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RESOLVING THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN NEPAL: A DISCUSSION OF
OBSTACLES TO POLITICAL INTEGRATION



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


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ระหว่างเดือนกุมภาพันธ์ 2548 ถึง กันยายน 2549 ประเทศเนปาลได้เกิดเหตุการณ์ต่าง ๆ มากมายทางการเมือง ซึ่งนับได้
ว่าเป็นเรื่องใหม่ในประวัติศาสตร์ชาติเนปาลเลยทีเดียว กบฏวิญญูชนั้นคราวหนึ่งคราวหนึ่งการปกครอง กลายเป็นการปกครองแบบ
เผด็จการ ทำให้เกิดความเคลื่อนไหวของมหาชนนับล้าน ๆ รวมถึงพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์ เนปาล-มาโออิสต์ ซึ่งเป็นพรรคที่อยู่มาเน
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การวิจัยนี้ใช้หลักฐานเดิมจากทฤษฎีของลัทธิมาร์กซ์ เพื่อแสดงให้เห็นถึงความมีเหตุผล และความน่าเชื่อถือ ของการรวม
ลัทธิมาร์กซ์กับงานทางการเมือง จากระบบรัฐบาล, การรวมกันทางการเมืองของ CPNM ซึ่งไม่เคยแสดงว่าจะเกิดขึ้นได้
ความสำเร็จของการรวมกันทางการเมืองนั้น เกิดขึ้นโดยพร้อมกันกับการลดกำลังอาวุธยุทธโปกรณ์ ซึ่งมีปัญหาด้านการลดกำลังอาวุธ
ของเนปาลนั้น ได้รับการถกเถียงกันเป็นอย่างมาก ซึ่งหัวข้อต่าง ๆ ได้แก่ การลดกำลังอาวุธ (Disarmament), การถอนกำลังทหาร
(Demobilization) และการกลับมารวมกันอีกครั้ง (Reintegration) หรือเป็นขอบข่ายของงานที่เรียกย่อๆ ว่า DDR สถานการณ์ใน
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Between February 2005 and September 2006, Nepal incurred the most eventful bout of political happenings in the country's recent history. The totalitarian takeover by King Gyanendra resulted in a mass people's movement numbering in the millions along with the emergence of the Communist Party Nepal-Maoists from a ten-year underground existence. This paper uses Classical Marxist Theory to show the plausibility of a Maoist-affiliated party participating in mainstream politics. On the brink of a new government system, political integration of the CPNM never seemed more possible. Successful political integration must be simultaneously accompanied by disarmament measures. The disarmament aspect of Nepal is discussed through the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Framework. The situation in Nepal is assessed until the submission of the interim constitution's first draft in August 2006.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
APF	Armed Police Force; Nepal
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
COHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement; Aceh, Indonesia
CPN-UML	Communist Party Nepal- United Marxist Leninist
CPNM	Communist Party Nepal Maoist
CPP	Communist Party Philippines
CMDST	The Civil Movement for Democracy and Social Transformation; Nepal
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front; El Salvador
GAM	Free Aceh Movement; Aceh, Indonesia
ICDC	Interim Constitution Drafting Committee; Nepal
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; Sri Lanka
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front; Philippines
MK	<i>Umkhonto we Sizwe</i> ; South Africa
NA	Nepal Army

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Nepal, a landlocked country wedged between India and China, first became a democratic country in 1990 at the demand of the people. In the initial years following the success of the people's movement, little progressive change occurred within the country. Rural development remained stagnate and the people at large were untouched by the positive impacts the cries of democracy promised. Some of the people began to question the new democratic system's ability to foster meaningful change within the country. Discontent with the new system of governance led many persons to join the newly birthed armed rebellion under Pushpa Kamal Dahal, using the alias Comrade Prachanda, and his fellow in the revolution, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. Like numerous other rebellions propagating through mountainous terrains, the combatants ideologically aligned themselves as Maoists under the identity of Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPNM). Although from 1996-2000, the rebellion's impact was only minimally recognized, in the wake of the 2001 Royal Massacre which left the reigning King Bihendra and eight other members of the Royal family dead, the situation became drastically different and the visibility of a Maoist-led conflict became much more apparent.

With a King many suspected to be responsible at least in part for the Royal Massacre, the Maoists grew in numbers and gained control or presence in a substantial amount of the rural areas. Peasant support came mostly as a result of the economic injustice and the absence of state infrastructure addressing the condition of Nepal's rural poor. Killings, bombings, abductions, and other human rights abuses increased at the hand of both the CPNM and the Nepal Army. In attempts to "control" the conflict, police checkpoints sprouted up throughout the country and every citizen began to feel the realities of the growing civil strife. In addition to police-induced checkpoints, the Maoists' recurrent forced strike closures (business, education, transportation, etc) ensured no person in Nepal went unaffected by the conflict.

1.1 King Gyanendra's Totalitarian Regime

The political frailty of the democratic system in Nepal allowed King Gyanendra to continually exercise his power by shuffling the powers that be. After naming and re-naming a handful of Prime Ministers in only few years' time, King Gyanendra finally deconstructed the government and named himself the sole power of the country. Gyanendra explicitly justified his totalitarian takeover of the country as an attempt to truly tackle the insurgency once and for all. Claiming that the democratic system had proven itself incapable of doing as such, Gyanendra promised to remain in control only long enough to bring peace to the country, a time period which he stated would be no longer than one hundred days.

1.2 The growing dissatisfaction of the people

In the months following, Gyanendra showed no progress or even any boost in attempts towards resolving the conflict. As the King's efforts languished and the one-hundred day promise became nothing more than empty words, dissatisfaction grew in the Seven Party Alliance (SPA); a coalition consisting of the seven foremost political parties in Nepal; the CPNM, as well as the general public of Nepal.

Despite international disapproval from the United States and India, the SPA and CPNM formed an alliance during a cease-fire in November 2005. The alliance sealed a 12-point agreement presented by the CPNM that the SPA refused only two years prior. The change in circumstance that drove SPA to sign the agreement was the urgency of removing the King from power. As the CPNM was the other major opposition to the King at the time, SPA saw the alliance as crucial to the achievement of their overarching goal.

The SPA's willingness to adhere to an agreement it previously rejected showed not only a change in circumstance but also an evident increase in CPNM bargaining power. In previous years, the CPNM and the King were equally distant from the SPA. Yet, the King's new disregard for democracy drove the SPA closer to the

CPNM. Furthermore, despite the SPA's insistence that the agreement would only remain so long as the CPNM upheld its ceasefire, the alliance continued even after CPNM broke ceasefire leaving twelve soldiers dead and eight other individuals injured on January 14, 2006 in the Kathmandu Valley. The SPA's decision to forge ahead in the agreement despite the CPNM's failure to comply with the ceasefire also implies growth in CPNM's strength concerning negotiations.

By the close of 2005, Nepal and King Gyanendra saw the beginning of a movement led by the people of Nepal that eventually well out-did the 1990 *Janandolen* (people's movements) originally responsible for bringing democracy to Nepal. The movements continued into the New Year and at the request and guidance of the SPA-CPNM alliance, mass demonstrations persisted in the days preceding the February 8, 2006 King-initiated municipality elections. The SPA-CPNM rejected the King's elections because only individuals without party representation were permitted to stand for election to office.

1.3 April Andolen

It became clear that King Gyanendra would be unable to maintain authoritarian power as the united country continued *Janandolen* for more than half the month of April. Numbers of protestors filling the Kathmandu valley alone numbered well over one million. On the nineteenth day of what became known as April Andolen or *Janandolen* II, King Gyanendra announced that he would relinquish power to the SPA. The SPA was granted authority by Gyanendra to reconstruct the government. Along with this responsibility, the SPA also bore the burden of addressing the issue of insurgency.

During the monarchy, solving the People's War seemed implausible because of the complex dynamics of the relationships between the three entities: the Royals, the SPA, and the CPNM. Numerous failed peace talks over the years proved it unlikely that in particular, the CPNM and the Monarchy could come to any joint resolution.

The period of transition from an absolute monarchy to democratic rule creates an environment conducive to ending the ten-year war. The construction of a new government body without a ruling monarchy leaves potential political space to include CPNM demands for Nepalese law as well as legitimizing the organization as a legally participating party in the democratic system.

Two months after April Andolen, the SPA and CPNM made a joint agreement to dissolve the parliament and post-Andolen modified constitution. The SPA recognized that in order to establish a lasting solution to the ongoing conflict, the CPNM must be included from the beginning stages of re-building the government. Thus, together SPA and CPNM outlined a timetable as to the implementation of an interim government that involves the Maoists.

1.4 Content of this paper

This paper will look at if and how the CPNM can disarm and integrate into the political mainstream as a legal party as a means to resolving the people's war. First, it is necessary to examine whether or not Maoist ideology allows political participation in a democratic system. This question will be answered from a classical Marxist perspective, which sees Maoism as a form of Stalinism. Second, the paper will analyze the commonly used Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process. DDR is a framework employed in many instances of conflict resolution worldwide, thus successes and setbacks in the implementation of DDR in various countries will be drawn upon. Finally, the paper will divulge the situation specifically in Nepal so as to prove that it is both ideologically and logistically possible for CPNM to participate at the ballot box and secure peace throughout Nepal.

CHAPTER 2: CLASSICAL MARXIST THEORY

As stated, this paper will evaluate the plausibility of Maoist participation in mainstream politics through the lens of classical Marxist theory. Unlike other political theories, Classical Marxism sees Stalinism and Maoism as aligned ideologies separate from Marxism, Leninism, and Trotskyism. The failure of the Russian Revolution in 1928 gave birth to the Stalinist school of thought responsible for inaccurately marring the image of Marxism. Stalinists lost concern for the revolution's international vision and the primary objective was to catapult Russia into the ranks of the world's most powerful countries.

The very foundations of Marxism and Stalinism are different. Industrialization is a prerequisite for Marxism, which relies heavily on the mobility of a large working class society. Thus, under Marxism, a country such as Nepal must first start by undergoing an agrarian reform to move towards the industrialization necessary for successful socialism to exist. Marxism demands the working class act as the main agent of change. Further, the working class not only propels change, they also reap the benefits of change. Stalinism also uses the working class, but the story is not the same. First, Stalinism does not require the entire country to be industrialized. As Russia proceeded with Stalinism, the country maintained a peasant majority population with a limited working class located in a few select cities. Second, in contrast to the Marxist model, Stalinist Russia does not empower the working class, but exploits them for the benefit of the state and the state elites.

Pushing Russia forward towards the goal of superpower status at the expense of the working class meant attempting to boost state capital at a rapid pace. Marxism focuses on production to meet the population's own needs, whereas Stalinist Russia's production focused on increasing the national budget. Producing profitable weaponry took precedence over the production of goods to fulfill the people of Russia's basic needs. This benefited the state bureaucrats and created an internal state bourgeoisie which in turn acted as a ruling class.

Stalinism exploits the working class for state gain. As stated Maoism is a form of Stalinism. However, in contrast, Maoist ideology first begins with mobilizing the peasant class. Historically, mobilization has often come in the form of armed revolution. Yet despite popular belief, Maoist politics do not begin and end exclusively with armed peasant rebellions. Maoism's classification as a form of Stalinism is justified because of the parallel political objectives and practices such as cross-class/party alliance making.

Although Maoism is heavily reliant on the peasant class to push forth the revolution, Maoists still use cross-class alliances to further their own cause. Alliance making does not stop with classes, but includes cross-party alliances when necessary. Alliances are formed as a means to increase resources and manpower as well as to work for the benefit of specific nationalistic aims. Maoism aligns itself to any class, party or group that can be temporarily beneficial to the party's objectives. Although Marxism sees a role for the peasant class in the revolution, it does not promote the use of alliance-making (Ungpakorn, 1998).

The Communist Party Nepal-Maoists itself has a consistent record for implementing the practice of alliance making since the initial agreements with the SPA in October 2005. CPNM alliance making has not been exclusively with the SPA as a collective body to oust the King. According to Subhir Khanal, personal advisor to two past Prime Ministers, the CPNM has been known to make alliances with particular members of the SPA within the negotiations when suitable:

Sometimes the Maoists don't seem to know what they want. One minute they are making an alliance with one of the [parties represented in SPA] and the next minute they forget that group and make an alliance with [another party within the SPA]. (2006)

Despite Khanal interpreting the different alliances as confusion on the part of the CPNM, they are actually well thought out Maoist political tactics. Khanal is not the

only political representative to recognize the CPNM's use of alliance-making tactics for their own advantage. In a paper presented at the 12th Central Committee meeting of CPN-UML, senior leader Madhav Kumar Nepal made similar comments against the CPNM:

[CPNM is] active in using one political party against the other for their own vested interests instead of developing responsible political relations with them...on the one hand, they accept the People's Multiparty Democracy (propounded by the late UML General-Secretary Madan Bhandari) and on the other, their action of concentrating attacks on the UML, which is active in implementing Bhandari's ideology, can be deemed opportunistic and self-centric.

Khanal and Nepal's claims of CPNM's alliance making tactics confirms that CPNM's practices align with overall Maoist political practices.

