THE IMPACTS OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON INTER-KOREAN RELATIONSHIP (1971-1976)

Abstract

This thesis examines the impacts of the rapprochement between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America on inter-Korean relationship during 1971-1976. It employs the Game Theory as framework for analysis, particularly, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game to build a model of the two Korean Leaders’ Dilemma. The central findings of this thesis are: 1) the rapprochement between China and the US objectively provided an opportunity for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to move towards détente. Since the Armistice of Korea War, the first reconciliation between North and South Korea happened in 1971; However, its reconciliation between two Koreas lasted only five years and then broke up again after 1976; 2) by analyzing the matrix of the Two Korean Leaders’ Dilemma, it is shown that maintaining the tension on the Korean Peninsula was the most rational choice to make; 3) after reviewing the historical facts and the cost of reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula, the thesis proves that even though the two Koreas chose to approach each other during 1971-1976, this relationship suffered a setback as a result of the best option of the Two Korea Leaders’ Dilemma which is to maintain in conflict; 4) Applying the Game Model as a heuristic device to analyze conflict in the Korean Peninsula was useful for understanding the current Inter-Korean relationship.