Abstract:
This study focuses on the role of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) in disaster relief operations during the flood 2011 in Bangkok. This is aimed to understand the fundamental barriers faced by the RTA in interfacing with government agencies in disaster relief operations. It also analyzes the weaknesses of the existing interfacing mechanism as well as determines the possible ways in minimizing the fundamental barriers for the interfacing process with government agencies. The study uses qualitative approach for the case-study, utilizing content analysis of written materials and key informant interviews in the form of semi-conducted style on the RTA units and key government agencies who were involved in the disaster relief operation during the Thailand Flood in 2011 in Bangkok. This study uses the Coordination Model, developed by the National Institute of Justice, the United Stated Department of Justice, to analyze the qualitative data from the interviews. This study revealed that the difficulties for the RTA can be categorized at two levels, policy level and operation level. There is also some gap between these levels during the disaster relief operations in the flood 2011 in Bangkok, which helps to understand the difference in the thoughts and concerns of the personnel of both levels. However, one major common difficulty for both levels is the unawareness and unpreparedness for this prolonged flooding. The relief operations were done at hand with very limited knowledge and experiences, creating complexity in management of assistances. The vital concern at the policy level is the legal and structural aspect of barrier. The role of the military in disaster relief is stated to be the supporting one, which means that the RTA must only operate upon the requests of other agencies in disaster relief. At the operation level, it is found that the vital concern is the relief equipment as the existing equipment is not designed for relief operations in such prolonged flood situation. From this study, it is reflected that the collective awareness and preparedness for natural disasters are not thoroughly promoted nor productively utilized for national plan.