2.1 Socialism within one country

In Stalinism and Maoism, the "greater good" is that of Nationalism which at any time takes precedence over the interests of the workers and the party. This nationalist agenda of Maoism strives toward the goal of building socialism within one country, a concept coined by Stalin. The concept of socialism within one country justifies the acceptance of compromised or inhibited socialist values outside of its own borders, so long as it will prop up the country's own national interests. While Marxism rejects sacrificing the global objectives in lieu of national gain, Stalinism and ultimately Maoism, openly utilize means that jeopardize global socialist efforts. In 1936, Stalinist Russia had made friends with two beneficial western countries: France and the United Kingdom. These two ties proved more significant to Russia's own agenda than the global social movement as she instructed revolutionaries in the nearby Spain to limit revolts so as not to disrupt Russia's new relations.

National interests take precedence over both the international revolution and the interests of the country's own citizens. Socialism within one country instructs individuals to place the good of the state above the class struggle. Examples of this can be found in the history of both Indonesia and the Philippines' Stalinist parties. In Indonesia, during the 1960s, the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) blatantly told party members that the class interests were of secondary concern to state interests. Similarly, in 1953, the *Partido Komunista ng Philippines* (PKP) claimed the cause of greatest concern for the already independent country was "the need for an anti-imperialist war." (ibid) Socialism within one country clearly promotes a nationalistic agenda above the class struggle.

2.2 The Two Stages Theory of Revolution

Rather than jump directly into socialism from a feudal monarchy or any other type of underdeveloped economy, Maoism and Stalinism believe the revolution must take place through two stages. The first stage is a national democratic stage during which a capitalist and modern state is created. In Nepal, this stage also focuses on dissolving feudalism and the caste system. The second stage, the building of socialism, can only begin after the first stage is achieved.

At the moment, Nepal appears to be heading towards restructuring a national democracy as a multi-party collaboration involving the SPA. The two-stage theory of revolution and the CPNM's current mode of entering the national democratic stage prove it plausible that although not without its hurdles, mainstream political integration may be in CPNM's near future.

CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL DYNAMICS

3.1 Why allow the CPNM to Participate?

One may pose the question, why should Nepal, or any other country for that matter, allow a rebel group to participate in the political mainstream in the first place? However, the more suitable question might be, can the country afford *not* to incorporate the rebel group into the political mainstream? In situations where the conflict affects the daily lives of virtually all citizens and the government proves incapable of ending the unrest, political integration is not an option, but perhaps a necessity. Often, a country must choose to attempt either to legitimize the rebel group through political mainstream incorporation, or face the grave consequence of perpetual strife.

In South Africa, the African National Congress had such a large support base that the Government of South Africa could no longer deny them a place on the ballot lest the country would enter into a state of unrest unparalleled to anything it had seen before. The immense popularity with the general population made it virtually impossible for the minority government to continue the exclusion of the ANC.

Aside from popularity and support of the people, the magnitude of a rebel group's presence also determines a country's conflict carrying capacity. If a rebel group's activities are fairly isolated to one area of the country, there is not necessarily an urgency for the government to attempt political integration. However, if the rebel group is active in multiple parts of the country or hinders local government bodies from operating at a functional level, political integration may be the most viable option for resolution.

3.2 CPNM's Strength and Opposition within Nepal

In Nepal, CPNM has constantly voiced a desire to fulfill the will of the people. Considering the sheer number of attendants at non-violent demonstrations held throughout the country through the summer of 2006, CPNM's claim cannot be entirely incorrect. Yet, exactly how strong is the CPNM's support base within Nepal? Do collective oppositional forces of substantial strength exist that would prohibit CPNM's political integration?

It is beyond refute that in the latter half of the People's War the Maoists gained considerable presence throughout the majority of the vast countryside as well as maintaining clandestine activities in major cities. The impact of the Maoist presence in rural areas varies from merely making monthly tax collection rounds to completely deconstructing local governing systems and replacing them with the Maoist's own governing bodies.

The drop in operating local state government bodies known as Village District Committees (VDCs) from 3,913 in the summer of 2002 to only approximately 1,400 the following year clearly shows the Maoist insurgents' effectiveness in thwarting government activities at the local level. In lieu of VDCs, the CPNM developed the People's Governments to conduct local governing duties. The Maoists ability to more than halve the number of VDCs and implement their own system in only one-year's time demonstrates a considerable amount of strength.

Oppositionists will claim the CPNM was only able to gain such a stronghold throughout the rural areas because of the implementation of violent tactics. While it may be easy to find evidence of unwilling victims forced to comply with CPNM's demands of free housing, food, and "donations", it is just as easy to find evidence of CPNM supporters or sympathizers. Further, it is an equally easy task to find villagers that have had high levels of justified fear towards the Nepal Army (formerly known as the Royal Nepal Army). Nar Bahadar Roka, a student originally from a small village in the western Myagdi District stated:

Walking [the five hour distance from home to boarding school], it wasn't the Maoists I feared. It was the Army. If they saw us students traveling by foot, they sometimes assumed we were Maoists. I'm not a Maoist. I don't have any affiliation with the Maoists at all, but still if they saw us traveling in groups, they assumed. After a while, some of my friends thought it was too dangerous and it wasn't worth risking life just to go to school.

Thus, the absence of thorough countrywide statistics nullifies the legitimacy of any claims made by oppositionists stating that CPNM was only able to gain such massive strength in rural areas through the use of force. It is impossible to calculate the exact amount of support had by the Maoists, however it is possible to disprove that an opposition strong enough to prevent their political integration exists.

After the April Andolen, CPNM has emerged from their ten-year underground existence. In years past, roadblocks and army checkpoints demarcated the country, yet with the fall of the monarchy, so too fell the illegality that forced the CPNM to work in a clandestine manner.

At checkpoints, NA officers or Armed Police Force officers were instructed to check all vehicles for weapons or individuals associated with CPNM. All individuals appearing to be of South Asian decent were forced to evacuate public busses while officials inspected carry-on bags. All non-South Asian passengers were allowed to remain on the bus during inspections. In more than 48 random inspections between the highways from Kathmandu to Pokhara and Pokhara to Beni between February 2003 and February 2006, not once was a single item of luggage unzipped for a thorough weapons search.¹

This tactic of road blockades and incessant "check" points was a political strategy used by the monarchy. Checkpoints attempted to propagate a nationwide sense of

¹Collective Observation from personal travels en route Kathmandu-Pokhara-Beni.

fear associated with Maoists and a sense of security associated with the state. However, in some respects, the monarchy's attempt to make people feel vulnerable without troops protecting them from Maoists achieved an adverse effect:

Before, traveling required numerous checks by the police and army. Even on the local bus just around the city, they were always checking for Maoists, checking for weapons. Just seeing the officers come on the bus made me feel like there was something I should be afraid of. And at night, we couldn't travel freely at night. But, now things are normal. Without the checkpoints we feel more safe, more free... like we aren't in a state of war.

Although Maoists are free to roam around the country and there are no state enforcers to protect civilians, individuals who are not even Maoist sympathizers feel a newfound sense of security.

CPNM Leaders Prachanda, Baburam Bhattarai, Dev Gurung, and Krishna Mahara have spoke openly with political leaders, the press, and the public multiple times over the past four months with little to no problems. Mass CPNM gatherings lasting numerous consecutive days have been held in both open-air areas and city halls with again, no violence.

Further, the CPNM has functioned at the city level on par with other various political parties. For example, in July 2006 an incident involving the death of a twelve-year-old boy during routine surgery at Ghandaki Public Hospital in Pokhara required mediation. The present ill-established state of the government made it unable to fulfill the role of facilitator between the boy's family, the public and the hospital officials. In lieu of the government, representatives from Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), and CPNM worked in collaboration to facilitate resolution of the community unrest.

Prior to April Andolen, Pokhara remained a city with relatively no open Maoist activity. For most residents of Pokhara, actual contact with Maoists was minimal at most and their exposure to the political governing practices of CPNM remained only by means of second-hand information. Visibility alone of the newly public group has altered perceptions of locals who previously thought of Maoists as persons to be feared. During the weeklong resolution, members of the community continually referred to the endeavors as talks led by “political parties” under which they categorized CPNM despite that the group’s technical status remains as armed insurgents. (ibid)

Even mere lip service references to the CPNM as an entity equal to that of other political parties such as NC and CPN-UML shows public acceptance by individuals who would not consider themselves Maoist sympathizers. Vernacular media reinforces this recognition of the CPNM as a bona fide political party by referring to the “eight political parties”: the Seven Party Alliance plus the CPNM.

Victims of war atrocities imposed by the Maoists exist as a very minimal oppositional force to the integration process. On August 13, 2006, officials arrested more than 200 victims protesting against the government’s negligence to bring justice for families suffering atrocities at the hand of the CPNM. While the group of protesters made national headlines, opposition protests in the hundreds are an insignificant handful in comparison to hundreds of thousands turning up for CPNM support rallies.

3.3 The United States of America

In 2001, the United States officially labeled CPNM as a “terrorist organization” when it was placed on their internally created list of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”. US Ambassador James Moriarty has voiced the United States’ disapproval of political involvement with an armed CPNM since the fall of 2005 following the first agreement between the SPA and CPNM. The United States has repeatedly tried to sway the parties from allowing the Maoists to participate in political decisions until the CPNM lays down arms. Putting actions to words, Moriarty stated that the United

States would discontinue all financial aid if the parties fail to adhere to the advice. James Moriarty claimed that US foreign policy does not allocate foreign aid to countries who fail to thwart terrorism.

For the 2006 fiscal year, the United States allocated US \$3 million for sustainable forest and agricultural products, US \$23 million for health and family planning, US \$1.9 million for hydropower development, US \$5.4 million for democracy and governance and US \$5.9 million exclusively for ending conflict and expanding democracy. If Moriarty's claims are fulfilled, aid in all sectors will come to a halt in the event that the SPA and the Nepalese people allow the CPNM to go to the ballots prior to disarmament.

Yet although Moriarty states that cutting aid from countries in similar situations is standard US foreign policy, evidence proves otherwise. The Philippines' own Maoist party, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). As was the case with Nepal's CPNM, the United States placed CPP on its internal list of terrorist organizations in 2002.

The CPP is involved in the electoral process through an affiliate known as Bayan Muna. Bayan Muna has participated in elections since 2001. Although the relationship between CPP and Bayan Muna is no secret, the United States continues to allocate aid money to the Philippines. In late 2001, George W. Bush agreed with Philippines' President Gloria Arroyo that the only way to truly fight terrorism is to simultaneously thwart the root problem of poverty. Aid to the Philippines has increased to a total of more than US \$63 million in 2004 and rising to US \$89 million in 2005.

Some may argue that because the armed organization and the organization standing in elections are technically different, it is acceptable for the US to continue funding the Philippines but deny funding to Nepal if in fact CPNM does integrate into the political mainstream. However, as already stated the CPP and the Bayan Muna have

a known affiliation. Thus, if the United States is truly interested in fighting organizations they have deemed as terrorists, funding to the Philippines should also cease due to the knowledge that technically the CPP *are* participating in elections despite under a representative group.

The reason the United States is willing to continue to support the Philippines whilst denying Nepal equal treatment is the advantageous nature of the island country. The United States has continually pumped money into the Philippines through dictatorships and politically active rebel movements for one main reason: the Philippines acts as a strategic military base for the United States in the Southeast Asian Pacific region. In March 2006, it was estimated that the United States had more than 5,500 troops deployed to the Philippines for strategic purposes.

While the US has always been a friend of the compliant monarchy of Nepal, it knows it can hardly expect to have the same feelings reciprocated by the CPNM, a group that has vocalized a continual distaste for the United States throughout the duration of the People's War. Likewise, the Philippines' CPP also does not favor the United States. However, in contrast to the CPNM, the CPP does not show a great enough support base to threaten the United States' relationship to the Philippines any time soon.

Nepal has geopolitical importance for the United States, as it lies between China's Tibet and northern India and in relative proximity to Pakistan and Kashmir. For this purpose, the United States needs a government that will support its own foreign policy; something that the US does not expect in the event of a potentially CPNM-governed Nepal.

Two questions remain. First, exactly how will the abrupt halt in financial aid summing around US \$40 million actually effect the country? Second, how much political influence will the United States' claim to stop aid have in the political decisions made by both the SPA and the CPNM?

To answer the first question, the US \$40 million makes up just under one sixth of the funds given in both grants and loans to the government of Nepal annually. The United States' decision to stop all aid alone will no doubt cripple the country's budget, but it will not be destroyed. As a lone country, the fulfillment of the United States claim to stop aid will have limited impact on the political future in Nepal. Stopping aid will only have major influence on Nepal's internal affairs if the United States can convince other major donor countries to do the same. Nepal's top donor country's include: Japan, United Kingdom, Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Netherlands, Canada, India and Finland. (ibid)

Nepal has little to worry about concerning its top donor country, Japan, stopping funding purely because of US influence. Recently, the United States made a decision to stop funding allocated to the Palestinian government now that it is headed by an organization that also remains on the United States internal list of terrorist organizations: the Hamas. However, despite the US' decision to cut aid, Japan subsequently allocated US \$30 million to the "terrorist" run government.

After a three-day visit from Nepal's acting Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala in early June 2006, India's Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh agreed to more than double India's aid to Nepal. In addition to increasing general aid, Singh made nine other financial-related benefits such as gifting an immediate one-time grant to Nepal. (ibid)

Thus far, no other countries have made announcements to cut aid to the landlocked country in the event that political integration of the CPNM occurs prior to disarmament.

