Abstract:
This thesis generates novel empirical evidence on Thai corporate governance in respect of the multiple-directorship impact on firm performance with classifying the directors into two types, executive and non-executive ones. Employing the sample of Thai listed firms in 1993 – 2005, this paper unfolds that boards in which directors serving a number of seats penalize firm’s market performance, but such boards create more value to the company in terms of accounting value. Besides, when exploring the relations by each type of directors, it is found that the directions of those relationships still remain unchanged for both types. In addition, when investigating over the time of pre- and post-Asian financial crisis in 1997, this thesis discovers that the types of director do matter. Also, there is some evidence that Thai firm’s governance is constantly ameliorated after the crisis. What’s more, when examining those relations according to the potential agency problems, this paper finds that the associations of boards in which non-executive directors holding numerous directorships with firm value are actually driven by the probable agency problems.
