิดเห็นทั่วไป ในประเด็นเชิงสังคม เช่นความเห็นในเรื่องการแยกขยะ เพื่อนำวัสดุบางอย่างกลับมาใช้ใหม่ ผู้ตอบแบบสอบถามจะไม่พบกับความยากลำบากในการตอบ เนื่องจากคำถามเกือบทั้งหมด เกี่ยวข้องโดยตรงกับ

หน่วยงาน ซึ่งเป็นสถานที่ปฏิบัติงานและคุ้นเคยของผู้ตอบ คำถามได้รับการจัดทำ ปรับปรุง ให้กระชับ ได้ใจความ เพื่อไม่ให้เสียเวลาในการตอบมากนัก นอกจากนี้ คำถามทั้งหมดได้รับการจัดทำขึ้นด้วยความประณีต และระวัง ไม่ให้ผู้ตอบพบกับความลำบากในการตอบ ประกอบกับคำถามเป็นแบบปลายปิด ผู้ตอบจึงน่าจะตอบแบบสอบถามได้ด้วยความสะดวกเร็ว สำหรับผลที่ได้จากการตอบแบบสอบถาม จะนำมาวิเคราะห์แบบรวม โดยวิธีการทางสถิติ และคำตอบจากแบบสอบถามแต่ละชุด จะได้รับการปิดเป็นความลับ

งานวิจัยนี้ ได้รับการคาดหวังว่าจะให้ประโยชน์ในทางวิชาการด้านรัฐศาสตร์ โดยเฉพาะจะเพิ่มองค์ความรู้ให้แก่ศาสตร์ด้านนโยบายสาธารณะ อันเป็นแขนงวิชาที่เชื่อมโยงประเด็นทางการเมือง การบริหาร เข้ากับประเด็นปัญหาสังคม ซึ่งนักศึกษาและนักวิชาการในสาขาวิชานี้และสาขาอื่นที่เกี่ยวข้อง จะได้รับประโยชน์จากงานวิจัยชิ้นนี้ ไม่มากก็น้อย และท้ายที่สุด ประโยชน์ของงานวิจัย น่าจะกระจายไปยังสังคมไทยโดยรวม

จึงเรียนมาเพื่อขอความร่วมมือ และขอบพระคุณในความอนุเคราะห์

ขอแสดงความนับถือ

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