3.4 India

India has an identity as a South Asian regional superpower. Recognizing the importance of regional support, over the past few years the United States has worked hard to form an alliance with India through a number of bi-lateral agreements. In

March 2006, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met to discuss cooperative efforts including a number of issues namely, energy, trade, and terrorism. (“Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh”, 2006) Singh highlighted the depth of the improved unity between the two countries when stating “that there are no limits to the Indo-U.S. partnerships”. (ibid)

Historically, the CPNM has recognized both India and the United States as imperialist enemies to the revolution. India reciprocates the CPNM’s negative sentiments primarily because the country continues to battle its own Maoist insurgency, the Naxalites, active in at least 14 Indian states. As things began to become bleak for the monarchy in Nepal during April Andolen, Prime Minister Singh held a meeting with the Chief Ministers of all states in India with Maoist representation to discuss new ways to foil the growing revolution. (Josse, 2006)

The government of India has shown a fairly consistent anti-Maoist/pro-Monarchy stance throughout the insurgency and the people’s movements prior to the fall of the monarchy in April 2006. However, The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) has played an active role in encouraging CPNM’s political participation since before the first CPNM-SPA agreement in the fall of 2005. Comrade Prachanda has since acknowledged that advice given prior to November 2005 by Yechury and other party members in Delhi helped shape CPNM’s decision to work in collaboration with the SPA and later attempt political integration. (Haviland, 2006c)

CPI-M remained in dialogue with the government of India regarding developments in Nepal’s political situation. Yechury made the government of India aware of all political discussions in Nepal preceding the people’s movements of both January 2006 and April Andolen. However, despite Yechury’s forewarning of the coming collapse of the monarchy, the government of India continued to support Gyanendra until the April Andolen was in full swing and the power of the people was blatantly evident. Only after it became clear that King Gyanendra could no longer harness power, did India change its pro-royal stance. Following the fall of the monarchy,

Singh praised Yechury and the CPI-M for assisting in the Nepal crisis. Further, Singh stated that India was ready to give “unstinting support to the people of Nepal in whatever manner they wish”. (Rosse, 2006)

The nearly overnight switch in the government of India’s policy towards Nepal’s political situation leaves room for question. Although Prime Minister Singh’s previously mentioned move to up India’s aid to Nepal over the summer of 2006 may seem as though India is putting its money where its mouth is and truly supporting the people’s freedom to decide the political fate of Nepal, more might be at stake than meets the eye.

The India-Nepal aid deal struck in July was the result of a multiple day meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries. Prime Minister Singh is the head of the Indian National Congress Party (INC) while acting Prime Minister Koirala heads the Nepali Congress Party (NC). NC, said to be Nepal’s oldest political party, was originally ideologically and structurally modeled after the INC.

Today, the biggest rift in the attempts for political agreement is division between the NC and the left-leaning parties. Nepal’s acting Prime Minister Koirala not only represents the main party pushing for reinstating the monarchy but also continues to defer the deconstruction of the House of Representatives; two stipulations demanded by the Maoists. India’s recent monetary gifts might have had unseen political implications. Rather than being a gift to ensure the people of Nepal truly guide the outcome of the political situation, it is highly probably that Singh’s pledge to Koirala was a guised exchange between cronies designed to give the government of Nepal and ultimately NC, the foot up in political bargaining against CPNM demands.

3.5 Vulnerability of Disarmed Groups

Although the United States continually urges groups to fully abandon arms prior to coming to the polls, this ignores the threat that the acting government poses to the rebel group. Disarming before electoral participation makes an armed group

vulnerable and subject to loss of power and persuasion even if the opposition group agrees to carry through with certain political stipulations after disarmament begins. If the rebel group does disarm, the opposition (usually a government) usually fails to take the previously armed group's demands seriously and typically fails to uphold promises or stipulations made while the group was still armed. Broken promises and lack of adherence to demands pushes groups to again take up the political use of arms. Although many international actors continually push for disarmament to precede political participation, this rarely, if ever, works.

During the 2003 peace talks in Sri Lanka, the United States attempted to pressure the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to disarm prior to receiving any political assurance from the government of Sri Lanka. The United States and other international actors continue to voice a strong opinion that disarmament of the CPNM should occur immediately before talks of any political participation continue. The United States continually fails to address the human rights violations caused by the Armed Police Force and the NA, and has yet to put any pressure on the government of Nepal to disarm or demobilize either entity. Yet despite the United States' attempts to encourage the CPNM to disarm, the party will staunchly reject this idea until political agreement is reached.

Just as the CPNM today is demanding a power-sharing role in the restructuring of the parliament and constitution, LTTE was also looking for a similar arrangement between itself and the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim elites. Disarming before such an arrangement was made, however, would have left the LTTE with little political pull, much in the same way the CPNM would be if they were to disarm before political guarantees are made. Thus despite the United State's push towards pre-political assurance disarmament, the LTTE remained armed as was politically in their best interest.

Disarmament by the armed group does not have to be an all or nothing situation. A bargain can be struck between the opposing groups that allows the armed group to

retain just enough to arms to make them feel secure but not enough arms to make the opposite force feel insecure.

The South African scenario provides a model for minimal arms retention by the armed group. Although the African National Congress signed the Pretoria Minute on August 6, 1990 expressing a desire to go “as speedily as possible towards a negotiated peaceful political settlement”, there was hesitation to disarm immediately. Rather than disarm completely, amendments were made through the DF Malan Accord to legalise certain arms the ANC deemed necessary in order to protect leadership within their military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK). (Dzinesa, 2006)

Regardless of whether or not an armed group has verbalized a commitment to non-violence or ceasefire, remaining an armed political group also poses a disadvantage. When a group stays armed, it affords oppositional forces the opportunity to make speculations, embellishments and accusations as to the group’s continual use of force. Regardless of whether or not a group uses the threat of weaponry and violence as a means to compel citizens to support their movement, so long as arms are present it is impossible to prove such occurrences do *not* happen.

For example, because South Africa’s MK remained armed after the DF Malan Accord, claims were made that ANC forcibly compelled at least some blacks to participate in the political movement. Such claims are most likely absurd convolutions constructed by oppositional forces attempting to defame ANC, yet because the group remained armed, it is impossible to prove that within the entire country of South Africa not one black participated in the political activities purely out of fear.

Throughout the People’s Revolution, similar accounts of violent persuasion used by the CPNM to gain political support have been made. For example, Jhapendra Khadka claims the CPNM combatants beat him when he did not employ a sympathizer of the party. Khadka believes that UN cantonment camps cannot account for small

weapons held by militia groups under the CPNM banner and a byproduct of the continual circulation of small arms in the field will be violent political force. (ibid) Persons such as Khadka will be the first to believe or perpetuate false accounts of CPNM's misuse of arms during a state of ceasefire.

3.6 Reverting to Unrest

There are many reasons why groups often forego peace processes and revert to violent measures. As stated before, the causes can be related to a lack of confidence in the peace process on one or both sides of the conflict, failure to provide security for the ex-combatants, failure to construct or adhere to a timeline and procedural blueprint, or any of a myriad of other reasons. Despite Comrade Prachanda's claim that nothing that happens will lead the CPNM to go "back to the jungle", many still fear the possibility of the group returning to their former underground identity.

Because of the fragility of resolutions, breakdowns can happen at any time throughout the process. These setbacks may be longer than momentary, yet the reoccurrence of violence does not mean all momentum towards longstanding peace is lost. The two steps forward, one step back approach is not favorable, but it is workable. These apparent "breakdowns" are political tactics to increase bargaining power in negotiations. Although the group outside of the legally represented arena may desire to be incorporated at the electoral level, reverting to methods that create an atmosphere of unrest, such as violence or continual mass protests, can sometimes be a beneficial move.

When groups momentarily back out of peace negotiations, normally they either revert back to old methods of violent practice or utilize their support base to organize mass protests. In Nepal re-arming in a fashion similar to past practices would be harmful not only to the peace negotiations as a whole but to CPNM's public image. It would also destroy any trust that has been built thus far. On the other hand, in the event of setbacks to peace, mass mobilization of CPNM supporters could be advantageous.

While mass movements and acts of outright violence are not the same, both do create an environment of instability. Just as under wartime violence, a state cannot remain fully functional, nor can it do so during periods of perpetual mass mobilization. Aside from bloodshed, there are also political differences between violence and mass mobilization. Although a rebel group wants to convey a message that the state is the enemy, reverting back to violence often has an adverse effect. Violence will leave a portion of the population feeling as though the true enemy is the rebel group. In contrast, mass mobilization paints the picture of the rebels and the people united in opposition to the state.

In South Africa, although the ban on ANC was lifted under President de Klerk in 1990 and procedures to assembling both a multiracial-inclusive government and a new constitution during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in December of 1991, violence was not entirely eliminated, nor was the peace process without its relapses.

Whether delegates from the currently acting political parties would author the new constitution or if the authoring of the document would be the responsibility of newly elected officials following an all-inclusive election, proved to be a major point of contention between particularly ANC and NP. NP's push for a power-sharing structure guaranteeing white veto power was in stark contrast to ANC's insistence in a centralized government with a majority rule eventually led ANC to fall out of CODESA completely.

In the weeks to follow, ANC demonstrated internal disputes as to their own next move. Part of the organization wanted to divert away from peace talks and ceasefire agreements whereas others wanted to forge ahead in dialogue with the other groups to seek resolve. The ANC's internal dilemma led the group to function temporarily in a divided manner with some reverting to protests and mass mobilization.

The mass mobilization of part of the ANC ultimately led to at least two dozen of their own dead in June 1992 alone (Wood, 2000). These deaths, however, helped shed additional light on the numerous atrocities committed by the state against the ANC and the black communities. Although the ANC was still technically an armed rebel group, public deaths at the hand of the South African Government shows an unscrupulous attempt to oppress freedom of organization.

Such was the case during April Andolen in Nepal when the King ordered protesters to be “shot on sight”. While April Andolen was not a CPNM-exclusive movement, the acts committed did enforce the image of the throne as a terrorist of the people that CPNM has long tried to prove. Now, with the King out of power, if the CPNM results in mass protests, any violence at the hand of the NA can potentially cause an equally negative image of the acting government or the SPA.

Elisabeth Woods outlines three benefits of the mid-peace talk mobilization of part of the ANC:

The period of mass action, despite the human costs, ultimately served the negotiations well for three reasons. First, it reminded all parties that a return to mobilization and repression was too costly, underscoring the advantages of compromise. Second, the militance of the campaign suggested to ANC leadership that it should make concessions with caution. Third, the degree of support demonstrated once again to the government that the ANC had an unparalleled following. (2000)

Firstly, Woods points out, is that remobilization is altogether much more costly than negotiation. Both the CPNM and the Government of Nepal have made considerable investments in the activities of war throughout the past decade. In addition to the financial burden, the loss of human life is also one of wartime’s greatest costs. For the past ten years, CPNM has seen violent means as a necessary tool of war. Further, martyrdom of one’s own combatants or activists is also at times, seen as to have

positive impact on a war. However, even the benefits of martyrdom are limited. During the summer of 2006, however, when violence has remained at its lowest, the greatest strides towards sustainable peace and the achievement of CPNM's objectives. At this stage of political dialogue, any relapse to violence or constant will quickly prove a less effective means on the cost-benefit analysis scale.

Second, because mobilization occurred by some but not all of ANC members or supporters, Woods identifies the lesson to be that all agreements made by the party's leaders should be made only after careful consideration of the party as a whole so as not to undermine the people it represents. CPNM leaders and its negotiation team should be well advised to likewise take serious thought as to the wants of its base supporters. Throughout the negotiations, many have questioned why although CPNM repetitively claims to fully represent the people, leaders Baburam Bhattarai and Comrade Prachanda have failed to open the floor for discussion with average citizens. Riverting to violence or mass mobilization after what the majority of the population has seen as a successful start to an all-encompassing democracy may even cause CPNM to lose some of their bargaining power. Perpetuating a state of unrest in the country may create doubt in the citizen's perception of the CPNM's commitment to resolution. Further, returning to arms without the full support of the vast majority to do so, would demonstrate CPNM's continual reliance on the politics of arms to get their way in settlements despite the will of the people.

Although members of both the Maoists and the SPA take a considerable amount of credit for the *Janandolen* II that resulted in the deconstruction of the monarchy, it was in fact a result of not only a combined effort of both CPNM and SPA, but that of the average, unaffiliated citizen as well. Political student leader Gagan Thapa recognized the importance of the people's voice when in an interview to the British Broadcasting Correspondence stated, "In 1990 the parties had to convince the people – but now the people are convincing the parties."

Maoist Negotiation Team Member, Dev Gurung, claims April Andolen as by and large, the worked of CPNM. The CPNM's claim that the mass movement resulting in a victory celebrated by the vast majority of the country was a work of primarily their own doing is a great exaggeration of the truth. Taking credit as the driving force, however, was not an erroneous misperception of reality, but rather a strategic political move.

3.7 History and Structure of the CPNM

Convincing the public of their principal role as the agents of change is one of the most important objectives of the CPNM. One of the CPNM's current aims is demonstrating that the general interests of the party and the people of Nepal are one in the same. The CPNM continues to persuade the people that throughout the revolution, the real enemy of the people has been the NA and the monarchy. CPNM Commissioner Seetal's comment pertaining to the party's recent development endeavors in Palpa District including playground construction, a library and a health clinic, attempts to do just that:

In the past we were preparing for war – we had no time for development. We were too much at risk from the army. But now we're closer to the people every day. Our relations are much improved.

The words of Seetal and other members of CPNM are strategic attempts to boost the public persona of the party. CPNM do not just want to integrate into the political mainstream, they want to be victorious at the ballot box. In the months preceding the elections, the CPNM have continued to remember that reaching political agreement with the government is not their exclusive objective. The party must also be concerned with mustering up additional support that will translate into more votes in any future election.

3.7.1 Structure

The CPNM continued to use CPN-UC's two division structure. The People's Liberation Army became the armed wing and United People's Front became the political wing. Each division had its own leadership at the various levels.

Party	People's Liberation Army	United People's Front
Standing Committee	Central Commission	Military United People's District Committee
Politburo	Regional Commissions	Military United People's Village Committees
Regional Bureaus (five)	District Commissions	Military United People's Ward Committees
Sub-regional bureaus	Included in this are: Temporary Battalion	
District Committees	Companies	
Area Committees	Platoons	
Cell Committees	Squads (separate People's militias also exist under united village people's committees)	

Source: Sudheer Sharma, "The Maoist Movement: An Evolutionary Perspective," in Deepak Thapa, ed., *Understanding the Maoist Movement in Nepal* (Kathmandu: Centre for Social Research and Development, 2003) 379.

Prachanda is the chairperson of the entire party. As chairperson, he is responsible for overseeing all activities in both the political and armed wings. Further, Prachanda has acted as the foremost public face of the party even during its underground existence. Baburam Bhattarai acts as chief of the United People's Front while Ram Bahadar Thapa is head of the PLA. Although technically Prachanda is the superior of the equal-ranking heads of the political and armed divisions, Bhattarai is referred to exclusively as the second in command. Bhattarai's position is unofficially elevated to a higher status than that of the head of the armed wing because the political wing and its leadership is of more importance to the party. Moreover, in many instances Bhattarai is recognized as the low key mastermind behind Prachanda's public persona.

3.7.2 The Legend of Dr. Baburam Bhattarai

Baburam Bhattarai's personality also remains at the heart of one of Nepal's most re-told story of educational inspiration. Bhattarai grew up in Ghoroka district, a rural area of Nepal where educational facilities are sub-par in comparison to the Kathmandu valley. In his peasant society, Bhattarai emerged with academic excellence, earning the country's top score for grade 10 standardized test. The story continues with his two friends and fellow graduates, Upendra Devkhota and Nayan Pokharel, who also ranked in the nation's top scorers. Three peasant youth; Devkhota, Pokharel and Bhattarai; went on to be amongst the ranks of the nation's most influential persons. Devkhota became Nepal's most famous neurosurgeon and acted as Health Minister. Pokharel became one of the country's most prominent religious figures and led the World Hindu Federation. The story of three young friends who changed the face of medicine, religion and politics in Nepal is one Nepalese never grow tired of telling.

Bhattarai's identity as one of the three men in Nepal's legendary tale is bittersweet for CPNM. The three peasant boys who are able to reach their full potential and have had lasting impact on Nepal are inspiration of hope for many. The story itself portrays uncompromising commitment to achievement despite the obstacles of peasantry. The romanticism of Bhattarai's formative years gives CPNM representation in a nationwide tale of victory over the obstacles of circumstance.

CPNM uses charismatic personalities and stories to gain the support. However, the support or following of any organization or leader that is purely based on zeal and captivation is not a solid base. Persons who are easy are easy to convert to any teaching, religion, or political ideology are often the easiest to fall away as well. Other methods must be implemented in order to sustain support.

3.7.3 Theory of Hegemony

Convincing the public of their principal role as the agents of change is one of the most important objectives of the CPNM. One of the CPNM's current aims is demonstrating that the general interests of the party and the people of Nepal are one in the same.

Gramsci's theory of hegemony identifies *domino* and *direzione* as its two main components. *Domino* is the coercion that occurs at various levels of civil society through the penetration of a party's ideology. Coercion may occur with or without the presence of arms. The party uses coercion to instill their objectives on the people who then in turn view the party's objectives as their own. (Callinicos, 1999) The concept that infiltration would occur through various venues such as churches, schools and local organizations until the society was fully penetrated with the ideas of the party was known as the 'war of position'. (Merrington, 1968) The 'war of position' is an analogous reference to a war strategy of "the gradual capture of individual positions" in comparison to another war strategy known as the 'war of manoeuvre' that is a "direct frontal assault". (Callinicos, 1999) The People's Liberation Army portion of the CPNM is able to effectively infiltrate ideas at the local levels. As CPNM's political wing does not have active leadership at the district, area and cell committee levels, the PLA represents the party and its ideas at these levels.

Direzione addresses the party's need to have effective moral leadership. Gramsci saw leadership of consent a mandatory precursor to a party winning an election. (Merrington, 1968) This enables the party to 'lead' the people (although under coercion) rather than dominate them. The political wing of CPNM is the division responsible for leading a consenting public.

3.7.4 Influence of the Parties

The three most influential political parties in Nepal today are Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Communist Party Nepal-Maoist (CPNM). Aside from the issue of arms, CPN-UML and CPNM have demonstrated similar ideological interests. The differences in the two parties' will for the people remains ambiguous when excluding the armed wing of CPNM. Thus, victor of the two parties will largely rely on the personality of leadership. The party successful in persuading similar audiences will be the one that demonstrates the capacity and intellect to lead. One active member of CPN-UML was greatly impressed by Maoist Leader Dev Gurung after interpreting during an interview conducted for this research:

He was one of the politest people I have ever met. I can't believe it, actually. His language was so polite. Really, the way he talked... was so sincere, so genuine. He meant everything he said and he knew what he was talking about. He didn't sound like a politician at all, and definitely not a leading figure in an armed rebellion. (Kunwar, 2006)

To gain influence over supporters of CPN-UML, CPNM must continue to demonstrate that they have the more capable, trustworthy leadership.

Nepal's primary right-leaning party is Nepali Congress. The party's main platforms have consistently been the push for a constitutional monarchy and increased economic liberalization. Yet, the party's slogan remains "Democracy. Socialism. Nationalism." The slogan would more accurately apply to either CPNM or CPN-UML. Thus, unintentionally, NC's most basic ideological guideline infiltrates the position of CPNM, yet their actual politics do not. In order to harness support away from NC, CPNM must prove to the people that yes, NC's slogan of "Democracy, Socialism, Nationalism" is what you want, but it is not what you will get with NC.

To foil NC's reputation as a party in favor of socialism, CPNM must keep April Andolen at the forefront of the mind of the public. NC's push to reinstate the

monarchy despite the perseverance of the people to oust King Gyanendra because of his oppression of the people and feudal practices that are anti-socialist must be repeatedly exposed. Keeping the events of April Andolen fresh is necessary to continually remind the people *why* they struggled so long. Reiterating that it was the people, not only CPNM, that wanted the King out, will help CPNM successfully lead the coerced will of the people.

3.8 The Royal Dilemma

For as long as CPNM has been in existence, they have opposed the monarchical system. Prior to the April Andolen, the Himalayan Kingdom was the only legally Hindu state in the world. Nepalese interpretation of Hinduism sees the King as a reincarnation of the Hindu God, Krishna. In addition to rejecting the monarchy because of the feudalism it perpetuates, CPNM rejects even the presence of a ceremonial kingship on the basis of Maoist beliefs in a secular state.

Faith in the King as a god reincarnated was destroyed for many at the time of the massacre of Gyanendra's predecessor, Bihendra. By the end of April Andolen, the majority of the population had debunked past ties between the King and the gods. However, despite the harsh reaction of the people towards the throne once revered as holy, this long engrained tradition of religion has given room for some to believe reinstating a ceremonial king would not only be accepted by the majority but also beneficial to the government.

Following King Gyanendra's surrender of power after April Andolen, the role of the Nepal Army (NA) has become increasingly unclear. Without King Gyanendra, the individual previously responsible for controlling the armed unit formerly known as the Royal Nepal Army, many members of SPA, particularly NC, feel there is little sense of direction concerning the NA.

Although the Seven Party Alliance is responsible for constructing both the interim and new governments, they do not have the loyalty of the army in the same way as a reigning King. Subir Khanal, personal advisor to two previous Prime Ministers, sees the army dilemma as a major point of contention because this sole issue has left the SPA completely divided on what to do with the King.

Despite the mass movement of the greater portion of the entire Nepalese population demanding the King capitulate his position as dictator, the right-leaning parties of the SPA still see room for the King as purely a figurehead with his lone responsibility to be commanding the army. Khanal states:

As the system is currently set up, without the King controlling the army, the only person in full command is the Army's Commander in Chief. In a country like Nepal, with only one armed unit - without an Air Force, Navy, or Marines unit - this leaves the country very vulnerable. In countries with multiple armed units, there is a share of power. But since this army, who is only trained that their sole authority is the Army's Commander in Chief, is our only unit there is little accountability. There is no other unit, no other authority to whom they feel compelled to listen to, nothing to keep the army and its Commander in Chief fully in check.

Most of those persons from the left who participated in the strikes for 19 days straight hardly see the unscrupulous former King as an adequate authority for keeping the army responsible for grave human rights violations in check. Although Khanal agrees the former king, Gyanendra, is not an ideal person to sit on the throne, the lack of unified direction has crippled the SPA and ultimately the process of peace:

The SPA's main problem is they are not confident that they are the ones controlling the army. Only until the Nepal Army is really under the SPA or the King, can the

dialogues go on successfully. This point, this issue of what to do with the army and whether to bring the King in as a symbolic King with the duty of being the voice over the army or not has successfully divided the parties. Some cannot agree to the King whatsoever. A large reason for this is because having a king would mean having Gyanendra as king. If it were Bihendra, it would be a different story. More people would be willing. But it's not and we have to deal with that. So, what to do? Only one thing is sure. So long as the SPA is divided on the issue of the army and sub sequentially, the monarchy, they are not clear to deal with the Maoists. (2006)

Recent announcements that the 1,792 hectares of land owned by the royal family will be redistributed to the landless nearly guarantees that while the parties may feel it is necessary to maintain a throne for the purpose of army control, the king will remain out of power. Reports claim the royal family will only keep ownership of 18.92 hectares of land, the maximum amount of land past laws allow average citizens to own. Yet, despite the announcement of redistribution of the royal properties, the government of Nepal still shows favour towards instilling the Royal Succession Act in attempts to keep a ceremonial monarchy.

The SPA's fear that having only one branch of military is dangerous for the country ignores the existence of the Armed Police Force (APF). The APF is a paramilitary body that was created with the intention of acting as part of a checks and balance system for the then Royal Nepal Army during the CPNM insurgency. The APF has worked on assignment alongside the (R)NA on virtually all major insurgent-related assignments.

CPNM sees no reason that anyone other than the ruling Prime Minister should be responsible for the Nepal Army. The rationale given by party members that the King is necessary in order to keep the Army Commander in Chief in check is incoherent

reasoning rejected by the CPNM leaders. Previously, the King was responsible for appointing the Army Commander in Chief. Thus, there is no reason why appointing the King to oversee the army and Commander in Chief in which he himself appoints, would act as a check system. As the country will have a democratically elected ruling Prime Minister, CPNM sees no reason why he or she will not be capable of performing the duty of overseeing the army just as efficiently as some perceive the King would. Further, appointing an individual who is not elected by the people to be in control of an armed unit directly violates democratic principles. Ultimately, maintaining a monarchy solely to control the army is a weak excuse to perpetuate long running feudalistic systems.

The army dilemma affects the political integration of CPNM because of the division it causes amongst SPA members in regards to the monarchy. The rebel group has a long opposition to the existence of the monarchy even as a constitutional monarchy. Any strong push towards retaining the monarchy would result in the Maoists pulling out of peace dialogues.

3.9 The Constitution

At the present time, Nepal is not only determining the best strategy to begin DDR and political integration for the Maoists in attempts to end the ten year conflict, it is also concerned with restructuring the entire governmental body. Although Koirala is sitting as Prime Minister, in reality the people have not given him the power to be a central, final decision maker. The former king, Gyanendra, left fundamental governing responsibilities in the hands of a disagreeing Seven Party Alliance, who are primarily responsible for formulating the interim government and arranging the Constituent Assembly elections. However, despite the presence of a Prime Minister, there is no identifiable authoritative body calling the shots - at present, it isn't even clear who is commanding the Nepal Army.

The absence of a pre-existing government is both a blessing and a curse. While the lack of a unified voice from the SPA exasperates negotiations, building a new government virtually from scratch allows breathing room for more give and take progressions. Restructuring the government also allows the CPNM to be included at the decision-making level. If a constitution, rule of law, and official government body were already in place, there would be less space to fulfill the objectives of a rebel group through peaceful agreements.

The curse, however, lies in the details pertaining to the restructuring of the government. A major component of which, is writing the new constitution. Rewriting the constitution was a point of contention between the government of Nepal and CPNM. The finality of a constitution and its role as the foundation of the country's legal system led CPNM to reject the possibility of assigning this task to the existing or future interim government. In lieu of a permanent constitution, the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee (ICDC) was allocated the task of drafting the temporary document. This committee is comprised of members of the SPA, CPNM, Dalits, and ethnic minority groups.

An incomplete draft was submitted in late August 2006, but major points of contention include the monarchy's role through the interim phase, the federal system and the interim parliament. (ibid) The draft constitution allows the monarchy to remain intact yet powerless under the interim government. Article 165 of the draft leaves the decision of the monarchy's future in the hands of a referendum scheduled to take place during the Constituent Assembly elections.

3.10 House of Representatives

As of August 2006, an interim House of Representatives had yet to replace the pre-April Andolen HoR. Maoist leaders continue to petition the government to deconstruct the current HoR, stating that their failure to do so has the potential to interrupt the peace process. In addition to CPNM leaders, the existing HoR has

gained criticism for remaining in tact solely to ensure the job security of individual representatives seeking tenure.

Despite the opposition, Prime Minister Koirala has stated that as of now the government would not dissolve the HoR. (ibid) This presents a problems seeing as the CPNM has stated the construction of an interim government is a requirement if PLA disarmament is to occur. Failure to construct an interim government perpetuates a past system which does not grant representation to the CPNM, minority ethnic groups or low caste communities such as the Dalits. Inclusion at the decision-making level is pivotal to CPNM integration. Koirala's commitment to the old system seems to demonstrate a higher level of loyalty to members of the House than to the peace process.

3.11 Vision of CPNM

The CPNM wants to destroy the centuries-old feudalistic system. This includes removing the caste system that divides the population. CPNM gives special concern to the Dalits, the "untouchable" caste, but also seeks equality for ethnic minorities. CPNM's power-sharing structure includes proportional assembly representation for all groups in Nepal. (ibid) Further, the CPNM seeks representation of women. (ibid)

In addition to giving political representation to the various castes, ethnicities and genders in Nepal, the primary objective of CPNM is to build a democratic republic. In basic terms, a republic requires the voice of the governed population determine the political power of an elected government. The only offer the CPNM has made to fully disarm and destroy all weapons was in exchange for transforming Nepal into a republic reinforces the truth that the republic is the CPNM's goal.

Maoist Negotiation Team Leader, Dev Gurung claimed CPNM will not move forward towards the republic without the blessing of the people, which in his mind, could take a very long time:

We want everything to be the will of the people. As things are now, people cannot have a full appreciation for the benefits of the republic, and [CPNM] understand[s] that. First, we want the people to be allowed to voice their own opinion and to be the one's leading the government. The people should be the driving force. So for now, we choose democracy. When will the republic come? We cannot know right now but it isn't anytime soon. Little by little we will show the people, we will teach the people so they can have an understanding as to the positive benefits of the movement. Then, after they see, after they understand- then they will be the driving force leading to the republic. (2006)

Dev Gurung's estimation as to the people's preparedness for a republic may be underestimated considering CPNM is not alone in desiring a republic state. Other parties such as the Communist Party Nepal United Marxist-Leninist Party (CPN-UML) and organizations such as the Civil Movement for Democracy and Social Transformation (CMDST) are also pushing for a republic state.

Recently, the CPNM has mustered up support from the Communist Party Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist party (CPN-UML) for a push towards a democratic republic. After growing discontent with the SPA's other predominant party, Nepali Congress (NC), right-leaning practices, CPN-UML has sided with the CPNM. Together the two groups plan on forming a new group comprised of various parties with the aim of building a "democratic republican order as a matter of ideology".

CPN-UML leaders made the move towards alliance building with CPNM after coming to a consensus that NC; a party with which CPN-UML worked closely during February's opposition to the municipality elections and through April Andolen, should be "shunned as an ally for a long time". The new front created by the CPNM

and CPN-UML designed to promote the democratic republic ideology will consist of any group in favor of such ideology regardless of their political opinions on various other issues. (ibid)

The two groups are not alone in their desire to build a democratic republic. The Civil Movement for Democracy and Social Transformation (CMDST), an organization representing more than 36 civil society groups, also has plans in motion to promote the creation of a democratic republic. CMDST has programs planned in five cities throughout the early fall of 2006 aimed at promoting preservation of the great strides towards democracy made since April Andolen.

Yet despite the common goal of CMDST and the CPNM and CPN-UML alliance, CMDST strongly rejects the use of arms. Arjun Karki, a member of CMDST representing the NGO Federation stated, “The politics of arms should end. For the Maoists can launch an armed struggle even after the conclusion of the disarmament process. Arms management alone will not suffice. The focus should be on ending the politics of arms.”

Just as Mahara’s statement showed political agreement must precede disarmament, Karki’s statement shows there are many who still believe no political agreement can be trusted without the preceding of not only physical disarmament, but also mental disarmament that rejects the use of weaponry as a medium of political bargaining power.

From the Maoists’ perspective, peace-seekers have given too much emphasis on disarmament and not enough emphasis on the political agreement. Statements such as Mahara’s that total disarmament and weapon destruction will be a result of a republic should lead politicians and peace-seekers to realize DDR will be a by-product of political agreement and that the two are inseparable: disarmament will come only with a political situation accepted by the CPNM and not a minute sooner.

3.12 Political Agreement versus Disarmament

In many conflict situations, opposing sides see the answers for resolution from contrasting angles. As in the case of Nepal, typically one side sees the focal point as being political agreement, whereas the other side sees it as disarmament. The former often demands a nearly complete political agreement before it will consent to disarmament. In contrast, the latter often demands nearly complete disarmament before it will consent to any great political agreements. This either-or approach often leaves peace talks stalemate.

In April 1999, a year after Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement, no resolution was developed between the opposition. The contrasting emphasis of arms versus political agreement was the primary, if not sole reason the peace talks remained stagnate. Nepal is facing a similar situation as the main point of contention between the Government of Nepal and the CPNM continues to be arms management and disarmament. On one side of the conflict, the CPNM is demanding political agreement to occur prior to any disarmament. On the flip side, the government is requiring CPNM disarmament occur before any political agreement can be made.

Both political agreement and disarmament are necessary for lasting resolve. Further, both sides should benefit from both disarmament and political agreement. Currently, the CPNM only see the party benefiting from political agreement. Likewise, the government and SPA see only disarmament of the CPNM as a benefit to their overall objective for peace. However, despite this confusion, the CPNM can also benefit from a disarmament process and the SPA and Government of Nepal can benefit from a political agreement.

As Nepal is restructuring the entire government body, political agreements are a necessary step regardless of whether or not the CPNM is involved in the decision-making process. If the CPNM was not present in political decisions, the SPA would be in no quicker position to agree upon the structure of the new government. As it stands, the seven parties are divided on fundamental issues that are hindering the

agreement process. Considering the situation, reaching political agreement will not only benefit the CPNM, but will enable the entire government structuring process to move forward.

Likewise, a disarmament agreement can also benefit the CPNM. Disarmament procedures can be exchanged for particular points on the political agreement agenda. Also, the CPNM can most likely successfully request at least partial demilitarization of the state in exchange for the disarmament of PLA combatants.

Procedural steps must be considered once at least an initial agreement to begin DDR of the PLA and NA is made. The DDR process may seem like a technical process, however, breakdowns in the technicality can lead to breakdowns in the peace process and political integration. Thus, just as the actual political agreements are important to concluding the war in Nepal, so are the procedural steps of DDR.



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CHAPTER 4: DISARMAMENT, DEMOBOLIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is the process by which armed forces surrender arms, disband as an organized group, and rejoin society as laypersons. In most instances, this process is normally directed solely at the rebel group. In Nepal, all eyes have been on the disarmament of CPNM. However, the process is also applicable to state-led forces. The number of mobilized troops patrolling the country is higher during a state of war than a state of peace. Thus, as Nepal transitions out of war, the number of soldiers and arms in the NA will also need to decline.

As previously stated, being an armed group increases the bargaining power of the CPNM and gives political leverage that otherwise might be minimal or nonexistent. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the group will undergo disarmament prior to participating in the electoral process. Similar demands to be included in the executive process prior to disarmament have occurred with other rebel groups, including Northern Ireland's Sinn Fein.

4.1 Why Disarmament Must Occur

In the most recent statements made regarding disarmament, Maoist negotiator Krishna Mahara named disarming before elections a "suicidal" move by the party. Disarmament is a suicidal move when it is a one-sided endeavor. Attention has circled almost exclusively around the disarmament of the CPNM despite the gross human rights violations committed by the Armed Police Force and the Nepal Army.

However, despite the reality that it is not anticipated that CPNM disarm prior to an election to a constituent assembly, inevitably the group must disarm after time. It may be argued that other political groups throughout the world continue to remain armed entities whilst being legally represented at the ballot box such as is the case in Palestine and the Philippines. Palestine's maintenance of the Hamas as an armed

group is because Palestinians see themselves in a war of National Liberation. The New People's Army in the Philippines can coexist with Bayan Muna and the Communist Party of the Philippines because unlike the CPNM in Nepal, they are nowhere near entering the government through elections.

4.2 Disarmament

Nine standard conditions are typically considered during the first step of DDR, disarmament. Being the first component of the DDR process, disarmament also includes laying the groundwork for the demobilization and reintegration to follow. These conditions are to assist DDR to be as successful as possible. These conditions include: **consent, armed forces command, ceasefire, procedures and timing, donors, target groups, supervision, neutral international observers, and effectiveness and viability.**

4.2.1 Consent and Armed Forces Command

Consent refers to the willingness of all parties involved to partake in DDR. Without consent of both the acting government and the armed rebel group, disarmament is a nearly impossible feat. Forced DDR is not realistic because of the impracticality of knowing the number of arms without participation and the information offered by insurgents and leaders. Furthermore, forced DDR would more suitably be called a war victory from the opposing side rather than “disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.”

In Sierra Leone, DDR began prior to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement in July of 1999. In February 1998, almost a year and a half before inking the agreement, the government of Sierra Leone took thousands of members of the rebel group Revolutionary United Front, under custody both voluntarily and forcefully. While all combatants were disarmed, less than half completed the reintegration plan designed to train ex-combatants to be members of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). Just as the government of Sierra Leone was incapable of successfully demobilizing the

Revolutionary United Front through force, the government of Nepal is also incapable of forcefully disarming CPNM in a lasting manner.

Further, aside from consent at the official level, consent must also be present at the **armed forces command** level. Because decision makers are rarely in direct contact with those combatants on the ground, and even more rarely if the conflict covers a vast area of mountainous terrain with little available infrastructure as is the case in Nepal, the consent of the armed forces command level is where much of the success of DDR plans and peace accords lies.

Many armed rebellion groups face the problem of splinter groups. Splinter groups can be either groups that later disagree with the original rebel group and thus form a smaller group, or are groups which existed independently but allowed themselves to be absorbed by the larger group in order to have access to arms, support, etc.

Both scenarios make compliance at the armed forces command level difficult. Agreements reached among leaders are often violated by splinter groups. In Northern Ireland, despite the April 10, 1998 signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the result of ten months of peace talks, Ireland suffered its most deadly paramilitary attack only four months later resulting in 29 dead and over 100 injuries. The Real IRA, a splinter group of the IRA, is named the party responsible for the attacks.

Nepal also faces potential dangers of splinter groups. In May, Maoist Prabhaker described CPNM's army as a "politically indoctrinated" army willing to adhere to all instructions given by the top commanders, including instructions to disarm. However, Prabhaker's generalization makes the dangerous assumption that all combatants are only ready to adhere to the will of Prachanda, Bhattarai, and the CPNM negotiation team, and do not have any agenda of their own.

During an interview, Khushi Man Gurung, former CPNM Logistics Director for Kaski district, voiced a growing discontent with the party he represented for more than three

years and served an 18-month prison sentence for his membership in the formerly illegal group. Gurung, a Mongolian ethnic minority, claimed that at least 600 combatants in only one isolated area had broken away from the Maoists to form a new faction, *Tamuone Muhkti Kacha*. Allegedly, the 600 combatants are part of a larger network breaking away from CPNM.

Khusi Man Gurung stated that although these 600 combatants wore the Maoist uniform and bore the scarlet letter of the armed insurgents all the way to prison, ulterior motives aside from CPNM's own agenda existed since the group merged with the Maoists years earlier. He claimed that the splinter group had possession of over 500 arms, however only approximately 200 of which were functional. In addition to the arms already had, Gurung stated a training was being conducted to instruct the ex-Maoists how to steal weaponry back from the CPNM to support its own ethnic agenda.

Aside from actual weaponry, Gurung said amongst the 600 ex-Maoists are those individuals previously responsible for bomb construction. Thus, along with Ak-47s and other small arms, the splinter group is said to have a significant knowledge base to aid the efforts of another uprising.

While no validity of the above-mentioned claims has been made as of yet, the likelihood of such occurrences is high. Other affiliates of the Maoists party that have supported and battled under the CPNM umbrella through the duration of the decade long conflict include the Tarai Liberation Front and the Kirant Workers Party. The Tarai Liberation Front's ulterior motive is to gain autonomy for Nepal's southern Tarai region (which borders India). The Kirant Worker's Party represents an ethnic minority in the less- Maoist occupied eastern region of the country. The primary, if not sole interest that has led the Kirant Worker's Party to join the Maoist struggle is the betterment of their own ethnic minority group. If CPNM fails to ensure the ability to provide for the vested interests of these support groups, their consensus to

participate in DDR and their overarching support for CPNM as an unarmed political body is in jeopardy.

Tamuone Mukhti, Kirant Workers Party, and Tarai Liberation Front only minimally illustrate the numerous ethnic identities throughout Nepal. The CPNM has maintained support from various ethnic minorities hoping to gain political representation. Yet, throughout its existence, CPNM has failed to incorporate ethnic minorities and lowest members of society such as the Dalits and Sunwars, in any legitimate role of leadership. Prachanda, Baburam Bhattarai and other key leaders are all decedents of ethnic majorities and middle-high castes. The absence of inclusion at the decision-making level drives individuals such as Khusi Man Gurung to join oppositional fronts that outwardly express a specific interest in the plight of ethnic minorities.

4.2.2 Ceasefire

A ceasefire must not only be called, but also adhered to, prior to starting a process of DDR. Attempting to begin the process of disarmament without ceasefire not only makes the entire DDR process instable, it endangers the lives of the agents of DDR.

This relates to the aforementioned commitment of the armed forces command. The primary reason that ceasefires are not abided by throughout the country is largely due to the lack of proximity between the place or places of decision-making and the places where the vast majority of insurgents are active.

In Nepal, for example, virtually all decision making occurs within the capital, Kathmandu. Yet, although top ranking Maoist officials agreed to a ceasefire in April 2006, acts of violence continued in areas outside of the Kathmandu Valley. Between mid-May and late June alone, reports held Maoists responsible for at least nine deaths and numerous kidnappings. The absence of basic infrastructure such as telephone

lines can be in part to blame for the diffusion of peace, which at the core of the capital appears to be a solid, steadfast commitment.

Not knowing “what’s going on in Kathmandu” is a common claim made by Maoists, politicians and locals only 200 kilometers west of the capital in the highly media accessible Pokhara. It can only be assumed that persons in isolated western regions with little access to news of their capital-based higher ups experience an even stronger feeling of information insularity.

In order for the ceasefire to be upheld without any command attacks occurring by simple failure to understand the agreements made within the capital city, CPNM and DDR officials must make every effort to fully communicate negotiations to PLA in the field.

4.2.3 Procedures and Timing

The *hows* and *whens* of DDR are usually set forth in the peace accord. While the peace accord may give exact dates for specific requirements (specific number of arms to be surrendered by an exact date), flexibility is crucial to a successful DDR. So long as progress is being made and the combatants continue to be compliant, the actors involved in DDR typically sidestep the hard line approach of demanding fulfillment of a rigid timeline.

The development of the timeline is central to the successes and failures of DDR programmes. While it is important that DDR starts as promptly as possible after the signing of peace agreements, it is also important that all plans are made with careful consideration rather than in a rushed fashion. Lack of a thorough weapons assessment, budget, and ample donations to fund DDR, or oversight of other significant details can topple the normally already frail peace agreements.

El Salvador’s Chapultepec Accord amassed more than one hundred dates pertaining to DDR requirements. Such deadlines were documented in reference to the date of

the ceasefire agreement, which became known as “D-day”. For example, the day for dissolution of the acting intelligence body was D+135, or 135 days after ceasefire.(ibid) While not all of the specific dates of when individual DDR activities were to be accomplished were in fact met, the plan did provide functional benchmarks that aided in the success of El Salvador’s resolution. Further, the promptness in which DDR began after the Chapultepec Accord left no time for either party to back out of the agreement and thus helped propel the peace process forward according to plan.

Commitment to meeting the fulfillment of DDR schedules is external evidence of the parties’ dedication to the peace process. Failure to meet disarmament deadlines creates apprehension and doubt on both sides of conflict. Peace accords and DDR blueprints become weak and fragile if both parties do not see progression in the process.

The breakdown of DDR in Sierra Leone can in part be attributed to the failure to maintain deadlines to at very least, a minimal degree. Although the *Lome Peace Agreement* set forth a plan to officially begin the next attempt at disarmament within six weeks of its signing, the process did not begin until approximately three months had already passed.

In Indonesia, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed in the latter part of 2002 as an attempt to bring peace between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement failed for a number of reasons, including the lack of a sufficient timetable for DDR activities. Although Article 5 of COHA was allocated to the specifics of the disarmament timeframe, only the DDR starting date was mentioned rather than a complete outline as to the steps along the way. The absence of detailed DDR instruction in COHA left the peace agreement subject to an almost inevitable failure.

As previously stated, CPNM has used arms to maintain political control in rural areas through their own system of governance known as the “people’s government” established after the deconstruction of state VDCs. In the June 16th agreements with SPA, the CPNM promised to end their local governing bodies in exchange for dissolving the parliament, re-writing an interim constitution, and allocating a date for the constituent assembly elections. The SPA-CPNM agreement did not indicate how many “people’s governments” would be dissolved at each phase. The vague nature of the agreement is an ongoing strategy of the CPNM. CPNM did not agree to any step by step plan to deconstruct a certain number of people’s governments as each of aforementioned demands were met. This strategy allows the CPNM to hold on to their local governments assists the group in maintaining a large amount of control throughout the country until every aspect of their agreement is fulfilled. On August 24, 2006 a first draft of the interim constitution was submitted yet no correlating information pertaining to the status of the CPNM’s promise to deconstruct people’s governments has been made.

Timelines should not exclusively pertain to activities relating to disarmament. Rather, timelines should outline a simultaneous plan representing both disarmament activities as well as political guarantees. Excluding political guarantees promotes a one-sided plan highly susceptible to failure.

4.2.4 Donors

One of the major reasons for the delayed start in Sierra Leone is the lack of funds necessary to implement DDR. The Lome Peace Agreement’s failure to consider funding whilst making a timeline hindered the process and crippled progress in the plan towards lasting resolution, thus unintentionally setting peace efforts up for failure.

Just as wartime expenditures are high, post-conflict endeavors are also costly. Securing funds prior to implementation is vital. Throughout the duration of the war,

Nepal's government has received funding specifically allocated to thwarting the CPNM to bring lasting peace to the country. The most efficient way to secure aid for DDR is for the SPA and interim government to convince the countries previously providing funds to Nepal's military efforts to redirect the funds.

Although the motivation for providing a country with military aid and DDR aid are politically different, there are international benefits to financial assisting DDR plans. For example, India has its own Maoist insurgency, the Naxalites, in the northern region of the country. In the past, India has provided its northern neighbor with military aid in attempts to rid the country of the insurgents. While India is less than excited about the possibility of the CPNM participating in the government and potentially coming to power democratically, India realizes this scenario may be unavoidable and disarmament of the party can at least potentially help contain CPNM activities to within its own borders. UN representative, Ian Martin and his team is currently organizing funding for the DDR process. As of late August 2006, funds those pledging to contribute include Norway, India and the EU. (ibid)

4.2.5 Target Groups

It is necessary to identify the groups targeted for disarmament prior to starting DDR. In some situations, more than one group will disarm during DDR. This includes both multiple rebel groups or a combination of rebel group(s) and state armies. In addition to recognizing the groups that shall undergo DDR, it is also imperative to outline what to what extent the group or groups will go through DDR. Partial disarmament occurs when only a portion of one particular armed group disarms while other combatants operating under the same command remain in tact.

Between 1992 and 2000, the El Salvadoran Army was reduced to less than half of its wartime size. The FMLN's refusal to fully undergo DDR without such sizeable reductions by the government's army pushed the government to make drastic changes in its own armed forces. Because peacetime budgets typically allot less money for

military expenditures, reducing the state-led army is a win-win situation. First, it cuts down the government's own expenses and second, it can encourage rebels to follow suit. If done simultaneously with the rebels, DDR of a government army may be considered a measure of good faith, a necessary element in conflict resolution.

It is assumable that CPNM will not partake in a one-sided disarmament plan that targets only PLA combatants. The NA and the Armed Police Force must also be a target group for disarmament if DDR is going to be fair and successful. As stated, pre-April Andolen Nepal was heavily militarized with NA and APF checkpoints throughout the country. These military zones are no longer in existence, thus the need for the troops deployed to them is void. With an absence of need, there is no justifiable reason to maintain an oversized Nepal Army.

The Ceasefire Agreement drafts written in July 2006 addressed both the NA and PLA. Amongst other requirements, both groups were banned from recruitment. Such agreements insinuate that equal plans for the NA and the PLA are in the makings.

4.2.6 Neutral International Observers

Mediation is often done by international organizations such as the United Nations. Once again, consent by all parties as to *whom* will observe is fundamental. Failure to involve all parties in the process of inviting a third entity no doubt will cause friction and reservations on the part of the party or parties excluded from the decision-making.

In July 2006, the SPA wrote a letter to the United Nations inviting their participation in the DDR process. While the CPNM has previously been in favour of UN participation, the SPA's choice to invite them as a third party actor without consulting the CPNM first, was highly criticized. Maoist Negotiation Team Member, Dev

Gurung publicly condemned the letter and demanded that the Maoists should be involved in all such decisions.

Yet, when all sides of a conflict welcome an international observer, the role of teams from the UN and other organizations is often times invaluable. Even El Salvador's highly acclaimed Chapultepec Accord had obstacles along the way that by and large were remedied through the assistance of international observers. In the initial weeks following the February 1992 cease-fire El Salvador's peace process seemed in jeopardy. The one-month deadline to fully converge the government Armed Forces was not met, numerous problems regarding land were unresolved, and ARENA's approved to keep the National Guard and Treasury Police by merely changing their names despite an agreement made to dissolve the two units. The commitment that both the government and FMLN had in turning towards ONUSAL, the UN organized committee, helped El Salvador find resolution through the disputes. "According to one ONUSAL official, the UN mission's high profile presence "made it difficult for the two sides to intensify the fighting or to walk away from the negotiating table," and neither side wanted to be perceived as the "spoiler".

In Aceh, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was founded by the European Union and ASEAN countries in order to assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of GAM in August 2005. The Government of Indonesia and GAM both agreed to "give all its support for carrying out the mandate of AMM. Support consisted of providing a safe environment and free movement for AMM representatives as well as compliance with and "full cooperation" with AMM activities. The consensus between the Government of Indonesia and GAM to form an international observation group attributes to the relative success of the recent DDR process in Aceh.

Although the SPA's petitioning of UN assistance early in the summer of 2006 was highly criticized for its failure to incorporate CPNM in the request, not all hope for international observation in Nepal was lost. By August 2006, SPA and CPNM had

drafted yet another multiple point-agreement, under which they jointly sought UN participation in the peace process. Having both the SPA and the CPNM on board under the five-point agreement sets UN monitoring up for a higher chance of success. Under the new agreement, PLA and NA combatants will remain under UN care at least until the Constituent Assembly is completed, yet rejects UN peacekeeping forces within the country.

4.2.7 Supervision

Hand in hand with international observation is internal supervision. This requires that acting representatives of all involved parties take part in supervising the peace process and actual disarmament to at least some extent. Continual consultation of all parties ensures a better chance at completing DDR. In Nepal, a supervising committee will include SPA, Government of Nepal and CPNM members. The primary function of the committee is to ensure timetables and procedural agreements are fulfilled and all actors adhere to commitments agreed upon under peace agreements.

Duties of supervision also include aspects such as the UN-led cantonment camps in the makings in Sindhuli, Sindhupalchowk, Palpa and Surket. The CPNM has agreed to keep its combatants in the camps, yet has refused to separate from arms despite the government's insistence. During a briefing given to PLA combatants in mid-August 2006, battalion commissioners reminded the soldiers that even under the new containment camp, the PLA should be prepared to follow commands to destroy the camps in absolute crisis. (ibid)

If CPNM's main objective was to destroy UN camps, they would not have agreed to take part in the first place. The instructions given to the combatants by commissioners are worst-case scenarios, and while the CPNM may be refusing to separate from arms within the camp during the early stages, this does not rule out later options of in-camp disarmament:

Our arms are like a life-partner for us. It would be quite new for us to separate from them. If it's a conspiracy that makes us give them up, we'll revolt. But, if it is for peace and directed by the party, I'd do anything. (ibid)

Although the CPNM has agreed to place combatants under UN supervision, they have not agreed to allow the UN to take part in the peace process. CPNM leader, Baburam Bhattarai said that SPA and the CPNM must reach a concrete political agreement before the monitoring team that the UN has already established may help with the peace process.

4.2.8 Effectiveness and Viability

Effectiveness and Viability refers to the logistical side of disarmament. This takes into account inhibiting infrastructural inadequacies in order to foresee potential problems in disarmament. In Nepal, many combatants are dispersed throughout remote mountainous terrains absent of roads. Combatants are very used to the conditions of walking great distances throughout the ups and downs of the rural areas for wartime activities, however their gumption to do so to cooperate with disarmament procedures will not be on par with that had during revolutionary tasks. Thus, to ensure an effective disarmament, DDR officials must take in consideration the locale of collection sites and make them as easily accessible as possible. Further, they must ensure combatants are well informed to the sites' whereabouts.

4.2.9 Compensation

The most effective way to entice combatants to turn weapons in to collection sites is by offering compensation per weapon surrendered. However, offering money for weapons can also encourage the importation of more arms to not only combatants but non-combatants as well.

During the DDR process in Sierra Leone, individuals who brought hand grenades worth a mere US \$10 were given a payment of US\$300. This resulted in an influx of arms not had during wartime from neighboring countries such as Guinea for a quick profit. There were little to no way for DDR officials to verify whether or not arms brought to collection sites were new arrivals to Sierra Leone and whether or not those surrendering were really combatants of war or not.

The most obvious way to avoid funding ‘start-up’ entrepreneurs that import arms purely to sell directly to the DDR collection sites is to pay a fair, not exorbitant rate for such arms. Systems rewarding individuals with alternative compensation such as food, material goods, or credit can be given in lieu of hard cash as well.

4.2.10 Weapons Assessment

A thorough weapons assessment will outline the exact number of each type of weapon in the possession of the armed group as well as the location of the said weaponry. By and large, obtaining an accurate number of weapons is virtually impossible yet without these numbers the actual success of the disarmament process is difficult to measure.

Normally, this information must be offered by the group undergoing disarmament themselves. In many instances, the group has kept nearly accurate track of the number and whereabouts of their arms. However, it is common for rebel group leaders to modify the total number of arms. This allows rebel groups to hold on to some of their arms while still making the DDR appear successful.

Subir Khanal estimates that when the CPNM eventually does give an approximate number of arms in their possession, the figure will represent approximately half of those actually in existence. Khanal’s anticipation that the group will report such a low amount of arms shows an absent of trust the government has for the CPNM. Likewise, any failure to report an accurate number of arms is due to the CPNM’s own

lack of trust in the government or SPA because of the absence of any concrete political guarantee.

In Nepal, The Ceasefire Agreement drafts of July 2006 outlined a plan to keep records of all weaponry had by both the NA and the PLA. Keeping data on the armed unit of both sides insinuates that DDR plans will include both the state army and the CPNM army.

In El Salvador, the FMLN is said to have disarmed in a time period of only eight months, however, it was discovered that FMLN had obscured the number of arms in possession and thus retained a large number of weaponry from ONUSAL. Because the discovery of the hidden arms was made public, FMLN turned in massive amounts of withheld weapons. However, there is no guarantee that even then, FMLN handed over all secret weapons to ONUSAL.

In Indonesia, the vague nature of the timeline and procedures constructed in COHA includes in part the negligence to perform a systematic weapons assessment. The Indonesian agreement required that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) surrender 20% of its weapons each month for the five months following the initiation of DDR. Yet the absence of any weaponry data made it statistically impossible to know exactly how many weapons comprised 20% of the GAM's total amassed arms.

Following a gradation of trust, the first weapons typically surrendered by the armed rebellion are highly dilapidated or completely functionless. Over the duration of collection, the quality of the weaponry surrender is directly related to the growing trust. As the rebel group's trust for the collection officials and the opposition group grows, the quality of arms also grows. The highest quality, most effective weapons are kept under the rebel group's possession until the finality of the collection. Retaining the best weaponry is a defense mechanism employed by the rebel group: if there is a return to conflict, the rebel group is not with its least functional arms, but rather its best.

4.3 Demobilization

The second “D” in DDR, demobilization, is defined by the United Nations as the “process by which armed forces either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace.” The word demobilization literally means to make inactive or stagnate, however in DDR, the process of demobilization specifically refers to organized violence and use of force.

There are two main points the demobilization phase of DDR often fails to recognize.

They are:

- Demobilizing armed forces does not mean demobilizing political ideals.
- Demobilization is political but it is also psychological.

Firstly, the term “demobilization” gives the false impression that it is a disbanding of ideology or free organization of people. Rather, in some instances, demobilization is redirecting mobility away from that of arms to other means. As stated, the politics of Maoism is not only about arms. It is about building a national democracy followed by socialism. Thus part of demobilization must be equipping combatants at the local level with the necessary tools to achieve their political goals through means other than arms.

In the case of Nepal, it is not necessary for PLA combatants to renounce their identity as Maoists or surrender the ultimate goals of the movement to take part in demobilization. While demobilization does require the group disband as an organization reliant on force as a tool of persuasion and control, demobilization does not require former PLA members cease to organize or remain politically mobilized. Former combatants should be ensured equal rights to peacefully remain political mobile as any other free citizen of the country.

CPNM itself has already begun to prepare its combatants for a new type of political mobility. Although the People's Revolution has always been a conflict ignited with a strong ideological foundation, CPNM Commissioner Seetal reported PLA combatant trainings have recently transitioned from an emphasis on arms to what he refers a "war of ideas". Trainings such as this allows former combatants to learn to channel their political needs through means other than the weaponry they have relied on for so long.

Second, although demobilization is political, it is also psychological on an individual level. The overall goal of demobilization of the CPNM is to remain a politically mobilized body yet mentally demobilized from arms. Mental demobilization is different from disarmament because it is not the physical absence of arms, but also the mental detachment from weapon dependency as a political bargaining tool.

Arms have been a part of the People's War since its conception. As previously quoted, arms have become like a "life partner" to many of the Maoists insinuating that being unarmed will be an unfamiliar and likely uncomfortable feeling. Simply, arms have become a part of the combatants' daily lives. Just as it is hard to change any long instilled practice, it will be equally hard for PLA combatants on the ground to change. Although in eagerness to fulfill commands given by senior members PLA members may disarm, on a personal level, permanent mental demobilization from the politics of arms takes time.

Finally, the distance in locality between the decision-making and the warfare is problematic. Regardless of whether or not the PLA is truly an "indoctrinated army" as claimed by leaders, it is important to make PLA combatants aware of the power vested in the political process, their recognition of the vote and peaceful representation of the party as agents of change. Making information regarding electoral processes and the significance of their role as party representatives and active participants is vital to re-shaping the ex-combatants understanding of mobility.

4.4 Reintegration

Reintegration refers to the transition of an individual's status as a combatant to a layperson or civilian. Normally, this specifically refers to the change in employment and issues of social concern. At the time of demobilization, ex-combatants are registered with DDR officials. Registration information includes education level, employment prior to participation in the conflict, skills obtained as a combatant, rank within armed group, postings, and positions of service.

After a thorough assessment of an individual's profile is done, DDR officials can analyze potential further education programmes or employment opportunities for the ex-combatants. Many reintegration programmes include vocational trainings aimed at preparing ex-combatants for the job market. Reintegration and job creation takes creativity and critical thinking. The situation cannot be tackled in a one-size-fits-all manner, but rather numerous options specifically tailored on the basis of the Maoists' skills and education, location and access to resources must be considered when developing a plan for each individual's post-combatant life.

However, merely providing training programs or assuming that jobs are available for skilled and semi-skilled individuals ignores the root cause of many civil conflicts, including that of Nepal. In an economy such as Nepal, where internal unemployment rates are astronomical, lack of employment opportunities especially in remote regions was at least initially a push factor for many to join the armed rebellion. Thus, the practicality of providing employment without any substantial growth or development in the country will pose a problem. Expecting ex-combatants to fit into a job market already exceeding its carrying capacity is as effective as pouring more water into an already full glass. Just as the water in the glass and the water being poured cannot be combined unless the glass is changed, neither can the ex-combatants and civilians both be employed unless the job market and ultimately, the economy itself, is altered. Instead of diverting back to previous neo-liberal policies which have failed to bring

economic justice to remote areas, alternate routes such as state-owned enterprise hold potential to solve both problems of combatant reintegration as well as overarching national economic setbacks.

Although Nepal is rich in resources, for the most part its natural abundance has economically benefited the country very little, much in the same way the prosperity of the Philippines is minimal in comparison to its vast resources. The absence of reliable infrastructure in the way of roads, electricity and other amenities has left many of the country's resources inaccessible. The dichotomy furthers as although certain goods are in existence in Nepal, the country is forced to import from countries such as India.

According to Dev Gurung, the CPNM vision for future economic policy will aim at taking the country into a phase of industrialization in attempts to escape its current reliance on primarily Indian products. Further, Gurung claims the party plans to do this without abolishing private land ownership (ibid).

4.4.1 Jumla Scenario

It is common knowledge among Nepali citizens that the western district of Jumla is lush in apple orchards. However, the vast majority of the apples go rotten each year because of the isolation of the district. With no roads or rivers leading out of the district, it is implausible to make the apples available for market consumption outside of the district's own small population. In the meantime, the country is busy importing apples from India.

Jumla also has a considerable amount of Maoist activity within its district limits. Until now, economic gain through the area's most promising resource has been bleak. However, the budget proposed by the government in the summer of 2006 has allotted funds to build roads to access Jumla district. While road construction will take a substantial amount of time, the plan holds potential economic gain for local farmers and ex-combatants that do not presently exist in the infrastructure-lacking district.

4.4.2 Ghandaki Hospital Reintegration

Because the CPNM is no longer an underground activity, reintegration is unofficially underway. Previously, the party had provided medical trainings for a number of PLA combatants in order to service civilians in remote communities lacking medical experts as well as to care for their own injured and sick. CPNM-sponsored trainings are not state approved and provide no legal medical licenses. However, in July 2006, approximately 20 individuals previously working as unlicensed medical technicians for the PLA relocated to Pokhara's Ghandaki Hospital.

Existing medical employees were given no forewarning or explanation as to the arrival of the new batch of CPNM technicians. Rather, the technicians disbursed throughout the various departments of the hospital leaving doctors and nurses little information as to their knowledge base and previous experience. The absence of dialogue created tension between the state-certified employees and PLA technicians eventually leading to generalizations that the CPNM technicians lacked vital skills as one doctor states:

The Maoists walk around the hospital completely lost like they don't know what is going on at all. Then, when [doctors] try to tell them what to do, they act as if they already know everything but in reality they appear to know nothing. (ibid)

While the comments as to the inadequate capabilities of the technicians may hold some truth it is likely that they are largely derived from personal perceptions that the CPNM training is sub-par in comparison to that taught in recognized institutions:

[The PLA technicians] just learned as they go. They learned up in [in the remote areas]. We, on the other hand, studied to work here. We spent a good deal of time learning before we were able to practice. But, they, they

just come here and demand a job and because they are Maoist and we are afraid of them even if they aren't armed, we just let them work. (Anonymous, 2006)

The frustrations of the hospital employees are very legitimate, especially considering the nature of medical work and its direct impact on the safety and health of the community. However, it is pure speculation that CPNM-trainings are inadequate in comparison to traditional institutions. In order to thwart any doubt, rather than compelling PLA members to attend further training, organizing an aptitude test for non-traditional students is highly recommended. Further, it is understandable that the PLA members may feel disoriented in a new environment of a full-scale hospital when in previous times they most likely worked in individual residences or small clinics.

The unofficial reintegration of PLA at Ghandaki Hospital provides an interesting scenario. Firstly, it is admirable that the hospital did in fact allow CPNM trained medical technicians to practice in a public hospital prior to official DDR. Many countries, such as Zimbabwe, did not allow rebel-trained medical practitioners to be eligible for employment because of the lack of recognized education. However, despite the progressive nature of allowing rebels to work alongside civilians, the situation was not without mistakes.

To recap, important points of modification for further integration include:

- **Aptitude testing-** ensures safety of patients, proves individual capability, makes traditional and non-traditional medical employees equally legitimate.
- **Introduction-** allows existing employees to understand the situation rather than leaving room for speculation.
- **Orientation-** CPNM members should be granted new job orientation just as normal employees so as to take away 'disorientation'.
- **Integration at the Administration Level-** CPNM members should be integrated at the decision-making level.

The tensions and problems faced in the Ghandaki Hospital scenario show the difficulty of reintegration. Doctors are among the most educated members of society, yet not only despite but perhaps *because* of their educated elitism, the integration process faced many difficulties. If tensions exist at the most educated level of society, it can only be assumed that the process will be a long, difficult road at the rural level where education and acceptance is less prevalent.

4.5 Armed Unit Transformation

The entire process of DDR fails to include the possibility of transforming pre-existing armed forces into new armed forces. Rather than deconstruct armed forces into nothing as a means of peace, there is always the possibility of restructuring units. The creation of a new armed unit will also require many of the characteristics of DDR, however, from a different angle.

In the case of Nepal, numerous suggestions to combine the NA and PLA have been made. It is implausible to expect that the Nepalese federal budget has the funds necessary to sustain an army the size of what a combined army would amass to for any great length of time. Further, there is no need for such a sizeable force. However, combining at least a number of combatants from both sides and forming a new state army will likely occur. In such an event, both traditional and alternative means of DDR will be necessary. Traditional DDR will occur at some point for the combatants any newly formed state-led force cannot absorb long term whereas alternative DDR applies to those combatants that will permanently transition from armed rebels to employees of the state.

In the scenario of merging armies to create a new body, the name “remobilization” is more appropriate than “demobilization”. Remobilization defines the process by which combatants are never fully “ex-combatants” but rather only switch identities.

This switch of identities will occur both by ex-PLA combatants as well as ex-NA combatants.

Previously, the primary function of the Royal Nepal Army was to protect the throne of the Kingdom of Nepal. It was the RNA's duty to uphold the monarchy, which often resulted in the promotion of gross human rights violations and the absence of progressive change in the lives of everyday citizens. In short, the RNA protected the monarchy at the cost of the people. Seeing as protection of the monarchy is no longer an objective of any newly created army, former (R)NA soldiers must be retrained as to their new role in society.

As admitted by rebel leaders themselves, the PLA is a heavily indoctrinated army. Because of the devout nature of many combatants, compromise of ideals, even at the order of a commanding officer, will be difficult. The claim that members of PLA will follow any command given by the CPNM leaders undermines the combatants' loyalty to political aspirations rather than just loyalty solely to CPNM leaders. Thus, because remobilization means the combatants will have access to arms, it is crucial that significant efforts are made to ensure the utmost loyalty of the combatants. In short, both former NA and former PLA combatants will undergo extensive training as to their new position and the role of the new armed unit.

In this "alternative" DDR (or more appropriately, DRR) where combatants experience a period of transition between armed forces rather than a complete laying down of arms and live as laypersons, the reintegration will also take on a different face than in traditional DDR. The combination of armed forces means that the entity, and ultimately the individuals once thought to be one's foe quickly becomes an ally, a brother. Reintegration must include rebuilding broken relations at the individual level. It is also important to recognize that while the LPA combatants are admittedly an indoctrinated force, likewise, the NA was also an indoctrinated force: indoctrinated to fight against the Maoists and to identify the rebels as the enemy force.

Intentionally posting soldiers from the same armies at the same locations (i.e. Jumla district with only ex-PLA soldiers; Myagdi district with only ex-RNA soldiers) may be a temporary solution; however, this cannot be a long-term arrangement. Reintegration must have making the soldiers previously from two different armies learn to perform as a unified body a central concern. Because of the intense level of human rights violations committed by both armies not only against civilians but also against one another, hostility towards one another may likely be deeply ingrained.

4.6 Police Reforms

Although potential reforms of the NA has been the subject of much speculation, there have been little or no talks regarding police reform. As police have been equally responsible for monitoring and patrolling the country on watch for Maoist activity and thus responsible for attacks made on individuals both accurately and inaccurately attached with CPNM, large reforms must also be made for this armed unit.

In 1998, after recognizing that Northern Ireland's police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was comprised of 92% protestants and thus seen as a biased, the peace agreement asked that a police force that could "enjoy widespread support from...the community as a whole". By 2000, The Police Bill was created to promote equal recruitment from Catholics and Protestants alike. However, Sinn Fein did not participate in the Police Board and rejected the reformations as inadequate. Police reform must demonstrate actual change. In the Northern Ireland example, the Sinn Fein's rejection was the result of little actual change with the police force.

Currently, the CPNM is without representation in Nepal's police force. Reforming the police force will look much like reformations made throughout the NA with emphases on the dynamics of social aspects within the force so as to created one unified body and ensuring all personnel understand the new role of the police in a post-war Nepal.

4.7 Gender Issues in DDR

The biggest dilemma in DDR is that in many situations it is offered in a “package deal”. The package often sees combatants not individuals. It is blind to the diverse stratification of men, women, boy and girl as well as the complexity of ethnically diverse countries such as Nepal. As mentioned, particularly in the demobilization and reintegration phases of DDR, success lies in the project’s ability to see at the human level rather than at the armed force level. Only if the armed force is seen as a larger body made up of very diverse individuals with very complex needs will DDR be successful on a personal level. Successful DDR has the goal of rebuilding lives affected by war rather than simply the goal of deconstructing armies. Truly impacting lives in a positive manner sees individuals, not groups.

4.7.1 Women in War

Due to CPNM’s feminism and push for equality among all people, the group gained a number of female supporters and combatants. An estimated 1/3 of all armed combatants are female. Female participation in Nepal’s PLA highly exceeds many other armed rebellions throughout the world in recent history. Thus, Nepal must not neglect the issue of women when considering a DDR plan.

CPNM’s belief in equality and a casteless society goes against many social norms in Nepalese society. In particular, CPNM’s approval of inter-caste marriage is highly rejected by the vast majority of mainstream Nepalese. Because in most instances, combatants are away from their families and home communities, most unmarried combatants avoid marital arrangements common in Nepalese society. While CPNM does not often arrange marriages, a couple is required to get CPNM’s permission to marry. As stated, CPNM rejects the caste system and thus will not disapprove of any couple marrying based on caste differences.

As the war has been going on for ten years, it is highly conceivable that many marriages blessed by the party but not by the family have occurred, and children been

born. Further, it is likely that many in-law families have yet to meet their daughter or son-in-law as well as the combatant couple's children.

Nepalese culture requires that the wife live in the home of her husband's family. CPNM does not uphold a number of conservative cultural norms, thus in some instances, the tradition may not be upheld. However, in many cases the individuals must make a choice to either uphold tradition in order to keep family connections or reject tradition and face being ostracized by the family. If the couple chooses the former, it is highly conceivable that many daughter-in-laws of inter-caste marriages will face abuse, neglect, and other hardships living her husband's home.

In some situations, a couple may not even be presented an option, but rather face rejection by their family members on the solely because of the inter-caste nature of the marriage. The complexity of such social aspects requires special attention by DDR planners.

4.7.2 DDR with Children and Youth

As is the case in many conflicts plaguing the world today, CPNM has employed a great deal of soldiers under the age of eighteen. Estimates guess that as high as 30% of the CPNM's supposed 20,000 combatants are minors. The statistics given for both number of combatants and the demographic make up have not been verified by any source to date, however it is common knowledge that youth are actively involved in the party and armed unit.

While for a great deal of the PLA, demobilization may mean merging with NA into a newly constructed state-led armed unit, this does not address the issue of demobilizing child combatants. Seeing as minors cannot legally be employed as national soldiers and seeing as the number of armed persons are under eighteen, the demobilization plan must include a specific plan for the young combatants.

4.7.2.1 Education

Many reintegration programs aimed at children and youth take into consideration educational needs. In a country like Nepal, access to adequate education is vastly different from the rich and the poor. Nearly all government schools in Nepal, regardless to location, are under-funded and thus, inadequate. To ensure at least a substandard education, sending a child to private school becomes a top priority to even those with very modest means. Like in India, all private schools teach in English medium whereas government schools teach in the local language. Thus, language divides education even further. Access to learning materials becomes significantly less when learning in Nepalese rather than English. Because private schools are rarely located in rural areas, parents of village students are compelled to find living arrangements in the town or city if they wish to send their child to receive an adequate education.

Many DDR programs directed at children provide an opportunity for education. In the case of Nepal, normally education is provided to at least grade 8 in rural areas free of charge aside from uniform and examination fees. However, the root cause leading many combatants to join willfully is the inadequate nature of village government schools and the lack of opportunity and funds to join city boarding schools. The 2003 test results for the national Student Leaving Commencement Exam that students take in order to attend higher education, showed that while 81.9% of students attending private schools passed the exam, only 26% of those attending government public access schools passed. These figures do not even take into consideration the drastic difference in retention rates of private versus public schools.

Dismantling the apartheid-like divide created by the two school systems (private and public) has been a CPNM concern since its conception. Rather than providing subsidized school fees to allow ex-child combatants to attend private schools, an entire educational reform will rectify deeper seeded problems in the country as a whole. Nationalizing education by abolishing the thriving private schools has the potential to improve educational standards for all children.

4.7.2.2 Children and Youth: Willing versus Compelled Combatants

Many documented cases exist regarding CPNM compelling individuals to leave their families and take up arms against their free will. Yet, while most reports concerning child combatants in Nepal either focus on those under compulsion or inaccurately assume that all underage participants are victims of force, this is not reality. A number of students joined the movement willingly as an outlet for their dissatisfaction with different factors of their poverty-stricken lives.

Resentment for the inequality of educational standards and opportunities given to city dwelling youth in comparison to residents of rural areas is a common sentiment amongst Maoist youth. Feeling denied basic educational infrastructural needs by the government, hopelessness to be able to compete against their advantaged peers, students turn to the Maoists as an outlet.

Tikbir Pun, a young Maoist since 2004, joined the movement at the age of 18. Although he was no longer a minor, he had long considered joining the CPNM. At the age of sixteen, Tikbir missed three days of school in order to attend a Maoist-led rally a five hours' walk from his village. Pun felt that although his village school was amongst the best in the district, village students were still left with little chance to succeed. For Pun's final two years of study, he contemplated trading in his books for the armed rebellion. The only factor stopping him was the plea of his parents'. Hoping their son would finish tenth standard and pursue a job as a trekking guide in the neighboring tourist haven, Ghorepani, they begged Pun not to pick up arms.

Despite Pun being of adult age, his sentiments are quite similar to many underage youth. While categorically, Pun does not fit the description of "child soldier", because Nepalese culture does not define the word "child" or "youth" on the basis of a benchmark age but rather in regards to certain rights of passage such as marital status and education, his story can still be used for the purpose of discussing

reintegrating young soldiers. Tikbir's situation could easily apply to combatants only three years his juniors, who thus at the age of seventeen are legally considered child soldiers.

The demobilization and reintegration process for youth such as Pun and his slightly younger counterparts will most likely be different than youth compelled against their own will to take part in the movement.

4.8 Social Integration: Willing versus Compelled Combatants

One can anticipate that individuals turned combatants under compulsion will easily surrender arms and family reunification will come naturally, since it was never his or her own desire to be separated from home whilst acting as an armed combatant. Although local societies may have animosity towards CPNM itself, they are likely to embrace any individual they see as a victim of the group rather than a part of the group.

In contrast, combatants motivated to join the CPNM because of their own discontent with the Nepal government and poverty itself may have a difficult time demobilizing and reintegrating. Local societies may feel resent for CPNM and hold ex-combatants responsible for tragedies that occurred throughout the duration of the People's War.

Tikbir Pun joined the Maoists not only against the will of his parents and extended family members but also his friends. Although Maoists regularly made rounds through his home village and that of his school, a two-hour walk away, Tikbir is the only known youth to join the Maoists' PLA since 2002 when an underage male from the same school joined and was later killed. After Tikbir joined the movement, he had little to no contact with his previous classmates and friends. Most of his previous friends speak badly of his decision to join PLA:

We don't talk to [Tikbir] now because he is Maoist. We don't know where he is, so that is part of it. But even if

we did know, we don't agree with his choice. He should study like us. Why does he need to join the Maoists? It's nothing but danger and causes nothing but problems for Nepal nowadays.

Disagreement with a decision alone does not make reintegration impossible, but local superstitions and lack of education and understanding are thorns in reintegration's side. Nepalese villages have a longstanding practice of shunning individuals for a myriad of socially intolerable reasons. Reintegration of persons formerly involved in prostitution (both willingly and not), street children attempting to return home, individuals plagued with both curable and incurable diseases, and a number of other issues, has proven a difficult task in Nepalese society. In many cases, homes in city centers open to absorb those individuals who cannot return because their home community has shunned or isolated them.

4.8.1 Options for Social Reintegration

Only after assessment is made on an individual basis, can appropriate measures be taken. The overall goal is most likely that an individual be returned to his or her family in his or her home village or community. In some instances, this will require awareness programs for both the individual family members and the members of community. However, despite the amount of effort put forth into educating those persons the repatriated individual will come into daily contact after reintegration is complete, social conflicts make repatriation impossible. In these cases, the DDR officials must be prepared to give provisional care or implement alternative options for displaced persons.

4.9 DDR and the Political Agreement

As of August 2006, no concrete political agreement or exact plan for DDR has been finalized. In order for the political agreement to be as successful as possible, DDR

measures and the future stability of individual combatants must be taken into consideration. From arms collection to societal integration, the steps of DDR are not just a process, but are also political. The overarching goal of incorporating the Maoists into the political mainstream is to restore peace to Nepal. CPNM's participation at the ballots alone is not enough to ensure security for both combatants and civilians.

People's War takes recognition of the resolve that must occur at the local level. Peace efforts cannot only occur on paper in Kathmandu alone. Truly restoring peace to Nepal and resolving the In a sense, DDR can be said to have the opportunity to be the political agreement fostering peace at the person-to-person level. Restoring individual relationships disrupted by war is social politics. Political integration occurs not only at the electoral process but in the community as well. True resolve includes both official political agreement to include CPNM in the political mainstream and unofficial societal acceptance of ex-combatants of the NA and CPNM.



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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Using the classical Marxist perspective, CPNM is a form of Stalinism. CPNM's identity as a Maoist party ideologically enables them to participate in the political mainstream as part of the national democratic stage of revolution. At present, the Maoists are attempting to undergo this first stage through a multi-party system. However, forming concrete political agreements with the government has proved difficult. As the Maoists will not enter into disarmament without political agreement, the government will likewise not enter into a solid political agreement without certainty of disarmament.

The order of events is often the breaking point for peace processes. As in the situation of the CPNM, the disarming group will demand the security of a political settlement be the first initiative. However, state governments or opposing groups are often hesitant to make political settlements without ensuring physical security from violence by the armed group. The dynamics continue to gain complexity when the state or opposing group is equally guilty of a number of human rights violations and violent attacks against both the rebel group and civilians.

In essence, both sides of the conflict want security. The absence of trust that exists in armed conflict situations is the responsible for the absence of feelings of security. In Nepal, measures must be taken on both the side of the government and the CPNM to cultivate trust. Basic give and take practices allow both sides to demonstrate loyalty to the peace plan by backing up their words with deeds. Political agreement and disarmament by both the CPNM and the NA should not occur as separate steps. Rather, political agreement and disarmament should be intertwined and as some aspects of agreement are fulfilled, some measures of DDR for both forces should occur.

The past few months have been filled with some of the country's most significant political events. Although the future does not ensure a smooth transition out of war, it is likely the CPNM will play a pivotal part in the continuing political events. The possibility of CPNM integrating into the political mainstream has never been greater.



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BIOGRAPHY

Pamela Sciantarelli was born and raised in the suburbs of Denver, Colorado; USA. She obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from Baylor University in Waco, Texas. During her undergraduate studies, she was heavily involved in a local non-profit organization working with inner city youth. Post graduation, Pamela has been involved in the non-profit sector in both Nepal and Thailand. Working in conjunction with Women and Community Awareness Society of Nepal, Pamela is the founder of Jaymasay Children's Home in Pokhara, Nepal. Jaymasay houses ex-street children recovering from previous lives of drugs, abandonment, and exploitation. Pamela aims to open similar projects in Brazil and South Africa in the next five years.



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